Humanist Manifesto I. In 1933, a group of thirty-four American humanists enunciated the fundamental principles of their philosophy in Humanist Manifesto I. Signatories included Dewey, the father of American pragmatic education; Edwin A. Burtt, a philosopher of religion; and R. Lester Mondale, a Unitarian minister and brother of the later United States vice president Walter Mondale.
The Affirmations. In the preamble, the authors identify themselves as “religious humanists” and affirm that “to establish such a religion is a major necessity of the present” (Kurtz, Humanist Manifestos I and II). The manifesto consists of fifteen basic affirmations, the first six of which read:
“First: Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created.” These are nontheists (see Theism) who deny existence of a Creator to bring into existence or sustain the universe.
“Second: Humanism believes that man is a part of nature and that he has emerged as the result of a continuous process.” Naturalism and naturalistic evolution are affirmed. The supernatural is denied.
“Third: Holding an organic view of life, humanists find that the traditional dualism of mind and body must be rejected.” Humans have no soul or immaterial aspect to their nature. Neither are they immortal (see Immortality). No existence extends beyond death.
“Fourth: Humanism recognizes that man’s religious culture and civilization . . . are the product of a gradual development.” Further, “the individual born into a particular culture is largely molded to that culture.” This implies cultural evolutionand cultural relativity. Cultural evolution means society has gradually become more sophisticated and complex; cultural relativity means that individuals are shaped largely by their respective cultures.
“Fifth: Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantee of human values.” There are no God-given values to discover; therefore values are relative and subject to change (see Morality, Absolute Nature of).
“Sixth: We are convinced that the time has passed for theism, deism, modernism, and several varieties of ‘new thought. ’” Framers of the first manifesto were atheists (see Atheism) or agnostics (see Agnosticism) in the traditional senses of the terms. Even desupernaturalized beliefs are rejected (see Miracles, Arguments Against).
Humanist Manifesto II. In 1973, forty years after the framing of Humanist Manifesto /, proponents of secular humanism from several countries felt an updating was necessary. Humanist Manifesto II was signed by Isaac Asimov, A. J. *Ayer, Brand Blanshard, Joseph Fletcher, Antony *Flew, Jacques Monod, and B. F. Skinner.
In the preface, the authors deny that they “are setting forth a binding credo” but say that “for today it is our conviction.” They acknowledge their continuity with earlier humanists in affirming that God, prayer, salvation, and providence are part of “an unproved and outmoded faith.”
The Affirmations. The seventeen basic affirmations in Humanist Manifesto II appear under the headings “religion” (arts. 1-2), “ethics” (3-4), “the individual” (5-6), “democratic society” (7-11), and “world community” (12-17). Several import affirmations are singled out here:
“First: In the best sense, religion may inspire dedication to the highest ethical ideals. The cultivation of moral devotion and creative imagination is an expression of genuine ‘spiritual ’ experience and aspiration.” The authors quickly add “that traditional dogmatic or authoritarian religions ... do a disservice to the human species.” Moreover, they find insufficient evidence for existence of the supernatural. As “non-theists, we begin with humans not God, nature not deity.” They could discover no divine providence. Hence, “no deity will save us; we must save ourselves.”
“Second: Promises of immortal salvation or fear of eternal damnation are both illusory and harmful.” They distract from self-actualization and from concern over injustice. Science discredits belief in the soul (see Immortality). “Rather, science affirms that the human species is an emergence from natural evolutionary forces.” Neither has science found evidence that life survives death. Humans should look after the welfare of this life, not the next.
“Third: We affirm that moral values derive their source from human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational, needing no theological or ideological sanction.” Humanists base their values system on human experience, “here and now.” Values have no suprahuman basis or goal (see Morality, Absolute Nature of).
“Fourth: Reason and intelligence are the most effective instruments that humankind possesses.” Neither faith nor passion will substitute. Humanists suggest that “the controlled use of scientific methods . . . must be extended further in the solution of human problems.” A combination of critical intelligence and human caring is the best hope for resolving human problems.
