Give Me Tomorrow

The men formed into platoons. George Company loaded itself, veterans and replacements, into the olive drab 6x6 trucks of Baker Company Second Motor Battalion.

Baker Company transported two hundred-plus men of George Company in its trucks. Some had canvas covers; others were open to the elements. It was the afternoon of November 28, and the temperature plummeted to -10 degrees and continued to drop. Puffy white cumulus clouds masked the sun, and hard snowflakes occasionally pelted the men along the winding roads north.The three dozen or so trucks in the convoy made their way along the treacherous and steep mountain roads of the Taebaeks. Bob Harbula and his buddy Joe Rice sat together, huddled in the cold with the other machine gunners for the long ride north.

“Most of my time from Majon-ni to this point was a blur. I was just numb, but I remember looking at Joe and then someone snorted out ‘maybe we’ll see a saber tooth tiger or dinosaurs.’ The place was so desolate and barren; it had a prehistoric feel that was surreal,” remembered Harbula.

As the trucks wound down the roads, riflemen Harrell Roberts remembered nervously peering over the side of his truck, seeing a sheer chasm dropping steeply several hundred feet to the valley floor below. He recalled, “I remember seeing the remains of a damaged helicopter. One of ours that didn’t make it.”

The convoy kept pushing north, and the persistent rumors of going home were deflating, like the air coming out of an old balloon. By now, most of the men realized they weren’t going home for Christmas. They were heading north, deeper into the war zone.

The next major landmark the convoy encountered was Funchilin Pass where the convoy traversed a narrow bridge spanning a deep gorge with a 2,000-foot drop on one side. The engines whined and the gears ground as they crept along the shelflike road cut along the eight-mile pass. The road was cut into the side of a cliff and was nearly impassable. The trucks traveled mere feet from the drop-off. Since early November, the First Marine Division had sporadically engaged elements of the Chinese near Funchilin Pass. Bob Camarillo, Clark Henry’s best friend, couldn’t help but notice the hundreds of spent artillery and tank shells littering the road along the pass. The bridge had not been blown up by the enemy, leading Major General Smith to wonder suspiciously, “Was this the dog that had not yet barked?” Did the Chinese want to lure them past the bridge, then trap them on the other side? Smith suspected this, and the worst; however; Generals Almond and MacArthur ignored the signs.

Since Inchon and the liberation of Seoul, MacArthur had been racing toward the Yalu River, victory seemingly in his grasp. At their historic meeting, October 15, 1950, on Wake Island, MacArthur had assured Truman, “Victory was won in Korea.”

However, the Chinese had clearly signaled their intention to intervene in support of North Korea. On October 3, 1950, China woke India’s ambassador in the dead of night and told him, “We will intervene,” if MacArthur’s forces pass the 38th Parallel. The warning was a charade. Mao hoped his “warning would be ignored: thus he could go into North Korea claiming he was acting out of self-defense.” If the Chinese had wanted to make their intentions known, they would have issued an official public statement through normal channels so that the press could cover it. Obsessed with victory that seemed nearly at hand, MacArthur’s staff and the general himself failed to connect the dots, believing only the most optimistic intelligence assessments that reported the Chinese were not in Korea in great strength.

A small CIA station located in Japan, run by former OSS Officer William Duggan, reported that many former Nationalist Chinese troops, now members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), still possessed their radios and were transmitting valuable intelligence on their whereabouts to Nationalist forces in Taiwan. Duggan’s operatives in Taiwan relayed this information to Duggan, who clearly understood that all the messages shared a common theme: troops were heading to Manchuria and North Korea. Chillingly, at the end of October, radio contact went silent as the Chinese marshaled their troops and began crossing the border. Although the valuable intelligence came in many forms and from different sources, MacArthur’s intelligence officers dismissed the information and did not relay it up the chain of command.

Victory seemed to blind MacArthur. Perhaps in a state of denial, he ignored all the signs of a Chinese invasion that had already begun. He informed President Truman that only 125,000 Chinese troops were situated along the border of North Korea and, at best, only 50,000 to 60,000 troops could have passed the Yalu River. Confidently, MacArthur stated, “They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, it would be the greatest slaughter in history.”

In reality, between 300,000 and 400,000 Chinese soldiers had infiltrated through the mountains, traveling by night and hiding by day to avoid detection by air reconnaissance teams. Over 200,000 Chinese troops stood ready to face down the Eighth Army. Another 125,000 or more cleverly positioned themselves around the First Marine Division and X Corps. The Communists constructed a massive trap to “consume” UN troops.The bulk of the troops consisted of Americans and South Koreans, but Turkey, the U.K., Canada, Australia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Belgium, New Zealand, South Africa, and Luxembourg had sent forces as well. The trap was about to be sprung.

