On November 11, 1942, the Germans crossed the demarcation line taking over the free zone, as they broke the Armistice and put an end to Vichy sovereignty.

If the military presence was rapidly felt, the German police, whose missions required a good understanding of the local French population, seemed to move slowly at first. As early as April 1943 the German police carried out targeted arrests of Jews in Carpentras and Avignon. These arrests continued sporadically, and in the following months were mostly focused on a few notables; a very striking contrast with the collective arrests of the foreign Jews in August 1942. Was this a Vaucluse anomaly or part of a more generalized phenomenon?

An appropriate answer may be found in Marseille, where the section of the German police in charge of Jewish affairs, under the direction of Sergeant major Willy Bauer and his boss Rolf Mühler, shows a clear interest in the arrest and deportation of Jews as early as March 1943, but here as well it was in a small proportion relative to the total Jewish population.

At the beginning of May 1943 a conflict occurred between Bauer and Mühler, on one hand, and Raymond Raoul Lambert, the director of UGIF for the free zone, and Robert Andrieu, Regional Intendant of police, on the other hand.1 Following an assassination attempt on May 1, 1943, when two SS were seriously injured, Bauer tried to impose sanctions; he demanded from Robert Andrieu a list of people to arrest, and from Lambert a list of 200 Jews and 10% of his personnel. Both refused to comply; Andrieu had the support of Vichy. As to Lambert, he argued that the arrests were contrary to the armistice agreement and that no French law allowed to bypass it.

The German reaction was not long to come, and on May 6 Bauer turned up, with a German police unit, at the offices of the UGIF, 58, rue de la Joliette in Marseille. They arrested the personnel, as well as refugees, men, women and children, caught in the mouse trap. Bauer stated that he had orders to arrest 100 Jews without any distinction of nationality, but he released a few Italian and Turkish Jews. Bauer seized the pretext of the assassination attempt to send a message: there was no point in protecting French Jews any more.

On May 18 Lambert, who was at the prefecture for a meeting with Robert Andrieu, found himself face to face with Rolf Mühler also visiting Andrieu. There is little doubt that the question of Jewish hostages, a major point of contention between them, came up on this occasion.

Lambert and Andrieu were both arrested after a noble but clearly futile struggle. Were they able to save a certain number of people by delaying the fatal outcome? Raymond Raoul Lambert, his spouse and their three children were deported on convoy 64. Robert Andrieu was freed.

Despite sporadic actions and the broadening of the arrests to French Jews, the German anti-Jewish activity remained limited. It is in this context that the roundups of April 19, 1943, in the Vaucluse must be placed as well as two prefectural behaviors, discretely supported by Vichy, must be considered. On one hand, a passive resistance to the measures against the Jews, in particular the French Jews; on the other hand, the delivery, in October 1943, of a list of foreign Jews to the Germans, who had unsuccessfully requested the list of all Jews, seven months earlier, in March 1943.

But, while German intentions were clear, there was a big difference between their wishes and reality. The German police had other fish to fry, they were understaffed, and they were not completely deployed in the southeast, largely covered by Italian occupation troops. Moreover, the implementation of an efficient network of French auxiliaries, which the Germans badly needed, required a lot of time and effort to set up.

The Italian capitulation in September 1943 and their evacuation of southeastern France created new demands placing a heavy burden on an already overextended staff, but they also provided the opportunity for the Germans to take full control of the region. This coincided with the arrival of Aloïs Brunner, the Berlin envoy of the SD in charge of accelerating the deportation of the Jews from France. Changes were about to take place.

Finally, the “negotiations” between French and Germans about the denaturalization of a new segment of the Jewish population were not progressing. Vichy still resisted giving its agreement for the deportation of French Jews. The Germans were becoming impatient, and at least formally they tried to obtain the collaboration of the French so as not to offend public opinion. It seems though that by the fall of 1943, the Germans had lost their illusions about collaboration and were to care less and less about public opinion.