W. F. Albright, The Archaeology of Palestine.
G. L. Archer Jr .,A Survey of Old Testament Introduction.
C. Billington. "The Dead Sea Scrolls in Early Christianity.”
E. M. Blaiklock and R. K. Harrison, The New International Dictionary of Biblical Archaeology.
F. F. Bruce, Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls.
M. Burrows, More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls.
J. Charlesworth, et al. ,Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls.
E. M. Cook, Solving the Mysteries of the Dead Sea Scrolls.
A. Dupont-Sommer and G. Vermes, The Essene Writings of Qumran.
R. H. Eisenman and M. Wise, The Dead Sea Scrolls Uncovered.
D. Estrada and W. White Jr., The First New Testament.
R. L. Harris, Inspiration and Canonicity of the Bible.
J. C. Trever, ‘The Discovery of the Scrolls.”
J. VanderKam, The Dead Sea Scrolls Today.
G. Vermes, The Dead Sea Scrolls in English.
G. E. Wright, ed., The Bible and the Ancient Near East.
S. Zeitlin, The Dead Sea Scrolls and Modern Scholarship.
Deconstructionism. See Derrida, Jacques.
Deism. Deism is the belief in a God who made the world but who never interrupts its operations with supernatural events. It is a *theism minus miracles (see Miracle). God does not interfere with his creation. Rather, he designed it to run independent of him by fixed natural laws (see Spinoza, Benedict). In nature, he has also provided all that his creatures need to live.
Deism flourished in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries but began to die in the nineteenth century. Today its tenets live on in anti supernatural denial of miracles (see Miracles, Arguments Against), critical views of the Bible (see Bible Criticism), and the practice of those who believe in a supreme being who has little or nothing to do with their lives.
Deism flourished in Europe, especially France and England, and in late-eighteenth-century America (see Orr, chaps. 3-4). Some of the more prominent European deists were Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648), the father of English deism; Matthew *Tindal (1656-1733); JohnToland (1670-1722); and Thomas Woolston(1669-1731). Some of the notable American deists were Benjamin Franklin (1706-90), Stephen Hopkins (1707-85), Thomas *Jefferson (1743-1826), and Thomas *Paine (1737-1809). The effects of the views of the American deists, especially Paine and Jefferson, are more widely felt today through the United States’ political foundation and heritage (see Morais, chaps. 4, 5).
Various Kinds of Deism. All deists agree that there is one God, who created the world. All deists agree that God does not intervene in the world through supernatural acts. However, not all deists agree on God’s concern for the world and the existence of an afterlife for human beings (see Immortality). Based on these differences, four types of deism are discernible. The four range from ascribing minimal concern on the part of God to allowing his maximum concern for the world without supernaturally intervening in it (Morais, 17, 85-126).
The God of No Concern. The first type of deism was largely of French origin. According to this view, God is not concerned with governing the world he made. He created the world and set it in motion but has no regard for what happens to it after that.
The God of No Moral Concern. In the second form of deism, God is concerned with the ongoing happenings of the world but not with the moral actions of human beings. Man can act rightly or wrongly, righteously or wickedly, morally or immorally. It is of no concern to God.
The God of Moral Concern for This Life. The third type of deism maintains that God governs the world and does care about the moral activity of human beings. Indeed, God insists on obedience to the moral law that God established in nature. However, there is no future after death.
The God of Moral Concern for This Life and the Next. The fourth type of deism contends that God regulates the world, expects obedience to the moral law grounded in nature, and has arranged for a life after death, with rewards for the good and punishments for the wicked. This view was common among both English and American deists.
Basic Beliefs. Although there are points upon which deists differ, beliefs they hold in common allow an understanding of their common worldview.
God. All deists agree that there is one God (see Theism). This God is eternal, unchangeable, impassable, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good, true, just, invisible, infinite—in short, completely perfect, lacking in nothing.
God is an absolute unity, not a *Trinity. God is only one person, not three persons. The Christian theistic concept of the Trinity is false, if not meaningless. God does not exist as three coequal persons. Of this Jefferson scoffed that “the Trinitarian arithmetic that three are one and one is three” is “incomparable jargon.” Paine believed that the trinitarian concept resulted in three Gods and thus was polytheistic (see Polytheism). In contrast, deists contend that God is one in nature and one in person.
The Origin of the Universe. The universe is the creation of God. Before the universe existed, there was nothing except God (see Creation, Views of). He brought everything into being. Hence, unlike God, the world is finite. It had a beginning while he has no beginning or end.
