eleven
the revolt of the colorados
On March 6, 1912, in El Vergel, Pascual Orozco, standing in front of 3,000 men under arms, finally accepted leadership of the revolt against Madero’s government in the midst of Vivas and applause. Alongside him were Máximo Castillo, the Quevedo brothers, Emilio Campa, José Inés Salazar, Rojas, and Orpinel. He signed the Pacto de la Empacadora, which talked vaguely about adhering to the Plan de San Luis, and the further reforms set forth in the Plan de Tacubaya along with the Plan de Ayala attached as an annex. Orozco’s was a forthrightly progressive plan, it set fixed hours for the working day, banned company stores, shared out the land, and prohibited child labor. All in all, it was notably influenced by the former Magonistas. The local congress recognized Orozco and renounced Abraham as if they were dealing with a simple administrative concern. Pascual filled his government with a mix of radical Magonistas, Vazquistas, Zapatistas, and Chihuahuan Científicos and oligarchs. It was a strange cocktail, seating revolutionaries and their radical agrarian reform program at the same table beside individuals from the land-owning oligarchy who would be the last to support such a program. They were all united by their hatred for Madero. It was difficult to explain, very difficult. History would struggle to find the proper adjectives for subsequent events.
Villa later stated: “Orozco was well known and well-liked, and his rebellion was considered patriotic by some people of good faith. In the first days after that pronouncement, it was difficult to find anyone willing to defend the government.”
While the Pacto de la Empacadora was being signed, news came that Col. Francisco Villa, according to what he had telegraphed to a friend, was traveling toward Durango but that he would return in a month. One day later, the letter that Villa had written to Orozco in February found its way into the press (published as if it was written in the early days of March) and was presented as evidence of his “duplicitous” character. In Chihuahua, as Villa went about organizing an army, the press asserted that “one of the first acts of the forces under the command of General Orozco will be the persecution of the actions undertaken by chief Francisco Villa.”
Villa, in search of a social base, established his camp in Santa Veracruz, where he assembled 500 men. He soon received an unexpected visitor, Pascual Orozco’s father, who, whether under his own initiative or following instructions from his son, came to convince Villa to withdraw from the dispute.
“How many men do you think will follow you, Colonel?” said Orozco.
They shared a meal and, according to some accounts, the senior Orozco said, “You know that my son and I have always appreciated you.”
He argued that Villa should not back up the Maderistas and offered him $300,000 pesos to go to the United States and live in peace.
“I don’t know if this government is good or bad because there hasn’t been enough time for anyone to judge its actions,” replied Villa. And remarking that no one could buy him off, concluded, “And if we were friends in the past, now we are going to have to shoot it out.”
Villa, counseled by some of his men, thought about taking the older Pascual hostage to save Abraham González (who he assumed had been detained in Chihuahua) and telling Orozco that if an attempt was made against Don Abraham, he would pay for it with his father’s life. However, the senior Orozco informed Villa that Abraham had crossed into the United States and Villa believed him. It was snowing and very cold and Orozco did not have a blanket, so Villa gave him his and then the old man got in a car and left for Chihuahua.
Speculation in Chihuahua continued with respect to Villa’s whereabouts. After the meeting with the old fox, Villa was on the move again. They say he “was close by Satevó in the nearby hills after having camped in the proximity of the Charco hacienda” and that he had gone in search of a column of 500 men under the command of Capt. Severino Muñoz. An open letter was published from Capt. Agustín Moreno, an old friend and compañero of Villa’s, inviting him to correct the mistake he was making in supporting Madero, “the new dictator,” and to join the “party that proclaims Don Emilio Vázquez Gómez president of the republic” because he is “all powerful.”
Villa moved away from the capital city, withdrawing from Satevó and Valle de Zaragoza under pressure from Orozquista partisans. He met up with two old foreign Maderistas, a Frenchman named Charpentier—who had constructed a canon that never worked and who ran a currency exchange office in Chihuahua—and a US citizen named Thomas Fountain, who had supported the striking Cananea mine workers and who had fought with Urbina.
One of the units chasing them, the troops under Lt. Col. Toribio Reza, caught up with them in La Boquilla on March 15 and a “minor battle” took place. The Villistas tried to resupply weapons and horses after Villa’s horse was killed in the scuffle but had to retreat in the face of the Colorados’ superior numbers. José Inés Salazar reported to Pascual Orozco, “Villa defeated completely, eight enemies dead and six wounded. Ours uninjured and our flag triumphant.”
