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Language, Religious. See Analogy, Principle of; Logical Positivism; Wittgenstein, Ludwig.
Lapide, Pinchas. Pinchas Lapide is a late-twentieth-century Jewish rabbi and biblical scholar who, without converting to Christianity, supports the Christian belief that Jesus of Nazareth rose bodily from the grave. His conclusion supports a crucial link in the Christian apologetic—that of Christ’s resurrection
In his book The Resurrection of Jesus, Rabbi Lapide concluded, “In regard to the future resurrection of the dead, I am and remain a Pharisee. Concerning the resurrection of Jesus on Easter Sunday, I was for decades a Sadducee. I am no longer a Sadducee since the following deliberation has caused me to think this through anew” (125). He adds, “If God’s power which was active in Elisha is great enough to resuscitate even a dead person who was thrown into the tomb of the prophet (2 Kings 13:20-21), then the bodily resurrection of a crucified Jew also would not be inconceivable” (ibid., 131).
Since a miracle is an act of God that confirms the truth of a prophet of God (see Miracles, Apologetic Value of), it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Jesus is the Messiah (see Christ, Deity of). As one writer put it, “Pinchas Lapide’s logic escapes me. He believes it is a possibility that Jesus was resurrected by God. At the same time he does not accept Jesus as the Messiah. But Jesus said that he was the Messiah. Why would God resurrect a liar?” (“Resurrection of Jesus”). Indeed, another rabbi said to Jesus, “Rabbi, we know you are a teacher who has come from God. For no one could perform the miraculous signs you are doing if God were not with him” (John 3:2).
P. Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus.
Time, "Resurrection of Jesus.”
Leibniz, Gottfried. Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) was a child genius in Germany who learned both Greek and scholastic philosophy at an age so young he was denied a master’s degree in law at the University of Leipzig because of his youth. He co-invented calculus with Isaac Newton in 1676. He wrote a doctoral dissertation on symbolic solutions to philosophical problems. Leibniz was greatly influenced by contemporary rationalist Benedict *Spinoza, although Spinoza was a pantheist (see Pantheism), and Leibniz remained a theist (see Theism).
The most influential works of Leibniz were Discourse on Metaphysics, Monadology, and Theodicy. His influence on modern thought has been considerable. Immanuel *Kant was a Leibnizian rationalist before he was awakened from his “dogmatic slumbers” by reading David *Hume.
Leibniz’s Proofs for God. Leibniz offered several arguments for the existence of God.
Argument from Perfection or Harmony. His argument from perfection or harmony can be stated:
1. Pure essences are eternal possibilities.
2. It is better to exist than not to exist.
3. All things have a drive toward existence (conatus).
a. Some are incompatible with others.
b. Not all can exist at a given moment.
c. But all strive to exist.
4. Yet there is harmony in the universe.
5. Hence, there must be a God who orders all things, keeping them in harmony with one another. Cosmological Argument. The *cosmological argument as formulated by Leibniz took the form:
1. The entire observed world is changing.
2. Whatever changes lacks the reason for its own existence.
3. But there is a sufficient reason for everything.
4. Hence, there must be a cause beyond the world for its existence.
5. This cause is either its own sufficient reason, or there is one beyond it.
6. But there cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons, for the failure to reach an explanation is not an explanation. There must be an explanation.
7. Therefore, there must be a First Cause of the world that has no reason beyond itself but is its own sufficient reason.
This argument differs from that of *Thomas Aquinas by its use of the principle of sufficient reason. Thomas Aquinas appealed only to the principle of causality and, thus, avoided the charges of rationalism that were leveled at Leibniz. The principle of sufficient reason led atheists (see Sartre, Jean-Paul; Nietzsche, Friedrich) to conclude that the cosmological argument eventuated in the self-contradictory concept of God as a self-caused being because if everything needs a cause (reason), then so does God. But then God would be a self-caused being, which is impossible, so they argued. Ontological Argument. Leibniz also contributed to the *ontological argument debate:
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect being to exist, then it is necessary for it to exist.
a. By nature an absolutely perfect being cannot lack anything.
b. But if it did not exist, it would lack something.
c. Hence, an absolutely perfect being cannot lack existence.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
a. A perfection is a simple quality (= monad), since each one differs in kind.
b. But whatever is simple cannot conflict with another simple thing.
c. Hence, it is possible for one being (God) to have all perfections.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect being exists.
Metaphysics (Monadology). Leibniz developed his own theory of substance in order to bridge the physical world to metaphysical realities. His doctrine revolved around monads. He believed monads
exist as an immaterial “particle” more elemental even than the atom, for while physical atoms can be divided, metaphysical monads cannot. Monads differ from one another in shape, size, space, and quality. They are created, they can be destroyed, but they cannot change. Each monad perceives and acts differently, at its own hierarchical level, as established by God. Together they act in total harmony with each other according to the plan of God and have an innate drive toward perfection that is built into their essence. Since body and soul are separate substances, their separate monads function together in precise harmony as ordered by God.
In the hierarchy of monads, the higher are those belonging to the spiritual realm Soul monads are of a higher order than those of the body. The highest, uncreated Super Monad is God. God created all other monads and maximizes good among and through them
Problem of Evil. According to Leibniz, God foreordains all things by foreknowledge, without coercing free will. Freedom is the spontaneity of an intellectual being. God has an antecedent will, which is only for good. He also has a consequent will to bring about the best world possible given the existence of evil. As best of all possible beings, God wills the best of all possible worlds. Since this world is willed by God, it must be the best possible or least defective world.
Three kinds of evil exist: metaphysical (fmitude), moral (sin), and physical (suffering). Finitude underlies sin and suffering. Sin is the result of ignorance, a confused or unclarified state. Evil is part of a total picture of good, giving darkness so that the light stands out in contrast (see Evil,
Problem of).
God is working to perfect the universe, which can only be done by perfecting people. God aims at perfecting an immortal soul through the universal church. This view of the church borrows from *Augustine’s City of God.
Evaluation. There are many positive contributions of Leibniz that should be recognized.
Positive Contributions. Through his work in developing calculus, Leibniz did an immense service to modern math and science, and he contributed to *epistemology, *metaphysics, theology, and theodicy as well.
Epistemology. Leibniz was a foundationalist (see Foundationalism), who correctly stressed that knowledge is impossible without first principles. Even though many disagree with his belief in innate ideas, even Kant in his *agnosticism acknowledged the necessity of an innate dimension to knowledge.
Metaphysics. As a theist (see Theism), Leibniz believed in creation ex nihilo. He struggled with and gave modern form to theistic concepts in the tradition of *Augustine, *Anselm, and *Thomas Aquinas. His cosmological argument has influenced theists.
