Whoever destroys a single life is deemed by Scripture as if he had destroyed a whole world;

And whoever saves a single life is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world1

As early as the summer of 1940, the Vichy institutions—prefecture, CGQJ, Legion and later SOL and Milice—constituted the main threat the Jews had to face.

The round ups of foreign Jews of August 1942 ended in one hundred or so arrests and deportations; almost half of the victims were not targeted by the “list of 111”^* of Aimé Autrand.

The targeted Jews who had eluded arrest and those who had been forgotten came out with the feeling that it was possible to reach an arrangement with the French institutions, even if the Statut des Juifs mandated a significant reduction of their individual “lebensraum.” All the more so since by the end of 1942 the prefecture did not seem eager to arrest the Jews who had been spared by the recent deportations. This sentiment was reinforced by the attitude of the French authorities that tolerated a limited practice of religion.

On July 28, 1942, the office of the chief Rabbi sent a letter to Blanche Mossé… to inform her that the chief Rabbi of France wants to come for the re-opening of the Carpentras synagogue.

On August 31, 1942, the ministry of the interior informs the prefect of the Vaucluse… that the Cavaillon synagogue is exempt from the shutdown rule…²

Those Who Said “No!”

Even before the occupation of the southern zone, a small fraction of the Jewish population rose up against the anti-Semitic measures of Vichy and saw in them as unacceptable collaboration with the Germans. For the most part, these were French Jews or foreign Jews who had lived in France for a long time.

In 1941, de Camaret informs Xavier Vallat that Mr. Achille Naquet, staff captain, and Mr. Lévy, infantry lieutenant, were still members of the board of the Avignon Reserve Officers Association, in violation of the Statute of the Jews. The General Commissioner for Jewish Questions did not take long to answer, and the prefecture—specifically Autrand—is requested to get them to resign. Mr. Lévy gives up, but Achille Naquet “who had objected” is struck off administratively on February 23, 1942.

In an inquiry of August 21, 1943, Lebon writes that the Gak-Gorny family “has been stripped of the French nationality in March 1941. This nationality was restored on July 28, 1943, by the judgment of the Orange tribunal…” Without naming the judge who was known to be Judge Pierre Burgède, Lebon adds:

However, an issue remains obscure. What right did the Orange tribunal have to restore a French citizenship that had been stripped by the Ministry of the Interior? …3

The members of the Gak-Gorny family had “dared” sue the government for having illegally stripped them of French citizenship, in violation of the law of August 10, 1927, that broadened access to citizenship by naturalization. This law still being on the books made Burgède side with the plaintiff against an illegal act by Vichy. This kind of independence explains why Judge Burgède will be chosen to preside over the Avignon court of justice at the Liberation, despite his service as a Vichy magistrate during the war.

Once again, this brings to light a typical characteristic of that period when traditional institutions were upside down, without necessarily appearing abnormal. Jean Lebon, a raging subaltern of the SEC, expected justice to rule according to his own wishes, while ignoring the law when it did not suit him. The investigation about Burgède will take an unexpected turn when a loaded question is asked by the isn’t the Gak-Gorny family enjoying “secret support from people in high places”?^*

This kind of civil disobedience was more frequent before the invasion of the southern zone, but some went even further.

Georges Manberger, a Jew from Strasbourg, the manager of the Duparcq factory in Carpentras, was involved in the demonstrations against Vichy on July 14, 1942. Jointly with Dr. Uhry, Humbert, a tradesman, and Desbrun, an industrialist, he wrote a letter to the American embassy in Vichy. This letter, probably written before November 1942, was seized and copied by the censors. Here are a few paragraphs.

… Our press and our radio proclaim that president Roosevelt and the American People show a total lack of understanding toward the French People.

If you believed them, you would think that all of France is entirely won over to totalitarian doctrines; it accepted with delight the replacement of republican institutions by dictatorship and the burial of its now defunct parliamentary regime.