The defeat, and the news that all of Chihuahua was in the hands of the Colorados, discouraged Villa’s partisans and he lost many fighters. From the 500 men he began with, only sixty remained. He kept in contact with Luz Corral in Chihuahua via woodcutters, milkmen, and coal delivery men and worried about what might happen to her and his newborn daughter, whom he had never seen.
He temporarily managed to throw his persecutors off his trail and decided to move towards the South, marching from Balleza to the swamps in Olivos. Meanwhile rumors circulated claiming that Villa and Urbina had united their forces in the southern part of the state, prompting a column of Colorados under the command of captains Oropeza and Yáñez to go after them. But Pancho found out about the rumor and left before he could be overtaken, setting off towards Parral. Along the way, Gorgonio Beltrán and twelve more men joined up with him as did Trinidad Rodríguez and his brothers on the outskirts of Parral. After Villa learned that some of his men’s houses were being used as barracks, he joked “Don’t worry, boys. You’ll get to see who owes us rent!”
Villa entered the town plaza in disguise, sizing up the environment and looking for one of the Maderista irregulars’ Tenth brigade officers named Maclovio Herrera, a campesino and mule driver from Hidalgo del Parral. He was nicknamed el Sordo (the deaf one) for obvious reasons, had thick eyebrows, stuttered slightly, and some say was “brave to the point of recklessness.”
The situation in Parral was confusing, partly because the garrison had not defined their intentions. Villa said that J. de la Luz Soto—the two men’s relationship had taken a turn for the worse over the previous couple months—was keeping suspicious communications with Orozco via telegram. Puente wrote that J. de la Luz, “sank into the sad state of backing the defectors out of fear of Villa.” Between Maclovio and Villa, on March 24 they assembled some 500 men and succeeded in disarming the garrison and detaining J. de la Luz.
That same day, the government suffered a terrible defeat. A column of troops traveling by train under the command of Gen. González Salas, Madero’s Minister of War, was destroyed when it struck a cart loaded with dynamite at the Rellano station, derailing the train. For years afterwards, people spoke of the “train of death.” Although the Federales’ casualties were relatively low, only twenty-two soldiers died, the ensuing disorganization was tremendous and the Colorados took advantage of the chaos. Gen. Salas later killed himself.
Meanwhile, Villa availed himself of Parral’s resources to organize a broad recruitment campaign. Urbina, Fidel Ávila, and Nicolás Fernández once again took up arms.
If the town expected to be looted, no such thing happened. Villa’s troops were very disciplined, and they kept order. At the same time, this was a revolution and, without shedding a tear, Villa gathered together Parral’s wealthy citizens and extracted a $100,000-pesos compulsory loan. He expropriated horses and ammunition and seized the Banco Minero’s funds, easily justified as the bank was owned by Creel who was clearly on the side of the Orozquista revolt. The bank’s manager, Chávez Domínguez later recounted threats made against himself and his children and how Villa’s men made off with $50,000 pesos.
With this bounty in hand, Villa paid his brigade’s soldiers some $67,000 pesos at the rate of $1.50 pesos per day. He bought uniforms, horses and bits for their bridles, food, and hay. He sent $3,000 pesos to Urbina, $3,000 pesos to Guadalupe and Calvo’s volunteers, $2,000 pesos to Fountain to construct a new canon, $2,000 pesos to Natividad García, $2,000 pesos to Miguel Baca Ronquillo, and $2,000 pesos to the Herrera brothers. And reverting to his old habits as an outlaw, he buried $5,000 pesos in silver in the mountains of Santa Bárbara.
Taking advantage of the breathing space his enemies gave him, he asked Fischbein, a well-known Parral tailor, to make him a suit. Fischbein told him to remove his gun and cartridge-belt so he could take his measurements and Villa complied reluctantly. The tailor announced that Villa stood at 5 feet 5 inches and that his shoulders sloped. “I promised him I would come to his shop in three days for adjustments. That was the day that Campa attacked the city, and I did not return.”
The novelist Rafael Muñoz reconstructed the warning that one of Campa’s Colorados gave to a compañero as they approached Parral: “You don’t know Villa, he’s the most cunning man there is. If he is in Parral at sunrise, by noon he can be eighty kilometers to the north or south [. . .]. No one will catch Villa [. . .]. We might defeat him, sure, but take him. . .”
