Augustine, City of God.
W. Crockett, ed.,Fours Views on Hell.
B. W. Davidson, “Reasonable Damnation.”
L. Dixon, The Other Side of the Good News.
J. Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards.
N. L. Geisler, “Man’s Destiny.”
J. Gerstner, Jonathan Edwards on Heaven and Hell.
C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock.
---, The Great Divorce.
---, The Problem of Pain, chap. 8.
---, The Screwtape Letters.
D. Moore, The Battle for Hell.
F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals.
R. A. Peterson. Hell on Trial.
B. Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian.
J.-P. Sartre. No Exit.
W. G. T. Shedd, The Doctrine of Endless Punishment. J. L. Walls, Hell.
Hellenic Saviors. See Apotheosis; Divine Birth Stories; Mithraism; Resurrection Claims in Non-Christian Religions.
Henotheism. Henotheismis a type of *polytheism that believes there is one supreme god among the many finite gods that exist, such as Zeus in Greek polytheism It is not to be confused with *theism or monotheism (see Monotheism, Primitive), which believes there is only one supreme God and no other gods.
Hick, John. John Hick (1922-2012) was one of the most important philosophers of religion of the late twentieth century. His literary output and influence were strong forces against orthodox Christianity at several crucial junctures. This includes the questions of the existence of God, the problem of evil, the destiny of human beings, and the deity of Christ.
Hick strongly defended *pluralism and unitarianism His theodicy (see Evil, Problem of) involved both *universalismand *reincarnation. All of these, including Hick’s views, are discussed in other articles. Hick’s main works and some evaluations of these are listed below.
Sources
A. D. Clarke and B. W. Winter, eds., One God, One Lord.
D. R. Geivett. Evil and the Evidence for God.
K. Gnanakan. The Pluralistic Predicament.
J. Hick, Death and Eternal Life.
--,An Interpretation of Religion.
--, The Metaphor o f God Incarnate.
--, "A Pluralist's View?”
A. McGrath, 'The Challenge of Pluralism for the Contemporary Christian Church.”
--, "Response to John Hick.”
R. Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior?
Η. A. Netland, Dissonant Voices.
D. L. OkholmandT. R. Phillips. More Than One Way?
Higher Criticism. See Bible Criticism; Redaction Criticism, Old Testament; Spinoza, Benedict; Wellhausen, Julius.
Hinduism, Vedanta. Hinduism represents a broad category of religious beliefs, most of which are pantheistic (see Pantheism) or panentheistic (see Panentheism). One of the oldest forms of pantheism is found in the last section of the Vedas, the Hindu scriptures. This final section is called the Upanishads. Because the Upanishads came at the end of each of the four Vedas, the Upanishads came to be spoken of as the Vedanta, meaning end or goal of the Vedas. “Thus it is that when a modern Hindu speaks of the Vedanta he may have both senses more or less in mind, the scriptures referred to being for him that last part of the Vedas and at the same time their ultimate reason for existence, their perfect culmination—in a word, their highest wisdom” (Prabhavananda, Spiritual Heritage of India, 39).
The author and date of the Upanishads are unknown They consist of the recorded experiences of Hindu sages (ibid., 39, 40). The Upanishads, along with the Bhagavad-Gita, laid the foundation for Vedanta Hinduism, which is a classic example of pantheism (see Monism; Parmenides; Plotinus).
Vedantic View of God. Not all forms of Hinduism believe in an impersonal God. Bhakti Hinduism does not. Nor does Hare Krishna. However, Vedanta pantheism teaches that only one God (Brahman) exists. This God is at once infinite in form, immortal, imperishable, impersonal, all-pervading, supreme, changeless, absolute, and indivisibly one, and at the same time none of these. For God is beyond all thought and speech:
Him [Brahman] the eye does not see, nor the tongue express, nor the mind grasp. Him we neither know nor are able to teach. Different is he from the known, and . . . from the unknown. He truly knows Brahman who knows him as beyond knowledge; he who thinks that he knows, knows not. The ignorant think that Brahman is known, but the wise know him to be beyond knowledge. (Prabhavananda, Upanishads, 30-31)
Brahman is inexpressible and indefinable. Nothing can be truly said or thought of Brahman. This is graphically illustrated by the Hindu philosopher Sankara in his commentary on the Upanishads:
“‘Sir,’ said a pupil to his master, ‘teach me the nature of Brahman.’ The master did not reply. When a second and a third time he was importuned, he answered: ‘I teach you indeed, but you do not follow. His name is silence”’ (Prabhavananda, Spiritual Heritage of India, 45).
Vedantic View of the World. Vedanta pantheism also teaches that all is God and God is all. There is only one reality. The world that we see, hear, touch, taste, and smell does not actually exist. It appears to exist, but it is in fact an illusion, or maya. The universe we perceive is like walking through a dense forest at night and seeing what appears to be a snake. But when we return to the same spot in the light of the day, we see that the snake really was a rope. The rope looked like a snake, but it actually was not a snake. Just as the snake appeared to exist, so the universe appears to exist but it actually does not. Instead, the universe is maya, an illusion superimposed upon the only true reality, Brahman.
As the Upanishads state, “Brahman alone is—nothing else is. He who sees the manifold universe, and not the one reality, goes evermore from death to death” (Prabhavananda, Upanishads, 21). “Meditate, and you will realize that mind, matter, and Maya (the power which unites mind and matter) are but three aspects of Brahman the one reality” (ibid., 119).
Vedantic View of Humanity. Vedanta pantheism says that humankind is Brahman. Maya, or the illusory universe, has deceived us into thinking that each person is a particular in the universe. But if the person would clear the senses and mind of maya and meditate upon the true Self (Atman), then the realization would come that Atman is Brahman, the one true reality. The depth of a person’s soul is identical to the depth of the universe.
Having attained to Brahman, a sage declared, “I am life. ... I am established in the purity of Brahman. I have attained the freedom of the Self. I am Brahman, self-luminous, the brightest treasure.
I am endowed with wisdom. I am immortal, imperishable” (ibid., 54).
Vedantic View of Ethics. According to Vedanta pantheism, people must transcend the world of illusion to discover the true Self (Prabhavananda, Spiritual Heritage of India, 55). This is accomplished by going beyond good and evil. “When the seer beholds the Effulgent One, the Lord, the Supreme Being, then, transcending both good and evil, and freed from impurities, he unites himself with him” (Prabhavananda, Upanishads, 47). When a person unites himself with Brahman, he no longer will be plagued by such thoughts as ‘“I have done an evil thing’ or ‘I have done a good thing.”’ For to go beyond good and evil is to be troubled no more by what has been done (ibid., 111). It is to become unattached to personal (or anyone else’s) past, present, or even future actions. Even the results of any actions will be viewed with indifference. “When your intellect has cleared itself of its delusions, you will become indifferent to the results of all action, present or future” (Prabhavananda, Bhagavad- Gita, 41).
This drive toward indifference to any action is explained most clearly in the Bhagavad-Gita. In the Gita, a long dialogue occurs between Krishna, a manifestation of Brahman, and his friend and disciple, Arjuna. Arjuna tells Krishna of his reluctance to fight against a people among whom he has many friends. He asks Krishna how killing his friends could possibly be justified. Krishna tells Arjuna that he must detach himself from the fruits of his actions, no matter what they are. Thus states Krishna:
He whose mind dwells Beyond attachment,
Untainted by ego,
No act shall bind him With any Bond:
Though he slay these thousands He is no slayer, (ibid., 122)
Krishna explains to Arjuna that this state of union with Brahman can be achieved by following one or any combination of the following paths:
1. Raga yoga—the path of union through meditation and mind control
2. Karma yoga—the path of union through work
3. Jnana yoga—the path of union through knowledge
4. Bhakti yoga—the path of union through love and devotion (Prabhavananda, Spiritual Heritage of India, 98, 123-29)
But any path one follows must be accompanied by unattachment or indifference to any action. Only then will good and evil be transcended and union with Brahman attained.
Reincarnation and Human Destiny. Realizing one’s oneness with Brahman is essential in Vedanta pantheism, for apart from this realization one is doomed forever to the cycle of samsara. Samsara is the wheel of time and desire, or birth, death, and rebirth by *reincarnation. It is the wheel to which everything in the world of illusion is shackled. And samsara “itself is subject to and conditioned by endless cause, the dharma of the universe” (Corwin, 22).
One’s life is also determined by the law of karma or action. This is the moral law of the universe. Huston Smith explains that karma is “the moral law of cause and effect.” It is absolutely binding and allows no exceptions. Karma says that every decision made by an individual in the present is caused by all prior decisions in past lives and will in turn affect every future decision (Smith, 76).
A person whose karma is good may follow one of two possible paths. One who manages to free self from samsara—the cycle of birth and rebirth—will attain to higher planes of existence or consciousness until becoming one with the divine being “in his impersonal aspect and so reaches at last the end of his journey” (Prabhavananda, Spiritual Heritage of India, 70).
One who has been good, but not good enough to become free from samsara, will go “to one or
another heaven, where he enjoys the fruits of his good deeds which he has done in the body . . . and when these fruits are no more, he is born again, that is, reincarnated” on earth in “a new body appropriate to a new and higher realm of being” (ibid., 70-71). If a person’s karma is largely evil, then he “goes to the regions of the wicked, there to eat the bitter fruits of his deeds. These fruits once exhausted, he too returns to earth” in a reincarnated state (ibid., 71).
Concerning the law of karma and the cycle of samsara, “it is on this earth that a man determines his spiritual destiny and achieves his final realization” (ibid.). Salvation is solely of personal efforts. Higher states of existence offer rewards of happiness and lower states are punishments that each person earns on his own. “The history of a particular individual, the number of times he experiences rebirth, or reincarnation as it is called, depends entirely upon the quality of his will, upon the moral effort he puts forth” (ibid., 27) (see Hell).
Ultimately, all humankind will achieve liberation from samsara and union with Brahman. Some people may return to earth often, but eventually they will all earn their salvation. As Prabhavananda says, “The Upanishads know no such thing as eternal damnation—and the same is true of every other Hindu scripture” (ibid., 71 [see Hell]).
Vedanta pantheism is the absolute pantheism of the East. Hinduism has found more popular expression and favor in the West through such religious groups and practices as transcendental meditation and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness. Vedanta pantheism is an absolute monism, declaring that God is all and all is One.
Evaluation. Like other worldviews, *monism has positive and negative dimensions. Although its view of ultimate reality is wrong, Vedantic Hinduism can be commended for its quest to know ultimate reality. There is more to reality than the world of our senses perceives. The desire to negate all limitations of ultimate reality is also good. The ultimate cannot be limited by human sensations or perceptions. Hinduism grapples with the basic problem of evil (see Evil, Problem of). It acknowledges that evil must be explained and dealt with.
