I left my assignment as a federal investigator to take a position with the Security Education Division (SED). In SED, I was assigned as the Chief of Training for the CIA federal police force. It was a demanding but rewarding job. I enjoyed supporting the men and women of the newly formed CIA federal police, the Security Protective Service (SPS). To my disappointment, during my first briefing with the incumbent, his advice was, “watch your back,” referring to Frank Murdock, the Chief of SED.
“Oh boy,” I thought to myself, “another snake to deal with.”
Despite the warning given to me about Frank, I worked hard to make improvements and streamline the SPS program. I had four subordinates working for me in the Division. Two were senior members of the SPS. Frank decided he simply did not like one of my SPS subordinates and two of my co-workers. So, he proceeded to make their lives miserable, threatening to write nasty letters for their personnel files and ruin their careers. In the case of the two co-workers, he did exactly that.
Frank went after one of the SPS officers who worked for me, Pete Santori. Pete was a good SPS officer and a good employee. Everything I tasked Pete with he did; and did with all his might. I never had a problem with his performance. However, whatever creature inhabited Frank’s mind decided one day he would go after Pete for sport. Frank was one of those CIA officers who was a little fish, until the agency took a risk and gave him some authority. Once he sat behind the big desk, he became a monster. I learned this sort of person is, basically, a coward, terrified someone is going to rise above him and take his promotion. People like this keep themselves from scrutiny by attacking everyone around them.
One morning, Frank took me into his office and told me he simply did not like Pete and wanted to get rid of him. His plan was to make Pete’s life miserable. When Pete became upset with the treatment, Frank would write his Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) with a low rating because of attitude and poor performance.
When it came time for Pete’s performance evaluation, I gave him the rating he deserved; a good one. As soon as Frank saw it, he commanded his deputy, Larry Anderson, to pull me into his office for a meeting. During the meeting Larry, in a menacing tone, threatened,
“Frank is not happy with your rating of Pete on his PAR. He wants you to change it to poor.”
“I can’t do that.”
“You what?”
“I can’t do that. I rated Pete accurately and fairly based on his performance.”
“I am ordering you to rate Pete down on his PAR!”
“I’m sorry, but I’m not going to do that.”
“If you don’t rate Pete down on his PAR, Frank is going to write a letter against you and put it in your personnel file.”
“Well, then tell Frank to write the letter, because I am not going to do it. If Frank wants to write his comments in the review section he can do that. Pete’s rating stays what it is.”
“That will be all,” said Larry with a low, threatening tone.
From that point on, I became Frank’s target. When I went into the classified system, protected by passwords known only to me, I noticed someone in the office had broken into my files to access the PARs on my employees. And, sure enough, Frank began to write memos and make phone calls to destroy my career. I was not going to let him do it. I found out later there is a CIA regulation forbidding managers from ordering a subordinate manager to change the PAR of an employee. It was a serious infraction.
One afternoon, a fellow senior officer, who had been the brunt of Frank’s retribution, came into my office and closed the door. She advised she had secretly gone to the CIA Inspector General (IG) and reported Frank and Larry’s actions. The IG had opened an investigation and wanted to talk to me. I advised her that, if the IG called me, I would dutifully come in and tell them the truth. The next morning, Frank called me into his office.
“You know Kevin,” he said.
“Some people have talked to the IG, and really regretted doing it.”
“Really?’
“That’s right. Some people have had their careers ruined by doing that.”
“What is that supposed to mean, Frank?”
“Nothing. That will be all. You can go.”
Frank ended the meeting. Walking out of his office, after receiving a direct threat, my decision to talk to the IG just solidified.
During my meeting with the IG, I was met by a very gracious and seasoned lady, a senior IG investigator. I answered her questions about Murdock and Anderson truthfully. She advised the IG staff was conducting an aggressive investigation and was outraged by their behavior. There was probably going to be official action taken against them.
The official gave me the IG contact code name “Martha.” She advised when I got the telephone message “Martha” called, the IG was making its move to sanction Murdock and Anderson.
Three weeks later, I came into my office and found a note from my secretary. It contained the words, “Martha called.” It had begun. The hammer came down on Murdock and Anderson. Almost fired, both men were removed from the office. Frank was given a small office shuffling papers and Larry was shipped off to the field; their titles stripped from them. I felt no sense of vindication. This sort of practice had become all too common in the CIA, which is veiled from oversight by organizations such as the Department of Labor. All personnel actions within the CIA are classified and can be withheld from investigators from other federal agencies. Some managers abuse this secrecy.