At sunrise on April 2, 500 men under Emilio P. Campa attacked Parral. Campa was a great guerrilla chief known to be courageous, audacious, and crazy. Villa established a defensive perimeter around the city, “I decided to stay in the place and hold my own.” He personally took part in defending the train station and helped Maclovio in the southern part of the city. The enemy’s cavalry appeared at five o’clock in the morning and the fight was underway by seven. Nellie Campobello wrote: “Villa defended the plaza. Scattered across the hills, his soldiers resisted the attack. The people supported Villa. They sent crates of bread to the hills, coffee, clothing, bandages, ammunition, pistols, and rifles of every kind.” Parral’s prostitutes brought food and water to Villa’s frontline troops.
Villa, who was at the station with Martiniano Servín—born in Toluca, having served twenty-five years in the federal army, graduated from the military college as an artilleryman, a Maderista from the early days—said: “You take a hundred infantrymen and get me that hill with blood and fire. I’ll stay here at the station with these twenty-five men, they will have to get by me first, leave this flank to me while you take the hill.”
Twenty minutes later, Villa heard the bugle, Servín had taken the hill “with two machine guns and a cannon.” The enemy’s mounted troops began to disperse under the fire of Tom Fountain’s machine gun and Villa led a charge on horseback. The Colorados fled. Returning to the town, he assisted Maclovio who was fighting in the lower part of Parral. Once again, the Colorados took off running. One hundred prisoners, arms, and ammunition were left behind on the battlefield, a huge booty for a force that only controlled the ground on which it stood.
The final shots could still be heard when Villa returned to Fischbein’s shop to have his suit adjusted. Pancho was very relaxed, “Don’t mind them, the bullets you have to worry about are the ones you don’t hear.”
The following morning, a milkman arrived carrying a message from Campa, “You wretch, within four days I will be there to strip away your pride.” On April 8, 5,000 Colorados appeared in the area around Parral under the command of José Inés Salazar. Villa resisted the assault with 160 men from the middle of the day until eleven o’clock at night when he broke out of the encirclement. “I gathered all the people I could, and I left Parral with them.”
Salazar took Thomas Fountain, Villa’s machine gunner, prisoner and shot him despite protests from the United States consul. Richard Coleman, another of Villa’s men from the United States, was saved because he had a friend among Salazar’s officers who intervened on his behalf. The Colorados looted Parral. None of these actions contributed to the insurrectionaries’ popularity.
Villa was indignant. At some point after Thomas Fountain’s execution, Villa wrote a note to the press in which he affirmed that any foreigner fighting with the Orozquistas who fell into his hands would be shot. The declaration produced a flood of reactions among US diplomats.
Villa reconcentrated his people in Villa de Santiago, then departed for Santa Bárbara where he purchased more horses. There, an eyewitness reported that Villa’s column made off with all the medicine (and more) from the pharmacy and that a legion of young girls rode on their horses’ haunches, along with an accordion and several guitars. They left Santa Bárbara because they suspected the Colorados had learned of their location and departed for the Obligados’ ranch where they arrived on April 14. They moved off towards Las Nieves where they found Urbina and 400 men. “Compadre, organize your forces so we can head from Torreón tomorrow,” said Villa.
In Las Zarcas, someone reported, or invented, a philosophical conversation between Villa and Tomás Urbina.
“It’s necessary to be suspicious, Pancho,” said Urbina.
“Pure suspicion only engenders distrust. We have to be confident, have faith when the shooting starts. Be confident when we enter the open field,” replied Villa.
Along the way, they met up with Maclovio Herrera, whose reflections were more prosaic: “Every prisoner set free is an enemy that one must continue worrying about. It doesn’t make sense to let them live.”
So goes the logic of the guerrilla.
A letter from Madero, dated April 10 and addressed to Villa in “the field of operations,” arrived in his hands, reading: “I have been informed that you have behaved as a man, one of the loyal ones, and that you have made an example out of the traitor Orozco. I congratulate you most warmly [. . .]. I hope that you will place yourself under the command of Gen. Victoriano Huerta, who will act as General-in-Chief [. . .]. Your support will be very important and very efficacious.” Following orders, Villa left for the southeast. The president’s forces were gathering in Torreón on the border between Durango and Coahuila while the Division of the North was establishing its barracks, commanded by Gen. Victoriano Huerta.
