It was August 7, 1998. At approximately 10:30 a.m. a truck loaded with 1,500 pounds of TNT was detonated by suicide terrorists in the parking lot of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. More than 200 people were killed; twelve of them Americans. Four minutes later, a second truck loaded with explosives was detonated outside the American embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The blast killed eight people. Al Qaeda had begun the first of its large-scale attacks in the global Jihadist war against the United States. Twin bombings would become the modus operandi of an Al Qaeda operation.
Security at the embassy in Nairobi was poor. The building was located at one of the busiest intersections in the capital city, with no protection from the blast. There were no security devices in place to protect the building and its parking lot was also used by two adjoining commercial companies, the Cooperative Bank House and the Ufundi Cooperative Building.
Embassy security was contracted to a security company that employed local, unarmed guards. There was no embassy security control of the shared parking lot. Parking lot security was also provided by a private company contracted by the bank in the adjacent building. The security guards were poorly trained and paid paltry salaries.
The suicide bombers driving the truck altered the suspension so the vehicle could carry heavy explosives without being detected. A tarp covered the TNT. The attackers drove the truck over the curb aiming at the exit lane from the shared parking lot. A guard posted at the exit lane did nothing. A barrier, designed to protect the exit lane from entry, had not yet been installed, and the bombers were able to drive the truck into the parking lot.
A security guard, who observed the truck jump the curb, lowered the barrier to the underground parking garage. One suicide bomber immediately jumped out of the truck and ordered the guard to raise the barrier. The guard refused and the bomber threw a hand held Improvised Explosive Device (IED) at him. The bomber missed and threw a second bomb as the security guard ran around the corner of building. Another guard, hearing the ensuing chaos, locked the steel gates to the underground garage. The two suicide bombers, still in the truck stuck in the parking lot, set off the main charge. The explosion leveled the Ufundi building and destroyed the outer and middle structures of the US embassy.
1998 Nairobi Embassy Bombing.
Nissan Atlas Truck Similar to that used against US Embassy, Dar es-Salaam.
Immediately after the US embassy suicide bombings, I was assigned to the newly created CIA/CTC Fusion Center. The Fusion Center had been created to be a central information conduit for all US intelligence and defense agencies to funnel information related to the bombings to the US government for immediate sharing, analysis and dissemination.
The Fusion Center was an impressive operation to observe. For the first time in my experience working for US intelligence, I was part of an impressive, efficient (albeit stressful) and vibrant counterterrorism effort bringing all the US entities of intelligence and defense together. The Fusion Center and its approach appeared to be the answer to US agencies’ inability to work together and share information. Classified and unclassified documents, secure and non-secure telephone calls, e-mails and hand delivered information poured into the Fusion Center in a constant, rapid twenty-four-hour stream.
The sheer outrage caused by attacks on US embassies and the loss of life brought US intelligence and defense together for one brief moment in history. Unfortunately, three short years later, the fusion concept had broken down. US intelligence agencies, primarily the CIA and the FBI, were once again refusing to disseminate vital intelligence to each other. Shortly thereafter, the 9/11 attacks occurred, due in part to a lack of sharing and acting on existing intelligence information, that could have possibly prevented the attacks.
The fusion center concept has since been adopted by other counterterrorism organizations, such as the New York Police Department (NYPD). The new technique of intelligent policing and the creation of law enforcement fusion centers are growing steadily in the US. In the case of the NYPD counter terrorism unit, its efficiency has exceeded that of the Department of Homeland Security. During NYPD’s response to 9/11, politics, turf protecting, and bureaucratic laziness were all put aside and the counterterrorism mission placed as a priority. NYPD’s management and officers had personally felt the pain and loss of their own officers during the 9/11 attacks. Political delays could simply no longer be tolerated [A point worth noting is, because intelligence fusion involves the collection of information from multiple sources, privacy and civil rights concerns must be addressed and adequately balanced].
The CIA and the New Global Jihad
Global terrorism, essentially a multi-tentacled World War IV (if you count the Cold War as World War III), began with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini. The unpopular US- supported Shah of Iran was overthrown by the Iranian people in a violent coup. The people of Iran saw the government of the Shah as a rich, hedonistic dictatorship, which ignored the needs of the ordinary masses. While US intelligence slept, Khomeini took control of Iran and declared global Jihad against the United States and Israel.
US intelligence did not take the threats of global Jihad seriously. Khomeini’s violent brand of Islam rapidly spread across the world, creating silent radical Islamic groups preparing themselves for battle. Only a few years later, the United States had underestimated the ability of these groups to stage a successful attack against the US, especially on American soil. Despite pieces of information gained, but not shared, by different parts of the US Intelligence Community and specific warnings by other foreign intelligence services, the threat of global terrorism had not been realized by the US.
