These excerpts are taken from Che Guevara’s final diary, his diary of the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia.1 The notebooks found in his backpack were seized when Che was wounded in battle and captured by the Bolivian army on October 8, 1967. Che was assassinated the following day on the instructions of the CIA.
The first entry of the diary is November 7, 1966, three days after Che arrived in Bolivia and the day he arrived at the first guerrilla base camp at a farm on the Ñacahuazú River. His last entry is October 7, 1967, the day before his capture. Although generally written in Che’s characteristic concise style, the diary—especially the monthly summaries—is invaluable for anyone seeking to understand the recent history of Latin America.
This selection includes Che’s comments on events as they unfolded and some of the problems, such as the conflicts with the leaders of the Bolivian Communist Party (especially Mario Monje, its general secretary), whom Che called traitors; he is also critical of public statements made by Régis Debray (referred to as “the Frenchman” in the diary) and Ciro Bustos (“Pelao, the Argentine”); and he makes references to the disrespectful statements made by Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, who described Che as a “Bakunin” and “irresponsible,” reflecting the dispute between the pro-Moscow communist parties and those advocating armed struggle.
[…] In the afternoon, I met with the Bolivian group to discuss the Peruvian offer to send 20 men; everyone agreed they should be sent, but after the action had begun.
Everything has gone quite well; my arrival [in Bolivia] was without incident; half the troops have arrived, also without incident, although they were somewhat delayed; Ricardo’s main collaborators are joining the struggle, come what may. The general outlook seems good in this remote region and everything indicates that we could be here for practically as long as necessary. The plans are: to wait for the rest of the troops, increase the number of Bolivian [combatants] to at least 20, and then commence operations. We still need to see how Monje2 reacts and how Guevara’s3 people conduct themselves.
Chino4 arrived early, quite effusive. We spent the day chatting. The substance is: he will go to Cuba to inform them in person of the situation, and that five Peruvians can join us in two months, after we see some action. Two will come now to stay for a while: a radio technician5 and a doctor.6 Chino asked for weapons and I agreed to give him a BZ, some Mausers, and grenades; and I will purchase an M-1 for them. I also decided to assist them in sending five Peruvians, who would establish the necessary connections for sending arms to a region near Puno, on the other side of [Lake] Titicaca. He told me about his troubles in Peru, including a daring plan to free Calixto,7 which seems unrealistic to me. He thinks that some survivors of the guerrilla movement are active in that area, but he is not certain because no one has been able to make it there to see.
The rest of the conversation was anecdotes. He said goodbye with the same enthusiasm he had when he arrived; he took some of our photos with him to La Paz. Coco8 has been instructed to organize the contacts with Sánchez9 (whom I will see later) and to contact the head of the president’s information office, who is Inti’s10 brother-in-law and who has offered to help. The network is still in its infancy.
Uneventful. Everyone is quiet since it is Sunday. I give a little talk about our approach to the Bolivians who will be coming and about the war.
Today, in fact, completes our first month here, but for the sake of convenience I will give the summaries at the end of each month.
I spoke to the whole group, taking them to task about the reality of war. I emphasized the importance of a united command and discipline, and I warned the Bolivians of the responsibility they would bear in violating the discipline of the party’s line by adopting another one. I made the following assignments: Joaquín11 as military second in command; Rolando12 and Inti as political commissars; Alejandro13 as head of operations; Pombo,14 services; Inti, finances; Ñato,15 provisions and armaments; and Moro,16 medical services, for the moment. […]
[…] A telegram came from Manila [Cuba] indicating that Monje will be coming from the south.
They set up a contact system, but I was not satisfied because it shows how truly suspicious of Monje his compañeros are.
[…] Iván17 has the opportunity to do some business but his poorly forged passport is preventing him; the next step is to improve the document and write to our friends in Manila to expedite it.
Tania18 will come soon to receive instructions; I will probably send her to Buenos Aires. […]
[…] The conversation with Monje began with generalities but came down to his fundamental position, summarized by three basic conditions:
1)He will resign from the leadership of the party, but he will at least ensure it remains neutral and he will recruit cadres for the struggle.
2)He will head the political-military struggle for as long as the revolution is taking place in Bolivian territory.
3)He will handle relations with other South American parties, and try to convince them to support liberation movements. (He used Douglas Bravo as an example.)
I responded, saying that the first point was up to him, as secretary of the party, although I considered his position to be a grave error.
It was vacillating and compromising and protected those who should be condemned by history for abandoning their principles. Time will prove me right.
Concerning the third point, I had no objections to his attempting this, but it was doomed to fail. To ask Codovila19 to support Douglas Bravo was like asking him to condone an uprising in his own party. Time will be the judge here too.