The universe operates by natural laws. These laws flow from the very nature of God (see Essentialism, Divine). Like him they are eternal, perfect, and immutable, representing the orderliness and constancy of his nature. They are rules by which God measures his activity and rules he expects to be the standard for his creation.
The Relation of God and the Universe. God is as different from the universe as a painter is from a painting, a watchmaker is from a watch, and a sculptor is from a sculpture (see Teleological Argument). But, like a painting, watch, and sculpture, the universe reveals many things about God. Through its design it displays that there exists a cosmic Designer, what this Designer is like, and what he expects. The universe also reveals that it must have been caused to exist by Another and that its regularity and preservation in existence are attributable to Another. There is a God who created, regulates, and sustains the world. And this world is dependent on God, not God on the world.
God does not reveal himself in any other way but through creation. The universe is the deist’s Bible. Only it reveals God. All other alleged revelations, whether verbal or written, are human inventions (see Revelation, Special).
Miracles. Miracles do not occur (see Miracles, Arguments Against). God either cannot intervene in nature, or he will not. Those deists who believe God cannot perform miracles often argue from the immutability of the laws of nature. A miracle would violate natural laws. But natural laws are immutable and hence cannot be violated, for a violation would involve a change in the unchangeable. Therefore, miracles are impossible. Those deists who think God could perform a miracle but would not often argue from the proneness of humans toward superstition and deception, the lack of sufficient evidence in support of a miracle, and the unbroken human experience of nature as uniform They insist that it magnifies the nature of the perfect Mechanic that he made the machine of nature to run without constant need of repair. For deists all miracle accounts are the result of human invention or superstition.
Human Beings. Deists agree that humanity has been created by God and is adequately suited to live happily in the world. The human being is personal, rational, and free (see FreeWill), endowed with natural rights that should not be violated by any individual, group, or government. The human being has the rational ability to discover in nature all that needs to be known to live a happy and full life.
Like all other animals, Homo sapiens were created with strengths and weaknesses. Strengths are reason and freedom Among weaknesses are a tendency toward superstition and a desire to dominate others. Both of these innate weaknesses have led to supernatural religions and oppressive governments.
Ethics. The basis of human morality is grounded in nature (see Revelation, General). In nature each person discovers how to be self-governing, to associate with other creatures, and to relate to God. For many deists, the only innate human principle is the desire for happiness. How this innate desire is satisfied is governed according to reason A person who fails to act by reason becomes miserable and acts immorally.
Deists differ on the universality of moral laws. They agree that the basis of all value is universal, because it is grounded in nature. But they disagree as to which moral laws are absolute and which are relative. The fact that there is a right and a wrong is not in dispute. The problem is in determining exactly what is right and wrong in each case and circumstance. Some deists, such as Jefferson, conclude that specific moral rules are relative. What is considered right in one culture is wrong in another (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). Other deists would argue that a correct use of reason will always lead one to an absolute right and an absolute wrong, though the application of these absolutes may vary with culture and circumstance.
Human Destiny. Though some deists deny that humanity survives death in any respect, many believe that people live on. For most of these deists, the afterlife is of an immaterial nature where the morally good people will be rewarded by God and the morally bad ones will be punished.
History. In general, deists had little to say about history. They commonly held that history was linear and purposeful. They also held that God did not intervene in history through supernatural acts of revelation or signs called miracles. They differed on whether God concerned himself with what occurs in history. Many French deists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries believed God was utterly unconcerned. Most English deists looked to God to exercise a certain degree of providential care over the affairs of history, yet without miraculous intervention.
Many deists held that the study of history had great value, for, if nothing else, history demonstrates the human tendency toward superstition, deception, and domination and the terrible consequences that follow when this tendency goes unchecked and unchallenged.
An Evaluation of Deism. Contributions. Positive things may be learned from deism Many have agreed with the deists’ insistence on the importance and use of reason in religious matters (see Apologetics, Need for; Faith and Reason; Logic and God). The many claims made about miracles and supernatural revelation must be verified. No reasonable person would step into an elevator if he had good reason to believe that it was unsafe. Neither should anyone trust a religious claim without good reason to believe that it is true.
Deists have been commended for their belief that the world reflects the existence of a God (see Cosmological Argument). The regularity and orderliness of the world suggest a cosmic Designer. The inadequacy of the world to account for its operations and existence seems to imply an ultimate explanation beyond the world—God. The limited perfections discoverable in nature may imply that there is an unlimited perfect Being beyond nature who created and sustains all things. This natural evidence is available for all to view and respond to in a reasonable way.