Since Vedantic Hinduism is a form of monism and pantheism, it is evaluated under those topics.
Its basic metaphysical error lies in a rejection of the analogy of being (see Analogy, Principle of). All being is not univocal—the same thing. There is Infinite Being, and there are finite beings, and these are different kinds of beings. There is an analogy of being.
Likewise, the denial of the reality of evil is a classic form of *illusionism But one cannot know the world is an illusion who does not know what is real. Knowing the real is a prerequisite for knowing what is not real.
In order to maintain an absolute pantheism, monists must deny the validity of sense knowledge. The senses tell us there are many things and that they are physical. The monist must deny both of these pieces of information about reality. But the denial of all sense knowledge is self-defeating. One could not know the senses were being deceptive without trusting in the senses to tell this. We see a crooked stick in the water and know that our senses are playing a trick on us. How do we know the stick is really straight? We must use our senses. The sense of sight tells what it looks like when out of the water and touch tells what it feels like in the water.
A monist expects us to trust our senses when we look at their books or listen to their lectures so that we will understand them They fail to recognize that while knowledge is more than sensation, it begins with sensation. Everything in the mind was first in the senses except the mind itself. So we know more than sensation, but we do not know the world without sensation. Sensation is basic to all understanding of reality.
Epistemologically, monistic Hinduism is subject to many of the same criticisms as *agnosticism It is self-defeating, for it uses the basic laws of thought in order to express its views about what it claims is inexpressible. It uses *first principles in its rejections of first principles and finite reality.
The ethics of Vedantic Hinduism is a form of relativism, since it denies that there are moral absolutes (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). This too is self-defeating. One cannot avoid all moral absolutes without affirming the moral absolute that there are no moral absolutes. The claim that one “ought” to avoid absolutes is a moral “ought” of its own. One cannot claim that ultimate reality goes beyond all good and evil unless there is an ultimate moral principle by which to measure good and evil. But in this case there is an ultimate moral standard.
D. Clark and N. L. Geisler ,Apologetics in the New Age.
C. Corwin, East to Eden?
N. L. Geisler and J. U. Amano, The Reincarnation Sensation.
N. L. Geisler and W. D. Watkins. Perspectives.
Η. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity.
S. Prabhavananda, transBhagavad-Gita.
---, The Spiritual Heritage of India.
S. Prabhavananda and F. Manchester, trans., The Upanishads.
S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life.
---, The Principle Upanishads.
H. Smith, The Religions of Man.
Historical Apologetics. Historical apologetics stresses the historical evidence as the basis for demonstrating the truth of Christianity (see Apologetics, Types of). At this point it overlaps with *classical apologetics. The crucial difference between the two is that historical apologetics does not believe that it is necessary to first establish the existence of God. Historical apologists believe that the truth of Christianity, including the existence of God, can be proven from the foundation of historical evidence alone.
This assumption places historical apologetics within the broad class of evidential apologetics, but it differs in that it stresses the importance, if not necessity, of beginning with the historical evidence for the truth of Christianity. Usually, the historical apologist sees the resurrection of Christ as the linchpin of apologetics. In this sense, it can be called resurrection apologetics.
Proponents of Historical Apologetics. Christianity is a historical religion, so it is understandable that it would have a historic emphasis from the very beginning. The earliest apologists, including *Justin Martyr, *Tertullian, *Clement of Alexandria, and *Origen, defended the historicity of Christianity. Likewise, the classical apologists (see Classical Apologetics), such as *Augustine, *Anselm, and *Thomas Aquinas, considered historical apologetics an important part of their overall strategy in defending the Christian faith.
However, what distinguishes historical apologetics as a discipline is its belief that one can defend the whole of the Christian faith, including the existence of God and the fact of miracles, strictly from the historical evidence, without the necessity of any prior appeal to theistic arguments (although some use theistic evidences in a supplementary way). This emphasis appears to be largely a modern phenomenon. Contemporary apologists who fall into this category include John Warwick Montgomery and Gary Habermas (see Miracles, Apologetic Value of; Miracles in the Bible).
Contrast with Other Systems. Historical apologetics differs from both *presuppositional apologetics and *classical apologetics, although it has things in common with them
Historical versus Presuppositional Apologetics. Historical apologists disagree with the various forms of presuppositional apologetics (see Presuppositional Apologetics) over the nature of evidence itself and the nature of historical evidence in particular.
The historical apologists, in agreement with the classical apologists, begin with evidence to demonstrate the truth of Christianity. Presuppositionalists, on the other hand, begin with the unbeliever’s presuppositions. At issue is the validity of evidence to support truth. The pure (revelational) presuppositionalists insist that no evidence, historical or otherwise, makes any sense unless it is interpreted in the grid of one’s overall Christian worldview. The historical apologist believes that the historical facts are self-interpreting in their historical context. Pure presuppositionalists, on the other hand, insist that no facts are self-interpreting; all facts are interpreted and require a Christian *worldview framework for proper understanding.
Historical versus Classical Apologetics. Historical apologists have much in common with classical apologists (see Classical Apologetics). Both believe in the validity of historical evidence. Both see historical evidence to be crucial to the defense of Christianity. However, they sharply disagree over the need for theistic apologetics as logically prior to historical apologetics. Classical apologists believe it makes no sense to speak about the resurrection as an act of God unless one has first established that a God exists who can first act. The historical apologists, on the other hand, argue that one can show that God exists by demonstrating from the historical evidence alone that an act of God occurred, as in the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
The Historical Approach. The basic approach of historical apologetics is to begin with the historicity of the New Testament documents and then to use the miracles of Christ, particularly the resurrection, to demonstrate that Christ is the Son of God (thereby establishing that a theistic God exists who can work miracles).
A typical approach of historical apologetics might begin by attempting to show the historicity of the New Testament documents. This usually includes arguments for the authenticity of the New Testament documents {see New Testament, Dating of; New Testament Manuscripts) and the reliability of the New Testament witnesses {see New Testament, Historicity of; New Testament, Non-Christian Sources).
The second step would be to examine the New Testament claims of Christ to be the Son of the theistic God who offers miraculous proofs for his claims. The most important of these proofs is that Christ was resurrected from the dead {see Miracles, Arguments Against).
Third, a defense of the miracles of Christ, particularly his resurrection, is given. Sometimes this is supported by historical arguments outside the New Testament, but the basic reliability of the New Testament documents is the usual (and essential) focus.
From these premises alone it is concluded that Jesus is the Son of the one, true, theistic God who alone can account for these miraculous events in Jesus’ s life. From the deity of Christ it can be, and often is, argued that the Bible is the Word of God, since Jesus (who is God) affirmed it to be so {see Bible, Evidence for; Bible, Jesus’s View of). In this way, God, miracles, the deity of Christ {see Christ, Deity of), and the inspiration of the Bible are all supported by way of a historical argument.
Evaluation. Critiques of historical apologetics come from two sides, the presuppositionalists and the classical apologists.
Bare Facts? Presuppositionalists, and even some classical apologists, object that historical apologetics begins with the false assumption that the historical facts “speak for themselves.” The historical approach wrongly assumes that there are “bare facts” that are “self-interpreting.” These are facts that any fair-minded person can see and from which draw the proper conclusions. But all “facts” gain meaning from their ultimate worldview context. A worldview is like a pair of tinted glasses that color everything seen through their lenses. All facts are interpreted facts. So-called bare facts are like dots scattered over a sheet of paper. No connecting lines are there, and the dots are meaningless unless the mind connects them. How the lines are drawn depends on one’s perspective.
As noted among objections to classical apologetics, only a theist understands the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as a supernatural act of the theistic God and that this act demonstrates that Jesus is the unique Son of a theistic God (see Theism). That only theists, or tacit theists, come to these conclusions indicates that a theistic worldview is logically prior to the identification even of a resurrection from the dead as supernatural (see Resurrection, Evidence for). The event cannot be a special act of God unless there is a God who can perform such special acts (see God, Nature of).
This is not to say that psychologically an event like this could not trigger belief in God, were some skeptic or agnostic to come to believe it actually happened. It only means that only one who accepts at least the possibility, if not plausibility, of a theistic view would come to this conclusion. The vast majority of people who come to believe in Christianity because of the miracles of Christ and the apostles do so only because they already have an explicit or implicit theistic worldview. For example, members of preliterate people groups are often converted to Christianity after they come to believe in such miraculous events. But these people already held a tacit theism that worshiped a high god or sky God (see Monotheism, Primitive). Even deists (see Deism) believe God performed the big miracle of creating the world. Thus, a resurrection from the dead could evoke their belief that God could do other miracles as well. But the fact remains, both in principle and in practice, that belief in a miracle-working God is logically prior to belief that any given event is a miracle, including the event of someone being raised from the dead.
Whose Fingerprint? Other gaps in the historical apologetic approach can only be filled if one holds a theistic worldview. For example, a crucial step in the overall apologetic is to be able to identify a given event as a miracle. But how does one know that a miracle is the “fingerprint of God” to confirm a truth claim of a prophet of God unless one already knows that there is a God and what his “fingerprints” are like? Only if one knows what God is like can he identify God-like acts. The very identifiability of an unusual act as a miracle depends on prior knowledge of such a God.
What Sort of God? Unless one assumes the existence of a theistic God (who is morally perfect and would not deceive), the historical argument does not work. Suppose there were not a morally perfect God who, nonetheless, had the ability to perform miracles. Could he not deceive people by performing miracles for an impostor? Crucial to the historical argument is the premise that God would not perform a miracle through or for someone who is making a fraudulent claim in his name. Unless one has prior assurance that the God who performs such miracles is an essentially perfect Being (i.e., a theistic God) who would not so deceive us, then one cannot be sure that the historical evidence for a miracle actually supports the claim of the one through whom or for whom the miracle is being performed.
Sources
G. H. Clark, Historiography.
N. L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics, chaps. 5, 15.
G. Habermas, The Historical Jesus.
--, The Resurrection of Jesus.
J. W. Montgomery, Christianity and History.
--, Evidence for Faith.
Historical Jesus. See Christ of Faith vs. Jesus of History; Jesus Seminar; New Testament, Historicity of.
History, Objectivity of. The overall argument in defense of Christianity is based on the historicity of the New Testament documents (see New Testament, Historicity of; New Testament Manuscripts). But this in turn is grounded in the assertion that history is objectively knowable. Since this is strongly challenged by contemporary historians, it is necessary to counter this claim in order to secure the defense of Christianity.
Objections to Objective History. Many arguments have been advanced against the position that history is objectively knowable. The discussion here follows generally an excellent summary found in an unpublished master’s thesis by William L. Craig (see Craig). There are at least ten arguments against the objectivity of history to be examined (see Beard, 323-25).
