J. M. Allegro, The Treasure of the Copper Scroll.
G. L. Archer Jr .,A Survey of Old Testament Introduction, app. 4.
D. Barthelemy and J. T. Milik, Ten Years of Discovery in the Judean Desert.
T. S. Coss, Secrets from the Caves.
K. Elliger and W. Rudolph, eds.,Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia.
N. L. Geisler, "Bible Manuscripts.”
N. L. Geisler and W. E. Nix, A General Introduction to the Bible.
N. Glueck, Rivers in the Desert.
M. Goshen-Gottstein, "Biblical Manuscripts in the United States.”
R. L. Harm, Inspiration and Canonicity of the Bible.
P. E. Kahle, The Cairo Geniza.
F. G. Kenyon, The Bible and Archaeology.
R. Kittel and P. Kahle, eds.,Biblia Hebraica.
M. Mansoor, 'The Dead Sea Scrolls.”
J. C. Trever, "The Discovery of the Scrolls.”
G. Vermes, The Dead Sea Scrolls in English.
E. Wiirthwein, The Text of the Old Testament.
Ontological Argument. The ontological argument for the existence or being (Gk. ontos) of God proceeds from the mere idea that God is an absolutely perfect or Necessary Being. The ontological argument was first formed by *Anselm (1033-109), although he did not name it. It has been subject to extensive criticism by both defenders of theistic arguments (see Thomas Aquinas) and opponents (see Hume, David; Kant, Immanuel). Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the first to call it the ontological argument because he believed it made an illicit transition from thought to being (ontos).
Anselm’s Form(s). The ontological argument might more accurately be called “the proof from prayer,” since it came to Anselm as he meditated on the nature of God. It is widely believed that Anselm developed two forms of the ontological argument. The second emerged in his debate with another monk named Gaunilo.
The first form of the ontological argument is based on the idea of God as an absolutely perfect Being. One cannot conceive of a greater being (see Plantinga, Ontological Argument, 3-27). In logical form, it is:
1. God is, by definition, a Being, greater than which nothing can be conceived.
2. It is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the mind.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality. If he didn’t, he wouldn’t be the greatest being possible.
The second form of the argument comes from the idea of a Necessary Being:
1. God is, by definition, a Necessary Being.
2. It is logically necessary to affirm what is necessary to the concept of a Necessary Being.
3. Existence is logically necessary to the concept of a Necessary Being.
4. Therefore, a Necessary Being (= God) necessarily exists.
Objections. Anselm ,s Debate with Gaunilo. Gaunilo contended that the argument is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must also exist in reality outside the mind. Anselm responded that this is not so. Only in the case of an absolutely perfect being, which would have to be a Necessary Being, is it true that, if it is conceivable, then it must exist outside the mind too. All contingent beings could not exist. Only a Necessary Being cannot not exist.
Gaunilo also contended that the mere idea of a perfect island did not guarantee its existence, nor does the idea of a perfect Being. But Anselm insisted that there is an important difference; the idea of a perfect island may lack existence, but not the idea of a perfect Being. It is possible for an island— even a perfect one—not to exist. But it is not possible for a perfect (Necessary) Being not to exist.
Aquinas ,s Objection. The ontological argument did not convince *Thomas Aquinas. His objection to Anselm’s argument can be seen in his restatement of Anselm’s argument:
1. God is, by definition, a Being, greater than which nothing can be conceived.
2. What exists both mentally and actually is greater than that which exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually, for once the sentence “God exists” is understood, it is seen to be a self-evident proposition.
Aquinas offers three objections to this argument. First, not everyone understands the term “God” to mean “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Second, even if God is understood this way, it does not prove that he actually exists but only that the conception exists mentally. This point gets to the heart of the common objectionto the ontological argument. Third, the proposition “God, a Necessary Being, exists” is self-evident in itself, but it is not self-evident to us. For we cannot know God’s essence directly but only through his effects (see Cosmological Argument). Hence, we can only arrive at his existence through his effects, a posteriori. We cannot know it a priori in itself.
Only God knows his own essence intuitively. This too is more to the central point of criticism
Descartes ,s Form of the Argument. Not much advanced in the dialogue over the ontological argument for centuries. Then the seventeenth-century rationalist Rene *Descartes (1596-1650) set off a series of criticisms by reformulating and defending the argument. His statement followed Anselm’s second form:
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept what is essential to its nature (e.g., a triangle must have three sides).
