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A. O. Aldridge, "Paine, Thomas.”

R. Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories.

N. L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics.

N. L. Geisler and T. Howe, The Big Book of Bible Difficulties.

N. L. Geisler and W. D. Watkins, Worlds Apart.

I.    Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.

J.    LeLand. A View of the Principal Deistic Writers.

C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections.

---, Miracles.

J. G. Machen, The Virgin Birth of Christ.

Η. M. Morais ,Deism in Eighteenth Century America.

J. Orr, English Deism.

T. Paine, The Age of Reason, parts 1 and 2.

---, Common Sense.

---, Complete Works of Thomas Paine.

---, The Rights of Man.

M. Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation.

Paley, William William Paley (1743-1805) was an English apologist who wrote three major books, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785), A View of the Evidences of Christianity (1794), and Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity (1802). As late as 1831, while studying for his BA examinations at Cambridge, Charles *Darwin studied and was deeply impressed by Paley’s Evidences.

Paley’s Apologetics. Paley was a classical apologist (see Classical Apologetics). His two books in the area cover the two central areas of traditional apologetics, the existence of God (Natural Theology) and the truth of Christianity (A View of the Evidences of Christianity).

Argument for God’s Existence. Paley offered what has become the classic formulation of the *teleological argument. It is based on the watch analogy: If one found a watch in an empty field, one would rightly conclude that it had a maker because of its obvious design. Likewise, when one looks at the even more complex design of the world in which we live, one cannot but conclude that there is a great Designer behind it.

In Paley’s words, “In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone and was asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer that for anything I knew to the contrary it had lain there forever.” But “suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had given before, that for anything I knew the watch might have always been there.” He asks, “Why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive—what we could not discover in the stone—that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose” (Paley, A View of the Evidences, 3). Paley shows that the contrivances in nature are more incredible than those in a watch. He is careful to root his argument in observation, saying repeatedly, “We observe . . . ,” “These observations . . . ,” and “Our observer . . .” (ibid., 10, 11, 16, 17, 20, 29).

The reasoning goes: A watch shows that it was put together for an intelligent purpose (to keep time). It has a spring to give it motion. A series of wheels transmits this motion, made of brass so that they do not rust. The spring is made of resilient steel. The front cover is glass so that one can see through it. All this is evidence of intelligent design.

But the world shows greater evidence of design than a watch. It is a greater work of art than a watch. It has an endless variety of means adapted to ends. The human eye alone would suffice to demonstrate intelligent design in nature. Paley ransacked Kiell’s Anatomy for illustrations of adaptations of means to end in nature, including the bones and muscles of human beings and their equivalents in the animal world.

Paley argued that there must be only one Designer, since there is manifest in nature a uniformity of divine purpose in all parts of the world. This intelligent (personal) Creator is also good, as evidenced by the fact that most contrivances are beneficial and by the fact that pleasure is provided as an animal sensation.

Paley added that an infinite regress of causes is not plausible (see Infinite Series). For “a chain composed of an infinite number of links can no more support itself than a chain composed of a finite number of links.” This is so “because, by increasing the number of links, from ten, for instance, to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, etc., we make not the smallest approach; we observe not the smallest tendency toward self-support” (Paley, A View of the Evidences, 9-10).

An updated version of Paley’s argument might go something like this: In crossing a valley, suppose I come upon a round stratified stone and were asked how it came to be such. I might plausibly answer that it was once laid down by water in layers that later solidified by chemical action. One day it broke from a larger section of rock and was subsequently rounded by the natural erosion processes of tumbling in water. I come upon Mount Rushmore with its granite forms of four human faces. Here are obvious signs of intelligent production, not the result of natural processes. Yet why should a natural cause serve for the stone but not for the faces? When we inspect the faces on the mountain, we perceive what we could not discover in the stone—that they manifest intelligent contrivance. They convey specifically complex information. The stone, on the other hand, has redundant patterns or strata easily explainable by the observed process of sedimentation. But the faces have sharply defined, complex features. Experience leads us to conclude that such shapes only occur when made by intelligent artisans (see Geisler and Kerby, 159).

Evidences for the Truth. Paley was aware that miracles (see Miracle) are essential to the certification of the Christian revelation (see Miracles, Apologetic Value of). He accepted David *Hume’s contention that the credibility of miracles depends on the reliability of witnesses. The witnesses for Christianity, he argued, are known to be reliable since they persisted in their report even under the risk of persecution and the threat of death. He rejected other wonders that could be reduced to false perceptions, exaggeration, or that were important to the self-interest of the one claiming them

Paley rejected Hume’s contention that universal experience testified against miracles. This, he held, begged the question, since miracles by definition must be an exception to universal occurrence. The real issue is whether there are reliable witnesses.

Evaluation. Paley was one of the great apologists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Indeed, his influence continues. Paley used the core arguments. He stressed the evidence to establish the classic arguments. Two disciples, F. R. Tennant and A. E. Taylor (see Teleological Argument), carried on his version of the teleological argument. Recently, Paley’s thought has been the subject of a revival through the development of the *anthropic principle.

Hume ^,s Critique. It is widely believed that Hume answered Paley’s teleological argument in advance. Hume’s first objection assumes design in the universe but argues by analogy that finite human designers cooperate to build great works, using trial and error or a long period of time (see Hume). Paley explicitly addressed this point in his argument that the entire world reveals one unified plan—a fact indicative of a single Intelligence.

The second argument of Hume shifted the ground by arguing that the design is only apparent. The adaptation of means to ends may result from chance. He insists that if one grants that the universe of matter in motion is eternal, then in an infinity of chance operations every combination will be realized. Thus, there is no need to posit an intelligent cause (ibid.).

Not only did Paley respond to this objection, but he used Hume’s principle of uniformity to disprove Hume’s contention that it is reasonable to postulate a natural cause for the manifest contrivances of nature. Paley argued, following Hume, that “uniform experience” reveals that only an intelligent cause can produce the kinds of effects we see in nature. Paley wrote, “Wherever we see the marks of contrivance, we are led for its cause to an intelligent author. And this transition of the understanding is founded upon uniform experience.” Intelligence, Paley said, can be distinguished by certain properties, such as an ultimate purpose, intimate relationship of the parts to one another, and complex cooperation of parts to serve a common purpose (Paley, Natural Theology, 37). Uniform experiences (which Hume was even willing to call a “proof’) argue against any natural causes of the kinds of effects we see throughout nature. In fact, the only kind of cause known by repeated, uniform experience (which is Hume’s basis for knowing a causal connection) is an intelligent cause.

Thus, Hume’s argument against design actually boomerangs into an argument for a Designer (see Teleological Argument).

Conclusion. Paley’s arguments for God and for Christianity still provide the backbone for much of contemporary apologetics. The only major difference is that we now have much more “meat” to put on the skeleton. With the discovery of evidence for an origin of the universe (see Big Bang Theory),

Hume’s infinite time has been scientifically eliminated. With the discovery of the anthropic principle, it is evident that there is only one supernatural Mind behind the universe from the moment of its inception. Microbiology, with the incredible complexity of the DNA molecule (see Evolution, Chemical), adds dimensions of specified complexity and intelligent contrivance to Paley’s argument that he never could have imagined.

