Satipatthãna

1 M I 55–63, the tenth discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya

2 D II 305–15. The Burmese edition (sixth Saṅgāyana) has added the longer section on the four noble truths to the Majjhima version as well; the Sinhalese edition, however, agrees with the pts edition in presenting only a short statement of the four noble truths.

3 These are the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta at S V 141–92, and the Satipaṭṭhāna Vagga at A IV 457–62. In addition, there is also a Sati Vagga at A IV 336–47; a Satipaṭṭhāna Vibhaṅga Vibh 193–207; and twice a Satipaṭṭhāna Kathā at Kv 155–9 and at Paṭis II 232–5. Shorter discourses with similar titles are the three Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas at S IV 360, S IV 363, and A III 142; the three Sati Suttas at S II 132, S IV 245, and A IV 336; and the three Sato Suttas at S V 142, S V 180, and S V 186.

4 According to Schmithausen 1976: p.244, five additional versions are in existence: two complete versions in Chinese (in the Madhyama Āgama: Taishō 1, no.26, p.582b, and in the Ekottara Āgama Taishō 2, no.125, p.568a), and three fragmentary versions in Chinese and Sanskrit (these being the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, the Śāriputrābhidharma (Taishō 28, no.1548, p.525a), and the Śrāvakabhūmi). An abridged translation of one of the complete Chinese versions, the Nien-ch’u-ching, being the ninety-eighth sūtra in the Chinese Madhyama Āgama an be found in Minh Chau 1991: pp.87–95. A complete translation of this version and also of the other Chinese version from the Ekottara Āgama this being the first sūtra in the twelfth chapter (Yi Ru Dao) of the Ekottara Āgama, can be found in Nhat Hanh 1990: pp.151–77. A comparison of the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta with its corresponding Chinese version can be found in Choong 2000: pp.215–18, and in Hurvitz 1978: pp.211–29.

5 At S V 178 the Buddha included the four satipaṭṭhānas among his insights into things unknown at his time. Cf. also S V 167, which reports how the recently awakened Buddha reflected that the four satipaṭṭhānas were the direct path to awakening, whereupon Brahmā Sahampati came down to applaud and approve this reflection (cf. also S V 185). Both cases give only the outline of the four satipaṭṭhānas and do not contain the detailed practical examples given in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

6 S II 105 refers to sammā satti as the rediscovery of an ancient path, traversed by the Buddhas of the past. Similarly A II 29 speaks of sammā satti as an ancient practice. In fact D II 35 reports bodhisatta Vipassī engaged in dhammānupassanā on the five aggregates, which confirms that satipaṭṭhāna was an ancient practice, undertaken by previous Buddhas, a practice which however must then have fallen into oblivion until its rediscovery by Gotama Buddha.

7 Lily de Silva (n.d.): p.3, points out that the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta was only delivered once “the Dhamma (had) spread from its original seat of Magadha to the outskirts of the Kuru country”. Other discourses spoken at Kammāsadhamma in the Kuru country (e.g. D II 55; M I 501; M II 261; S II 92; S II 107; and A V 29) support an association of this location with a relatively evolved stage of development of the early Buddhist community (e.g. M I 502 speaks of many followers from various backgrounds). According to Ps I 227, a uniting feature among the discourses spoken at this particular location is their comparatively advanced nature, owing to the capacity of its inhabitants to receive deep teachings. The location of the Kuru country corresponds to the area of modern Delhi (according to Law 1979: p.18; Malalasekera 1995: vol.I, p.642; and T.W. Rhys Davids 1997: p.27). This same part of India is also associated with the events in the Bhagavadgītā (Bhg I.1)

8 The implications of the term dhamma, which I have left untranslated, are discussed on p.182.

9 The fact that this “refrain” is indispensable to each meditation exercise is shown by the remark concluding each occurrence of the “refrain” (e.g. M I 56): “that is how a monk in regard to the body (feelings, mind, dhammas) abides contemplating the body (feelings, mind, dhammas).” This remark connects the exposition to the question asked at the outset of each satipaṭṭhāna (e.g. M I 56): “how does a monk in regard to the body (etc.) abide contemplating the body (etc.)?”

10 These are the standard introduction and concluding sections in what Manné 1990: p.33, classifies as a typical “sermon”.

11 The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra offers the following explanation for this pattern: having investigated the body, the meditator searches for the cause of attachment to it, which is found to be pleasant feeling. Investigating feelings the question “who experiences feelings?” arises, leading to contemplation of the mind. This in turn forms a basis for an inquiry into the causes and conditions of mind, being the focus of contemplation of dhammas (in Lamotte 1970: pp.1158, 1162, 1167). On the progressive pattern underlying the sequence of the satipaṭṭhāna contemplations cf. also Ariyadhamma 1994: p.6; Gethin 1992: p.47; Guenther 1991: p.219; Khemacari 1985: p.38; King 1992: p.67; and Meier 1978: p.16.

12 Cf. e.g. S V 326, which reports that the Buddha himself, after his awakening, still continued to practise mindfulness of breathing.

13 M III 83.

14 S V 158; S V 181; S V 182; and S IV 363.

15 Ps I 249 allows for full awakening based on breath-awareness, Ps I 252 based on awareness of the four postures, Ps I 270 based on clearly knowing bodily activities, Ps I 274 based on the cemetery contemplations, Ps I 277 based on contemplation of feelings, Ps I 280 based on contemplation of the mind etc.

16 Cf. e.g. Dhammadharo 1997: p.54, who assembles all four satipaṭṭhānas under one single practice. Goenka 1994b: p.2, proposes the same, explaining that since the “body” is to be experienced via “feelings”, which at the same time are related to the “mind” by being “mental objects”, by observing bodily sensation one can cover all four satipaṭṭhānas. Sunlun 1993: p.110 takes a similar position regarding the touch-sensation. Taungpulu 1993: p.189, also includes all four satipaṭṭhānas under the single practice of body contemplation.

17 e.g. Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.58, recommends practice of all four satipaṭṭhānas. He suggests focusing on a few selected contemplations, and to give attention to the other contemplations whenever an opportunity arises in the course of practice. Soma 1981: p.xxii, takes a similar position.

18 M I 62: “if anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas … one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or, if there is a trace of clinging left, non-returning.” Pradhan 1986: p.340, points out that the practice of all satipaṭṭhānas is required for being able to gain such high levels of realization.

19 S V 175.

20 S V 325.

21 Debes 1994: p.190, aptly sums up: “it may be possible to gain realization with one single exercise, but that one who has practised all of them should still not realize awakening would seem to be impossible.” (My translation)

22 Ps I 281.

23 Cf. also Fryba 1989: p.258, who proposes employing the four satipaṭṭhānas as labelling categories for such analytical dissolution of subjective experience by classifying experiences of warmth, movement, trembling, itching, pressure, lightness, etc. under “body”; being pleased, amused, bored, sad, etc. under “feelings”; being concentrated, scattered, tense, greedy, hate-filled, etc. under “mind”; and experiencing thinking, wishing, planning, intending, etc. under “dhammas”.

24 Ñāṇananda 1993: p.48, aptly expresses this by speaking of satipaṭṭhāna as “an objective approach to understand the subjective in one’s experience”. Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.75, comments: “the whole discourse on the foundations of mindfulness may be regarded as a comprehensive … instruction for the realization of … anattā.” Of a similar opinion are Schönwerth 1968: p.193; and Story 1975: p.viii.

25 S IV 197.

26 Ps I 239.

27 Nett 83; cf. also Ps I 239 and Vism 678. Concerning these four vipallāsas it is noteworthy that they are listed only once in the four Nikāyas, at A II 52. The term as such occurs also at Vin III 7 in the sense of “disturbance” and at Sn 299 in the sense of “change”; and is referred to as catubbipallāsā at Th 1143. The four vipallāsas become prominent particularly in Paṭis and the later Pāli literature. The same four mistaken notions form part of a definition of ignorance in Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra (at II.5).

28 Nett 123 also associates each satipaṭṭhāna with a corresponding type of realization, relating contemplation of body and feelings to the desireless liberation, contemplation of the mind to the empty liberation, and contemplation of dhammas to the signless liberation. (One would, however, have expected the last two to be the other way round.)

29 Ps I 239 points out that all four satipaṭṭhānas partake of the same essence, Ps I 240 adds that it is only by way of differing objects that they are distinguished. Than Daing 1970: p.59, illustratively compares the similarity of all four satipaṭṭhānas in leading to the same goal to four staircases leading up to the platform of a pagoda.

30 Vibh-a 222. Bodhi 1993: p.279, explains: “the four foundations of mindfulness have a single essence, which consists of mindful contemplation of phenomena. They are differentiated in so far as this mindful contemplation is to be applied to four objects.”

31 M I 55. On this passage cf. also Janakabhivaṃsa 1985: pp.37–44.

32 In contrast at A III 314, a passage otherwise resembling the “direct path” statement does not have the ekāyano specification. The same absence of ekāyano can be seen at A III 329 in relation to the practice of recollecting the Buddha. Khantipālo 1981: p.29; and Ñāṇapṇika 1973: p.12; draw attention to the emphatic implications of the term ekāyano in ancient India (various examples of which are discussed in Gethin 1992: p.61).

33 According to A V 195, whosoever have escaped, are escaping, or will escape from this world, all of them do so by way of well developing the four satipaṭṭhānas.

34 S V 167 and S V 186.

35 Ps I 229: ekamaggo na dvedhāpathabhūto … ekena ayitabbo … ekassa ayano … ekasmiṃ ayano…ekaṃ ayati. These alternatives are discussed by Gethin 1992: pp.60–3.

36 “Direct path” as a way of translating ekāyano is also used by Ñāṇatiloka 1910: p.91 n.7 (“der direkte Weg”); and by Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.145. Translating ekāyano as “direct path” has the advantage of avoiding the slightly dogmatic nuance conveyed by the translation “the only path”, noted e.g. by Conze 1962: p.51 n.++.

37 M I 75, the same is then repeated for a path leading in the direction of a tree, a mansion, and a pond. Cf. also Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.1188 n.135.

38 D I 235.

39 Dhp 274. Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.371, points out that to speak of the “only path” would be applicable only to the entire noble eightfold path, not to satipaṭṭhāna alone, which after all is just one of its factors.

40 Gethin 1992: p.64, commenting on ekāyano, explains: “what is basically being said is that the four satipaṭṭhānas represent a path that leads straight and directly all the way to the final goal.”

41 Cf. also Bodhi 2000: p.1504 and p.1915 n.122; and Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.10.

42 Maurice Walshe 1987: p.589 n.629.

43 Occurrences of upaṭṭhahati which correspond to “being present” are, for example, a watchdog being present at D I 166; the messengers of death being ever present (in the sense of being ready) for someone of advanced age at Dhp 235; meal time “has come” at Sn 130; a seat being present (in the sense of being put up) under a tree at Sn 708. Cf. also It 36, which relates upaṭṭhahati to mental factors (the presence of shame and fear of wrong-doing), thereby forming a close parallel to its use in the satipaṭṭhāna context.

44 Upaṭṭhahati in the sense of “attending” can be found, for example, at D II 271, where devas have to attend on Sakka; or at D III 189 in the sense of waiting on one’s teacher; or in the sense of looking after one’s parents at A I 151 and Sn 262; or as ministering to the monastic community at A I 279. The same nuance also underlies the recurrent noun “attendant”, upaṭṭhāka (e.g. at S III 95).

45 C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: p.256, speaks of the “four presences of mindfulness”.

46 e.g. Ps I 238 and Vism 678. However, on this derivation one would expect a doubling of the consonant, the resulting term being satippaṭṭhāna.

47 C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1979: p.xv. By distinguishing between the early discourses on the one hand and the historically later Abhidhamma and commentaries on the other I follow Ñāṇamoli 1991: p.xli, who distinguishes between these three as the three main layers of the Pāli tradition.

48 e.g. at M III 23, where upaṭṭhita sati is contrasted with muṭṭhassati, loss of mindfulness; or at M III 85, where upaṭṭhita sati is the result of practising satipaṭṭhāna; cf. also S IV 119: upaṭṭhitāya satiyā; or A II 244: sati sūpaṭṭhitā hoti; or the causative form satiṃ upaṭṭhāpessanti at A IV 22. As a matter of fact, the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta itself speaks of satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā, “having established mindfulness”, and of sati paccupaṭṭhitā, “mindfulness is established” (both at M I 56). Paṭis I 177 also relates sati to upaṭṭhāna.