These voices speak French but they are not French voices. Mr. Ambassador, you are not without knowing who leads them and which impure inspiration is driving them. You must be aware. But we think it useful for some citizens, suffering to see their most precious sentiments and ideals trampled upon, to rise and bring you, the most distinguished representative of America, the testimony of their love for your free and generous country; and to tell you that we have faith in your country, that ravaged France is under the victor’s yoke, and that, being gagged, it cannot think and speak its mind freely…4

On January 8, 1943, this letter, probably intercepted by the RG, is provided by Jean Lebon, the SEC delegate, to his boss in Marseille. Jean Lebon, who already had an eye on Georges Manberger, had invited him on December 18, to appear in his office—at the home of de Camaret at 13, rue de la Banasterie in Avignon—“to discuss a matter which concerns you.” On January 25, 1943, Jean Lebon sent to his boss his report about the Duparcq enterprise, belonging to Valentine Garcin, the “catholic” widow of René Duparcq. This “Aryan” business is managed by “the Jew” Manberger. The conclusions of Jean Lebon’s boss are not late in coming:

          1.    Manberger is a French Jew

          2.    The Duparcq enterprise is entirely under his influence

          3.    His income declaration is notoriously false and hides more significant profits

          4.    It is common knowledge that Manberger is engaged in an anti-national activity, and consequently, he is dangerous.

              Therefore, I am asking

          1.    The director of the Economic Aryanization in Marseille to put the Duparcq enterprise under a provisional administrator so as to eliminate any Jewish influence.

          2.    The Prefect of the Vaucluse, with copy to the Regional Prefect, to take a measure of administrative internment against Manberger.

On February 25, 1943, Aimé Autrand informed the prefect of the Bouches du Rhône, in the name of the prefect of the Vaucluse, that Manberger has been committed to a residence in Sault, a softer measure than the internment recommended by Lebon’s boss. Unfortunately, before the end of this bureaucratic maneuvering, Georges Manberger was already arrested in Marseille, sent to Drancy on January 24, 1943, and from there, deported to Sobibor on convoy 53.

Did Jean Lebon’s report play any role in the arrest and deportation of Manberger or was he randomly picked up in the great roundups of January 22, 1943? We will never know, but Georges Manberger left behind a legacy of honor and courage.

He was not alone.

Maxime Fischer, a friend of Manberger, pays no heed in 1941 to the CGQJ ordering him to cease his activity as a lawyer. He was summoned by the sub-prefect in Carpentras: “Come on, resign at once, and stop making trouble for me!” Maxime Fischer replies: “Who is making trouble for whom?” Together with reserve Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Beyne, Fischer set up the Maquis Ventoux. He fought and fortunately survived. He was joined by numerous Jews.5

The Prefecture Takes the Pulse of the Jews

On January 4, 1941, prefect Valin underscored for the benefit of the minister of the interior that “numerous people… hope for England’s victory, but this does not mean they all are followers of Mr. de Gaulle, whose most loyal supporters are recruited among the sizeable Israelite community of our region.”⁶

In September 1942, shortly after the deportation of the foreign Jews by Vichy, Prefect Piton went a little further in pointing the finger at Jewish opposition. He focused on the cost of living: “All this dissatisfaction is exploited by the communist, Gaullist, and Jewish propagandas which secretly work on public opinion—and one must agree—successfully so.”⁷ In his reports of October and November 1942, Piton detected the desire of some to increase the measures against the Jews:

Finally, those in complete support of the Maréchal and the government do not understand why measures—be it only as reprisals—were not taken to intern all Anglo-Saxons and numerous Jews who are still free among us, while the loyal supporters of the Maréchal are being executed or imprisoned in North Africa.

Then, the tone changed. The prefecture and its allies perceive a growing worry among the Jews. Commander Tainturier, head of the Vaucluse gendarmerie shared his observations on December 23, 1942:

The foreign population is calm. The Italians regularly visit their compatriots from the armies in operation… The British make every possible effort to go unnoticed out of fear that the German or Italian authorities require that measures be taken against them. Moreover, it is the same for the Israelites who in large parts have fled from the sea shore toward remote Vaucluse cities, where their only concern is to look for better living conditions, while spending lavishly and buying everything they can at any price.

“Going unnoticed” does clearly not mean getting out of sight of informers of the gendarmerie and prefecture.

Avignon Under German Rule

The weekly RG bulletin of November 30, 1942, reported a recent demonstration of open hostility against the Jews by the PPF. “Numerous graffiti against the Jews were painted in various Avignon streets during the night from the 25 to the 26 of this month. These inscriptions seem to come from the PPF.”8 It looks like the arrival of the Germans galvanized the PPF into a show of loyalty toward the occupiers.

From then on, the weekly bulletins indicate both a growing worry and a wait-and-see attitude among the Jews. During the week of December 19, 1942, “the recent measures against the Jews did not cause any major reaction in Jewish circles that are nevertheless worried about their future.” For the week of February 20, 1943:

As far as the Jews are concerned, a substantial worry emerges among them following rumors in the département about the creation of a “forbidden zone” which would include the city of Avignon.