Deists have also been credited with exposing much religious deception and superstition. Their relentless attacks on many beliefs and practices have helped people to evaluate their religious faith and to purge it of corruption.
Criticisms. Yet there is reason to criticize the deistic worldview. A being who could bring the universe into existence from nothing could certainly perform lesser miracles if he chose to do so. A God who created water could part it or make it possible for a person to walk on it. The immediate multiplication of loaves of bread and fish would be no problem to a God who created matter and life in the first place. A virgin birth or even a physical resurrection from the dead would be minor miracles in comparison to the miracle of creating the universe from nothing. It seems self-defeating to admit a great miracle like creation and then to deny the possibility of lesser miracles.
The deists’ understanding of universal natural law is no longer valid. Scientists today consider the laws of nature to be general, not necessarily universal. Natural laws describe how nature generally behaves. They do not dictate how nature must always behave (see Miracles, Arguments Against).
If God created the universe for the good of his creatures, it seems that he would miraculously intervene in their lives if their good depended on it. Surely their all-good Creator would not abandon his creation. Instead, it would seem that such a God would continue to exercise the love and concern for his creatures that prompted him to create them to begin with, even if it meant providing that care through miraculous means (see Evil, Problem of).
Assuming, then, that miracles are possible, one cannot reject out of hand every claim to supernatural revelation without first examining the evidence for its support. If it lacks supporting evidence, it should be rejected. But if the evidence does substantiate the claim, then the alleged revelation should be considered authentic. It certainly should not simply be ruled out of court without further investigation.
Further, the fact that many individuals and groups have invented and abused religious beliefs is not sufficient ground for rejecting supernatural religions. Scientific discoveries have been abused, but few suggest that abuse makes the discoveries false or is a reason to abolish science. Also, the mutability of human language and the fact of human error do not appear to be valid arguments against supernatural revelation (see Bible, Alleged Errors in; Bible, Evidence for). An all-powerful, all-knowing God could conceivably overcome these problems. At least such problems should not rule out the possibility that God has revealed himself, either verbally or in written form Again, the evidence should first be consulted.
Finally, the deists’ case against Christianity and the Bible has been found wanting (see Bible Criticism). What anti supernatural 1st has adequately answered such Christian theists as J. Gersham *Machen and C. S. *Lewis? They have built an extensive and solid case from science, philosophy, and logic against the belief that miracle stories in the Bible are necessarily mythical (see Mythology and the New Testament).
For example, Paine’s belief that most of the books of the Bible were written by people other than the ones who claimed to write them and written very late is still proclaimed as indisputable fact by many critics. But there is not one credible shred of evidence that has not been rejected for good reason by archaeologists and biblical scholars. More than twenty-five thousand finds have confirmed the picture of the ancient world given in the Bible (see Archaeology, New Testament; Archaeology, Old Testament). There is sufficient evidence to support the authorship claims and early dates for most biblical books (see New Testament, Dating of; New Testament Manuscripts).
Further, the deistic attack against such Christian teachings as the Trinity, redemption, and deity of Christ (see Christ, Deity of) shows a superficial and naive understanding of these teachings.
Sources
J. Butler, The Analogy of Religion.
R. Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories.
N. L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics.
N. L. Geisler and W. D. Watkins, Worlds Apart.
I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.
J. LeLand. A View of the Principal Deistic Writers.
C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections.
--,Miracles.
J. G. Machen, The Virgin Birth of Christ.
Η. Μ. Morais ,Deism in Eighteenth Century America. J. Orr. English Deism.
T. Paine, Complete Works of Thomas Paine.
M. Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation.
Derrida, Jacques. Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) was usually regarded as a contemporary French “philosopher,” though some challenge that he was truly a philosopher. He was the father of a movement known as “deconstructionism” He personally disavowed this term’s popular meaning. The movement also is called “postmodern,” though Derrida again did not use the word in describing his view.
Among Derrida’s influential books are Speech and Phenomena (1967-68, trans. 1973), Of Grammatology (trans. 1978), Writing and Difference (trans. 1978), Positions (1981), and Limited Inc. (1977, trans. 1988).
Some of his thinking was drawn from Immanuel *Kant (*metaphysics), Friedrich *Nietzsche (*atheism), Ludwig *Wittgenstein (view of language), Friedrich Frege (*conventionalism), Edmund Husserl (phenomenological method (see Truth, Nature of), Martin Heidegger (*existentialism), and William *James (*pragmatism and the will to believe).