The first signs of the massive juggernaut appeared in late October when the Chinese mauled the U.S. Eighth Cavalry Regiment and the Sixth ROK Division in a surprise attack. To avoid tipping their hand, the Chinese surreptitiously disappeared and melded back into the mountainous rock formations, masking their true numbers as they patiently waited to entrap the Eighth Army. Along the Marine front, Chinese prisoners captured in different locations were also evidence of the country’s intervention. By mid-November, the Marines had engaged with the PLA in several clashes. However, the intentions and true numbers of the Chinese Red Army were still unknown.The Chinese remained essentially invisible.²⁵

At Chinese headquarters, General Peng furrowed his brow as he leaned over the main relief model of the Chosin Reservoir (the Chinese called it the Changjin Reservoir). Born a peasant in Hunan Province, Peng Dehuai had dabbled in Communism for years. He aligned himself with Mao Zedong and emerged as a commander during the Long March. During the Chinese Civil War, Peng was twice wounded in hand-to-hand combat. Now an experienced and gifted general, Peng served as the political commander and czar of Chinese forces in Korea.

Units under his command were regularly destroyed and remanned with fresh bodies.

Peng’s concentration was interrupted by Major General Liu Fei (pronounced loofy), who served under the command of Ninth Army Group Commander Song Shilun. “It is snowing thicker than cow shit on the reservoir,” announced Liu.

Peng chuckled at the remark and shot back, “The enemy has learned nothing over the last few weeks. They continue to advance recklessly. To that extent, our first-phase offensive has been a failure.”

Beads of sweat formed on his forehead. Peng leaned further over the model as the other members of his staff craned their necks in anticipation of his next words. “The Ninth Army group will encircle and exterminate the U.S. Marines around the Changjin Reservoir. Other enemy forces in that area will be mopped up along the coast. This should be possible, bearing in mind the enemy’s scattered disposition across difficult country.”

Also present at the meeting was the Commander of the Ninth Army Group General Song Shilun. Only forty years old, Song had worn a uniform since the age of seventeen.The graduate of Whampoa Military Academy became a master of guerrilla warfare under the tutelage of Mao’s right-hand man Chou En-lai. Courageous and able, he had commanded the regiment in its famous Long March.With over 120,000 men, General Song’s soldiers outnumbered the First Marine Division eight to one. Two of his field armies, the Twentieth and Twenty-Sixth were initially earmarked for the invasion of Taiwan. His forces also included the Twenty-Seventh Field Army, and each army group was beefed up with an additional division. Beginning in mid-October, Song’s army marched a torturous 150 miles on foot across the Yalu through the rugged mountains to the Chosin Reservoir in just twelve days.

With China’s inexhaustible supply of men, Mao planned to “grind down” the Americans. He later told Stalin that after losing 100,000 Chinese soldiers, he was “ready to persist in a long war, to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives so they will back down.”

Mao planned for the long war. “Don’t try to win a quick victory,” he added. “The enemy will not leave Korea without being eliminated in great masses.”

The Chairman reminded Stalin he could seriously weaken America—for a price. Mao wanted Russia’s industrial expertise, and he built a first-class army and the industrial base to support it. World domination was more than a pipe dream: with the atomic bomb capabilities he also craved, he could achieve it.

But Stalin wasn’t going to give Mao what he wanted. He had no intention of building a Chinese arms industry that could eventually compete with Russia, yet he wanted Mao to do his fighting. So he gave them just enough to stay in the fight. Initially promising Mao air cover, Russia reneged and told Mao the planes would not be ready.

At the time, America did not know of the rifts between the two leaders, instead believing Communism was monolithic. In part, America was right, because “Uncle Joe” Stalin called the shots.

Spurred by Stalin, who advised, “The Chinese soldiers may be considered as volunteers and of course will be commanded by the Chinese,” Mao officially authorized a name change for the PLA units entering North Korea to “Chinese People’s Volunteers.” Volunteers in name only, units were formed from the Northeast China Border Defense Force. On October 8, 1950, he wired Prime Minister Kim Il Sung of North Korea, “We have decided to dispatch the volunteers to help you.” In keeping with the artifice, many Western commentators referred to these units as Chinese Communist Forces or CCF.

Despite the contrived veil of “volunteer” status, the PLA of 1950 remained a potent force, with nearly inexhaustible reserves. Its core had been battle-hardened from the infamous 6,000 mile Long March, which winnowed its numbers from 90,000 to 20,000, as well as years of Civil War fighting, in which they defeated superior numbers of Nationalist forces.The PLA would emerge as one of America’s greatest adversaries. By 1950, the PLA consisted of survivors, men of iron, who shed creature comforts and made do with very little. Perhaps most strikingly, the PLA made no provision for the honorable discharge of its soldiers from military service. Soldiers for life, the Chinese men remained in uniform until dead, wounded, or captured.²⁶ In many cases, soldiers were denied an honorable discharge for more nefarious reasons; Mao had a lot of people he wanted to “get rid of.” In the final year of the Chinese Civil War, millions of Chiang’s Nationalist troops surrendered.The war provided “the perfect chance to consign former Nationalist troops to their deaths.” In the event the war did not kill the former Nationalists, “there were special execution squads in the rear to take care of anyone hanging back.”