49 Cf. e.g. Edgerton 1998: p.614.

50 M III 221.

1 M I 56.

2 T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.38. Cf. also Upali Karunaratne 1989: p.484, who translates anupassati as “observing or seeing properly”; Ñāṇārāma 1997: p.11, who speaks of “special modes of attention…cognitive evaluations”; and Vajirañāṇa 1946: p.47, who has “analytical reflection” as a translation. According to Sasaki 1992: p.16, “anu” has a particularly emphatic function in Pāli. Another relevant nuance of anu is “along with”, which in the present context could be taken to point to the process character of all experience, revealed during contemplation. According to Vism 642, “anu”-passati implies observation of an object repeatedly and in diverse ways, that is, from different angles.

3 Cf. e.g. S IV 211; A III 142; and A V 359.

4 Hamilton 1996: p.173, translates: “body qua body”; Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.145: “body as a body”; Ṭhānissaro 1993: p.97: “body in and of itself”.

5 M I 56: “he abides contemplating dhammas internally … externally … internally and externally.”

6 Ps I 249. A more detailed discussion of this commentarial explanation can be found on page 95.

7 This suggestion can claim support from M III 83, where the Buddha spoke of the process of breathing as a “body among bodies”. A similar position is also taken by several modern meditation teachers; cf. e.g. Buddhadāsa 1976: p.64; Maha Boowa 1994: p.101; and Ñāṇasaṃvara 1974: p.41.

8 M I 56: “he abides contemplating the nature of arising … of passing away … of both arising and passing away.” Such contemplation of impermanence can then lead on to an understanding of the other two characteristics of conditioned existence, dukkha and anattā. Cf. Paṭis II 232 and Ps I 243. Ps I 242 moreover speaks of overcoming the wrong notion of substantiality.

9 Ps I 242; also Debvedi 1990: p.23; and Ñāṇamoli 1982b: p.206 n.17. Here it needs to be pointed out that although the discourses do use repetition in order to express emphasis, this is usually done by repeating the same phrase without case variations. In contrast, in the present instance the repetition occurs in a different case. Ps I 241 also offers another explanation, suggesting that the repetition implies that each area of contemplation should be kept separate from the other areas (cf. also Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.33; and Sīlananda 1990: p.20). This commentarial suggestion is questionable, since in the Ānāpānasati Sutta (M III 83) the Buddha clearly showed that an object of body contemplation, the breath, can be used to contemplate feelings, mind, and dhammas, rather than keeping breath contemplation restricted to the area of body contemplation only.

10 Lily de Silva (n.d.): p.6.

11 Nett 82 correlates ãtãpî with energy (viriya), sampajãna with wisdom (paññã), and vineyya loke abhijjhãdomanassa with concentration (samãdhi). Paìis II 15 further expands the correlation with all five faculties.

12 Cf. S I 103 and S V 421.

13 Basham 1951: p.88.

14 Bronkhorst 1993: pp.31–6, and 51.

15 At DI 161 and at S IV 330 the Buddha rejected the false report that he was categorically against all austerities. At A V 191 the Buddha explained that he was neither in favour of nor against austerities, since what really mattered was whether any particular austerity or practice led to an increase of either wholesome or unwholesome states of mind.

16 At A II 200. Cf. also M I 81, where the Buddha, after listing the ascetic practices he had performed previous to awakening, concluded that these had not led him to realization because of the absence of wisdom.

17 M II 93.

18 The bodhisatta’s ascetic practices are described in detail at M I 77–81 and at M I 242–6. Mil 285 explains that none of the previous Buddhas ever practised austerities, Gotama being the only case, owing to his immature knowledge at the time.

19 Cf. S I 103, where the recently awakened Buddha congratulated himself on having left asceticism behind and having gained awakening through mindfulness instead.

20 This can be gathered from his humorous reply to the accusation of being a tapassī himself at Vin I 235; Vin III 3; A IV 175; and A IV 184; where he pointed out that his form of self-mortification was to “mortify” what is unwholesome. Cf. also Collins 1982: p.235; and Horner 1979: p.97.

21 D III 106. The association of the awakening factors with “exertion” (padhāna) occurs also at D III 226; A II 16; and A II 74. S I 54 even goes so far as to associate them with “austerity”: bojjhaṅgatapasā (however, Bodhi 2000: p.390 n.168, suggests the reading bojjhā tapasā instead).

22 D III 130 speaks of other ascetics accusing the Buddha’s disciples of living a life devoted to indulgence in pleasure. At M I 249 the Buddha faced criticism because he sometimes slept during the day. The same topic comes up again at S I 107, where Māra poked fun at the Buddha for being still asleep at sunrise (after a night spent in walking meditation), cf. also S I 110. At Vin IV 91 the Buddha was derisively called a “shaven-headed householder” by an Ājīvika ascetic, presumably because of the abundance of food received by Buddhist monks. Cf. further Basham 1951: p.137; and Chakravarti 1996: p.51.

23 Compare e.g. Makkhali Gosāla’s view (at D I 53 or at S III 210) that there is no power or energy (to take decisions or influence one’s destiny in any way), a view which the Buddha strongly censured (e.g. at A I 286); or Pūrana Kassapa’s view (at D I 52) that there is neither evil nor good. (S III 69 seems to confuse these two teachers, putting Gosāla’s view into Kassapa’s mouth.)

24 Cf. e.g. M II 174; Dhp 280; It 27; and Th 1165. Cf. also Pande 1957: p.519; and C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1898: p.50.

25 At S V 272, Ānanda countered the proposal that to overcome desire using desire would be a task without end with the argument that the desire for realization will automatically subside once realization is gained. Similarly, according to A II 145 it is on the basis of “craving” (for the destruction of the influxes) that craving (in general) will be overcome. Cf. also Sn 365, where the Buddha spoke approvingly of someone longing to attain Nibbāna. The importance of “desire” as an aspect of the path leading to realization is also exemplified in the canonical presentation of the four roads to power (iddhipāda), one of which is desire (chanda). Cf. also Burford 1994: p.48; Katz 1979: p.58; and Matthews 1975: p.156. A helpful distinction between various types of desire in this context can be found in Collins 1998: pp.186–8.

26 A typical instance of such reinterpretation is Dhp 184, where patience is identified as the highest austerity. Cf. also Kloppenborg 1990: p.53.

27 A I 50.

28 M I 219.

29 M I 94. This ability of the Buddha to sit without moving for seven days is also documented at Vin I 1; Ud 1–3; Ud 10; and Ud 32. Thī 44 and Thī 174 each report the same for a realized nun. It is telling if one contrasts the Buddha’s experience of sitting without moving for seven days experiencing only bliss with a description of sitting “with determination” in Maha Boowa 1997: p.256: “sitting … for many hours … the painful feelings quickly spread to all parts of the body … even the backs of the hands and feet feel as if they are on fire … inside the body it seems as if … bones … are about to break apart and separate … the body … as if it were burning in a mass of flames externally … internally as if it was being beaten by hammers and stabbed with sharp steel daggers … the whole body is in agony.”

30 In fact at M I 481 the Buddha used the expression “let my blood dry up” etc. in order to admonish monks who were unwilling to give up eating in the evening. As 146 glosses this expression with “firm and steadfast effort”.

31 e.g. at Th 223; Th 313; and Th 514.

32 M III 92.

33 S V 213

34 Cf. e.g. M III 159, where both are listed as possible obstructions to developing a concentrated mind. The need for an intelligent maintenance of balance in meditation practice is also reflected at M II 223, according to which the path to freedom from dukkha at times requires the application of effort, while at other times it just requires equanimous observation.

35 Other translations of ātāpī reflect similar shades of meaning, it being variously rendered as “conscientious”, as “active”, or as the input of energy that “revives the decreasing morale” (Hamilton 1996: p.173; Katz 1989: p.155; and Pandey 1988: p.37). The nuance of continuity can be seen at A III 38 and A IV 266, which associate ātāpī with being continuously active. Another relevant instance is at M III 187, where ātāpī occurs in what might refer to spending a night in meditation (following Ñāṇapoṇika 1977: p.346, for bhaddekaratta). Similarly Dhīravaṃsa 1989: p.97, understands ātāpī as “perseverance”; and Ñāṇārāma 1990: p.3, as “unbroken continuity”.

36 Vin I 182 and A III 375; (also Th 638–9); and in the satipaṭṭhāna subcommentary, Ps-pṭ I 384, in order to illustrate the need for balanced energy in satipaṭṭhāna contemplation. The need for balance is also stressed by Kor 1985: p.23.

37 Khantipālo 1986: p.28; and Vimalaraÿsi 1997: p.49, warn against the dangers of overstraining or forcing meditation and the emotional disturbances and hardening of the mind that may ensue. Mann 1992: p.120, based on comparing the common character type in ancient Indian and the typical modern “western” mind, warns against indiscriminately applying to “hate” type meditators instructions developed mainly for the “craving” type. Cf. also W.S. Karunaratne 1988a: p.70.

38 S V 421.

39 At S I 1 the Buddha pointed out that by avoiding stagnation and excessive striving he had been able to “cross the flood”. Cf. also Sn 8–13, which similarly recommend neither going too far nor lagging behind.

40 M III 187 and Dhp 276.

41 e.g. at S II 21; S III 74–9; S IV 37; S IV 64; S IV 76; and A IV 299. T.W. Rhys Davids 1997: p.242, and Singh 1967: p.127, relate tapas in a secondary sense to retirement into solitude in the forest, which parallels the use of ātāpī together with “dwelling alone and secluded” in the standard description of such a monk’s going into seclusion for intensive practice.

42 Jotika 1986: p.29 n.15. This parallels the commentarial understanding of the related term appamāda as undistracted mindfulness, satiyā avippavāso (e.g. Sv I 104 or Dhp-a IV 26).

43 T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: pp.655 and 690.

44 The Satipaṭṭhāna subcommentary, Ps-pṭ I 354, explains sampajāna as “knowing in every way and in detail”. Guenther 1991: p.85, speaks of “analytical appreciative understanding”; Ñāṇārāma 1990: p.4, of “investigative intelligence”; and van Zeyst 1967a: p.331, of “deliberate, discriminative knowledge”.

45 D III 103 and D III 231.

46 M I 286 and M I 414. Furthermore A II 158 distinguishes between the threefold action being done either sampajāna or else a sampajāna, a context which also merits rendition as “deliberateness”.

47 S V 180.

48 A I 13.

49 It 10.

50 e.g. Dhs 16 and Vibh 250. Sampajañña is also related to wisdom by Ayya Kheminda (n.d.): p.30; Buddhadāsa 1989: p.98; Debvedi 1990: p.22; Dhammasudhi 1968: p.67; Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.46; and Swearer 1967: p.153.

51 M I 56: “breathing in long, he knows ‘I breathe in long’”; M I 57: “he knows accordingly however his body is disposed.”

52 e.g.MI 61: “he knows the eye, he knows forms, and he knows the fetter that arises dependent on both.”

53 MI 62: “he knows as it really is, ‘this is dukkha’ … ‘this is the arising of dukkha’ … ‘this is the cessation of dukkha’ … ‘this is the way leading to the cessation of dukkha.’”

54 M I 57: “when going forward and returning he acts clearly knowing; when looking ahead and looking away he acts clearly knowing.…” I will consider this exercise in more detail on page 141.

55 e.g. at D I 70.

56 Maintaining equanimity towards attentive or non-attentive disciples at M III 221; going to sleep at MI 249; enduring illness and pain at D II 99; D II 128; S I 27; S I 110; and Ud 82; giving up his life principle at D II 106; S V 262; A IV 311; and Ud 64; lying down to die at D II 137. The presence of both at the time of death is recommended to the monks in general at S IV 211.

57 M III 119 (parts of this also at D II 108).

58 A II 195 and S I 31.

59 Contemplating feelings and thoughts at A IV 168; (cf. also A II 45); perceptual training at D III 250 and D III 113; and overcoming sloth-and-torpor e.g. at D I 71.

60 e.g. at DII 313; cf. also the comment at Vism 163; Guenther 1991: p.124; and Gunaratana 1996: p.92.

61 The interaction between sati and wisdom is described at Ps I 243, according to which wisdom contemplates what has become an object of awareness. Cf. also Vibh-a 311, which distinguishes between sati with and without wisdom, showing that wisdom is not an automatic result of the presence of sati, but needs to be deliberately developed. On the importance of combining sati with sampajañña cf. Chah 1996: p.6; and Mahasi 1981: p.94.

62 III 152 and S V 434.

63 I will consider sampajañña again when discussing the practice of mental labelling (page 113) and when investigating clearly knowing in regard to bodily activities as one of the body contemplations (page 141).