Theodicy. Leibniz’s solutionto the problem of evil was classic (see Evil, Problem of). It grappled with the origin, nature, and persistence of evil in a way that attempted to preserve both God’s absolute perfection and human freedom. Further, in spite of justified criticisms, his concept of a “best possible world” is an essential element in theodicy.
Weaknesses. The central values notwithstanding, Leibniz is open to some criticism.
Rationalist epistemology. As Hume showed, the concept of innate ideas is contrary to experience. There is no evidence that we are born with a whole storehouse of ideas, waiting only to be activated. The a priori dimension to knowledge appears to be in the area of capacity, not content. That is, we are born with the capability to know truth but not with a mind full of truths.
Dualism. Leibniz’s *dualism of mind and body leads to the unlikely views of parallelism, occasionalism, and established harmony of mind and body. There is no real interaction or unity between the two.
The principle of sufficient reason. In spite of the validity of many of Leibniz’s first principles, the principle of sufficient reason leads logically to a contradictory, self-caused being. For if the cause of God’s being is within himself, then God is self-caused. Unlike the first principle of causality of Aquinas, the principle of sufficient reason is not rooted in reality (see Realism) but only in the realm of ideas. Finally, the principle is not undeniable, since one can say that something does not have a reason (cause) without engaging in a self-defeating statement. Indeed, the uncreated God is the ultimate uncaused Cause.
The ontological argument. Leibniz’s form of the ontological argument is based on the widely rejected premise that existence is a perfection (see Kant, Immanuel). Further, his attempt to prove that the concept is logically possible fails to reach its goal. It is subject to the same criticism leveled against other pluralisms that hold to a univocal view of being (see Analogy, Principle of). It is impossible to avoid monism
Even Leibniz’s form of the otherwise valid cosmological argument gives no certain starting point being based only in the observation (appearance) of change.
View of evil. His view of free will tends to reduce to a form of determinism. For if it is God who gives the drive or desire for free choices, how can it be really free (see Free Will)?
Likewise, his theodicy implies that the best God can do still involves evil. This was powerfully satirized by Voltaire’s Candide. While God must do his best, this present world is not it. This is not the best possible world, though it may very well be the best possible way to the best possible world (see Evil, Problem of).
Sources
J. Collins, God in Modern Philosophy.
N. L. GeislerandW. Corduan, Philosophy of Religion.
J. E. Gurr, The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900.
D. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.
G. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics.
--, The Monadology.
--, Theodicy.
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81) was the son of a scholarly German pastor. He studied theology at Leipzig University, where he imbibed the *rationalism of the Enlightenment, whose leading spokesman was Christian Wolfe, a follower of Gottfried *Leibniz. Lessing was influenced by the English deists (see Deism). As a theater critic, he came under the influence of the deist Hermann Reimarus, from whose book An Apology for Rational Worshippers of GodhQ published extracts in 1774 and 1777 to 1778. Lessing finally came to be dominated by the *pantheism of Benedict *Spinoza.
Lessing’s influence on others was immense. It can be seen in the liberalism of Friedrich *Schleiermacher and Samuel Coleridge, as well as the *existentialism of Soren *Kierkegaard and the historicismof G. W. F. *Hegel and the positivism of Auguste *Comte.
Views of God. Lessing came from a trinitarian (see Trinity) background but gradually adopted deist ideas and eventually became a Spinozan pantheist. As such, his life foreshadowed much of the history of the next two centuries. By 1753, Lessing indicated in The Christianity of Reason that he was moving toward *pantheism, as he mixed Spinoza and Leibniz and denied that God is a
superobject beyond or behind the world (see Lessing, Lessing’s Theological Writings, 445). His 1763 work, On the Reality of Things outside God, which was published posthumously in 1795, denied traditional theism He denied that a created world exists distinct from God.
Lessing not only believed that nothing exists outside the divine mind, but since ideas of contingent things are necessary, also believed that a contingency exists inside God. This foreshadowed the later process theologians (see Panentheism), such as Alfred North *Whitehead.
History and the Gospels. In 1754, Lessing published a series of “Vindications,” in which he defended a number of historical figures he believed had been badly treated by the church. While expressing sympathy with the Christian ethic in these leaders, he showed antipathy toward Christian doctrines.
Christ versus Jesus. The turning point for Lessing occurred in 1769. As librarian for the duke of Brunswick, he began to publish fragments of a manuscript by the deist Reimarus (1766-69). The last fragment precipitated a controversy with Hamburg pastor Johann Goeze and touched off the quest for the historical Jesus (see Christ of Faith vs. Jesus of History; Jesus, Quest for the Historical; Jesus Seminar). Not only did Lessing distinguish between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, but he also did a critical study of the sources of the Synoptic Gospels in New Hypotheses Concerning the Evangelists Regarded as Merely Human Historians (1784). Lessing’s views were expressed in a play, “Nathan the Wise,” which pleaded for love and tolerance rather than assent to a creed. Lessing’s view was the essence of Enlightenment Christianity, the view that, beneath creedal accretions, Christianity is a moral code of universal brotherhood.
Lessing’s “Ditch. ” The legacy of Lessing was a “ditch” dug between the contingent truths of history and the necessary truths of faith. He split the revelation of timeless truths from the time-bound, contingent truths of history. It was this huge gulf with which Soren *Kierkegaard struggled and from which he took his “leap of faith” (see Fear and Trembling).
Lessing affirmed that the “accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason” (Lessing, Lessing’s Theological Writings, 445). There is no logical connection between historical realities and faith. Faith truths are mathematical and a priori, independent of experience. The former are a posteriori, contingent truths of experience. Therefore, historical narrative can never convey knowledge of God.
Relativism. Lessing was more of a relativist than a skeptic. He immortalized his view in the aphorism, “If God held all truth in his right hand and in his left the everlasting striving after truth, so that I should always and everlastingly be mistaken and said to me, Choose, with humility I would pick on the left hand and say, Father grant me that; absolute truth is for thee alone” (ibid., 445).
Evaluation. Lessing’s self-claimed humility aside, it is clear that the net result of his views is a self-defeating form of *agnosticism, relativism (see Truth, Nature of), and a dichotomy of fact and value and of history and faith (see Apologetics, Overall Argument of; New Testament Manuscripts). One insightful assessment is that “Lessing spent his life hoping that Christianity was true and arguing that it was not” (ibid., 445).
E. H. Gombrich, “Lessing.”
P. Hazard ,European Thought in the Eighteenth Century.
S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling.
F. C. A. Koelin, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment.
G. Lessing, G. E. Lessing’s Gesammelte Werke.
--,Lessing’s Theological Writings.