Sources

M.    L. Clarke. Paley.

N.    L. Geisler and R. M. Brooks, When Skeptics Ask.

N. L. Geisler and W. Corduan. Ph ilosophy of Religion .

N. L. Geisler and J. Kerby, Origin Science.

D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

D. L. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Paley.

G. W. Meadley, Memoirs of William Paley.

W. Paley ,Evidences of Christianity.

---, Natural Theology.

F. R. Tennant. Philosophical Theology.

Panentheism. Panentheism is not to be confused with pantheism. Pantheism literally means all (“pan”) is God (“theism”), but panentheism means “all in God.” It is also called process theology (since it views God as a changing Being), dipolar theism (since it believes God has two poles), organicism (since it views all that actually is as a gigantic organism), and neoclassical theism (because it believes God is finite and temporal, in contrast to classical theism).

Differences between theism and panentheism can be summarized:

Theism	Panentheism
God is Creator.	God is director of the world.
Creation is ex nihilo .	Creation is ex materia .
God is sovereign over the world.	God is working with the world.
God is independent of the world.	God is dependent on the world.
God is unchanging.	God is changing.
God is absolutely perfect.	God is growing more perfect.
God is monopolar.	God is dipolar.
God is actually infinite.	God is actually finite.

Rather than viewing God as the infinite, unchanging, sovereign Creator of the world who brought it into existence, panentheists think of God as a finite, changing, director of world affairs who works in cooperation with the world in order to achieve greater perfection in his nature.

*Theism views God’s relation to the world as a painter to a painting. The painter exists independently of the painting; he brought the painting into existence, and yet his mind is expressed in the painting. By contrast, the panentheist views God’s relation to the world the way a mind is related to a body. Indeed, panentheists believe the world is God’s “body” (one pole), and the “mind” is the other pole. This is why the term bipolar is used. However, like some modern materialists who believe the mind is dependent on the brain, panentheists believe God is dependent on the world. Yet there is a reciprocal dependence, a sense in which the world is dependent on God.

Variations on Panentheism. All panentheists agree that God has two poles, an actual pole (the world) and a potential pole (beyond the world). All agree that God is changing, finite, and temporal in his actual pole. And all agree that his potential pole is unchanging and eternal.

The major difference in how they view God is whether God in his actual pole is one actual entity (event) or a society of actual entities. Alfred North *Whitehead (1861-1947) holds the former view, and Charles Hartshorne holds the latter.

Most other differences are primarily methodological. Whitehead’s approach is more empirical, while Hartshorne’s is more rational. Hence, Whitehead has a kind of *teleological argument for God, whereas Hartshorne is famous for his *ontological argument. Some panentheists, such as John Cobb, reject the disjunction between the two poles in God. He claims that God acts as a unity, not simply in one pole or the other. But all agree that God has two poles, which can be diagrammed as follows:

Primordial Nature	Consequent Nature
potential pole	actual pole
eternal	temporal
absolute	relative
unchanging	changing
imperishable	perishable
unlimited	limited
conceptual	physical
abstract	concrete
necessary	contingent
eternal objects	actual entities
unconscious drive	conscious realization

Representatives of Panentheism. There were many forerunners of a process view of God.

*Plato’s (428-348 BC) Deminrgos eternally struggled with the chaos to form it into the cosmos. This provided the dualistic (see Dualism) background for God’s two “poles.” Even earlier (ca. 500 BC), Heraclitus’s flux philosophy asserted that the world is a constantly changing process.

In the modern world, G. W. F. *Hegel’s (1770-1831) progressive unfolding of God in the world process took a significant step toward panentheism In the cosmic evolutionismof Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), the universe is viewed as an unfolding and developing process. Henri Bergson (1851-1941) then proposed a creative evolution (1907) of a life force (elan vital), which drives evolution forward in “leaps.” Later he identified this Force with God (1935). Even before this, Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity (1920) pioneered a process view of God’s relation to the temporal universe. The main fountainhead of panentheism, however, is Whitehead. His influence is manifest in Hartshorne, Schubert Ogden, Cobb, and Lewis Ford.

Basic Beliefs of Panentheism. Although there are intramural differences among panentheists, their basic worldview has the same essential elements.

The Nature of God. All panentheists agree that God has two poles. The consequent or concrete pole is God in reality. It is God as he actually is in his moment-by-moment existence. It is God in the actual particulars of his becoming. In this pole, God is finite, relative, dependent, contingent, and in process. God’s other pole is the primordial or abstract one. This is God in abstraction, what is common and constant in God’s character no matter what world exists. The divine abstract pole gives a mere outline of God’s existence without filling it out with concrete or particular content. In this pole, God is infinite, absolute, independent, necessary, and immutable.

Panentheists agree that God’s abstract pole is included in his concrete pole. His becoming or process characterizes all of reality. But this reality of God is not to be thought of as being, which is static and uncreative. Creativity pervades all that exists. And God is supremely creative.

God is also viewed as personal. There is disagreement over whether he is one actual entity (as in Whitehead) or an ordered series of actual entities (as in Hartshorne). But almost all panentheists believe that God is personal.

The Nature of the Universe. The universe is characterized by process, change, or becoming. This is so because it is constituted by a multitude of self-creative creatures who are constantly introducing change and novelty into the universe. Also, the universe is eternal. This does not necessarily mean that the present universe is eternal. Rather, it could mean that there have been many universes throughout the infinite past. Some world has existed in some form always, and some world in some form will always exist into the infinite future. Lastly, all panentheists reject the traditional theistic understanding of creation out of nothing, that is, ex nihilo (see Creation, Views of). Some, including Ogden, accept the phrase ex nihilo but reinterpret creation to mean only that the present world or world-state once was not and was created out of a previous world. Others (like Whitehead and Hartshorne) reject even the notion of creation ex nihilo and affirm creation ex materia (out of preexistent material). Of course, since the material is really God’s physical pole, creation is also ex Deo. In fact, the present universe is co-created by God and man out of the preexisting “stuff.” God, of course, is the prime Transformer or Shaper of each world and of each world-state.

Relation of God to the Universe. In a panentheistic worldview, God’s consequent pole is the world. This does not mean that God and the world are identical, for God is more than the world, and the individuals that make up the world are distinct from God. It does mean, however, that the world is God’s cosmic body and that those creatures who make up the world are like cells in his body. This is why God cannot exist without some kind of physical universe. He does not need this world, but he must coexist in some world. Similarly, the world cannot exist without God. Hence, the world and God are mutually dependent. Moreover, the creatures in the universe contribute value to God’s life. The inclusive aim or goal of all creatures is to enrich God’s happiness and thus help him fulfill what he lacks.

Miracles. An implication of panentheismis that supernatural acts are impossible (see Miracles, Arguments Against). Since the world is the body of God, there is nothing apart from God that can be broken into or interrupted. Indeed, God is largely a passive recipient of his creatures’ activity rather than an active force in the world. God is a cosmic Sympathizer rather than a cosmic Activist (see Finite Godism; Kushner, Harold). Consequently, miraculous intervention in the world is out of character with the nature of the panentheistic God. Many panentheists reject miracles because the contemporary scientific view of the world rules them out. Ogden takes this stance. This is one reason why he adopts Rudolph Bultmann’s program to demythologize the miracle stories recorded in the Bible (see Mythology and the New Testament).