On the second point, there was no way I could accept his proposal. I had to be military chief and would not accept any ambiguity on this. Here the discussion got stuck and went around and around in a vicious circle.
We left it that Monje would think it over and talk to his Bolivian compañeros. We moved on to the new camp and there he spoke with everyone, presenting the ultimatum that they could either stay or support the party; everyone opted to stay, which he seemed to take quite hard.
At 12:00, we made a toast, pointing out the historical importance of this date. I replied, taking advantage of his words and marking this moment as the new Cry of Murillo20 of the revolution on this continent, saying that our lives meant nothing when faced with the fact of the revolution.
The team of Cubans has been successfully completed; morale is good and there are only minor problems. The Bolivians are doing well, although few in number. Monje’s attitude can delay the development on the one hand, but on the other, can free me from political constraints. Apart from waiting for more Bolivians, the next steps are to speak with [Moisés] Guevara and with the Argentines Mauricio21 and Jozami22 (Masetti23 and the dissident party).
In the morning, with no further discussion, Monje informed me that he was leaving and would present his resignation to the party leadership on January 8. According to him, his mission was over. He left looking like he was being led away to the gallows. My impression was that when Coco told him that I would not budge on strategic matters, he held onto this point to force the break, because his arguments are inconsistent.
In the afternoon, I brought everyone together to explain Monje’s position and to announce that we would unite with all those who want to make the revolution happen. I predicted difficult times ahead and days of moral anguish for the Bolivians, and that we would try to solve problems through collective discussions or through the commissars.
I worked out the details of Tania’s trip to Argentina to speak with Mauricio and Jozami and to bring them back. […]
[…] The others (Sánchez, Coco, and Tania) left in the afternoon when Fidel’s speech was over. He talked about us in a way that makes us feel even more committed, if that is possible. […]
[…] After the class, I launched into a little tirade about the qualities required of a guerrilla force and the need for greater discipline; I explained that our mission, above all else, was to become a model nucleus, one of steel. I explained the importance of study as indispensable for the future. […]
I stayed at the camp, drawing up some instructions for the cadres in the city. […]
[…] Mario Monje spoke to three others coming from Cuba, dissuading them from joining the guerrillas. Not only did he not resign from the party leadership, but he also sent a document to Fidel, attachment D. IV. I received a note from Tania about her departure and Iván’s illness, and another note from Iván, which is attachment D. V. […]
[…] I wrote instructions for the urban cadres (Document III). […]24
[…] Manila [Cuba] sent a message reporting that everything had been received and that Kolle25 will go to where Simón Reyes26 is already waiting. Fidel said he would hear them out, but will be hard on them.
As I expected, Monje’s position was at first evasive and then treacherous.
The party has taken up arms against us and I do not know where this will lead, but it will not stop us and maybe, in the end, it will be to our advantage (I am almost certain of this). The most honest and militant people will be with us, although they are going through a more or less severe crisis of conscience.
Up to now, Guevara has responded well; we will see how he and his people act in the future.
Tania departed, but the Argentines27 have shown no sign of life and neither has she. Now the real guerrilla phase begins and we will test the troops; time will tell what they can do and what the prospects for the Bolivian revolution are.
Of everything that was envisioned, the slowest has been the incorporation of Bolivian combatants.
[…] We decoded a long message from Havana, the main news being about the meeting with Kolle, who claimed he had not been informed our undertaking was on a continental scale and, if this was the case, they were ready to collaborate in a plan and wanted to discuss details with me; Kolle himself, Simón Rodríguez,28 and Ramírez29 will come here. The message also stated that Simón had declared his decision to help us independently of what the party decides.
Besides this, there is news that the Frenchman,30 traveling with his own passport, will arrive in La Paz on the 23rd, and will stay with either Pareja31 or Rhea.32 Part of the message has yet to be decoded. We will see how to deal with this new conciliatory offensive. Other news is that Merci33 turned up with no money, claiming it was stolen; misappropriation is suspected, although something more serious cannot be ruled out. Lechín34 is going to ask for money and training.
[…] From the outside, there is no news of the two men who should have arrived to complete the group; the Frenchman should be in La Paz by now and should come to the camp any day. I have no news of the Argentines or Chino. Messages are being communicated well in both directions. The party’s position remains vacillating and two-faced, to say the very least, although when I speak with the new delegation and hear the latest explanation, this will be clearer.
The march has been going well enough, although it has been seriously affected by the accident that cost Benjamín35 his life. The men are still weak and not all of the Bolivians are able to hold up; the last few days of hunger have dampened their enthusiasm, which was already obvious after the group was divided.