During the night of February 6 to 7, the windows of two Jewish stores, situated in rue de la République in our town, were smashed by unknown individuals using cobblestones. This action was disapproved of by most of the Avignon population and seemed instead to elicit a strong reaction in favor of the Israelites…

The open hostility toward the Jews seemed to be limited to fanatics—PPF or other collaborationists.

The report of the week of March 1 to 6, 1943, indicated that the Jews with resources were still residing in the Avignon hotels and “do not work while families of workers have been expelled from Avignon.” These “expulsions” from Avignon were in fact the product of the commission headed by Aimé Autrand and in charge of assigning foreign workers to GTEs and their families to mandatory residences; the transfers generally took place within the boundaries of the Vaucluse, and of course, the new addresses of the expelled individuals were tracked by the prefecture.

During the following months, “the Israelites do not seem very reassured, they particularly dread new measures susceptible to curtail their activity more efficiently…” (Week of March 14 to 20, 1943), “the Israelites continue to worry about their future…” (Week of March 21 to 26, 1943), “the Israelite elements are taking an increasingly self-effacing stand…” (Week of April 10 to 16, 1943), “… seek rather to not be seen. They are concerned by the arrests conducted by the German authorities and move into the zone controlled by the Italians…” (Week of April 17 to 24, 1943), “… Departures are noted among the richer Jews following arrests in their social circles and they live in expectation and fear of new measures…” (Week of May 16 to 22, 1943), “… The vast majority of Israelites make every effort to go unnoticed. Those who can afford it have left the big centers and retreated to small villages where they are less known…” (Week of June 20 to 26, 1943), “… Moreover, many leave their residences clandestinely…” (Week of June 27 to July 3, 1943).

Most Jews used to live in the open, and few had truly gone underground, although this would have provided them better protection. But even this proved to be at times unrealistic. For instance, the Cohen family was living in Bedoin under an assumed name, Audibert. So a visiting relative who did not know their exact address asked a local for the whereabouts of the Audiberts. The man replied: “Ah, do you mean the Cohens?” The arrival of a stranger could not possibly go unnoticed.

Of course, we must take into account that the geography of those days seemed much larger than that of today. It will suffice to consider the transportation difficulties of Jean Lebon, before his boss agreed to provide him a motorcycle.

Because of fuel shortages, public transportation had to cancel several lines, so much so that some villages are totally devoid of means of transport.

Example: When I had to conduct an investigation in Ménerbes, here are the details of my trip

Train from Avignon to Cavaillon at 5:15 a.m.; arrival in Cavaillon 6:25 a.m.; I have to wait until 9:00 a.m., namely the time when offices open, to borrow a bike at the police station. Ménerbes is 15 km away from Cavaillon and the location of my investigation is 4 km further away.

The result is that the day is completely wasted for a one-hour investigation since I am coming back to Avignon at 9:25 p.m.9

Ménerbes was in the middle of nowhere.

Except for the lucky few, people were not moving around that much, as if there were tall mountains between Carpentras and Marseille or even Entraigues and Avignon. That is why moving away was tantamount to hiding. The benevolent or even neutral attitude of some municipalities strengthened that feeling of safety.

One must also remember that the hunted Jews were not professionals of covert activity, and that for most Jews, hiding often came down to being out of sight of the Avignon SiPo-SD by settling in a remote village. However, everyone needed food ration cards and other documents, and they did not necessarily realize that a request made at the municipality or the gendarmerie was often transmitted for approval to the sub-prefecture and the prefecture. The list of foreign Jews was also provided to the Germans by the prefecture itself… not to mention the legion of local informers already discussed.

Moreover, the gangsters had a significant number of loyal antennas in the towns and villages. They only needed to make contact and ask. Also, the information provided by the CGQJ to the Germans found its way to the gangsters in their services.

Around July 1943 the atmosphere was changing and those who could left secretly (but not unbeknown to the RG); this exodus would steadily continue during the following months. The departure of the Italians left a clean sweep for the Germans signaling a significant worsening of the Jews’ anxiety. “The announcement of the arrival of a German commission in charge of arresting young Jews to force them into the STO is badly received in Israelite circles, who believe that the internment and deportation measures are continuing…” (Week of September 5 to 11, 1943). Worry was mixed with the hope of an allied landing suggested by the Italian capitulation. Jews huddled down. “The Jews try more and more to be forgotten…” (Week of October 31 to November 6, 1943).