Human Beings. Panentheists agree that humanity is personal and free. In fact, humanity as a whole is a co-creator with God and of God. Humans help decide not only the course of human and world events but also those of God. Human identity is not found in some enduring “I” or self. Rather, like the rest of the world, identity is found only in the events or actual occasions of history in which humanity is becoming. The human being is partially creating himself or herself in every decision and act each moment. The goal is to serve God by contributing value to his ever-growing experience.

Ethics. Many panentheists believe that there are no absolute values (see Morality, Absolute

Nature of). Since God and the world are in great flux, there can be no absolute, unchanging standard of value. On the other hand, suchpanentheists as Hartshorne contend that there is a universal basis for ethics, namely, beauty, harmony, and intensity. Anything that promotes or builds upon or acts from this basis is good; anything that does not do so is evil. But even granting this universal aesthetic foundation, specific ethical commands or rules are not universal. Though in general one should promote beauty and not ugliness, exactly how this should be done is relative. Therefore, even though there may be an ultimate basis or ground for ethics, values themselves are not absolute but relative.

Human Destiny. The destiny of humanity is not to be looked for in an actual heaven or hell or a conscious afterlife (see Immortality). Rather, human beings, like all of God’s creatures, will live forever only in God’s cosmic memory. A person who contributes richly to God’s life will have the satisfaction of knowing that God will fondly remember him or her forever. Those who live without contributing much value to God, who, in other words, live unfaithfully, will not be remembered with much fondness by God.

In panentheism, an ongoing evolutionary process helps move events forever forward. God and humanity are also seen as co-creators of history. However, unlike theism, there is no ultimate end of history. There will always be the unsurpassable deity who is constantly growing in perfection. And there will always be some world filled with self-creative creatures whose inclusive aim is to enrich the experience of God. History has no beginning, and it has no end. There is no ultimate destiny, utopia, eschaton, or end. History, as everything else, has always been, is coming to be now, and will always be in process. History is not going anywhere; it is just going on.

Evaluation. Contributions of Panentheism. Panentheists seek a comprehensive view of reality. They recognize that a piecemeal understanding of things is inadequate. Instead, they have sought to develop a coherent and reasonable view of all that exists, a complete worldview.

Panentheism manages to posit an intimate relation between God and the world without destroying that relation, as does pantheism God is in the world but not identical to it. The presence of God in the universe does not destroy the multiplicity that humans experience but rather preserves it and even bestows upon it purpose and meaning. Granting the existence of a supreme Being, panentheists show that the world must depend upon God for its origin and continuation. Unless God exists, the world could not continue to exist. They insist that there must be an adequate cause to account for the world.

Panentheists seriously relate their worldview to contemporary theories of science. Whatever worldview one holds, science cannot be ignored. Valid human discoveries in any field or discipline must be incorporated into one’s worldview. If reality is truly reasonable and noncontradictory, then all of knowledge can be consistently systematized, no matter who discovers it or where it is found. Panentheists take this to heart.

Criticisms of Panentheism. Some of the more important criticisms will be noted here.

The idea of a God who is both infinite and finite, necessary and contingent, absolute and relative is contradictory. A contradiction results when opposites are affirmed of the same thing at the same time and in the same manner or respect. For example, to say that a bucket is both filled with water and not filled with water at the same time and in the same respect is contradictory. Such a thing could never occur, for it is logically impossible.

Hartshorne has responded to the charge of contradiction by pointing out that the metaphysical contraries are not attributed to the same divine pole. Rather, those attributes that belong together, such as infinity and necessity, are applied to one pole, while the other attributes that belong together, such as finitude and contingency, are applied to a different pole. Infinity and finitude, necessity and contingency, though applied to the same being at the same time, are applied to different poles in God (Hartshorne, Man’s Vision of God, 22-24). The Christian theist Η. P. Owen has responded that there seems to be no real distinction between the two divine poles. Since the abstract pole has no concrete or actual existence, then it must be a mere idea, having mental reality but no existence (Owen, 105). Therefore, God must not really be infinite and necessary, for those attributes are in the potential pole that does not exist in reality. God in reality is only finite and contingent. Or God must be both sides of the metaphysical contraries at the same time and in the same pole. The first optionmakes panentheism’s doctrine of God meaningless, and the second makes it contradictory. In either event, the bipolar concept of God is incoherent.

Also, the idea of God as a self-caused being is contradictory. It is difficult to see how any being could cause itself to exist. To think this could occur is to believe that potentials can actualize themselves. Cups could fill themselves with coffee, and steel could make itself into a skyscraper.

How could a being exist prior to itself in order to bring itself into existence? This is what a self-caused being would have to do in order to exist. A panentheist might respond that God did not bring himself into existence; he has eternally existed. Rather, the panentheistic version of a self-caused God creates his becoming. That is, God produces changes in himself. God actualizes his own potentials for growth.

But this leads to another problem If God causes his own becoming and not his own being, then what or who sustains God in existence? How can a being change without there existing an unchanging being that grounds the changing being’s existence? Everything cannot be in flux. Whatever changes passes from potentiality to actuality, from what is not to what is. Such change could not actualize itself or be self-caused, for potentials are not yet the something they have the potential to be.

Nothing cannot produce something. Neither could such changes be uncaused, for there must be a cause for every effect or event (see Causality, Principle of). It seems, therefore, that the universe of change, which is the concrete pole of God, must be caused by something that does not change. Something outside of the changing order must sustain the entire order in existence. Therefore, there must be a being other than what the process philosopher views as “God” that sustains him in existence. If this is true, then the panentheistic God is not really God, but the Being that grounds him is really God. Such a God is not an immutable-mutable being, as is the process deity, but would have to be simply immutable.

Another aspect of this problem is that the panentheist knows that everything, including God, is relative and changing. How can anyone know that something is changing when there is no stable reference point by which to measure the change? The theist has God and his absolute, unchanging character and will. The panentheist has no such standard. A panentheist could answer that his unchanging measure is the immutable primordial nature of God. But this does not seem adequate. For God’s primordial pole is only an abstraction—it has no reality. It can be a conceptual measure but not an actual one. Besides, a panentheist who says that God is immutable means that God is immutably mutable—he cannot fail to always change and always change for the better (Hartshorne, Natural Theology, 110, 276). Hence, we seem to be back where we started, with everything changing and nothing that is being changed.

Further, the panentheistic concept of personhood appears to conflict with our experience of ourselves. We, at least, believe ourselves to be personal beings who, to some degree, endure change. Most of us do not believe that we become new persons each moment we exist. In fact, to even say that “I become a new person each moment I exist” assumes that there is something that endures, the “I” to whom the changes occur. Otherwise, what changes? If nothing endures from moment to moment, then can it really be said that anything changes? If there is no sense in which the self is a continuous identity, then it appears that we can only speak of a series of unrelated actual “I” occasions (ibid., 58). And the only thing that can be said to change in that series of “I’s” is the series itself, not each individual “I” in the series. This seems to destroy self-identity and to contradict human experience. This problem is particularly acute for Hartshorne. In accord with his view, one goes out of existence every time there is a moment with no conscious “L” That would include periods of sleep or under anesthesia or other moments of lapsed consciousness. A parent awakening a child from sleep would actually call the young one back into existence.