Of the Cubans, two of those with little experience, Pacho36 and Rubio,37 have not responded well. Alejandro has done extremely well; of the old timers, Marcos38 is a constant headache and Ricardo39 is not up to speed. The rest are doing well. The next phase will be combat, and that will be decisive.
I spent the day in talks and discussions with Chino, going over some points, and with the Frenchman, Pelao, and Tania. The Frenchman brought news we had already heard about Monje, Kolle, Simón Reyes, etc. He came to stay, but I asked him to go back and organize a support network in France, stopping first in Cuba, which coincides with his desire to get married and to have a child with his compañera. I must write letters to [Jean-Paul] Sartre and B[ertrand]. Russell so they can organize international support for the Bolivian liberation movement. He should also talk to a friend who will organize all channels of support, fundamentally financial, medical, and electronic—the latter in the form of an electrical engineer and equipment.
Pelao, of course, is ready to receive my orders and I proposed to him that he act as a kind of a coordinator, working for now only with the groups led by Jozami, Gelman,40 and Stamponi,41 and sending me five men to begin training. He is to send my greetings to María Rosa Oliver42 and the old man.43 I will give him 500 pesos to send off and 1,000 to get around with. If they accept, they should begin exploratory activities in northern Argentina and send me a report.
Tania made her contacts and the people came, but, according to her, she had to drive them here in a jeep, and although she intended to stay only one day, things got complicated. Jozami could not stay the first time, and the second time no contact was made because Tania was here. […]
[…] At 18:30 with nearly all personnel present, I made an analysis of our expedition and its significance, reviewing Marcos’s errors and demoting him, and then named Miguel44 as head of the vanguard. At the same time I announced the discharge of Paco,45 Pepe,46 Chingolo,47 and Eusebio,48 telling them that they would not eat if they do not work; I suspended their tobacco ration and redistributed their personal things among other compañeros more in need. I referred to Kolle’s plan to come here and hold discussions at the same time as those members of the youth organization who are here with us are being expelled, saying that we are interested in action—words are of no importance. I announced we would look for a cow and that study classes would be resumed.
I informed Pedro49 and El Médico [Ernesto] they have almost achieved full status as guerrilla fighters, and gave Apolinar50 some encouragement. I criticized Wálter51 for being too soft during the trip, for his attitude in combat, and for the fear he showed of the planes; he did not react well. I went over some details with Chino and Pelado, and gave the Frenchman a long oral report on the situation. In the course of the meeting, the group adopted the name National Liberation Army of Bolivia, and a public statement about the meeting will be made.
[…] Communiqué No. 1 was drafted, which we will try to send to journalists in Camiri (D. XVII).52
A day of little action but an extraordinary amount of news: the army provides a wide range of information that, if true, could be very valuable. Radio Habana already reported the news, and the Bolivian government announced its support for Venezuela in presenting the case against Cuba before the OAS. […]
This month was full of events, but the general panorama is characterized as follows:
The phase of consolidation and purging of the guerrilla force—fully completed.
The phase of slow development with the incorporation of some Cuban elements, who do not seem bad, and Guevara’s people, who are generally low level (two deserters, one “talking” prisoner, three cowards, and two quitters).
The initial phase of the struggle, characterized by a precise and spectacular blow, but marked by gross indecision before and after the fact (the withdrawal of Marcos, Braulio’s53 action).
The beginning of the enemy’s counteroffensive, characterized to this point by a) a tendency to take measures to isolate us; b) a clamor at a national and an international level; c) total ineffectiveness, so far; and d) mobilization of peasants.
Evidently, we will have to hit the road before I expected and move on, leaving a group to recover, saddled with the burden of four possible informers.
The situation is not good, but now begins a new testing phase for the guerrilla force that will be of great benefit once surpassed. […]
[…] The announcement by the North Americans that they are sending advisers to Bolivia corresponds to an old plan and has nothing to do with the guerrillas. Perhaps we are witnessing the first episode of a new Vietnam.
[…] Communiqué No. 2 was written for the Bolivian people.54
[…] After a long delay, we completely decoded Message No. 35, which had a paragraph asking for me to add my signature to a call in support of Vietnam, organized by Bertrand Russell.
[…] Radio Habana broadcast a report from Chilean journalists stating that the guerrillas are so strong that they can threaten cities and that they recently captured two military trucks full of supplies. The magazine Siempre interviewed Barrientos who, among other things, admitted that he had Yankee military advisers and that the guerrilla movement arose due to the social conditions in Bolivia.
[…] Of the points on military strategy noted above, we can emphasize:
a) The measures taken to control us have not been very effective to date, and while they bother us, they allow us some movement, given the army’s weakness and lack of mobility; besides, after the last ambush against the dogs and the trainer, we can presume they will be more careful when entering the woods.
b) The clamor continues, but now from both sides; after the publication of my article in Havana,55 there can be no doubt about my presence here.