In Mapimí, some sixty kilometers from Torreón, Villa encountered the vanguard of the Division of the North under the leadership of Raúl Madero, who brought along a group of irregular railway men. There is a photograph that shows them walking along, oddly, not carrying any weapons. Raúl Madero is wrapped in some kind of jacket or overcoat made from rough wool and Villa is in his suit with a grey jacket and huaripa hat. Pancho, compared to some photos from 1911, has put on weight. The old comrades looked happy, and they must have been very fond of each other because they were smiling broadly.
Villa judged the small campaign he had just finished to be of some significance. He would write a letter to Madero months later, arguing: “Look, Señor, if I was not at the head of the government’s troops when they were resupplied, they [the enemy troops] would have taken Torrión [sic] and looted more than $1 million pesos and a large quantity of elements of war and they would have become very dangerous.” He was insinuating that he had slowed the progress of the Orozquista rebellion to the south of Parral, leaving Orozco without the resources to purchase ammunition. Although this assessment is debatable, what was clear, according to Villa, was that “he gave the government time to get itself organized.”
He left his troops under the command of Urbina in Mapimí and headed for Torreón with only a guard. Twenty kilometers from Bermejillo, he ran into his old enemy, Trucy Aubert, the federal officer who led Gen. Navarro’s cavalry during the early days of the fighting in 1910. There is a picture in which the two appear in a none-too-friendly pose.
On April 18, Huerta reported to Madero. The remnants of the Federales still fighting were defeated in Rellano and were in a disastrous state, although they could still count on the irregular troops under Aguirre Benavides and Raúl Madero. He ended the letter, stating: “I request that you do me the favor granting me the authority, in writing, so that I might give Villa, who has given himself the rank of colonel [this is curious, Huerta should have known that Madero himself bestowed the rank of colonel on Villa before the battle of Ciudad Juárez in May 1911], the title of brigadier. Then I will place some units under his command to flatter him with this rank and, I believe, achieve good results. I request your answer in this matter.”
On April 21, Villa was in Gómez Palacio, Torreón’s sister city, from where he wrote to Madero, “As per your wishes, I am following Gen. Huerta’s orders.”
Victoriano Huerta, a new personality entering the scene, deserves our attention. He was born in 1844 in Colotlán, Jalisco, the son of a mestizo father and a Huichol Indian mother. He was accepted to serve as the secretary of a military officer, and he studied at the military college. He served as a lieutenant in charge of fortifications before being stationed under the command of Bernardo Reyes. He worked as a cartographer for nine years, producing geographical and mineralogic reports for the army. In 1893, he was promoted to colonel and assigned to repress anti-Porfirian revolts in Guerrero. Afterwards, he returned to a topographical desk duty for two years. In 1900, he participated in the elimination of the Yaqui insurrection and then, in 1903, in repressing the Caste War of Yucatán. Thus, he took part in the two large-scale dirty wars at the end of Mexico’s century. Owing to his relation to Gen. Reyes, he was discharged from the army (relieved of duty) and then entered into a murky business dealing in Monterrey, under his godfather’s shadow. He was not much more than a spectator during Madero’s revolt in 1910, being placed in charge of Morelos and Guerrero in 1911, and he commanded Porfirio Díaz’s escort during his retreat to Veracruz. During Interim President De la Barra’s term before Madero assumed office, Huerta was charged with the persecution of the Zapatista rebels in Morelos who refused to disarm. Fernández McGregor described him as such:
He was of medium stature, straight-shouldered, vigorous, with the look of a soldier; he had short legs, knock-kneed like a bulldog, broad chest, arms longer than normal; he stood squarely on his heels with his feet well apart; his Mestizo-Indigenous face was hard as nails; his hair was cut very short and his inquisitive pupils danced from an irritating conjunctivitis behind dark lenses that sometimes slid down his nose because of the alcoholic sweat oozing from all over his face; he pushed them back up his nose with his thumb and index finger so he could see out of them and adjusted the hinges nervously, repeating this so many times that it became a tic. His voice was martial, but he spoke with a snide tinge, using his own crude expressions.
Ignacio Muñoz, to demonstrate that Huerta was not a drunk, utilized a not very fortunate citation from Gen. Gorostieta: “During my eventful life as a soldier, I have never seen a mind more resistant than that of my Gen. Huerta. He could drink up to three bottles of cognac in just one day and his lucidity never blurred.” Manuel Bonilla shared a portrait of Huerta from a mutual friend: “Ambitious, with few scruples, an inveterate dipsomaniac, cunning and sly, for whom human life had no significant value. He was, besides being an able mimic, [. . .] brave and not lacking in ingenuity.”