What is more, to say with the panentheist that some world or other must have always existed begs the question. Of course it is impossible that total nothingness could ever be experienced, for no one could be there to experience it. Otherwise it would not be total nothingness. But this presupposes that only what can be experienced can be true. Why should this criteria for truth be accepted? Hartshorne implies that it should be accepted because there can be no meaning without experience (ibid.). Thus, a concept that cannot be experienced must be meaningless. But if this is so, then Hartshorne seems to have won his case by definition. For if there can be no meaning without experience, then total nonbeing, which cannot be experienced, must be meaningless. Hartshorne has established his case by defining meaning in such a way that makes total nonbeing a meaningless concept. He has not proved the meaninglessness of “nothing exists” but only assumed it, which is question begging.

Even if Hartshorne can establish that total nothingness is not possible, the panentheistic view does not follow. For this would simply be a way of saying that everything cannot be contingent. But this leads naturally to a theistic position (see Theism) in which there must be a Necessary Being beyond the contingent world. It is not necessary to conclude that panentheism is true, simply because a total state of nothingness is not possible.

If the proposition “Nothing exists” is logically possible, then the existence of Hartshorne’s and Ogden’s God is tenuous. Such a God must keep the universe rolling and change universes quickly, or he poofs out of the picture. He is tied as with an umbilical cord to some world. But if it is logically possible that “some world exists” has not always been true, then it is logically possible that “God exists” has at some time been false. But, according to Hartshorne and Ogden, if God is not logically necessary, a Necessary Being that must always exist no matter what, then the existence of God must be logically impossible. By this rule, the God of Hartshorne and Ogden is necessarily false.

Finally, process theology faces a serious dilemma (Gruenler, 75-79). God comprehends the whole universe at one time, yet God is limited to space and time. But anything limited to space and time cannot think any faster than the speed of light, which takes billions of years to cross the universe at about 186,000 miles a second. However, there seems to be no way that a mind which takes this kind of time to think its way around the universe could simultaneously comprehend and direct the whole universe. On the other hand, if God’s mind does transcend the universe of space and time and instantly and simultaneously comprehend the whole, then this is not a panentheistic view of God but a theistic view.

Sources

T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica.

J. B. Cobb Jr .,A Christian Natural Theology.

L. Ford, The Lure of God.

N. L. Geisler et at, The Battle for God.

--, “Process Theology.”

N. L. Geisler and W. D. Watkins, Worlds Apart.

G. R. Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God.

C. Hartshome, The Logic of Perfection.

---, Man 's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism.

---,A Natural Theology for Our Time.

S. M. Ogden, The Reality of God and Other Essays.

---, Theology in Crisis.

---, 'Toward a New Theism.”

Η. P. Owen, The Christian Knowledge of God.

W. E. Stokes, "A Whiteheadian Reflection on God's Relation to the World.” A. N. Whitehead ,Adventures of Ideas.

---, Modes of Thought.

---, Process and Reality.

Pantheism. Pantheism means all (“pan”) is God (“theism”). It is the worldview held by most Hindus, many Buddhists, and other New Age religions. It is also the worldview of Christian Science, Unity, and Scientology.

According to pantheism, God “is all in all.” God pervades all things, contains all things, subsumes all things, and is found within all things. Nothing exists apart from God, and all things are in some way identified with God. The world is God, and God is the world. But more precisely, in pantheism all is God, and God is all.

Pantheism has a long history in both the East and the West. From the Eastern mysticism of Hindu sages and seers to the rationalism of such Western philosophers as Parmenides, Benedict *Spinoza, and G. W. F. *Hegel, pantheism has always had advocates.

Kinds of Pantheism. There are differing types of belief within pantheism An absolute pantheism is represented by the thought of the fifth-century BC Greek philosopher Parmenides and the Vedanta school of Hinduism (see Hinduism, Vedanta). Absolute pantheism teaches that there is only one being in the world, God, and that all else that appears to exist actually does not. Another type is emanational pantheism, which was set forth by the third century AD philosopher *Plotinus. According to this view, everything flows from God in the same way a flower unfolds from a seed. There is also the developmental pantheism of Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel viewed the events of history as the unfolding manifestations of Absolute Spirit. The modal pantheism of the seventeenth-century rationalist Spinoza argued that there is only one absolute substance in which all finite things are merely modes or moments. The multilevel pantheism is found in some forms of Hinduism, especially as expressed by Sarvepail Radhakrishnan. This view sees various levels of manifestation of God, with the highest level manifesting God as the Absolute One, and lower levels showing him in increasing multiplicity. Permeational pantheism is the view popularized by the Star Wars movies of George Lucas, in which the Force (Tao) penetrates all things. This belief is found in Zen Buddhism More recently, Avatar is a form of permeational pantheism

Basic Beliefs. There are other types of pantheism, but these lay out the worldview’s commonalities. Each of these types identifies God with the world, but they vary in the conception of this identity. All pantheists believe that God and the real world are one, but they differ as to how God and the world are united. The following are basic beliefs of a pantheistic worldview.

The Nature of God. For most pantheists, God and reality are ultimately impersonal. Personality, consciousness, and intellect are characteristics of lower manifestations of God, but they are not to be confused with God in his being. In God there is the absolute simplicity of one. There are no parts. Multiplicity may flow from it, but in and of itself it is simple, not multiple.

The Nature of the Universe. Those pantheists who grant any kind of reality to the universe agree that it was created ex Deo, “out of God,” not ex nihilo, “out of nothing,” as theism maintains (see Creation, Views of). There is only one “Being” or Existent in the universe; everything else is an emanation or manifestation of it. Of course, absolute pantheists hold that the universe is not even a manifestation. We are all simply part of an elaborate illusion. Creation simply does not exist. God exists. Nothing else.

God in Relation to the Universe. In contrast to theists, who view God as beyond and separate from the universe, pantheists believe that God and the universe are one. The theist grants some reality to the universe of multiplicity, while the pantheist does not. Those who deny the existence of the universe, of course, see no real relation between God and the universe. But all pantheists agree that whatever reality exists, it is God.

Miracles. An implication of pantheism is that miracles are impossible. For if all is God, and God is all, nothing exists apart from God that could be interrupted or broken into, which is what the nature of a miracle requires. For more discussion of this, see the article on Spinoza. Since pantheists agree that God is simple (has no parts) and is all there is, then God could not perform any miracles, for a miracle implies a God who is in some sense “outside” of the world in which he “intervenes.” The only sense in which God “intervenes” in the world is by a regular penetration of it in accordance with repeated higher spiritual laws, such as the law of karma (see Reincarnation). Therefore, the pantheistic worldview rules out miracles (see Miracles, Arguments Against).

Human Beings. Pantheists either believe that the human as a distinct being is absolutely unreal (absolute pantheism) or else that humanity is real but far less real than God. The primary teaching of absolute pantheism is that humans must overcome their ignorance and realize that they are God. Those who put a distance between God and humanity teach a dualistic view of the person—a body and a soul. The body holds the human down, keeping him or her from uniting with God. So each must purge his or her body so the soul can be released to attain oneness with the Absolute One. For all pantheists, the chief goal or end of humanity is to unite with God.

Ethics. Pantheists usually strive to live moral lives and to encourage others to do so. Often their writings are filled with exhortations to use good judgment, to be devoted to truth, and to selflessly love others.

