thirty-nine
the january conspiracy
On December 21, Villa returned from Guadalajara by train to Mexico City and set up living quarters at 76 Liverpool Street. It was at that point that he received the first reports from the always faithful Silvestre Terrazas about a conspiracy in which President Eulalio Gutiérrez himself would be implicated. This probably originated from the faint echoes of a meeting that had been held in El Paso between the Aguirre Benavides brothers at their father’s funeral at which Eugenio told Luis that there was a pact between Blanco, Isabel Robles, and himself to break with Villa. How accurate was Terrazas’s information? At the time, gossip and rumors promoted, pronounced, and denounced conspiracies on every street corner in the city. Paradoxically, it was precisely at that time when Villa suggested to one of the most inveterate conspirators, José Vasconcelos, that he go north with Ángeles so that when they captured Monterrey they might name him secretary of government and in that way stay out of harm’s way from el Agachado’s threats.
Vito Alessio Robles, himself not connected to the conspiracy—but looking at things from his position as chief of police—received information that clearly pointed him towards investigating it. He met with President Eulalio Gutiérrez and suggested that he talk with Villa and Zapata and, if the situation could not be brought under control, that it would be best for Gutiérrez to step down. Eulalio refused to listen as he was, in fact, deeply involved in a plot in which he was seeking support from Obregón and Villarreal. Vito told him, “Don’t believe a single thing Obregón offers you [. . .]. We’re still crossing a wide river. And you’re aiming to change horses in midstream?” Vito came to the conclusion that Gutiérrez “was under a lot of pressure” from, among others, his brother: the general who was in San Luis Potosí but had still not clarified his position with respect to Carranza on the one hand, and the Convention on the other.
On December 15, Zapata took Puebla; however, he did not continue on to Veracruz, instead withdrawing to Tlaltizapán. On December 23, Pancho and Emiliano talked things over by telegraph. Zapata was then on the outskirts of Cuernavaca. We don’t know the contents of this conversation, but rumors spread that it had to do with the long-anticipated offensive against Veracruz. One journalist reported to Sarabia, the governor of Durango, that Villa had completed the plan for the campaign and would “within a few days commence operations against Veracruz.”
On Christmas Day, Gen. Martín Espinosa, president of the permanent session of the Convention, delivered the flag that all the delegates had signed at the Convention to Eulalio’s brother in San Luis Potosí. Rumors claimed that he had done so on the president’s initiative. It was public knowledge, including being leaked and published in the newspapers, that the president was making efforts to get the Carrancista generals to recognize his authority. It was well known, or at least often stated—at these heights, such verbs were easily confused—that Eulalio was in correspondence with Obregón and Villarreal. However, it was also assumed, that he felt isolated, and that Villismo had full confidence in Aguirre Benavides and José Isabel Robles. On December 26, a presidential manifesto directed at the Convencionista generals was published expressing alarm at the number of kidnappings and assassinations and demanded that they control their subordinates.
The first crisis erupted on the night of December 26 to the early morning of December 27. Chao, the governor of the Federal District of Mexico City, informed Pancho Villa that President Gutiérrez had invited him to leave the city and head for San Luis Potosí. Villa ordered the train stations to be watched: Colonia, Buenavista, and Peralvillo were demonstratively occupied by a detachment of one hundred from the Division of the North.
The following morning, Villa convened the members of the permanent commission of the Convention and informed them that Eulalio had betrayed them and that he had intended to flee the city in a special train to meet up with Obregón: “No one makes a fool of me.”
Later that afternoon, in an attempt at reconciliation, the parties met in the president’s home office in the old Braniff house on Paseo de Reforma where Gutiérrez typically worked because he didn’t like working in the National Palace alongside Eufemio Zapata—who subsequently took advantage of the situation to set up a corral for the Zapatistas’ horses in one of the Palace’s patios. Villa, Urbina, Roque González Garza, the permanent commission members, and Eulalio attended the meeting, accompanied by José Isabel Robles and Vito Alessio. Martín Luis Guzmán, who “stood in the back,” summarized the session, reporting that “Villa’s irritability was notorious. Eulalio was badly congested, and his ears were bright red with a fever.” He noted the following dialogue:
“I was going to leave because I do not wish to be an accomplice to the assassinations being committed every day,” said Eulalio.
“And where are you going to go?” asked Villa.
“To the top of a hill.”
“Not one train can leave without my orders.”
“I’m going to leave even if I have to ride a burro,” said the president.
They argued over who controlled the rails. Villa argued that his trains and his men needed the railways to move and that’s why he had been named general-in-chief. Later, he ordered Fierro to take him prisoner and changed the guards at Gutiérrez’s house. Robles then spoke up in a conciliatory tone.