It seems certain that the North Americans will intervene heavily here, having already sent helicopters and apparently the Green Berets, although they have not been seen around here.
c) The army (at least one or two companies) has improved its technique; they surprised us at Taperillas and were not demoralized at El Mesón.
d) The mobilization of peasants is nonexistent, except as informers, which is somewhat troublesome; but they are neither quick nor efficient, and of no consequence.
Chino’s status has changed and he will be a combatant until the second or third front is established. Dantón and Carlos56 were victims of their own haste, almost desperation, to leave and of my lack of energy to stop them; now communication with Cuba is cut off (Dantón) and the plan of action for Argentina (Carlos) is lost.
In summary: A month in which all has developed normally, considering the inevitable contingencies of a guerrilla force. Morale is good among all the combatants who have had their preliminary test as guerrilla fighters.
[Juan] Almeida spoke in Havana, applauding the famous Bolivian guerrillas and me. The speech was rather long but good. […]
All the radio stations are constantly covering news that some Cubans landing in Venezuela were intercepted. The Leoni57 government presented two of the men with their names and ranks; I do not know them, but everything suggests that something has gone wrong.
[…] The most important features are:
1) A total loss of contact with Manila, La Paz, and Joaquín, which reduces the number of our group to 25.
2) A complete failure to recruit peasants, although they are losing their fear of us and we are gaining their admiration. It is a slow and patient task.
3) The party, through Kolle, offers its collaboration, apparently without reservation.
4) The clamor surrounding Debray’s case has given more momentum to our movement than 10 victories in battle could have.
5) The morale of the guerrilla movement is growing stronger and, if handled well, will certainly guarantee success.
6) The army remains disorganized and its technique has not significantly improved.
News of the month: The arrest and escape of Loro,58 who now should be rejoining us or heading to La Paz to make contact.
The army reported the arrest of all the peasants who collaborated with us in the Masicuri area; now comes the stage in which the peasants will be afraid of both sides, although in different ways; our triumph will signify the qualitative change necessary for their leap in development.
[…] The radio broadcast some interesting news: the newspaper Presencia announced one dead and one wounded for the army from Saturday’s clash; this is great and almost certainly true, and means that we have maintained our pattern of clashes resulting in casualties. Another report announced three dead, among them Inti, one of the guerrilla leaders, and noted the foreign components of the guerrilla force: 17 Cubans, 14 Brazilians, four Argentines, and three Peruvians. The Cuban and the Peruvian count is true; we will have to find out where they got this information.
[…] The political upheaval in this country is fascinating—the incredible number of pacts and counter-pacts that are in the air. Rarely has the potential for a guerrilla catalyst been so clear.
[…] I turned 39 [today] and am inevitably approaching the age when I need to consider my future as a guerrilla, but for now I am still “in one piece.”
Paulino59 promised to take my message to Cochabamba. We will give him a letter for Inti’s wife, a coded message for Manila, and four communiqués. The fourth outlines the composition of our guerrilla force and clears up the rumor about Inti’s death; it is the [blank in the original]. We will see if we can now establish contact with the city. […]
[…] An Argentine radio station broadcast the news of 87 victims at the mining area of Siglo XX […]
[…] In the political arena, the most important development is the official announcement by Ovando60 that I am here. Moreover, he said that the army is facing a perfectly trained guerrilla force that includes the Vietcong commanders who have defeated the best US regiments. His information is based on statements made by Debray who apparently talked more than was necessary, although we cannot tell what implications this has, or what the circumstances were under which he talked. It is also rumored that Loro was murdered. They attribute to me a plan for insurrection in the mines, to coincide with the one in Ñacahuazú. Things are turning out beautifully, so very shortly, I will no longer be “Fernando Sacamuelas” [Tooth-puller].
A message was received from Cuba reporting on the low level of development of the guerrilla movement in Peru, where they scarcely have any men or weapons, but have spent a fortune and are talking of a supposed guerrilla force involving Paz Estenssoro, a colonel Seoane, and a certain Rubén Julio, a very rich man belonging to the movement in the Panda region; this will take place in Guayaramerin. […]
[…] The most important features are:
1) Continued total lack of contact, which reduces us now to 24 men, with Pombo wounded and with reduced mobility.
2) Continued lack of peasant recruitment. It is a vicious circle: to recruit we need to maintain constant activity in populated territory, and to do this we need more people.
3) The legend of the guerrilla force is growing like wildfire, now we are invincible superhumans.
4) The lack of contact extends to the party, although we have made an attempt through Paulino that could bring results.