However, these exhortations usually apply to a lower level of spiritual attainment. Once a person has achieved union with God, he has no further concern with moral laws. Nonattachment or utter unconcern for one’s actions and their results is often taught as a prerequisite to achieving oneness with God. Since God is beyond good and evil, the person must transcend them to reach God. Morality is stressed as only a temporary concern, and underlying this is no absolute basis for right or wrong (see Morality, Absolute Nature of). Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Usherwood admit as much when they say, “Every action, under certain circumstances and for certain people, may be a stepping-stone to spiritual growth—if it is done in the spirit of nonattachment. All good and all evil is relative to the individual point of growth. . . . But, in the highest sense, there can be neither good nor evil” (Prabhavananda and Usherwood, 140).

Thus, for pantheists, ethical conduct is a means, not an end in itself. It is used only to help one attain a higher level of spirituality. Ultimately, reality is neither good nor evil. As Prabhavananda puts it, “If we say, ‘I am good,’ or ‘I am bad,’ we are only talking the language of may a [the world of illusion; see Illusionism], ‘I am Brahman,’ is the only true statement regarding ourselves that any of us can make” (Prabhavananda, 203).

History and Human Destiny. Pantheists hardly ever talk about history, except in modified forms of

pantheism usually influenced by Western theism (as in Hegel). They are not concerned with it, for either it does not exist, or it is regarded as an aspect of the world of appearances, a thing to be transcended. History has no ultimate goal or end. Whenever it is granted a kind of reality, it is always (except in Hegel’s pantheism) considered to be cyclical. Like the wheel of samsara, history forever repeats itself. There are no unique events or final events of history. There is no millennium, utopia, or eschaton.

As to individual human destiny, most pantheists, especially Eastern varieties, believe in reincarnation. After the soul leaves the body, it enters into another mortal body to work off its karma. Eventually, the goal is to leave the body and, in the case of most pantheists, merge with God. This is called nirvana, and it means the loss of individuality. Ultimate salvation in this kind of pantheistic system is from one’s individuality, not in it as Christians believe (see Immortality).

Evaluation. Absolute pantheism is self-defeating. The absolute pantheist claims, “I am God.” But God is the changeless Absolute. However, humans go through a process of change called enlightenment because they have this awareness. So how could people be God when people change but God does not?

Pantheists attempt to escape this criticism by allowing some reality to humanity, whether it be emanational, modal, or manifestational. But if we are really only modes of God, then why are we oblivious to it? Η. P. Owen describes this as a “metaphysical amnesia” that pervades all our lives. If we are being deceived about the consciousness of our own individual existence, how do we know that the pantheist is not also being deceived in claiming to be conscious of reality as ultimately one?

In fact, if the world is really an illusion, how can we distinguish between reality and fantasy at all? Lao-tse puts the question well: “If, when I was asleep I was a man dreaming I was a butterfly, how do I know when I am awake I am not a butterfly dreaming I am a man?” (Guiness, 14). If what we continually perceive to be real is not, how could we ever distinguish between reality and fantasy? Maybe when we cross a busy street, with three lanes of traffic coming toward us, we should not worry, for it’s all an illusion anyway. Indeed, should we even look when crossing the street, if we, the traffic, and the street do not really exist? If pantheists would live out their pantheism consistently, there would be no pantheists left.

Further, according to pantheism, individual minds are themselves aspects of the illusion and can therefore provide no basis for explaining it. If the mind is part of the illusion, it cannot be the ground for explaining the illusion. Hence, if pantheism is true in asserting that my individuality is an illusion, then pantheism is false, since there is then no basis for explaining the illusion (see Clark, Pantheism of Alan Watts, chap. 7).

Pantheism also fails to handle the problem of evil in a satisfactory manner (see Evil, Problem of). To pronounce evil an illusion (see Illusionism) or as less than real is not only frustrating and hollow to those experiencing evil but also seems philosophically inadequate. If evil is not real, then what is the origin of the illusion? Why have people experienced it for so long, and why does it seem so real? Despite the pantheist’s claim to the contrary, he or she also experiences pain, suffering, and eventually will die. Even pantheists double-over in pain when they get appendicitis. They jump out of the way of an oncoming truck so as not to get hurt.

If God is all, and all is God, as pantheists maintain, then evil is an illusion and ultimately there are no rights and wrongs. There are four possibilities regarding good and evil:

1. If God is all-good, then evil must exist apart from God. But this is impossible, since God is all

—nothing can exist apart from It.

2.    If God is all-evil, then good must exist apart from God. This is not possible either, since God is all.

3.    God is both all-good and all-evil. This cannot be, for it is self-contradictory to affirm that the same being is both all good and all-evil at the same time. Further, most pantheists agree that God is beyond good and evil. Therefore, God is neither good nor evil.

4.    Good and evil are illusory. They are not real categories.

Option 4 is what most pantheists believe. But if evil is only an illusion, then ultimately there are no such things as good and evil thoughts or actions. Hence, what difference would it make whether we praise or curse, counsel or rape, love or murder someone? If there is no final moral difference between those actions, absolute moral responsibilities do not exist. Cruelty and noncruelty are ultimately the same. One critic made the point with this illustration:

One day I was talking to a group of people in the digs of a young South African in Cambridge. Among others, there was present a young Indian who was of Sikh background but a Hindu by religion. He started to speak strongly against Christianity, but did not really understand the problems of his own beliefs. So I said, “Am I not correct in saying that on the basis of your system, cruelty and non-cruelty are ultimately equal, that there is no intrinsic difference between them?” He agreed. . . . The student in whose room we met, who had clearly understood the implications of what the Sikh had admitted, picked up his kettle of boiling water with which he was about to make tea, and stood with it steaming over the Indian’s head. The man looked up and asked him what he was doing and he said, with a cold yet gentle finality, “There is no difference between cruelty and non-cruelty.” Thereupon the Hindu w alked out into the night. (Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 101)

If pantheists are correct that reality is not moral, that good and evil, right and wrong are inapplicable to what is, then to be right is as meaningless as to be wrong (Schaeffer, He Is There and He Is Not Silent). The foundation for morality is destroyed. Pantheism does not take the problem of evil seriously. As C. S. *Lewis put it, “If you do not take the distinctions between good and bad seriously, then it is easy to say that anything you find in this world is a part of God. But, of course, if you think some things really bad, and God really good, then you cannot talk like that” (Lewis, 30).

In this and other ways, the pantheistic concept of God is incoherent. To say God is infinite, yet somehow shares his being (ex Deo) with creation, is to raise the problem of how the finite can be infinite, which is what absolute pantheists say. Otherwise, one must consider the finite world less than real, though existing. We have seen the problems with the first, absolute option. But the second option makes God both infinite and finite, for it is said to share part of its being with creatures, which entails an Infinite Being becoming less than infinite. But how can the Infinite be finite, the Absolute be relative, and the Unchanging changed?

Pantheism’s God also is unknowable. The very claim “God is unknowable in an intellectual way” seems either meaningless or self-defeating. For if the claim itself cannot be understood in an intellectual way, then it is self-defeating. For what is being affirmed is that nothing can be understood about God in an intellectual way. But the pantheist expects us to intellectually know this truth that God cannot be understood in an intellectual way. In other words, the pantheist appears to be making a statement about God to the effect that no such statements can be made about God. But how can one make a positive affirmation about God that claims that only negative affirmations can be made about God? Plotinus admitted that negative knowledge presupposes some positive awareness. Otherwise, one would not know what to negate.