1 Following Jayatilleke 1980: p.63.

2 M II 211.

3 M I 520 and M II 171.

4 A survey of the sixty-two grounds for formulating views, presented in the Brahmajāla Sutta (D I 12–39), reveals that “direct” meditative experiences are the most frequent cause for formulating a view, while speculative thought assumes only a subordinate role: forty-nine instances appear to be based purely or at least in part on meditative experiences [nos 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, 17, 19–22, 23–5, 27, 29–41, 43–9, 51–7, 59–62]; against only thirteen instances based on pure reasoning [nos 4, 8, 12–16, 18, 26, 28, 42, 50, 58] (correlations made with the help of the commentary). Cf. also Bodhi 1992a: p.6.

5 Ud 68.

6 Ud 67; cf. alsoDII 282. Another illustration of such a wrong conclusion can be found at M III 210, where direct supernormal knowledge led to various wrong assumptions about the working mechanism of karma.

7 At S IV 139 the Buddha proposed contemplation of the mind in relation to sense experience as a method of arriving at final knowledge independent of faith, personal preferences, oral tradition, reasoning, and acceptance of a view.

8 This brings to mind the threefold distinction between wisdom based on reflecting, on learning, and on mental development (a threefold presentation which in the discourses occurs only at D III 219).

9 Cf. Bodhi 1993: p.86; Gethin 1992: p.36; Guenther 1991: p.67; and Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.1188 n.136. The Sanskrit equivalent of sati is smṛti, also connoting memory and mental retention, cf. Monier-Williams 1995: p.1271; and C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: p.80.

10 e.g. sati pamuṭṭhā at MI 329 meaning “forgotten”; or sati udapādi at D I 180 as “remembering”; cf. also A IV 192, which uses the term asati when describing a monk pretending to have forgotten an offence for which he was being reproved.

11 Cf. Dhs 11; Vibh 250; Pp 25; As 121; Mil 77; and Vism 162.

12 Vin II 287 reports ānanda calling to mind and reciting the discourses spoken by the Buddha during the first council. Whether or not this account of the first council corresponds to historical truth, the fact that the Vinaya attributes the recital of the discourses to ānanda must be reflecting his outstanding powers of memory (to which he himself refers at Th 1024). Ānanda’s eminence in sati comes in for the Buddha’s praise at A I 24. Nevertheless, according to Vin I 298 he also had lapses of sati, such as when he once set out to collect alms forgetting to put on all his robes.

13 e.g. at A III 284. On the six recollections cf. also Vism 197–228; and Devendra 1985: pp.25–45.

14 A II 183 points out that recollection of past lives is to be undertaken through sati. Similarly A V 336 speaks of directing sati to the Buddha in order to recollect him. Nid II 262 clearly understands all recollections as activities of sati. Vism 197 sums up: “it is through sati that one recollects.”

15 Th 217–8. Th-a II 82 explains that based on recollecting the Buddha the monk then developed deep concentration which enabled him to recall past Buddhas, with the result that he realized that even Buddhas are impermanent. This in turn led to his awakening.

16 e.g. at M I 356.

17 The passage at MI 356 could then be rendered as: “he is mindful, being endowed with highest discriminative mindfulness (so that) things said or done long ago are recalled and remembered.” Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.1252 n.560, explains: “keen attentiveness to the present forms the basis for an accurate memory of the past.” Ñāṇananda 1984: p.28, points out: “mindfulness and memory … the keenness of the one naturally leads to the clarity of the other.”

18 Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.9; Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.382; and T.W. Rhys Davids 1966: vol.II, p.322. Griffith 1992: p.111, explains: “the basic meaning of smṛti and derivatives in Buddhist technical discourse … has to do with observation and attention, not with awareness of past objects.”

19 Paṭis I 16; Paṭis I 116; and Vism 510.

20 Cf. S I 44, where sati is related to wakefulness. A related nuance occurs at Vism 464, which relates sati to strong cognition (thirasaññā).

21 The opposite case is documented at Vin II 261, where a nun failed to memorize the training rules for lack of sati.

22 Ñāṇananda 1993: p.47.

23 Sn 1053; Sn 1066; and Sn 1085.

24 S IV 119.MI 266; S IV 186; S IV 189; and S IV 199 make the same statement in relation to kāyasati. Similarly Sn 150–1 refers to the practice of radiating mettā in all directions as a form of sati, so here too sati represents an “immeasurable” state of mind.

25 Piatigorski 1984: p.150. Cf. also Newman 1996: p.28, who distinguishes between two levels of attention, primary and secondary: “I may be thinking about tomorrow and still be aware that now I am thinking about tomorrow …my first level awareness is on tomorrow but my second level awareness is on what is happening now (i.e. that now I am thinking about tomorrow).”

26 Definitions of sati as a faculty mention both the practice of satipaṭṭhāna (S V 196 and S V 200) and memory (S V 198), the latter being also the definition of sati as a power (A III 11). As an awakening factor, sati again covers both aspects, since at M III 85 the presence of undistracted mindfulness as the outcome of satipaṭṭhāna practice forms sati as an awakening factor (the same definition is found several times at S V 331–9); whereas the awakening factor sati functions as memory at S V 67, since here it is concerned with recollecting and considering the teaching.

27 M III 73 defines right mindfulness as the presence of awareness when overcoming wrong thought, wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood, and when establishing their counterparts.

28 This is highlighted in the Paṭisambhidāmagga, according to which a clear appreciation of this difference constitutes “discriminative understanding” (dhammapaṭisambhidañāṇa), cf. Paṭis I 88 and Paṭis I 90.

29 M III 85; cf also S V 68.

30 D II 313: “he abides contemplating the body … feelings … the mind … dhammas, diligent, clearly knowing and mindful, free from desires and discontent in regard to the world – this is called right mindfulness.” An alternative definition of “right mindfulness”can be found in the Atthasālinī, which simply speaks of remembering properly (As 124). The definition of right mindfulness in the Chinese Āgamas also does not mention the four satipaṭṭhānas: “he is mindful, widely mindful, keeping in mind, not forgetful, this is called right mindfulness,” (translation by Minh Chau 1991: p.97; cf. also Choong 2000: p.210).

31 “Micchā sati” at D II 353; D III 254; D III 287; D III 290; D III 291; M I 42; M I 118; M III 77; M III 140; S II 168; S III 109; S V 1; S V 12; S V 13; S V 16; S V 18–20; S V 23; S V 383; A II 220–9; A III 141; A IV 237; and A V 212–48 (A III 328 also has a wrong form of anussati). This substantial number of references to “wrong” types of sati to some extent disagrees with the commentarial presentation of sati as an exclusively wholesome mental factor (e.g. As 250). This presentation of the commentaries causes, in fact, a practical difficulty: how to reconcile sati as a wholesome factor with satipaṭṭhāna in relation to the hindrances, if wholesome and unwholesome mental qualities cannot coexist in the same state of mind? The commentaries attempt to resolve this contradiction by presenting satipaṭṭhāna of a defiled state of mind as a quick alternation between mind-moments associated with sati and those under the influence of defilements (e.g. at Ps-pṭ I 373). This explanation is however not convincing, since with either the defilement or else sati being absent, satipaṭṭhāna contemplation of the presence of a defilement in one’s mind becomes impossible (cf. e.g. the instructions for contemplating the hindrances, which clearly refer to such a hindrance being present at the time of satipaṭṭhāna practice, M I 60: “he knows ‘there is … in me’”). Cf. furthermore Gethin 1992: pp.40–3; and Ñāṇapoṇika 1985: pp.68–72. According to the Sarvāstivāda tradition, sati is an indeterminate mental factor, cf. Stcherbatsky 1994: p.101.

32 At S I 208 Maṇibhadda proposed: “being mindful one is always blessed, being mindful one dwells happily, being mindful one lives better each day, and one is free from ill-will.” The Buddha then repeated the first three lines, but corrected the fourth line to read: “yet one is not free from ill-will”. Thus the central point in the Buddha’s answer was to emphasize that sati alone might not suffice for eradicating ill will. This does, however, not mean that sati is incapable of preventing the arising of ill will, since its presence goes a long way in helping one to remain calm when confronted with the anger of others, as documented at S I 162; S I 221; S I 222; and S I 223.

33 M I 117 speaks in this context of practising mindfulness (sati karaṇīyaṃ), while earlier he had actively to protect the crop by closely watching over the cows (rakkheyya). This, however, does not imply that sati cannot also take part in holding back a cow about to stray into ripe crops, which in fact it does at Th 446, but only that the more relaxed observation described above brings out a characteristic feature of bare and receptive sati.

34 Th 765.

35 M III 136.

36 M II 260.

37 S I 172 and Sn 77. This simile might have suggested itself since with the help of the goad the farmer ensures the continuity of the ploughing, keeping the ox “on track”, while the ploughshare penetrates the surface of the earth, turns up its hidden parts, and thereby prepares it for seeds to be grown and planted. Similarly, continuity of sati keeps the mind “on track” with regard to the meditation object, so that sati can penetrate the surface appearance of phenomena, turn up their hidden aspects (the three characteristics), and enable the seeds of wisdom to grow. The fact that ploughshare and goad are mentioned together in the above simile points moreover to the need to combine clarity of direction with balanced effort in developing sati, since the farmer has to execute two tasks at the same time: with the goad in one hand he has to ensure the straightness of the furrow by keeping the oxen moving in a straight line, while with the other hand he has to exert just the right amount of pressure on the ploughshare, so that it neither gets stuck because he has pushed it too deeply into the ground or only scratches over the surface for lack of pressure.

38 Spk I 253 and Pj II 147 explain the import of this simile to be that wisdom understands phenomena only when they are known through sati.

39 A III 346. The same imagery occurs again at Th 695; and is at Th 1090 even transferred from an elephant to the Buddha himself.

40 M II 137 depicts the Buddha turning his whole body whenever looking back. This “elephant look” of the Buddha is again documented at D II 122; while M I 337 reports the same for the Buddha Kakusandha.

41 According to Mil 266, arahants never lose their sati.

42 S IV 292. The whole simile originally comes up at Ud 76, where it is only the commentary, Ud-a 370, which relates the single spoke to sati. Though the image of a single spoke might appear strange, as long as this spoke is strong enough (viz. the arahant’s presence of sati), it is capable of providing the required connection between hub and rim to form a wheel.

43 Sn 1035; on this verse cf. also Ñāṇananda 1984: p.29.

44 The relation of sati to wisdom is also alluded to at Vism 464, according to which the characteristic function of sati is absence of confusion (asammoharasa).

45 S V 6. A variation on the same imagery occurs at S I 33, where the Dhamma itself becomes the charioteer, with the consequence that sati is relegated to being the chariot’s upholstery. The image of sati as upholstery illustrates how established sati in a way “cushions” the practitioner against the impact of the “potholes” of life, since the presence of awareness counters the tendency towards those mental reactions and proliferations that ordinarily tend to arise in relation to the vicissitudes of life.

46 S V 170. I will examine this simile in more detail on page 122.

47 S IV 194.

48 A IV 110.

49 Cf. also Chah 1997: p.10: “that which ‘looks over’ the various factors which arise in meditation is ‘sati’.”

50 D III 269 and A V 30.

51 A IV 385. Cf. also the similar formulation at A IV 339 and A V 107. Th 359 and 446 also refer to the controlling influence of sati on the mind.

52 A V 352.

53 M I 221.

54 S V 148, where the Buddha related a parable in which a monkey was caught by a hunter because he had left the jungle (his “pasture”) and entered a region visited by men. The need to keep to one’s proper pasture comes up again at S V 146 in a parallel simile depicting a quail which in this way can avoid getting caught by a falcon.

55 S V 149. However, the commentaries to M I 221 and A V 352 (Ps II 262 and Mp V 95) explain lack of skill in “pasture” to imply lack of understanding the difference between mundane and supramundane satipaṭṭhāna.

56 S IV 198. Since this simile is concerned with mindfulness of the body in particular, I will discuss it in more detail on page 123. 57 M I 462. In fact at D II 141 the Buddha particularly emphasized the need to keep to sati for monks who were coming in contact with women.

57 M I 462. In fact at D II 141 the Buddha particularly emphasized the need to keep to sati for monks who were coming in contact with women.

58 At It 33 the Buddha distinguished between two successive aspects of his teaching, the first of which was to recognize evil as evil, while the second was to get free from such evil.

59 An example for the coexistence of sati with intense effort is furnished by the bodhisatta’s ascetic practices (at M I 242), where even during excessive striving he was able to maintain his mindfulness.

60 Lily de Silva (n.d.): p.5; Fraile 1993: p.99; Naeb 1993: p.158; Swearer 1971: p.107; and van Zeyst 1989: pp.9 and 12. This receptive and not interfering quality of sati is also echoed at Nid II 262, which relates sati to peacefulness.