2. But existence is logically necessary to the nature of a Necessary Existent (i.e., Being).
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a Necessary Existent does exist.
Critiques of Descartes ,s Argument. Descartes had his antagonists. Caterus, a priest, insisted that the argument proves only a conceptual existence of God. For the complex of words “existent lion” is conceptually necessary, but this does not prove that a lion exists. Only experience can do that. Thus, the complex “Necessary Being” does not prove that God exists. Pierre Gassendi argued that God need not exist any more than must a triangle. The essence of either can be thought of apart from its existence.
The main critiques of the ontological argument came from David *Hume and Immanuel *Kant. Hume argued that Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction, for if it leaves open any other possibility, then this position is not necessarily true. But whatever we conceive to exist we can also conceive as nonexistent. The existence or nonexistence of things cannot be ruled out conceptually. The most definitive and lasting critique came from Kant, who argued that existence is not a property or a predicate since it adds nothing to the conception of an essence and is not part of that essence. A real dollar does not have any characteristics that an imagined one lacks. Hence, it is possible to think of God without this property of existence.
Findlay’s Ontological Disproof. The ontological argument took a radical turn with the attempt of some atheists to turn it into a disproof for God’s existence (see God, Alleged Disproofs of). The ontological argument is widely rejected in modern times. Some have even turned the tables on it, making it a kind of ontological disproof of God. Such was the intention of J. N. Findlay, who argued (see Plantinga, Ontological Argument, 111-22) that:
1. The only way God could exist is if he exists necessarily (any kind of existence less than necessary would make him less than God).
2. But nothing can exist necessarily (for necessity does not apply to existence but only to propositions).
3. Therefore, God cannot exist (for the only way he could exist is the very way he cannot exist).
In the second form, the fallacies of the argument become apparent. We will pass by the objectionto premise 1 from the vantage point of *finite godism(that God does not have to be conceived as necessarily existing), since the subject here is whether or not the traditional theistic conception of an absolutely perfect Being is correct. The theist would challenge premises 2 and 3.
Charles Hartshorne’s Restatement. After such a checkered history, this venerable argument for theism has lived to see a new day. One of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument is the panentheist Charles Hartshorne. His statement and defense of the argument in full view of all the traditional criticisms are instructive (see Plantinga, 123-35). Hartshorne states the argument:
1. The existence of a Necessary Being is
a. impossible, and there is no example of it
b. possible, but there is no example of it
c. possible, and there is an example of it
2. But premise b is meaningless, like saying there is a round square, for a Necessary Being
cannot be merely a possible being.
3. And premise a is not eliminated by the ontological argument as such, but the meaningfulness of
the term Necessary Being is a justifiable assumption that may be defended on other grounds.
Norman Malcolm is often credited with reviving the ontological argument in a more viable form, although Hartshorne’s work on it said the same thing some twenty years earlier. Malcolm restates Anselm’s second argument:
1. The existence of a Necessary Being must be
a. a necessary or “must-be” existence
b. an impossible, “cannot-be” existence
c. a possible, “may-or-may-not-be” existence
2. But the existence of a Necessary Being is not an impossible existence.
3. Therefore, a Necessary Being necessarily exists.
Plantinga’s Attempt Fails. Alvin Plantinga attempted to revive the ontological argument based on modal logic. He insists that something necessarily exists in all possible worlds. Hence, there must be a Necessary Being. However, this too fails since it begs the question. For he admits that no world at all is not a “possible world.” If this is so, then the argument begs the question by assuming that something must necessarily exist. The truth is that the ontological argument is invalid for the same reason that the following argument is invalid:
1. If there is a triangle, then it must have three sides.
2. This is a triangle.
3. Therefore, this must have three sides.
So, yes, if a triangle exists, then it must have three sides. But it does not have to exist. Likewise, if God exists, then he must exist necessarily. But it begs the question to say God exists.
Conclusion. The ontological argument has taken many forms. Each, however, seems to be invalid. The only feasible way to make it valid (if it can be made valid at all) is to assume or affirm that something exists. And once one argues, “Something exists, therefore God exists,” he has really argued cosmologically. The ontological argument by itself, without borrowing the premise “Something exists,” cannot possibly prove the existence of God. For it is always logically possible that nothing ever existed, and, hence, it is not logically necessary to affirm that God exists.