“The people understand someone speaking their mind. If the president has complaints, he should state them. I told him that Gen. Gutiérrez will not be leaving Mexico City.”
Villa appeared to be calmed by this.
“OK, let’s see. What are the complaints you have against me? I obey you for better or worse. You are in charge of me. What have I done to you? If we are part of the same government, aren’t my forces also your forces?”
Eulalio raised Berlanga’s killing and the threats against Minster Vasconcelos. With regards to the first, Villa accepted responsibility for ordering Berlanga’s killing because “he was a lap dog who was yapping at me. I got tired of his lip, and I smacked him.” But he denied the second charge, contending, on the contrary, that he was protecting Vasconcelos.
The conversation grew tiresome. Villa didn’t have any proof that Eulalio was definitively in contact with Obregón. Finally, on Robles’ suggestion, Villa and Eulalio embraced. Later, Eulalio would provide his own version accusing Villa of having shown up at his house with ten armed men, Fierro and Urbina among them, and two thousand cavalry troops surrounding it, accusing him of being the head of a weak government.
At any rate, the confrontation did not get out of hand at this point and things seemed to be calming down. The following day in the offices at 76 Liverpool, a civilian commission composed of Iglesias Calderón, Francisco Escudero, Miguel Silva, Miguel Díaz Lombardo, and Miguel Alessio interviewed Villa. Alessio remembered that it was a cold morning. They aimed to soften the clashes between Villa and the president, but Villa, without further ado, proposed that they join the government.
Over the next several days, Vito Alessio, who was growing increasingly concerned because Eulalio’s associates continued pushing him towards a confrontation (especially, he thought, Vasconcelos), sought a meeting with President Eulalio Gutiérrez, an old friend. “If you follow the chimerical plans being presented to you, you are headed for utter failure. The only thing those plans will bring is Carranza’s total victory.”
“You are acting more Villista than Villa,” replied the president.
Meanwhile, pressure continued to build on Carranza’s side. On December 28, Villarreal wrote to Lucio Blanco: “I am sorry that you are still not entirely convinced of Doroteo Arango’s incorrigible perversity [. . .]. If you and Eulalio continue politicking with Doroteo Arango, he’s going to slit your throats.”
Eulalio made several changes in his cabinet on January 1, 1915. Vito Alessio was named governor of the Federal District in place of Manuel Chao, who was sent to help Urbina in the campaign in the Huastec region along the Gulf of Mexico. That same day, Vasconcelos announced a banquet to be held at the Palace with the diplomatic corps, “Villa arrived, arrogantly clanking his spurs, dressed in a blue military uniform.” Vasconcelos ate asparagus while Villa wrestled with a chicken leg. There were French wines and champagne. It couldn’t have been a very friendly atmosphere. Eulalio offered a toast, and Villa remarked, “The meal’s over, the party’s finished,” and left.
On January 4, Villa called on Federale officers who had not participated in the coup, in Madero’s assassination, and who had not committed any dishonorable acts during the Civil War, to join the army. This contradicted a statement from the Minister of War, José Isabel Robles, a week earlier, maintaining that no Federale officers would be incorporated into the force, as well as a December 25 order signed by Mateo Almanza mandating the dismissal of any Federales enlisted in the Convencionista army.
Working through Gen. José Delgado, Pancho organized a meeting of Federale generals and officers—abiding by the exceptions noted above—which took place on January 5, in the San José de García barracks at three o’clock in the afternoon. “I have left any quarrels aside,” said Villa. Almada estimated that some 1,500 generals and officers attended the event, but that number is greatly exaggerated. Miguel Rodríguez and Eduardo Ocaranza were among the most interested in joining up with Villa, along with Caso López, Agustín García Hernández, and Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza. The measure also had an economic side to it as the payments made to the defeated Federale officers agreed to in the Treaty of Surrender had been suspended.
Urbina was one of those who opposed the move, “Now my general Villa is going to place us under the command of those who were persecuting us.” Neither, it seems, were the ex-Federales very happy about joining up. Capt. Ignacio Muñoz later commented that “They are placing us under the orders of individuals who were hardly fit to shine our shoes in the regular army,” forgetting to add that those “individuals” had defeated them.
The inclusion of these officers in the revolutionary army was not without danger, even if it was intended to strengthen its core amidst a flood of volunteers and to reduce its casualties. At the same time, all throughout the North, a new wave of recruitment was underway. On January 4 in Torreón, Baltazar Piñones informed the governor of Durango that “Gen. Villa’s special recommendation was to make a down payment by securing the greatest number of volunteers possible” and to inspect the approximately thirty men from Santiago Papasquiaro that had volunteered.