As we have seen, neither his career path nor these portraits painted a very generous picture of his character.
What kind of an impression did Victoriano Huerta make on Villa the first time they met? Ramón Puente offered this reflection from Pancho: “Huerta gave me the impression that he was up to no good, he didn’t even like us Maderistas. His face, his manners, and his constant drinking [he was almost always drunk, and it was an open secret amongst the federal troops that he smoked marijuana too] never gave me the slightest assurance.” In one of their first meetings, Villa asked Huerta for Mauser rifles to replace their .30-30 carbines and to provide ammunition. Huerta did not reply to the request, so Villa bought munitions using the resources he had expropriated in Parral. He handed over the remaining $7,400 pesos to Huerta. Finally, on May 2, the general arrived to review Villa’s column in Torreón, which consisted of 400 men and the 500 that had arrived with Urbina.
They spent five days in Torreón, Villa stayed at the San Mateo Inn in Gómez Palacio. Justino Palomares, the editor of a paper whose recent editions had strongly criticized Villa, came across the colonel in front of the editor’s office where Villa was asking about him. Cleverly, Palomares told Villa that Palomares (Villa not knowing what he looked like) “had left to collect some debts.” Villa recruited him on the spot to work as his secretary. For several days, Palomares took charge of Villa’s correspondence without revealing his own identity. He sent letters to Mexico City, telegrams to Madero (who Villa nicknamed el Chaparrito, little shorty), signing off “With love as always” and “Loyal until death.” He sent one letter to his brother in Durango. While Palomares worked as Villa’s scribe, the two kept up a good relationship. Villa finally asked him if it wasn’t strange that Palomares had not yet returned, prompting Palomares to confess. Villa asked him why he hadn’t said so before and Palomares replied, “Purely out of fear.” Villa laughed. Madero instructed Villa to add his men to Huerta’s column.
When Huerta was convinced that the Colorados were low on arms because of the border closure and had amassed a significant number of troops, he decided to go into action. His force consisted of two infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade under Rábago, and the artillery of Rubio Navarrete. All of these were regular army forces or, put another way, the Porfirian dictatorship’s old army recycled by Madero, with brigades under Eugenio Aguirre Benavides (made up of railway workers), one from Emilio Madero, the Nuevo León riflemen under Raúl Madero, and, finally, Villa’s people who received the title Scouting Corps.
To avoid surprises, and given the Federales’ ignorance of the local terrain, Villa was sent ahead to open a path. It was reported that “because none of the Division’s chiefs knew the territory in which they were going to be operating, an advance guard, a light guerrilla was commissioned, one who was very courageous and knew the region well: Francisco Villa.” Pancho advanced towards Bermejillo with 300 to 400 men, while the bulk of the Division reached the town five days later. “Villa, always distrustful of everyone, always spent the nights along the march at least two or three kilometers ahead of the federal forces,” accompanied by his friend Margarito Barrera.
In Bermejillo, Villa received orders to make contact with the Colorados. “Huerta was drunk when he gave me the order.” Villa explained to Huerta that he preferred to leave during the night, so that the dust his horses kicked up wouldn’t give away his position. He said the same thing to Rábago. They ignored him and summoned up the Seventh Regiment of the federal cavalry.
May 8 saw the first clash with the Colorados under Cheché Campos and Argumedo’s command, who were taken by surprise in Tlahualilo. Pancho caught the Colorados’ advance guard unawares in the middle of the night and defeated them around midday. While the rebels were retreating, Rábago arrived to support Villa and began bombarding the enemy troops, “firing four canons, finishing them off and forcing them to disperse.” Villa captured a large war booty: 600 horses, ten wagons filled with provisions, saddles, rifles, and ammunition.
Huerta congratulated him and sent along a laudatory communication.
There is a pair of photographs from the Tlahualilo victory. In one, Villa and several of his officers pose proudly in front of a captured machine gun, extraordinarily serious. In the other, a distracted Villa has a lost look about him while Gen. Rábago looks into the camera.