If these arguments are valid, it will make verification of Christianity via a historical method impossible. These ten arguments fall into four broad categories: epistemological, methodological, axiological, and metaphysical.
Epistemological Objections. Epistemology deals with how one knows, and the historical relativist contends that the very conditions by which one knows history are so subjective that one cannot have an objective knowledge of history. Three main objections are offered.
The nonobservability of history. Historical subjectivists argue that the substance of history, unlike that studied by empirical science, is not directly observable. The historian does not deal with past events but with statements about past events. This fact enables the historian to deal with facts in an imaginative way. Historical facts, they insist, exist only within the creative mind of the historian. The documents do not contain facts but are, without the historian’s understanding, mere ink lines on paper.
Further, once an event is gone, it can never be fully re-created. The historian must impose meaning on the fragmentary and secondhand record. “The event itself, the facts, do not say anything, do not impose any meaning. It is the historian who speaks, who imposes a meaning” (Becker, “What Are Historical Facts?” 131).
Two reasons allow the historian only indirect access to the past. First, the historian’s world is composed of records and not events. This is why the historian must contribute a “reconstructed picture” of the past. In this sense, the past is really a product of the present. Second, the scientist can test his view, whereas experimentation is not possible with historical events. The empirical scientist has the advantage of repeatability; he may subject his views to falsification. The historian cannot. The unobservable historical event is no longer verifiable; it is part of the forever departed past. Hence, what one believes about the past will be no more than a reflection of imagination. It will be a subjective construction in the minds of present historians but cannot hope to be an objective representation of what really happened.
The fragmentary nature of historical accounts. At best, a historian can hope for completeness of documentation, but completeness of the events themselves is never possible. Documents at best cover a small fraction of the events (Beard, 323). From only fragmentary documents one cannot validly draw full and final conclusions. The documents do not present the events but only an interpretation of the events mediated through their recorders. At best, we have a fragmentary record of what someone else thought happened. So “what really happened would still have to be reconstructed in the mind of
the historian” (Carr, 20). Because the documents are so fragmentary and the events so distant, objectivity becomes a will-o’-the-wisp for the historian Too few pieces of the puzzle remain, and the partial pictures on the few pieces only suggest the mind of the one who passed the pieces down.
Historians are historically conditioned. Historical relativists insist that the historian is a product of a time and is subject to unconscious programming. It is impossible to stand back and view history objectively because the observer is part of the historical process. Historical synthesis depends on the personality of the writer as well as the social and religious milieu in which the writer lives (Pirenne, 97). In this sense, one must study the historian before one can understand the historian’s history.
Since the historian is part of the historical process, objectivity can never be attained. The history of one generation will be rewritten by the next, and so on. No historian can transcend historical relativity and view the world process from the outside (Collingwood, 248). At best, there can be successive, less than final, historical interpretations, each viewing history from the vantage point of its own generation of historians. There is no such person as a neutral historian.
Methodological Objections. Methodological objections relate to the procedure by which historians do their work. Three major methodological objections attack the concept that history is objective enough to establish the truth of Christianity.
The selective nature of research. Not only does the historian lack access to events and must work with their fragmentary interpretations, but what makes objectivity more hopeless is that the historian also selects from among these fragmentary reports. Historians do not even touch some volumes in archives (Beard, 324). The actual selection among the fragmentary accounts is influenced by subjective and relative factors, including personal prejudice, availability, knowledge of languages, personal beliefs, and social conditions. The historian becomes inextricably a part of the history written. What is included and what is excluded in interpretation will always be a matter of subjective choice. No matter how objective a historian, it is practically impossible to present what really happened. A “history” is no more than an interpretation based on a subjective selection of fragmentary interpretations of past and unrepeatable events.
So, it is argued, the facts of history do not speak for themselves. “The facts speak only when the historian calls on them; it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context” (Carr, 32). Indeed, when the “facts” speak, it is not the original events that are articulating but rather later fragmentary opinions about those events. The original facts or events have perished.
So by the very nature of the project, the historian can never hope for objectivity.
The need to structure the facts. Partial knowledge of the past makes it necessary for the historian to “fill in” gaping holes with imagination. As a child draws the lines between the dots on a picture, the historian supplies the connections between events. Without the historian the dots are not numbered nor arranged in an obvious manner. Imagination provides continuity.
Furthermore, the historian is not content to tell us simply what happened but feels compelled to explain why it happened (Walsh, 32). This makes history fully coherent and intelligible. Good history has both theme and unity, which are provided by the historian. Facts alone do not make history any more than do disconnected dots make a picture. Herein, according to the subjectivist, lies the difference between chronicle and history. The former is merely the raw material. Without the structure provided by the historian, the “stuff’ of history would be meaningless.
The study of history is a study of causes. The historian wants to know why, to weave a web of interconnected events into a unified whole. So subjectivity is inevitably interjected. Even if there is some semblance of objectivity in chronicle, nonetheless there is no hope for objectivity in history. History is, in principle, nonobjective because the very thing that makes it history (as opposed to mere chronicle) is the interpretive structure of framework given to it from the subjective vantage point of the historian. Hence, it is concluded, the necessity of structure inevitably makes objectivity impossible.
The need to select and arrange. The historian views fragmentary documents indirectly through the interpretation of the original source. In the process, a selected amount of material from available archives is hung on an interpretive structure by the use of the historian’s own value-laden language within an overall worldview. Events come to be understood from the relative vantage point of the historian’s generation, and even the topics studied accord with the researcher’s subjective preferences. The dice are loaded against objectivity from the start. In the actual writing, a historian covers nonrepeatable events from fragmentary, secondhand accounts from a personal point of view while subjectively arranging the material (Collingwood, 285-90).
The selection and arrangement will be determined by personal and social factors. The final written product will be prejudiced by what is included and by what is excluded. It will lack objectivity by how facts are arranged and emphasized. The selection in terms of the framework given will either be narrow or broad, clear or confused. Whatever its nature, the framework reflects the mind of the historian (Beard, 150-51). This moves one still farther away from objectively knowing what really happened.
Subjectivists conclude that hopes of objectivity are dashed at every point in the process.
An Axiological (Value) Objection. The historian cannot avoid making value judgments (see Truth, Nature of). This, argue historical relativists, renders objectivity unobtainable. For even in the selection and arrangement of materials, value judgments are made. Titles of chapters and sections imply values of the writer.
As one historian put it, the very subject matter of history is “value-charged” (Dray, 23). The facts of history consist of murders, oppression, and other evils that cannot be described in morally neutral words. By use of ordinary language, the historian is forced to impose values. Whether, for instance, one is called a “dictator” or a “benevolent ruler” is a value judgment. How can one describe Adolf Hitler without making value judgments? And if one were to attempt a kind of scientifically neutral description of past events without any stated or implied interpretation of human purposes, it would not be history but mere raw-boned chronicle without historical meaning.
There is no way for the historian to keep out of the history. Perspectives and prejudices will be expressed in value language by which and through which the world is viewed. In this sense, objectivity is unattainable. Every writer will inevitably evaluate things from a subjective perspective and chosen words.
Metaphysical Objections. Three metaphysical objections have been leveled against the belief in objective history. Each is predicated, either theoretically or practically, on the premise that worldview colors the study of history.
The unavoidability of worldviews. Every historian interprets the past in the overall framework of a Weltanschauung. Every historian operates from inside one of three philosophies of history:
(1) History is a chaotic jumble of meaningless events; (2) the events of humankind’s story repeat themselves in some sort of cycle; and (3) events are pushing forward the story in a linear fashion toward an endpoint (Beard, 151). Which one of these the historian adopts will be a matter of faith or philosophy. Unless one view or another is presupposed, no interpretation is possible. The Weltanschauungen determine whether the historian sees the events as a meaningless maze, a series of endless repetitions, or a purposeful advance. These worldviews are both necessary and inevitably value oriented. Without a *worldview the historian cannot interpret the past, but a worldview makes objectivity impossible.
A worldview is not generated from the facts. Facts do not speak for themselves. The facts gain meaning only within the overall context of the worldview. Without the structure of the worldview framework, the “stuff’ of history has no meaning. *Augustine, for example, viewed history as a great theodicy, but G. W. F. *Hegel saw it as an unfolding of the divine. It is not an archaeological or factual find but simply the religious or philosophical presuppositions that prompted each person to develop a view. Eastern philosophies of history are even more diverse; they involve a cyclical rather than a linear pattern.
Once one admits the relativity or perspectivity of one worldview instead of another, the historical relativists insist that all rights to claim objectivity have been waived. If there are different ways to interpret the same facts, depending on the overall perspective, then there is no single objective interpretation of history.
Miracles are suprahistorical. Even if one grants that secular history could be known objectively, there still remains the problem of the subjectivity of religious history. Some writers make a strong distinction between Historie and Geschichte (Kahler, 63; see Kahler, Martin). The former is empirical and objectively knowable to some degree; the latter is spiritual and unknowable in a historical or objective way. But as spiritual or suprahistorical, there is no objective way to verify it. Spiritual history has no necessary connection with the spatiotemporal continuum of empirical events.
It is a “myth” (see Miracles, Arguments Against; Miracles, Myth and; Mythology and the New Testament). It offers subjective religious significance to the believer but lacks objective grounding. Like the story of George Washington and the cherry tree, Geschichte is a story made up of events that probably never happened but that inspire people to some moral or religious good.
If this distinction is applied to the New Testament, then even granted that the life and central teachings of Jesus of Nazareth can be objectively established, there is no historical way to confirm the miraculous dimension of the New Testament (see Miracles in the Bible). Miracles do not happen as part of Historie and therefore are not subject to objective analysis; they are Geschichte events and as such cannot be analyzed by historical methodology. Many contemporary theologians have accepted this distinction. Paul Tillich claimed that it is “a disastrous distortion of the meaning of faith to identify it with the belief in the historical validity of the Biblical stories” (Tillich, 87).
Rather, with Soren *Kierkegaard, Tillich believed the important thing is that it evoke an appropriate religious response. With this Rudolf *Bultmann and Shubert Ogden would concur, as would much of contemporary theological thought.
Even those, such as Karl Jaspers, who oppose Bultmann’s more radical demythologization view accept the distinction between spiritual and empirical dimensions of miracles (Jaspers, 16-17). On the more conservative end of those maintaining this distinction is Ian Ramsey. According to Ramsey, “It is not enough to think of the facts of the Bible as ‘brute historical facts’ to which the Evangelists give distinctive ‘interpretation.’” “No attempt to make the language of the Bible conformto a precise straight-forward public language—whether that language be scientific or historical—has ever succeeded.” The Bible is about situations that existentialists call “authentic” or “existential-historical” (Ramsey, 118, 119, 122). There is always something “more” than the empirical in every religious or miraculous situation.