Derrida’s views are difficult to understand because of the nature of the positions, his writing, and sometimes poor translations. Because of such factors, he has often been misread. He did not embrace *nihilism, for example, which is the negation of all being and value (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). Nor was he an anarchist who negates all social structure. Despite writings that seem to negate all moral law, neither was Derrida an antinomian.
Deconstructionism is a form of hermeneutics, of interpreting a text. As such, it can be distinguished from other interpretive approaches. Yet Derrida was not interested in destroying meaning but in reconstructing it. It is not negation that dismantles a text but criticism that remodels it. It stands against fixed rules of analysis. A deconstructionist reads and rereads a text, looking for new, deeper, forgotten meanings.
Deconstructionismembraces conventionalism. All meaning is relative to a culture and situation. There is no meaning prior to language.
Deconstructionismacceptsperspectivalism. All truth is conditioned by one’s perspective.
Deconstructionismholds a form of referentialism. There is no perfect reference or one-to-one correspondence between words and the meaning they confer. Meaning, therefore, is ultimately untransferrable between writer and reader. We constantly change the context through which we view symbols. This context is limited. We cannot know from an infinite perspective.
Deconstructionismis differentialism. All rational structures leave something out. The reader approaches the text with suspicion, looking for the “difference,” the unknown something that is not there.
Deconstructionismembraces a form of linguistic solipsism. By this view we cannot escape the limits of language. We can broaden our linguistic concepts, but we cannot escape their limits.
Deconstruction holds to semantic progressivism. One will never exhaust all possible meanings. A text can always be deconstructed.
Derrida and Deconstructionism. Derrida was an atheist (see Atheism) regarding the existence of God and agnostic concerning the possibility of knowing absolute truth. He was antimetaphysical, claiming that no *metaphysics is possible. He believed we are locked in our own linguistic bubble.
Yet he recognized that using language to deny metaphysics is itself a form of metaphysics. This incoherence points to the need for archi-writing, a poetic protest against metaphysics.
Three factors are key to understanding Derrida’s philosophy: grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Grammar expresses acceptable phrases with appropriate modifying words. Logic recognizes the absurdity of contradictory phrases. And rhetoric shows how and when to use the phrases mastered through grammar and logic.
Derrida believed that grammar is relatively superficial, having to do with keeping the signs of language in good order. *Logic and rhetoric are more profound, dealing with the use and interpretation of signs. Derrida rejected the history of Western philosophy in which language is based on logic. That would mean there is a logical underpinning of reality. He rejected that assumption.
According to Derrida, language is based on rhetoric, not logic. The sovereignty of logic is rooted in the view that signs (e.g., words) represent ideas. Ideas stand in semantical contrast to other ideas. Language differentiates ideas. We must “deconstruct” language based in logic to learn how linguistic expressions are used in human activity. Language based on logic entails a mistaken belief that there are “private languages” with “inner speech” and “private mental life.” If logic is sovereign, then a private language is possible. Ideas would not vary with circumstances.
Rhetoric as Basis of Language. Derrida held that meaning is based in rhetorical force, viz., the role it plays in human activity (see Wittgenstein, Ludwig). Rather than an underlying formal logic, meaning comes out of the stream of life. Words express time-bound experience. So to understand what a text means one must first fully understand its actual life context. This may be seen in five central arguments of Derrida:
1. All meaning is complex. No pure and simple meanings stand behind the signs of language. If all language is complex, no essential meaning transcends time and place.
2. All meaning is contingent. Every object of language and meaning is contingent upon a changing life reality. There is no objective meaning.
3. All meaning is mixed. No pure experiences exist without reference to transient experience. There is no private mental life that does not presuppose an actual world. We cannot even think about a concept without contaminating it with some reference to our own past or future.
4. There is no such thing as a perception. Deconstructionists do not reject everyday experience. They reject idealized concepts disconnected from the everyday world. The nature of what is signified is not independent of the sign that signifies it.
5. Rhetoric is the basis of all meaning. All written language is dependent on spoken language. It is not dependent on the meaning of spoken signs. It is dependent on the pattern of vocalization (phonemics). Phonemes are parts of sound that can be represented by a letter. Without this difference in phonemes, letters are impossible. “Difference” is the key to meaning, since all sounds must be differentiated to be distinct and form meaningful sounds.
Many believe Western philosophy comes to an end with Derrida. It literally self-destructs as it deconstructs. Derrida himself believed it goes on endlessly in continuous deconstructions or reinterpretations.
