Was it the best of times or the worst of times? In 2000, CEOs Gerald Levin and Steve Case announced that Case’s America Online would be acquiring Levin’s Time Warner for about US$182 billion in stock and debt. At the time, it was the largest takeover ever. Time’s own Fortune magazine reported on the “widespread confusion about the payoff in this deal.” How should Wall Street evaluate this transaction, the unprecedented acquisition of an old, storied media company by a new, digital one? Veteran journalist Carol Loomis wrote, “The murkiness won’t be dispelled soon. Even at internet speed, it will take some time for the world to judge whether AOL overpaid in offering 1.5 shares of its stock for each Time Warner share, or whether Time Warner sold its impressive assets too cheaply, or whether this is truly a marriage made in heaven.”1
Since then, the union has become the poster child for matches made in Hades. Two of AOL Time Warner’s problems were the dot-com crash and then the corporate-culture clash of analog-content creators and digital-content distributors. Its stock price plummeted, and Levin left the company in 2002. The board approved the diplomatic Richard Parsons to replace him, and Parsons braced shareholders for the turnaround.2 In a few years, he indeed helped turn the company around, dropping AOL from its name and restoring Time Warner to its perch as the world’s most profitable media company.3
Fast-forward to 2007. Parsons’s successor, Jeff Bewkes, was known for his celebrated television dramas (e.g. producing The Sopranos) rather than for corporate drama. His strategy focused on what he considered to be the company’s competitive advantage—its video content—and he started investing more than US$12 billion a year in new program development. He also shed assets that didn’t strengthen the company’s competitive position, such as the remains of AOL, Time Warner’s cable distribution business, and the Time Inc. magazine group. In 2017, Bewkes announced his biggest deal yet: the sale of the whole company to AT&T for US$109 billion. With the June 2018 closing of this new marriage of content and digital distribution, Bewkes has delivered an eye-popping 341% return to shareholders during his time in office, including spin-offs and dividends.4
Our tale of two Time Warner deals brings us to one of the more debated questions within the world of modern finance: on average, have M&As destroyed more value than they have created? Among those who say “M&A activity generally creates shareholder value” are many investment bankers, corporate lawyers, shareholder activists, and other advisors who make their living by advocating and brokering such deals. Those who say “Such deals often fail to create value and can even destroy it” are typically management consultants who sell their postmerger integration services to forestall the predicted destruction. They often say that the main reasons for not delivering sufficient value are overpaying for the deal and missteps in integrating the acquired company. They also will add that management tends to underestimate both deal integration costs and the difficulty in capturing synergies.
To get at an empirical answer, EY reviewed much of the scholarly and not-so-scholarly research on the subject. In one study of 500 publicly traded companies in developed markets, the enterprise value growth rate of serial acquirers—those firms that acquired at least one company a year between 2009 and 2013—was 25% higher than that of firms without acquisitions. These serial acquirers had a 31% higher enterprise value to EBITDA multiple than the nonbuyers.5 Of course, correlation is not causality, and comparing companies that do many deals with those that do fewer doesn’t tell us what might have happened to these acquisitive companies had they not acquired.
Though there may not exist definitive statistical proof of M&A’s value, we have seen the following, time and time again: companies that do not innovate and grow don’t thrive. Instead, they slip into a rapidly accelerating death spiral of market-share erosion, brand devaluation, talent attrition, and cost cutting. This inevitably leads to a further slowdown in top-line growth, a decline in stock price (which of course is largely based on expectations of future growth), and a loss of shareholder confidence. Even those companies considered by many to be the most internally innovative and well run—Microsoft, Disney, and Johnson & Johnson, to name a few—rely to varying degrees upon M&A to fuel their innovation and growth. How could they otherwise develop all of the operational know-how, market access, customer knowledge, intellectual property, and other attributes required to succeed in this rapidly changing world? M&A is a crucial tool for growth and survival.
However, not all M&A is good; in some cases, companies move too quickly. Valeant Pharmaceutical’s rapid attempt to digest more than 50 acquisitions over five years is one example. Likewise, the infamous WorldCom made 65 acquisitions in rapid succession before it imploded. But that type of roll-up strategy tends to be the exception rather than the rule.
If M&A is an essential item on a firm’s Capital Agenda, then the question that board members, CEOs, CFOs, heads of corporate development, and other executive stakeholders should ask themselves is: “How do we manage the upside return and downside risk of each deal?” Put another way, “How do we stress test our M&A—particularly when we are doing many transactions—in order to maximize shareholder value?” We suggest four areas of action:
Companies have many reasons to make an acquisition. We categorize these deal types into four quadrants, according to the size of the acquired company relative to the acquirer and the complexity of the business models to be integrated. See Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Categories of deal types
Deals might sometimes fall into more than one of the quadrants. What matters most is that the deal rationale aligns with the integration strategy and architecture.