Lewis, C. S. Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) is arguably the most influential late-twentieth-century Christian theist and apologist (see Apologetics, Need for). An Oxford University professor, this former atheist so expressed profound truths in simple language that he reached into the hearts and minds of millions. Lewis disclaimed being a philosopher or theologian, but his insight into the essentials of *theism made him a significant apologist and communicator.
The Nature and Existence of God. Lewis accepted the Augustine-Anselm-Aquinas view of God as eternal, necessary, transcendent, morally perfect, and personal (see God, Nature of). God transcends space and time: “Almost certainly God is not in Time. His life does not consist of moments following one another. . . . Ten-thirty—and every other moment from the beginning of the world—is always the Present for Him” To put it another way, “He has all eternity in which to listen to the split second of prayer put up by a pilot as his plane crashes in flames” (Mere Christianity, 146).
God is, nevertheless, immanent (present and operating) in creation. Lewis wrote, “Looking for God —or Heaven—by exploring space is like reading or seeing all Shakespeare’s plays in the hope that you will find Shakespeare as one of the characters or Stratford as one of the places. Shakespeare is in one sense present at every moment in every play. But he is never present in the same way as Falstaff or Lady Macbeth. Nor is he diffused through the play like a gas” (Christian Reflections, 167-68).
The *Cosmological Argument. Although he initially accepted a theistic form of evolution (see below), Lewis believed in creation out of nothing (see Creation, Views of). For “what God creates is not God; just as what man makes is not man” (God in the Dock, 138). He explained that matter is not coeternal with God:
Entropy by its very character assures us that though it may be the universal rule in the Nature we know, it cannot be universal absolutely. If a man says, "Humph Dumpty is falling." you see at once that this is not a complete story. The bit you have been told implies both a later chapter in which Humpty Dumpty will have reached the ground, and an earlier chapter in which he was still seated on the wall. A Nature which is "running down” cannot be the whole story. A clock can't run down unless it has been woundup.” (Miracles, 157)
Matter is the product of a cosmic Mind (see Dualism). “But to admit that sort of cosmic mind is to admit a God outside Nature, a transcendent and supernatural God” (ibid., 30). The universe is matter. Matter cannot produce mind; only mind can produce matter (see Materialism). The creation of the world was not from some preexisting matter or stuff. It was created from nothing. God created this world freely: “The freedom of God consists in the fact that no cause other than Himself produces His acts and no external obstacle impedes them—that His own goodness is the root from which they all grow and His own omnipotence the air in which they all flower” (Problem of Pain, 23).
God did not create the world because he had to; he created it because he wanted to. The existence of the universe is entirely contingent on the goodwill of the Creator.
The *Moral Argument. Lewis begins Mere Christianity with the premise that an objective moral law, such as even common disagreements presuppose, entails a Moral Law Giver. There is “something which is directing the universe, and which appears in me as a law urging me to do right and making me feel responsible and uncomfortable when I do wrong. I think we have to assume it is more like a mind than it is like anything else we know—because after all the only other thing we know is matter and you can hardly imagine a bit of matter giving instructions” (Mere
Christianity, 34).
Lewis’s argument can be summarized:
1. There must be an objective, universal moral law, or else no ethical judgments make sense (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). Nothing could be called evil or wrong, and there would be no reason to keep promises or treaties (God in the Dock, chap. 1).
2. This moral law does not originate with us. In fact, we are bound by it.
3. The source of this law is more like mind than matter, and it cannot be part of the universe any more than an architect is part of the building he designs.
4. Therefore, there exists a Moral Law Giver who is the ultimate source and standard of all right and wrong (ibid., chap. 7).
For a fuller discussion of Lewis’s moral law argument and its defense, see his section in the article Moral Argument for God.
The Nature of Rationality. Lewis would not blush at the appellation “rationalist.” Repeatedly, he exalts human rationality. He writes, “I couldn’t get at the universe unless I could trust my reason. If we couldn’t trust inference we could know nothing but our own existence” (ibid., 277). “The heart never takes the place of the head; but can and should obey it” (Abolition of Man, 30).
There also must be an ultimate reason or explanation. “You cannot go on ‘explaining away’ forever: you will find that you have explained explanation itself away.” Moreover, “you cannot go on ‘seeing through’ things forever.” Consequently, “it is no use trying to ‘see through’ first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent.” But “to ‘see through’ all things is the same as not to see” (ibid., 91).
Lewis believed rational thought is undeniable. He insisted that “all arguments [against] the validity of thought make a tacit, and illegitimate, exception in favor of the bit of thought you are doing at that moment.” Hence, “the validity of thought is central: all other things have to be fitted in round it as best they can” (Miracles, 23).
The Nature of Morality. Lewis spoke of “men without chests” (Abolition of Man, 34). “The head rules the belly through the chest—the seat... of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments.” Without this middle element “man is vain: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal” (ibid., 34). Beyond the moral nature stands an attainable moral ideal. Lewis would agree with the statement that the primary value of education is an education in primary values. Education fulfills its proper purpose as it cultivates value judgments to help perfect the moral nature. Without trained emotions, the intellect is powerless against the animal (ibid., 33, 34). Thus, Lewis observes, it is better to play cards with a skeptic who is a gentleman than with a moral philosopher who was brought up among card sharks (ibid., 34). Only because we stand within God’s law can we speak of having the power of self-control (ibid., 86).
Lewis holds that “either we are rational spirit obliged forever to obey the absolute values of the Tao [moral law], or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes” (ibid., 84). The only guarantee against tyranny and slavery is to affirm immortal human worth in the context of an absolute moral law. For “the process which, if not checked, will abolish Man, goes on apace among Communists and Democrats no less than among Fascists” (ibid., 85). Only within the absolute moral law is there a concrete reality in which to be truly human (ibid., 86).
Lewis was keenly aware of the danger of replacing the objective moral law of God with subjective
political laws. History shows that dictators who step outside the moral law are invariably not benevolent. The potential for evil when great power resides in a person’s political grasp is horrendous. This message also figures into the social commentary of the allegorical That Hideous Strength.
Miracles. *Naturalism claims that nature is “the whole show.” So if naturalism is true, then every event in nature must be explicable in terms of the total system of nature. But human (inferential) reason, such as even naturalists assume and exercise, cannot be explained strictly in terms of nonrational natural causes. Moreover, “the Naturalist cannot condemn other people’s thoughts because they have irrational causes and continue to believe his own, which have (if Naturalism is true) equally irrational causes” {Miracles, 22). Furthermore, argues Lewis, if naturalism is right then there is no reason that the thoughts of a lunatic or drug addict should not be valued by a naturalist as much as his or her own thoughts. This is the self-contradiction of naturalism
There is more than nature; there is mind, which cannot be reduced to matter. And there is value (ought), which cannot be reduced to nature (what is). In fact, there is an absolute moral Mind behind nature who gives the moral law.