By the time the danger was understood, it was too late. Attacks against the United States began to materialize with fury, eventually culminating in 9/11, the greatest intelligence failure in US history, trumping Pearl Harbor.
Events leading up to the 9/11 attack bore several similarities to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In 1947 the CIA was founded by President Harry S. Truman in response to the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. Prior to that attack, there was significant credible intelligence indicating an attack by the Japanese was imminent. Failures in disseminating and analyzing information resulted in one of the worst domestic attacks in US history and a significant loss of life.
Despite intelligence failures involved in the attack, there was significant American opposition to the creation of a secret intelligence organization. Many government officials were concerned it could evolve into a kind of Gestapo. The FBI, the Department of Defense and the Department of State all considered the CIA a competitor and a threat to their authority. This climate of distrust lasted fifty-four years, continuing all the way up to the 9/11 attacks.
Sixty years after Pearl Harbor, the impetus for the creation of the CIA, the same errors in intelligence occurred again, with a similar, but more horrific loss of American life, this time civilians. Similar to Pearl Harbor, there was credible intelligence available to conclude an attack on US soil was imminent; information that could possibly have prevented the attack.
The CIA had become a huge monolith structured to confront the Soviet global threat. Sadly, after the fall of the Soviet Union, not only was the Agency in total disarray, with morale at an all-time low, but it did not have the functional capability to go after an amorphous enemy such as global terrorism. It was in serious need of redesign. Unfortunately, because of intense internal resistance to change, and political pressure from the executive branch, redesign never took place, in part paving the way for 9/11.
Errors before a Catastrophe
Both the CIA and the FBI made serious errors in their analysis of possible terrorist attacks on American soil. The CIA failed to analyze the potential of airliners being used as flying bombs. This was despite concrete intelligence regarding the famous 1995 Bojinka plot, which was engineered by Ramsi Yousef, the same man who masterminded the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Yousef developed a complex plan to attack targets in the US, which included the Pentagon, Wall Street and CIA headquarters itself.
In addition, Philippine intelligence provided the CIA with information indicating Yousef was also planning to hijack and explode eleven US airliners, with 4,000 passengers aboard, traveling from Asia to the US. The CIA was unable to uncover the connection between Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Ramzi Yousef.
The relationship between the architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Khalid Sheik Mohammad, and Al Qaeda was never examined. The CIA had also been provided reports that Sheik Mohammad was sending terrorists to attack targets within the US on orders from Bin Laden. The fact that Ramsi Yousef was a cousin of Sheik Mohammad was overlooked.
The CIA had information connecting Sheik Mohammad’s plans to use airplanes during terrorist attacks, information indicating he was planning attacks on US soil and he had direct connections to Al Qaeda. Foreign intelligence services were providing the CIA with regular information warning of an attack on US soil, but none of this information was taken seriously. ???????????????????? warned the CIA just prior to 9/11 that terrorists were planning to hijack aircraft for use as weapons against the US.
??????????????????? issued a warning to the FBI and the CIA that Al Qaeda was planning an attack on US targets. ???????intelligence warned the CIA that Bin Laden had engaged in discussions with the Taliban regarding hijacking US commercial aircraft. FBI agents in Phoenix, Arizona, had reported to the CIA that several Arab individuals were seeking flight training, including instruction on how to fly large commercial aircraft. The CIA conducted no analysis of this information.
The FBI field office in Minneapolis, Minnesota, briefed the CIA on the flight training attempts of Zacharias Moussaoui and briefed the DCI on the attempts of “Islamic Extremists” to learn how to fly. No warning was issued by the CIA Director or other Agency officials. In addition, a report provided to the Intelligence Community by the Library of Congress warned Al Qaeda suicide bombers had the capability to fly aircraft loaded with explosives into the Pentagon.
Prior to 9/11, officers from the CIA, FBI, and NSA (which had collected several communication intercepts that pointed directly to 9/11, but never communicated these to the rest of the Intelligence Community) had access to cable traffic documenting the travels of the two Al Qaeda hijackers, al-Hamzi and al-Mihdhar, but none of these agencies contacted the others to analyze the information. Although the CIA knew about the presence of the two operatives, it did not turn the information over to the FBI until just a few weeks before the attacks. The FBI, when it received the information, did not act on it.
Although these hijackers had associated themselves with an FBI informant, the FBI was not monitoring their activity. The CIA also neglected to notify the Department of State that al-Mihdhar was in possession of a multiple-entry visa to the US, should have been placed on a watch list and should have been prevented from re-entering the country.
After 9/11, I went back and read the Department of State’s assessment of the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing. It was chilling. When taken together with the above warning signs, a second attempt at the WTC was obvious. Even previous terrorist attacks and basic common sense made it clear that if Al Qaeda failed to complete an attack on a high value target, it would return to finish the job. Thousands of Americans went back to their offices in the WTC under the assurances from the government they were safe. Nothing could have been farther from the truth.