The incorporation of the ex-Federales loomed large among the Carrancistas for whom it “showed the reactionary Villa” joining with the old order. And when the list was presented, recently-recruited Federales, Maderista officers like Medina or Servín, or those who joined the revolution in 1913 such as Ángeles, Gonzalitos, Cervantes, and Vito Alessio were all thrown together in the same bag by the Carrancistas.
On December 5, the Carrancistas recaptured Puebla. That same day, Villa left Mexico City to consult with Gen. Scott in El Paso, head of the high command of the US Army. It was believed he was going to place himself at the head of the army in order to confront the Carrancistas in some location, but he turned up in Irapuato en route to the north. When he arrived in Ciudad Juárez, he went straight to the Division of the North’s offices on Lerdo Street.
On January 7, they met on the international bridge. The first meeting was held in a small hut on the bridge with Villa accompanied by Rodolfo Fierro, Félix Sommerfeld, and Col. Luis Gaxiola, who acted as interpreters. Later, they moved to the Immigration Detention Station where they were joined by Silvestre Terrazas, Pérez Rul, Díaz Lombardo, and Ramón Puente.
The meeting lasted two hours. Although the press reported they were negotiating over the importation of arms, the main topic was the fighting between the Carrancistas and Maytorena’s people in Naco and Agua Prieta—the region bordering Sonora. Stray bullets had killed an American and injured twenty-seven others.
Scott would recount: “We found ourselves in a large room with some two hundred Mexicans [. . .]. I wanted to order Maytorena to sign an agreement that would guarantee security along the border [. . .]. Villa didn’t want to give such an order [. . .]. Just like two elk, we locked horns for two hours until he finally got tired [. . .]. Everyone in the room knew that Villa would keep his promise.”
Carothers reported that Villa had asked Scott to move his forces away from the fighting for eight hours. With his hands thus untied, Maytorena would solve the problem. Scott held firm and insisted that if stray bullets continued flying across the border, he would be obliged to intervene.
The first round of talks produced no results. Scott made a statement to the press, but Villa refused to comment. There is a photo of the party on the steps of the customs house as they are leaving. Villa is wearing a wrinkled three-piece suit without a tie. Fierro, dressed more elegantly, is sporting a silk neckerchief around his neck. A second shot shows them walking through El Paso by the customs exit. From there, they took a trolley to Ramón Corona Street on the way to the horse races. Villa looks happy in a photo taken of him at the Ciudad Juárez racetrack, smiling as he watched the races standing along the rail. A pair of photos snapped by Robert Aultman shows Félix Sommerfeld translating for Villa and Scott as the two converse almost shoulder to shoulder.
Félix, who had been operating as a Villista arms agent in the United States attached to Lázaro de la Garza and the Finance Agency of the Division of the North, had set himself up in the Hotel Astor in New York. Three months after the conference in Juárez-El Paso, he contacted German intelligence who were at the time conspiring with Huerta to return him to power. He offered his services, pointing out his privileged position as a translator in order to sell himself to the Germans, insinuating that he was very influential. He continued to act as an arms purchaser for Villa, seemingly unconcerned about serving multiple bosses.
The following day, January 8, a second meeting was held in Ciudad Juárez as fighting was taking place in Saltillo. The Sonora matter ended with Villa relenting and signing a telegram to Maytorena that read “In the talks with Scott yesterday (January 7), we agreed for you to sign the accord proposed by Gen. Scott.” Villa was interested in ending the arms embargo and Scott made efforts to get Villa to offer guarantees for US mining interests in Chihuahua.
Villa explained that, besides discussing the fighting in Naco, Scott presented US conditions for recognizing the de facto Convencionista government, to which Villa responded that it was a matter for President Eulalio. We do not know what conditions Scott offered, however, upon returning to Chihuahua, Villa commented to Terrazas, “Faced with that kind of recognition, I’d prefer to go to the mountains and eat charred meat.”
On the last day of the meetings in Ciudad Juárez, Villa mysteriously took Scott in his car and drove him all around the city; suddenly, he told him that there had been too many people in the El Paso conference to speak openly, but that in Mexico City, just a few days prior, a ship captain representing the Japanese admiralty had sounded him out about what his attitude would be if Japan were to attack the United States. Villa replied that he would help the gringos in case of that kind of aggression and that Mexico’s resources would oppose them.