The following day, May 9, the Secretary of Defense ratified Villa’s promotion to brigadier general as Huerta had proposed three weeks prior. Years later, Villa would relay to Jaurrieta: “I arrived at Gen. Huerta’s headquarters in the Hotel Salvador. I saw a mess of officers decked out in dress uniforms [. . .] one could detect a certain mocking posture amongst all the Federales’ chiefs. Some displayed it more than others, but none more so that a Señor Col. García Hidalgo [. . .]. I kept my eyes pointed to the ground, dying of shame and fury, but from time to time I would see those old potbellies ridiculing me and laughing it up. The only one who maintained a serious, manly attitude was my friend Gen. Rábago.” Felipe Ángeles remarked years later that Huerta, who frequently repeated Villa’s words in a sarcastic tone, notified Villa of his promotion to general. Huerta ordered Villa to get himself a uniform. Ramón Puente said that he did so to ridicule Villa, to force him to submit, to subjugate him.
Villa’s new rank would be recognized amongst the career officers as a “honorary general,” stressing the “honorary” as Huerta would often do. Villa would not forget the “mockery that he awoke among my generalissimo’s army.” Silently and self-consciously, in his gut, Pancho didn’t think the Federales were worth all that much aside from Rábago, the artillery general. During these weeks, Villa spoke sparingly to the Federales and was hurt by their jokes. And he wasn’t the only one. Nicolás Fernández, who fought with Urbina’s troops, remembered that the Federales called the Maderistas “cow eaters” and “greasers.”
Manuel Bauche Alcalde would ask a couple years later, “Was Huerta a real general?”
Villa replied, “When he was in his right mind, he gave very good orders.”
“And what time of the day did he start drinking?” insisted Bauche.
“From seven in the morning on,” Villa shot back merrily.
On May 12, Villa, now Gen. Villa, was called to a conference with Aubert, Rábago, and Emilio Madero. Villa was assigned to take charge of the Division’s right wing. Huerta said something foolish to Villa about not giving up his position on the battlefield until he was dead, which Villa would indignantly recall years later. As if it were necessary to tell him that. They clashed with the Orozquistas at Estación Conejos. A Colorado cavalry column tried to flank the Division of the North and stumbled upon Villa’s scouts whom he was leading personally. The forces intermingled as they charged each other, creating tremendous confusion. The lack of uniforms didn’t help. Marcelo Caraveo led the Colorados. Each side retreated to reorganize itself. They say that Villa and Caraveo’s horses almost ran into each other. Villa recounted: “When I saw we had regained control, I ordered my cavalry (800 men) to charge. My soldier’s momentum was such that we got mixed up with them and were killing them with our pistols.” The Colorados withdrew.
After the clash, Villa developed a high fever. Col. García Hidalgo, Huerta’s Chief of Staff, came across him lying on the ground and reprimanded him. Villa, annoyed, told him that the troops he just defeated will keep their distance. “I was burning up with a fever, lying on the ground, and if I didn’t leave it was because I saw the enemy there in front of us and I didn’t want to desert my post.” The discussion ended with Villa still angry, telling the colonel, “You are a fool, get out of my sight, I don’t want any more headaches after having fought all day.”
The Maderista’s cannons proved decisive during the day. The artillery wrecked the Colorados who had left their cannons behind in Rellano on the train tracks. The central federal offensive broke the Orozquistas, and some 5,000 men were forced to retreat during the night in absolute disorder. The Colorados lost some 600 men, including Trucy Aubert who was injured.
Gen. Huerta celebrated Villa’s intervention during the first part of the day’s fighting, giving him a hug and congratulating him. Villa couldn’t help but think that if Huerta had pursued the defeated enemy, that might have put an end to the Orozquista rebellion.
There is a photograph after the battle in which Emilio Madero appears to be making a joke that makes Villa laugh, while Huerta stands close by in his dark glasses contemplating both of them. Curiously, Villa is not wearing a military uniform. Or he was sick of it, or it still wasn’t ready.
The column’s doctors gave Villa one of their “concoctions,” but Villa didn’t mix well with alcohol. He was then given orders to explore five hundred meters in front of the trains on the right flank. Villa insisted to Huerta that he establish advanced guards.
The following day, in Escalón, Huerta ordered Villa to support Rábago’s assault along the right while Emilio Madero attacked from the left. Word spread among the irregular Maderista troops that Huerta was using them as cannon fodder, so as to not waste the Federales. Once again, the Maderistas carried out a double flanking maneuver and the Colorados retreated without a fight.