Some have suggested that our conclusion is invalid because the very concept of “nothing” is negative and thus presupposes that something exists. If this is correct, they contend, then our contention that “it is logically possible that nothing ever existed” is wrong. This objection, however, confuses the concept of nonbeing (which does presuppose the concept of being) and a state of nonbeing that does not presuppose a state of being. We are referring to the logical possibility of the state of nothingness, not to the concept of nothingness.
It would appear that no valid ontological proof has been given that makes it rationally inescapable to conclude that there is a Necessary Being. On the other hand, neither has anyone made a successful ontological disproof of God, making it logically impossible that there is a God. Necessary to a valid theistic argument is the premise that “something exists or existed.” One who argues that “something exists, therefore God exists” has left the purely a priori ontological approach and has moved into an a posteriori cosmological approach.
If one could somehow validate a theistic argument by importing the undeniable premise that “something exists” and arguing from this that “something necessarily exists,” it still is a long way from this to the simple and absolutely perfect Being of Christian theism. It is interesting to note that three views of God have been concluded from the same kind of ontological argument, and others feel a fourth may be inferred. Descartes and Leibniz concluded a theistic God. Spinoza argued to a pantheistic God. Hartshorne ended with a panentheistic God (see Panentheism). It is also suggested that, apart from importing some kind of Platonic premise, the ontological argument yields polytheistic gods (see Polytheism). Even many atheists are willing to recognize the universe is somehow necessary, but in no way do they identify it with God. Since the positions are mutually exclusive, it follows that they cannot all be true.
In order to defend theism, one must apparently go beyond the ontological argument. For the ontological argument alone apparently does not designate which kind of God (or gods) is found at the conclusion.
Sources
R. Descartes ,Meditations on First Philosophy.
N. L. Geisler, 'The Missing Premise in the Ontological Argument.”
N. L. Geisler and W. Corduan, Philosophy of Religion.
G. E. Hughes, "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?”
A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity.
---, ed., The Ontological Argument.
B. Spino/a. Ethics.
Ontology. Ontology is the study (logos) of being (ontos). It is the study of reality. It answers the question “What is real?” as ethics answers the question “What is right?” as aesthetics answers the question “What is beautiful?” and epistemology answers the question “What is true?”
Ontology and metaphysics are used interchangeably. Both study being as being or the real as real. They are the disciplines that deal with ultimate reality.
Open Theism. See Neotheism.
Origen. Origen (185-254) was an early church father and apologist for Christianity. He was heavily influenced by Platonic (see Plato; Plotinus) and Gnostic (see Gnosticism) thought. As a consequence, his defense of the faith tended to sacrifice important teachings. He denied the historicity of crucial sections of Scripture; he taught the preexistence of the soul and universalism (the belief that all will eventually be saved; see “Heathen,” Salvation of) and denied that Jesus was raised from the dead in a physical body (see Resurrection, Physical Nature of). These positions were condemned as heretical by later church councils.
Origen was an early second-century Christian writer from Alexandria, Egypt. He studied eleven years with Neoplatonist Ammonius Saccas, where he was a classmate of Plotinus (205-70). Origen headed up a catechetical school in Alexandria (211-32) and later founded a school in Caesarea.
His many works include the Hexapla, a six-column comparison of various Greek and Hebrew renditions of the Old Testament. Unfortunately, no copies of this great work survive. He also wrote Contra Celsus, an apologetic work answering the philosopher Celsus, and De Principiis, a major theological treatise.
The Bible. While Origen claimed that the Bible was divinely inspired, he did not accept the complete historicity of Scripture, nor did he interpret it all literally. Like others in the Alexandrian school of interpretation, he often allegorized crucial sections of Scripture. For example, he claimed that the story of Adam and Eve was to be taken figuratively. He also argued that the Gospels themselves are filled with the same kind of narratives, for example, the temptation of Jesus story {De Principiis, 4.1.16).
Unorthodox Doctrines. Origen argued for the preexistence and eternality of the soul. He was a universalist, believing that all will eventually be saved. He denied the physical nature of the resurrection body and held to Gnostic views of the soul, knowledge, and salvation. In about 400, the Council of Toledo condemned his view, declaring, “We believe verily, that there shall be a resurrection of the flesh of mankind” (Parker, 24, 26). And the Fourth Council of Toledo (663) added, “By whose death and blood we being made clear have obtained forgiveness of (our sins) and shall be raised up again by him in the last days in the same flesh wherein we now live, (and) in the manner wherein the same (our) Lord did rise again” (ibid., 26). Origen also denied the deity of Christ, claiming that Jesus has a subordinate status to the Father even to the point that he forfeited his deity while on earth. Origen wrote, “The Son of God, divesting Himself of His equality with the Father, and showing to us the way to the knowledge of Him, is made the express image of His person” {De Principiis, 1.2.8).