5) Debray is still in the news but now he is linked with my case, and I have been identified as the leader of the movement. We will see the result of this move by the government and if it is positive or negative for us.
6) The morale of the guerrilla fighters continues to be strong and their commitment to the struggle is increasing. All the Cubans are exemplary in combat and there are only two or three weak Bolivians.
7) The army continues to be useless in its military tactics, but is doing work among the peasants that we cannot ignore, transforming all members of the community into informers, either through fear or by fooling them about our goals.
8) The massacre in the mines greatly improves our outlook; if we can get our statement circulated, it will be a great clarifying factor.
Our most urgent task is to reestablish contact with La Paz, to replenish our military and medical supplies, and to recruit 50 to 100 men from the city, even if the number of active combatants comes to only 10 or 25.
[…] Barrientos held a press conference in which he acknowledged my presence, but predicted that in a few days I would be wiped out. He spoke his usual stream of nonsense, calling us rats and snakes and repeated his intention to punish Debray. […]
[…] [T]he statements from Debray and Pelado are not good; on top of everything, they have admitted to the continental aims of the guerrilla movement, something they did not have to do.
[…] The PRA [Revolutionary Authentic Party] and PSB [Bolivian Social Democratic Party] have withdrawn from the Revolutionary Front61 and the peasants are warning Barrientos about an alliance with the Falange.62 The government is disintegrating rapidly. Such a pity that we do not have 100 more men right now.
[...] The political news is of a tremendous crisis and no one knows how it will be resolved. For now, the agricultural unions in Cochabamba have formed a political party of “Christian inspiration” that is backing Barrientos, who is asking to be “allowed to govern for four years”; it is almost a plea. [Vice-President] Siles Salinas is threatening the opposition that our rise to power would cost everyone’s head and is calling for national unity, declaring the country to be in a state of war. On the one hand, they seem to be pleading, and using demagogy, on the other; maybe they are planning a takeover.
[…] We are trying to decode a long message from Manila. Raúl [Castro] spoke at a graduation ceremony for officers at the Máximo Gómez School; among other things, he refuted criticisms the Czechs made about my article on Vietnam. Our friends are calling me a new Bakunin and are sorry about blood that has been spilled and blood that would be spilled if there were three or four Vietnams.
[…] In the evening I gave a little talk about the significance of July 26, the rebellion against oligarchies and against revolutionary dogmas. Fidel made a brief mention of Bolivia.
[…] The most important features are:
1) Total loss of contact continues.
2) Continued sense of the lack of peasant recruitment, although there are some encouraging signs in the reception from peasants whom we have known for a while.
3) The legend of the guerrilla force is acquiring continental dimensions; Onganía63 is closing the borders and Peru is taking precautions.
4) The attempt at contact through Paulino failed.
5) The morale and combat experience of the guerrilla fighters is increasing with each battle; Camba64 and Chapaco65 remain the weak ones.
6) The army continues to be ineffective, but there are units that appear to be more combative.
7 The political crisis of the government is growing, but the United States is giving small loans, which are of great assistance in tempering the level of Bolivian discontent.
The most urgent tasks are: To reestablish contact, to recruit combatants, and to obtain medicines.
[…] I gathered everyone together tonight to make the following speech: We are in a difficult situation; Pacho is recuperating, but I am a complete wreck and the incident with the little mare shows that at times I am beginning to lose control; this will be corrected, but we are all in this together and anyone who does not feel up to it should say so. This is one of those moments when great decisions have to be made; this type of struggle gives us the opportunity to become revolutionaries, the highest form of the human species, and it also allows us to emerge fully as men; those who are unable to achieve either of those two states should say so now and abandon the struggle. All the Cubans and some of the Bolivians committed themselves to stay until the end. […]
[…] Fidel made a long speech in which he attacks the traditional parties, especially, the Venezuelan party; it appears there was a big behind-the-scenes row. […]
A bad day. It was dreary as we carried out our daily activities without incident, but at night the news bulletin reported in precise detail that the cave where the men were sent had been discovered, so there can be no doubt. I am now condemned to suffer from asthma indefinitely. They also seized all kinds of documents and photographs. This is the worst blow they have delivered; someone must have talked. Who? That is the question.
The most important features are:
1) We continue without contact of any kind and have no reasonable hope of establishing it in the near future.
2) We continue being unable to recruit peasants, which is logical considering how few dealings we have had with them recently.
3) There is a decline in combat morale; temporary, I hope.
4) The army has not increased its effectiveness or its aggressiveness.
We are at a low point in our morale and in our revolutionary legend. The most urgent tasks are the same as last month, notably: to reestablish contact, to recruit combatants, and to obtain medicine and supplies.