Miracles are historically unknowable. On the basis of Ernst *Troeltsch’s principle of analogy, some historians have come to object to the possibility of ever establishing a miracle based on testimony about the past. As discussed more fully in Miracles, Arguments Against, Troeltsch stated the problem this way: “On the analogy of the events known to us we seek by conjecture and sympathetic understanding to explain and reconstruct the past. . . . Since we discern the same process of phenomena in operation in the past as in the present, and see, there as here, the various historical cycles of human life influencing and intersecting one another.”
Without uniformity we could know nothing about the past, for without an analogy from the present we could know nothing about the past. In accord with this principle, some have argued that “no amount of testimony is ever permitted to establish as past reality a thing that cannot be found in present reality” (Becker, “Detachment,” 12-13). Unless one can identify miracles in the present, there is no analogy on which to base understanding of alleged miracles in the past. The historian, like the scientist, must adopt a methodological skepticism toward alleged events for which there are no contemporary parallels. The present is the foundation of our knowledge of the past. As F. H. Bradley put it, “We have seen that history rests in the last resort upon an inference from our experience, a judgment based upon our own present state of things . . . ; when we are asked to affirm the existence in past time of events, the effects of causes which confessedly are without analogy in the world in which we live, and which we know, we are at a loss for any answer but this, that... we are asked to build a house without a foundation. . . . And how can we attempt this without contradicting ourselves?” (Bradley, 100).
A Response to Historical Relativism. Despite these strong objections to the possibility of historical objectivity, the case is by no means closed. There are flaws in the historical relativists’ position. The responses given are in the order of the above objections.
The Problem of Indirect Access. If by objective one means absolute knowledge, then no human historian can be objective. On the other hand, if objective means “a fair but revisable presentation that reasonable men and women should accept,” then the door is open to the possibility of objectivity. In this latter sense, history is as objective as some sciences (Block, 50). Paleontology (historical geology) is considered one of the most objective of all sciences. It deals with physical facts and processes of the past. However, the events represented by fossil finds are no more directly accessible to the scientists or repeatable than are historical events to the historian. There are some differences. The fossil is a mechanically true imprint of the original event, and the eyewitness of history may be less precise. But natural processes also can mar the fossil imprint. At least if one can determine the integrity and reliability of the eyewitness, one cannot slam the door on the possibility of objectivity in history any more than on objectivity in geology.
The scientist might contend that he can repeat the processes of the past by experimentation, whereas the historian cannot. But even here the situations are similar. In this sense, history too can be “repeated.” Similar patterns of events, by which comparisons can be made, recur today as they occurred in the past. Limited social experiments can be performed to see if human history “repeats.” The historian, no less than the scientist, has the tools for determining what really happened in the past. The lack of direct access to the original facts or events does not hinder the one more than the other (see Origins, Science of).
Likewise, scientific facts do not “speak for themselves” any more than do historical facts. Iffact means “original event,” then neither geology nor history is in possession of any facts. Fact must be taken by both to mean information about the original event, and in this latter sense, facts do not exist merely subjectively in the mind of the historian. What one does with data, what meaning or interpretation is given to them, can in no way eliminate the data. There remains for both science and history a hard core of objective facts. The door is thereby left open for objectivity. One may draw a valid distinction between propaganda and history. Propaganda lacks sufficient basis in objective fact but history does not. Without objective facts no protest can be raised either against poor history or propaganda. If history is entirely in the mind of the beholder, there is no reason one cannot decide to behold it any way he desires.
This brings us to the crucial question as to whether “facts speak for themselves” because they are objective. An argument might be advanced that, yes, they do. It is self-defeating to affirm that facts are without meaning, since the affirmation about the allegedly meaningless fact is a meaningful statement about fact. All facts are meaningful; there are no so-called bare facts. But this argument does not really prove that facts speak for themselves. It does show that facts can and do bear meaning. But what it must prove (and fails to prove) is that facts bear only one meaning and that they bear it evidently. The fact that no meaningful statement about facts can be made without attributing some meaning to the facts does not prove that the meaning emanated from the facts. It is possible that the meaning was assigned to the facts by the one making the meaningful statement about them Indeed, only “mean-ers” (i.e., minds) can emanate meaning.
It is not at all clear in what sense an objective fact can mean anything in and of itself. It is a subject (e.g., a mind) that utters meaning about objects (or about other subjects), but objects as such are not subjects that are emitting meaning. This is so unless we assume that all objective facts are really little minds transmitting meaning or transmitters through which some other minds or a Mind is communicating. But to assume this would be to invoke one particular worldview over another in order to prove that “facts speak for themselves.” And even then it could be argued that the facts are not speaking for themselves but for the Mind (God) who is speaking through them
It seems best to conclude, then, that objective facts do not speak for themselves. Finite minds may give differing interpretations of them or an infinite Mind may give an absolute interpretation of them, but there is no one objective interpretation a finite mind can give to them Of course, if there is an absolute Mind from whose vantage point the facts are given absolute or ultimate meaning, then there is an objective interpretation of the facts that all finite minds should concur is the ultimate meaning. If this is the correct worldview (see God, Evidence for; Theism), then there is an object meaning to all facts in the world. All facts are theistic facts, and no nontheistic way of interpreting them is objective or true. Hence, objectivity in history is possible, since in a theistic world history would be His-story. Objectivity, then, is possible within a worldview.
The Fragmentary Nature of Historical Accounts. The fact that the fossil record is fragmentary does not destroy the objectivity of paleontology. The fossil remains represent only a very tiny percentage of the living beings of the past. This does not hinder scientists from attempting to reconstruct an objective picture of what really happened in geological history. Likewise, human history is transmitted through partial records. Not every bone is necessary to make some qualified judgments about the whole animal. The reconstruction of both science and history is subject to revision. Subsequent finds may provide new facts that call for new interpretations. But at least there is an objective basis in fact for the meaning attributed to the find. Interpretations can neither create the facts nor ignore them, if they would approach objectivity. We may conclude, then, that history need be no less objective than geology simply because it depends on fragmentary accounts. Scientific knowledge is also partial and depends on assumptions and an overall framework that may prove to be inadequate upon the discovery of more facts (see Science and the Bible).
Whatever difficulty there may be, from a strictly scientific point of view, in filling in gaps between the facts, once one has assumed a philosophical stance toward the world, the problem of objectivity in general is resolved. If there is a God, then the overall picture is already drawn; the facts of history will merely fill in the details of its meaning. If the universe is theistic, the artist’s sketch is already known in advance (see Theism); the detail and coloring will come only as all the facts of history are fit into the overall sketch known to be true from the theistic framework. In this sense, historical objectivity is most certainly possible within a given framework such as a theistic worldview. Objectivity resides in the view that best fits the facts consistently into an overall theistic system that is supported by good evidence (see God, Evidence for).
Historical Conditioning. It is true that every historian is time bound. Each person occupies a relative place in the changing events of the spatiotemporal world. However, it does not follow that because the historian is a product of a time that the person’s historical research is also a product of the time. Simply because a person cannot avoid a relative place in history does not preclude objectivity. The criticism confuses the content of knowledge and the process of attaining it (Mandelbaum, 94). Where one derives a hypothesis is not essentially related to how its truth is established.
Further, if relativity is unavoidable, the position of the historical relativists is self-refuting. For either their view is historically conditioned, and therefore unobjective, or else it is not relative but objective. If the latter, it thereby admits that it is possible to be objective in viewing history. On the contrary, if the position of historical relativism is itself relative, then it cannot be taken as objectively true. It is simply subjective opinionthat has no basis to claim to be objectively true about all of history. If it is subjective, it cannot eliminate the possibility that history is objectively knowable, and if it is an objective fact about history, then objective facts can be known about history. In the first case, objectivity is not eliminated, and in the second, relativity is self-defeated. In either case, objectivity is possible.
The constant rewriting of history is based on the assumption that objectivity is possible. Why strive for accuracy unless it is believed that the revision is more objectively true than the previous view? Why critically analyze unless improvement toward a more accurate view is the assumed goal? Perfect objectivity may be practically unattainable within the limited resources of the historian. But the inability to attain 100 percent objectivity is a long way from total relativity. Reaching a degree of objectivity that is subject to criticism and revision is a more realistic conclusion than the relativist’s arguments. In short, there is no reason to eliminate the possibility of a sufficient degree of historical objectivity.
The Selectivity of Materials. The fact that the historian must select from among all possible materials does not automatically make history purely subjective. Jurors make judgments “beyond reasonable doubt” without having all the evidence. Availability of the relevant and crucial evidence is sufficient to attain objectivity. One need not know everything in order to know something. No scientist knows all the facts, and yet objectivity is claimed. As long as no important fact is overlooked, there is no reason to eliminate the possibility of objectivity in history, any more than in science.
The selection of facts can be objective to the degree that the facts are selected and reconstructed in the context in which the events represented actually occurred. Since it is impossible for any historian to pack into an account everything available on a subject, it is important to select the points representative of the period (Collingwood, 100). Condensation does not necessarily imply distortion. Further, the evidence for the historicity of the New Testament from which Christian apologetics draws is greater than for the truth of any other document from the ancient world (see New
Testament, Historicity of; New Testament Manuscripts). If the events behind it cannot be known objectively, it is impossible to know anything from that time period.
There remains, however, the question of whether the real context and connections of past events are known or are knowable. Unless there is an accepted framework or structure for the facts, there is no way to reconstruct in miniature what really happened. The objective meaning of historical events is dependent on knowing the connection that the events really had when they occurred. But the events are subject to various combinations, depending on the structure given to them by the historian, the relative importance placed on them, and whether prior events are considered causal or merely antecedent. There is really no way to know the original connections without assuming an overall hypothesis or worldview by which the events are interpreted. Of course, objectivity of bare facts and mere sequence of antecedent and consequent facts are knowable without assuming a *worldview. But objectivity of the meaning of these events is not possible apart from a meaningful structure, such as that provided by an overall hypothesis or worldview. Hence, the problem of finding objective meaning in history, like the problem of objective meaning in science, is dependent on one’s Weltanschauung. Objective meaning is system-dependent. Only within a given system can the objective meaning of events be understood. Once that system is known, it is possible by fair and representative selection to reconstruct an objective picture of the past. Thus, within an established theistic structure objectivity is possible.
Structuring the Material of History. All the historian could possibly know about past events without assuming the truth of one interpretive framework over another is the sheer facticity and sequence of the events. When the historian moves beyond bare facts and mere order of events and begins to speak of causal connections and relative importance, an interpretive framework is needed through which to understand the facts. Whether the facts are determined to have originally had the assumed causal connection and the attributed importance will depend on whether the given worldview is correct. To affirm that facts have “internal arrangement” begs the question. The real question is, How does one know the correct arrangement? Since the facts can be arranged in one of at least three ways (chaotic, cyclical, and linear), it begs the question merely to assume that one of these is the way the facts were really arranged. The same set of dots can have the lines drawn in many ways. The fact is that the lines are not known to be there apart from an interpretive framework through which one views them Therefore, the problem of the objective meaning of history cannot be resolved apart from appeal to a worldview. Once the skeletal sketch is known, then one can know the objective placing (meaning) of the facts. However, apart from a structure the mere “stuff’ means nothing.