The human is both a rational and a moral being. Without a moral nature there would be no true humanity, so those who would abolish the moral law would abolish humanity in the bargain {Abolition of Man, 77):
Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasure of masters who must, by hypothesis, have no motive but their own “natural” impulses. Only the Tao provides a common human law of action which can over-arch rulers and ruled alike. A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery, (ibid., 84-85)
Evil. According to Lewis, evil is not eternal, as dualism claims.
The two Powers, the good and the evil, do not explain each other. Neither . . . can claim to be the Ultimate. More ultimate than either of them is the inexplicable fact of their being there together. Neither of them chose this tete-a-tete. Each of them, therefore, is conditioned—finds himself willy-nilly in a situation; and either that situation itself, or some unknown force which produced that situation, is the real Ultimate. Dualism has not yet reached the ground of being. You cannot accept two conditioned and mutually independent beings as the self-grounded, self-comprehending Absolute. (God in the Dock, 22)
Evil arose from free choice {see Free Will). This does not mean that it is evil to be free. In freedom we most resemble God and take part in eternal reality (ibid., 129). Christianity agrees with dualists that the universe is at war. But the Christian does not think this is a war between independent powers. It is, rather, a civil rebellion, and we are living in territory occupied by the rebel {Mere Christianity, 51). This rebellion was not at first a turning to wickedness. “Wickedness, when you examine it, turns out to be the pursuit of some good in the wrong way” (ibid., 49).
Like *Augustine and *Thomas Aquinas, C. S. Lewis believed that evil does not exist in itself but as a corruption of good {see Evil, Problem of). “Goodness is, so to speak, itself: badness is only spoiled goodness. And there must be something good first before it can be spoiled” (ibid., 49). Even the devil is a fallen angel. So “evil is a parasite, not an original thing” (ibid., 50).
God does not permit evil without a good purpose. Even physical evil has a moral impact. For “God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pain: it is His megaphone to rouse a deaf world” {Problem of Pain, 81).
Final Destiny. Life is the proving ground for eternity. During life, each rational creature makes a lifetime decision. All play the game, and “if a game is played, it must be possible to lose it.” Of course, adds Lewis, “I would pay any price to be able to say truthfully ‘All will be saved.’ But my reason retorts, ‘Without their will, or with it?’ If I say ‘Without their will,’ I at once perceive a contradiction; how can the supreme voluntary act of self-surrender be involuntary? If I say ‘With their will,’ my reason replies ‘How if they will not give in?’” (ibid., 106-7).
At the end of life and history, Lewis finds two kinds of people: “those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end, ‘ Thy will be done.’ All that are in hell, choose it.” Lewis believed “without that self-choice there could be no hell. No soul that seriously and constantly desires joy will ever miss it. Those who seek, find. To those who knock it is opened” (Great Divorce, 69). Thus, the doors of hell are locked on the inside. Even those who wish to come out of hell would not do so at the expense of self-abandonment through which alone the soul can reach any good (ibid., 127).
Evaluation. Lewis’s writings have a great value to Christian apologetics. Mere Christianity is to date one of the best books to give to an unbeliever. Lewis wrote one of the finest critiques of naturalism in print (Miracles). The Problem of Pain is still one of the best books on the topic. The Abolition of Man remains a top book on moral absolutism, and so on Lewis defended the literal death and resurrection of Christ, the immortality of man, and an eternal hell (The Great Divorce).
Nevertheless, Lewis was not orthodox in a number of areas.
The Denial of Old Testament Miracles. Lewis denied the literal nature of many Old Testament miracles (see Miracles in the Bible):
The Hebrews, like other peoples, had mythology: but as they were the chosen people so their mythology was the chosen mythology—the mythology chosen by God to be the vehicle of the earliest sacred truths, the first step in that process which ends in the New Testament where truth has become completely historical. Whether we can ever say with certainty where, in this process of crystalisation, any particular Old Testament story falls, is another matter. I take it that the memoirs of David’s court come at one end of the scale and are scarcely less historical than St. Mark or Acts; and that the Book of Jonah is at the opposite end. (Miracles, 139)
In all fairness, Lewis does recognize that he might be wrong about Old Testament miracles. He admits that his view is tentative and liable to error and that the subject matter is beyond his knowledge:
A consideration of the Old Testament miracles is beyond the scope of this book and would require many kinds of knowledge which I do not possess. My present view—which is tentative and liable to any amount of correction—would be that just as, on the factual side, a long preparation culminates in God’s becoming incarnate as Man, so, on the documentary side, the truth first appears in mythical form and then by a long process of condensing or focussing finally becomes incarnate as History, (ibid., 139)
The Denial of the Historicity of Many Old Testament Events. Lewis did not believe in the historicity and authenticity of some of the very Old Testament events Jesus accepts. Jesus verified the literal truth of Jonah (Matt. 12:40), of the nonevolutionary creation of Adam and Eve (Matt. 19:4), of the flood (Matt. 24:38-39), and of other miraculous events (see Geisler, Inerrancy, 3-35). Lewis seems to read into the Old Testament a non-Christian development of myth (see Miracles, Myth and). This is especially surprising in view of his criticism of New Testament scholars who do the same. Lewis chides them:
A theology which denies the historicity of nearly everything in the Gospels to which Christian life and affections and thought have been fastened for nearly two millennia—which either denies the miraculous altogether or, more strangely, after swallowing the camel of the Resurrection strains at such gnats as the feeding of the multitudes—if offered to the uneducated man can produce only one or other of two effects. It will make him a Roman Catholic or an atheist. (Christian Reflections, 153)
Lewis also accepted other higher critical ideas about the Old Testament (see Bible Criticism). He questioned the historicity of Job, “because it begins about a man quite unconnected with all history or even legend, with no genealogy, living in a country of which the Bible elsewhere has hardly anything to say” {Mere Christianity, 110). Lewis held this in spite of references to Job as historical in both Old (Ezek. 14:14, 20) and New Testaments (James 5:11). Uz is mentioned in Jeremiah 25:20 and Lamentations 4:21. Customs and forms of proper names connected with Job also have been verified (Archer, 438-48).