Evaluation. Derrida shows how the linguistic tradition leads to agnosticism He made some pointed critiques of Western thought. He revealed that, unless one’s philosophy begins in reality, it will never logically end in reality. His critique of “private language,” esoteric thought cut off from human experience, is insightful.
Nonetheless, Derrida’s deconstructionism is open to serious critique. His difficult (highly metaphorical) expression is obscure and contradictory. This obscures his view, generates misunderstanding, and makes evaluation difficult. His view contains self-defeating claims, such as: “The history of philosophy is closed” or, “Metaphysics has come to an end.” He cannot avoid using philosophy and metaphysics in such statements. His doubt that we can really know anything is self-defeating. How does he know this unless we can know something? What sort of epistemological status should we give to his statements? If they were true, they would be false. If they are mere poetical protests, then they do not destroy objective meaning or metaphysics.
Even his denial of logic in rhetoric is highly problematic, if not self-defeating. The very language that denies logic is based in it; otherwise it would be meaningless.
Despite his rejection of (or protest against) metaphysics, Derrida had metaphysical presuppositions. The very fact he discussed “What is real?” indicates an underlying metaphysics. Also, he claimed language depends on a relation to the world. That implies a metaphysical view of the world.
His view is a form of nominalism and radical empiricism (“real” is concrete reality, immediately before me). As such it reduces to a type of solipsism and is subject to the same criticism of these views.
The primacy of difference over identity departs from common sense and makes all real communication impossible. Indeed, Derrida could not even communicate his own positionto us if he was right.
Derrida’s position is closely associated with logical positivism, with its well-known self-defeating nature. (For a critique, see Ayer, A. J.) Derrida’s conventionalist view of meaning is self-defeating (see Conventionalism). The sentences conveying his view would have no meaning on a conventionalist theory of meaning. In short, he appears to have left himself no ground to stand on— even to express his own view.
Finally, Derrida’s “speech” is no better than Kant’s unknowable “noumena,” Wittgenstein’s “silence,” or Hume’s “flames,” for none of them tell us anything about reality.
A faith of sorts is involved in this process, and deconstructionismis fideist (see Fideism). Faith is always necessary. Since absolute meaning is impossible, indecision is inescapable. We always live somewhere between absolute certainty and absolute doubt, between skepticism and dogmatism. Hence, faith is always necessary.
Sources
J. Derrida, Limited Inc.
--, Of Grammatology.
--, Speech and Phenomena.
--, Writing and Difference.
C. S. Evans and M. Westphat eds., Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge.
S. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism.
R. Lundin, The Culture of Interpretation.
J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition.
G. B. Madison, Working through Derrida.
C. Norris ,Derrida.
Descartes, Rene. French theist Rene Descartes was born in 1596 and died in 1650 after giving an early morning philosophy lesson to Queen Christina of Sweden He was called to philosophy through a dream on November 10, 1619. He was a great mathematician and learned philosophy from the Jesuits. His main works are Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) and Discourse on Method (1637).
From Doubt to Existence. Descartes found his universal starting point in doubt. He argued from doubt to thought to existence. He went from dubito to cogito to sum (from “I doubt” to “I think” to “I am”).
Descartes reasoned thus: The one thing that I cannot doubt is that I am doubting. But if I am doubting, then I am thinking (for doubt is a form of thought). And if I am thinking, then I am a thinking thing (for only minds can think). My mind is a thinking thing—and I cannot doubt its existence. My body and the world are extended things—and I can doubt their existence.
God’s Existence Can Be Proven. Even though he was a theist, he could find no way to reason directly to God from the external world, such as *Aristotle, *Thomas Aquinas, Gottfried *Leibniz, and many other theists have (see Cosmological Argument). Nevertheless, Descartes found an indirect way to demonstrate God’s existence involving the external world. He would begin with his indubitable starting point in his own existence and reason from it to God and then from God to the external world.
A Cosmological Argument (a Posteriori Proof). Descartes’s reasoning proceeded as follows:
(1) If I doubt, then I am imperfect (for I lack in knowledge). (2) But if I know I am imperfect, then I must know the perfect (otherwise I would have no way of knowing that I am not perfect). (3) Now knowledge of the perfect cannot arise from me, since I am imperfect (an imperfect mind cannot be the source [basis] of a perfect idea). (4) Hence, there must be a perfect Mind that is the source of this perfect idea. This approach was distinctive, if not unique. Descartes had to prove God existed before he could be sure the world existed!