The report of the week of November 14 to 20, 1943, is particularly revealing. No place was safe anymore.

The Israelite circles of the département still seem in the grip of the arrests conducted in Carpentras and Cavaillon where a certain number of Jews were included. At the present time, most Jews in that sector expect to be arrested at any minute. Moreover, they think that a general measure is about to be taken in France by the German authorities to secure the arrest of all the Israelites who are still free on French territory.

The anxiety kept on growing, but the tone changed with the first big roundups. The report of the week from March 26 to April 1, 1944, observed the departure of the registered Jewish stallholders and their families who had been in the open all along.

For the week of April 2 to 8, 1944, a worried wait-and-see is nevertheless still detected:

The Jews appear very worried by the police operations executed by the German authorities and aimed at seeking a large number of Israelites. They wonder whether they too will not meet the same fate as their co-religionists.

Then, for the week of April 9 to 16, 1944:

… Many think that in the near future similar measures will be taken in the entire département in the context of general reprisals against the Jewish population, in expectation of the landing of the Anglo-Saxon forces on French soil.

The effect of the great roundup of the end of March continued to be felt, and the report of April 30 to May 6, 1944, goes even further:

Following an operation conducted by the German police in Avignon at the end of March (during which a number of foreign nationals of the Israelite race were arrested), most of Avignon Israelites have adopted a more unassuming attitude. Most of the place Pie stallholders have ceased they commercial activity, and a number of Jews have left town for a residence where they would be safer.

Buis-les-Baronnies, the Hub

The proceedings against Palmieri confirmed that the great roundup in Avignon at the end of March 1944 was based on the census of the foreign Jews. This must have shaken up the others, who felt more particularly targeted and fled.

Some of them were to be caught up in Buis-les-Baronnies, in the Drôme, during the following weeks. Their hiding places were not as watertight as they thought. We know through numerous testimonies that the French auxiliaries of the Germans were aware of the presence of Jews and members of the Resistance from the Vaucluse in Buis-les-Baronnies and the surrounding area. In fact, in 1944 that village had become a hub for the clandestine resistance, the hidden Jews, the informers of the German police and the gangsters at their service—a little Switzerland without neutrality. As in part of Mme. Marthe Angel’s testimony of March 24, 1945:

After discussion, my husband gave Merle the amount he was asking and on his advice, he left for Buis-les-Baronnies where I joined him.

One month after we left Avignon, my husband was arrested by three German soldiers and three French civilians.

Marthe Angel refers to the great roundup of Buis-les-Baronnies which seemed unavoidable. Palmieri knew how to catch up with his victims, because he had steered some of them toward that safe haven.

Furthermore, Bergeron had been sent to Buis-les-Baronnies to protect the Achard family whose father had been wounded during an assassination attempt by the Resistance. During the same period, Esther Felzner, the wife of Abraham Felzner, a member of the Maquis Ventoux—both registered in the 1944 census in Entraigues—found shelter at the Hotel du Lion d’Or, where she gets a job and serves as a mailbox for the Resistance, with the full knowledge of the hotel owner who also belongs to the Resistance. She had obtained forged identity documents in the name of Madeleine Lefèvre.

The Census and the Lists of Jews

In spite of the “departures,” the total number of Jews in the census does not seem to change. This was because of a simultaneous exodus and an influx. The prefecture report of December 12 to 18, 1943, explained those “departures.”

The number of Jews living in the département is approximately 1500; one-third of them are foreigners. 40% came after the armistice mostly from Paris and Alsace-Lorraine.

Most of the refugees settled in the villages where they feel safer and they find better food… Most of them have normally submitted to the obligation of the law of December 11, 1942…

When comparing the census of 1941 with that of 1944, one finds that 871 individuals (642 French Jews and 229 foreign Jews) appear in both. Therefore, a significant number of newcomers replaced the people who left and mingled with the rest of the population; at the same time, a drift of the Jews toward the remote villages took place, but most of them regularized their situation with the prefecture and the local authorities. This is another indication that they did not really hide. Moreover, the census lists of September 1943 and May 1944 still show a significant number of people still living in Avignon, completely in the open. In spite of this Jewish population drift, the prefecture was still able to keep the census up to date. This should be attributed to the municipalities which served as gate keepers for various essential requests, like work permits, ID cards and food cards.

