M. Black, The Scrolls and Christian Origins.
F. L. Cross, "Essenes.”
A. Dupont-Sommer, The Jewish Sect of Onmran and the Essenes.
I. Ewing, The Essene Christ.
C. D. Ginsburg, The Essenes.
F. Josephus. .Jewish Wars.
J. B. Lightfoot, St. Paid's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon.
Essentialism, Divine. Essentialism(Lat. esse, “to be”), as it relates to moral principles and God’s will, is the view that ethical principles are rooted ultimately in the unchangeable divine essence (see God, Nature of), not simply in God’s changeable will. It is opposed to divine voluntarism, which asserts that something is good because God wills it. Essentialism, on the contrary, holds that God wills something because it is good. There are two basic kinds of essentialism: Platonic and theistic. *Plato believed that God, the Demiurgos, wills all things in accordance with the Good (the Agathos), which is outside God and to which he is subject. Theists (see Theism), on the other hand, believe that God wills things in accordance with his own unchangeably good nature (see God, Nature of). So the ultimate good is not outside God but inside him, his own unchanging nature. This is called divine essentialism
Arguments for Essentialism. Christian essentialists offer three basic lines of argument in favor of their view: philosophical, biblical, and practical.
Philosophical Arguments for Essentialism. Traditional theists argue that God is unchangeable in his nature. *Thomas Aquinas offered three basic arguments for God’s immutability (see God,
Nature of).
The first argument is based on the fact that a God of pure Actuality (“I Am-ness”) has no potentiality, for everything that changes has potentiality. But there can be no potentiality in God (he is pure Actuality). Therefore, God cannot change (Exod. 3:14), for whatever changes has the potential to change. But as pure Actuality, God has no potential to actualize through change. The second argument for God’s unchangeability argues from his absolute perfection. Whatever changes acquires something new. But God cannot acquire anything new, since he is absolutely perfect; he could not be better. Therefore, God cannot change. God is by his very nature an absolutely perfect being. If he lacked any perfection, he would not be God. However, to change one must gain something new. But to gain a new perfection is to have lacked it. A God lacking in some perfection would not be the absolutely perfect God who is. The third argument for God’s immutability follows from his simplicity. Everything that changes is composed of what changes and what does not change. But there can be no composition in God (he is an absolutely simple being). Hence, God cannot change.
Biblical Arguments for Essentialism. Scriptures that support theistic essentialism are those that declare God to be unchangeable in his nature. The Old Testament psalmist declared, “In the beginning you [Lord] laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands. They will perish, but you remain; they will all wear out like a garment. Like clothing you will change them and they will be discarded. But you remain the same, and your years will never end” (Ps. 102:25-27). First Samuel 15:29 affirms that “he who is the Glory of Israel does not lie or change his mind; for he is not a man, that he should change his mind.” The prophet added, “I the Lord do not change. So you, O descendants of Jacob, are not destroyed” (Mai. 3:6). The New Testament is equally strong about God’s unchangeable nature. Hebrews 1:10-12 quotes Psalm 102 with approval. A few chapters later the author of Hebrews asserts, “God did this so that, by two unchangeable things in which it is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18a). The apostle Paul adds in Titus 1:2, “God, who does not lie, promised before the beginning of time.” James 1:17 points out that “every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows.”
Now if God is unchangeable in his nature, then his will is subject to his unchangeable nature. Thus, whatever God wills must be good in accordance with this nature. God cannot will contrary to his nature. He cannot lie (Heb. 6:18). He cannot be unloving nor unjust. Divine essentialism must be correct.
Practical Arguments for Essentialism. Two practical arguments are offered in favor of divine essentialism, the need for moral stability and moral repugnance. These are supported by what we experience of God’s trustworthiness and the scriptural testimony that God can be trusted not to change.
The argument from the needfor moral stability. If all moral principles were based on God’s changing will, then there would be no moral security. How could one be committed to a life of love, mercy, or justice only to find out that the rules had changed about whether these were right? Indeed, how could we serve God as supreme if he could will that our ultimate good was not to love him but hate him?
The argument from moral repugnance. Divine essentialists insist that it is morally repugnant to assume, as voluntarists do, that God could change his will on whether love is essentially good and will instead that hate be a universal moral obligation Likewise, it is difficult to conceive how a morally perfect being could will that rape, cruelty, and genocide would be morally good. Since it is morally repugnant for creatures made in God’s image to imagine such a change in God’s will, how much more must it be for the God in whose image we are made.
The argument from God’s trustworthiness. The Bible presents God as eminently trustworthy. When he makes an unconditional promise, he never fails to keep it (cf. Gen. 12:1-3; Heb. 6:16-18). Indeed, the gifts and callings of God are without change of mind on his part (Rom 11:29). God is not a man that he should repent (1 Sam 15:29). He can always be counted onto keep his word (Isa.
55:11). But this ultimate trustworthiness of God would not be possible if he could change his will at any time about anything. The only thing that makes God morally bound to keep his word is his unchangeable nature. Otherwise, he could decide at any moment to send all believers to hell. He could reward the wicked for murder and cruelty. Such a God would not be trustworthy. The God of the Bible is unchangeably good.
A Response to Objections to Essentialism. Objection from God’s Supremacy. Voluntarists, such as, *William of Ockham, object to essentialism One argument is from the supremacy of God, which can be stated: Either God wills it because it is right, or else it is right because God wills it. But if he wills it because it is right, then God is not supreme because there is something outside him to which he is subject. Hence, it is right because God wills it.
Essentialists note two problems with this argument. Premise 1 presents a false dilemma. It need not be an either/or; it could be a both/and. That is, perhaps moral principles flow from the will of God as rooted in the nature of God. If so, then a voluntaristic conclusion does not follow. Also, premise 2 wrongly assumes that the supreme ethical standard to which God’s will must be subject is “outside” of God. But if it is “inside” God, namely, his own supreme moral nature, then the dilemma vanishes.
Objection from the Nature of Morality. Those opposed to essentialism argue that moral principles by their very nature flow from the will of God, not from his nature. For a moral law is a prescription, and prescriptions come only fromprescribers. It is an ethical command, and commands come only from commanders. Hence, it is of the very nature of moral law that it come from a Moral Law Giver. They insist that to claim (as essentialists do) that moral laws flow from God’s essence, not his will, is to misunderstand the nature of a moral principle.