The Denial of the Inerrancy of Scripture. Lewis held a very negative view of many Psalms, even calling some “devilish” {Reflections on the Psalms, 25). He rejected the Davidic authorship of all butPsalml8 (ibid., 114). This is especially surprising given Lewis’s high view of Christ and the Gospels. Jesus verified that David wrote Psalm 110 (Matt. 22:41-46). Jesus also affirmed the divine authority of the whole Old Testament (Matt. 5:17-18; John 10:35) and especially the Psalms (cf. Luke 24:44), which was one of the books he quoted most frequently.
Lewis believed that there were (1) human opinions in the Bible; (2) inconsistencies in parallel accounts, (3) admission of human sources, (4) unhistorical events (like Jonah and Job), and (5) other inspired writings. He also believed that even wicked men can utter inspired things like the Bible. He adds, “It seems to me that 2 and 4, under “The Errant Nature of the Bible” rule out the view that every statement in Scripture must be historical truth. And 1,3,5, and 6 rule out the view that inspiration is a single thing” in the sense that the whole Bible is equally inspired (cited inGeisler, Systematic Theology, 399, 401).
Uncritical Acceptance of Macroevolution. Like so many of his continental (and American) contemporaries, Lewis accepted macroevolution. He did, however, have some later doubts (see Lerngren) about an evolutionary {see Evolution, Biological) view of the universe’s origin (see Mere Christianity, 52, 65). Nonetheless, that even so pious and courageous an intellectual apologist as Lewis could be sucked into the myth of macroevolution reveals how important it is to carefully evaluate the truth of what he or she is learning in a secular environment (see Johnson).
Sources
G. L. Archer Jr .,A Survey of Old Testament Introduction.
A. Barkman, C. S. Lewis and Philosophy as a Way of Life.
G. B. Femgren and R. L. Numbers, “C. S. Lewis on Creation and Evolution.”
N. L. Geisler, Is Man the Measure?
--, ed., Inerrancy.
_, Systematic Theology, vol. 1.
G. Habermas, D. Baggett, and J. Wall, eds., C. S. Lewis as Philosopher.
P. E. Johnson. Darwin on Trial.
C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man.
--, Christian Reflections.
--, God in the Dock, esp. “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment.”
--,Mere Christianity.
--,Miracles.
--, The Problem of Pain.
--,Reflections on the Psalms.
--, The Screwtape Letters.
--, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature.
R. MacSwain and M. Ward, eds., The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis.
R. L. Purtill. C. S. Lewis ’ Case for the Christian Faith.
D. L. Sayers, ‘Toward a Christian Esthetic.”
Life, Origin of. See Evolution, Chemical.
Limitation of Christ, Theory of. Bible critics have offered two theories that undermine the apologetic argument for the deity of Christ (see Christ, Deity of) and the authority of Scripture (see Bible, Evidence for). A crucial link in the overall argument for both is that Jesus taught that he was the Son of God and that the Bible is the Word of God (see Apologetics, Overall Argument of). These propositions are based on the premise that the Gospels accurately tell us what Jesus taught. If Jesus intentionally accommodated his words to what his audience believed but did not disclose what he really believed, then the conclusion does not hold (see Accommodation Theory).
Likewise, if Jesus was so limited in his human knowledge that it did not extend to such matters as the authority and authenticity of the Old Testament, he was not really affirming these matters. Rather, his ministry was limited to spiritual and moral matters, and he affirmed nothing about historical and critical matters.
The Case for a Limited Christ. Two supporting pillars in the argument for limitation are the humanity of Christ and the kenosis theory.
Humanly Limited Knowledge. The Bible makes clear that Jesus was human (see Christ, Deity of). But if Jesus was truly human in every respect, why could he not experience human error? Why could Jesus not have been wrong about many of the things he believed, so long as they did not hinder his overall redemptive mission?
Emptying at the Incarnation. The Bible further teaches that Jesus “emptied himself’ of his omniscience at his incarnation. That this severely limited his knowledge when he taught is called the kenosis theory, from the Greek word kenos, “empty.” He was ignorant of the time of his second coming, for he said, “No one knows about that day and hour, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father” (Mark 13:32). He did not know whether figs were on the tree in Mark 11:13. As a child he “increased in wisdom,” as do other children (Luke 2:52). He had to ask questions (Mark 5:9, 30; 6:38; John 14:9). Perhaps Jesus was also ignorant of the origin of the Old Testament and of the historical truth of its record.
Response to the Limitation View. The “limitation theory” is more plausible and potentially more damaging than the accommodation theory. But both arguments in favor of the limitation of Christ’s understanding ignore crucial points about who Jesus was.
Can God err or sin? In Jesus, one and the same person was both God and human at the same time. If the human person had sinned or erred, then God would have sinned or erred. This is why the Bible is careful to say, “We have one who was tempted in every way, just as we are—yet was without sin” (Heb. 4:15). He was human enough to be tried and tempted but not to be sinful (see 2 Cor. 5:21;
1 Peter 3:18; 1 John 3:3). If a sin attributed to Christ must also be attributed to God, who cannot sin (Hab. 1:13; Heb. 6:18), then an error attributed to Christ would have been an error God made (see Trinity).
The kenosis theory that Jesus emptied himself of deity when he became human is unfounded. It is certainly not the meaning of Philippians 2. Verses 5 and 6 say that he emptied himself of his divine nature by humbling himself to become a human being. When he emptied himself, he was still in the form or essence of God. If the same word, form, as applied to a servant means he was a servant, then applied to God it means he is God. This is what John 1:1 declares. The human Jesus claimed to be
God. How he showed that to be so is covered at length in the article Christ, Deity of. The incarnation did not subtract deity; it added humanity. An error or sin would have been attributable to the second person of the Godhead.
Since the orthodox doctrine of Christ acknowledges that he was fully human, there is no problem with the statement that Jesus was ignorant of many things. He had two natures, one infinite or unlimited in knowledge, the other finite or limited in knowledge. Could it be that Jesus did not really “err” in what he taught about the Old Testament but that he was simply so limited that his human knowledge and authority did not extend into those areas? The evidence in the New Testament records demands an emphatic negative answer to that question.
Jesus had supranormal knowledge. Even in his human state, Christ possessed super-human knowledge. He saw Nathaniel under the fig tree (John 1:48). Jesus knew the private life of the Samaritan woman (John 4:18-19). He knew who would betray him (John 6:64) and all that would happen in Jerusalem (Mark 8:31; 9:31; John 18:4). He knew about Lazarus’s death before he was told (John 11:14). Whatever his limitations, Jesus’s knowledge was completely adequate for his mission and doctrinal teaching.