Jews registered in the census had little difficulty in finding a place to live even in the most remote cities and villages of the Vaucluse. This brings up an important distinction between a person who was taking the risk of secretly hiding non registered Jews and a villager who was opening his door to a registered Jew in exchange for rent or for participation in the work of the farm. The first one was acting heroically while the second was providing a welcome hospitality that was not negligible in times of hardship. We found a large number of cases in the second category and a small number in the first one—and this rather late.

But how many Jews remained at their usual address and in particular in Avignon where the danger was greater? We have seen the double blackmailing of Marie Riz at the same address—that of her restaurant “Le Coq Hardi”—first by the Parietas gang, and then by the Palmieri gang. And Jacques Senator who was arrested on May 30, 1944, in a café on the place de l’Horloge, the meeting place of the gangsters; he was carrying money in the lining of his coat. And Estréa Asseo in the middle of the street on June 6, 1944, and Sarah Levendel, in her store on the same day; both of them had momentarily returned to their homes…

In short, a large part of the Jews in the Vaucluse, whether hidden or not, in their original homes or far away, were easy prey for those seeking their elimination. Palmieri was holding many victims within his reach. He kept a reserve list of 200 names, which he probably continued to feed while verifying new addresses. He was not running out of Jews to arrest.

The Genocidal Intent

The appointment of Aloïs Brunner in July 1943 to handle operations against the Jews in France testifies to the impatience of the German leaders to finish the job. In that sense, it was also a slap in the face of Helmut Knochen,* head of the security police in Paris, and his subordinate Heinz Röthke,^† who had replaced Théo Dannecker at Jewish affairs (Judenreferat) in August 1942. Brunner who pulled rank on Knochen was receiving his orders directly from Adolf Eichmann in Berlin. This was to be a source of tension, and probably of competition between the two men.

In May 1943, General Karl Oberg,* supreme chief of the German police forces, and Röthke had tried in vain to obtain from Vichy the denaturalization of a new slice of the Jewish population. However, the Germans had not waited for the end of these fruitless “negotiations” before they arrested a number of French and foreign Jews in the Vaucluse. The Germans were to progressively have a growing tendency to ignore Vichy.

In March-April 1944 Knochen issued secret directives aimed at accelerating the process of arrests and deportation of Jews,¹⁰ and Brunner approved. There would be no distinction any more between French and foreign Jews, and since the Germans could not rely on the French government, they would use all the means at their disposal. To discover hidden Jews, relatively small bonuses, between 500 and 1.000 francs, would be granted to informers at the discretion of the local chiefs of the German police.

How did the genocidal intentions of Berlin’s Section IV B 4 turn out in practical terms in the Vaucluse?

Successful Operations and the Capabilities of the System

During the trial of Reynoir, a gangster who helped Quinson in the hunt for the Jews in the Var, Jean Gibelin, a member of the Palmieri gang, declares during his deposition on September 18, 1944:

… Around the end of March [1944], the Avignon agent Lucien Blanc arrived at the office with a list of about 60 Israelites to be arrested in the region; this when Charles [Palmieri] decided to launch an operation in cooperation with the Avignon SD. The participants in this operation were Charles, Alfred [Palmieri], Simon, Heiter and the Avignon agents. The operation yielded about 40 people all delivered to the Avignon SD.¹¹

This operation started on March 28, 1944, after sundown and ended two days later in the morning.

Ten weeks later, on the evening of June 6, 1944, Palmieri phoned Carteron (Jean Gibelin) at the office of 8, rue Paradis in Marseille, and left a message for Rodolphe Bride.¹² Bride was ordered to join Palmieri and his gang, who had left the previous evening to arrest Jews in Avignon; he must bring his typewriter because the boss wanted to prepare a report about his activity during the day. On June 7, 1944, in the morning, Bride arrived at the Avignon train station where Lucien Blanc picked him up and drove him to the Grand Nouvel Hotel, at 4, rue Molière, requisitioned by the Germans to host their auxiliaries when they came to town. According to Bride’s statement:

The owner [of the hotel] seemed to know Palmieri very well and behaved with him in a servile way… the people accompanying Palmieri were: Bergeron, aka Toto, Fasciola, aka Olivier, Albert Simon, Lucien Blanc, Mouillade,… a Gestapo officer who had his own car and whose name was Billartz… I understood that the gang had wreaked havoc in the region, since Charles Palmieri had me type at the hotel a pretty long list of Jews whom he had arrested. This list was typed in several copies and I saw Charles Palmieri hand them over to the German Billarz* and keep a copy for himself…