Evaluation. Origen was at best a mixed blessing for Christian apologetics. He did defend the basic inspiration and historicity of the Bible. He stressed the use of reason in defending early Christianity against the attacks of paganism and other false teachings. He was a textual scholar.
However, Origen’s negatives seem to outweigh the positives. He denied the inerrancy of the Bible, at least in practice {see Bible, Alleged Errors in). He taught *universalism, contrary to both Scripture and orthodox creeds. He taught the preexistence of the soul in contrast to the orthodox teaching of creation. He engaged in highly allegorical interpretation of Scripture, undermining important literal truths. He held an aberrant view on the nature of Christ, which gave rise to the later Arian heresy {see Christ, Deity of). He denied the tangible, physical nature of the resurrection body {see Resurrection, Evidence of; Resurrection, Physical Nature of) in contrast to the clear teaching of Scripture (Luke 24:39; Acts 2:31; 1 John 4:2) and the creeds (see Geisler, Battle for the Resurrection, chap. 5, and In Defense of the Resurrection, chap. 9).
Sources
C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria.
H. Bullinger and T. Harding, The Decades of Henry Bullinger.
J. Danielou, Origen.
W. Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology.
N. L. Geisler, The Battle for the Resurrection.
--, In Defense o f the Resurrection.
Origen, Contra Celsns.
--, On First Principles.
P. Schaff, ed.. A Select Library ofNicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. J. W. Trigg, Origen.
Origins, Science of. The belief that the universe and all forms of life were created by God is not considered true science by some because science deals with theories that can be verified by testing. There is no way to test creation, since it was a unique past singularity. This objection is based in a misunderstanding of two kinds of science: empirical and forensic. Operation science deals with the world as it now exists, and origin science with the past (Geisler and Kerby, chaps. 1, 6, 7). Operation science is an empirical science that deals with present regularities, but origin science is a forensic science that considers past singularities—the origin of the universe and life-forms.
Since there is no direct way to test a theory or model of origin science, it must be judged to be plausible or implausible based on how consistently and comprehensively it reconstructs the unobserved past in conformity with the available evidence. Operation science is based on principles of observation and repetition. The laws of physics and chemistry, for example, are based on the observation of recurring patterns of events. Such observations can be made with the unaided eye or with the aid of sensitive instruments, but observation of some sort is crucial. Likewise, there must be some repetition or recurring pattern. For no scientific analysis can be made on the basis of a singular event. Operation science is based on the repetition of similar patterns of events. Operation science involves not only present regularities but also future ones that can be projected. But no scientific trend or prediction can be made from a singular event.
The operation of the cosmos is studied by the operation science of cosmology. But the origin of the cosmos is the field of the science of cosmogony. The operational science of biology does not properly deal with the beginning of life but with its continuing functioning. How life began is for biogeny.
In distinguishing these two areas of investigation, it is important to note substantial differences even in the natural laws and processes they look at. Laws by which something operates today may not explain how it functioned at the beginning. It is difficult to know what factors even existed to interact with one another. A simple and obvious example is that the laws operating during the running of a windmill are not sufficient to produce that windmill. A windmill functions by purely natural laws of physics—pressure, motion, and inertia. Inertia, however, cannot create the design, weld the metal, assemble the wind-powered generator, or adjust the propeller blades. Someone had to come from outside the windmill system, bringing necessary know-how, plans, and manipulation of materials. Natural laws adequately explain why electricity is generated by a windmill on a continuing basis; they are insufficient to explain the commencement of the system
Only because things operate in a regular way is it possible to make observations and predictions based on them So a whole different approach and different goals are at work in a forensic science. One normally hears of forensic science in law enforcement, where scientists may attempt to reconstruct what happened to cause an unobserved death, for example. Some elements may be repeatable, but not the essential series of events, since the person at the center of those events is dead. But the lack of empirical science principles does not totally frustrate a scientific analysis of the death.
Forensic science has its own rules and principles. Using the evidence that remains (such as weapons, injury patterns, blood splatters, and fingerprints), the forensic scientist can make a plausible reconstruction of the original event. In a similar way, the origin scientist attempts to reconstruct the origin of the universe and the origin of life.