61 The expression “choiceless awareness” is used by Brown 1986b: p.167; Engler 1983: p.32; Epstein 1984: p.196; Goldstein 1985: p.19; Kornfield 1977: p.12; Levine 1989: p.28; and Sujīva 2000: p.102.

62 Dhīramvaṃsa 1988: p.31.

63 This is to some extent paralleled at A I 295, which presents satipaṭṭhāna as a middle path, aloof from both indulgence in sensuality and self-mortification.

64 Cf. Festinger 1957: p.134.

65 D I 19 and D III 31.

66 D II 272.

67 Abhidh-s 7. The discourses assign a similarly important role to attention (manasikāra) by including it in the definition of “name” (nāma), e.g. at M I 53. On the relation of sati to attention cf. Bullen 1991: p.17; Gunaratana 1992: p.150; and Ñāṇapoṇika 1950: p.3.

68 Ñāṇapoṇika 1986b: p.2. This “bare” quality of sati is alluded to at Vism 464, which considers being directly face-to-face with an object as a characteristic manifestation of sati.

69 Wise attention (yoniso manasikāra) is applied to antidotes for the hindrances at S V 105, can lead to realization by giving attention to the impermanent nature of the aggregates at S III 52 and of the sense-spheres at S IV 142, establishes the awakening factors at S V 94, and consists in contemplating the four noble truths at M I 9. Cf. also A V 115, where wise attention functions as “nutriment” for mindfulness and clear knowledge, which in turn act as nutriment for satipaṭṭhāna.

70 Deikman 1966: p.329; Engler 1983: p.59; Goleman 1980: p.27; and 1975: p.46; and van Nuys 1971: p.127.

71 The standard definition of sense-restraint, found e.g. at M I 273, speaks of avoiding being carried away by one’s evaluations and reactions to what is perceived through the senses. Cf. also Debvedi 1998: p.18; and page 225 infra.

72 M I 56: “free from desires and discontent in regard to the world.”

73 Modern scholars and meditation teachers offer several alternative summaries of the essential aspects of sati. Ayya Khema 1991: p.182, distinguishes two applications of sati: the mundane application, helping one to be aware of what one is doing, and the supramundane application of penetrating to the real nature of things. Dhammasudhi 1969: p.77, describes four aspects of sati: awareness of surroundings, of one’s reactions to these surroundings, of one’s own conditioning, and of stillness (“pure awareness”). Hecker 1999: p.11, mentions vigilance, self-control, depth, and steadiness. Ñāṇapoṇika 1986b: p.5, enumerates four “sources of power” in sati: tidying up by naming, non-coercive procedure, stopping and slowing down, and directness of vision.

74 M III 25–8 documents that this need applies to each stage in the ascending series of meditative absorptions, since it lists sati among the mental factors of the four absorptions of the form sphere and of the first three immaterial attainments. The fourth immaterial attainment and the attainment of cessation, both being states of mind not amenable to factor analysis, are still related to sati on emergence (M III 28). Presence of sati in all jhānas is also documented at Dhs 55 and at Paṭis I 35.

75 Vism 514.

76 Described e.g. at M III 25.

77 Cf. D III 279; Paṭis II 16; and Vism 129.

78 The standard descriptions of the third jhāna (e.g. at D II 313) explicitly mention the presence of sati and of clearly knowing.

79 The standard descriptions of the fourth jhāna (e.g. at D II 313) speak of “purity of mindfulness due to equanimity”, which then can be used to develop supernatural powers (e.g. at M I 357). That here sati is indeed purified by the presence of equanimity can be gathered from M III 26 and Vibh 261; cf. also As 178 and Vism 167.

80 The concentrative attainments possible through satipaṭṭhāna practice are documented on several occasions, such as D II 216; S V 151; S V 299; S V 303; and A IV 300. According to Ledi 1985: p.59, one should embark on the development of absorption only when one is able to maintain satipaṭṭhāna contemplation uninterruptedly for one or two hours daily.

81 M III 136. Whereas the pts edition speaks of thoughts in relation to the objects of satipaṭṭhāna (kāyūpasaṃhitaṃ vitakkaṃ etc.), the Burmese and the Sinhalese editions speak of sensual thoughts instead (kāmūpasaṃhitaṃ vitakkaṃ). Judging from the dynamics of the discourse, this seems to be the less probable reading, since this passage follows on the removal of the five hindrances and leads on to absorption, and that straightaway into the second jhāna. The corresponding Chinese version (T’iao Yü Ti Ching, Madhyama āgama no. 198), however, supports the reading of the Burmese and Sinhalese editions. In addition, it also mentions the attainment of the first jhāna, which in all the Pāli editions is missing.

82 M I 301. Ps II 363 takes this to refer to the moment of realization, which, however, as the commentary also admits, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the discourse speaks of developing and making much of this samādhinimitta. The supportive role of satipaṭṭhāna for the development of right concentration is also echoed at A V 212, according to which right mindfulness gives rise to right concentration.

83 A I 23.

84 S V 294–306; cf. also Malalasekera 1995: vol. I, p.88.

85 Cf. e.g. Schmithausen 1973: p.179, who suggests that satipaṭṭhāna was originally purely a concentration exercise.

86 Cf. also Bullen 1982: p.44; Delmonte 1991: pp.48–50; Goleman 1977a: p.298; Shapiro 1980: pp.15–19; and Speeth 1982: pp.146 and 151. Gunaratana 1992: p.165, aptly sums up: “concentration is exclusive. It settles down on one item and ignores everything else. Mindfulness is inclusive. It stands back from the focus of attention and watches with a broad focus.”

87 Brown 1977: p.243: “two major cortical control mechanisms … involved in selecting and processing information … a frontal system associated with restrictive processing and a posterior-temporal system associated with more wide-range processing of information. The brain may be likened to a camera that can use either a wide-angle lens or a zoom lens. Or, in cognitive terms, attention can be directed to the more dominant details in a stimulus field or to the entire field.”

88 S V 156.

89 At the beginning of this passage the Buddha spoke in praise of being well established in the four satipaṭṭhānas. Thus the reason for his exposition about “directed” and “undirected” modes of meditation appears to be that he wanted to show how samatha can act as a support for the practice of satipaṭṭhāna.

90 Kamalashila 1994: p.96; Kyaw Min 1980: p.96; and Ruth Walshe 1971: p.104. Cf. also page 262.

91 Cf. Brown 1986b: p.180, who in a comparison of Rorschach tests done with different meditators describes in his conclusion the “unproductivity and relative paucity of associative process which characterizes the samādhi state”, while “the Rorschachs of the insight group … are primarily characterized by increased productivity and richness of associative elaborations.”

92 Mahasi 1990: p.23: “the knowing mind … as in the case of a stone hitting a wall”; which Sīlananda 1990: p.21, identifies: “like the stone hitting the wall … that hitting of the object is mindfulness”. Paṇḍita (n.d.): p.6, goes further, when he describes satipaṭṭhāna as implying to “attack the object without hesitation … with violence, speed or great force … with excessive haste or hurry”, which he then compares to soldiers defeating an enemy troop in a sudden attack.

93 Such more advanced stages of satipaṭṭhāna practice are sometimes referred to as “vipassanā jhānas”, an expression not found in the discourses, the Abhidhamma, or the commentaries. Cf. Mahasi 1981: p.98; and a detailed exposition in Paṇḍita 1993: pp.180–205, cf. esp. p.199: “non-thinking, bare attention is called the second vipassanā jhāna”.

94 This is the term apilāpanatā, found at Dhs 11 (detailed expo at As 147); Vibh 250; Pp 25; Nett 54; Mil 37; and Vism 464. On the term cf. also Guenther 1991: p.68 n.2; Horner 1969: p.50 n.5; Ñāṇamoli 1962: p.28 n.83/3; and C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1922: p.14 n.3.

95 Gethin 1992: pp.38–40, suggests that the commentarial reading of apilāpeti should rather be apilapati (or abhilapati), which instead of describing sati as “plunging into”, would come to mean “reminding someone of something”. Cf. also Cox 1992: pp.79–82.

1 M I 56. A IV 430 explains “world” as referring to the pleasures of the five senses. This squares well with A IV 458, where satipaṭṭhāna leads to their abandoning. Vibh 195 takes “world” in the satipaṭṭhāna context to represent the five aggregates.

2 Nett 82.

3 S V 144 and S V 157.

4 Ps I 244.

5 e.g. by Kheminda 1990: p.109.

6 Generally speaking, the form vineyya can be either a gerund: “having removed” (this is how the commentary understands it, cf. Ps I 244: vinayitvā), or else 3rd sing. potential: “one should remove” (as e.g. at Sn 590; cf. also Woodward 1980: vol. IV, p.142 n.3). However, in the present context to take vineyya as a potential form is not acceptable, as then the sentence would have two finite verbs in different moods (viharati + vineyya). Usually the gerund form does imply an action preceding the action of the main verb, which in the present case would mean that the removal has to be completed prior to the practice of satipaṭṭhāna. However, in some cases the gerund can also represent an action occurring concurrently with the action denoted by the main verb. An example of a concurrent action expressed by the gerund is the standard description of the practice of loving kindness in the discourses (e.g. at M I 38) where the “abiding” (viharati) and the “pervading” (pharitvā) are simultaneous activities, together describing the act of radiating loving kindness. The same type of construction occurs in relation to the attainment of absorption (e.g. at D I 37), where the “abiding” (viharati) and the “attaining” (upasampajja) also take place simultaneously. In fact, several translators have rendered vineyya in such a way that it represents the outcome of satipaṭṭhāna practice. Cf. e.g. Dhammiko 1961: p.182: “um weltliches Begehren and Bekümmern zu überwinden”; Gethin 1992: p.29: “he … overcomes both desire for and discontent with the world”; Hamilton 1996: p.173: “in order to remove [himself] from the covetousness and misery in the world”; Hare 1955: vol. IV, p.199: “overcoming the hankering and dejection common in this world”; Hurvitz 1978: p.212: “putting off envy and ill disposition toward the world”; Jotika 1986: p.1: “keeping away covetousness and mental pain”; Lamotte 1970: p.1122: “au point de controler dans le monde la convoitise et la tristesse”; Lin Li Kouang 1949: p.119: “qu’il surmonte le déplaisir que la convoitise cause dans le monde”; C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: p.257: “overcoming both the hankering and the dejection common in the world”; Schmidt 1989: p.38: “alle weltlichen Wünsche and Sorgen vergessend”; Sīlananda 1990: p.177: “removing covetousness and grief in the world”; Solé-Leris 1999: p.116: “desechando la codicia y la aflicción de lo mundano”; Talamo 1998: p.556: “rimovendo bramosia e malcontento riguardo al mondo”; Ṭhānissaro 1996: p.83: “putting aside greed and distress with reference to the world”; Woodward 1979: vol. V, p.261: “restraining the dejection in the world that arises from coveting”.

7 A IV 458.

8 S V 150.

9 M III 84.

10 This would however only apply for the preliminary stages of practice, since for the first three satipaṭṭhānas to lead to awakening, freedom from desire and discontent is a requirement, indicated at M III 86 by qualifying the arising of the awakening factor of equanimity in relation to each of the four satipaṭṭhānas with the same expression as the one used at M III 84 in relation to the final four steps of mindfulness of breathing.

11 M I 55: “this is the direct path … for the disappearance of … discontent … namely, the four satipaṭṭhānas.”

12 Ps I 244 understands a successful removal of desires and discontent to be an outcome of the practice. Cf. also Debvedi 1990: p.22; Khemacari 1985: p.18; Ñāṇasaṃvara 1961: p.8, Ñāṇuttara 1990: p.280; and Yubodh 1985: p.9.

13 Ps I 244

14 At D I 72; D I 207; D III 49; M I 181; M I 269; M I 274; M I 347; M II 162; M II 226; M III 3; M III 35; M III 135; A II 210; A III 92; A III 100; A IV 437; A V 207; and It 118. In its general usage in the discourses, abhijjhā represents one of the ten unwholesome ways of acting (e.g. at D III 269). In this context it means covetousness, in the sense of the wish to own the possessions of others (cf. e.g. M I 287). Cf. also van Zeyst 1961b: p.91.

15 D II 306 defines domanassa as mental pain and unpleasantness. M III 218 then distinguishes between the types of domanassa owing to sensual discontent and those owing to spiritual dissatisfaction. According toM I 304, these latter types of domanassa are not at all related to the underlying tendency to irritation.

16 It is a typical tendency of the commentaries to associate a key term (in the present context abhijjhā) with a whole set or standard category as part of their attempt to clarify the teachings, but at times this is done without sufficient consideration of the context.

17 The standard definition, e.g. at M I 273, speaks of guarding the sense doors in order to avoid the flowing in of desires and discontent.