The Ontological Argument (a Priori Proof). Like St. *Anselm before him, Descartes believed the *ontological argument for God’s existence was valid. His form of it went like this: (1) It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept what is essential to its nature (e.g., a triangle must have three sides).
(2) But existence is logically necessary to the nature of a necessary Existent (i.e., Being).
(3) Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
There were many reactions to Descartes’s ontological argument. But he staunchly defended it, restating it in this form to avoid some criticism: (1) God’s existence cannot be conceived as only possible but not actual (for then he would not be a necessary Existent). (2) We can conceive of God’s existence (it is not contradictory). (3) Therefore, God’s existence must be conceived as more than possible (namely, as actual).
One objectionto his argument that he never answered was Pierre Gassendi’s insistence that Descartes did not really prove God’s existence is not logically impossible. Hence, he did not prove it is logically necessary. Gottfried Leibniz later argued that existence is a perfection and as such is a simple and irreducible quality that cannot conflict with others. Hence, God can have all perfections, including existence. But Immanuel *Kant later critiqued this view, insisting that existence is not an attribute.
The Proof of the Existence of an External World via God Descartes’s very method of systematic doubt brought the question of the existence of an external world in question—at least by way of the senses alone. Hence, it was necessary for him to argue for the world’s existence in a more circuitous manner. This he did in the following way: (1)1 am receiving a strong and steady succession of ideas of a world that are not under my control (hence, I cannot be erring about them).
(2) Hence, either God is making me believe them falsely or else there is a real external world causing them (3) But God will not deceive me (nor allow me to be deceived) in what I am perceiving clearly and distinctly, since he is perfect (and deception is a sign of imperfection). (4) Therefore, it is true that there is an external world. (5) Since the same argument applies to my body, it is true that I have a body.
An Evaluation of Descartes’s Views. Descartes is a mixed blessing to Christian *theism On the one hand, he is a rational theist who offers arguments for God’s existence. On the other hand, his form of rationalistic dualism is a significant negative factor supporting views that are contrary to biblical theism
Some Positive Features. On the good side of the ledger, Descartes can be commended for several things. Among them several have apologetic value.
Truth is objective. For one thing, Descartes held that truth is objective (see Truth, Nature of). It is not subjective or mystical. Rather, truth is commonto all rational minds.
Truth is knowable. In oppositionto *agnosticism, Descartes affirmed that truth is knowable. Unlike Immanuel *Kant or David *Hume, Descartes argued that the truth about reality is knowable by the mind. Further, he held that certitude could be gained in our knowledge. Skepticism was avoidable. Indeed, it is self-refuting.
Truth is rational. Descartes embraced *first principles of knowledge, such as the law of noncontradiction. He used them in understanding the world. He believed that without them reality could not be known.
Truth is arguable. Not only is truth knowable and rational, but one can offer rational arguments, such as arguments for the existence of God. This view is helpful for Christian apologetics, particularly for classical apologetics.
Negative Dimensions. Not everything Descartes believed is helpful for the Christian apologist. In fact, some things have proven to be a bane to orthodox Christianity.
The invalid ontological argument. Most Christian apologists do not agree with Descartes’s defense of the ontological argument. Most thinkers argue that it involves an illegitimate transition from thought to reality.
An insufficient starting point. A more serious problem is Descartes’s starting point. Why should one doubt what is obvious to him, namely, that he has a body and that there are other bodies around him? Why should one doubt everything that is doubtable? Why not doubt only what is necessary to doubt or what one has no good reason to believe? Or to put it another way, one can doubt whether Descartes’s starting point in doubt is the best way to approach the world.
An unrealistic starting point. Descartes began his philosophy in thought (indubitable thought) and then moved to reality. He reasoned “I think, therefore, I am” In reality, however, “I am, therefore, I think.” He literally got de carte before de horse!
Once one begins in the realm of thought apart from reality, he or she can never legitimately break out of the realm of pure thought. Just is the fate of any rationalism or idealism that does not begin within existence (see Realism).
An unbridgeable dualism of mind and body. Descartes’s particular form of rationalism set up an unbridgeable dualism between mind and matter. In fact, they are defined in such a way that they are logically separate. Mind is defined as a thinking but nonextended thing, and matter as a nonthinking extended thing. Thus, by definition, “never the twain shall meet.” In doing this, Descartes opened himself to the criticism of holding that man is “a ghost in a machine.” This Cartesian dualism has serious implications for one’s view of the nature of human beings as well as the nature of Scripture, for it not only denies the unity of human nature but also sets up a dichotomy in nature between the material and the spiritual that supports much of negative biblical criticism (see Bible, Alleged Errors in; Bible, Evidence for; Bible Criticism).