It must be recognized that Inti and Coco are becoming more and more outstanding as revolutionary and military cadres.
We decoded the entire report that stated that OLAS [Organization of Latin American Solidarity] was a triumph, but the Bolivian delegation was shit; Aldo Flores of the PCB [Bolivian Communist Party] pretended to represent the ELN [National Liberation Army] so they had to show he was lying. They have requested that one of Kolle’s men come to discuss matters; Lozano’s66 house was raided and he is now underground; they think that they can make an exchange for Debray. That is all; evidently they have not received our last message.
[…] A Budapest daily is criticizing Che Guevara, a pathetic and apparently irresponsible figure, and applauds the Marxist stand of the Chilean Party for taking a pragmatic position when faced with reality. How I would like to have power, for nothing more than to expose cowards and lackeys of all stripes and to rub their snouts in their own filth.
Another day of tension. In the morning, Radio Balmaseda of Chile announced that highly placed sources in the army announced Che Guevara is cornered in a canyon in the jungle. The local stations are silent; this could be a betrayal and they are convinced about our presence in the area. In a while, the soldiers began moving back and forth. […]
It should have been a month of recuperation, and almost was, but the ambush in which Miguel, Coco, and Julio67 were killed ruined everything, and left us in a perilous position, losing León68 as well; losing Camba is a net gain.
We have had several small skirmishes: one in which we killed a horse; another in which we killed one soldier and wounded another; one where Urbano69 had a shoot-out with a patrol; and the disastrous ambush at La Higuera. Now we have abandoned the mules and I believe it will be a long time before we have animals like that again, unless I fall into another bad state of asthma.
On the other hand, there may be truth to the various reports about fatalities in the other [Joaquín’s] group, so we must consider them wiped out, although it is still possible there is a small group wandering around, avoiding contact with the army, because the news of the death of seven people at once might well be false, or at least, exaggerated.
The features are the same as last month, except that now the army is demonstrating more effectiveness in action and the peasant masses are not helping us with anything and are becoming informers.
The most important task is to escape and seek more favorable areas; then focus on contacts, despite the fact that our urban network in La Paz is in a shambles, where we have also been hit hard. The morale of the rest of the troops has remained fairly high, and I only have doubts about Willy,70 who might take advantage of some commotion to escape, if he is not spoken to first.
The 11-month anniversary of our establishment as a guerrilla force passed in a bucolic mood, with no complications, until 12:30 when an old woman tending her goats entered the canyon where we had camped and we had to take her prisoner. The woman gave us no reliable information about the soldiers, saying that she knew nothing because it had been a while since she had been over there. She only gave us information about trails, from which we conclude we are approximately one league from La Higuera, another from Jagüey, and about two more from Pucará. At 17:30, Inti, Aniceto71 and Pablito72 went to the old woman’s house; she has one daughter who is bedridden and the other is almost a dwarf. They gave her 50 pesos with instructions to not say a word, but we have little hope she will stick to her promise.
The 17 of us set out under a sliver of a moon; the march was exhausting and we left tracks in the canyon we walked through; there were no nearby houses, but there were potato seedbeds irrigated by ditches from the same creek. We stopped to rest at 2:00 because it was futile to continue. Chino becomes a real burden when we have to walk at night.
The army issued an odd report about the presence of 250 men in Serrano to block the escape of the 37 [guerrillas] that are said to be surrounded. Our refuge is supposedly between the Acero and Oro rivers.
The report seems to be diversionary.73
1. Ernesto Che Guevara, The Bolivian Diary (Melbourne and New York: Ocean Press), 2006.
2. Mario Monje Molina, leader of the Bolivian Communist Party.
3. Moisés Guevara Rodríguez (Guevara or Moisés). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla forces in March 1967, and was killed in the ambush at Vado del Yeso on August 31, 1967.
4. Juan Pablo Chang-Navarro Lévano (Chino). Peruvian. He met with Che in December 1966 and was integrated into the guerrilla struggle from March 1967. He was captured and taken alive to La Higuera, where he was murdered along with Che on October 9, 1967.
5. Lucio Edilberto Galván Hidalgo (Eustaquio). Peruvian. Born in the city of Huancayo, Peru in 1937. He was a member of the Peruvian ELN and joined the guerrilla forces, together with Negro and Chino, in March 1967. He was killed in combat in Cajones, at the fork of the Río Grande and Mizque rivers on October 14, 1967.
6. Restituto José Cabrera Flores (Negro or Médico). Peruvian. On August 31, 1967, during the ambush at Vado del Yeso, he attempted to escape along the river, but was captured and brutally murdered on September 4 on the Palmarito River.
7. A reference to Héctor Béjar Rivera, the leader of the National Liberation Army in Peru, who had been arrested and imprisoned.