Jesus possessedfinal authority. Christ claimed, with absolute and final authority, that whatever he taught came from God. “Heaven and earth will pass away but my word will not pass away” (Matt. 24:35). Jesus proclaimed that “all things have been delivered to me by my Father” (Matt. 11:27). He told his disciples to teach others “to observe all that I have commanded you” (Matt. 28:18-19). Jesus claimed that the very destiny of people hung on his words (Matt. 7:24-26) and that his words would be the basis for judgment (John 12:48). The emphatic “Amen, amen” or “Truly, truly” is used to preface his teachings twenty-five times in John alone. In Matthew, he declared that not a single stroke would pass from the law that he had come to fulfill. Then, throughout the rest of Matthew 5, Jesus placed his own words on a par with that law. He claimed that his words bring eternal life (John 5:24) and vowed that his teaching came from the Father, declaring, “The things I have heard from him [the Father], these I speak to the world” (John 8:26). Despite the fact that he was a human being on earth, Christ accepted acknowledgment as deity (e.g., Matt. 28:18; John 9:38).
Conclusion. The most reasonable conclusion is that Jesus’s teachings possessed divine authority. Despite the necessary limitations involved in a human incarnation, there is no error or misunderstanding in what Christ taught. Whatever limits there were in the extent of Jesus’s knowledge, there were no errors in what he did teach. The limits involved things about which he did not speak, such as the time of his return to earth (Matt. 24:36). There were no limits in terms of errors on what he did speak. For he did speak only the truth. So just as Jesus was fully human, yet his moral character was without flaw (Heb. 4:15), likewise he was finite in human knowledge and yet without factual error in what he taught (John 8:40, 46). Whatever Jesus taught came from God and carried divine authority.
Sources
N. L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics, chap. 18.
J. W. Wenham, Christ and the Bible, chap. 2.
Locke, John. The Life and Works of Locke. Locke was born in Somersetshire, England, in 1632 and died in 1704. He disliked his scholastic training but read and enjoyed Rene *Descartes and Francis Bacon. His work on tolerance strongly influenced the American Revolution—Thomas
*Jefferson in particular.
Locke’s main writings included An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695).
Locke’s Prooffor the Existence of God. Locke’s proof for the existence of God follows the line of the traditional *cosmological argument.
1. Something exists. For example, I exist (which is known by intuition). Further, the world exists (which is known by sensation).
2. This something that exists comes
a. from itself,
b. from nothing, or
c. from another.
3. But only something can cause something. Something cannot be caused by nothing.
4. There cannot be an *infinite series of causes of the existence of the world. If there were, the whole world would rest on nothing. But this is impossible, for in this case (since nothing cannot cause something) the world would never have come into existence.
5. Therefore, there must be a First Cause of my existence and the world.
6. This eternal being must be most powerful and most knowing.
It must be most powerful because it is the source of all power, and it must be most knowing because the cognitive cannot arise from the noncognitive. Locke believed it was ridiculous to say everything else has a mind behind it except the universe.
The Defense of Christianity. Building on his rational *theism, Locke argued in the tradition of classical apologetics (see Classical Apologetics). In his Reasonableness of Christianity, he defended the existence of miracles. In his two Vindications (1695, 1697), he defended what he said in the Reasonableness of Christianity.
The Defense of the Supernatural. Locke was neither a deist (see Deism) nor a Socinian who denied the resurrection (see Resurrection, Evidence for). He defended miracles, as well as the Bible as the Word of God (see Bible, Evidence for). He believed the Bible could be defended by reason but that it contained mysteries of the Christian faith that go beyond reason.
The Deity of Christ. He also defended Christ’s deity (see Christ, Deity of), claiming, “We see the people justified their believing in him, i.e., their believing him to be the Messiah, because of the miracles he did” (Reasonableness of Christianity, [58] 1). He added of Jesus, “He was sent by God: His miracles shew it” (ibid., 242). There is a conspicuous absence of discussion on the Trinity. However, absence does not necessarily mean denial. Though Locke admits in a letter to Limborch that he said some things to please the deists (see Deism), he explicitly denied Arianism
Locke’s View of Ethics and Government. Locke held that the law of nature teaches us that “being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker” (Essay Concerning Toleration, 2.6).
This same view was expressed by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence (1776) when he wrote, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
Sources
J. G. Clapp, "Locke, John.”
J. Collins, A History of Modern European Philosophy.
J. Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
--,An Essay Concerning Toleration.
-, The Reasonableness of Christianity.
Logical Positivism. Logical positivism is a school of thought that operated during the 1920s within a circle of Vienna philosophers that included A. J. *Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and Moritz Schlick. They took an antimetaphysical stand and developed a principle of empirical verification by which all but tautologies and empirical statements were considered meaningless.
This view held devastating implications for Christianity, since neither the existence nor attributes of God could be meaningfully stated. All God-talk was pronounced to be literally nonsense (see Analogy, Principle of; Wittgenstein, Ludwig). This view is sometimes called *acognosticism or semantical atheism
Roots of the principle of empirical verifiability are found in David *Hume’s empirical skepticism In the last line of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume wrote:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume—of divinity or school of metaphysics, for instance—let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quality or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. (Hume, 173)
If Hume is correct, then there are two kinds of meaningful statements: (1) those true by definition (analytic), and (2) those known to be true through the senses (synthetic). Only definitional and sensible sensory statements are meaningful. All the rest are literally nonsense.
In the English-speaking world, Ayer was a zealous proponent of this view. He formulated Hume’s conclusion into the principle of empirical verifiability, which stated in its original form that there are only two kinds of meaningful propositions. Later, Ayer rejected his earlier view and became a realist.
Logical positivism died by its own sword (see Feigel). The principle of empirical verifiability is not empirically verifiable. Every attempt to broaden it destroys its effectiveness. Hence, logical positivism cannot be used to exclude metaphysical statements, including statements about God (see Metaphysics; Analogy, Principle of).
Sources
A. J. Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.
--, Language, Truth, and Logic.
--, The Problem of Knowledge.
H. Feigel, "Logical Positivism after Thirty-Five Years.”
F. Ferre, Language, Logic and God.
A. Flew, New Essays in Philosophical Theology.
N. L. Geisler and W. Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, chap. 12.
D. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Logic and God. Logic deals with the methods of valid thinking. It reveals how to draw proper conclusions from premises and is a prerequisite of all thought. In fact, it builds from fundamental laws of reality and truth, the principles that make rational thought possible (see First Principles). Logic is such an indispensable and inescapable tool for all thought that even those who eschew it still use logical forms to argue for their rejection of it (see Fideism).
The three fundamental laws of all rational thought are:
1. the law of noncontradiction (A is not non-A)
2. the law of identity (A is A)
3. the law of excluded middle (either A or non-A)
Each serves an important function. Without the law of noncontradiction, we could say that God is God, and God is the devil. Unless the law of identity is binding, there can be no unity or identity. Without it there is no difference in stating, “I ami” or “I am a chair.” If the law of excluded middle does not hold, then opposites could both be true.