As we discussed in Chapter 2, using objectivity prevents overpaying and allows you to plot more than one path to risk-adjusted value creation by not relying solely on a specific inorganic path to growth. It’s also important to have a strong stage-gate process that is consistently applied. Investment bankers and others are incentivized to get deals done, so it’s important to counterbalance that view with a risk- adjusted view of the synergies and other valuation assumptions.
Due diligence must thoroughly cover all the crucial areas, including the following:
In our experience, thorough due diligence, with a particular focus on the future, can help remove politics and personalities from the decision process by forcing everyone involved to view the deal through the same lens—namely, one of what the operating model will look like postclose, how long it will take to get there, and what the costs and benefits are. Especially in the dynamic world we live in, due diligence must focus more on the future potential of the target than on its history leading up to the acquisition.
Too often, executives underappreciate the importance of integration strategy, the difficulty of capturing synergies, and the deterioration of value that comes from moving too slowly. This is why increasingly we see corporate boards asking for the integration playbook or plan as part of the due diligence process, and why integrations are not a one-size-fits-all effort. Rather, the best executives work with their integration leaders to align around a plan, communicate it to others, prioritize resourcing for the plan, and help troubleshoot throughout implementation.
Boards are requesting more detailed integration strategies and road maps as part of their approval process. They want to know the source of synergies, a rough time line to capture value, who will drive integration, how leaders will set up the process so that it does not distract employees or detract from the business, and how it will be funded. This section will help executives to build a robust integration strategy and create that more detailed road map by focusing on five elements of a strong integration. (See Figure 5.2.)
Figure 5.2 Elements of a strong integration
Deal makers (namely the corporate development or M&A team) need clarity in deal strategy and the expected level of integration, especially with transactions that involve capabilities outside of the buyer’s core competency. If deal makers stray from their original deal thesis and rationale, they may make undesirable or suboptimal compromises during integration. It’s also critical to drive toward more seamless handoffs among the corporate development team, the integration teams, and business leaders responsible for executing the integration.
An early and important action is to identify talent pools critical to delivering customer care. If this is not done, you can expect a host of problems that result in lost value, including increased customer dissatisfaction and attrition, and employee disengagement and retention challenges.
In addition, the lack of shared understanding of the target’s cultural heritage can lead to real culture clashes during integration, with the possibility of some of these clashes being quite public. Elements of an organization’s heritage are its organizational values, management style, communication style, approach to innovation, tolerance for risk taking, and other cultural markers. Lack of insight into programs, training, and benefits that support this culture may result in ineffective incentives or real pushback during integration.
We’ve found that the biggest drivers of integration complexity are the number of employees involved, the number of countries where operations are located, the disparity among the two companies’ major information systems, and to what extent the acquired company is a carved-out business requiring transition services agreements (TSAs) and a lot of heavy lifting on Day 1. With integrations that involve thousands of employees and multiple countries, it’s crucial that the integration be directed or advised by people experienced in this type of complexity. After one such integration, we took a moment to count the sum total of actions that were taken. The number was close to 10,000. Given the relatively short integration windows that most organizations work under, experienced guidance is a key determinant of success.
Leaders from both the buyer and the target firms must show their continuous commitment to the integration process. They can do this by being visible and active at steering committee meetings, helping to make critical decisions, communicating frequently, and participating in frequently asked questions sessions.
It is not an overstatement to say that integrations succeed or fail because of the chemistry among people and their actions (or inactions). Finance, taxation, operations, and many other factors are highly important, but the people dimension is crucial.
Culture does not change easily, and it does not change with mere words, however true or sincere you make those words. Actions are what count, and words without actions are worse than no words at all.
At any point, people can lose sight of objectives and slip out of alignment, jeopardizing business continuity, value preservation, and the employee experience. Leaders from both the buy side and the sell side must align their messages, coordinate their delivery, and sustain a consistent, well-coordinated internal and external messaging campaign for the duration of the integration. Such a thoughtful campaign minimizes confusion, frustration, and flight risks among employees, and preserves the value of both the brand and the deal. The more complex a transaction, the more extensive and frequent must be the communications.
It’s helpful to remember that in most acquisitions, a relative handful of people are on the integration team. They know all about the deal, what it involves, and what it does not involve. At the same time, the vast majority of people in both organizations typically hear and transmit constant rumors.
Revenue synergies may be more central to the value proposition for a transaction than cost synergies; however, they may require significant investment and a longer lead time to realize. Lack of comprehensive due diligence efforts may result in unexpected costs. An example is insufficient due diligence on IT assets, specifically the condition and age of the assets, complexity of design, transferability of licenses and security, and stability of the infrastructure. In general, companies often underestimate, or don’t bother to take the time to model the cost of achieving synergies. EY uses a standard of 0.5–1.5 times the recurring annual cost synergies to estimate one-time integration costs.