Principles of Origin Science. Besides the two obvious principles that every theory or model should be consistent and comprehensive, the most crucial principles of origin science are causality and uniformity (analogy) (ibid., 131-32).
Causality. Like the forensic scientist, the origin scientist believes that every event has an adequate cause (see Causality, Principle of; First Principles). This is true of unobserved as well as observed events. This principle has such universal acceptance that it scarcely needs justification. It is sufficient to note that *Aristotle said, “The wise man seeks causes.” Francis Bacon believed that true knowledge is “knowledge by causes” (Bacon, 2.2.121). Even the skeptic David *Hume agreed (Letters of David Hume, 1.187). It is self-evident to most rational beings that everything that comes to be had a cause. If this were not so, things would pop into and out of existence willy-nilly, but they do not. Indeed, without the principle of causality, no science would be possible.
It is an important aside to note that the principle of causality does not claim that everything has a cause. With the atheist (see Atheism) we agree that if matter (energy) is eternal and indestructible, then it does not need a cause. Only everything that begins—or is contingent—has a cause. If a Being is eternal and independent (whether it is the universe or God), then it does not need a cause. Causality applies to things that come to be; whatever just is, is uncaused.
Uniformity (Analogy). Generally stated, the scientific principle of uniformity affirms that “the present is the key to the past.” Applied more specifically to the question of past unobserved causes, the principle of uniformity (analogy) asserts that the cause of certain kinds of events now would have produced like effects in the past. Past events have causes similar to the causes of the present events.
The principle of uniformity derives its name from the uniform experience on which it is based. Repeated observation reveals that certain kinds of causes regularly produce certain kinds of events. For example, water flowing over small rolling rocks gradually wears the rock’s surface smooth and rounded. Wind on sand (or water) produces waves. Heavy rain on dirt results in erosion, and so on. These are natural, secondary causes. Their effects are produced by natural forces whose processes are an observable part of the ongoing operation of the physical universe.
However, the principle of uniformity should not be confused with uniformitarianism. That latter is a naturalistic (see Naturalism) presupposition, which wrongly assumes that all causes of events in the world must be natural causes. This both begs the question and is contrary to the best evidence for the origin of the universe (see Big Bang Theory; Evolution, Cosmic; Thermodynamics, Laws of). There is no reason to accept the premise that everything that happens in nature was caused by nature (see Naturalism; Miracle). After all, the natural world did not cause itself (see Cosmological Argument; Kalam Cosmological Argument). Even finite minds can intervene all the time in the natural world. There is no reason an infinite Mind cannot do the same.
In addition to secondary causes, there are primary causes. Intelligence is a primary cause. And the principle of uniformity (based on constant conjunction) informs us that certain kinds of effects come only from intelligent causes: language, projectile points, pottery, portraits, and symphonies. So convinced are we by previous repeated experience that only intelligence produces these kinds of effects that when we see even a single event that resembles one of these kinds of effects we invariably posit an intelligible cause for it. When we come across the words “John loves Mary” scratched into a beach, we never assume that waves did it. The question is whether the origin of the
first living organism (which we did not observe) was by a secondary (natural) cause or by a primary intelligent cause. The only scientific way to determine this is by analogy with our experience of what kind of cause regularly produces that kind of effect.
The principle of uniformity is an argument from analogy. It is an attempt to get at the unknown (past) through the known (present). Since we do not have direct access to the past, we can “know” it only by analogies with the present. This is how human history, earth history, and life history are reconstructed. Historical geology, for example, is totally dependent as a science on the principle of uniformity. Unless we can presently observe in nature or the laboratory certain kinds of causes producing certain kinds of events, we cannot validly reconstruct geological history. But since we can observe natural causes producing these kinds of effects today, we can postulate that similar natural causes produced similar effects in the geological record of the past. Archaeology as a science is possible only because we assume the principle of uniformity. Certain kinds of tools, art, or writing consistently say certain things about the intelligent beings who produced them Even simple projectile points lead us to claim what Indians produced them and when. They can be differentiated from pieces of flint or rock shaped by wind and water. When past remains contain writing, art, poetry, or music, we immediately insist they came from intelligent beings.
So whether the evidence calls for a secondary or primary cause, the principle of uniformity is the basis. Unless we have had a constant conjunction of a certain kind of cause with a certain kind of effect in the present, we have no grounds on which to apply the principle to past events known only from their remains.