Apart from an overall structure, there is no way to know which events in history are the most significant, and, hence, there is no way to know the true significance of these and other events in their overall context. The argument that importance is determined by which events influence the most people is inadequate. It is a form of historical utilitarianism subject to the same criticisms as any utilitarian test for truth. The most does not determine the best; great influence does not mean great importance or value. Even after most people have been influenced, one can still question the truth or value of the event that influenced them Of course, if one assumes as a framework that the most significant events are those that influence the most people in the long run, then utilitarian ideals will be determinative. But what right does one have to assume a utilitarian framework any more than a nonutilitarian one? Here again, it is a matter of justifying one’s overall framework or worldview.
The argument advanced by some objectivists is that past events must be structured or else they are unknowable and faulty. All this argument proves is that it is necessary to understand facts through some structure, otherwise it makes no sense to speak of facts. The question of which structure is correct must be determined on some basis other than the mere facts themselves. If there were an objectivity of bare facts, it would provide only the mere “what” of history. But objective meaning deals with the why of these events; this is impossible apart from a meaning-structure in which facts may find their placement of significance. Objective meaning apart from a worldview is impossible.
However, granted that there is justification for adopting a theistic worldview, the objective meaning of history becomes possible (see God, Evidence for; Theism). Within the theistic context, each fact of history becomes a theistic fact. Granted the factual order of events and known causal connectionof events, objective meaning becomes possible. The chaotic and the cyclical frameworks are eliminated in favor of the linear. And within the linear view of events, causal connections emerge as the result of their context in a theistic universe. Theism provides the sketch from which history paints the complete picture. The pigments of mere fact take on real meaning as they are blended on the theistic sketch. Objectivity means systematic consistency. That is, the most meaningful way all the facts of history blend into the whole theistic sketch is what really happened. In this way, theism can provide an objective framework for historical facts.
Selecting and Arranging Materials. The historian can rearrange data about the past without distorting it (Nagel, 208). Since the original construction of events is available to neither the historian nor the geologist, the past must be reconstructed from available evidence. But reconstruction does not require revision. The historian must arrange the material. The important thing is whether it is arranged or rearranged in accordance with the events as they really occurred. As long as the historian consistently incorporates all the significant events in accordance with an overall established worldview, objectivity is secure. Objectivity arranges facts in accordance with the way things really were. Distortion comes when facts are neglected and twisted.
The historian may desire to be selective in the compass of study, to study only the political, economic, or religious dimensions of a specific period. But such specialization does not demand total subjectivity. One can focus without losing the overall context. It is one thing to focus on specifics within an overall field but quite another to ignore or distort the overall context in which the intensified interest is occurring. As long as the specialist stays in touch with reality rather than reflecting pure subjectivity, a measurable degree of objectivity can be maintained.
Value Judgments. One may grant the point that ordinary language is value laden and that value judgments are inevitable. This by no means makes historical objectivity impossible (Butterfield, 244). Objectivity means fair dealing with the facts, to present what happened as correctly as possible. Further, objectivity means that when one interprets why these events occurred, the language of the historian should ascribe to these events the value they had in their original context. Granting within an established worldview that certain things have a given value, then an objective account of history must reconstruct and restructure these events with the same relative value. So objectivity demands making value judgments rather than avoiding them The question is not whether value language can be objective but which value statements objectively portray the events. Once the worldview has been determined, value judgments are not undesirable or merely subjective; they are essential. If this is a theistic world, then it would not be objective to place anything but a theistic value on the facts of history.
The Needfor an Overall Worldview. Those who argue against the objectivity of history apart from an overall worldview must be granted the point. Meaning is system-dependent. Without a worldview it makes no sense to talk about objective meaning (Popper, 150ff.). Without a context meaning cannot be determined, and the context is provided by the worldview and not by the bare facts.
But granted that this is a theistic universe, it follows that objectivity is possible. In a theistic universe, each fact has objective meaning; each fact is a God-fact. All events fit into the overall context of an ultimate purpose. One can determine the facts and assign them meaning in the overall context of the theistic universe by showing that they fit most consistently with a given interpretation. Then one may lay claim to having arrived at the objective truth about history.
For example, given that this is a theistic universe and that the corpse of Jesus of Nazareth returned from the grave, then the Christian can argue that this unusual event is a miracle that confirms the associated truth claims of Jesus to be the Christ. Apart from this theistic framework, it is not even meaningful to make such a claim Overarching hypotheses are necessary to determine the meaning of events, and a theistic hypothesis is essential to claim that any historical event is a miracle.
The Historical Unknow ability of Miracles. Upon examination, Ernst *Troeltsch’s principle of analogy turns out to be similar to David *Hume’s objection to miracles built on the uniformity of nature. No testimony about alleged miracles should be accepted if it contradicts the uniform testimony of nature. Troeltsch also rejects any particular past event for which there is no analog in the uniform experience of the present. There are at least two reasons for denying Troeltsch’s argument from analogy. First, it begs the question in favor of a naturalistic interpretation of all historical events. It is a methodological exclusion of the possibility of accepting the miraculous in history. The testimony for regularity in general is in no way a testimony against an unusual event in particular. The cases are different and should not be evaluated in the same way. Empirical generalizations (“People do not rise from the dead in normal circumstance”) should not be used as counter-testimony to worthy eyewitness accounts that in a particular case someone did rise from the dead. The evidence for any particular historical event must be assessed on its own merits, aside from generalizations about other events.
The second objection to the Troeltsch analogy type argument is that it proves too much. As Richard *Whately convincingly argued, on this uniformitarian assumption not only miracles would be excluded, but so would any unusual event of the past. One would have to deny that the career of Napoleon Bonaparte occurred. No one can deny that the probability against Napoleon’s successes was great. His prodigious army was destroyed in Russia; yet in a few months he led another great army in Germany, which likewise was ruined at Leipzig. However, the French supplied him with yet another army sufficient to make a formidable stand in France. This was repeated five times until at last he was confined to an island. There is no doubt that the particular events of his career were highly improbable. But there is no reason on these grounds that we should doubt the historicity of the Napoleonic adventures. History, contrary to scientific hypothesis, does not depend on the universal and repeatable. Rather, it stands on the sufficiency of good testimony for particular and unrepeatable events. Were this not so, then nothing could be learned from history.
It is clearly a mistake to import uniformitarian methods from scientific experimentation into historical research. Repeatability and generality are needed to establish a scientific law or general patterns (of which miracles would be particular exceptions). But this method does not work at all in history. What is needed to establish historical events is credible testimony that these particular events did indeed occur (see Witnesses, Hume’s Criteria for). So it is with miracles. It is an unjustifiable mistake in historical methodology to assume that no unusual and particular event can be believed, no matter how great the evidence for it. Troeltsch’s principle of analogy would destroy genuine historical thinking. The honest historian must be open to the possibility of unique and particular events, regardless of whether they may be described as miraculous. One must not exclude a priori the possibility of establishing events like the resurrection of Christ without examining the evidence. It is a mistake to assume that the same principles by which empirical science works can be used in forensic science. Since the latter deals with unrepeated and unobserved events in the past, it operates on the principles of origin science, not on those of operation science. And these principles do not eliminate, but establish, the possibility of objective knowledge of the past—whether in science or in history (see Origins, Science of).
The Superhistorical Nature of Miracles. A miracle is supernatural. Surely the Christian apologist does not contend that miracles are mere products of the natural process. Something is miraculous when the natural process does not account for it. There must be an injection from the realm of the supernatural into the natural, or else there is no miracle (see Miracle). This is specially true of a New Testament miracle, in which the processes by which God performed acts are unknown. This is also true to some degree of a second-class miracle, where we can describe how the miracle occurred by scientific means but not why it occurred when it did. In either case, it seems best to admit that the miraculous dimensions of a historical event are in, but not of, the natural process.
Miracles do occur within history. In accordance with the objectivity of history, there is no good reason why the Christian should yield to the radical existential theologians on the question of the objective and historical dimensions of miracles. Miracles may not be of the natural historical process, but they do occur inside it. Even Karl *Barth made this distinction when he wrote, “The resurrection of Christ, or his second coming... is not a historical event; the historians may reassure themselves . . . that our concern here is with the event which, though it is the only real happening in is not a real happening 0/history” (Barth, 90, emphasis added).
Unlike many existential theologians, we must also preserve the historical context in which a miracle occurs, for without it there is no way to verify the objectivity of the miraculous. Miracles do have a historical dimension without which no objectivity of religious history is possible. And as was argued above, historical methodology can identify this objectivity just as surely as scientific objectivity can be established, within the accepted framework of a theistic world. In short, miracles may be more than historical, but they cannot be less than historical. It is only if miracles do have historical dimensions that they are both objectively meaningful and apologetically valuable.
A miracle is significant in a theistic context. A miracle can be identified within an empirical or historical context both directly and indirectly, both objectively and subjectively. Such an event is both scientifically unusual and theologically and morally relevant. The scientific dimensions can be understood in a directly empirical way; the moral dimension is knowable only indirectly through the empirical. It is both “odd” and “evocative” of something more than its empirical data. A *virgin birth is scientifically odd, but in the case of Jesus, it is represented as a “sign” to draw attention to him as something “more” than human. The theological and moral characteristics of a miracle are not empirically objective. In this sense, they are experienced subjectively. This does not mean, however, that there is no objective basis for the moral dimensions of a miracle. If this is a theistic universe (see Theism), then morality is objectively grounded in God. Hence, the nature and will of God are the objective grounds by which one can test whether the event is subjectively evocative of what is objectively in accord with the nature and will of God. The same thing applies to the truth dimensions of a miracle. They are subjectively evocative of a response to an associated truth claim. However, the truth claim must be in accord with what is already known of God. If its message does not correspond with what we know to be true of God, we should not believe the event is a miracle. It is axiomatic that acts by a theistic God would not be used to confirm what is not the truth of God.
So miracles happen in history but are not completely of history. They are nonetheless historically grounded. They are more than historical but not less than historical. There are both empirical and superempirical dimensions to supernatural events. The empirical dimensions are knowable objectively, and the latter make a subjective appeal to the believer. But even here there is objective ground in the known truth and goodness of God by which the believer can judge whether the empirically odd are really acts of the true and good God.
The Complete Relativity of History. In addition to the invalidity of the arguments of historical relativism, there are some strong arguments against their conclusions in general. Two of these arguments are sufficient to demonstrate why the possibility of objectivity in history has not—and cannot—be systematically eliminated.