The presence of Bilharz is corroborated by Charles Palmieri during his confrontation with Moïse Benyacar, an Auschwitz survivor arrested on June 6, 1944: “I do not contest this arrest with Billartz who was the boss. He belonged to the Marseille Gestapo under the orders of Bauer…”¹³

Rolf Bilharz was the subordinate of Aloïs Brunner (and not Bauer). Today we know that Bilharz had eluded detection until 1983.¹⁴ Stationed in Nice at the time, his presence demonstrated Brunner’s determination to accelerate the rate of arrests in the southeast. The harnessing of Palmieri and his men, French members of the “anti-Semitic” service of the Marseille SiPo-SD, indicated the collaboration between the networks of Brunner and Rolf Mühler. Palmieri’s confusion about the hierarchy above Bilharz originates from the fact that the reporting structure tends to become blurred within tight collaboration.

After having established a “delivery slip” which would allow him to cash the promised bonuses, Palmieri left his victims in the hands of the Germans at the Hautpoul barracks in Avignon and returned with his gang to Marseille on June 7, 1944. Bilharz and his small entourage (the Frenchmen “Jean” and “Pierre”) took their own car. As we have already seen, we know the next steps from Estréa Asseo,¹⁵ who was among those arrested. We also know independently that Palmieri and his gang had arrested at least 38 people in the Vaucluse on that day.

In each case, on March 28–29 and on June 5–6, about 40 Jews were arrested during two days of work. The gangsters knew how to do the job.

A Lack of Vigor

The 300 arrests during German occupation of the southern zone took place from November 11, 1942, to August 15, 1944, over a 644 day time span. September 7, 1943, coincides with the departure of the Italians and March 1, 1944, with the arrival of Palmieri.

We observe a slight decrease of the arrest activity after the departure of the Italian occupation troops at the beginning of September 1943. However, there is a perception that, in September 1943, the Jews lost the protection of the Italian occupation troops. Is that perception real? Between November 11, 1942, and September 8, 1943, there were 72 arrests of Jews in the Vaucluse. During the same period, 17 Jews (22%) were arrested in Carpentras, Pernes, Mormoiron, Pertuis and le Thor (see Appendix C) through German incursions in the Italian zone, as we have seen in the case of Henri Dreyfus, the former mayor of Carpentras. On one hand, obviously, the Italian “sovereignty” over most of the Vaucluse did not prevent the Germans from conducting arrests there. On the other hand, given that about half of the Jews were living under Italian occupation, one is tempted to attribute the smaller percentage of arrests in that area to the Italian protection of Jews. However, two other factors must be taken into consideration. First, the towns in the Italian zone were distant from Avignon, thus making arrests less cost effective. Secondly, the larger concentration of Jews in Avignon, close to the German police headquarters, made them easier targets. Therefore, the lower percentage of arrests in the Italian occupation zone of the Vaucluse does not imply that the Jews benefited from a significant protection.

The arrival of Parietas in November 1943 to head up Alfred André’s gang and help the GFP did not yield any significant change in the pace of arrests of Jews. On the other hand, Palmieri’s “reign” shows a very large increase in anti-Jewish activity, and comparatively, attests to a new sense of urgency. It is however certain that Palmieri is not the sole factor of this quickening pace, since we are aware that his Marseille associates and the other Avignon gangs also joined the hunt for the Jews. It is probable that this increase was due to the impetus of the Germans and their hierarchy.

At a rate of 40 Jews per operation, people like Palmieri and his gang would have needed 8 operations to arrest the 300 Jews of our list. Based on two-day operations, 16 days would have been sufficient out of 644 available days. This would have left 628 “idle days.” We know that the Avignon and Marseille gangsters took advantage of these “idle days” to line their pockets by setting up bogus police raids. On more than one occasion, it is clear that the gangsters did not want to kill “the goose that lay golden eggs.” In fact, witnesses—mainly those released after payment—testified about their deals with their hunters between official roundups. Although Palmieri demonstrated his organizational skills during the various raids he coordinated in the spring and early summer of 1944, the “limited” bogus cop operations and targeted arrests fit in better with the style common to gangsters than large scale operations. They also provided additional sources of income behind the backs of their German bosses.