8. Roberto Peredo Leigue (Coco). Bolivian. He was involved in all the preparations of the guerrilla organization from its beginnings and posed as the owner of the Ñacahuazú farm, which served as the first base camp for the guerrillas. He was part of the vanguard detachment and was killed in an ambush at Quebrada del Batán, near La Higuera, on September 26, 1967.
9. A reference to Peruvian journalist Julio Dagnino Pacheco (Sánchez), who served in La Paz as a liason for the National Liberation Army of Peru.
10. Guido Álvaro Peredo Leigue (Inti). Bolivian. Joined the guerrilla forces on November 27, 1966. He was killed by the repressive forces in La Paz on September 9, 1969.
11. Juan Vitalio Acuña Núñez (Joaquín or Vilo). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces on November 27, 1966, and commanded the rearguard detachment. He was killed on August 31, 1967, in the ambush at Vado de Puerto Mauricio, on the Río Grande River.
12. Eliseo Reyes Rodríguez (Rolando or Luis). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces on November 20, 1966, and was appointed by Che to the post of political commissar. He was killed on April 25, 1967, in the battle of El Mesón, located between the village of Ticucha and the Iquira River.
13. Gustavo Machín Hoed de Beche (Alejandro). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces in November 1966 and was appointed by Che as chief of operations. He was killed at Vado del Yeso on August 31, 1967.
14. Harry Villegas Tamayo (Pombo). Cuban. Companion of Che since the Sierra Maestra and the mission in the Congo (1965). He arrived in Bolivia in July 1966 and was in charge of the guerrilla force’s final military preparations. He survived the battle at Quebrada del Yuro, and along with Inti, Darío, Benigno, and Urbano, was able to break through the encirclement. The three Cuban survivors reached the Chilean border and arrived back in Cuba on March 6, 1968.
15. Julio César Méndez Korne (Ñato). Bolivian. He was one of the first guerrilla combatants and functioned as head of supplies and weapons. He was one of the 10 survivors of the battle at Quebrada del Yuro, but, after the encirclement had been broken, was killed in the final military action on November 15, 1967.
16. Octavio de la Concepción de la Pedraja (Moro, Morogoro, Muganga or Médico). Cuban. He arrived at the Ñacahuazú farm on December 11, 1966, as a doctor and combatant. He died in combat in the region of Cajones, at the junction of the Río Grande and Mizque rivers, on October 12, 1967.
17. Iván Montero (Renán). Cuban. One of the contacts of the urban network in Bolivia.
18. Haydée Tamara Bunke Bider (Tania). Argentine-German. She remained in the guerrilla forces after her visit in March 1967 and was incorporated into the rearguard on April 17, 1967. She was killed in the Vado del Yeso ambush on August 31, 1967, and her body was found seven days later next to the river.
19. Victorio Codovila. Argentine. He was first secretary of the Argentine Communist Party.
20. Pedro Domingo Murillo was a Bolivian patriot who led the first struggle for independence from Spain in 1809.
21. Ciro Bustos (Mauricio, el Pelao or Carlos). An Argentine artist.
22. Eduardo Jozami. Former member of the Argentine Communist Party. Journalist and lawyer.
23. Jorge Ricardo Masetti. Argentine journalist. The founder and first director of Prensa Latina, Masetti died in combat in the north of Argentina in 1964.
24. See later in this anthology: Documents from Bolivia.
25. Jorge Kolle Cueto (Kolle or Kolly). A leader of the Bolivian Communist Party.
26. Simón Reyes was a leader of the Bolivian Communist Party.
27. Ciro Bustos and Eduardo Jozami.
28. Refers to Simón Reyes.
29. Humberto Ramírez, a leader in the Bolivian Communist Party.
30. Jules Régis Debray, referred to in Che’s diary as the Frenchman, Dantón, Debré or Debray.
31. Dr. Wálter Pareja Fernández. Collaborator with the urban underground movement.
32. Collaborator with the urban underground movement in Bolivia.
33. Carlos Alvarado (Merci). Guatemalan. Later the truth of this story and his loyalty to the Latin American revolution were proved beyond doubt.
34. Juan Lechín Oquendo was a key leader of the Bolivian Workers Confederation.
35. Benjamín Coronado Córdoba (Benjamín). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla movement on January 21, 1967. He drowned when crossing the Río Grande on February 26, 1967.
36. Alberto Fernández Montes de Oca (Pacho or Pachungo). Cuban. He arrived with Che in La Paz on November 3, 1966. He was killed on October 9 at Quebrada del Yuro.
37. Jesús Suárez Gayol (Félix or Rubio). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces on December 19, 1966, and died in combat on April 10, 1967 during an action in Iripití.