However, essentialists respond that voluntarists again wrongly assume that it is either/or rather than both/and. The problem is resolved if one posits (as essentialism does) that moral principles flow from the will of God as rooted in the unchangeable nature of God. That is, God wills what is right in accordance with the unchangeably good character of his moral nature (see Morality, Absolute Nature of).
Objection from God’s Sovereignty. The argument from God’s sovereign will is based more on a specific interpretation of certain Scriptures than on philosophical reasoning. Did not Job declare to God, “I know that you can do all things; no plan of yours can be thwarted” (Job 42:2)? And did not the apostle Paul affirm of God, “‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.’ It does not, therefore, depend on man’s desire or effort, but on God’s mercy” (Rom 9:15-16). Does not God do everything “in accordance with his pleasure and will” (Eph. 1:5)?
One need not reject the sovereignty of God to see the fallacy of this argument. These passages are not speaking of the ultimate basis of moral principles but of God’s election. Even biblical texts that
speak of God’s will as the ultimate source of what is morally right do not prove voluntarism. Moral principles could come ultimately from God’s will as rooted in his unchangeable nature. This is, in fact, exactly what the Bible declares of God’s unchangeable character.
Objection That God Has Changed His Will. According to essentialists, there are examples in Scripture where God changed his will. Did he not “repent” of making mankind in the days of Noah (Gen. 6)? Did God not “repent” or change his mind about the destruction of Nineveh (Jonah 3)? Did God not change his mind about destroying Israel after Moses prayed (Num. 14)?
Divine essentialists point out that God did not actually change in any of these cases. Human beings changed in relation to God, and, hence, it only appeared from a human standpoint that God changed. The wind appears to change when we turn from pedaling a bike into it and ride with it at our back. A waterfall has not changed its flow simply because we right a downward-turned cup and suddenly find that it is full. As *Thomas Aquinas noted, when the person moves from one side of the pillar to the other, the pillar does not move in relation to the person. Rather, the person moves in relation to the pillar.
Conclusion. Divine essentialismis rooted in good arguments philosophically, biblically, and practically. The objections against it fail to stick. Hence, while ethical principles do flow from God’s will, nevertheless, they are rooted in his unchangeable nature. Thus, God cannot will anything that is contrary to his essentially good moral nature.
T. Aquinas, Summa Theologicci.
Augustine, The City of God.
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity.
Plato, Protagoras.
---, The Republic of Plato.
Eusebius. Eusebius (ca. 260-340) was bishop of Caesarea and the “father of church history.” His Ecclesiastical History is the principal source of information from the apostolic period to the fourth century. It contains an immense amount of material on the Eastern Church, though little about the West. Eusebius also wrote The Martyrs of Palestine, an account of the Diocletian persecutions (303-310). He also wrote a biography of the emperor Constantine.
The apologetic and polemic writings of Eusebius were extensive. They include Against Hierocles (answering anti-Christian rhetoric of a pagan governor of Bithynia), The Preparation for the Gospel (why Christians accept the Hebrew tradition and reject the Greek), and Demonstration of the Gospel (arguments for Christ from the Old Testament). Eusebius also wrote a work on the incarnation, The Theophany. Against Marcellus, Bishop of Ancyra is a collection of Old Testament passages foretelling the coming of Christ. To the latter he added a theological Refutation of Marcellus. Eusebius wrote The Defense of Origen on *Ori gen’s views of the *Trinity and incarnation (see Schaff, 2nd series, 1.36). He wrote a book on Problems of the Gospels, On Easter, On the Theology of the Church, and On the Names and Places in the Holy Scriptures.
Eusebius is a crucial historical link between the apostles and the Middle Ages. After the apostles and earliest apologists, he is a prime example of the form taken by early Christian apologists. Further, he played a key role in the transmission of Scripture (Geisler and Nix, 278-82) by preparing fifty copies of the Bible only twenty-five years after Diocletian had ordered its extinction in 302. Other early witnesses are covered in the article New Testament, Non-Christian Sources.
Sources
F. L. Cross, "Eusebuis.”
N. L. Geisler and W. Nix. A General Introduction to the Bible.
P. Schaff, ed., The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. J. Stevenson, Studies in Eusebius.
D. S. Wallis-HadriU, Eusebius of Caesarea.
Evil, Problem of. If God is absolutely good, then why is there evil (see God, Nature of)? The problem of evil is a serious challenge to the defense of Christianity. Actually, there are many problems relating to evil, for example, the problems about its origin, nature, purpose, and avoidability. The problems of evil can be divided among moral, metaphysical (see Metaphysics), and physical.
Worldviews and Evil. Although every worldview has to deal with the problem of evil, it is an especially acute problem for *theism Of the three major worldviews, *atheism affirms the reality of evil and denies the reality of God. *Pantheism affirms the reality of God but denies the reality of evil. Theism affirms the reality of both God and evil. Herein is the problem How can an absolutely good Being (God) be compatible with evil, the opposite of good?
As compared with the other worldviews that affirm both God and evil, theism would seem to be in a more disadvantageous position. *Finite godism, for example, can claim that God desires to destroy evil but is unable to because he is limited in power. *Deism, likewise, can distance God from evil by stressing that God is not immanent in the world, at least not supernaturally. We are on our own. And for *panentheism evil is a necessary part of the ongoing progress of the interaction of God and the world (his body).
The problem for theism is that it believes not only that God is all-powerful and could destroy evil but also that he is all-loving and should destroy it. Further, the theistic God is all-knowing and created this world fully aware of what would happen. What is more, God created the world freely (see Creation, Views of) so that he could have done otherwise.
It is in the context of this kind of theistic God that we approach problems of evil.
The Origin of Evil. Where did evil come from? An absolutely good God cannot create evil. Nor, would it seem, can a perfect creature give rise to imperfection. Whence, then, evil? The problem can be summarized:
1. God is absolutely perfect.
2. God cannot create anything imperfect.
3. But perfect creatures cannot do evil.
4. Therefore, neither God nor his perfect creatures can produce evil.
However, in a theistic universe, these are the only two sources for moral evil. Therefore, there seems to be no solution for the origin of evil in a theistic universe.