Objective Knowledge by Facts and Worldview. A careful look at the arguments of the relativists reveals that they presuppose some objective knowledge about history. This is seen in at least two ways. First, they speak of the need to select and arrange the “facts” of history. But if they are really facts, they present some objective knowledge in themselves. It is one thing to argue about the interpretation of the facts but quite another to deny that there are any facts to interpret. It is understandable that one’s worldview framework colors understanding of the fact that Christ died on a cross in the early first century. But it is quite another to deny that this is a historical fact (see Christ, Death of).
Second, if relativists believe one’s worldview can distort how one views history, then there must be a correct interpretation. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to say that some views are distorted.
Total Historical Relativity Is Self-defeating. In fact, total relativity (whether historical, philosophical, or moral) is self-defeating (see First Principles). How could one know that history is completely unknowable unless something is known about it? It requires objective knowledge to know that all historical knowledge is subjective. Total relativists must stand on the pinnacle of their own absolute in order to relativize everything else. The claim that all history is subjective turns out to be an objective claim about history. Thus, total historical relativism cuts its own throat.
Of course, some might claim that historical knowledge is not totally relative but only partially so. Then history, at least some history, is objectively knowable, and Christian claims are at least possibly knowable. The historical claims for the central truths of Christianity are more amply supported by the evidence than are claims of facticity for almost any other event in the ancient world. Therefore, this is also an admission that partial relativity does not eliminate the historical verifiability of Christianity. In brief, total historical relativism is self-defeating, and partial historical relativism admits that historical arguments are justified in defending Christian faith.
The Objectivity of Historiography. Several general conclusions may be drawn from the subjectivity-objectivity debate. Foremost is that absolute objectivity is possible only for an infinite Mind. Finite minds must be content with systematic consistency. Humans can only devise revisable attempts to reconstruct the past based on an established framework of reference that comprehensively and consistently incorporates the facts into an overall sketch. At this level of objectivity, the historian can be as accurate as the scientist. Neither geologists nor historians have direct access to, nor complete data on, repeatable events. Both must use value judgments to select and structure the partial material available.
In reality, neither the scientist nor the historian can attain objective meaning without a worldview by which to understand the facts. Bare facts cannot even be known apart from some interpretive framework. Hence, the need for structure or a meaning-framework is crucial to the question of objectivity. Unless one can settle the question as to whether this is a theistic or nontheistic world on grounds independent of the mere facts themselves, there is no way to determine the objective meaning of history. If, on the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that this is a theistic universe, then objectivity in history is a possibility. For once the overall viewpoint is established, it is simply a
matter of finding the view of history most consistent with that overall system Systematic consistency is the test for objectivity in historical, as well as in scientific, matters.
Summary. Christianity makes claims about historical events, including claims that God supernaturally intervened in it. Some historians complain, however, that there is no objective way to determine the past. And even if there were an objective basis, miracles do not fit it. The historian has fragmentary, secondhand material from which to select. These fragments cannot be objectively understood, because the historian inevitably imposes an interpretive value structure and worldview. Miracle-history is particularly unreliable, since it is neither empirical nor observable. As superhistory or myth, it is useful to evoke a subjective religious response but not to reliably describe the past.
These objections, however, fail. History can be as objective as science. The geologist also views secondhand, fragmentary, and unrepeatable evidence from a personal vantage point. Although interpretive frameworks are necessary, not every worldview must be relative and subjective.
As to the objection that miracle-history is not objectively verifiable, miracles can occur in the historical process, like any other event. The only difference is that the miracle cannot be explained by the flow of events. Christian miracles claim to be more than empirical, but they are not less than historical. Historically, miracles can be verified. Moral and theological dimensions of miracles are not totally subjective. They call for a subjective response, but there are objective standards of truth and goodness (in accordance with the theistic God) by which they can be assessed.
The door for the objectivity of history and thus the objective historicity for miracles is open. No mere question-begging, uniformitarian principle of analogy can lock it a priori. Evidence that supports the general nature of scientific law cannot rule out good historical evidence for unusual but particular events of history. Anti-miracle arguments are not only invincibly naturalistic in bias but if applied consistently also rule out known and accepted secular history (see Miracles, Arguments Against). The only truly honest approach is to examine carefully the evidence for an alleged miracle to determine its authenticity.
Sources
K. Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man.
C. Beard, “That Noble Dream.”
C. Becker, “Detachment and the Writing of History.”
--, “What Are Historical Facts?”
M. Bloch, The Historian’s Craft.
F. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History.
H. Butterfield, “Moral Judgments in History.”
E. H. Carr, What Is History?
R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History.
W. L. Craig, “The Nature of History.”
W. H. Dray, ed., Philosophy of History.
P. Gardiner, ed., Theories of History.
N. L. Geisler, ‘Historiography.”
G. Habermas, “Philosophy of History, Historical Relativism, and History as Evidence.”
K. Jaspers andR. Bultmann,Myth and Christianity.
M. Kahler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ.
M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge.
J. W. Montgomery, The Shape of the Past.
E. Nagel, 'The Logic of Historical Analysis.”
H. Pirenne, "What Are Historians Trying to Do?”
H. Plutarch, 'The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans.”
K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism.
I. T. Ramsey, Religions Language.
P. Tillich. Dynamics of Faith.
E. Troeltsch, "Historiography.”
W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History.
R. Whately, Historical Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bonaparte.
Hittites, Problem of. Genesis asserts that Heth was progenitor of the Hittites, whose kingdom arose in what is now Turkey. However, according to some archaeological evidence, the Hittites did not become a prominent force in the Middle East until the reign of Mursilis I, about 1620 BC. It was Mursilis who captured Babylon in 1600 BC.
However, several times in Genesis 23, reference is made to Abraham’s encounter with the sons of Heth, who controlled Hebron in about 2050 BC. How could the Hittites have controlled Hebron so long before they became a significant force in the area?
Cuneiform tablets have been found describing conflicts in Anatolia (Turkey) among Hittite principalities from about 1950 to 1850 BC. Even before this conflict there was a race of non-Indo-Europeans called Haitians. These people were subdued by invaders about 2300 to 2000 BC. The Indo-European invaders adopted the name Haiti. In Semitic languages such as Hebrew, Haiti and Hitti would be written with the same letters. Only consonants were written, not vowels.
In the days of Ramses II in Egypt, the military strength of the Hittites was sufficient to precipitate a nonaggression pact between Egypt and the Hittite empire, setting a boundary between them At this time the Hittite empire reached as far south as Kadeshonthe Orontes River (modern Asi). However, additional evidence indicates that the Hittites actually penetrated farther south into Syria and Palestine.
Although the Hittite kingdom did not reach its zenith until the second half of the fourteenth century, there is sufficient evidence to substantiate a Hittite presence, significant enough for control, in Hebron at the time of Abraham
Sources
G. L. Archer Jr., Encyclopedia of Biblical Difficulties.
R. H. Beal, "History of Kizzuwatna.”
T. Bryce, Life and Society in the Hittite World.
N. L. Geisler and T. Howe, When Critics Ask.
O. R. Gurney, The Hittites.
E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws.
Holy Spirit, Role in Apologetics. Most Christian apologists agree that the Holy Spirit witnesses to the individual with regard to his or her personal salvation. Romans 8:16 asserts, “The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God’s children” (1 John 3:24; 4:13). Many also believe that the Holy Spirit bears witness to the truth of Christianity. One text supporting this is 1 John 5:6-10: “This is the one who came by water and blood—Jesus Christ. . . . And it is the Spirit who testifies, because the Spirit is the truth . . . We accept man’s testimony, but God’s testimony is greater because it is the testimony of God, which he has given about his Son. . . . Anyone who does not believe God has made him out to be a liar, because he has not believed the testimony God has given about his Son.”
Some have charged that the use of reason relating to God, as apologetic arguments do (see Apologetics, Need for), is inconsistent with the biblical emphasis on the necessity of the Holy Spirit to convince someone of the truth of Christianity. But the Christian position is that there is no contradiction between reason and evidence on the one hand and the work of the Holy Spirit on the other.
Thomas Aquinas. The question of the relation between the Holy Spirit and the use of human reason is really a subdivision of the broader topic of *faith and reason. *Thomas Aquinas (1224-74) spoke extensively about both. He spoke of rational proofs for the existence of God and offered historical and experiential evidence in support of the truth of Christianity. Aquinas also believed that no one ever comes to faith in Christ apart from a special, gracious work of the Holy Spirit.
Philosophy Applies Reason. Aquinas saw three uses for reason in philosophy. Human reason can be used to prove natural theology (the existence and nature of one God). Also, it can be used to illustrate supernatural theology (the Trinity and incarnation), and it can be used to refute false theologies.
It demonstrates God’s existence, oneness, and other propositions concerning God and creatures. “Such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason” (Summa Theologica, la. 3, 2). Philosophy uses teachings of the philosophers to explain Christian doctrines such as the Trinity. Even though demonstrative arguments are unavailable for supernatural theology, there are certain probable arguments that can make divine truth known. And philosophy can be used to oppose attacks against faith by showing they are false or unnecessary.
Human Reason Can Support Faith. On the use of “reason” (apologia) in 1 Peter 3:15, Aquinas argued that human reasoning in support of what we believe stands in a twofold relation to the will of the believer [see Faith and Reason], Sometimes someone does not have the will to believe unless moved by human reason. In this sense, reasoning diminishes the merit that would come with faith, since the person “ought to believe matters of faith, not because of human reasoning, but because of the divine authority.” Also, “human reason may be consequent to the will of the believer.” For “when a man has a will ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way, human reasoning does not exclude the merit of faith, but is a sign of greater merit” (ibid., 2a2ae.2, 10).
Faith is supported by, not based on, probable evidence. “Those who place their faith in this truth, however, ‘for which the human reason offers no experimental evidence,’ do not believe foolishly, as though ‘following artificial fables.’” Rather, “arguments confirm truths that exceed natural knowledge and manifest God’s works that surpass all nature” (Summa contra Gentiles, 1.6). The kind of positive evidence Aquinas used included the raising of the dead, the conversion of the world, and miracles {see Miracles, Apologetic Value of).
The negative evidence encompasses arguments against false religions, including their fleshly appeal to carnal pleasures, teachings that contradict their promises, fables and falsities, the lack of attesting prophets and miracles to witness to divine inspiration of their holy book (for example, the Qur’an), use of arms to spread the message, the testimony of wise men who refused to believe, and perversions of Scripture.
It may surprise some who know their differences to note how closely Aquinas’s reasons why the
Holy Spirit is needed parallel those of John Calvin. Calvin closely studied Aquinas and the medieval scholastics, though he owed the most to Augustine.