We must take into account that the “Vaucluse men”—the Parietas gang, the “favorites of the Germans” and Lucien Blanc’s men—were also serving their masters in other capacities, in addition to their own personal “idle time.” The activity of the Palmieri gang, based in Marseille, also spanned the Basses Alpes, the Alpes Maritimes, the Var and the Bouches du Rhône départements. In some cases, he was accompanied by Vaucluse men; Bergeron was also seen in the Var. All this implies that the availability of the gangsters in the hunt of the Jews was at best limited.

Their German bosses in Avignon did not project a greater sense of urgency than their French “employees.” They were aware of the “secondary” sources of revenue of their “favorites,” albeit not in the details. But, had they applied more pressure, would they have had better results, and above all, would they have continued to benefit from the generosity of the auxiliaries? Who else would have organized their Sunday outings to the racetrack in Le Pontet, as Rodolphe Bride mentioned in his deposition?

The Germans and their French cronies acted in fits and starts, as if they were responding once in a while to prodding from above. The pace of the big roundups fits this pattern. Moreover, we know that Aloïs Brunner, who had been sent to France by his boss Adolf Eichmann to accelerate the deportation of Jews, was concerned by the small number of Jews coming from the southeast. This was why he took a number of trips to the Mediterranean coast, in particular to the Nice area, but also to Marseille. Fanny Deyns, arrested in Pertuis on January 5, 1944, was interrogated in Marseille by Aloïs Brunner. On April 29, 1946, she testified before the gendarmes Louis Mouret and Marcel Richaud.

I was taken with my sister [Suzanne Tibi*] directly to Gestapo headquarters, 425, rue Paradis in Marseille, where we were interrogated by other Gestapo agents, in particular by a man named Brunner. This interrogation was aimed at finding out my opinions as well as other members of my family. I was threatened with guns to get me to talk… At the camp of Drancy, I was interrogated again by Brunner and brutalized by a man named Brückler^†…

In her testimony of June 7, 1946, Fanny Deyns added: “Every time [anti-] Jewish operations were taking place in various French cities, Brunner was going there to rule on the prisoners and to direct them to Drancy.”

Brunner had also set up a procedure to “recover” the close relatives of the arrested Jews that were still at large, and he did not hesitate to get personally involved, as indicated by Fanny Deyns’ testimony. He also used, on the southeast coast and later in the Paris region and in Brittany, the services of Oscar Reich, an Austrian Jew, as a tout to get at other Jews. Around the end of May 1943, Oscar Reich, a former soccer player in Vienna,^‡ had been chased by Jean Lebon, the SEC delegate for the Vaucluse, out of the Avignon Sports Association, where he had been hired as a coach in violation of the Vichy laws.¹⁶ After the Liberation, Reich was executed by firing squad in Montrouge.

Much has been said about Aloïs Brunner, a sadistic and fanatical anti-Semite, and we will add only one remark. The arrival of Palmieri and his Marseille helpers in Avignon, and the sudden burst of energy that we noticed in the arrests from that moment on, were clearly the result of Brunner’s orders and of the coordinated action between him and the Marseille SiPo-SD. Although it was considerable, this spurt will nevertheless come up against a corrupt system. One thing is certain: under the pressure of his chain of command, the boss of the Marseille SiPo-SD was not satisfied at all with Palmieri’s results, in spite of a slight improvement in the pace of arrests. He even reprimanded him. His excessive interest in the money of the Jews and lack of interest in their arrest resulted in his incarceration by his German bosses at the beginning of August 1944.

That’s how the SiPo-SD, overwhelmed by all their duties and unable to count on Vichy, was led to hire subcontractors from the underworld. It must be noted that the local gangsters were already operational when the Germans arrived long before the big chiefs were sent to keep them in line. The Germans found a few recruits in the collaboration organizations. But, with the exception of a few “favorites of the German,” they were unable to mobilize organizations like the PPF and the Milice, in their entirety. The loose attribution of the word “milicien” to describe a French collaborator may have induced some to conclude too quickly that the Milice, as an organization, was dedicated to the hunt for the Jews. Our investigation does not support this claim in the Vaucluse.