Beyond these basic principles, there are the principles of valid inference. These inferences traditionally were classed under deductive or inductive logic (see Inductive Method), or under transcendental arguments. All of these, however, use some form of the three basic laws.
Logic and God. If logic is the basis of all thought, it is the basis of all thought about God (theology). Some object that this makes God subject to logic. But God is sovereign and not subject to anything beyond himself. So how can thought about God be subject to logic?
In one sense, God is not subject to logic; rather, our statements about God are subservient to logic. All rational statements must be logical. Since theology purports to make rational statements, theological statements are subject to rules of rational thought, as are any other statements.
In another sense, God indeed is subject to logic, but not because there is something more ultimate than he. Since logic represents the principles of rational thought and since God is a rational Being, God is subject to his own rational nature. Insofar as logic manifests reason, it flows from the very nature of God, and God is subject to his own nature. Indeed, he cannot act contrary to it, ethically or logically. For example, “It is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18). Likewise, it is impossible for God to contradict himself. Both violate his basic nature (see God, Nature of).
God is subject not only to his own rational self-consistency but also to logic that is derived from it. For we could not even begin to think about or talk about God without the law of noncontradiction. In this sense, logic is prior to God in that we need to use logic before we can even think about him rationally. Logic is prior to God in the order of knowing, but God is prior to logic in the order of being. Logic is prior to God epistemologically, but God is prior to logic ontologically.
To object that this makes God subject to our logic sets up a faulty dichotomy. Logic is logic; it is not “our” logic as opposed to “his.” Ours is based on his. God’s rational nature is the basis of our rational nature. He made it that way so we could understand something about him The law of noncontradiction applies to God’s thoughts as well as to ours. People did not invent it; they discovered it.
Rationality versus Rationalism. Others protest that making truths about God subject to human reason is a form of *rationalism (see Epistemology; Spinoza, Benedict). However, this objection overlooks several important things. First, God is not being subjected to our reason. God is the author of reason, and he created us to be like himself. So the basic principles of reason are not arbitrarily imposed on God; rather, they come from God (see Faith and Reason).
Second, the basic laws of reason are not opposed to God’s revelation; they are an essential part of God’s general revelation Human rationality, with its basic laws, is a manifestation of God’s rationality. God is rational, and humans are made in his image. So using logic is not opposed to revelation; it is part of it.
Third, even special revelation (see Revelation, Special) cannot be known or communicated apart from logic. We would not even be able to distinguish the revelation from God from that of the devil unless the law of noncontradiction is valid. Furthermore, when the Bible reveals that “God so loved the world,” we could not know that love is not hate unless the law of noncontradiction is valid. So logic is essential to special revelation (see Revelation, Special) as well as to general revelation (see Revelation, General).
Finally, there is a difference between using reason and being a rationalist. A rationalist tries to determine all truth by human reason. A reasonable Christian merely uses reason to discover truth that God has revealed, either by general revelation or by special revelation in the Bible (see Bible, Evidence for).
Logic and Aristotle. Some critics of traditional logic object that *Aristotle invented logic, and there is no reason we must accept his Western form of logic over an “Eastern” type that does not use the law of noncontradiction. However, Aristotle did not invent logic; he discovered it. The laws of rational thought were in operation eternally in God and from the very beginning in rational creatures. Aristotle only articulated them
This criticism also implies that “Eastern” thought can avoid using logic. But as we have seen, the basic laws of thought are inescapable for all rational beings, whatever their culture and worldview. No “Eastern” philosopher (see Zen Buddhism) can even think or speak without using the law of noncontradiction. The very denial of this law employs the law in its denial. It is literally undeniable.
Many Kinds of Logic. Others object that there are many kinds of logic. Why choose just one kind and make it the norm for all kinds? In response, it need only be noted that while there are many kinds of logic (deductive, inductive, symbolic, etc.), nonetheless, all forms of logic depend on the basic rational principles of thought stated above. For example, no valid form of logic can operate apart from the principle of noncontradiction. If contradictories can be true, then thought itself is impossible. But we cannot deny thought without thinking. Hence, denying the laws of thought is literally unthinkable.
Logic and Omnipotence. The Bible says that “nothing is impossible for God” (Matt. 19:26). He is all-powerful (omnipotent), and an omnipotent Being can do anything. Therefore, it would seem that God could violate the law of noncontradiction if he wished. However, this is based on a misconception. When the Bible declares that God can do what is impossible, it does not refer to what is actually impossible but to what is humanly impossible.
Further, omnipotence does not imply that God can do what is contradictory. If it did, then God could cease being God. But it is impossible for the Uncreated to decide that he wants to be created. It is impossible for a Necessary Being (which cannot cease to be) to decide it does not want to be. God cannot contradict his own nature. So omnipotence does not mean that God can do literally anything. The Bible says that “it is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18; cf. 2 Tim. 2:13). And just as God cannot contradict his moral nature, so he cannot contradict his rational nature. Indeed, omnipotence only means that God can do anything that is not actually contradictory or impossible. For example, God cannot make a square circle. Neither can he make a stone so heavy he cannot lift it. For if he can make it, then he can move it. He doesn’t even have to “move” it. All he would have to do is to destroy it and re-create it wherever he wanted it to be.
Logic and Miracles. God created natural laws, yet he can transcend them by miracles (see Miracle). God engineered the law of gravity and the viscosity of liquids, but Jesus walked on water. Why can’t the laws of logic be broken like the laws of physics?
First, this is an invalid analogy. Laws of nature are descriptive, whereas logical laws, like ethical laws, are prescriptive. That is, laws of logic tell us how we ought to reason in order to conform our thought to how things really are. Like moral laws, they are universal prescriptions (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). Everyone should reason that if all triangles have three sides and this figure is a triangle, then it has three sides. There are no exceptions; everyone should come to this conclusion. Laws of physics are descriptive generalizations. They merely inform us about the way things are; they do not exhort us about how something ought to be. As descriptions of the way things usually occur, they admit of exceptions. A miracle is an exception. As such, it does not contradict the general law. The comparison between physical laws and laws of thought is invalid.
Further, God did not create laws of logic. They manifest his uncreated nature. God is rational, and there are certain basic principles of rationality that cannot change any more than God can change his own essential nature. The laws of physics are not so. Presumably, God could have created other kinds of worlds, with other kinds of laws. The law of gravity, for example, applies in a material universe. It does not apply to angels with no physical bodies.