The Spirit Overcomes Effects of Sin. With the later Calvin, Aquinas believed that sin profoundly distorts the mind. This distortion makes reason unable to contemplate God and so find the faith that brings certitude. God wants his people to have confidence, so his Spirit delivers certain knowledge of him by way of faith (Summa Theologica, 2a2ae. 1, 5, ad 4).
The Spirit Reveals Supernatural Truth. For Aquinas, the sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture—an authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it. It is necessary “to receive by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason.” Without the revelation of the Holy Spirit, we would be in darkness about such mysteries of the faith as the Trinity, salvation, and other matters revealed only in the Bible.
The Spirit Is Necessary to Give Faith. Not only are many things known only by faith, but the faith by which they are known is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Reason may accompany faith, but it does not cause faith. “Faith is called a consent without inquiry in so far as the consent of faith, or assent, is not caused by an investigation of the understanding.” Faith is produced by God. Commenting on Ephesians 2:8-9, Aquinas contended that free will is inadequate for faith since the objects of faith are above reason. “That a man should believe, therefore, cannot occur from himself unless God gives it”
(Commentary on Ephesians, 96). Faith is a gift of God, and no one can believe without it.
Reasoning accompanies the assent of faith; it does not cause it (On Truth, 14. Al, ad 6). One does not cause the other, but faith and reason are parallel. “Faith involves will (freedom) and reason doesn’t coerce the will” (ibid.). A person is free to dissent, even in the face of convincing reasons to believe.
The Spirit Gives a Motive to Believe. In order to believe in God, one must have the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. For “one who believes does have a sufficient motive for believing, the authority of God’s teaching, confirmed by miracles, and the greater motive of the inner inspiration (instinctus) of God inviting him to believe” (Summa Theologica, 2a2ae.6, 1). As to voluntary assent in matters of faith, we can look to two types of causes. A cause that persuades from without is attested to by something like a miracle witnessed or a human appeal. This is sufficient if there is not a cause that persuades from within. “The assent of faith, which is its principal act, therefore, has as its cause God, moving us inwardly through grace.” The belief is a matter of the will that has been prepared by God through his grace to receive the knowledge that surpasses nature (ibid., 2a2ae.2,
9, ad 3).
The Spirit Makes Probable Evidence Certain. How we can be sure when the support of our faith rests on intermediary (fallible) testimonies? Aquinas responds that we believe prophets and apostles because their witness has been attested by miracles (Mark 16:20; see Miracles in the Bible). We believe other teachers only as they agree with the writings of the prophets and apostles (On Truth,
14.10, ad 11). The Bible alone, inspired by the Holy Spirit, gives certainty and infallible authority to faith (see Certainty/Certitude).
God Is the Basis for Faith. God alone, not reason, is the basis of faith. Reason can prove that God exists, but it cannot convince an unbeliever to believe in God (Summa Theologica, 2a2ae.2.2, ad 3). We may believe (assent without reservation) in something that is neither self-evident nor deduced from it (where the intellect is moved) by a movement of the will.
This does not mean that reason plays no prior role. “Faith does not involve a search by natural reason to prove what is believed. But it does involve a form of inquiry unto things by which a person is led to belief, e.g., whether they are spoken by God and confirmed by miracles” (ibid., 2a2ae.2.1, reply).
Demons, for example, are convinced by the evidence that God exists, but it “is not their wills which bring assent to what they are said to believe. Rather, they are forced by the evidence of signs which convince them that what the faithful believe is true.” However, “these signs do not cause the appearance of what is believed so that the demons could, on this account, be said to see those things which are believed” {On Truth, 14.9, ad 4).
John Calvin. John *Calvin (1509-64) held that human reason was adequate to understand the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and even the truth of Christianity. At the same time, he believed no one could come to certainty about these truths apart from the work of the Holy Spirit. Calvin did believe that many truths about God could be known, even apart from any special work of the Holy Spirit. These included a sense of deity, natural law, and evidence for the truth of the Bible.
The Innate Sense of Deity. Every human has a natural sense of God apart from the work of the Holy Spirit. Some sense of the person of God is built into the human mind and instincts. “There is no nation so barbarous, no race so brutish, as not to be imbued with the conviction that there is a God”
(Institutes, 1.3.1). This sense of deity is so naturally engraven on the human heart that even many unbelieving philosophers are forced to acknowledge it (ibid., 1.4.4).
God’s Existence and the Soul’s Immortality. Calvin spoke of “the invisible and incomprehensible essence of God” that has been made visible in creation. This proof extends to the soul’s immortality. “On each of his works his glory is engraven in characters so bright, so distinct, and so illustrious, that none, however dull and illiterate, can plead ignorance as their excuse” (ibid., 1.5.1-2). Regarding Romans 1:20-21, Calvin concludes that God has presented to the minds of all the means of knowing him, so that they must necessarily see what of themselves they seek not to know—namely, that there is some God” {Epistles of Paul to the Romans and Thessalonians, 31-32).
Natural Knowledge of Natural Law. The innate knowledge of God includes knowledge of his righteous law. Calvin held that since “the Gentiles have the righteousness of the law naturally engraven on their minds, we certainly cannot say that they are altogether blind as to the rule of life”
{Institutes, 1.2.22). This moral awareness is natural law and is enough so that no mortal has an excuse for not knowing God. By this natural law the judgment of conscience is able to distinguish between the just and the unjust. This knowledge includes a sense of justice implanted by nature in the heart. It includes a natural discrimination and judgment that distinguish justice and injustice, honesty and dishonesty. Calvin believed that such crimes as adultery, theft, and murder are known to be evil in every society, and honesty is esteemed (ibid., 48). It is evident that God has left proofs of himself for all in both creation and conscience.
Evidence for Inspiration of Scripture. Calvin repeatedly spoke of “proofs” of the Bible’s inspiration {see Bible, Evidence for). These include the unity of Scripture, its majesty, its prophecies, and its miraculous confirmation. Calvin wrote, “If we lookat [Scripture] with clear eyes and unbiased judgment, it will forthwith present itself with a divine majesty which will subdue our presumptuous opposition, and force us to do it homage” {Institutes, 1.7.4). The evidence compels even unbelievers to confess (at some level of consciousness) that the Scripture exhibits clear evidence that it was spoken by God (ibid.).
The use of human reason, though not absolute, did bring a sufficient conviction about both the existence of God and the truth of Scripture. Calvin said proofs of the inspiration of Scripture may not be so strong as to produce and rivet a full conviction in the mind, but they are “most appropriate helps” (ibid., 1.8.1).
Calvin speaks of “the credibility of Scripture sufficiently proved, in so far as natural reason admits.” He offers rational proofs from various areas, including the dignity, truth, simplicity, and efficacy of Scripture. To this he adds evidence from miracles, prophecy, church history, and even the martyrs (ibid.).
The Needfor the Holy Spirit. At the same time, Calvin believed that no one ever came to be convinced of the certainty of truths about God, Christ, and the Bible apart from the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. He saw no contradiction in what he said about the natural knowledge of God and Scripture.
The vitiating effects of depravity. Calvin believed human depravity obscures human ability to understand and respond to this natural revelation of God. He wrote, “Your idea of His [God’s] nature is not clear unless you acknowledge Him to be the origin and foundation of all goodness. Hence, would arise both confidence in him and a desire of cleaving to him, did not the depravity of the human mind lead it away from the proper course of investigation” (ibid., 1.11.2).
The testimony of the Spirit. Complete certainty comes only by the Spirit working through the objective evidence to confirm in one’s heart that the Bible is the Word of God. Calvin affirmed that “our faith in doctrine is not established until we have a perfect conviction that God is its author. Hence, the highest proof of Scripture is uniformly taken from the character of him whose word it is.” Hence, “our conviction of the truth of Scripture must be derived from a higher source than human conjecture, judgments, or reasons; namely, the secret testimony of the Spirit” (ibid., 1.7.1, cf. 1.8.1, 1.7.4; emphasis added). Using reason to defend Scripture is insufficient. “Although we may maintain the sacred Word of God against gainsayers, it does not follow that we shall forthwith implant the certainty which faith requires in their hearts” (ibid., 1.7.4).
Calvin insisted that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to reason. “For as God alone can properly bear witness to his own words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit.” He adds, “The same Spirit, therefore, who spoke by the mouth of the prophets, must penetrate our hearts, in order to convince us that they faithfully delivered the message with which they were divinely entrusted” (ibid., 1.7.4).
Let it therefore be held as fixed, that those who are inwardly taught by the Holy Spirit acquiesce implicitly in Scripture; that Scripture, carrying its own evidence along with it, deigns not to submit to proofs and arguments, but owes the full conviction with which we ought to receive it to the testimony of the Spirit. . . . Enlightened by Him, we no longer believe, either on our own judgment or that of others, that the Scriptures are from God; but, in a way superior to human judgment, feel perfectly assured . . . that it came to us, by the instrumentality of men, from the very mouth of God. (ibid., 1.7.5)
Calvin went on to say that the proof the Spirit gives transcends proofs and probabilities (see Certainty/Certitude). Its assurance does not ask for reasons; in such knowledge the mind rests more firmly and securely than in any reasoning. It is a “conviction which revelation from heaven alone can produce” (ibid.). Apart from this divine confirmation, all argument and support from the church are vain. “Till this better foundation has been laid, the authority of Scripture remains in suspense” (ibid., 1.8.1).
The Testimony of the Spirit and Evidence. It is important to remember, as R. C. Sproul points out, that “the testimonium is not placed over against reason as a form of mysticism or subjectivism. Rather, it goes beyond and transcends reason” (Sproul, “Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit,” 341). It is God working through the objective evidence, not apart from evidence, that provides the subjective certainty that the Bible is the Word of God. It is a combination of the objective and the subjective, not an exclusion of the objective evidence by a subjective experience. See the comments below on B. B. *Warfield.
Jonathan Edwards. Jonathan *Edwards (1703-58) provides further insight into the relation between apologetic evidence and the Holy Spirit. He too saw complementary relation between the two. Edwards saw eight functions in reason:
1. Reason must prove the existence of God, the Revealer.
2. Reason anticipates that there will be a revelation.
3. Reason can show that a “pretended” revelation is not from God.
4. Reason demonstrates the rationality of revelation.
5. Reason verifies a true revelation as genuine.
6. Reason argues for the dependability of revelation.
7. Reason anticipates that there will be mysteries in a genuine divine revelation, defends them, and refutes objections to their presence.
8. Reason comprehends what is illumined by revelation.
Reason Proves the Existence of God. Edwards outlines his own approach to God’s existence in Freedom of the Will (2.3). The first proof is a posteriori (from effects) that there is an eternal cause. From arguments, such a being is shown to be necessarily existent. The necessity of this existence shows his perfections a priori. *Cosmological and *teleological proofs unite in this approach.