“Fifth: The preciousness and dignity of the individual person is a central humanist valueT Humanists allow for as much individual autonomy as is consistent with social responsibility. Accordingly, individual freedom of choice should be increased (see FreeWill).
“Sixth: In the area of sexuality, we believe that intolerant attitudes, often cultivated by orthodox religions and puritanical cultures, unduly repress sexual conduct.” The authors affirm rights to birth control, abortion, divorce, and any form of sexual behavior between consenting adults. “Short of harming others or compelling them to do likewise, individuals should be permitted to express their sexual proclivities and pursue their life styles as they desire.”
“Ninth: The separation of church and state and the separation of ideology and state are imperatives.” Humanists believe that the state “should not favor any particular religious bodies through the use of public moneys, nor espouse a single ideology.”
The conclusion speaks out against “terror” and “hatred.” It holds out the values of reason and compassion, as well as tolerance, understanding, and peaceful negotiation It calls for “the highest commitment [i.e., to these values] of which we are capable,” which “transcends . . . church, state, party, class, or race.” It is clear from this that humanists are calling for an ultimate commitment to transcendent moral values—a religious commitment.
An Evaluation of Humanist Manifesto II. Humanist Manifesto II is stronger, more detailed, and less optimistic than Humanist Manifesto I. It is less guarded in its use of moral terms such as should and in its call for an ultimate commitment. It is a strong, urgent, moral, and religious call. Like its predecessor, it is also atheistic, naturalistic, evolutionistic, socialistic, relativistic, and still optimistic that humankind can save itself. The internationalist emphasis is much stronger.
The Secular Humanist Declaration. A third coalition voice for secular humanism has been raised. Signers of The Secular Humanist Declaration, which appeared in the secular humanist journal Free Inquiry, included Asimov, Fletcher, Skinner, and some who did not sign Manifesto If among them philosophers Sidney Hook and Kai Nielsen.
The Affirmations. The declaration espouses “democratic secular humanism” It is clear from the opening paragraphs that humanists see established religion as their chief enemy: “Regrettably, we are today faced with a variety of anti-secularist trends: the reappearance of dogmatic, authoritarian religions; Fundamentalist, literalist, and doctrinaire Christianity.” In addition, the document complains of “a rapidly growing and uncompromising Moslem clericalism in the Middle East and Asia, the reassertion of orthodox authority by the Roman Catholic papal hierarchy, nationalistic religious Judaism; and the reversion to obscurantist religions in Asia.” The platform of these humanists includes the following.
Free inquiry. “The first principle of democratic secular humanism is its commitment to free inquiry. We oppose any tyranny over the mind of man, any efforts by ecclesiastical, political, ideological, or social institutions to shackle free thought.”
Separation of church and state. “Because of their commitment to freedom, secular humanists believe in the principle of the separation of church and state.” In their view, “any effort to impose an exclusive conception of Truth [see Truth, Nature of], piety, virtue, or justice upon the whole of society is a violation of free inquiry.”
The ideal of freedom. “As democratic secularists, we consistently defend the ideal of freedom” The secular humanism concept of freedom includes not only freedom of conscience and belief from repressive ecclesiastical, political, and economic powers but also “genuine political liberty, democratic decision-making based upon majority rule, and respect for minority rights and the rule of law.”
Ethics based on critical intelligence. “The secular humanist recognizes the central role of morality in human life.” Ethical conduct should be judged by critical reason, and their goal is to develop “autonomous and responsible individuals, capable of making their own choices in life based upon an understanding of human behavior.” Although secular humanists are ostensibly opposed to absolutist morality, they maintain that “objective standards emerge, and ethical values and principles may be discovered, in the course of ethical deliberation.”
Moral education. “We believe that moral development should be cultivated in children and young adults . . . ; hence it is the duty of public education to deal with these values.” Such values include “moral virtues, intelligence, and the building of character.”
Religious skepticism. “As secular humanists, we are generally skeptical about supernatural claims.” While it is true that “we recognize the importance of religious experience: that experience that redirects and gives meaning to the lives of human [beings, we deny] that such experiences have anything to do with the supernatural.” It is maintained that there is insufficient evidence for the claim that some divine purpose exists for the universe. Men and women are free and responsible for their own destinies, and they cannot look to any transcendent being for salvation.