Were German military reversals a factor in the “lack of energy” evidenced in the deportation of the Vaucluse Jews? Probably not to a significant degree, because the gangsters, like many of their compatriots, were convinced that the inferior position of the Jews had become a French asset that would outlast the war, and that their extortions and thefts would be pardoned once the gangsters switched to serving new masters. This thinking surfaces in the purge trials; the gangsters easily admit their actions against the Jews, while focusing the attention away from their crimes against the Resistance. Others were deeply aware of the approaching allies, but were too implicated against the Resistance to change course; Mouillade had put it very clearly to an employee at the Vaucluse prefecture named Reau:

“We are cleaning up to shut the mouth of the Gaullists. As for myself, I have decided to act, because I would be dead meat if the Americans were to land.”17

1942 and 1943–1944

Whatever the reasons, the “yield” of the Germans and their French auxiliaries in 1943-1944 pales in comparison with the arrests of August 1942 made by Aimé Autrand. Within a few days he had organized and carried out the arrests of one hundred of foreign Jews, while it took almost two years for the gangsters to arrest 300 Jews out of a total population of about 2,000. It also took months to gather some speed. The Germans would have needed many more gangs, to be able to organize surprise operations at once—like the prefecture did in 1942. But they had to make do with whatever was available: a small number of auxiliaries that were drawn in by lucrative “private enterprise.” Even with the German “spurts” of March 1944, it was too little and too late.

The persecution of the Jews in the Vaucluse did not end up in the catastrophe it could have been. But this is often not because the local population was hiding the Jews. The French gangsters did not put their hearts in this work, and they were holding the employers in check. The sole means of pressure the Germans had was not to renew the temporary SiPo-SD permits of their “employees.” But did they really have a choice and could they have managed without their auxiliaries? In this case, would they have given up on the final solution or would they have moved to brutal action, as in eastern Europe, at the risk of rapidly alienating the local population?

In any case, one can hardly imagine the resulting slaughter, if the German police and their helpers had been able to hunt the Jews with steady consistency instead of working in bursts, and if they had more auxiliaries at their service as well as the active collaboration of the prefecture.

On the other hand, no hindrance of the aryanization process mitigated the fate of the Jews of the Vaucluse. Even if the prefecture did not participate in arrests during the occupation, some threads of the information spider network weaved by the Germans and their helpers are connected to Vichy institutions. A society that had first marginalized the Jews also enabled what appears to be a sinister lottery.

The history of the deportation of the Vaucluse Jews must be based on an examination, where the genocidal intent is seen in the context of local variations. It should also be viewed at the confluence of the deportation routes, from the villages and towns of the Vaucluse to Marseille, from Marseille to Drancy and from Drancy to Auschwitz. The closer we get to the end of the voyage, the higher the likelihood of achieving the extermination goal. Conversely, at the bottom of this hierarchy, far from Auschwitz, the genocidal intent must take into account the reality on the ground where its success is far from absolute.

In the end, the reality in the Vaucluse may resemble that of other parts of France, and certainly in the neighboring départements which we have come to know better. The extent and the depth of the damage will certainly vary according to the geography. It is however probable that a certain number of elements that emerge from our study—greed, villainy, absence of moral compass, the decomposition of the institutions—played a significant role in Nazi Europe in general. In any case, it is evident that neither Europe nor France in particular can be considered as homogeneous blocs. More local studies would provide significant contributions to the development of regional, national and European syntheses. Without the differentiation of operational realities, it is impossible to understand what happened through the sole study of Nazi strategy.

____________________

* In the “list of 111,” one person was listed twice.

* Judge Pierre Burgède distinguished himself more than once by his independence from Vichy.

* Knochen, sentenced to death in France in 1954, had his sentence commuted in 1956 and was released in 1962 after being pardoned by President Charles de Gaulle.

† Röthke died in the sixties without ever being indicted.

* Oberg was sentenced to death in France in 1954, had his sentence commuted in 1958 and was released in 1965 after being pardoned by President Charles de Gaulle.

* This name has been spelled in several ways: Billartz, Billarz, and even Bilarts. His real name was Rolf Bilharz.

* Suzanne Tibi domiciled in Pertuis, deported on convoy 69.

† This is likely to be Ernst Brückler, the loyal torturer at the service of Aloïs Brunner.

‡ Austrian born Léo Bretholz, a soccer fan in Vienna before 1939, told Isaac Levendel that Oskar Reich, then in his twenties, had played before the war in the ranks of the Brigittenau Athletic Club of Vienne (BAC), then for Hakoah (Vienna Jewish club). Léo who jumped off the train en route for Auschwitz says that Drancy echoed the name of Oskar Reich.