The basic elements in the theistic response to this problem are found in *Augustine and *Thomas Aquinas. Theists since then have followed the contours of their thought. Both agreed on the response that can be stated as follows:
1. God is absolutely perfect.
2. God created only perfect creatures.
3. One of the perfections God gave some of his creatures was the power of free choice.
4. Some of these creatures freely chose to do evil.
5. Therefore, a perfect creature caused evil.
God is good, and he created good creatures with a good power called free will. Unfortunately, they used this good power to bring evil into the universe by rebelling against their Creator. So evil did arise from good, not directly but indirectly, by the abuse of a good power called freedom Freedom in itself is not evil. It is good to be free. But with freedom comes the possibility of evil. So God is responsible for making evil possible, but free creatures are responsible for making it actual.
Of course, other questions attach to this free choice solutionto the origin of evil. One is, what caused the first creature to choose evil?
Theists distinguish between the primary cause of a free action (God) and the secondary cause (a human being). God gave the power of choice. However, God is not responsible for the exercise of that free choice to do evil. God does not perform the free action for us. Human free choice is not a mere instrumental cause through which God works. Human beings are the efficient, albeit secondary, cause of their own free actions. God produces the fact of free choice, but each human performs the act of free choice. God then is responsible for the possibility of evil, but we must bear the responsibility for the actuality of it. God neither wills evil to be done nor wills it not to be done. He wills to permit evil to be done, and this is good.
But if God cannot will evil, then what is the cause of it? No action can be uncaused, since this violates the first principle of causality (see Causality, Principle of), which demands that every event has a cause.
To respond to this question it is necessary to unpack the nature of free choice. There are three basic views of the nature of free choice: In determinism, a free act is caused by another; in *indeterminism, it is uncaused; and in self-determinism, it is caused by oneself. Determinism would eliminate human responsibility, since another caused the action, not ourselves. Indeterminism is irrational, since a fundamental rule of reason is that every action has a cause. It follows, then, that every free choice must be self-caused.
Of course, a person uses the power of free choice to make free choices. However, the person is not free choice. He simply has free choice. It is wrong to say I am free choice; I simply have free choice. So, I am the efficient cause of my own free actions, but the power of free choice is the means by which I freely act.
The Nature of Evil. There is another dimension to this difficulty. What is the nature of evil? That is, what is the essence or identity of evil? This too is a particularly pesky problem for a classical theist (see Classical Apologetics), for God alone is eternal, and everything he created was good. What, then, is evil?
Theists reject *dualism Evil is not a coeternal principle outside of God, for not all opposites like good and evil are first principles. This wrongly assumes that just because something can be essentially good (God), something can be essentially bad. But once dualism is rejected, one has great difficulty explaining the reality of evil. If evil is not something outside of God, and it cannot be anything inside of God, then what is it? The problem can be summarized this way.
1. God is the Author of everything.
2. Evil is something.
3. Therefore, God is the Author of evil.
Rejecting the first premise leads to dualism Likewise, denying the second leads to illusionism, which denies the reality of evil (see Pantheism). Neither is acceptable to a theist. What, then, is the solution? To agree that God did not create all things is to deny his sovereignty. To say evil is nothing denies reality. However, to admit that God caused all things and evil is something is to acknowledge that God caused evil—a conclusion rejected by Aquinas. But this conclusion seems to follow logically from these premises. Unless one rejects the truth of one of the premises, he must accept the truth of the conclusion.
The theist responds that evil is not a thing or substance. Rather, it is a lack or privation of a good thing that God made. Evil is a deprivation of some particular good. The essence of this position is summarized:
1. God created every substance.
2. Evil is not a substance (but a privation in a substance).
3. Therefore, God did not create evil.
Evil is not a substance but a corruption of the good substances God made. Evil is like rust to a car or rot to a tree. It is a lack in good things, but it is not a thing in itself. Evil is like a wound in an arm or moth holes in a garment. It exists only in another but not in itself.
It is important to note that a privation is not the same as mere absence. Sight is absent in a stone as well as in a blind person. But the absence of sight in the stone is not a privation, absence of something that ought to be there. Since the stone by nature ought not to see, it is not deprived of sight, as is the blind man. Evil, then, is a deprivation of some good that ought to be there. It is not a mere negation.
To say that evil is not a thing but a lack in things is not to claim that it is not real. Evil is a real lack in good things, as the blind person knows only so well. Evil is not a real substance, but it is a real privation in good substances. It is not an actual entity but a real corruption in an actual entity.
Evil as privation comes in different kinds. There are physical privations, such as mutilations, and there are moral privations, such as a sexual perversity. Privation can be in substance (what something is) or in relationships (how it relates to others). There are not only bad things but also bad relations between things. A relationship of love is a good one; hate is an evil one. Likewise, when a creature worships its Creator, it relates well; blaspheming the Creator is an evil relationship.
From this perspective, it follows that there is no such thing as something that is totally evil. If it were totally deprived of all good, it would be nothing. A totally rusty car is no car at all. And a totally moth-eaten garment is only a hanger in a closet. Evil, like a wound, can only exist in something else. A totally wounded arm means the person is maimed.
In view of this, something cannot be totally private, at least not in a metaphysical sense. A totally corrupted being would not exist at all. And a totally incapacitated will could not make any moral actions. One must take care not to carry human depravity so far that one destroys the ability to sin. There cannot be a supreme evil, for although evil lessens good, it can never totally destroy it. Nothing can be complete, unmitigated evil. For if all good were entirely destroyed—and this would be required for evil to be complete—evil itself would vanish, since its subject, namely good, would no longer be there.
The fact that evil cannot be total in a metaphysical sense by no means implies that it cannot be total in a moral sense. A being can be totally (or, radically) depraved morally in the sense that evil has invaded every part of being. But the moral total depravity can only be extensive, not intensive. It can extend to every part of a person’s being, but it cannot destroy personal being. If it destroyed one’s person, there would no longer be a person to do evil. Total evil in this sense would destroy a person’s ability to do evil.
Classical theists describe things in terms of their four causes: (1) efficient, (2) final, (3) formal, and (4) material. A human being has God as the efficient cause, God’s glory and their good as final cause, a soul as formal cause, and a body as material cause. However, since evil is not a substance, it has no formal cause, and its material cause is a good substance.
efficient cause—free choice final cause—none; evil is the lack of order formal cause—none; evil is the privation of form material cause—a good substance
The efficient cause of moral evil is free choice, not directly but indirectly. There is no purpose (final cause) of evil. It is lack of proper order to the good end. Evil has no formal cause of its own. Rather, it is the destruction of form in another. Its material cause is a good but not its own. It exists only in a good thing as the corruption of it.