Reason. “We view with concern the current attack by nonsecularists on reason and science.” Although secular humanists deny that reason and science can solve all human problems, they affirm that they know of no better substitute than human intelligence.
Science and technology. “We believe the scientific method, though imperfect, is still the most reliable way to understand the world. Hence, we lookto the natural, biological, social, and behavioral sciences for knowledge of the universe and man’s place within it.”
Evolution. This article laments the attack by religious fundamentalists on evolution. While denying that evolution is an “infallible principle,” secular humanists believe it “is supported so strongly by the weight of evidence that it is difficult to reject it.” Consequently, “we deplore the efforts by fundamentalists (especially in the United States) to invade the science classrooms, requiring that creationist theory be taught to students and requiring that it be included in biology text-books” (see Origins, Science of). Secular humanists consider this a serious threat to both academic freedom and educational integrity.
The declaration concludes with the plea that “democratic secular humanism is too important for human civilization to abandon.” It decries contemporary orthodox religion as “anti-science, anti-freedom, anti-human,” pointing out that “secular humanism places trust in human intelligence rather than in divine guidance.” It ends by deploring “the growth of intolerant sectarian creeds that foster hatred.”
Evaluation of the Secular Humanist Declaration. It may seem surprising that this declaration appeared so soon after Humanist Manifesto II (only eight years), especially since many of the same people signed both. Much of the content is similar to one or both manifestos. With previous humanist statements it stresses naturalism, evolution, humankind’s ability for self-salvation, as well as common humanistic ethical commitments to freedom, toleration, and critical intelligence.
However, the declaration does have distinctives. The most significant aspects of this declaration are those areas in which it differs from previous efforts. First, these secular humanists wish to be called “democratic secular humanists.” The stress on democracy is evident throughout. Second, nowhere do they claim to be religious humanists, as do the authors of the prior documents. This is strange, since humanists have pleaded for recognition as a religious group, and the United States Supreme Court so defined it in Torcasso v. Watkins, 1961. Indeed, the declaration could be justly characterized as antireligious, for it particularly attacks the recent trend toward conservative religious beliefs. The bulk of the declaration, in fact, seems to be a reaction against the recent trends contrary to secular humanism Finally, one cannot help but notice a strange inconsistency in that the declaration affirms academic freedom yet insists that scientific creationism be excluded from school science classes.
Common Elements in Secular Humanism. A study of the humanist manifestos and declaration, and other writings of prominent secular humanists, reveals a common core of at least five beliefs:
1. Nontheism is common to all forms of secular humanism Many humanists deny the existence of God altogether, but all deny the need for a Creator of the world. Thus, secular humanists join in opposing all theistic religion.
2. Naturalism is essential to humanism, following from the denial of theism Everything in the universe must be explainable in terms of natural laws alone.
3. Evolution is the secular humanist’s way to explain origins. Either the universe and living things originated by means of the intervention of a supernatural Creator, or they evolved by purely naturalistic means. Nontheists thus have no choice but to defend evolution.
4. Ethical relativism unites secular humanists, for they have a distaste for absolutes (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). There are no God-given moral values; humanity decides its own values. These standards are subject to change and relative to different situations. Since there is no absolute basis for values in God, there are no absolute values to be received
from God.
5. Human self-sufficiency is a central tenet. Not all secular humanists are utopian, but all believe human beings can solve their own problems without divine help. Not all believe the race is immortal, but all hold that humanity’s survival depends on personal behavior and responsibility. Not all believe that science and technology are the means of saving humankind, but all do believe human reason and secular education are the only hope if the race is to endure.
Conclusion. Secular humanism is a movement consisting mostly of atheists, agnostics, and deists. All are antitheists and anti supernatural. All are strongly naturalistic. These specific doctrines are challenged in other articles, among them: God, Alleged Disproofs of; God, Evidence for; God, Objections to Proofs for; Evolution; Evolution, Biological; Evolution, Chemical; Evolution, Cosmic; Miracle; Miracles, Arguments Against. Morally, humanists are relativists (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). Various kinds of nontheistic humanism are evaluated under the names of their leading proponents.
D. Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism.
N. L. Geisler. Is Man the Measure?
J. Hitchcock, What Is Secular Humanism?
P. Kurtz, ed., Humanist Manifestos I and II.
--, ed., "A Secular Humanist Declaration.”
C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man.
F. Schaeffer, Whatever Happened to the Human Race?
R. Webber, Secular Humanism.
Humanist Manifestos. See Humanism, Secular.
Hume, Criteria for Credible Witnesses. See Witnesses, Hume’s Criteria for.
Hume, David. David Hume (1711-76), philosopher and historian, was born and reared in Edinburgh, Scotland, and attended Edinburgh University. He earned a degree in law but soon after decided not to practice. Instead, during the height of the European Enlightenment, Hume took up a rigorous study of philosophy. This study led to skepticism (see Agnosticism) and a disdain for the miraculous (see Miracles, Arguments Against). However, unlike Benedict *Spinoza a century earlier, Hume attacked miracles from an empirical perspective, not a rationalistic one. In many ways, the two men were opposites. Spinoza was dogmatic, and Hume was a skeptic. Spinoza was rationalistic, and Hume was empirical. Differences notwithstanding, they shared the conclusion that it is unreasonable to believe in miracles. For Spinoza, miracles are actually impossible; for Hume, they are merely incredible.
Hume’s Empirical Skepticism. The skeptic believes in suspending judgment about metaphysical questions. Hume’s skepticism was based in his epistemology. He believed that all ideas are based in sense experience. Since there are no sense experiences of concepts like God, Hume rejected these as meaningless.
Two Kinds of Propositions. All objects of human inquiry, Hume wrote, are either relations of ideas or matters of fact. The first kind includes mathematical statements and definitions; the second includes everything known empirically—through one or more of the senses. So emphatic was Hume about this distinction that he concluded Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: “When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume—of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance—let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (12.3.173).
Causes Known by Custom. For Hume, “all reasoning concerning matters of fact seems to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses” (ibid., 4.1.41). In view of this, the mind can never find the cause for a given event. Only “after the constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instance . . . we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other” (ibid.,
5.1.57). That is, we use causality, but we have no empirical grounds for doing so. In short, one cannot know causal connections between things; one can only believe in them based on customary conjunctions. “All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning” (ibid.).
According to Hume, we cannot even be sure the sun will rise tomorrow. We believe it will because it has customarily risen in the past. Some things happen so often in conjunction with others that it is foolish not to believe they will be so conjoined in the future. Hume would even call this uniform experience a “proof,” by which he means “such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition” (ibid., 6.1.69). Nonetheless, “all events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them They seem conjoined, but never connected’ (ibid., 7.2.85). But conjoined events do not prove they are causally connected any more than there is a causal connection between the rooster crowing and the sun rising. All one can do is extrapolate based on oft-repeated occurrences.
An Evaluation of Hume’s Skeptical Empiricism. It Is Self-defeating. Hume’s skepticism is vulnerable to serious criticisms. Perhaps the most serious is that it is self-defeating. According to Hume, meaningful propositions are empirical or analytical. The empirical have content but tell us nothing about metaphysical reality, such as God. The analytical are empty and contentless. Like the principle of empirical verifiability based on Hume’s two kinds of propositions, this is a self-destructive proposition (see Logical Positivism). For the statement that “only analytic or empirical propositions are meaningful” is not itself an analytic (true by definition) or empirical statement. Hence, by its own criteria, it is meaningless. If one allows that such statements are meaningful, then why cannot metaphysical statements be meaningful?