18 e.g. at D II 83; D III 101; M I 339; S III 93; S V154; S V160; S V 184; S V 301; S V 302; A III 155; A III 386; and A V 195. Of particular interest in this context is S III 93, which states that during this advanced level of well-established satipaṭṭhāna practice unwholesome thoughts will no longer be able to arise.

19 Cf. e.g. A V 114, where satipaṭṭhāna depends on sense-restraint, which in turn depends on mindfulness and clear knowledge (one of the body contemplations). This suggests some degree of interrelation between sense-restraint and satipaṭṭhāna in actual practice, rather than a one-sided dependency of the former on the latter.

20 e.g. at Vin IV 115.

21 At M I 301 samādhi is defined as unification of the mind (cittassekaggatā).

22 A III 30 speaks of samādhi gained through walking meditation. Although walking meditation can be employed to develop mental calm, it would not be the appropriate posture for deeper states of concentration. A II 45 refers to contemplating the arising and disappearance of feelings, cognitions, and thoughts, and to contemplating the impermanent nature of the five aggregates, as forms of samādhi. This breadth of meaning of samādhi is also documented at D III 222, which speaks of four different ways of developing samādhi, distinguished according to their results: samādhi leading to pleasant abiding (the jhānas), to knowledge and vision (through development of clarity of cognition), to mindfulness and clear knowledge (by contemplating the arising and passing away of feelings, cognitions, and thoughts), and to the destruction of the influxes (by contemplating the arising and passing away of the five aggregates).

23 A IV 300.

24 e.g. at D II 313: “he enters upon and remains in the first jhāna … the second jhāna … the third jhāna … the fourth jhāna … this is called right concentration.”

25 A IV 422 speaks of realizing the destruction of the influxes based on the first jhāna; cf. also M I 350; M I 435; and A V 343.

26 All four jhānas are needed only for the approach to realization by way of the threefold higher knowledge (tevijjā), cf. e.g. M I 357. In fact S I 191 reports that, of a substantial congregation of arahants, two out of each three had neither the threefold higher knowledge (tevijjā), nor supernormal knowledges (abhiññā) nor immaterial attainments. If all arahants possessed the ability to attain the fourth jhāna, one would expect a much higher percentage of them to have used this in order to develop one or the other of these attainments. However, Perera 1968: p.210, considers attainment of all four jhānas a necessary condition for awakening.

27 D II 217; M III 7; and S V 21. Cf. also D III 252 and A IV 40. Other ways of defining right concentration can also be found at e.g. M III 289, where a penetrative understanding of the six senses constitutes right concentration; or at S I 48, where rightly concentrating is a result of establishing sati; or at A III 27, which lists what is probably a form of insight meditation as an alternative way to develop right concentration.

28 M III 71: “monks, I will teach you noble right concentration.”

29 M III 71: “right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, and right mindfulness. Unification of the mind equipped with these seven factors is called noble right concentration.” Judging from other discourses, to speak of “unification of the mind” need not necessarily imply absorption attainment, since e.g. A II 14 relates unification of the mind to walking and standing, or at A III 174 unification of the mind occurs while listening to the Dhamma.

30 Cf. also Ba Khin 1994: p.69: “right concentration cannot be achieved unless there is right effort and right mindfulness”; Buddhadāsa 1976: p.36: “’a wholesome mind steadily fixed on an object’ … the term ‘wholesome’ is much more important than ‘steadily fixed’ … the motives for practising concentration must be pure … must be based on insight and right view”; and Weeraratne 1990: p.45: “right concentration … is the one pointedness of mind achieved through cultivating the preceding seven stages of the path,” (as a translation of M III 71).

31 Vibh 107 defines right concentration simply as “steadfastness of the mind” (in the Abhidhamma exposition; the Suttanta exposition at Vibh 106, however, enumerates the four jhānas). Vism 510 also defines right concentration as “unification of the mind”.

32 A III 423 points out that without purifying view it is not possible to develop right concentration.

33 Cf.MI 164 for the bodhisatta’s encounters with Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta.

34 Cf. Monier-Williams 1995: p.1181, who translates the corresponding Sanskrit term samyak with “complete”, “entire”, and “whole”. T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.655, has “towards one point”. Cf. also Gruber 1999: p.190, who comments on the inappropriateness of translating sammā as “right”.

35 The relation between these two words appears on several occasions, e.g. at D II 239; D II 265; M I 243; Dhp 372; Sn 1009; and Thī 401.

36 M III 14 speaks of being under the influence of the five hindrances as a type of jhāna of which the Buddha did not approve. Another example is the injunction “not to neglect jhāna” (anirākatajjhāna), which at M I 33 and It 39 occurs together with “being devoted to mental calm” and “being endowed with insight”, probably including both in the general sense of “meditation”. Similarly, the frequent exhortation jhāyatha bhikkhave (e.g. at M I 46) is better rendered “meditate monks” than “attain absorption monks”. Another example is the expression “not lacking jhāna” (arittajjhāno), which at A I 39–43 is combined with several meditation practices that do not in themselves yield absorption attainment, such as satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of impermanence, or the six recollections. The most common use of jhāna in the discourses, however, refers to absorption, this kind of usage being easily recognizable by the circumstance that absorption jhāna is usually classified as “first”, “second”, etc. (except for A V 133, where “jhāna” is at first used unspecified, but at the conclusion of the discourse this jhāna is shown to be the first level of absorption).

37 The standard definitions, e.g. at D I 73, speak of the first jhāna as “with initial and sustained mental application” (savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ). Several discourses also mention a level of absorption without initial but with sustained mental application (D III 219; D III 274; M III 162; S IV 360; S IV 363; and A IV 300). The resulting fivefold form of presenting the four jhānas became more prominent in the Abhidhamma (explained in detail at As 179). Stuart-Fox 1989: p.92, points out that some of the above quoted occurrences are missing from the corresponding Chinese editions.

38 Barnes 1981: p.257; Bucknell 1993: p.397; Kalupahana 1994: p.35; Ott 1912: p.348; and Stuart-Fox 1989: p.94.

39 M II 28 associates the second jhāna with the cessation of “wholesome intentions”, while S II 273 speaks of the second jhāna as “noble silence”; the same expression occurs also at Th 650 and 999. (Commentary Th-a II 274 identifies this as second jhāna, but Th-a III 102 even speaks of the fourth jhāna.)

40 Cf. e.g. Vism 125 on the development of the counterpart sign; and Vism 285 on the development of absorption based on the concentrative sign gained through in- and out-breathing.

41 M III 162, where only after having consecutively overcome a whole series of mental obstructions (cf. in detail page 199, footnote 73) he was able to attain the first jhāna. Cf. also A IV 439, which reports his struggle to overcome sensuality in order to be able to develop jhāna.

42 M I 246. Possibly his ability to enter the first jhāna so easily at this particular moment during his early youth was related to samatha practice undertaken in a previous life, an ability lost during his adolescence and later sensual indulgence as a young man, so that he had to develop it anew.

43 S IV 263.

44 Cf. A I 23.

45 S IV 217; same at S IV 220–3. Kv 200 uses this passage to oppose the (wrong) view that the jhāna factors initial and sustained mental application refer to vocal activity. This view arose because of their definition as verbal formations at M I 301.

46 A V 135. According to Brahmavaṃso 1999: p.29, “while in any jhāna it is impossible to ... hear a sound from outside or produce any thought.” Kv 572 also refutes the view that it is possible to hear sound during jhāna attainment. At Vin III 109, some monks accused Moggallāna to have falsely claimed attainment, because he had stated that while being in the “imperturbable concentration” (i.e. fourth jhāna or an immaterial attainment) he had heard sounds. The fact that this led the monks to accuse him of false claims shows that the impossibility of hearing sound during deep absorption was generally accepted among the monks. However, the Buddha exonerated Moggallāna, explaining that it was possible to hear sound even during such a deep level of jhāna, if the attainment was impure (aparisuddho). Sp II 513 explains that because he had not fully overcome the obstructions to absorption, Moggallāna’s attainment was not stable and thus the hearing took place in a moment of instability of the concentration.

47 A IV 430 refers to a monk having attained the first jhāna as having reached the end of the world (“world” being identified with the five sense-pleasures in the same discourse). Another example of the distinct character of the jhānic experience is the kind of cognition operating during the first jhāna, which D I 182 calls a “subtle but real” cognition (sukhumasaccasaññā). This expression indicates the attenuated form of cognition that takes place during absorption, different from the way in which the ordinary world is cognized.

48 These are the elements of materiality and immateriality (D III 215), corresponding to the material and immaterial realms of existence (S V 56), and different from the element of sensuality or the sensual realm.

49 M I 521.

50 M I 159 and M I 174.

51 M III 73.

52 “Application of the mind” (cetaso abhiniropanā) occurs at Vibh 257 and at Vism 142 in a definition of vitakka. Similar understandings of vitakka can be found in Ayya Khema 1991: p.115; Bodhi 2000: p.52, and 1993: p.82; Chah 1992: p.53; Cousins 1992: p.153; Eden 1984: p.89; Goenka 1999: p.93; Ledi 1986a: p.52; Pa Auk 1999: p.17; C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1922: p.8 n.1; Shwe 1979: p.238 n.1; Stcherbatsky 1994: p.104; and Sujīva 1996: p.10.

53 Indicated in the standard descriptions of the second jhāna (e.g. at D I 74) by qualifying the joy and happiness experienced to be “born of concentration” (samādhija), and by the expression “singleness of mind” (cetasa ekodibhāva).

54 e.g. at S IV 80.

55 A III 426 points out that without samādhi it is impossible to gain realization.

56 A III 19; A III 200; A III 360; A IV 99; A IV 336; A V 4–6; and A V 314 explain that without right concentration it is not possible to gain liberation. A III 423 stresses again that right concentration is required to be able to eradicate the fetters and realize Nibbāna. It is interesting to note that in most of these cases the absence of right concentration is due to a lack of ethical conduct, so that in the reverse case (cf. e.g. A III 20) one gets a statement indicating that the “rightness” of concentration is the outcome of ethical conduct (viz. factors three, four, and five of the noble eightfold path). This brings to mind the alternative definition discussed above of right concentration as unification of the mind in interrelation with the other path factors. (This is further supported by the use of the Pāli word upanisā in the instances under discussion at present, which echoes the expression sa-upanisā used in the definition of right concentration as unification of the mind at M III 71.)

57 The distinction drawn here is concerned with what the commentaries refer to as “supramundane” and as “mundane” concentration (cf. the definition given at Vism 85).

58 S V 410 lists the need to associate with worthy men, to listen to the Dhamma, to develop wise attention (yoniso manasikāra), and to undertake practice in accordance with the Dhamma as requirements for the realization of stream-entry. (S II 18 explains practice in accordance with the Dhamma to refer in particular to overcoming ignorance through developing dispassion.) On requirements for stream-entry cf. also M I 323.

59 One would expect this ability to be mentioned among the four characteristic qualities of a stream-enterer, which however are confined to perfect confidence in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha, together with firm ethical conduct. At S V 357 the Buddha mentioned these four as defining characteristics of a stream-enterer.

60 e.g. A III 63. Cf. also M I 323, which mentions several qualities needed for stream-entry, among them not being obsessed by the hindrances.

61 It 118.

62 S V 95.

63 D I 110 and D I 148 feature rich Brahmins, whose busy lifestyle as administrators of a royal domain would not be particularly conducive to the development of jhāna, yet each of them realized stream-entry while hearing a discourse of the Buddha. M I 380 and A IV 186 report the stream-entries of stout followers of the Jains during a discourse of the Buddha. (Considering that the leader of the Jains, according to S IV 298, even doubted the existence of the second jhāna, one may well suppose that jhānic abilities are improbable in the case of his followers. This impression is borne out by the account given in Tatia 1951: pp.281–93.) At A IV 213 a drunken layman, sobered up through the impact of meeting the Buddha for the first time, realized stream-entry during a gradual discourse given at that same first meeting. Ud 49 has a leper, described as a poor, pitiable, and wretched person, similarly realizing stream-entry during a discourse of the Buddha. This leper had actually mistaken the crowd listening to the Buddha for a free distribution of food and had only approached in hope of getting a meal. Finally, according to Vin II 192, several hired killers, one of whom even had the mission of killing the Buddha, all became stream-enterers instead of completing their mission after hearing a gradual discourse by the Buddha. In all these cases it is not very probable that those realizing stream-entry were involved in the regular practice of meditation or in the possession of jhānic attainments.

64 All above quoted instances explicitly mention the mind being free from the hindrances.

65 Cf. Visuddhacara 1996: who gives a convenient overview of statements by several well-known meditation teachers on the issue.