Various Areas of Origin Science. Now that the basic principles of origin science are set forth, they can be applied to the three main areas of origin: the beginning of the universe, the emergence of first life, and the appearance of human (rational) beings. In each case, this yields a distinction between origin and operation science. Names already exist to distinguish them
|
Origin Science |
Operation Science | |
|
Universe |
Cosmogony |
Cosmology |
|
Life |
Biogeny |
Biology |
|
Humans |
Anthropogeny |
Anthropology |
The scientific evidence is presented elsewhere for the creationists’ view of cosmogony (see Evolution, Cosmic), biogeny (see Evolution, Chemical), and anthropogeny (see Evolution, Biological). Hence, it remains here simply to ask whether creation is a science.
Creation as Science. The belief that there is an intelligent Creator of the universe, first life, and new life-forms is just as scientific as the naturalistic views of macroevolutionary theory. Both are origin science, not operation science. Both deal with past singularities. Both take a forensic approach by reconstructing a plausible scenario of the past unobserved event in the light of the evidence that remains in the present. Both use the principles of causality and analogy. Both seek an appropriate explanation of the data. Both sometimes appeal to a primary (intelligent) cause to explain the data. Archaeology posits an intelligent cause for pottery. Anthropologists do the same for ancient tools. Likewise, when creationists see the same kind of specified complexity in a simple one-cell animal, such as the first living thing is supposed to be, they too posit an intelligent cause for it. Their view is as scientific in procedure as that of the evolutionists when they offer a natural explanation for the first living thing.
Likewise, the creationists’ view of the origin of the cosmos is as scientific as is the evolutionists’ position. Both use scientific evidence in the present. And both use the principle of causality. The creationist points to the evidence for the second law of thermodynamics, that the universe is running down, as evidence that it had a beginning, along with the other evidence for the *big bang theory. This, combined with the principle of causality, yields the conclusion that:
1. The cosmos had a beginning.
2. Everything that begins had a cause.
3. Therefore, the cosmos had a cause (see Kalam Cosmological Argument).
Objections to Origin Science. Two basic objections to origin science surface repeatedly. The first has to do with the scientific method as such and the second with the origin of a scientific model.
Naturalism in the Scientific Approach. At this point, it is often objected by the evolutionists that the creationist approach is not scientific because it appeals to a supernatural cause. Evolutionists assume only natural causes. Hence, the creationists’ view is disqualified, even as an origin science. This objection is a classic case of begging the issue. Who said science can allow only natural causes for phenomena in the natural world? This move is invalid, for it eliminates creation by definition.
One could, by the same move, demand that there are only supernatural causes for all events and eliminate all natural causes by definition (see Miracles, Arguments Against). It is a form of methodological *naturalism While it may admit the existence of a supernatural realm, it insists that the scientific method must permit only natural causes. While this may be true of operation science, it is not so of origin science.
Eliminating an intelligent cause of the world and life as a scientific explanation is contrary to the origin and early history of science. Most founders of modern science were creationists who believed that the scientific evidence pointed to an intelligent supernatural Creator of the universe and life. To redefine science so as to eliminate the possibility of an intelligent cause is contrary to the very commencement and character of modern science itself.
A scientific approach should go where the evidence leads, even if it leads to a supernatural cause. What is scientific about an approach that refuses to conclude that there exists the kind of cause to which the evidence points? Should an archaeologist refuse to accept anything but a natural cause for art it unearths?
The only adequate cause for the origin of life and the universe is a supernatural one. After all, if— as all the evidence indicates—the whole natural world had a beginning, then the Cause must have been beyond nature (see Kalam Cosmological Argument). That, by definition, means supernatural. By what logic does one cease to draw the logical conclusion simply because one wishes to posit a stipulative definition of “science” so as to exclude that kind of cause from the realm of science?
Even if one stubbornly insists, for whatever reason, to exclude all but natural causes from the word science, that does not invalidate supernatural causes or their study. They simply move to another area of intellectual endeavor, be it “philosophy” or whatever. Science is simply impoverished in its own search for truth. There is no valid reason supernatural explanations should be excluded from an academic endeavor interested in finding and teaching the truth about our world.
The Origin of a Scientific Model. Some opponents of origin science insist that the creation model is taken from a religious document, the Bible, and religion has no place in science. While one may object that teaching the Bible in a public school science class is a religious exercise, this objection overlooks a very important distinction: The origin of a scientific theory has no relation to its validity.