Atomism Is Contrary to Experience. Another serious objectionto Hume’s skeptical empiricism is that it is based on an unjustified empirical atomism Hume believed all sensations to be atomically separated. “One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them They seem conjoined, but never connected’ (ibid., 7.2.85). But this is not how we experience them We encounter them as a continuous flow. We do not get a staccato series of snapshots. Rather, we see a continuous flow motion picture of the external world. Only if one wrongly assumes that everything is atomically loose and separate is there a problem of connecting them
Causality Can Be Experienced Internally. Hume is widely misunderstood. He did not deny the principle of causality. He denied the basis on which some people try to prove causality (see Causality, Principle of). Hume rejected intuition, dismissing causal connections we experience in our own consciousness that are not based on external events. I am the cause of this sentence as I am typing, and I experience that fact. Everyone experiences their own thoughts and actions. These are not atomically loose and separate. We experience them as a continuous flow of cause and effect.
Hume Could Not Live His Theory. Hume was not consistent with his skepticism in either the practical or the theoretical realm In the practical area, Hume admitted that he had to take a break from his depressing skeptical pursuits and play a game of backgammon. Indeed, no one can live a life of suspended judgment on all metaphysical and moral matters. Life demands certain commitments in these areas. No skeptic suspends judgment on whether the moral right exists to believe and express these views. Nor is there doubt about everything. (Hume was not skeptical of skepticism) A complete skeptic could not eat, walk, or talk (see Agnosticism).
More pointedly, Hume was not consistent with his own theory. When arguing that we do not know the connection between events, Hume insisted that we could not even be certain that the sun will rise tomorrow. Yet when arguing against miracles, he insisted that the uniform experience to date that all men die and do not rise from the dead proves that no resurrection will occur tomorrow (see Resurrection, Evidence for).
Hume Never Denied Causality. What is more, Hume himself never denied that things have a cause for their existence. He wrote, “I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause” (Letters of David Hume, 1:187). Indeed, in the same source, Hume claimed that it would be “absurd” to deny the principle of causality. What Hume denied was the way some philosophers attempt to prove the principle of causality. For Hume, customary conjunction is the basis for positing a causal connection.
Hume’s Rejection of Proofs for God. Hume’s skepticism concerning the existence of God was based on his empiricism and is manifest in several objections that have been often repeated since his time. They are based on his famous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Arguments against a Theistic God. Hume argued that all attempts to prove God, at least a theistic God (see Theism), fail for any of the following reasons (see God, Objections to Proofs for).
Finite beings need only finite causes. According to Hume, positing an infinite Cause is metaphysical overkill. A finite universe needs only a finite cause.
The principle of causality is unprovable. There is no way to prove the principle of causality. Everything based on experience could be otherwise. And everything not based on experience is simply a tautology, that is, true only by definition.
The principle of analogy proves a nontheistic God. Even if one grants that there must be some kind of cause of the world, it would not be an infinitely perfect God. At best, the argument from analogy leads us to a finite and imperfect God for a finite and imperfect world. If one insists that God must be like what he created, then is God like a cabbage or a rabbit, because he made them?
An infinite series of causes is possible. An infinite series of causes is possible. Hence, there is no need to come to & First Cause. Infinite series are possible in mathematics.
Necessity does not apply to existence but only to concepts. A Necessary Being, such as the cosmological argument concludes, is a misapplication of the {Qrm necessary. The reason is that necessity applies only to concepts or ideas, never to actual reality. Necessary statements are analytic and contentless. And statements about the real world are not necessary.
There is no needfor a designer; chance can explain all (see Teleological Argument). There is no need to posit an intelligent Cause (designer) of the world; chance can explain the apparent design in the world. Given enough time, any “lucky” combination will result. The universe may be a “happy accident.”
It is possible that nothing ever existed, including God. It is always possible to conceive of anything, including God, as not existing. Hence, nothing exists necessarily. Since God is said to be a Necessary Being, even he must not exist necessarily. Hence, God must not exist at all.
What is logically necessary does not necessarily exist. Some antitheists argue that it is logically necessary for a triangle to have three sides, but it is not necessary for any three-sided thing to exist. Hence, even if it were logically necessary for God to exist, it would not mean that he actually does exist.
If all things were created, then so was God. If everything needs a cause, then so does God. And if all things do not need a cause, then neither does the world. But in neither case do we need a First Cause.
These arguments are answered and Hume’s logic critiqued in the article God, Objections to Proofs for.