The Persistence of Evil. There is another aspect of the problem of evil. Why does God allow it? Even if he did not produce it, he does permit it. Yet he is all-powerful and could destroy it. So why doesn’t he do so?
The classical way to state the problem of the persistence of evil is this:
1. If God is all-good, he would destroy evil.
2. If God is all-powerful, he could destroy evil.
3. But evil is not destroyed.
4. Therefore, there is no such God.
Put this way, the argument leaves open the possibility of a finite god, but theists reject such a concept. For every finite or limited being has a cause (see Cosmological Argument). So a finite god is only a creature that needs an infinite Creator. And since God is powerful, then he must be infinitely powerful. Likewise, since he is good, he must be infinitely good. So, a finite god is not an option for a theist. God has both the desire and the ability needed to do anything possible.
Is it possible to destroy evil? The theist responds as follows:
1. God cannot do what is actually impossible.
2. It is actually impossible to destroy evil without destroying free choice.
3. But free choice is necessary to a moral universe.
4. Therefore, God cannot destroy evil without destroying this good moral universe.
It is impossible for God to do what is contradictory. He cannot make an affirmation to be true and false at the same time. He can do nothing that involves such an impossibility, such as making a square circle or a stone so heavy he cannot lift it.
Even an omnipotent being cannot do anything. It can only do what is possible. But it is not possible to force people to freely choose the good. Forced freedom is a contradiction. Therefore, God cannot literally destroy all evil without annihilating free choice. The only way to destroy evil is to destroy the good of free choice. But when there is no moral free choice, then there is no possibility of moral good. Unless hate is possible, love is not possible. Where no creature can blaspheme, no creature can worship either. Therefore, if God were to destroy all evil, he would have to destroy all good too.
However, theism holds that even though God could not destroy (annihilate) all evil without destroying all good, nevertheless, he can and will defeat (overcome) all evil without destroying free choice. The argument can be summarized as follows:
1. God is all-good and desires to defeat evil.
2. God is all-powerful and is able to defeat evil.
3. Evil is not yet defeated.
4. Therefore, it will one day be defeated.
The infinite power and perfection of God guarantee the eventual defeat of evil. The fact that it is not yet accomplished in no way diminishes the certainty that it will be defeated. Even though evil cannot be destroyed without destroying free choice, nonetheless, it can be overcome.
An all-powerful God could, for example, separate good persons from evil ones according to what persons freely choose. Those who love God will be separated from those who do not. Those who desire the good but are hindered by evil will no longer have their good purposes frustrated. And those who do evil and are hampered by good influences will no longer be nagged by the proddings of good. Each, whether in heaven or in hell, will have it according to their free choice. In this way God’s victory over evil would not violate free choice.
Not only can a theistic God defeat evil, but he will do it. We know this because he is all-good and would want to defeat evil and because he is all-powerful and is able to defeat evil. Therefore, he will do it. The guarantee that evil will be overcome is the nature of the theistic God.
The Purpose of Evil. No evil is good, but some evil has a good purpose. Warning pains, for example, are painful, but their painfulness has a good purpose. Of course, not all evil seems to be of this type. What, then, of evil that seems to have no good purpose? The problem can be summarized as follows:
1. An all-good God must have a good purpose for everything.
2. There is no good purpose for some suffering.
3. Therefore, there cannot be an all-good God.
It seems evident that there is useless suffering in the world. Some people get better through suffering, but others get bitter. Broken bones are stronger when they heal, but some never heal. Many die. What about all the purposeless evil in the world?
The theistic answer to apparently purposeless evil is fourfold. First, God has a good purpose for
everything. Second, we do know a good purpose for much evil. Third, some evil is a by-product of good. Fourth, God is able to bring good out of evil.
God Has a Good Purpose for Everything. The antitheist overlooks an important distinction: God knows a good purpose for all evil, even if we do not. Simply because finite minds cannot conceive of a good purpose for some evil does not mean that there is none. Since God is omniscient, he knows everything. And since he is omnibenevolent, he has a good purpose for everything. Hence, God does know a good purpose for all evil, even if we do not know it:
1. An omnibenevolent God has a good purpose for everything.
2. There is some evil for which we see no good purpose.
3. Therefore, there is a good purpose for all evil, even if we do not see it.
The fact that finite beings don’t see the purpose for some evil does not mean there is none. This inability to see the purpose for evil does not disprove God’s benevolence; it merely reveals our ignorance.
The Purpose for Much Evil Is Known by Us. In spite of the fact that we do not know everything, we do know something. And what we do know is that there is a good purpose for much evil. Warning pains have a good purpose. In fact, the ability to have pain has a good purpose. For if we had no nervous system, we could destroy ourselves without even feeling any pain. Also, physical pain can be a warning to save us from moral disaster. As C. S. *Lewis noted, pain is God’s megaphone to warn a morally deaf world. And if we as finite beings know a good purpose for much evil, then surely an infinite Mind can know a good purpose for the rest.
Evil Sometimes Is a By-product of a Good Purpose. Not every specific evil needs a good purpose. Some evil can simply be a necessary by-product of a good purpose. The early bird gets the worm, but the early worm gets eaten. What is life for higher forms is death for lower forms. Plants and animals die so that man may have food to live. Thus, evil results indirectly from good because it is the consequence of a good purpose. Hence, the response may be put this way:
1. God has a good purpose for everything he does.
2. Some good purposes have evil by-products.
3. Therefore, some evil is a by-product of a good purpose.
Not every specific event in the world needs to have a good purpose; only the general purpose needs to be good. The blacksmith has a good purpose for hammering the molten iron into a horseshoe. However, not every spark that flies has a purpose for its destiny. Some sparks may ignite unintended fires. Likewise, God had a good purpose for creating water (to sustain life), but drowning is one of the evil by-products. Thus, not every specific drowning needs to have a good purpose, even though making the water in which they drown did. So many good things would be missed if God did not permit evil to exist. Fire does not burn unless air is consumed. Neither just retribution is inflicted nor patience is achieved but for the evil of tribulation.