Logic and the Mysteries of Faith. Some object that the great Christian mysteries, such as the Trinity, the incarnation (see Christ, Deity of), and predestination (see Free Will), violate laws of human reason. There is a difference between propositions that go beyond reason, such as mysteries of the faith, and those that go against reason. Those that go beyond human ability to reason do not go against reason. Human understanding unaided by special revelation cannot reach them They can only be known by special revelation. Once these truths are known, their premises do not contradict other revealed truth.
Logic and the Trinity. The doctrine of the *Trinity affirms three persons in one essence. It does not claim that there are three persons in one Person or three essences in one Essence. These would be logical contradictions.
Logic and the Incarnation. The incarnation does not claim that God became human. The Infinite cannot become finite, or the Necessary contingent. Rather, it affirms that the second person of the Godhead became man. Jesus assumed a human nature without laying his deity aside. Thus, the incarnation was not the subtraction of deity but the addition of his humanity. Two natures in one person is not a contradiction. Two natures in one nature or two persons in one Person would be, but not two natures sharing one Person. It is a mystery; it is not a contradiction.
Logic and Predestination. Neither is predestination and free choice a logical contradiction. It is not contradictory to assert that God has predetermined who will be saved, as long as he predetermined that it would be accomplished through their free choice. What would be contradictory is to claim that God forced people to freely accept him, since forced freedom is logically incompatible. But to claim that God knowingly determined how he would effect salvation by his grace and through our free choice is not a logical contradiction. It is a mystery but not a logical contradiction (see Free Will).
Sources
Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations.
--, Posterior Analytics.
--, Prior Analytics.
--, Topics.
I. M. Copi, Introduction to Logic.
N. L. Geisler and R. Brooks, Come Let Us Reason.
Logos Theory. The Greek word logos means “word, speech, explanation, principle, or reason.” In Greek philosophy, the concept of logos had varying meanings. Heraclitus considered it the rational law governing the universe. Anaxagoras saw it as the principle of intelligence in the universe, though he called it nous (“mind”), as did *Plato. For the stoics the logos was the principle of all rationality in the universe. But shortly before the New Testament was written, the Jewish philosopher *Philo (30 BC-AD 45) described the logos as the image of God, which was distinct from God and an intermediate between God and the world (Edwards). Later, in the third century, *Plotinus made the logos or nous a lower-level emanation from the One (God).
The use of the logos on a lower level from God led some early Fathers, such as *Origen, to assign less than full deity to Christ. This became the basis of Arianism, which was opposed by *Athanasius (see Christ, Deity of). Some scholars have assumed that John’s Gospel (1:1) borrowed from this Greek usage of logos and, hence, did not teach the full deity of Christ.
There is no reason, however, to suppose John is depicting something inferior to God in the logos. John declares clearly and emphatically that “the Logos was God” (John 1:1; see also 8:58; 10:30; 20:28). John’s concept of the Logos is of a personal being (Christ), whereas the Greeks thought of it as an impersonal rational principle. The Logos is referred to by personal pronouns, such as he (1:1) and his (1:14). This was not true of the Greek logos.
According to John, the Logos “became flesh” (1:14). To combine logos (reason) or nous (mind) and flesh was contrary to Greek thought. Flesh was either evil, as in *Gnosticism, or nearly evil, as in Platonic or Plotinian (see Plotinus) thought. Only in the Judeo-Christian tradition was matter or flesh thought respectable in any sense. Christians saw it as so good as to be worthy of clothing God in the incarnation.
The Old Testament, not Greek ideas, is the root of New Testament ideas. John, as all New Testament writers (except maybe Luke) were Jews. The root of their thought was in Judaism They cite the Old Testament hundreds of times. Hence, it is contrary to the Jewish background and thought of the New Testament writers to use Greek sources for their theological ideas.
The New Testament is a theistic (see Theism) book, whereas Greek thought was polytheistic and pantheistic (see Pantheism). We would not expect John to borrow from such a worldview to express his ideas. The Old Testament spoke of the coming Messiah who was God (Ps. 110:1; Isa. 9:6; 45:6; Zech. 12:10), who would come inhuman flesh, suffer, and rise physically from the dead (cf. Isa. 53). Never did Greek religion or philosophy teach this doctrine. Claims that Christianity borrowed from pagan ideas or gods are unsubstantiated (see Mithraism; Resurrection Claims in Non-Christian Religions).
Sources
G. H. Clark, Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy.
P. Edwards, "Logos.”
W. R. Inge, "Logos.”
J. G. Machen, The Origin of Paul's Religion.
R. Nash, Christianity and the Hellenistic World.
Philo,De Vita Contemplativa.
F. E. Walton, Development of the Logos Doctrine in Greek and Hebrew Thought.
Luther, Martin. Martin Luther (1483-1546), the great German Reformer, was not known as an apologist—he was too preoccupied with reforming the church However, he said nothing, properly understood, that would negate the consistent use of reason by the classical apologists (see Classical Apologetics) in defending the faith
Reason Condemned. Luther declared that human reason is that God-given faculty by which humans are distinguished from brute beasts (disputatio de homine). Luther was concerned that human reason not be substituted for the gospel, as were the other great teachers of the church The Augsburg Confession (art. 2) condemns the belief that anyone can be justified “by his own strength and reason” Martin Chemnitz added, “Reason of itself and from events cannot establish anything concerning the love of God toward us” (Chemnitz, 609). These deprecating statements about human reason must be seen in proper context (see Faith and Reason).
First, they were made in the context of someone trying to attain salvation by personal strength rather than by the merit of Christ and grace through faith. Human reason cannot attain salvation. Only the gospel brings salvation. However, this is not to say that reason cannot be used to defend the gospel. Second, Luther believed the redemptive love of God cannot be established by reason. This is not to say that the existence of God cannot be established by reason (see Cosmological Argument). Indeed, among the great classical apologists was *Augustine, Luther’s philosophical and theological mentor.
Reason in Lutheran Theology. While Luther himself, preoccupied as he was with salvation, developed neither an apologetic nor a systematic theology, his colleague, Philipp Melancthon, did both. Melancthon and other Lutheran Reformers used classical apologetics to develop proofs for the existence of God. Chemnitz speaks of the validity of teachings derived from Scripture “by way of good, certain, firm and clear reasoning” (ibid., 249). Luther’s own polemics are tightly constructed of cogently reasoned arguments.
Of course, reason can be, as Luther said, the “tool of the devil” when used in opposition to God.
But the stand on Scripture by the Lutheran Reformers and modern Lutheran scholars reveals a tradition of reasoned theology and apologetics. L. S. Keyser (A System of Christian Evidence) was a representative of such a view, as is John Warwick Montgomery in his numerous works defending the Christian faith.