Conclusion. Hume was one of the most influential figures in modern philosophy. His clear and powerful presentation of skepticism and antisupernaturalism was a significant factor in molding the modern secularistic mind. However, a careful analysis of Hume’s crucial positions reveals that they are both inconsistent and contrary to experience. Indeed, the heart of his skepticism is self-defeating, since he does not really suspend judgment on the many dogmatic positions he takes about God and miracles.
J. Collins, God in Modern Philosophy.
R. Flint. Agnosticism.
N. L. Geisler and W. Corduan, Philosophy of Religion.
D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
--, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
--, The Letters of David Hume.
Huxley, Julian. Julian Sorell Huxley (1887-1975) was the grandson of Thomas Huxley, who was known for his support of Charles *Darwin. Julian received his degree from Oxford in zoology and later taught there. In 1912, he was appointed biology department chair at Rice University. He became professor of zoology at Kings College, London, in 1925. In 1952, he became president of the British Humanist Association. He was a signer of the 1973 Humanist Manifesto II (see Humanism, Secular). His books included Principles of Experimental Embryology (1934), Evolution, the Modern Synthesis (1942), and Religion without Revelation (1928, rev. 1957).
Julian is noted for his evolutionary humanism This view had its most complete expression in Religion without Revelation. Building on the evolutionary biology of Darwin, the evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer, and the evolutionary ethics of his grandfather T. H. Huxley, Julian developed a complete system of belief he called evolutionary humanism He expressed views on the whole gamut of topics, including God, human origins, religion, values, science, the arts, and his hopes for the future possibilities of the human race. Like other humanists, Huxley did not believe in a theistic God (see Theism). He believed that evolution explained all (see Atheism; Evolution, Biological).
Huxley’s Disbelief in God. Huxley was opposed to God but in favor of religion. He said, “I believe . . . that we quite assuredly at present know nothing beyond this world and natural experience.” That is, “a personal God, be he Jehovah, or Allah, or Apollo, or Amen-Ra, or without name but simply God, I know nothing of.” Nor did he want to know. “I am not merely agnostic on the subject. ... I disbelieve in a personal God in any sense in which that phrase is ordinarily used” (Huxley, 17, 18).
Belief in God, Huxley held, was purely psychological. God the Father was a personification of nature; the Holy Spirit represented ideals; the Son personified ideal human nature. So “the gods are creations of man, personalized representations of the forces of destiny, with their unity projected into them by human thought and imagination” (ibid., 51).
Disbelief brought Huxley great relief. “For my own part,” he concluded, “the sense of spiritual relief which comes from rejecting the idea of God as a supernatural being is enormous.” He passionately hoped others would join him in his belief (and relief). Then “the insufferable arrogance of those who claim to be in sole possession of religious truth would happily disappear.” Along with this would go bigotry, religious war, religious persecution, the horrors of the Inquisition, attempts to suppress knowledge and learning, hastily to social and moral change (ibid., 33).
Huxley’s Belief in Religion. Despite his strong disbelief in God, Huxley considered himself deeply religious. “I believe,” said Huxley, “that it is necessary to believe something. Complete skepticism does not work” (ibid., 13). In the end, he found that believing in the scientific method met some of his religious longing. So Huxley believed that the scientific method “is the only method which in the long run will give satisfactory foundation for beliefs” (ibid., 13).
When Huxley applied the scientific method to religious experiences, including his own, he concluded that “religion arose as a feeling of the sacred.” The capacity for this feeling he reckoned fundamental to humankind, something given in and by the construction of the normal human mind. Huxley spoke honestly and vividly of his own religious experiences. “It also had that definite quality of being thrown into consciousness, implied in the term revelation, which has been described for purely intellectual discovery by many mathematicians and men of science, notably Poincare in his essays on scientific method. . . . But only once before had I had such a complete sense of outside givenness in an experience—the only occasion on which I had a vision (of a non-hallucinatory but amazingly real sort: such, of a religious cast, abound in the records of mystics [see Mysticism] such as St. Theresa)” (ibid., 86, 87).
