As a CIA officer, one of my assignments at Langley was senior briefer to new employees and members of the Intelligence Community Entering-On-Duty (EOD) with the CIA for the first time. These new employees ranged from clerical personnel to college graduates joining the CIA, case officers, senior members of the FBI, DEA, Department of State and ranking officers from each of the branches of the military. It was my job to provide a detailed, three-day lecture on the CIA, the Intelligence Community and an introduction to CIA operations.
In the paragraphs that follow, I will present an overview of the structure of the US Intelligence Community in general and CIA operational techniques in particular. This will serve as a good, concise explanation of how US intelligence agencies and, in particular, the CIA function.
The US Intelligence Community is, without a doubt, the most sophisticated, complex and sizable intelligence apparatus in the world. The CIA utilizes the most professional, refined, catalogued process of the collection, analysis and dissemination of information. This data, once analyzed and validated is called “intelligence.” A common mistake, especially in the private sector, is to call raw information gained from a source or document “intelligence,” before it is studied, analyzed, properly reported and properly disseminated. This can lead to serious embarrassment and has done so for several government and private organizations in very costly instances in the past. This oversight is made primarily because of a lack of understanding of the true nature of intelligence and the intelligence process.
What Makes Up the Intelligence Community?
The US Intelligence Community consists of seventeen large government organizations. This includes the newly created office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and intelligence branches of the Army, Navy, Marine Corp and Air Force. Four members of the Intelligence Community are considered national intelligence organizations due to the fact that they perform operations on behalf of the federal government as a whole. These national intelligence organizations consist of the CIA, NSA, NRO and NGA.
Other intelligence activities of the US government are conducted by smaller branches of executive civilian organizations. These consist of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Treasury and the Justice Department (FBI and DEA). For the purpose of this book, I will focus on the functions of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the four national Intelligence Community (IC) organizations. The DNI was created after the 9/11 attacks as a result of the 9/11 Commission’s investigation. The creation of the DNI abolished the single, powerful position of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) which controlled US intelligence. The DNI has more broad sweeping powers than the DCI, but is not involved in management of the Agency’s day-to-day operations. The DCI continues to function in that capacity.
The CIA was created by President Harry S. Truman (Ironically, Truman may be my distant relative. The “S” in Truman’s middle name stands for “Shipp/Solomon;” his two grandfathers Anderson Shipp and Solomon Young) originally as the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), in the midst of much controversy over a secret intelligence service within a democratic government.
The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA as an organization independent from the other national organizations within the executive branch reporting directly to the President of the United States. The CIA’s role is to serve the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisor, collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence to the NSC and perform “other operations the NSC may order the CIA to conduct.” This last function of the CIA is very broad and eventually paved the way for CIA covert operations.
Since the 1947 Act, the CIA has grown substantially in its power and interpretation of the 1947 Act and become the foremost Agency for covert human intelligence collection, analysis and covert operations. Executive Order 12333, issued by President Ronald Reagan, gave the CIA authority to covertly collect foreign intelligence within the US as long as the operation was not targeting domestic citizens or organizations.
The National Security Agency (NSA) was created in 1952 by President Truman to oversee communication intelligence activities. It is the most secret of the seventeen intelligence organizations. NSA’s primary responsibility is to collect signals intelligence and produce signals intelligence information, or SIGINT. NSA’s SIGINT responsibility includes communications intelligence, or COMINT, the interception and analysis of foreign radio, wire, or any other means of electronic communication and the decryption of these transmissions. SIGINT also includes non-communications information obtained from electromagnetic information produced by atomic detonation or sources of radiation. This type of information is called electronics intelligence, or ELINT.
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was formed in 1992. The NRO was created as the organization that would tie together the reconnaissance efforts of the Air Force, CIA and the Navy. This includes reconnaissance information derived from classified aircraft systems, SIGINT satellites, and imagery satellites which produce information designated as imagery intelligence, or IMINT. The NRO has also established its own Counterintelligence staff to counter foreign intelligence threats to its information, personnel and facilities.
The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) was created in 1996 based on the recommendation of DCI John Deutch and Secretary of Defense William Perry. The NGA’s mission is to the meet the imagery mapping needs of the US government.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established in 1961, performs the function of supporting the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the four military branches. The DIA was created to solve the problem of the significant overlap of military intelligence functions among the various military branches. Up until that point, several Defense Department intelligence activities were being duplicated and distribution of intelligence was inefficient. Consequently, important intelligence information was not getting to the military organizations in the Department of Defense.
The DIA established a centralized military intelligence function to ensure intelligence is collected in a coordinated fashion and disseminated properly throughout the Department of Defense and the military branches. In addition, the DIA did not approve of the CIA’s collection performance. The DIA has its own human intelligence, or HUMINT element and MASINT, or measurement and signature intelligence. MASINT consists of technically collected information resulting in intelligence that tracks, locates, identifies or reveals distinctive characteristics, or signatures, of fixed or mobile target sources. An example of this would be the precise location, size and structural characteristics of a targeted building. MASINT excludes information derived from IMINT or SIGINT sources.