66 e.g. at M I 226. The fact that once-returners do return to “this world” is documented e.g. at A III 348 and A V 138, where once-returners are reborn in the Tusita heaven, a lower celestial realm of the sensual sphere, far inferior to those planes of existence corresponding to absorption attainment. Similarly, according to A IV 380 the more advanced types of stream-enterers will be reborn as human beings, a level of rebirth even further removed from the planes of existence gained through absorption abilities.

67 According to A II 126, one who has developed the first jhāna will be reborn in the Brahmā world. A worldling (puthujjana) will then after some time be reborn in lower realms again, while a noble one (ariya) will proceed from there to final Nibbāna. (This passage refers not only to someone who is absorbed in the actual attainment at the time of death, but to anyone who possesses the ability to attain jhāna.) A similar passage can be found at A I 267 concerning immaterial attainments and rebirth, and at A II 129 regarding the divine abodes and rebirth.

68 According to A IV 380 the once-returner, in contrast to the non-returner, has not perfected/completed samādhi. A similar passage can be found at A I 232 and 233. Cf. also Dhammavuddho 1994: p.29; and Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.372.

69 e.g. M I 350 and A V 343 describe how a monk, based on attainment of the first or a higher jhāna, is able to reach the destruction of the influxes or non-returning. More explicit isMI 434–5, which clearly stipulates the attainment of jhāna as a necessity for the two higher stages of awakening. Similarly A IV 422 mentions jhānic abilities as a necessary condition for gaining non-returning or full awakening.

70 At A II 128 the insightful contemplation of absorption leads to non-returning (rebirth in the Suddhāvāsa heaven). Compare also M I 91 where Mahānāma, who according to the commentary (Ps II 61) was a once-returner, was advised by the Buddha to develop jhāna for further progress on the path.

71 MI 62: “if anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas…one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or, if there is a trace of clinging left, non-returning.”

72 MI 434 states that there is a path of practice which needs be undertaken in order to be able to overcome the five lower fetters, and this path of practice is jhāna attainment.

73 S V 129–33.

74 In the Madhyama Āgama as part of the body contemplations, and in the Ekottara Āgama as part of the contemplations of dhammas (in Minh Chau 1991: pp.89 and 90; and Nhat Hanh 1990: p.154 and 176).

75 M I 149. This particular “path” scheme forms the underlying structure of the Visuddhimagga. It has been compared to other religious traditions by Brown (1986a) who relates it to path descriptions in the Mahāmudra and the Yoga Sūtras, and by Cousins (1989) who compares it to St Teresa’s “Interior Castle”. Concerning this path scheme it may be worthwhile to point out that, even though it has a normative role for the commentaries and most modern vipassanā schools, this set of seven purifications occurs only once again in the discourses, at D III 288, where it forms part of a nine-stage scheme. This passage does not fit too well with Buddhaghosa’s presentation of the seven-stage model, since it adds two additional stages at the end of a progression of stages where, according to Buddhaghosa, with the seventh stage the peak of purification has already been reached (cf. Vism 672). Judging from its usage at M I 195 and M I 203, the term used for the seventh purification, “knowledge and vision”, is indeed only a stage leading up to, but not yet identical with, realization. This impression is confirmed by the Rathavinīta Sutta itself, which qualifies the purification by “knowledge and vision” as “with clinging” and therefore as falling short of the final goal (M I 148). Thus it seems as if Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of the seventh stage of purification were to some degree at variance with the implications of the same term in the discourses.

76 Possibly based on A II 195, where purity of mind is related to attaining the four jhānas. The ability to attain absorption as a necessary basis for realization is maintained by e.g. Kheminda 1980: p.14.

77 Cf. e.g. M I 197 and M I 204.

78 D I 124. Cf. also Chah 1998: p.9; and Goleman 1980: p.6.

79 A III 15 and A III 423.

80 A II 92–4 and A V 99.

81 A II 150.

82 A II 157; cf. also Tatia 1992: p.89.

83 e.g. D III 131; M I 454; or S V 308. The importance given to absorption in early Buddhism is documented by Griffith 1983: p.57, and C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1927a: p.696, both giving an overview of occurrences of the term jhāna in the Pāli Nikāyas.

84 A IV 34.

85 M I 463 explains that the mind of one who has had jhānic experiences will no longer be overwhelmed by the hindrances. On the other hand, it needs to be pointed out that if sensual desire or aversion should nevertheless manage to invade the mind, they can manifest with surprising vehemence, owing to the increased ability of the mind to remain undistractedly with a single object, even an unwholesome one. Examples of this can be found in several Jātaka tales (e.g. no. 66 at Ja I 305, no. 251 at Ja II 271, and no. 431 at Ja III 496), which report previous lives of the bodhisatta as an ascetic. In spite of being able to attain deep levels of concentration and possessed of supernormal powers, in each case this ascetic was nevertheless completely overwhelmed by sensual desire on unexpectedly seeing a sparsely-dressed woman.

86 This is the standard qualification of the mental condition on emerging from the fourth jhāna (e.g. at D I 75).

87 At M I 504 the Buddha related his lack of interest in sensual pleasures to his ability to experience far superior types of pleasure; cf. also A III 207 and A IV 411. A I 61 explains that the purpose of samatha is to overcome lust. Conze 1960: p.110, explains: “it is the inevitable result of the habitual practice of trance that the things of our commonsense world appear delusive, deceptive, remote, and dreamlike.” Cf. also Debes 1994: pp.164–8; and van Zeyst 1970: p.39.

88 M I 91.

89 M I 92; cf. also S IV 97 and A IV 439. A IV 56 stresses the importance of overcoming sensual desires for him to have been able to gain realization. The Buddha’s attainment of absorption might have taken place based on mindfulness of breathing, which according to S V 317 he practised frequently in the time before his awakening. His gradual progress through the various levels of absorption is described at M III 162 and A IV 440, clearly showing that by then he no longer had access to the jhānic experience of his early youth. His encounter with Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta would have to be placed after this gradual progress, since without having developed the four jhānas he would not have been able to reach any of the immaterial attainments. (The need for this is documented at D III 265, where the four jhānas precede the immaterial attainments in a sequence of successive stages of development.) Ps IV 209, however, assumes that the Buddha developed the four jhānas only during the first watch of the night of his awakening. This makes little sense in view of the fact that his pre-awakening development of samatha included also the practice of the “roads to power” (the iddhipādas, cf. A III 82) and developing the concentrative ability to know various aspects of the deva realms (A IV 302), in addition to attaining the four jhānas after overcoming a whole set of mental obstructions (M III 157; cf. also A IV 440, which clearly shows that he had to overcome various obstacles in order to gain each jhāna) and also gaining the four immaterial attainments (A IV 444). The broad range and gradual progression of the Buddha’s development of samatha does not fit well into a single night.

90 According to Alexander 1931: p.139, “the absorption scale corresponds to the chronological path of a well-conducted analysis.” Cf. also Conze 1956: p.20.

91 Ayya Khema 1991: p.140; and Epstein 1986: pp.150–5.

92 Engler 1986: p.17, aptly sums up the need for a well integrated personality as a basis for developing insight meditation: “you have to be somebody before you can be nobody.” Epstein 1995: p.133, (commenting on the insight knowledges) explains: “experiences such as these require an ego, in the psychoanalytic sense, that is capable of holding and integrating what would ordinarily be violently destabilizing. One is challenged to experience terror without fear and delight without attachment. The work of meditation, in one sense, is the work of developing an ego that is flexible, clear and balanced enough to enable one to have such experiences.” The supportive role of non-sensual inner happiness in case of hardship is documented at Th 351 and Th 436.

93 A IV 123.

94 A II 31. Cf. also S II 225, where lack of respect for the development of concentration is one of the causes of the disappearance of the true Dhamma. According to Thate 1996: p.93: “those who think that samādhi is not necessary are the ones who have not yet reached samādhi. That’s why they cannot see the merit of samādhi. Those who have attained samādhi will never speak against it.”

95 At A II 165 the Buddha compared attachment to the gratification and bliss experienced during absorption to grasping a branch full of resin, because owing to such attachment one will lose the inspiration to aim at the complete giving up of all aspects of one’s personality and experience. At M I 194 the Buddha then illustrated such attachment using the example of someone who took the inner bark of a tree in mistake for the heartwood he was searching for. Cf. also M III 226, which refers to such attachment to jhāna experiences as “getting stuck internally”. Buddhadāsa 1993: p.121, even goes so far as to suggest that “deep concentration is a major obstacle to insight practice”.

96 According to S I 120, the monk Godhika committed suicide because on six successive occasions he had attained and lost “temporary liberation of the mind”, which according to Spk I 182 refers to a “mundane” attainment, i.e. some concentrative attainment. The commentary explains that his repeated loss of the attainment was because of illness. According to a statement made by the Buddha after the event, Godhika died as an arahant. The commentary suggests that his realization took place at the moment of death (cf. also the similar commentarial explanations of the suicide cases of Channa at M III 266 or S IV 59, and of Vakkali at S III 123).

97 S III 125.

98 Nett 43 explains that both samatha and vipassanā need to be developed, since samatha counters craving, while vipassanā counters ignorance. According to A I 61, the development of both samatha and vipassanā is required to gain knowledge (vijjā). A I 100 stipulates the same two as requirements for overcoming lust, anger, and delusion. Awareness of their cooperative effect also underlies Th 584, which recommends practising both samatha and vipassanā at the right time. On the need to balance both cf. Cousins 1984: p.65; Gethin 1992: p.345; and Maha Boowa 1994: p.86.

99 Cf. de la Vallée Poussin 1936: p.193; Gombrich 1996: p.110; Griffith 1981: p.618, and 1986: p.14; Pande 1957: p.538; Schmithausen 1981: pp.214–17; and Vetter 1988: p.xxi. Kv 225 confutes a somewhat similar “wrong view”, involving two types of cessation (nirodha).

100 A I 61.

101 Cf. e.g. M I 296; see further Lily de Silva 1978: p.120.

102 In fact, Vism 702 explains that the attainment of the cessation of cognition and feeling (saññāvedayitanirodha) cannot be reached by samatha alone, but requires insight of the non-returner’s level at least. Although this is not directly stated in the discourses, at M III 44, after all eight preceding concentrative attainments have been distinguished according to whether they are attained by the unworthy person or by the worthy person (sappurisa), once the attainment of the cessation of cognition and feeling comes up the unworthy person is no longer mentioned, thereby indicating that this attainment is the sole domain of the worthy person (a term which on other occasions is used on a par with “noble”, cf. e.g. M I 300). This clearly shows that the attainment of the cessation of cognition and feeling is not merely the outcome of concentrative mastery, but also requires the development of insight, a fact that is hinted at in the standard descriptions with the expression, “having seen with wisdom, the influxes are destroyed” (e.g. at M I 160). Cf. also A III 194, which appears to relate the cessation of cognition and feeling to arahantship and non-returning in particular.

103 S II 121.

104 Gombrich 1996: p.126.

105 In this context it is telling that A IV 452 lists different types of arahants “freed by wisdom”, all of them, however, able to attain jhāna.

106 S II 115. Cf. de la Vallée Poussin 1936: p.218; and Gombrich 1996: p.128.

107 Spk II 122.

108 Critical assessments of the “two paths theory” can be found in Gethin 1997b: p.221; Swearer 1972: pp.369–71; and Keown 1992: pp.77–9, who concludes (p 82): “two types of meditation technique … exist precisely because final perfection can only be achieved when both dimensions of psychic functioning, the emotional and the intellectual, are purified.”

109 Paṭis I 21. On the interrelation of both in the Sarvāstivāda tradition cf. Cox 1994: p.83.

1 This expression is suggested by W.S. Karunaratne 1979: p.117.

2 Ṭhānissaro 1996: p.79, alternatively speaks of a basic pattern of three stages underlying the “refrain”.

3 M I 56. For the other satipaṭṭhānas, each instance of “body” in the above instruction should be replaced with “feelings”, “mind”, or “dhammas”.

4 Cf. S V 294, according to which to contemplate both internally and externally is the proper way to undertake satipaṭṭhāna.

5 This can to some extent be inferred from the way the “refrain” is worded, since attention now shifts from a particular instance (such as, for example, “a worldly pleasant feeling”) back to the general area (such as “feelings”).

6 On the importance of shifting from content to general process cf. Brown 1986a: p.233; Goldstein 1994: p.50; and Kornfield 1977: p.19. According to Engler 1986: p.28, one of the reasons western meditators tend to progress more slowly than their eastern counterparts is “the tendency to become absorbed in the content of awareness rather than continuing to attend to its process … become preoccupied with individual thoughts, images, memories, sensations etc., rather than keeping their attention focused on the essential characteristics of all psycho-physical events, whatever the content … a tendency to confuse meditation with psychotherapy and to analyse mental content instead of simply observing it.” On the same problem cf. also Walsh 1981: p.76. The need to contemplate the general characteristics of anicca, dukkha, and anattā when cultivating satipaṭṭhāna is also noted in the Abhidharmakośabhāśyam (in Pruden 1988: p.925).