Because the CIA had no focus on Al Qaeda and no penetrations of its organization, no assessment of Al Qaeda was prepared. Congressional intelligence oversight committees did not see the need to hold hearings on the existence of terrorism. No warnings were issued to the White House regarding a possible attack on the United States. America’s intelligence and counterterrorism apparatus was under-funded, disjointed and asleep at the switch. In addition, the Agency focused all of its attention on terrorist attacks against US interests abroad and did not consider the likelihood of a domestic attack. FBI reports indicated Al Qaeda was not sophisticated enough and did not possess the logistics and resources necessary to carry out an attack on American soil. In the years leading up to 9/11, there was no collection and analysis of information regarding the potential of turning airliners into weapons and there was inadequate information collected and analyzed regarding Al Qaeda’s plans to attack the United States.
To summarize, the NSA had collected several communication intercepts that pointed directly to 9/11, but never communicated these to the rest of the Intelligence Community. The CIA had information that two of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US in January of 2000 but failed to place the individuals on the terrorist watch list until just before the 9/11 attacks. Although these hijackers had associated themselves with an FBI informant, the FBI was not able to monitor their activity.
During the subsequent investigation by the 9/11 Commission, the FBI, Department of Defense and Department of State declassified their reports for review by the panel and the American public. The CIA refused to declassify reports delineating its failures prior to 9/11. The need for review of information that led to the attack was critical in preventing it from ever happening again. Apparently, to the CIA, this did not matter. What mattered most was, once again, protecting the organization’s negligence under the guise of “secrecy.”
In short, the 9/11 tragedy was the result of the same historical disparity between the CIA and the FBI. It was the failure of the entire Intelligence Community to work together, actively sharing information; a total departure from the fusion center concept.
Turmoil Within
As mentioned earlier, during the Cold War, the CIA had become a giant, secretive monolith built to confront the Soviet threat. After the fall of Soviet Communism, the Agency was in serious disarray. Entire divisions, along with their staffs were being cut from the organization. Employees were being told in meetings their jobs might be in jeopardy as the CIA cut programs tied to the Soviet threat.
With morale at its lowest point ever, infighting and back-channel attempts to save careers, at the expense of others, were intense. The giant structure that had been built since 1947, and flourished under the Reagan administration, could not adequately deal with the growing threat of global Jihadist cells.
In the midst of the CIA’s turmoil caused by the change in its mission, the drawing down of entire divisions and attempts to restructure the organization to meet the new threat of terrorism, multicultural diversity training and sexual harassment courses became a central focus of the Agency’s operation. Overlooking the real value of true diversity, especially in an organization with an international mission, the Agency began creating pseudo-diversity assemblies under pressure from groups inside and outside the organization.
The CIA began allowing multiple, internal racial and ethnic groups to have tacit authority to promote the advancement of their members by putting pressure on CIA management, career panels, etc. These groups began demanding promotion of their members based on status in the group, rather than merit. Some of the groups began to oppose each other. CIA employees who had earned promotions through high performance, but did not fit into a particular “diversity group,” were denied promotions based on this reason alone.
The CIA had become divided. High level positions that once required the successful completion of high standards mentioned earlier were changed and those requirements dropped to allow for the commanded demographical change. The CIA no longer possessed the employee unity it had while defending America against the real threat of communist expansion. Focus on the intelligence mission, especially counterterrorism, began to wane. The CIA was becoming weak.
In 1995, I wrote an essay on real multicultural diversity, the kind of diversity our Constitution and Bill of Rights protect, and the false diversity occurring at CIA headquarters. I placed the article titled, “Will the Real Multicultural Diversity Please Stand Up,” in an Agency unclassified, open discussion database. The article caused a barrage of responses. Postings regarding the article set an all-time record in the internal discussion site. Ninety-nine percent of the responses were supportive and expressed appreciation for putting into words what the vast majority of CIA employees, of all races and ethnic groups, were feeling. The database was shut down one month later.
Essentially, the CIA had divided its workforce into opposing groups, granting or withholding promotions for reasons other than EEO-based merit, and its internal operations were being weakened in the process. Multitudes of managers, case officers and security officers had left the organization because of this impact on morale and career potential.
While this and confusion over restructuring were going on, the CIA had paid little attention to the rising global jihadist movement, and CIA analysts reached the mistaken conclusion that radical groups were merely fronts for Soviet aggression—so they could not exist without Russian sponsorship. While the CIA continued to operate via this conclusion, jihadist groups all over the world began to develop and begin operations.
Because of US government actions, and primarily CIA operations occurring in Africa and the Middle East, fundamentalist Islamic groups were convinced the US government was bent on the conquest of the Muslim world. While the CIA failed to realize this perception, these groups mobilized themselves, preparing for a global war against the “crusaders and infidels.”
The 9-11 World Trade Center attack. Warnings after the 1993 attack were ignored.