38. Antonio Sánchez Díaz (Marcos or Pinares). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces on November 20, 1966. He was killed in an ambush on June 2, 1967, in the Bella Vista region.
39. José María Martínez Tamayo (Ricardo, Chinche or Papí). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces on November 27, 1966. He was seriously wounded on July 30, 1967, and died shortly afterwards while being cared for by his compañeros.
40. Juan Gelman. Argentine writer and revolutionary.
41. Luis Faustino Stamponi Corinaldesi. Argentine revolutionary.
42. María Rosa Oliver was an Argentine writer.
43. A reference to Che’s father, Ernesto Guevara Lynch.
44. Manuel Hernández Osorio (Miguel or Manuel). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces on November 27, 1966, and was killed at Quebrada del Batán, close to La Higuera, on September 26, 1967.
45. José Castillo Chávez (Paco). Bolivian.
46. Julio Velazco Montaño (Pepe). Bolivian.
47. Hugo Choque Silva (Chingolo). Bolivian.
48. Eusebio Tapia Aruni (Eusebio). Bolivian.
49. Antonio Jiménez Tardío (Pedro or Pan Divino). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla struggle at the end of 1966 and died fighting in the Iñaó mountains on August 9, 1967.
50. Apolinar Aquino Quispe (Apolinar, Apolinario or Polo). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla struggle as a combatant in December 1966. He was killed in the ambush at Puerto Mauricio on August 31, 1967.
51. Wálter Arancibia Ayala (Walter). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla forces on January 21, 1967, and was killed in the ambush at Puerto Mauricio on August 31, 1967.
52. Included at the end of this selection from Che’s diary.
53. Israel Reyes Zayas (Braulio). Cuban. He joined the guerrilla forces in Bolivia on November 27, 1966. He was killed in the ambush at at Puerto Mauricio on August 31, 1967.
54. Included at the end of this selection from Che’s diary.
55. A reference to Che’s Message to the Tricontinental.
56. Lorgio Vaca Marchetti (Carlos). He joined the guerrilla struggle on December 11, 1966, and drowned on March 16, 1967, while trying to cross the Río Grande.
57. Raúl Leoni, president of Venezuela (1964–69).
58. Jorge Vázquez Viaña (Bigotes, el Loro or Jorge). Bolivian. Following the action at the Coripote farm, near Taperillas, on April 22, 1967, he became isolated and lost. He was involved in a clash with the Bolivian Army, inflicting two fatalities, and finally was wounded and captured on April 29. He was taken to the hospital at Camiri where he was interrogated by top military officials and CIA agents. A month later, it was announced that he had escaped and he was tried in absentia together with Régis Debray and Ciro Bustos; by this time, however, rumors were already circulating that he had been killed.
59. Paulino Baigorria. A peasant who served as a liaison for the guerrilla force and asked to join their ranks. While fulfilling the mission assigned by Che, he was detained in Comarapa, held incommunicado, and tortured.
60. Alfredo Ovando Candia. Commander in chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces (1966–69).
61. The Revolutionary Front was a coalition that supported Barrientos.
62. Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB), a right-wing party.
63. Juan Carlos Onganía. Argentine soldier who overthrew Arturo Illía in 1966 and through a coup d’état, took over as president of Argentina.
64. Orlando Jiménez Bazán (Camba). Bolivian.
65. Jaime Arana Campero (Chapaco or Luis). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla struggle in March 1967. In the battle of Quebrada del Yuro, he was able to break through the encirclement. The group of survivors advanced to Cajones, where they were gunned down on October 14, 1967.
66. Dr. Hugo Lozano. A Bolivian dentist and member of the urban network.
67. Mario Gutiérrez Ardaya (Julio). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla movement on March 10, 1967. He was killed in the ambush at Quebrada del Batán, near La Higuera on September 26, 1967.
68. Antonio Domínguez Flores (Antonio or León). Bolivian.
69. Leonardo Tamayo Núñez (Urbano) joined the guerrilla forces on November 27, 1967, and survived.
70. Simeón Cuba Sanabria (Willi, Willy, Wily or Wyly). Bolivian. He arrived at the guerrilla camp in March 1967. He was executed on October 9, 1967, in the school at La Higuera.
71. Aniceto Reinaga Gordillo (Aniceto). Bolivian. He joined the guerrilla forces in early December 1966 and was killed in the battle of Quebrada del Yuro on October 8, 1967.
72. Francisco Huanca Flores (Pablo or Pablito). Bolivian. He died in combat at Cajones, located at the fork of the Mizque and Río Grande rivers, where he was killed on October 14, 1967.
73. This was the last entry in Che’s diary.