Critics further claim that the denial of many pantheists of the applicability of logic to reality is self-defeating. For to deny that logic applies to reality, it would seem that one must make a logical statement about reality to the effect that no logical statements can be made. For example, when Zen Buddhist D. T. Suzuki says that to comprehend life we must abandon logic (Suzuki, 58), he uses logic in his affirmation and applies it to reality. Indeed, the law of noncontradiction (A cannot both be A and not-A) cannot be denied without using it in the very denial (see First Principles). Therefore, to deny that logic applies to reality, one must not make a logical statement about reality. But then how will the position be defended?

Sources

D. K. Clark, The Pantheism of Alan Watts.

D. K. Clark andN. L. Geisler. Apologetics in the New Age.

G. H. Clark, Thales to Dewey.

W. Corduan, 'Transcendentalism: Hegel.”

R.    Flint. Anti-Theistic Theories.

N.    Geisler and W. D. Watkins, Worlds Apart.

O.    Guiness, The Dust of Death.

S.    Hackett, Oriental Philosophy.

G.    W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind.

C.    S. Lewis, Mere Christianity.

Η. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity.

Plotinus, The Six Enneads.

S. Prabhavananda, The Spiritual Heritage of India.

S. Prabhavananda and F. Manchester, trans., The Upanishads.

S. Prabhavananda and C. Usherwood, trans., Bhagavad-Gita, esp. app. 2.

S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life.

J. M. Robinson. An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy.

F. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There.

--, He Is There and He Is Not Silent.

H.    Smith, The Religions of Man.

B. Spino/a. Ethics.

D.    T. Suzuki. An Introduction to Zen Buddhism.

Pascal, Blaise. Blaise Pascal (1623-62) was a French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher. At age sixteen, he completed an original treatise on conic sections. He contributed to the development of differential calculus and originated the mathematical theory of probability. Several mathematical propositions and demonstrations have been named in his honor: Pascal’s arithmetical triangle, Pascal’s law, and Pascal’s mystic hexagram

Pascal’s stress on faith brought him in contact with the Jansenists, a splinter Catholic group at odds with the Jesuits. Among the Jansenists he experienced his “first conversion” (1646). Later, he experienced his “definitive conversion” when he discovered the “God of Abraham, God of Isaac,

God of Jacob, not of philosophers and scholars” (Pascal, 311).

After the condemnation of the Jansenist apologist Antoine Arnuald (in 1655), Pascal wrote his eighteen Lettres provinciales (1656-57), which attacked the Jesuit theory of grace and morality. His most famous work is Pensees (Thoughts), published after his death from notes he began earlier. Pensees vindicated Christianity through the presentation of facts and fulfillment of prophecy and by an appeal to the heart (Cross, 1036).

*Faith and Reason. Although Pascal’s oppositionto Rene *Descartes and his Cartesian rationalism earned him the undeserved title of fideist (see Fideism), Pascal actually offered many evidences in support of the Christian faith In the tradition of *Augustine, in which he was nourished, he believed that only faith could free him from sin and put him in a personal relationship with God. There is always an element of risk in faith, but it is a risk worth taking. He confessed that the “heart has its reasons of which reason knows not.” However, this does exclude the use of reason in supporting the truths of the Christian faith.

Apologetic. Pascal’s rational apologetic for Christianity can be divided into three parts: first, his use of evidence; second, the appeal to fulfilled prophecies; and, third, his famous wager.

The Use of Evidence. Pascal believed “it is a sign of weakness to prove God from nature” (Pascal, no. 466). He adds, “It is a remarkable fact that no canonical author ever used nature to prove God” (ibid., no. 463). However, he listed twelve “proofs” for Christianity:

1.    the Christian religion, by the fact of being established so firmly and so gently, though so contrary to nature

2.    the holiness, sublimity, and humility of a Christian soul

3.    the miracles of Holy Scripture

4.    Jesus Christ in particular

5.    the apostles in particular

6.    Moses and the prophets in particular

7.    the Jewish people

8.    prophecies

9.    perpetuity: no religion enjoys perpetuity

10.    doctrine, accounting for everything

11.    the holiness of this law

12.    the order of the world (ibid., no. 482)

Pascal’s Wager. InPensees, Pascal offered Pascal’s wager. Assuming, as Pascal does, that we cannot know for sure by reason alone whether God exists or what lies beyond this life, how then should we live in this life? What are the odds for there being a God and an afterlife? Pascal argued that since reason cannot determine whether God exists and we must decide, then we need to wager. But those who wager God exists have everything to gain and nothing to lose. But those who wager that God does not exist have everything to lose if he does. He concludes, “Let us assess the two cases: if you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then; wager that he does exist.” According to Pascal’s wager, one cannot lose by wagering that God and immortality exist. Even if one cannot prove God or an afterlife, it is a good bet to believe in them We have nothing to lose. If God does not exist, the life of the believer is a great life anyway. If he does exist, then so much the more. Not only is this life great, but the one to come will be even greater. So believing in God and a life to come is a good bet, both for this life and the one to come. The wager cannot be avoided. We must either believe in God or not. Since we can’t avoid betting, the odds overwhelmingly favor betting on God.

The game of life must be played. Even those who end their life must play the game; they only shorten its duration. But assuming there is no God to meet beyond the grave is a big gamble—one not worth taking. But assuming there is a God is a gamble not worth missing. For believing there is a God pays in this life for sure and possibly in the next. But assuming there is no God brings unhappiness in this life and the possibility of more to come. In Pascal’s own words, “That leaves no choice; wherever there is infinity, and where there are not infinite chances of losing against that of winning, there is no room for hesitation, you must give everything.”

Evaluation. Pascal, while emphasizing the heart and faith, is not a fideist. In Pensees no. 149, he puts into Jesus’s mouth these words: “I do not mean you to believe me submissively and without reason; I do not claim to subdue you by tyranny. Nor do I claim to account for everything. ... I mean to show you by clearly, by convincing proofs, marks of divinity within me which will convince you of what I am, and establish my authority by miracles and proofs that you cannot reject, so that you will then believe the things I teach, finding no reason to reject them but your own inability to tell whether they are true or not.” This is clearly not fideism

Pascal’s views came in for heavy criticism in the eighteenth century. The deist Francois-Marie *Voltaire (1694-1778) is typical. As for miracles, Voltaire wrote, “Not a single one of the prophecies that Pascal referred to can be honestly applied to Christ; and that his discussion of miracles was pure nonsense” (Torrey, 264). However, as seen in the article Prophecy, as Proof of the Bible, the deists’ questions can be answered and Pascal’s argument can be vindicated as a defense of Christianity.

As for Pascal’s wager, Voltaire was shocked that he would resort to such a means to prove God. If “the heavens declare the glory of God,” why did Pascal downplay the external evidence for God in nature (see God, Evidence for)?