This was not the first time. After the Battle of Zacatecas, the Japanese admiralty sent an envoy to meet with Villa at the Quinta Luján in Ciudad Juárez and, following a great deal of flattery, offered him arms and ammunition, apologized because Japanese factories had sold war materials to Huerta, and probed Villa’s attitude without anything coming of it.
Carothers, years later, would repeat the story with some small variations, noting that Villa was not sure if Scott had understood what he had told him and, therefore, repeated it, making clear that the Japanese wanted to know his posture with respect to a joint attack against the United States and the necessary preparations for such an action, even if it would take years. The direct result of Villa sharing this information was an increase in US troops stationed along the border between April and June 1915 in response to the risk of any European power trying to involve Mexico in the world war.
While Villa was negotiating on the border, Eulalio Gutiérrez was writing to Obregón. They would not move on Mexico City so long as “the campaign plan we are developing against Gen. Francisco Villa” was being developed. On January 9, the president met with John Sillman in the National Palace; he complained about Villa and Zapata and announced that something very important would occur in the coming days. Despite his cryptic language, Sillman clearly got the message and contacted the State Department, reporting that Eulalio was working on a pact with Obregón. Of course, Obregón was not going to make things easy for Eulalio, responding to his January 7 letter saying that “when your actions show that you have declared war on Villa and his henchmen [. . .] I will do everything I can to end the bloodletting.”
It was said Villa would return to Mexico City within twenty-four hours to take command of the Division of the North and march on Puebla, but that wasn’t clear. Villa remained in Chihuahua and on January 10, met in the Quinta Gameros with various agents in charge of finances in the territories controlled by the Division of the North (Díaz Lombardo, Escudero, Pérez Rivera, and Ramón Puente) where he put forward the need of collecting large amounts of money for the campaign against Carranza. Hipólito had reported that they were discussing $3 million silver pesos, besides the money in New York, and advances paid to Winchester, but it still wasn’t enough. They gathered money from the Maderos and Pedro Alvarado from Parral, raising their reserves to $20 million silver pesos. Villa summoned Gen. Gabino Durán to go to the Batopilas region to “audit” gold and silver production. He commissioned Puente to empty out the oligarchs’ chests in Mexico City and Guadalajara.
Villa was in Chihuahua on January 11, when he was informed about the Battle of Ramos Arizpe. Felipe Ángeles, after having captured Saltillo on January 8, launched a decisive battle on that front, defeating Villarreal and Maclovio Herrera. Monterrey was now within reach. Ángeles had 7,500 men under his command, split into four-and-a-half infantry brigades, with Orestes Pereyra acting as chief of the high command and the brigades commanded by the priest Triana, Raúl Madero, Máximo García, and Martiniano Servín, el Chojo (Droopy Eyes), who was killed in the fighting. Servín’s death, the first high commander of the Division of the North’s artillery, was a big blow to Villa, but the message attached to Ángeles’ report was even worse.
Ángeles sent a telegram stating that Col. Aguilar was on his way to Chihuahua with a sealed packet including “things” that were found in Villarreal’s railway car, transmitting a preview in a coded message. Villa, around ten o’clock at night, mobilized his guard and fired up the trains. In Bermejillo, they crossed paths with the train that was carrying Martiniano Servín’s remains as well as Maj. Aguilar and his mysterious package. Ángeles, after seizing Villarreal’s personal railway car in the Battle of Ramos Arizpe, had discovered President Eulalio’s correspondence with the enemy. According to Taracena, it wasn’t the only thing he discovered—there was also a large amount of women’s underwear. Was it Villarreal’s?
Villa read and reread Villarreal’s papers, arriving in Torreón at noon on January 12. He spread word that he was going to Monterrey, but headed towards Aguascalientes, where Gen. Víctor Elizondo, second-in-command of the Robles brigade, was in charge. It wasn’t known if Elizondo was involved in the conspiracy, but Villa thought that he, along with José Isabel, had to be aware of it.
Villa’s train entered Aguascalientes midafternoon on January 13. While the Dorados and a shock brigade unloaded the horses and got organized, Villa sent Candelario Cervantes, who turned up unexpectedly in Elizondo’s barracks, one block from the station, to bring the general to Villa’s train. Pancho laid out the papers from Monterrey in front of him. Well, what about it? Elizondo, keeping his cool, said he knew nothing about it, but they detained him regardless. He asked to be taken back to his hotel to gather his things and, while he was left unattended, cut his own wrists. Villa’s men got to him in time and kept him alive, but he remained very weak.
