By 1995 the CIA was in turmoil. An air of distrust among Agency employees hung over CIA headquarters. Careerism was at an all-time high. Officers fought for promotions and only the most ethical did so without back-channeling e-mails, closed door meetings or the shameless practice of doing anything their managers wanted, while stepping on those below them. This was becoming an acceptable internal procedure. Operational mistakes at the management level were covered up at all costs.
In the account that follows I must leave out the names of the actual offices, true names of people involved and the detailed results of the investigation I conducted because of the sensitivity of the information.
My first wake-up call came in 1995. I was an officer in the CIA’s Office of Security performing an internal investigation on a sensitive CIA operation. During a routine study of internal processes, I and my fellow security officer, who initially raised concerns about the issue, but was on her way to another assignment, uncovered what appeared to be a significant, global vulnerability to our agents overseas.
At first, it seemed too bizarre to be true. However, the more research I conducted the more concrete my conclusions became. Because of an overlooked vulnerability, the lives of our agents, and their assets, were at risk. I drafted an extensive report on my findings and submitted it to my supervisor, who I will call Tom K. After Tom, a very fair, objective manager, reviewed my findings, he advised there might be something to the information in the report and recommended I present my findings to the Agency division involved. I called this division and advised I had developed some information that could be of concern to them. I had a several-page report detailing my findings.
They arranged a meeting with the Chief of the Division and his Special Assistant. During the meeting, I presented an overview of my findings. When the presentation was finished, I left them a copy of the report.
A second meeting was immediately scheduled for me to present my findings to a panel of senior Agency officers. The group was a little intimidating, but I was sure of my results. During the meeting, I gave a slide presentation on the findings of my investigation and disseminated several copies of my report. At first, the air of the meeting was suspicious. By the end of the meeting there was a sense of concealed alarm.
After giving the division a week to digest my memorandum, I called to find out what conclusion had been reached regarding my findings. The Special Assistant, who was at both meetings replied, “What memorandum?”
I reminded her of the memorandum I had distributed at the briefing. She responded, “Oh, I do not have that, we must have lost it.”
I advised this was no problem, I would send her another one. I immediately did so. A week later, I called the Special Assistant again and asked if she had seen the memo. To my amazement she responded again, “What memo?” I reminded her of the memo I had given her two times. She replied she did not know what I was talking about and would have to check into it.
Several days later, I received a call from Charles N. (not his real name), chief of that division. In a threatening tone, he ordered me to drop the investigation, stating it was above my head (I was a GS 12) and was none of my business. I responded, respectfully, it would be negligent to do so and I thought we should continue. He angrily ordered me to drop the investigation and hung up the telephone. I was stunned.
It took me two days to go over the events in my mind and decide what I had to do and how much I was willing to risk my career. I finally reached the conclusion lives were at stake, and I had to pursue it.
I arranged a meeting with a senior officer at the Department of State who was heading the office in charge of embassy security. The CIA special assistant attended the meeting also. During the meeting, once again there was the familiar air of suspicion and superiority. I presented my findings to the group. The State officer advised there was no problem and the vulnerability had been corrected years ago, essentially mocking my findings.
Once again, I was shocked. My findings suggested otherwise. I respectfully advised I would do more research and close the matter if he was correct. He was not. More research revealed how potentially widespread the problem was.
Following the meeting, I went into the computer to access my memo from the server. The memo was gone. I called the Information Technology department to see if they could retrieve it from back-ups. They responded they could find no such memo on the backup server. Was this just a digital hiccup, or had someone intentionally deleted the file? Because I always kept important documents in hard copy, I retrieved a copy of the investigation memorandum from my files. I, along with another Agency officer, scanned the report back into the computer system. For several weeks I received nothing but silence from the officers I had briefed.
During the interim period my supervisor, Tom K., was attending a conference for Agency officers in the Senior Executive Service (SES). This is the highest career rank in the CIA. During offline discussions, Tom mentioned my findings to another SES officer; Mike O. Mike was the recipient of the CIA Intelligence Medal for heroism. He was one of the old school Agency officers who did his job for God and country. I had known him from his time in the CIA Office of Security. He was a man of authentic character. Tom mentioned to me Mike was going to give me a call.
Early one morning, I called another officer who was a good friend of mine. During the conversation he advised something had just been put on his desk he had to deal with and he would call me right back. Ten minutes later the phone rang. Thinking it was my friend, I answered, “Pizza Hut!” SES officer Mike O. was on the other end of the line (oops!). I had to explain to him I thought he was my friend who was supposed to call back. I deeply hoped he had a sense of humor.
Mike O. was now retired from the CIA and was working for the Department of State, Inspector General’s (IG) Office. Because my findings involved US embassies, State IG had the authority to conduct an investigation. Mike requested I send him a copy of my report. Feeling a great sense of relief, I immediately sent him the information via secure fax.
Within a week Mike O. called me, advised he had thoroughly read my report and he was concerned there was a real problem. He requested a meeting at Department of State headquarters. During the meeting, I gave a verbal presentation of my findings to Mike and two senior IG officers. At the conclusion, they complimented me on my work and advised they would look into the matter. As I walked out of State headquarters, I felt a huge sense of relief. I could drop the matter now and move on.
After a global investigation, which included visiting several foreign embassies, Mike O. and the IG staff completed their study. Mike O. called me with the results. It was worse than even I thought. The vulnerability was real and could have resulted in the deaths of our agents. Mike scheduled an immediate meeting with the State IG and the CIA division responsible. During the meeting Mike O. and the IG officers sat at one end of the table, the CIA Chief of the division at the other, and me in the middle. The Chief of State IG officially reprimanded the CIA for putting the lives of agents at risk for more than ten years and ordered him to correct the problem immediately. I saw my CIA career fading before my eyes. Surely, this CIA office would not forget the embarrassment. It did not matter, I had done the right thing, and I could sleep at night.
A few months later, a lengthy report was published to the entire Intelligence Community, detailing the identification of the vulnerability and recommending corrective action. A special Agency office was set up with orders to correct the problem. I received an Exceptional Performance Award for my work.
After these events, I had a great sense of personal and professional fulfillment. I had been confronted with the choice between my career and what was best for my country and my fellow officers in the field. I had made the right choice. I continued to be stunned by my own Agency’s serious cover-up of the problem, and especially its total disregard for the lives of its agents.
I lost a fundamental respect for the CIA’s honesty and its ability to efficiently carry out operations. I had received a wake-up call trumpeting how weaknesses can occur because of arrogance and the lack of real scrutiny of the CIA.