Walter Kauffnann of Harvard once quipped that maybe Pascal’s God would “out-Luther Luther.” That is, “God might punish those whose faith is prompted by prudence” (Kaufmann, 177). But this too is hardly a critique of the wager. At best, it would only exclude those who believe in God on such grounds. Further, the argument is based on a flawed view of God’s character. No morally worthy God, to say nothing of a rational one, would punish someone who uses wisdom in thinking about his ultimate destiny.

Atheist George H. Smith argues that one loses too much by making such a wager. “What have we got to lose? Intellectual integrity, self-esteem, and a passionate, rewarding life for starters. In short, everything that makes life worth living. Far from being a safe bet, PascaFs wager requires the wager of one’s life and happiness” (Smith, 184).

But it is not at all clear that this is the case. Pascal himself was a man of great intellect and great integrity, as even most of his enemies were willing to admit. And certainly it is simply false to hold that Pascal and other thinking Christians do not have a “rewarding life.” Indeed, this is part of PascaFs wager, namely, that we have nothing to lose, since this life of faith alone—even if there were no God—is eminently worthwhile. Finally, Smith overlooks the major point Pascal makes: The believer anticipates eternal reward as welk “Everything to gain and really nothing to lose”; unbelief has a difficult time answering PascaF

One could challenge the premise that believers have nothing to lose. If there is no God, Christians submit to a life of sacrifice for nothing (2 Cor. 11:22-28; 2 Tim. 3:12). They missed some fun by being a believer. But considering that the believer has true joy and peace, forgiveness, and hope, even in suffering (Rom. 5; James 1), this is hardly a telling point.

However, the wager is not a proof of God but at best a path of prudence. It merely shows that it is foolish not to believe in God. The question remains as to whether the “wise” path leads to truth.

Sources

D. Adamson, Blaise Pascal.

W. Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy. P. Kreeft. Christianity for Modern Pagans.

B.    Pascal, Pensees.

F.    L. Cross, "Pascal, Blaise.”

R. Popkin, "Pascal.”

G.    H. Smith,Atheism.

H.    F. Stewart. Pascal's Apology for Religion.

N. Torrey, "Voltaire, Francois-Marie Arouet De.”

C.    C. J. Webb. Pascal 's Philosophy of Religion .

Pascal’s Wager. See Pascal, Blaise.

Passover Plot. The Passover Plot Hypothesis. The Passover Plot is a book by radical New Testament scholar H. J. Schonfield, who proposed that Jesus was an innocent messianic pretender who connived to “fulfill” prophecy in order to substantiate his claims (Schonfield, 35-38).

According to the plot, Jesus secretly “schemed in faith” (ibid., 173), connived with a young man, Lazarus, and Joseph of Arimathea, to feign death on the cross, revive in the tomb, and demonstrate to his disciples (who were ignorant of the plot) that he was the Messiah. However, the plan went awry when the Roman soldiers pierced Jesus’s side and he died. Nonetheless, the disciples mistook others as Christ some days later and believed he had risen from the dead (ibid., 170-72).

A Challenge to the Passover Plot. If true, the Passover Plot would contradict orthodox Christianity, which is built on the beliefs that Jesus was truly the Messiah who supernaturally fulfilled Old Testament prophecy and who died on the cross and rose from the dead three days later (1 Cor. 15:1-5). Apart from these basic truths, there is no historic Christianity (1 Cor. 15:12-18). Thus, it is incumbent on the evangelical apologist to refute the Passover Plot hypothesis. At least three basic dimensions of traditional apologetics are called in question by this alleged plot: the character of Christ, the supernatural nature of messianic predictions, and the resurrection of Christ. Each will be addressed in order.

The Character of Christ. If the alleged plot is correct, then Jesus was anything but “innocent.” He was a conniving, cunning, and deceptive messianic pretender. He intended to deceive his closest disciples into believing he was the Messiah when he was not. But this thesis is contrary to the character of Christ known from the Gospel records, which have been demonstrated to be reliable (see New Testament, Dating of; New Testament, Historicity of; New Testament Manuscripts).

The Jesus of the Gospels is the perfect exemplar of honesty and integrity (see Christ,

Uniqueness of).

The Nature of Supernatural Prophecy. Contrary to the Passover Plot, messianic prophecy is supernatural (see Prophecy, as Proof of the Bible). And in the case of Christ there are many reasons that he could not have manipulated events to make it look like he fulfilled all the predictions about the Old Testament Messiah.

First of all, this was contrary to his honest character, as noted above. It assumes he was one of the greatest deceivers of all time. It presupposes that he was not even a good person, to say nothing of the perfect man the Gospels affirm him to be. There are several lines of evidence that combine to demonstrate that this is a completely implausible thesis.

Second, there is no way Jesus could have controlled many events necessary for the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies about the Messiah. For example, he had no control over where he would be born (Micah 5:2), how he would be born of a virgin (Isa. 7:14), when he would die (Dan. 9:25), what tribe (Gen. 49:10) and lineage he would be from (2 Sam 7:12), and numerous other things.

Third, there is no way short of being supernatural that Jesus could have manipulated the events and people in his life to respond in exactly the way necessary for it to appear that he was fulfilling all these prophecies, including John’s heralding him (Matt. 3), his accuser’s reactions (Matt. 27:12), how the soldiers cast lots for his garments (John 19:23-24), and how they would pierce his side with a spear (John 19:34). Indeed even Schonfield admits that the plot failed when the Romans actually pierced Christ. The fact is that anyone with all this manipulative power would have to be divine—the very thing the Passover hypothesis is attempting to avoid. In short, it takes a bigger miracle to believe the Passover Plot than to accept these prophecies as supernatural.

The Resurrection of Christ. The Passover Plot offers an implausible scenario as an alternative to the resurrection of Christ. This is true for many reasons. First, it is contrary to the Gospel records, which are demonstrably reliable (see New Testament, Historicity of), having been written by eyewitnesses and contemporaries of the events. Second, it totally overlooks the powerful testimony of the resurrection of Christ (see Resurrection, Evidence for), including:

1.    a permanently empty tomb

2.    over five hundred eyewitnesses (1 Cor. 15:5-7)

3.    some twelve physical appearances of Christ in the same nail-scarred body (John 20:27)

4.    which were spread over a period of forty days (Acts 1:3)

5.    during which time Jesus ate with them on at least four occasions and taught them concerning the kingdom of God

6.    and transformed them overnight from scared, skeptical, scattered disciples into the greatest missionary society the world has ever known

Conclusion. The Passover Plot is in fact an implausible scenario that is based on unjustified presuppositions and is contrary to many known facts. For example, it supposes:

1.    unjustified late dates for the Gospels (see New Testament, Dating of)

2.    an anti supernatural bias (see Miracle)

3.    a flawed character of Christ (see Christ, Uniqueness of)

4.    the incredible naivete of his disciples

5.    mass cases of mistaken identity after his death (see Resurrection, Evidence for; Resurrection, Alternate Theories of)

6.    a miraculous transformation based on a total mistake

To put it positively, the alleged plot is contrary to (1) the early dates of the Gospels; (2) the multiplicity of the eyewitnesses’ accounts; (3) the verification of history and archaeology (see Archaeology, New Testament); (4) the known character of Jesus’s disciples; (5) the permanently empty tomb; (6) the nature of the resurrection appearances; and (7) the incredible number of eyewitnesses of the resurrected Christ—over five hundred. In short, The Passover Plot is just another theory ruined by a brutal gang of facts.