The Intelligence Cycle
The intelligence process defines the methods used specifically by the CIA to produce finished intelligence. This process is known as the “Intelligence Cycle.” Let’s begin by discussing the different types of intelligence. Again, a critical point is that “intelligence” is not just merely raw information. It is material that originates from vetted, credible sources, has been properly analyzed, and a report of that data has been prepared by trained professionals. The final product of this process is “intelligence.”
There are several types of intelligence collected by the US Intelligence Community. These types of intelligence consist of military intelligence (the capabilities of hostile nations), political intelligence (political climate and policies of foreign nations), economic intelligence (the condition, trends and weaknesses of foreign economies), and scientific and technical intelligence (the technical capabilities of the civilian and military sectors of foreign governments).
The overall process of intelligence collection begins with information deemed necessary by the President of the United States, the National Security Advisor, the Vice President, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, military Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Attorney General, the leaders of the national unified commands and the four branches of the military. For example, the President or his National Security Advisor generate what is called a “requirement” for intelligence information necessary for them to make important US policy decisions.
Finished intelligence for dissemination to policymakers is produced by the systematic Intelligence Cycle. First, a definition of the requirement is determined, including planning and direction (i.e., by the White House or the National Security Council). The cycle consists of four primary steps:
1. Collection of existing intelligence and raw information from all available open sources (credible Internet sites, multiple publications, target Internet sites, research libraries and videotaped programs) and identifying and filling gaps in information by covert collection methods. Collection involves target analysis—that is, studying the target of information collection to identify where the information being sought is located and can best be exploited
2. Analysis of the information and preparation of the final intelligence report. Analysis is conducted using a strict set of guidelines by trained, unbiased professionals. Analysis may identify additional requirements
3. Reporting derived from processing the information, converting it from large amounts of data into a logical collection of information
4. Dissemination of the finished intelligence report to US policy makers. This intelligence process may, in turn, produce additional requirements for information and, hence, the cycle begins again
Figure 1: Expanded View of the Intelligence Cycle
(Courtesy of the Author)
The Collection Process
Once the requirement for intelligence has been issued, the collection process begins. In CIA HUMINT operations, the collection process is initiated with asset or agent recruitment. The CIA uses what is called the “Recruitment Cycle” to target, interview and recruit agents, attachés, detainees, émigrés, diplomats, defectors and in some cases, travelers who have visited, reside in or have relatives in targeted areas.
The CIA learned the hard way that good human intelligence cannot be replaced by technical collection such as SIGINT or IMINT. A recruited asset with direct access to target conversations, blueprints, operational plans, technical manuals, weapon system manuals and the motivations and intentions of the target is far more effective than technical methods.
In the late 1970s, under the direction of DCI Stansfield Turner, the decision was made to draw away from recruiting human assets in favor of using what he viewed as the safer, more efficient technical means of collection. Entire branches at the CIA were eliminated and the Directorate of Operations staff significantly reduced. Turner became so unpopular among the Directorate of Operations populace that morale suffered. One agent told me they had to regularly wipe the spit off Turner’s painting hanging in the hall of DCIs in CIA headquarters.
As mentioned earlier in the book, to make intelligence collection even more difficult, later came the Clinton administration’s order forbidding CIA officers from associating or recruiting any asset, including members of terrorist cells, with any human rights violations. These two historical events severely hampered US HUMINT operations for years and did decades of damage to the CIA’s HUMINT capability. When 9/11 occurred, the CIA had almost no valuable penetrations of Al Qaeda or other dangerous terrorist organizations.
Covert Operations
The CIA foreign agent recruitment cycle consists of spotting, assessing, developing the agent and the final recruitment pitch. The process of spotting a possible recruit begins with analysis of the target. This includes identifying the information required, the location of that information, individuals with access to that information, technical means of collecting the information and, finally, the identification of the specific individual(s) or technical targets, with direct access to the information. All of this requires complex operational planning regarding the system that will be used to recruit the agent or initiate the technical collection. All good operational plans will have contingency procedures built into them. So, if Plan A fails or is discovered, Plan B goes into effect, etc.
In the operational courses I taught, I always included a kind of tongue in cheek, but true, discussion of “Murphy’s Law”: “If something can go wrong, it will go wrong.” During my course, I used the example of an operation I was conducting to prevent a hostile foreign intelligence service from carrying out the assassination of a principal figure I was appointed as the team leader to protect. My job was to detect and stop any attempt by this service to surveil, track or attack my protectee.
As the operation unfolded, I was to communicate orders to the rest of the team via radio and advise them of any developments or necessary changes in their position. When the time came for this contact, I activated the radio I had been given by the Command Post. The radio was dead. I replaced the battery with the spare battery I was given. The spare battery was dead. I jettisoned the radio and went to the operational cell phone I also carried. The cell phone was dead. Lastly, I jumped into a pay phone with the back-up quarters I carried, and used the pay phone to call the other agents and organize our next movement. It really does pay to have a Plan B, C, or D. “Murphy” was right!
The CIA uses highly trained professionals called “case officers.” They are not called CIA “agents.” This term is a misnomer. Case officers are generally well educated men and woman fluent in foreign languages and tasked as “handlers” of operations designed to recruit foreign spies to act on behalf of the US.