Chinese forces largely dropped rank at the platoon level and encouraged their men to criticize their comrades and even spy on each other. The men also received intense political indoctrination.

Chinese officers were professional and skilled in European battle tactics that had been modified to include Mao’s strategy, as well as Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. When the Chinese had at least a three-to-one advantage, their tactics usually included overwhelming positions with large numbers of bodies.

At times, weapons were scarce for the Chinese.Attacking in wave after wave, the first two waves of men carried weapons. The third wave, and often the fourth wave, would remain in the rear and bear only light arms in anticipation of picking up weapons from fallen comrades.

Usually, the Chinese leadership informed their men of the basic plan of attack, which rarely changed once decided. This differed significantly from the American style of warfare, where officers and NCOs would issue orders in real time on the battlefield.

Following Chinese tradition, men from the same town formed into companies, and men from the same ethnic group fought in the same unit. Battalion and regiment forces linked to the same ethnic and geographic makeup averaged about 2,200 men on paper. The regiments folded into divisions of between 8,000 and 10,000 men. A Chinese army typically mustered 30,000 troops.

The typical Chinese soldier subsisted on a diet that would starve a gerbil: soy beans, rice, and millet. Winter clothing remained scarce, and after crossing the Yalu, troops received a two-piece reversible mustard-yellow-and-white uniform. Heavy cotton caps, often fur-lined, covered their heads. Gloves remained in abysmally short supply, and winter boots were nonexistent until months after China entered the war. Most troops wore canvas tennis shoes with crepe rubber soles. Their hands and feet froze in the harsh winter battles.

While Chinese artillery and tanks remained in short supply, Chinese troops carried a variety of hand-me-down weaponry from a half-dozen nations, with one of the largest stocks coming from U.S. surplus. The United States sold hundreds of millions of dollars worth of rifles, machine guns, bazookas, and other munitions to the Chinese leader at fire-sale prices.American guns now in Chinese hands were being turned against their maker.

On November 25, the Chinese struck a massive blow, using precise intelligence on the American armies. They hit the Eighth Army hard on the west coast and two days later X Corps on the east coast. Faced with obliteration, the forces retreated south in what was called “the Big Bug-out.”

Remarkably, two full days after the Chinese offensive started, Generals Almond and MacArthur ordered an immediate offensive by the Marines to drive west and penetrate forty miles into the enemy-occupied territory. Their mission was to link up with the Eighth Army. The roads were likely impassible and the weather cruel, often dropping to -20 degrees. MacArthur still did not realize that they were severely outnumbered and that the enemy had nearly surrounded them. They were almost cut off and completely isolated. Additionally, the Eighth Army was in full retreat and at high risk of being defeated by the Chinese on the west coast. The plans bore no resemblance to the situation on the ground.

“In those days, it was like complete insanity in the Command,” remarked Colonel Bill McCaffrey, a member of General Almond’s X Corps headquarters.

Almond pressed the Marine and Army units under his X Corps command to relentlessly advance, suspending the reality of facing certain death. Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, a battalion commander in the Thirty-Second Regiment, told Almond correctly, “he was facing two entire Chinese Divisions.”

Almond flatly stated, “That’s impossible; there are not two Divisions of Chinese in all of North Korea!”

Three and a half days after the Chinese attack, Almond still refused to acknowledge the full catastrophe falling on the American troops in North Korea: “We are still attacking and going all the way to the Yalu. Don’t let a bunch of Goddamn Chinese Laundrymen stop you.”

Conversely, General Song issued these orders to his troops: “Soon we will meet the American Marines in battle. We will destroy them. When they are defeated, the enemy army will collapse, and our country will be free from the threat of aggression. Kill these Marines as you would kill snakes in your homes.”

Snow pelted the convoy as George Company drove north. The Marines had no inkling of the higher-level strategies and the catastrophes befalling their division. Before sunset, the trucks rolled into the North Korean hamlet of Koto-ri. Clark Henry of the forward observer section noted: “It looked like a giant circus, just a bunch of tents strewn around, trucks, and other equipment.That was Koto-ri.”

Captain Sitter and the command of George Company presented themselves to the headquarters of the First Marine Regiment, led by Colonel Puller. The men were ordered to take up positions on the perimeter of the town, which meant finding a place to sleep.The lucky ones bedded down in the recesses of trucks, while other men found shelter from the elements anywhere they could.