God Can Bring Good out of Evil. Of course, God is all-powerful, and he is able to redeem good even from evils. A drowning person may inspire acts of bravery. Although sawdust is an unintended by-product of making lumber, it can be salvaged to make paper. Likewise, God in his providence is
able to redeem much (if not all) good out of the evil by-products in the world. God would in no wise permit evil to exist in his works unless he were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil.
That does not mean that this present world is the best of all possible worlds. It means that God has made it the best possible way to attain his ultimate goal of the greater good. God may not always redeem good out of every evil by-product in a fallen world. This could be true in both the physical and the moral realm Like radioactive waste, some evil by-products may resist reprocessing. Indeed, in view of the second law of thermodynamics, the physical world is decaying. But God has the power to re-create it (cf. 2 Peter 3:13). Human death can be overcome by resurrection (cf. Rom 8; 1 Cor. 15). Neither of these is any problem for an omnipotent God.
The Problem of Physical Evil. The above solutions to the problem of evil do not appear to solve the problem of natural disasters. Why tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes? It does not suffice to say that the free will of creatures caused all these. Further, many innocent people are killed in them How, then, can natural evil be explained? In logical form:
1. Moral evil is explained by free choice.
2. But some natural evil does not result from free choice.
3. Natural evil cannot be explained by free choice of creatures.
4. Hence, God must be responsible for natural evil.
5. But natural evils cause innocent suffering and death.
6. Therefore, God is responsible for innocent suffering and death.
Theists question several premises of this argument. One response to premise 5, for example, is that in this fallen world no one is innocent. We sinned in Adam (Rom 5:12) and as a consequence deserve death (Rom 6:23). Natural disaster is a direct result of the curse on creation because of the fall of humankind (Gen. 3; Rom 8). It will not be removed until Christ returns (Rev. 21-22).
Likewise, proposition6 is mistaken, since it implies that God is morally culpable for taking the life of a creature. This is a category mistake, since it wrongly assumes that since it is wrong for a creature to take innocent life, it is also wrong for the Creator to do so. But God gave life and alone has the right to take it (cf. Deut. 32:39; Job 1:21). We did not give life, and we do not have the right to take it.
Premise 3 is definitely untrue. For *theism can explain all natural evil by reference to free choice. In biblical language, the free choice of Adam and Eve brought natural disaster on this world. In addition, the free choice of evil angels accounts for the rest of human suffering. But even putting this possibility aside, which could in itself explain all natural evil, physical suffering can be explained in reference to human free choice.
1. Some suffering is brought on directly by our own free choice. The choice to abuse my body can result in sickness.
2. Some suffering is brought on indirectly by free choice. The choice to be lazy can result in poverty.
3. Some physical evil to others can result from our free choice, as in the case of spouse or child abuse.
4. Others suffer indirectly because of our free choice. Alcoholism can lead to poverty of one’s
children.
5. Some physical evil may be a necessary by-product of a good process. Rain, hot air, and cool air are all necessary for food and life, but a by-product of these forces is a tornado.
6. Some physical evil may be a necessary condition for attaining a greater moral good. God uses pain to get our attention. Many have come to God through suffering.
7. Some physical suffering may be a necessary condition of a greater moral good. Just as diamonds are formed under pressure, even so is character.
8. Some physical evil is a necessary concomitant of a morally good physical world. For instance, it is good to have water to swim and boat in, but a necessary concomitant is that we can also drown in it. It is good to have sex for procreation and enjoyment, even though it makes rape possible. It is good to have food to eat, but this also makes dying of food poisoning possible.
At this point, the critic could always ask why a physical world is necessary. Why did not God make spirits who could not hurt their bodies or die. The answer is: God did; they are called angels. The problem is that, while no angel can die of food poisoning, neither can they enjoy a prime rib. While no angel has ever drowned, neither has any angel ever gone for a swim or went water skiing. No angel has ever been raped, but neither has any angel ever enjoyed sex or the blessing of having children (Matt. 22:30). In this kind of physical world, we simply must take the concomitant evil along with the good.
Eventually, of course, Christian theists believe God will redeem us from all physical evil, giving us immortal and incorruptible bodies. But if we had those before we were morally ready for them, we would not have made the necessary moral progress toward being suited to them
The Avoidability of Evil. If God knew evil would occur, why did he create the world? God was free to create or not to create. Why did he choose to create a world he knew would fall? Theists believe God is all-knowing, all-good, and free. As all-knowing, God foresaw evil. As free, he could have avoided creating the world. But this conflicts with God as all-good, for such a God must have had a good purpose for creating a world he knew would fall. Why then did he create it?
There were other better alternatives open to God. He could have not created at all. He could have created a nonmoral world where no sin could occur. He could have created a free world where no one would have chosen to sin. He could have created a world where sin occurred but where everyone was ultimately saved. Any one of these worlds would have been better than the world conceived by the orthodox Christian theist, where evil occurs and where not everyone will be saved in the end (see Hell; Annihilationism; Universalism). The problem takes this form:
1. God could have chosen a better alternative by:
a. not creating at all
b. not creating a free world
c. creating a free world that would not sin
d. creating a world that sinned but would all be saved
2. But God did not choose one of these better alternatives.
3. Therefore, God did not do his best.
4. But to do less than his best is an evil for God.
5. Therefore, no all-perfect God exists.
Some theists challenge the fourth premise, arguing that God does not have to do his best; he merely has to do good. And what he did in creating this world was good, even if there could have been something better. But assuming, for the argument, that God must do his best, is any other alternative really better than this world? Theists say no.
A nonworld is not better than some world. Nothing is not better than something. This is a classic category mistake. Something and nothing have nothing in common, so they cannot be compared. It is not even like comparing apples and oranges, since they both are fruit. It is like comparing apples and nonapples, insisting that nonapples taste better.
A nonfree world is not morally better than a free world. A nonfree world is a nonmoral world, since free will is necessary for morality. A nonmoral world cannot be morally better than a moral world. Since a nonfree world is not a moral world, there is no moral basis for comparison. This too is a category mistake.
A free world where no one sins or even a free world where everyone sins and then gets saved is conceivable, but it may not be achievable. As long as everyone is really free, it is always possible that someone will refuse to do the good. Of course, God could force everyone to do good, but then they would not be free. Forced freedom is not freedom at all. Since God is love, he cannot force himself on anyone against their will. Forced love is not love; it is rape. And God is not a divine rapist. Love must work persuasively but not coercively. Hence, in every conceivable free world, someone would choose to do evil, so a perfect evil-free world may not be possible.