As part of the collection process, the CIA uses various types of cover to carry out its operations. A case officer will utilize two specific types of cover when conducting operations. The first, “cover for status,” affords the case officer with a legitimate reason to be in that country. This is usually in the form of “official cover” in which the case officer works as a ???????????????????????. This provides the officer with some measure of diplomatic immunity.
A case officer may be assigned overseas under a deeper cover for status known as nonofficial cover, or NOC. In this capacity the officer will act as a businessman, student, etc. NOCs typically utilize the second form of cover known as ????????????????. ??????????????????? which typically involves the use of an alias name and documentation disguising the person as a journalist, university professor or member of a foreign diplomatic service.
During my career I utilized several forms of cover to allow me to carry out the mission I was ordered to complete. On other assignments, I was dispatched as an overt CIA officer. Working under a solid cover provided a much safer feeling and kept me out of the view of the local intelligence service. On some overt missions while I was assigned as a protective agent for Agency officials, I was followed, my hotel room was discreetly entered, my luggage was searched, and sometimes I was generally harassed.
Once the operational plan is finalized the recruitment cycle continues. The next step in the cycle is called “spotting.” When spotting a potential asset or agent, the case officer is looking for an individual with access to the information being sought.
Spotting is followed by the next step in the cycle called “assessing.” In this step, the goal is to identify the target’s vulnerabilities, character and belief system, ego motivations, any disgruntlement and susceptibility to recruitment.
The next step is to “develop” the target for recruitment. This includes working the target by appealing to his or her motivations to change over and become an agent of the US government. There are many motivations that convince an individual to spy for the US. These include money, revenge, ego and the need to feel important, religious beliefs, or close friendship with the case officer.
The final step in the recruitment cycle is the “pitch.” This is the sensitive point at which the case officer is convinced that the target’s vulnerabilities or motivations are significant enough to cause him or her to accept the invitation to obtain sensitive information or access for the case officer.
There are two types of agents a case officer may target. The first is an “access agent.” This type of agent is an individual who can gain access to people or information that the case officer cannot. A good example of this is a terrorist cell, where cell members are largely family members or close friends and allies.
The second type of target agent is called a “penetration agent.” This agent is an individual with direct access to the internal areas of a target location or with access to highly protected information or materials.
An important part of collecting information from a source or agent is the process of vetting the individual. Using all available information about the individual and corroborating the information he or she provides, the case officer and the Station must make the decision that the source is credible, the information is legitimate and the source is not a double agent.
Another very valuable source of CIA recruitment is the defector. The CIA protects and debriefs significant defectors, sometimes over a period of months or years. Legitimate defectors are provided healthy salaries, nice homes and resettlement in the US. Defectors have provided the CIA and US policy makers with some of the most valuable and important foreign intelligence information. A classic example of this is Stanislav Levchenko. Levchenko, a KGB officer, defected from Russia for religious and philosophical differences with the Russian system of government. Levchenko provided the CIA with a treasure trove of information on the internal operations of the KGB.
Analyzing the Information
Once the CIA has collected and disseminated information back to headquarters, the process of analysis begins. The CIA possesses six different types of analysts: political (observe and assess political developments), leadership (monitor and assess foreign leaders), economic (assess foreign economic conditions and policies), military (assess foreign military capabilities), science and technology (monitor and assess information warfare, foreign technology advances, weapons proliferation, chemical and biological weapons and foreign energy issues) and targeting (use analysis of networks and sophisticated analytical tools and processes to locate, identify and provide information on key figures in the target organization).
Analytical techniques used by the US Intelligence Community include data mining (algorithms used to discover previously undetected patterns), social network analysis (locating individuals through connection in their social networks), automated database input (which automatically adds target information to databases), link analysis (which ties known activities with unknown individuals), clustering (allowing the utilization of the most valuable information first), time series analysis (identifying trends over time), and visualization (presenting complex information in understandable formats).
In the reporting phase of the intelligence cycle, finished intelligence is documented in report format for dissemination to policymakers. Finished intelligence reports fall into five categories: current intelligence, warning intelligence, analytical intelligence, periodicals, databases and maps. The CIA open source World Fact Book is a good example of an unclassified finished intelligence product.
Finally, the finished intelligence product is disseminated to the appropriate policymakers. Examples of finished intelligence products are the President’s Daily Brief, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, the Secretary of State’s Secretary’s Morning Summary and the Defense Department’s Military Intelligence Digest. With these publications the intelligence cycle is complete until new requirements arise.
A last type of intelligence CIA officers joke about at Langley is what we called rumor intelligence, or “RUMINT.” This consists of the constant hallway and smoking court chatter that always hums under the surface at CIA headquarters. RUMINT, although rarely true, many times affects careers, office morale, career decisions and the like.
CIA headquarters is a hornet’s nest of politics and career positioning and RUMINT was certainly a part of that. Many of us took dangerous assignments just to get away from the politics of CIA headquarters and some of its back channel practices. It was a humorous and unfortunate reality.
New CIA headquarters building in Langley, Virginia.
Seal on the lobby floor of CIA headquarters.