Such vivid religious experiences left Huxley with passionate “beliefs in the supreme value of certain ideas and activities.” He said, “These in the theological parlance are called Faith” (ibid., 76). In fact, Huxley confessed, “Fife would have been intolerable but for [such] glimpses of the alternative state, occasional moments of great happiness and spiritual refreshment, coming usually through poetry or through beautiful landscape, or through people” (ibid., 77).
One day while browsing through a library in Colorado Springs, Huxley came across some essays by Ford Morley in which he found these words: “The next great task of science will be to create a religion for humanity.” Huxley was challenged by this vision. He wrote, “I was fired by sharing his conviction that science would of necessity play an essential part in framing any religion of the future worthy of the name” (ibid., 82).
Huxley tookup Morley’s challenge to develop a scientific religion. He called it “evolutionary humanism” One of the foundational tenets, as the name would signify, is the theory of evolution.
Human Evolution and Destiny. The experience of the mystical led Huxley to reject a purely materialistic interpretation of the universe, such as he saw in Marxism (see Materialism). He concluded, “The materialist hypothesis, in denying the importance of mental and spiritual factors in the cosmos, is to me as erroneous as, though more sophisticated than, the naive notion of the magic hypothesis, which projects spiritual forces into material events.” But his rejection of pure materialism notwithstanding, Huxley was a complete naturalist. He insisted that discoveries of physiology, biology, and psychology necessitated naturalism. There was no longer roomfor the supernatural. Both material and “spiritual” forces in the cosmos were part of nature (ibid., 187).
According to Huxley, “the basic postulate of evolutionary humanism is that mental and spiritual forces ... do have operative effect, and are indeed of decisive importance in the highly practical business of working out human destiny; and that they are not supernatural, not outside man but within him” (ibid.). In evolutionary humanism, the general duty of the individual is to realize personal potential. The right kind of individual development leaves the way permanently open for growth.
Three areas of personal development are possible: specialization, cultivation of personal abilities in every area of life, and cultivating inner harmony and peace (ibid., 199-200).
Actually, evolutionary humanism has twin goals: present personal fulfillment and long-term cosmic progress. The latter value Huxley calls “the gospel of evolutionary humanism,” which is a “transcendent value” (ibid., 201).
Evaluation. As a religion, Huxley’s dream has not caught on quickly. More recent humanists have admitted that Huxley was too optimistic (cf. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973). There is no good observational evidence to indicate the inevitability of the evolution of a universal humanistic religion.
The evolutionary ethic involves some serious problems. How does society preserve individual rights of those who are blocking social evolution (see Morality, Absolute Nature of)? How can an ethical “ought” be derived from a biological “is”? How can the assumed fact of evolution be the basis for moral value? Many bad things evolve too. If so, there must be some standard outside of the evolutionary process by which to know what is good or bad.
Huxley’s confession of transcendent, supreme values, mystical experience, and a destiny of the world will be welcomed by those who claim that these are verbal indicators of a surrogate “God.” They will insist that only minds can “destine” and only persons can be the object of religious commitments. They will contend that Huxley has avoided the name God but not his reality.
Huxley is inconsistent. In one breath, he states that the first life arose from nonlife (ibid., 45), yet in the next he ridicules belief in spontaneous generation (ibid., 62). Huxley erroneously uses operation science to explain origins (see Origins, Science of). He tries to explain the unrepeatable events of the past by the repeatable events of the present. Huxley misuses the scientific method he advances as the basis of evolutionary humanism. Such naturalism also lacks philosophical justification. He offered no adequate arguments for denying the possibility of supernatural intervention (see Miracles, Arguments Against).
Finally, like other nontheists, Huxley’s critique of God (see God, Objections to Arguments for) is shallow and inadequate. He does not interact with the substantial evidence for the existence of a theistic God (see God, Evidence for).
A. Desmond. Huxley.
N. L. Geisler, Is Man the Measure?
J. Huxley. Religion without Revelation.
T. M. Kitwood, What Is Human?
E. Lo, “Religion without Revelation.”
E. L. Mascall, The Secularization of Christianity. D. A. Noebel, Understanding the Times.
R. Seeger, “J. Huxley, Atheistic Religionist.”