Some widely accepted scientific findings have had religious sources. Nikola Tesla (1856-1943) got the idea of the alternating current motor from a vision he had while reading the pantheistic poet Goethe. The model for the benzene molecule was invented by Kekule after seeing a vision of a snake biting its tail. No scientists would reject these scientific findings simply because of their religious source. Likewise, no one should reject the idea of an intelligent Creator of the universe and life simply because it has a religious source. The question is not where the idea came from but whether it adequately explains the facts. And an intelligent Creator does adequately explain the origin of the universe and life.
A “Flat Earth ” View. Many who oppose calling creation a scientific view insist that to do so is to open the door for teaching the “flat earth” view as science too. But this is clearly not the case.
Whether the earth is square or spherical is a matter of operation, not origin science, since the shape of the earth is subject to repeated verification and observation. The ongoing shape of the earth has nothing to do with the question of its origin. There is no need to allow the flat earth view to be taught as science, since it has been scientifically disproven. This can be said of few theories, but the “square earth” view is factually false. And there is no reason to allow something that has been falsified to be taught as a legitimate scientific view.
This is not the case with creation, since no one has factually disproven that there could have been an intelligent cause of the universe and life (see God, Alleged Disproofs of). Indeed, there is more plausible evidence for a Creator {see Cosmological Argument) and Designer {see Teleological Argument; Anthropic Principle) of the cosmos than for naturalistic evolution {see Evolution, Biological).
Creation and Other Religious Views. If one allows the biblical view of creation into science, it is said, the Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, and other religious views must be allowed in as well. But scientific creationism is not a religious point of view; it is a scientific view that appeals only to scientific evidence to support its conclusions. Simply because the idea for a scientific view comes from a religious book does not mean that the view is religious. As noted above, the source of many scientific views was religious, but the nature of the views was not. The implication that allowing creation to be taught alongside evolution would allow an endless number of other views of origin is not the case. Basically, there are two explanations of events of origin: Either the universe had an intelligent cause or a nonintelligent cause. Either the cause is natural or supernatural. All views of origin, whether Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, or Judeo-Christian, fall into one of these two broad categories. Whether the Cause of the Universe is to be worshiped or how to do so are religious questions and do not come under the purview of origin science.
*Aristotle posited an Unmoved Mover (an Uncaused Cause), but he never considered it an object of religious devotion. It was simply a rational explanation for what he observed in the world. Likewise, *Plato had a Demiurgos creator, but it was posited as a philosophical necessity, not as an object of religion.
Sources
F. Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings.
P. Davis and D. H. Kenyon, Of Pandas and People.
W. Dembski and J. Wells, The Design of Life.
N. L. Geisler, Knowing the Truth about Creation.
N. L. Geisler and J. Kerby, Origin Science.
D. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
---, The Letters of David Hume.
P. Johnson, Reason in the Balance.
S. C. Meyer, Signature in the Cell.
J. P. Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science.
--, ed., The Creation Hypothesis.
N. R. Pearcey and C. B. Thaxton, The Soul of Science.
C. B. Thaxton et al., The Mystery of Life's Origin (epilogue).
Orr, James. James Orr (1844-1913) was a Scottish theologian and apologist. Orr’s early work on apologetics was his most enduring. Christian View of God and the World (1893) was a standard reference into the 1950s. Orr was one of the earliest British critics of liberal theologian Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89) in his Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith (1897). He defended essential Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (see Pentateuch, Mosaic Authorship of) against the attacks of Julius Wellhausen. Although he was willing to accommodate some facets of biological evolution (see Evolution), his work God’s Image (1905) stressed the need to acknowledge supernatural creation of the human soul. In God’s Image in Man (1910), he argued that moral evolution undermined the seriousness of human depravity.
Orr’s apologetic approach was distinctive. In The Progress of Dogma (1901), he countered Adolf Harnack (1851-1930) and his attack on the history of dogma by showing the inner logic of the development of orthodoxy. The Virgin Birth of Christ (1907) and Revelation and Inspiration (1910) were significant contributions. Another enduring work was Orr’s editorship of the International Standard Bible Encyclopedia (1915). Orr also wrote articles for the twelve-volume defense of conservative theology, The Fundamentals (1910-15). Unlike his American counterparts, like A. A. Hodge and B. B. *Warfield, Orr did not hold to the total inerrancy of Scripture but allowed for minor errors in the original text (see Geisler).
Sources
N. L. Geisler and W. C. Roach. Defending Inerrancy.
G. G. Scorgie. A Call for Continuity.
--, "Orr, James.”