Other problems. Descartes has been criticized for many other things—space does not permit elaborating. Like Benedict *Spinoza, he had a questionable geometric form of deductionism He does not justify his use of the principle of causality. Nor does Descartes prove that an imperfect mind cannot be the cause of a perfect idea. He lacks appreciation for the role of experience in the pursuit of truth. His criterion of truth is not clear. It cannot apply to concepts, since only judgments are true. And it cannot apply to judgments, since he admits some of them are false. Finally, his view reduces to mental solipsism (namely, I know only while I am thinking—right now—and not when I am not thinking).
Sources
J. Collins, God in Modern Philosophy.
R. Descartes, Discourse on Method.
--,Meditations on First Philosophy.
E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience.
Dewey, John. John Dewey (1859-1952) has been called the father of modern American education, on which he has had immense influence. As a philosopher and writer he is closely identified with the philosophy of instrumentalism, also known as progressivismor pragmatic humanism Through the American educational system, his views have influenced virtually every American of the twentieth century. Dewey signed the Humanist Manifesto and was a leader in the movement to turn education toward secular humanism (see Humanism, Secular).
Dewey wrote many books and numerous articles on topics ranging from education and democracy {Democracy and Education, 1916), to psychology {Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, 1930), to logic {Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 1938), and even to art {Art as Experience, 1934). His view of God and religion is best expressed in A Common Faith (1934).
A New Sort of Religion. Despite Dewey’s rejection of religion and the supernatural, he by no means considered himself irreligious. He insisted on the need for, and preservation of, the religious. What Dewey did insist on was that religion as traditionally defined—as involving belief in the supernatural beyond this life—be discarded as a religious attitude toward all of life: “I shall develop another conception of the nature of the religious phase of experience, one that separates it from the supernatural and the things that have grown up about it.” And “I shall try to show that these derivations are encumbrances and that what is genuinely religious will undergo an emancipation when it is relieved from them; that then, for the first time, the religious aspect of experience will be free to develop freely on its own account” (Dewey, 2).
A Common Faith. Dewey’s religious form of pragmatic humanism was global. In his “common faith,” he saw a religious goal for all. “Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant” (ibid., 87). He saw the doctrine of the brotherhood of man as having the greatest religious significance. “Whether or not we are, save in some metaphorical sense, all brothers, we are at least in the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. The potential religious significance of this fact is infinite” (ibid., 84).
Science as the Means to Progress. Naturally, it is up to humankind to achieve social progress. This belief is neither egoistic nor optimistic. The only adequate means of achieving the goal of social progress is science. “There is but one sure road of access to truth—the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experimental record and controlled reflection” (ibid., 32). For “were we to admit that there is but one method for ascertaining fact and truth that conveyed by the word ‘scientific’ in its most general and generous sense—no discovery in any branch of knowledge and inquiry could then disturb the faith that is religious” (ibid., 33).
For Dewey, faith in science, that is, in the critical intelligence, is more religious than faith in any revelation from God. On the other hand, “some fixed doctrinal apparatus is necessary for a religion. But faith in the possibilities of continued and rigorous inquiry does not limit access to truth to any channel or scheme of things.” This faith reveres intelligence as a force (ibid., 26).
Hence, science and religion are irreconcilable. But a religious dedication to science is essential to human progress.
Evaluation. Pragmatism. Dewey’s view is a form of *pragmatism Dewey’s relativism is manifest in truth and ethics. By the pragmatic view of truth, whatever works is true. But many things that “work” in the short run are false. Truth is not what works but what corresponds with the facts (see Truth, Nature of). No pragmatist would appreciate someone misrepresenting his view simply because it worked well to do so. Even pragmatist parents do not want their children to lie to them simply because it is expedient to do so from the child’s perspective. Josiah Royce criticized William James’s pragmatism by asking whether James would take the witness stand in court and “swear to tell the expedient, the whole expedient and nothing but the expedient, so help him future experience!”
Pragmatism fares no better in the realm of ethics. Not everything that works is right. Some things that work very well are simply evil. Cheating, deceiving, and even killing undesirables have been “successful” activities. Ethical questions are not settled by obtaining desired results. All that success proves is that a given course of action works; it does not prove the course of action is right.
Progressivism. Dewey’s relativism is not total. His system has the absolute of progress or achievement. Whatever works for social progress is good; what hinders it is evil. But by what standard is progress to be judged? If the standard is within society, then we cannot be sure we are progressing. Maybe we are only changing. If the standard is outside the race, this is a transcendent norm, a divine imperative, which Dewey rejects.