Reason Can Give Certainty. It is impossible that nothing could cause something. And since something now exists, there must be an eternal and Necessary Being. Edwards’s firm conviction about this springs from the principle of causality, which he describes as a self-evident principle, a “dictate of common sense,” “the mind of mankind,” and “this grand principle of common sense” (ibid.). In Miscellanies, he declares that “’tis acknowledged by all to be self-evident that nothing can begin without a cause.” Thus, “When understood ’tis a truth that irresistibly will have place in the assent.” This being the case, “if we suppose a time wherein there was nothing, a body will not of its own accord begin to be,” for to hold that something can arise without a cause is “what the understanding abhors” (Miscellanies, no. 91).
So convinced was Edwards that something could not arise without a cause that, like Aquinas, he argued even an eternal world would need a cause. For “if we should suppose that the world is eternal, yet the beautiful, contrivance, and useful disposition of the world would not less strongly conclude for the being of an intelligent author.” He uses the example of a great work of literature.
Such a work, even if it had existed from eternity, would require more explanation than that ink had fallen on paper (ibid., no. 312).
We depend on metaphysics to show what that Necessary Being is like, to “demonstrate that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that He is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for Him to lie, or be unjust; and there is one God only and not hundreds or thousands” {Freedom of the Will, 4.13). Edwards was certain that reason demonstrates the divine attributes in their infinity (see God, Nature of).
Limited Reason Requires the Holy Spirit. In spite of the value placed on human reason, Edwards believed that significant limitations on human reason require the work of the Holy Spirit in the heart. Reason cannot make knowledge of God “real” to the unregenerate. It cannot yield a supernatural revelation that leads to salvation because of human depravity. If it does receive a revelation, it cannot determine the full divine content of that revelation.
It is clear to Edwards that, as valid as natural revelation is, there is an indispensable need for
supernatural revelation: “Were it not for divine revelation, I am persuaded, that there is not one doctrine of that which we call natural religion, which, notwithstanding all philosophy and learning, would not be for ever involved in darkness, doubts, endless disputes, and dreadful confusion ... In fact, the philosophers had the foundation of most of their truths, from the ancients, or from the Phoenicians, or what they picked up here and there of the relics of revelation” (Miscellanies, 1.1.19).
In spite of Edwards’s belief that natural reason could construct valid arguments for the existence of God, he denied that any non-Christian thinkers ever did this. “There never was a man known or heard of, who had an [right] idea of God, without being taught it” (ibid., 1.6.15).
The Spirit Breathes Life into Revelation. Christians can construct a valid natural religion where pagans fail because of the Holy Spirit’s light. This is why
the increase of learning and philosophy in the Christian world, is owing to revelation. The doctrines of revealed religion are the foundations of all useful and excellent knowledge. . . . The word of God leads barbarous nations into the way of using their understandings. It brings their minds into a way of reflecting and abstracting reasoning; and delivers from uncertainty in the first principles, such as, the being of God, the dependence of all things upon him. . . . Such principles as these are the basis of all true philosophy, as appears more and more as philosophy improves, (ibid.)
In view of this, it is unreasonable to suppose that philosophy itself could fill in the gap. Knowledge is easy, however, to those who understand by revelation.
It may seem inconsistent for Edwards to hold both that God may be proven by natural reason and that no unbelievers have really ever come to the true God in this manner. The reason, as Edwards explained it, is that reason can demonstrate a point that has been proposed by someone else far easier than it can come upon the point in the first place. Would we have known the works of creation are effects had we not been told they had a cause? The greatest minds might be led into error and contradiction were they to try to come up with a description of the cause simply by studying the effects (ibid., 1.6.16).
Edwards believed it possible for an unbeliever to construct valid proof for the existence of the true God, but the fact that none ever had done so showed him that the mind must have the illumination of the Spirit. Once the mind has knowledge of the true God from revelation, it is possible to construct a valid argument for his existence on the basis of premises drawn from nature and reason alone (see Revelation, General). So special revelation is not logically necessary to prove the existence of the true God, but it is in practice historically necessary.
Edwards asserts that, when we fully understand the difficulties involved in knowing the true God, we inevitably ascribe all true religion to divine instruction and all theological error to human invention (ibid., 1.6.22).
Subjective Illumination Is Necessary. All of his stress on rational and objective evidence notwithstanding, Edwards did not believe that either general or special revelation was sufficient to make depraved people open to truth. In addition to objective special revelation, there had to be a subjective divine illumination. Only the supernatural light could open the heart to receive God’s revelation. Without this divine illumination no one ever comes to accept God’s revelation, regardless of how strong the evidence for it is. A new heart is needed, not a new brain. This is done by the illumination of the Holy Spirit. This divine light does not give any new truth or new revelations. Rather, it provides a new heart, a new attitude of receptivity by which one is able to accept God’s truth.
B. B. Warfield. *Classical apologetics was carried on by Benjamin Breckinridge (B. B.)
*Warfield (1851-1921). He too saw a need for both human reason and the work of the Holy Spirit to convince people of the truth of Christianity.
The Needfor Rational Apologetics. Warfield defined apologetics as “the systematically organized vindication of Christianity in all its elements and details, against all opposition” {Works, 9:5). Or, more technically, “apologetics undertakes not the defense, not even the vindication, but the establishment, not, strictly speaking, of Christianity, but rather of that knowledge of God which Christianity professes to embody and seeks to make efficient in the world, and which it is the business of theology scientifically to explicate” (ibid., 3).
He divided apologetics functionally:
1. Apologetics demonstrates the being and nature of God.
2. Apologetics reveals the divine origin and authority of Christianity.
3. Apologetics shows the superiority of Christianity (ibid., 10).
The first function properly belongs to philosophical apologetics, which undertakes to establish the being of God as personal Spirit, Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things. To it belong problems of theism with the involved discussion of antitheistic theories.
Warfield believed apologetics a necessary prolegomena to theology. He wrote:
Apologetical Theology prepares the way for all theology by establishing its necessary presuppositions without which no theology is possible—the existence and essential nature of God, the religious nature of man which enables him to receive a revelation from God, the possibility of a revelation from God, the possibility of revelation and its actual realization in the Scriptures. (Works, 9.64)
Warfield held that apologetics has “a primary part” and “a conquering part” in the spreading of the Christian faith. Christianity is distinctive in its mission of reasoning its way to dominion. Other religions appeal to the sword or seek another way of propagating themselves. Christianity appeals to reason and so is “the apologetic religion” {Selected Shorter Writings, 2.99-100).
The Role of the Spirit. The indicia or demonstrations of the Bible’s divine character stand side by side with the Holy Spirit to convince people of the truth of the Bible. Warfield agreed with Calvin that they are not in themselves capable of bringing people to Christ or even convincing them of the complete divine authority of Scripture. Nonetheless, Warfield believed that the Holy Spirit always exercises his convincing power through the evidence.
On the relation of apologetics and the Bible, Warfield said, “It is easy, of course, to say that a Christian man must take his standpoint not above the Scriptures, but in the Scriptures. He very certainly must. But surely he must first have Scriptures, authenticated to him as such, before he can take his standpoint in them” (ibid., 2.98).
In this appeal to evidence, Warfield saw commonground with unbelievers. Facts are universally available, and all can be convinced of God’s existence and the truth of Scripture through them by the power of reasoning of a redeemed thinker. In his 1908 article on “Apologetics,” he said that, though faith is a gift, it is still a formal conviction of the mind. All forms of conviction must have evidence on which to rest. Reason investigates the nature and validity of this ground {Works, 9.15).
Reasoning saves no one, not because there is no proof for Christian faith but because the dead soul cannot respond to evidence. “The action of the Holy Spirit in giving faith is not apart from evidence, but along with evidence; and in the first instance consists in preparing the soul for the reception of the evidence.” Apologetics does not make men and women Christian, but apologetics supplies the systematically organized basis on which faith must rest (ibid.).
The relationship, then, between reason and evidence on the one side and the Holy Spirit on the
other is complementary. It is not either the Holy Spirit or evidence. It is the Holy Spirit working in and through evidence to convince people of the truth of Christianity. There is both an outer (objective) dimension and an inner (subjective) dimension to the process by which people come to know Christianity is true. These may be called the rational and the mystical, respectively. But the two are never separated as many Christian mystics and inner-light subjectivists tend to do (see Biblical and Theological Studies, chap. 16).
Summary. Obviously not all of the apologists surveyed above agreed on every point, but there is a general agreement in contrast with *fideism, *mysticism, and other forms of subjectivism
The Role of Reason. Human reason, apart from special revelation (see Revelation, General; Revelation, Special), can provide arguments in support of the existence of God, know many of God’s essential attributes (see God, Evidence for), offer evidence in support of Christian faith, defend Christianity against attacks, judge the truth of alleged revelations, and teach the content of a revelation from God.
There is general agreement on the limits of reason. It is marked by the effects of sin. It does not come to a proper knowledge of the true God apart from divine help. It cannot bring the highest certainty concerning truth about God. It cannot explain the mysteries of the incarnation and *Trinity. It supports faith in God, but it is not the basis for that faith. Alone it cannot move anyone to believe in God or provide saving knowledge.
The Role of the Spirit. Most classical apologists would agree that the Holy Spirit plays several needed apologetic roles. The Spirit empowered the origin of Scripture. He gives understanding of Scripture’s revealed truth and its implications to individuals. The Holy Spirit is necessary for full assurance of the truths of Christianity, and he alone prompts people to believe in God’s saving truth. The Holy Spirit works in and through evidence but not separate from it. As the Spirit of a rational God, he does not bypass the head on the way to the heart. The Spirit provides supernatural evidence (miracles) to confirm Christianity.
Sources
T. Aquinas, Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians.
--, On Truth.
--, Summa contra Gentiles.
--, Summa Theologica.
J. Calvin, Epistles of Paul to the Romans and Thessalonians.
--,Institutes of the Christian Religion.
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Humanism, Secular. Humanism focuses on the values and interests of human beings. There are Christian forms (see Lewis, C. S.) and non-Christian forms. Secular humanism is the dominant form of the latter. Its confession is that “man is the measure of all things.” Rather than being focused on human beings, its philosophy is based on human values.
Secular humanists comprise a diverse group. They include existentialists (see Sartre, Jean-Paul), Marxists (see Marx, Karl), pragmatists (see Dewey, John), egocentrists (see Rand, Ayn), and behaviorists. While all humanists believe in some form of evolution (see Evolution,
Biological; Evolution, Chemical), Julian *Huxley called his view “the religion of evolutionary humanism” Corliss Lamont could be called a “cultural humanist.” Differences notwithstanding, non-Christian humanists share a core of beliefs. These have been summarized in two “humanist manifestos” and represent a coalition of various secular humanist viewpoints.