Huerta’s delays were becoming exasperating. He took more than a week to advance. Finally, on May 21, Huerta commissioned Pancho to conduct an exploratory mission. Advancing towards Rellano, Villa discovered a mine along the railway with thirty-two boxes of dynamite and “ordered his men to cut about twenty centimeters [out of the trip wire that was set to detonate the explosive] and to re-cover the ditch where the battery was buried,” thereby foiling the Colorados’ attempt to repeat the disaster of the “train of death.”
There would hardly be time to enjoy their trick because an attempt was made on Villa’s life that very night by a person who presented themselves in camp asking for Gen. Villa and, not locating him, shot at a captain from the Federales’ division before fleeing into the night.
May 22 saw what the most important confrontation of the entire campaign would be. It took place in the hills of Rellano and the Colorados found themselves without reserves or ammunition. The attacking forces were comprised of Villa, Raúl and Emilio Madero, and Eugenio Aguirre Benavides as well as the Fifteenth Battalion and Gen. Rábago’s dragons. Huerta ordered Villa to advance while protecting his artillery’s placement and then to assume a position on the right flank.
The artillery, with some thirty-six cannons, hit the center of the Colorados’ lines. The Orozquistas had no chance to enforce their position, aside from taking cover behind a couple hills along the side of the tracks. Meanwhile, the Maderista cavalry attempted an enveloping maneuver to get themselves behind the rebels. In response, the Colorados’ launched a counterattack. The artillery continued to fire even though the two cavalry forces were now intermingled. The federal infantry advanced towards the center, provoking new charges and counterattacks while the artillery ravaged the Colorados’ lines. Huerta wore down the irregular forces and simultaneously sent the crew cut Federales to execute his tactics. The Orozquistas loaded onto their trains and retreated.
Artillery is a terrible and terrifying weapon. Rafael Muñoz told the story of a group of Colorados who lived through the battle and the bombardment, but never managed to even fire a shot.
The night was extremely tense as both sides waited for a new confrontation. At dawn on May 23, artillery fire recommenced and the Colorados, after twenty-two hours of combat, withdrew for Chihuahua, leaving behind 600 dead or wounded. The Division of the North had fired 3,000 canon shells and 1 million bullets.
After Rellano, Huerta once again congratulated Pancho Villa and invited him to eat gorditas and beans which “were very good for sure.” Villa wolfed down two. If relations between the two were not good, at least they were not so bad.
There is a series of photographs that show a uniformed Villa, including one in which he is standing in front of an artillery piece as if to demonstrate his profound respect for this recently-discovered weapon. He is surrounded by unarmed federal soldiers, most likely soldiers from the artillery division.
Villa’s forces continued their explorations without being able to push too deeply into the Colorados’ territory because he didn’t know they had retreated to Chihuahua. During one of these excursions, while his men were drinking from a well, they discovered seven cadavers in it. Emilio Madero, as the others laughed, said that he was going to vomit.
At some point during these days, Tomás Urbina was detained by the Federales. No one knew why, although it might have been because of a protest lodged by the US ambassador in which Urbina was accused of having looted the Compañía Tlahualilo. Villa, upon learning of his arrest, marched his brigade some five kilometers from camp and threatened to remove his troops from the Division of the North if his friend were not released and that, furthermore, he intended to report this to the president. With this in mind, he sent a pair of notes to the Madero brothers and to Rábago. Urbina was freed at eight o’clock the next morning, never being informed of the reason for his detention.
This was not the only cause of discontent among the irregular Maderista troops. Federal officers spoke badly of President Madero in camp and Huerta allowed them to do so. Moreover, Huerta was branded as indecisive because he didn’t pursue and finish off the Colorados.
On May 26, Emilio Madero’s cavalry units took Jiménez in the south of Chihuahua. Villa was sent to Parral together with Gen. Rábago where they received an impressive public welcome that was not extended to the regular army.
It was probably during this time that Villa struck up a relationship with Piedad Nevárez, the daughter of a cattleman named Delicias who knew how to play Chopin on the piano. Although some sources place their relationship in Jiménez, it was more likely to have begun in Parral at a banquet. Villa’s fame drew her to him. Their encounter, very much in Villa’s style, would be splendidly romantic. After meeting in the garden that night, Villa serenaded her and, evidently, asked her to marry him. A priest married them in the middle of the night at 1:30 a.m.