Another problem with progressivism is its lack of a fixed point by which one measures change. For example, an observer of a moving car who is in a moving car cannot easily know how fast the other car is moving. If the other car is moving at the same speed in the same direction, the observer cannot even know it is moving unless something else that isn’t moving can be used to measure it.
In practice, progressivism is grounded in the wishes of those with the power to set the agenda. Why social progressivism? Why democratic social progressivism? One can progress toward ever-better dictatorships. Dewey’s definition of “achievement” or “progress” in social and democratic terms was utterly arbitrary and philosophically unjustified. It stands on no better ground than other goals one may choose.
Relativism. Closely allied to progressivism is relativism. Dewey denies absolutes in the realm of truth {see Truth, Nature of) or ethics {see Morality, Absolute Nature of). This is inconsistent. To show that all is relative, one must have a nonrelative vantage point from which to view all of truth. One cannot relativize all else unless he stands on absolute ground. The statement “All is relative” either means that statement also is relative or else that at least that statement is absolute. We have seen that Dewey believed in absolutes, but of his own choosing. Thus, his statement is self-defeating and fails according to Dewey’s own worldview. He is guilty of special pleading, saying that everything is relative, except what he wants to be absolute. This is pure dogmatism.
Sources
J. O. Buswell, The Philosophies of F. R. Tennant and John Dewey.
G. H. Clark, Dewey.
J. Dewey, A Common Faith.
N. L. Geisler, Is Man the Measure? chap. 4.
W. James, ed., Essays in Pragmatism.
P. A. Schilpp and L. E. Hahn, eds., The Philosophy of John Dewey.
Divine Birth Stories. Since James *Frazer published The Golden Bough (1890, 1912), it has been common to charge that Christianity is not unique in its story of Christ’s incarnation but that stories of supernatural births are commonto pagan gods. If true, this would appear to undermine Christianity by showing that it might have borrowed ideas from other religions.
Several lines of evidence that refute the pagan myth source theory are discussed in detail elsewhere (see Mithraism; Mythology and the New Testament; New Testament, Historicity of; Virgin Birth of Christ). Here the main points are summarized:
1. The New Testament was written by contemporaries and is not the result of late myth development. Legends do not develop if the stories are written while eyewitnesses are still alive to refute inaccuracies.
2. The virgin birth records do not show signs of being mythical, nor do they include borrowed elements from known pagan birth myths.
3. Persons, places, and events identified in connection with Christ’s birth are accurate historically. Even details once thought to be errors have been vindicated by research.
4. No Greek myth spoke of the literal incarnation of a monotheistic God into human form In Christianity, the second person of the Godhead became human. In pagan religions, gods were only disguised as humans; they were not really human. In pagan myths, a god and human invariably mated sexually, which was not true in the Christian account.
5. Greek myths of gods who became human postdate the time of Christ, so the Gospel writers could not have borrowed from them
6. There is one virgin birth story prior to Christianity called the Jakata tale no. 540 (Cowell) in fourth century BC Buddhism However, there is no evidence that it was borrowed by the Greeks or that it influenced the Christian (New Testament) virgin birth story. In fact, the only form of Buddismthat influenced Greek thinking at that time was the Sarvastivadins school, and it rejected the Jakata tradition.
Sources
N. Anderson, Christianity and World Religions.
W. Corduan, Neighboring Faiths.
E. B. Cowell, The Jakata.
J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough.
J. G. Machen, The Virgin Birth of Christ.
R. Nash, God and the Greeks (formerly Christianity and the Hellenistic World). W. Schmidt, The Origin and Growth of Religion.
E. Yamauchi, "Easter—Myth, Hallucination, or History?”
Divine-Human Legends. See Apotheosis.
Docetism. Docetism(Gk. dokein, “to seem”) was a late-first-century heresy asserting that Jesus only seemed to be human (Kelly, 141). Docetism is “the assertion that Christ’s human body was a phantasm, and that his suffering and death were mere appearances. ‘If he suffered he was not God; if he was God he did not suffer”’ (Bettenson, 49). Docetists denied the humanity of Christ but affirmed his deity. This is the opposite of Arianism, which affirmed the humanity of Jesus but denied the deity of Christ (see Christ, Deity of). Docetism was already present in late New Testament times, as is evident by the exhortation of John the apostle about those who deny “that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh” (1 John 4:2; emphasis added. See also 2 John 7).