P. Toon, The Development of Doctrine in the Church.
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Paine, Thomas. Thomas Paine (1737-1809) was among the most militant deists (see Deism) in early America. His political writings, such as Common Sense (1776) and The Rights of Man (1791-92), were greatly influenced by his deistic beliefs. Paine’s thought was influential in both the American and French Revolutions. But his importance does not end there. In his work The Age of Reason (1794-95), Paine set forth his defense of deism in such a way as to make it readable to all people. Paine wrote The Age of Reason to destroy all claims to supernatural revelation and so discredit the clergy (Morias, 120-22).
View of God. “I believe in one God, and no more,” wrote Paine. Like theists, Paine believed that the one God was all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, infinite, merciful, just, and incomprehensible (Complete Works of Thomas Paine, 5, 26, 27, 201). But unlike Christian theists, Paine maintained that the only way to discover such a God is “by the exercise of reason.” He rejected all forms of supernatural revelation, believing them to be unknowable. He claimed that “revelation when applied to religion, means something communicated immediately from God to man.” Consequently, he disavowed even revelations to other people as having prescriptive authority. What was revealed to a person was revealed to that person only. It is hearsay to anyone else, and, consequently, they are not obliged to believe it (ibid., 26, 7). Hence, although “no man will deny or dispute the power of the Almighty to make such a communication, if he pleases,” such a revelation could only be knowable to the person who received it directly from God (ibid.).
Paine also argued that supernatural revelation (see Revelation, Special) was impossible given the inadequacy of human language to convey it. God’s revelation must be absolutely “unchangeable and universal” (ibid., 25). Human language could not be the means for its communication. The changes in the meaning of words, the necessity of translation to other languages, the errors of translators, copyists, and printers, and the possibility of willful alteration all show that no human language can be the vehicle of the Word of God (ibid., 19; cf. 55, 56). Thus, Paine rejected all claims to a verbal or written revelation from God. All such beliefs were “human inventions, set up to terrify and enslave mankind, and monopolize power and profit” (ibid., 6). The “revealed religion” he had the most contempt for was Christianity. He summarized his feelings: “Of all the systems of religion that ever were invented, there is none more derogatory to the Almighty, more unedifying to man, more repugnant to reason, and more contradictory in itself, than this thing called Christianity. Too absurd for belief, too impossible to convince, and too inconsistent for practice, it renders the heart torpid, or produces only atheists and fanatics. As an engine of power, it serves the purpose of despotism; and as a means of wealth, the avarice of priests; but so far as respects the good of man in general, it leads to nothing here or hereafter” (ibid., 150). “The only religion,” added Paine, “that has not been invented, and that has in it every evidence of divine originality, is pure and simple deism.” In fact, deism “must have been the first, and will probably be the last that man believes” (ibid.).
The Bible and Miracles. Paine wrote no view on history or destiny. However, he was sure that the Bible was historically unreliable (see New Testament, Historicity of) and filled with errors (see Bible, Alleged Errors in). He ridiculed and considered mythical any biblical stories touching
on the supernatural (see Mythology and the New Testament). He contended that the traditional ascriptions of authorship to practically every book in the Bible were wrong and that most were written quite later than traditionally believed. He argued that the entire New Testament was written (see New Testament, Dating of) “more than three hundred years after the time that Christ is said to have lived” (ibid., 9-12, 15, 19-21, 53, 61-131, 133).
Paine did not believe that supernatural acts of God had ever occurred in history (see Miracles, Arguments Against). Accepting the laws of nature as prescriptions for how nature “is supposed to act,” he defined a miracle as “something contrary to the operation and effect of those laws.” But he added that “unless we know the whole extent of those laws, and ... the powers of nature, we are not able to judge whether anything that may appear to us wonderful or miraculous be within, or be beyond, or be contrary to, her natural power of acting.” Hence, our limited knowledge of nature leaves us with “no positive criterion to determine what a miracle is, and mankind, in giving credit to appearances under the idea of there being miracles are subject to be continually imposed upon.” As a consequence of these considerations, “nothing can be more inconsistent than to suppose that the Almighty would make use of means such as are called miracles.” It is far more likely (“millions to one”) that the reporter would lie than that nature would change. “We have never seen, in our time, nature go out of her course, but we have good reason to believe that millions of lies have been told in the same time” (ibid., 51-53).
Evaluation. The basic elements of Paine’s views are evaluated elsewhere. See the articles Bible, Alleged Errors in; Bible, Evidence for; Deism; Hell; Miracles, Arguments Against; New Testament, Historicity of.