A world where sin never materializes is conceivable, but it may not be the most desirable morally. If evil is not permitted, then it cannot be defeated. Like automobiles, a tested world is better than an untested one. Or, to put it another way, no boxer can beat an opponent without getting into the ring. God may have permitted evil in order to defeat it. If evil is not allowed, then the higher virtues cannot be attained. No pain, no gain. Tribulation works patience. There is no way to experience the joy of forgiveness without allowing the fall into sin. So, a world where evil is not defeated and the higher goods attained would not be the best world achievable. Therefore, while a world where sin does not occur is theoretically conceivable, it would be morally inferior.
Conclusion. No one has demonstrated that any alternative world is morally better than the one we have. Hence, no antitheist can show that God did not create the best world, even given the privation of good. This, of course, does not mean that the theist is committed to the belief that this present world is the best world that can be achieved. God is not finished yet, and Scripture promises that something better will be achieved. The theist’s assumption is that this world is the best way to the best world achievable.
Sources
THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL
T. Aquinas, Compendium of Theology.
--, Summa Theologica.
Augustine. Against the Epistle of the Manichaeans.
--, The City of God.
--, On the Nature of Good.
--, On True Religion.
THE MORAL PROBLEM OF EVIL
T. Aquinas, On Evil.
N. L. Geisler, If God, Why Evil?
N. L. Geisler and W. Corduan, Philosophy of Religion.
G. Leibniz, Theodicy.
C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce.
THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM OL EVIL
Augustine, The City of God.
A. Camus, The Plague.
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain.
A. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil. F.-M. Voltaire, Candide.
Evolution. Evolution covers three basic areas: the origin of the universe; the origin of first life, and the origin of new life-forms. Respectively, these are called cosmic evolution, chemical evolution, and biological evolution (see Evolution, Biological; Evolution, Chemical; Evolution, Cosmic). Because differing implications and arguments set apart the apologetics relating to each of these evolutionary highways, they will be discussed in separate articles.
In the broad sense, evolution means development, but more specifically, it has come to mean the theory of common ancestry. It is the belief that all living things evolved by natural processes from earlier and more simple forms of life. Theistic evolution posits a God who got the process going (by creating matter and/or first life) and/or has guided it. Naturalistic evolution believes the entire process is natural, including the origin of the universe and first life by spontaneous generation.
For other discussions relating to a critique of evolution science, see Adam, Historicity of; Anthropic Principle; Big Bang Theory; Creation, Views of; Darwin, Charles; Missing Links, Evolutionary; Origins, Science of; Teleological Argument.
Evolution, Biological Some ancient Greeks believed in evolution. However, before Charles *Darwin (1809-82), theories of evolution tended to arise out of a pantheistic worldview (see Pantheism) and lacked scientific credibility. Darwin theorized a mechanism, called “natural selection,” to make evolution work. This placed evolution in the naturalistic framework that has been its stronghold ever since. Much of what Darwin taught has been rejected and surpassed, but his doctrine of natural selection has been maintained.
Biological evolution is divided into microevolution (small scale) and macroevolution (large scale). Opponents of macroevolution generally accept microevolution, since this process simply describes the ability of various forms of life to adapt to their environment. For example, there are several hundred kinds of dogs, but they are all canines. Their differences in breed “evolved” (developed) through both natural and artificial selection. Macroevolution embraces evolution on the large scale, from microbe to man, from the first one-cell animal to human beings as the highest animal so far developed in the chain.
Most macroevolutionists believe that life first began as a result of chemical reactions in what Darwin called a “warm little pool.” Research has shown that it is possible to generate the essential proteins necessary for life using only a few basic gases and water. This has encouraged the view that life arose from nonliving matter (see Evolution, Chemical). New life-forms are said to have evolved through mutations and natural selection. As conditions on earth changed, animals adapted new characteristics to meet the challenges. Those who adapted survived, and those that did not passed into extinction. The great variety of extinct animals represented among fossils, and their similarities to living species are used to confirm this thesis.
Scientific Basis. Evolution, like other approaches to past events, is a speculative, rather than an empirical, science. Speculative science deals with past singularities for which there are no recurring patterns of events by which they can be tested. Theories of evolution and creation also are called theories of origin science (see Origins, Science of), rather than operation science. Operation science is empirical science; it deals with the way things operate now. It studies regular and repeated phenomena. Its answers can be tested by repeating the observation or experiment. Its basic principles are observability and repeatability. Micro-evolution is a legitimate study of operation science, especially as it relates to genetics.
Since origin science deals with past singularities, it is speculative in nature. Past events of origin were not observed and cannot be repeated. They must be reconstructed by viewing the evidence that remains. Just as a forensic scientist attempts to reconstruct how a homicide occurred from physical evidence, so an origin scientist tries to reconstruct the origin of the universe, first life, and new life-forms from the evidence.
The Principles of Origin Science. Instead of observation and repetition, the origin scientist uses principles of causality and analogy. The principle of causality (see Causality, Principle of; First Principles), which is at the root of modern science and all rational thought, states that every event has an adequate cause. In science, the principle of analogy (or uniformity) states that the present is the key to the past. Or, more precisely, the kinds of causes that produce certain kinds of effects in the present are the kinds of causes that produced similar events in the past.
Two Kinds of Causes. Causality comes in two basic varieties: natural and intelligent. Intelligent causes are sometimes called primary causes, and natural causes are called secondary causes. Most sciences seek natural causes in the laws of physics or chemistry. Others, however, deal with intelligent causes. Archaeology, for example, seeks an intelligent cause for the cultural remains of the past. Astronomers in the SETI (Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence) program have tuned their radio telescopes into outer space, searching for a message from intelligent beings. Both of these sciences believe they can tell when they have found an effect that demands an intelligent cause by the special marks a mind leaves on what it produces. For example, there is an obvious difference between alphabet cereal spilled on the table and the arranged series of letters, “Tom, take out the garbage. Mom” Those who believe there is an intelligent cause for the origin of the universe, first life, and/or new life-forms are called “creationists.” Those who believe these can be explained by purely natural, nonintelligent causes are called “evolutionists.” “Theistic evolutionists” try to synthesize the two views.