7 Jumnien 1993: p.279, aptly describes this stage of practice: “at some point the mind becomes so clear and balanced that whatever arises is seen and left untouched with no interference. One ceases to focus on any particular content and all is seen as simply mind and matter, an empty process arising and passing away of its own …a perfect balance of mind with no reactions … there is no longer any doing.…”

8 Cf. Mahasi 1990: pp.17 and 21: “the actual method of practice in vipassanā meditation is to … observe … the successive occurrences of seeing, hearing, and so on, at the six sense doors. However, it will not be possible for a beginner to follow these on all successive incidents as they occur, because his mindfulness, concentration and knowledge are still very weak.… A simpler and easier form of the exercise for a beginner is this: With every breath there occurs in the abdomen a rising–falling movement. A beginner should start with the exercise of noting this movement.” Mahasi 1992: p.75: “we used to instruct the yogi whose powers of concentration have strengthened to extend this method of meditation to noting all that happens at his six sense doors.” Ba Khin 1985: p.94: “in fact one can develop the understanding of anicca through any of the six organs of sense. In practice, however, we have found that … the feeling by contact of touch … is more tangible than other types of feeling and therefore a beginner in Vipassanā meditation can come to the understanding of anicca more easily through bodily feelings.… This is the main reason we have chosen the body feelings as a medium for the quick understanding of anicca. It is open to anyone to try other means, but my suggestion is that one should have oneself well established in the understanding of anicca through bodily feelings before an attempt is made through other types of feeling.”

9 Dhs 187; same at Vibh 2–10 for each aggregate. Cf. also Vism 473.

10 This is, in fact, implied by the presentation at D II 216, where internal satipaṭṭhāna contemplation leads to concentration, which then enables one to undertake external contemplation. Cf. also S II 127, where contemplation of the states of mind of others forms part of a list of deep concentrative attainments, which suggests that here too such contemplation is understood as an exercise of psychic powers. Cf. also Ṭhānissaro 1996: p.76.

11 S V 143. Similarly S V 294; S V 297; and A III 450 treat these three modes as distinct contemplations. Several discourses apply the distinction between the internal and the external individually to feelings, to the hindrances, to the awakening factors, and to the aggregates (cf. e.g. M III 16; S IV 205; and S V 110). These passages suggest that the application of “internal” and “external” to all satipaṭṭhāna. in the “refrain” is not merely a case of meaningless repetition, but has to have some significance in each case. Cf. also Gethin 1992: p.54.

12 Vibh 193 (this occurs in the Suttanta exposition). Onthe dating of Vibh cf. Frauwallner 1971: vol.15, p.106; and Warder 1982: p.xxx.

13 Vibh 228. In fact, the satipaṭṭhāna. commentary explicitly applies “external” to each satipaṭṭhāna. technique, to the breath at Ps I 249, to the postures at Ps I 252, to bodily activities at Ps I 270, to the bodily parts at Ps I 271, to the elements at Ps I 272, to the cemetery contemplations at Ps I 273, to feelings at Ps I 279, to the mind at Ps I 280, to the hindrances at Ps I 286, to the aggregates at Ps I 287, to the sense-spheres at Ps I 289, to the awakening factors at Ps I 300, and to the four noble truths at Ps I 301.

14 S V 110.

15 Khemacari 1985: p.26.

16 D III 103 and A I 171. Cf. also M I 318, which recommends investigating by way of seeing and hearing for monks without telepathic powers in order to be able to assess the Buddha’s mental purity; or else M II 172, where observing the bodily and verbal conduct of a monk forms the basis for assessing whether his mind is under the influence of greed, anger, or delusion.

17 Ehara 1995: pp.58–61; and Vism 101–10. Cf. also Mann 1992: pp.19–51.

18 Mann 1992: p.112, speaks of realizing “that the forces at work within other people are the same as the forces that motivate our own behaviour”. Similarly, insights gained during external contemplation will in turn also support internal contemplation. For example, it is comparatively easy to uncover the underlying motives of particular reactions in someone else, while the same motives might pass undetected if one is the actor oneself. Cf. also Bullen 1982: p.32; Khemacari 1985: p.23; and Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.58, who explains that “many things permit of better understanding when observed in others, or in external objects, than in oneself”.

19 Cf. also Ñāṇapoṇika 1951: p.35.

20 Ps I 249.

21 This is implicit in the way the respective contemplations are formulated at Vibh 195, according to which internally one understands: “I feel a pleasant feeling”, externally one understands: “he or she feels a pleasant feeling”, internally and externally one understands: “a pleasant feeling”. The same recurs at Vibh 197 for mind and at Vibh 199–201 for dhammas.

22 M II 246.

23 D II 216.

24 Goenka 1999: p.54; Solé-Leris 1992: p.82; and Thate 1996: p.44. This way of understanding “internal” and “external” could be supported with Th 172, where “internal” and “external” are both used with regard to the speaker’s own body, so that here too they seem to be referring to the inner and outer parts of the same body.

25 M I 61: ajjhattikabāhiresu āyatanesu.

26 Dhammadharo 1993: pp.263–6; and Ñāṇasaṃvara 1961: p.27.

27 Cf. Jayatilleke 1980: pp.361–8; Kalupahana 1992: p.107; Karunadasa 1996: p.35; and W.S. Karunaratne 1988a: p.90. The term paramattha occurs at Sn 68; Sn 219; and Th 748. Elsewhere related terms occur, like paramañāṇa at A III 354, paramapaññā and parama ariyasacca at M III 245, paramasacca at M I 480, M II 173, and A II 115, and uttamattha at Dhp 403. All these instances are references only to Nibbāna. The presumption that the one-hundred-and-twenty-one types of mental states, fifty-two types of mental factors, and twenty-eight types of matter listed in the Abhidh-s can be considered “paramattha”, in the sense of being ultimately real, is a late development not found in the early discourses. For an exposition of this later conception of paramattha cf. Bodhi 1993: pp.6 and 25; and Ledi 1999b: p.99.

28 Dhammadharo 1987: pp.20 and 25, and Maha Boowa 1994: p.101, relate the distinction between internal and external to mental and physical feelings respectively, and to mind only (internal) and mind with an external object in the case of mind. Fessel 1999: p.105, understands “internal” to refer to internal mental experience and introversion, while “external” represents external influences and object-directed activities. Tiwari 1992: p.82, also relates “internal” to mental and “external” to physical feelings. Similarly, the Mahāprajñāpāramitāāśāstra considers internal feelings and states of mind to be those related to mind door events, while the corresponding external counterparts are those related to the other five senses (in Lamotte 1970: pp.1173–5). Ñāṇasaṃvara 1974: pp.28 and 71 applies this way of understanding to mindfulness of breathing, in the sense that the breath is “external”, while awareness of the breath is “internal”. This, however, does not yield meaningful alternative forms of practice, since the presence of both breath and awareness is required for “internal” and for “external” contemplation.

29 S V 279.

30 S V 110. However, it should be noted that the same discourse does not apply this distinction to sloth-and-torpor or to restlessness-and-worry, although both these hindrances could also arise owing to either mind door or five sense door experiences.

31 M I 60: “he knows ‘there is aversion in me’” (atthi me ajjhattaṃ); or M I 61: “he knows ‘there is the mindfulness awakening factor in me’” (atthi me ajjhattaṃ). These instructions do not seem to apply only to hindrances or awakening factors arising in relation to mind door events.

32 e.g. at D I 74. Other examples are “internal” calm of the mind at M I 213, or “internal” happiness (referring to jhāna) at M III 233.

33 M III 225: “seeing a visible object … cognizing a mental object … consciousness is distracted externally.” The phrase “internally stuck state of mind”, however, does indeed imply mental experience, namely attachment to the pleasure of jhāna.

34 e.g. M I 346 relates internal happiness to all six senses; or S IV 139 speaks of internal lust, anger, and delusion in relation to all six senses; or S V 74 relates an internally steady mind to all six senses.

35 This is suggested by several verses in the Sutta Nipāta, where “internal” and “external” occur together in the sense of “whatever there is”, expressing a sense of comprehensiveness, cf. Sn 516; Sn 521; Sn 527; and Sn 738. The need for such comprehensiveness is not only a characteristic of satipaṭṭhāna practice, but also features in a contemplation of emptiness described at M III 112, which similarly proceeds from “internal” to “external” and culminates in contemplation undertaken “both internally and externally”.

36 A similar shift towards comprehensiveness features in the standard descriptions on how to develop insight with regard to the five aggregates, where after a detailed examination of a single aggregate, the insight gained is applied to all possible instances of it (cf. e.g. M I 138).

37 This way of translating the compound is supported by its use at S III 171, where it clearly refers to the “nature of arising and passing away”. Cf. also Ñāṇatiloka 1910: p.95 n.1, who translates samudayadhamma as “the law of arising” (das Enstehungsgesetz); and Ñāṇamoli 1994: p.53, who translates vayadhamma “having the nature of fall”.

38 S III 171 and S IV 50.

39 S III 51 and S IV 142.

40 A III 2. Impermanence as the key aspect of insight is also emphasized by Fleischman 1986: p.11; Ledi 1999a: p.151; Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.60; Solé-Leris 1992: p.82; and Than Daing 1970: p.62.

41 According to Ledi (n.d): p.233, insight into arising and passing away is the key aspect of the insight knowledges and relevant for the progress to all four stages of awakening. Excellent expositions on the insight knowledges can be found in Mahasi 1994: pp.8–36; and Ñāṇārāma 1993: pp.19–62.

42 At D III 243; D III 251; D III 290; D III 291; S V 132; S V 345; A I 41; A III 85; A III 277; A III 334; A III 452; A IV 46; A IV 52; A IV 148; A IV 387; A IV 465; A V 105; and A V 309. (Literally translated, the pattern runs: “cognition of impermanence, cognition of unsatisfactoriness in the impermanent, cognition of not-self in the unsatisfactory”.) This pattern is also reflected in the statement “what is impermanent that is unsatisfactory, what is unsatisfactory that is not-self”, e.g. at S III 22; S III 45; S III 82; S IV 1; and S IV 153. Cf. also Bodhi 2000: p.844. Ñāṇananda 1986: p.103, explains: “in ‘sukha’ and ‘attā’ we have the affective and conative reactions to the illusion of permanence.”

43 S III 67.

44 A III 443 and A III 447 relate awareness of impermanence to disenchantment in general, while A IV 51 relates it in particular to being disinterested in worldly gains.

45 Awareness of the empty nature of what is unsatisfactory leads, according to A IV 53, to overcoming all notions of I or mine. Cf. also A IV 353; A IV 358; and Ud 37; according to which insight into not-self, being based on awareness of impermanence, leads to the eradication of all conceit and therewith to realization.

46 S V 183 explains the shift from mere satipaṭṭhāna to a “development” (bhāvanā) of satipaṭṭhāna to consist in contemplation of the nature of arising and passing away. This discourse is, however, missing from the Chinese Āgamas, cf. Akanuma 1990: p.247.

47 In fact, M I 62 speaks of the need to “develop” satipaṭṭhāna in order for it to lead to highest realization: “if anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas … one of two fruits could be expected for him”; an expression that is reminiscent of the reference to “development” (bhāvanā) at S V 183. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the emphasis the Pāli texts place on contemplation of impermanence, the Madhyama Āgama version of the satipaṭṭhāna “refrain” does not mention it at all. The Ekottara Āgama version, however, has preserved it at least in relation to contemplation of feelings, mind, and dhammas (cf. Minh Chau 1991: p.88; and Nhat Hanh 1990: pp.173, 175 and 177). The injunction to contemplate “arising” and “disappearing” in relation to all four satipaṭṭhānas occurs also in the Saṃyukta Āgama equivalent of the Samudaya Sutta (S V 184), cf. the translation in Hurvitz 1978: p.215.

48 Goenka 1994a: p.112.

49 M I 61: “such is material form … feeling … cognition … volitions … consciousness, such its arising, such its passing away.” Cf. further page 213.

50 Continuity in contemplating impermanence is mentioned at A IV 13 and A IV 145; cf. also Th 111.

51 A III 441.

52 A III 439.

53 A IV 224 and A V 174.

54 Cf. A III 377; A IV 404; A III 379; and Th 643.

55 Ps I 249.

56 S V 184. (However, this passage does not fully fit with the “refrain”, since the term used here is “disappearing”, atthagama, not “passing away”, vaya, as in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.)