Villa commented, “I held out hope until the end that Gen. José Isabel Robles, one of my most cherished commanders [. . .] had not decided to come out openly against us.” José Isabel Robles’s family lived in Chihuahua in Villa’s own house cared for by Luz Corral. Shortly before his defection, they had told Luz that they had to leave Chihuahua urgently because of a health emergency. Although it was not easy to move around without a pass, because all the trains were being used for military purposes, Luz used her influence and managed to get them aboard. The fact of the matter is that, of all the betrayals, this one hurt the most.
Villa sent a telegram to José Isabel and sent a message to Roque González Garza, who convened the permanent commission of the Convention to discuss sacking the president. The debate at the meeting became tangled in doubt, and the lack of proof, and failed to come to a conclusion.
But events would soon clarify the panorama.
On the night of January 14 and 15, the ministers of the Convention’s government met, presided over by Eulalio Gutiérrez. Around 2 a.m., Vito Alessio met with José Isabel Robles, who showed him a telegram from Villa in which he stated that if it were true that he was negotiating with Obregón, he would shoot Eulalio. Villa’s telegram forced them to make a decision.
Eulalio offered an explanation for his departure from the capital. It had been decided to dismiss generals Villa and Zapata on January 13, but “Villa anticipated this and, with a specific object in mind, had left 6,000 men in the capital under the command of Madinabeytia. Informed that he was to be dismissed, he gave secret orders to detain and shoot us immediately [. . .] which was why the government was forced to leave.” In a manifesto that marked his split with the remaining Convencionistas, dated January 13 from the National Palace, he stated that a deal had been struck wherein Villa would eliminate Lucio Blanco and Zapata was willing to kill Vasconcelos and this had “become known to public opinion.” Further, Gen. Martín Triana was going to be shot by Villa, but was saved during a struggle in which people from his general staff were killed. Strange justifications from a man who had spent several weeks negotiating with enemy generals.
At 3:30 a.m., President Eulalio Gutiérrez, with his ministers of government, war, and education (Lucio Blanco, José Isabel Robles, and Vasconcelos) at his side, left for Pachuca. Mateo Almanza and Eugenio Aguirre Benavides’s brigades accompanied them, along with the president’s own men and those of Blanco and Robles. The soldiers, some 10,000, were unaware of the meaning of their orders. They took $10,453,473 pesos with them. Curiously, in what would become a comedy of errors, the troops that remained loyal to Villa and the Convention—Agustín Estrada’s brigade, Madinabeytia’s garrison, the Zapatista garrison, and Vito Alessio’s police—were not only ignorant of what was happening, they were greatly outnumbered by the president’s forces. Hypothetically, it would not have been difficult for Eulalio and the rest of the plotters to seize Mexico City. Did the turncoats doubt the loyalty of their own troops? Did they worry their soldiers would not fight against the Division of the North?
Roque González Garza, upon seeing the president’s columns of troops marching in the middle of the night, went directly to the National Palace, took charge of the situation, and began reorganizing. The Zapatistas, as soon as they noticed the strange developments, retired to their original territory as did a portion of Garza’s forces. Roque spoke with Estrada and Madinabeytia and informed Villa by telegraph that the president had deserted.
Pancho, who had finally decided to move on Guadalajara, was intercepted by a telegraph operator in Lagos de Moreno who told him he had urgent messages waiting. Villa would later state in a letter to Zapata that “Gutiérrez’s betrayal and that of other individuals surprised me when [. . .] I had just arrived in Lagos. I didn’t know if I could leave the traitors behind. For a moment, I hesitated in deciding to continue to Mexico City or to go help secure the plaza in Guadalajara, which was in grave danger.” José Cervantes recorded that he, along with a group of terrified onlookers, watched as Villa choked up when he read the telegrams. He paced around like a lion, insulting Eulalio. “What more did the so-and-so want if he was already president of the country? Thief, scoundrel! He even carried off the currency engraving plates!”
Villa decided to set up his general headquarters in Aguascalientes. Over the next three days, remembered Enrique Pérez Rul, no one in Villa’s train slept. They were trying to get a picture of who was on what side; if things were hard before, now they were even more difficult. What damage had been done? Where had holes opened up?
On the afternoon of January 16, González Garza finally established a telephone connection with Villa in Aguascalientes. The Convention was discussing an alternative candidate to Eulalio Gutiérrez for the presidency, and Roque himself was one of the most qualified candidates. Villa feared that Madinabeytia and Estrada would be trapped in Mexico City if confronted by an alliance between Obregón and Eulalio and he told them to leave for the North and to take the Convention with them. Concerned with maintaining their alliance with the Zapatistas, Roque responded that such a move was not necessary and that the situation in the city was under control.