Three basic areas of dispute separate creationists and evolutionists on the question of origins:
(1) the origin of the universe (see Evolution, Cosmic), (2) the origin of first life (see Evolution, Chemical), and (3) the origin of human life. Historically, these areas have been called cosmogony, biogony, and anthropogony (see Missing Links, Evolutionary), in distinction to the operation sciences cosmology, biology, and anthropology.
Origin of New Life-Forms. Naturalistic Explanation of Origins. New life-forms have come either from natural or supernatural (intelligent) causes. Darwin made one of his greatest contributions to the theory of evolution with his analogy of selection by breeders to selection in nature. This principle of natural selection became the hallmark of evolution because it provided a system by which new developments of life-forms could be explained without recourse to a supernatural cause.
Darwin was aware that there were serious flaws with the analogy between breeders and nature, but he hoped that what humans could do in a few generations could be done by nature in several hundred generations. However, time is not the only factor that weakens the analogy. E. S. Russell wrote:
It is unfortunate that Darwin ever introduced the term “natural selection,” for it has given rise to much confusion of thought. He did so, of course, because he arrived at his theory through studying the effects of selection as practiced by man in the breeding of domesticated animals and cultivated plants. Here the use of the word is entirely legitimate. But the action of man in selective breeding is not analogous to the action of “natural selection, ” but almost its direct opposite. . . . Man has an aim or an end in view; “natural selection” can have none. Man picks out the individuals he wishes to cross, choosing them by the characteristics he seeks to perpetuate or enhance. He protects them and their issue by all means in his power, guarding them thus from the operation of natural selection, which would speedily eliminate many freaks; he continues his active and purposeful selection from generation to generation until he reaches, if possible, his goal. Nothing of this kind happens, or can happen, through the blind process of differential elimination and differential survival which we miscall “natural selection.” (cited in Moore, 124)
Evidence of the Fossil Record. It is seldom fully appreciated that the only real evidence for or against evolution is in the fossil record. Every other argument for evolution is based on what could have been. Only the fossil record records examples of what actually did happen. Darwin recognized this as a problem as well and wrote in On the Origin of Species, “Why then is not every geological formation and every stratum full of such intermediate links? Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic chain, and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and gravest objection which can be urged against my theory” (Darwin, 280).
In the century and a half since Darwin wrote, the situation has only become worse for his theory. Noted Harvard paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould has written, “The extreme rarity of transitional forms in the fossil record persists as the trade secret of paleontology. The evolutionary trees that adorn our textbooks have data only at the tips and nodes of their branches; the rest is inference, however reasonable, not the evidence of fossils” (Gould, 14). Niles El dredge and Ian Tattersall agree, saying, “Expectation colored perception to such an extent that the most obvious single fact about biological evolution—non-change—has seldom, if ever, been incorporated into anyone’s scientific notions of how life actually evolves. If ever there was a myth, it is that evolution is a process of constant change” (Eldredge and Tattersall, 8).
What does the fossil record suggest? Evolutionists such as Gould agreed with what creationists from Louis Agassiz to Duane Gish have said all along, that the fossil record includes two features particularly inconsistent with gradualism:
Stasis. Most species appear in the fossil record looking much the same as when they disappear; morphological change is limited and directionless.
Sudden appearance. In any area, a species does not arise gradually. It appears all at once and fully formed (Gould, ibid., 13-14).
There is no real indication that one form of life transforms into a completely different form While these two features seem to invalidate classical evolution, they are somewhat problematic to creationists also.
Some creationists say that the fossil record reflects the debris of the great flood, either because some animals were better able to escape the waters or by hydrodynamic sorting as the remains settled. These scientists are concerned with preserving evidence of a young earth because they believe creation was in seven literal twenty-four-hour periods and that there are no large gaps in the early genealogies of Genesis.
Others, known as “old-earth creationists,” hold that the earth need not be only thousands of years old. This group understands the fossil record to show that creation was accomplished in a series of stages, each new appearance in the geological strata pointing to a new moment of direct creation. Invertebrates appeared first, followed by a long period of nature balancing itself before the next burst of creation. Fish appeared next, and then amphibians, until man was created. The latter view does agree with the fossil record, but there is no consensus among creationists about the age of the earth. This is a hotly debated issue, but both sides agree that the fossil evidence supports creation better than evolution.
Some evolutionists have attempted to deal with the fossil evidence by introducing the idea of punctuated equilibrium These scientists say that the jumps in the fossil record reflect real catastrophes that induced sudden major changes in the existing species. Hence, evolution is not gradual but punctuated by sudden leaps from one stage to the next. The theory has been criticized because no evidence has been shown for a mechanism of secondary causes needed to make these sudden advances possible. Their theory appears to be based solely on the absence of transitional fossils. This view breaks with Darwin, who understood evidence of suddenness to be evidence in favor of creation. To accept the idea of punctuation as a result of a primary cause comes dangerously close to a creationist view.
The Evidence of Vestigial Organs. Evolutionists have used the presence of “vestigial organs” in humans as a support. They argue that, since the human body has organs for which there is no known use, they are left over from an earlier animal stage in which they were useful. The fact that vestigials can be removed with no apparent harm to the body indicates that they are useless. The appendix, ear muscles, and third eyelid are placed into this category.
However, just because functions for these organs are not known does not mean that none exist.
Since scientific knowledge is finite and progressive, there may be functions of which science is not yet aware. That they can be removed without apparent harm to the body is meaningless. Other organs may compensate for their loss. Also, a loss may exist that is not readily detectable. Some organs, such as tonsils, may be more important at an earlier stage in a person’s development as, for example, during early childhood to help fight off diseases. And organs such as a kidney or a lung can be removed without serious loss, yet they have a function.
It is significant that the list of vestigial organs has shrunk from over one hundred when the idea was first proposed to about a half dozen today, and there are purposes known for those. The appendix may aid in digestion and may be helpful in fighting off disease. Rabbits have a large appendix, and complete vegetarians may get more benefit from theirs. The muscle of the outer ear helps protect against freezing in colder climates. The third eyelid, or nictitating membranae, is used in humans to collect foreign material that gets in the eye. The “tail,” or coccyx, is necessary for sitting with comfort. The endocrine glands, once thought to be vestigial, are now known to be of great importance in the production of hormones. The thymus has been found to be involved in protecting the body against disease.