57 M I 22; M I 248; and A IV 176. S II 10 and S II 104 document his realization of dependent co-arising. The importance of the first two higher knowledges as exemplifications of impermanence and causality is noted by Demieville 1954: p.294; and Werner 1991: p.13; cf. also Lopez 1992: p.35. In addition to the above passages, the discourses document the growth of the Buddha’s wisdom from a variety of angles, involving a contemplation of the enjoyment, the inherent disadvantage, and the escape in relation to the elements (S II 170), the aggregates (S III 27; S III 29; and S III 59), the sense-spheres (S IV 7–10 and S V 206), feeling (S IV 233), the faculties (S V 204), the “world” (A I 258), and the four noble truths (S V 423). Each of these discourses directly relates the respective insight to the Buddha’s attainment of full awakening, which suggests that each of these insights can be considered a particular aspect of his comprehensive realization.

58 D II 31–5, where a detailed investigation of the conditional links leading from dukkha up to the reciprocal relationship between consciousness and name-and-form led on to his practice of the satipaṭṭhāna contemplation of the five aggregates, resulting in realization. A practical example of how impermanence and conditionality can be interrelated in the context of contemplation can also be found at S IV 211, which relates the conditioned arising of the three types of feelings to the impermanent nature of the body; (same at S IV 215 in regard to contact).

59 Cf. Kalupahana 1975: p.125.

60 See esp. Pūraṇa Kassapa and Makkhali Gosāla at D I 52. Cf. also Bodhi 1989: p.7.

61 A typical example can be found at S II 19, where the Buddha was asked whether dukkha was caused by oneself, by others, by both, or by neither (i.e. arisen by chance). After the Buddha had denied all four alternatives his interlocutor, surprised that all four ways of stating the causality of dukkha had been rejected, wondered whether the Buddha was simply unable to see or admit the existence of dukkha. A similar dialogue in relation to sukha dukkha occurs at S II 22. The novelty of the Buddha’s position can also be seen in the fact that the term paṭicca samuppāda was apparently invented by him in order to express his understanding of causality, cf. Kalupahana 1999: p.283. However C.A.F. Rhys Davids, in one of her imaginative interpretations of the Pāli canon, suggests that it was not the Buddha, but rather Assaji, who was responsible for the early Buddhist theory of causation (1927b: p.202).

62 Paṭis I 52. Bodhi 2000: p.741 n.50, points out that the scheme of four temporal modes (past cause, present result, present cause, future result) underlying the three-lifetime presentation has a predecessor at S II 24.

63 Jayatilleke 1980: p.450.

64 At D II 57, the first two links, ignorance and formations, as well as the six-sense-spheres link are missing, and consciousness is presented in a reciprocal relationship with name-and-form. The same reciprocal relationship between consciousness and name-and-form occurs at D II 32; S II 104; and S II 113. Sn 724–65 relates each of the links separately and independently to dukkha. (On these variations of the standard twelve-link formula cf. also Bucknell 1999: pp.314–41.) S II 31 leads from ignorance to birth but then on to joy, concentration, and realization. A different course from craving onwards is also taken at S II 108. Furthermore at D II 63 consciousness is shown to condition name-and-form at conception, during the embryonic stage, and also during life, a presentation which does not seem to be confined to rebirth within the context of the three-life application only. Or at S III 96 formations, as a result of ignorance, are not a past experience, but arise in the present moment. Cf. also W.S. Karunaratne 1988b: p.30.

65 Collins 1982: p.106 points out that “it is crucially important to distinguish between the general idea of conditionality and the twelve-fold series”. Cf. also W.S. Karunaratne 1988b: p.33; and Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.31. Reat 1987: p.21: explains: “paṭicca samuppāda … the term may properly be applied to any set of results dependent upon necessary and sufficient conditions.”

66 S II 26. This same distinction can be deduced from the standard way in which the “twelve link” application of dependent co-arising is often introduced in the discourses, where after a formulation of the principle (“when this is that comes to be … ”) the twelve links are introduced with the Pāli expression “that is to say” (yadidaṃ), showing that the twelve links are an exemplification of the principle just stated (cf. e.g. S II 28).

67 A III 439 explains that a quality of a stream-enterer is that he or she has understood causality and the causal origin of phenomena.

68 S II 96, a contemplation which then leads to realization. Similarly, at S II 92 the Buddha illustrated the depth and importance of dependent co-arising with the help of only the final five links (from craving onwards), a presentation more easily amenable to direct experience than the complete set of twelve links. That the entire set of twelve links is not necessarily intended for contemplation is also suggested by S II 81, where the Buddha recommended “thinking over” (parivīmaṃsati) the twelve links, using a type of terminology that points to a form of intellectual consideration. This suggests that a direct experience of the principle, gained through meditation, can then be applied to the twelve links by way of intellectual reflection, considering that the same principle operated in the past and will operate in the future, without any need to experience directly those past or future operations.

69 Vibh 164–92. On this passage cf. also Bodhi 1998: p.46 n.4; and Gethin 1997a: p.195. According to Buddhadāsa 1992: p.98, “the entire series of Dependent Origination operates … in a flash. … The … twelve conditions … may all arise, exercise their function and pass away, so fast that we are completely unaware of it.”

70 M III 299.

71 M I 111.

72 e.g. at M III 63: “when this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.” On specific conditionality cf. also Bodhi 1995: pp.2 and 9; and Ñāṇamoli 1980: p.161.

73 The complexity of the conditional interrelation of phenomena is illustrated in the Paṭṭhāna of the Pāli Abhidhamma from a variety of angles with altogether twenty-four types of conditions. Thus, for example, the conditioning influence exercised by A on B (A → B) could, from a temporal perspective, take place not only with A arising earlier than B (purejātapaccaya), but also if both arise simultaneously (sahajātapaccaya), or even when A arises later than B (pacchājātapaccaya). It could be the presence of A (atthipaccaya), but also its absence (natthipaccaya), that conditions B. Moreover A could be the active cause (kammapaccaya), or it could exert its conditioning influence while being itself a resultant effect (vipākapaccaya), or else A could be both cause and effect, when A and B are related to each other by way of mutuality condition (aññamaññapaccaya).

74 Tilakaratne 1993: p.41.

75 A III 415 explains that volition is the factor responsible for the undertaking of activities by way of body, speech, or mind.

76 M I 60: “he knows how unarisen sensual desire can arise, how arisen sensual desire can be removed, and how a future arising of the removed sensual desire can be prevented.”

77 M I 61: “he knows the eye, he knows forms, and he knows the fetter that arises dependent on both, and he also knows how an unarisen fetter can arise, how an arisen fetter can be removed, and how a future arising of the removed fetter can be prevented.”

78 M I 62: “he knows how the unarisen mindfulness awakening factor can arise, and how the arisen mindfulness awakening factor can be perfected by development.”

79 According to the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, conditionality is indeed the distinctive characteristic of contemplation of dhammas, cf. Lamotte 1970: p.1169.

80 M I 55: “this is the direct path … for acquiring the true method … namely, the four satipaṭṭhānas.”

81 The standard recollection of the community of noble disciples (e.g. at A II 56) speaks of them being in possession of the right method (ñāyapaṭipanno).

82 S II 68; S II 71; S V 389; and A V 184 mention “noble method” as a quality of streamentry.

83 S V 388; cf. also A V 184. “Noble method” also comes up at A II 36, where it is further explained to be of a wholesome nature (kusaladhammatā), a reference that could also be alluding to dependent co-arising, since the commentary Mp III 74 relates this reference to the path of insight. T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.394, confirms that dependent co-arising is referred to as noble method. However, the term “method” can elsewhere assume different implications, since at M I 522 it comes to include attainment of the four jhānas and the three higher knowledges, while at M II 182 it is related to overcoming the ten unwholesome paths of action (cf. also M II 197, where it is not further specified but distinguished according to whether it is being developed by a householder or by a monk).

84 S II 43; S II 45; S II 59; S II 79; and S II 80; each relates an understanding of dependent co-arising to “standing at the threshold of the deathless”. A temporal succession with understanding of dependent co-arising preceding realization of Nibbāna seems also to be implied by the Buddha’s statement at S II 124, where he explained that “knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma” (dhammaṭṭhitiñāoea) precedes realization, since at S II 60 such “knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma” refers to dependent coarising. This is further supported by S II 25, which identifies specific conditionality as the “stableness of the Dhamma” (dhammaṭṭhitatā). Cf. also Choong 1999: p.50.

85 M I 56: “mindfulness that ‘there is a body’ is established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and continuous mindfulness.” I take the prefix paṭi added to sati in the present context in its temporal nuance of “again” or “re-”, in the sense of pointing to the absence of lapses in the presence of sati, viz. its continuity.

86 Ps I 250; cf. also Ariyadhamma 1995: p.5; Debes 1994: p.130; Dhammiko 1961: p.189; and Ṭhānissaro 1993: p.101.

87 e.g. M I 56: “he knows ‘I breathe in long’”; M I 56: “he knows ‘I am walking’”; M I 59:“he knows ‘I feel a pleasant feeling’”; M I 59: “he knows a lustful mind to be ‘lustful’”; M I 60: “he knows ‘there is sensual desire in me’”; M I 61: “he knows ‘there is the mindfulness awakening factor in me’”; M I 62: “he knows as it really is, ‘this is dukkha‘”.

88 Onlabelling cf. Fryba 1989: pp.130–2; Mangalo 1988: p.34; and Ñāṇapoṇika 1986b: p.13.

89 Earle 1984: p.398; and Tilakaratne 1993: p.103. Epstein 1995: p.94, warns against simply “casting off … mental activity and thinking” since “people with this misconception abandon the ego skills necessary for successful meditation”. He explains (p 99) that “those with this misunderstanding … tend to overvalue the idea of the ‘empty mind’ free of thoughts. In this case, thought itself is identified with ego, and such persons seem to be cultivating a kind of intellectual vacuity, in which the absence of critical thought is seen as an ultimate achievement.” Ñāṇananda 1985: p.60, speaks of “rallying the concepts for the higher purpose of developing wisdom whereby concepts themselves are transcended”.

90 D I 12–39, cf. in detail page 45, footnote 4 and page 181, footnote 34.

91 At A IV 110, because endowed with knowledge of the Dhamma the disciple will be able to overcome what is unwholesome and develop what is wholesome. Th 1027 recommends knowledge of the discourses as the basis for living the holy life. Similarly,M I 294 lists knowledge of the discourses and related discussions as two of five factors required for right view to lead to realization. (The others are ethical conduct and the practice of samatha and vipassanā.)

92 In fact, even the fourth immaterial attainment (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana), a deep meditative experience as far removed from concepts as possible within the realm of mundane experience, still falls short of realization. Cf. Hamilton 1996: p.60.

93 According to It 53, arahants, because of their penetrative understanding of concepts and verbal expressions, are able to use them freely, without in any way falling prey to them. Cf. also Ñāṇananda 1986: p.103: “to believe that by merely demolishing concepts or theories one can rise above them is to stop at the fringe of the problem”.

94 M I 56. Kalupahana 1992: p.74, explains that the concepts used for satipaṭṭhāna “are to be pursued only to the point where they produce knowledge (ñāṇa-matta), and not beyond, for … conceptions carried beyond their limits can lead to substantialist metaphysics”.

95 At S I 136 the Buddha described his realization as beyond the reach of mere theoretical inquiry. Cf. also Dhp 19; Dhp 20; Dhp 258; and Dhp 259; which emphasize that what really matters is the practice of the Dhamma. At A V 162, excessive emphasis on a theoretical understanding of the Dhamma even led some monks to mistakenly claim realization. Cf. also W.S. Karunaratne 1988a: p.83.

96 A III 87. The same description, however, comes up at A III 178 in a recommendation to reflect on the Dhamma, demonstrating that the Buddha did not categorically reject such theoretical inquiry, but that his criticism was directed against neglect of the practice.

97 Cf. Chapter III.

98 This suggestion is supported to some extent by the commentary, Ps I 250, which relates this part of the “refrain” to mindfulness and clearly knowing.

99 M I 56: “he abides independent, not clinging to anything in the world.”

100 D II 68; M I 251; M III 244; S II 82; S IV 23; S IV 24; S IV 65; S IV 67; S IV 168; and A IV 88. Similarly M III 266 relates the absence of dependencies to overcoming dukkha. Cf. also A V 325, which points out that an advanced meditator can meditate without “depending” on the material or the immaterial elements, or on any aspect of perceptual experience, a description which Spk V 79 relates to the experience of Nibbāna.

101 Ps I 250.

NOTES