Even if some organs are truly leftovers from an earlier period in human development, this would not prove evolution. They may be left over from an earlier stage of the human race rather than from prehuman species. One might even say that an organ that has lost its function does not demonstrate we are evolving but devolving—losing some organs and abilities. This is the opposite of evolution.
The Evidence of the Genetic Code. Creationists reason that there are real limitations to evolutionary change that are built into the genetic code of every living being. Changes within this structure indicate design for each major category of life-form Each new life-form came into being by an act of intelligent intervention that arranged genetic information to fit functions. Just as letter sequences vary to form different words, DNA patterns vary to produce different species. If it requires intelligence to create King Lear from a selection of the words found in a dictionary, then it also requires intelligence to select and sort genetic information to produce the variety of species that work together as a system in nature.
The sudden appearance of these life-forms strengthens the case that a supernatural intelligence was at work to accomplish this organization In accordance with the principle of uniformity, this is the most plausible solution to the problem So, the greatest problem for evolutionists is not “missing links” but an explanation for the origin of complex new systems of genetic information
The Evidence from Specified Complexity. Not only was the first living cell exceedingly complex, but higher forms of life are even more complex. If the genetic information in a one-cell animal exceeds that in a volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica, the information in the human brain is greater than that in the Library of Congress. If it takes an intelligent cause to produce the simple first life-form, no less is needed for human life.
Complexity has always been a major problem for evolution. It amounts to the same problem encountered in examining the origin of first life (see Evolution, Chemical). The breeding analogy used to illustrate how natural processes did it all contains a great deal of intelligent intervention that is overlooked in the theory. Breeders manipulate according to an intelligent plan for encouraging specific developments. Informationally speaking, this is going from a state of complexity in the DNA code to a higher, or at least more specific, state of complexity. It is like changing the sentence “She had brown hair” to the more complex statement “Her auburn tresses shone in the sun.”
This increase in information encoded into the DNA strand requires intelligence just as surely as did the original coding to produce life. Indeed, if Darwin’s analogy proves anything, it shows the need for intelligent intervention to produce new life-forms. The principle of uniformity leads unhesitatingly to this conclusion once it is realized that we are working within origin science, not operation science.
The Evidence from Systemic Change. Macroevolutionary changes demand large-scale changes from one type of organism to another. Evolutionists argue that this occurred gradually over a long period. One serious objectionto this view is that all functional changes from one system to another must be simultaneous (see Denton, 11). For example, one can make small changes in a car gradually over a period of time without changing its basic type. One can change the shape of the fenders, its color, and its trim gradually. But if a change is in the size of the piston, this will involve simultaneous changes in the cam shaft, block, and cooling system Otherwise the new engine will not function.
Likewise, changing from a fish to a reptile or a reptile to a bird calls for major changes throughout the system of the animal. All these changes must occur simultaneously or blood oxygenation will not go with lung development and will not match nasal passage and throat changes, autonomic breathing reflexes in the brain, thoracic musculature, and membranes. Gradual evolution cannot account for this.
To make this same point in terms of the genetic code, one cannot go from small gradual changes in a simple genetic code to a more complex DNA molecule without major simultaneous changes, particularly not by random mutations. Small, random changes to “Mary had a little lamb ...” will never produce King Lear, even if all the letters of the alphabet and punctuation are present. The first small random change might read, “Mary sad a little lamb.” The next, “Mary sad a litter lamb.” And the next, “Mary sad a litter lamp.” With each single change the message gets more garbled. It is a long way from King Lear and going in the wrong direction. Only an intelligent being can reform the same letters of the English language into King Lear—by simultaneous and systematic redevelopment.
The English alphabet has twenty-six letters; the genetic alphabet has only four, but the method of communicating by sequence of letters is the same. Information scientist Hubert P. Yockey insists, “It is important to understand that we are not reasoning by analogy. The sequence hypothesis applies directly to the protein and the genetic text as well as to written language and therefore the treatment is mathematically identical” (Yockey, 16). It turns out that a single strand of DNA carries the same amount of information as one volume of an encyclopedia.
Each new form of life has its own, unique code that, although it is similar in the letters used, differs vastly in the message conveyed. One can use the very same words and convey an entirely different message. Hence, the evolutionist argument from the high similarity of the words in an ape and a human being do not prove common ancestry. The two sentences “You do love me” and “Do you love me?” have the same words but convey a totally different message. With ingenuity one could construct a paragraph (or even an entire book) in which exactly the same sentences convey a completely different message. A very rudimentary example might go something like this: John came before Mary. Mary came after John [= later than]. So John and Mary came together [= at the same place]. Compare this with the same sentences in a different order, which conveys a different meaning:
Mary came after [= pursued] John. John came before Mary [= in her presence]. So John and Mary came together [= in a
personal relationship],
A high degree of similarity of genetic information in an ape and a human means absolutely nothing. It is the way the pieces are put together that makes a world of difference. Hear this evolutionist’s testimony: “When we get down to the business of trying to establish an evolutionary series of sequences, we cannot find the linear, primitive-to-advanced arrangement we had expected.” In fact, “instead of a progression of increasing divergence, each vertebrate sequence is equally isolated [e g ] from the cytochrome sequence for the dogfish.” Thus, “in this and countless other comparisons, it has proved impossible to arrange protein sequences in a macroevolutionary series corresponding to the expected transitions from fish > amphibian > reptile > mammal” (Thaxton, 139-40).
Due to the landmark work of Michael Behe (Darwin’s Black Box) on the irreducible complexity in a living cell, we now know this is only known to be produced by an intelligent being. Likewise, the insightful work of Stephen Meyer (Signature in the Cell) has demonstated that only an intelligent being could have caused the specified complexity found in the DNA code in living things.
Conclusion. Now that we have new evidence about the nature of the universe, the information stored in DNA molecules, and further fossil confirmation, the words of Agassiz resound even more loudly than they did when first written in 1860: “[Darwin] has lost sight of the most striking of the features, and the one which pervades the whole, namely, that there runs throughout Nature unmistakable evidence of thought, corresponding to the mental operations of our own mind, and therefore intelligible to us as thinking beings, and unaccountable on any other basis than that they own their existence to the working of intelligence; and no theory that overlooks this element can be true to nature” (Agassiz, 13).
There are two views of the origins of new life-forms. One says that everything came about by natural causes; the other looks to a supernatural (intelligent) cause. The overwhelming evidence is in favor of the latter.