Sources

C. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels.

G.    Habermas, The Historical Jesus.

H.    J. Schonfield, The Passover Plot.

C. A. Wilson, The Passover Plot Exposed.

E. Yamauchi, "Passover Plot or Easter Triumph.”

Paul’s Religion, Alleged Contradictions with Jesus. See Bible, Alleged Errors in; Miihraism.

Pentateuch, Mosaic Authorship of. The Bible attributes the first five books of the Bible, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, or the Pentateuch, to Moses in Exodus 24:4; Joshua 1:7-8; Ezra 6:18; Daniel 9:11; and Malachi 4:4. Jesus quoted from the Pentateuch, attributing the source to Moses in Mark 7:10 and Luke 20:37. Most modern critics deny Mosaic authorship and organize the writings around a much later, complex set of priestly scribes and editors. The objective has been to avoid the books’ accounts of supernatural occurrences and divine authority (see Bible Criticism; Redaction Criticism, Old Testament; Wellhausen, Julius).

As early as the late seventeenth century, Benedict *Spinoza denied that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. Many critical scholars joined him in the nineteenth century. Julius *Wellhausen claimed that the first five books were written by various persons he called the Jehovist (J), Elohimist (E), Priestly (P), and Deuteronomist (D). Literary characteristics supposedly distinguished these authors.

Responding to the Arguments. Conservative scholars have responded that none of these arguments is strong enough to warrant the extraordinary claims and theories that have arisen from them in Old Testament studies. There are stronger reasons for attributing the Pentateuch to Moses.

The Account of Moses ^,s Death. Since Moses was a prophet (Deut. 18:15; Acts 3:22) who possessed miraculous gifts and abilities (see, e.g., Exod. 4), there is no reason why he could not have written the account of his death in advance (see Miracles, Apologetic Value of).

However, since there are no signs in the text of this being a prophecy, it may have been written by his successor. Such scholars as R. D. Wilson, Merrill Unger, Douglas Young, R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer Jr., and R. K. Harrison easily accept that the final chapter of Deuteronomy was likely appended by Joshua or someone else in Moses’s inner circle. This, in fact, supports the view of the continuity of the writing prophets, a theory that each successor prophet writes the last chapter of his predecessor’s book. The addition of a chapter on Moses’s funeral by another prophet in accordance with the custom of the day in no sense takes away from the belief that Moses was the author of everything up to that final chapter. This certainly doesn’t conformto the J-E-P-D scenario.

Parenthetical Sections. The parenthetical sections in Deuteronomy 2 need not be later redactions. Authors often use editorial (e.g., parenthetical) material in their own writings. Such an addition was made to the previous sentence in this paragraph. No earlier manuscripts omit them This section fits into the text. So there is no compelling evidence to suggest that they were the work of a later redactor.

But even if parenthetical comments were added into the text, this would not change anything Moses wrote in the rest of the text, nor detract from his claim to authorship of the inspired text. Many evangelical scholars are willing to admit that comments like these could have been made by later scribes to elucidate the meaning of the text. If they are additions, they are uninspired changes that are subject to the same textual debate as Mark 16:9-20 and John 8:1-11. One can argue on the basis of internal and external evidence whether they should be considered part of the inspired text of Scripture. And, like the King James Version’s rendering of 1 John 5:7 on the Trinity, if there is no good evidence, the text should be rejected. Lacking that kind of evidence for this passage, it seems best to consider it an editorial comment by Moses himself. In neither case is the Mosaic authorship of the inspired text of the Pentateuch brought into question.

Moses and Genesis. As to the composition of Genesis, God could have revealed the story of beginnings to Moses, as he did other supernatural revelations (e.g., Exod. 20). Moses was on the Mount for forty days, and God could have revealed to him the history up to his time.

Since there is no clear indication in the text that this is what happened, there is perhaps better reason to think that Moses compiled, rather than composed, the record of Genesis. There is indication that Genesis was a compilation of family documents and oral history that had been carefully passed down. Each section has attached to it the phrase “This is the history of... ” (NKJV) or “account of’ (NIV 1984). These phrases occur throughout the book of Genesis (2:4; 5:1; 6:9; 10:1, 32; 11:10, 27; 25:12, 19; 36:1; 37:2), tying it together as a series of family records and genealogies. Sometimes the accounts are even called a “book” (5:1 NKJV) or “written” (NIV 1984) account. As leader of the Jewish people, Moses would have had access to these family records of past history and could have compiled them into the form we know as the book of Genesis.

Different Names for God. Critics have argued that different names for God in different passages indicate different authors. They point to Genesis 1, where the alleged Elohist (E) author uses Elohim for God exclusively. Yet in Genesis 2, the phrase Yahweh Elohim (“Lord God”) is used. The use of Yahweh (or Jehovah) is said to indicate the hand of the Jehovist (J).

But this argument fails. The same kind of thing occurs in the Qur’an, which is known to have one source, Muhammad. The name Allah is used for God in suras 4, 9, 24, and 33, but Rab is used in suras 18, 23, and 25 (Harrison, 517). In the Qur’an, the names are used in different chapters. In Genesis, they are interspersed within the same chapter or section, leading to some incredible dissections of the text. Even J-E-P-D scholars cannot agree where to draw all the lines.

The more natural explanation is that different names of God are used depending on the subject and aspect of God being discussed. The majestic Elohim is an appropriate word when speaking of creation, as in Genesis 1. Yahweh the Covenant-maker is more appropriate when God engages people, as in Genesis 2-3.

Writing Style. J-E-P-D critics say that the Pentateuch reflects a style of writing and literary forms from a much later period. For example, the Deuteronomist (D) uses seventh-century style and structure. But this contention also cannot be grounded in fact. Archaeological discoveries show that the literary form used in Deuteronomy is, in fact, an ancient one throughout the Near East. Moses follows as a literary device the suzerainty treaties made between kings and their subjects (see Kline).

The argument makes an assumption that is not true in literary history. The critics assume that Moses could not have written in more than one style. As a well-educated Egyptian, he had been exposed to suzerainty treaties and every other narrative and artistic writing form then available. Good modern authors change style and form as they change in their own craft and for effect. Sometimes they may use different forms within a single work. A notable example is C. S. *Lewis. Bible critics would go crazy if confronted with one author’s name over children’s stories, in-depth literary critiques, scholarly analysis, allegorical satire, science fiction, biographic narrative, and logic-driven disputations and treatises.

Late Place Names. Late names of places are easily explained as later interpolations. Later copyists may have updated some place names so the people would better understand. In Joshua 14:15, this is almost certainly the case, since a parenthetical notation has entered the text that says “(Hebron used to be called Kiriath Arba after Arba, who was the greatest man among the Anakites).”

Possession of the Land. Deuteronomy 2:13 refers to Israel in the “land of their possession,” which did not take place until after Moses died. Hence, it is argued that Moses could not have written these words.

As Old Testament commentators C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch concluded, this reference is to “the land to the east of the Jordan (Gilead and Bashan), which was conquered by the Israelites under Moses and divided among the two tribes and a half, and which is described in chap, iii.20 as the ‘possession’ which Jehovah had given to these tribes” (Keil and Delitzsch, 293). Also, being a parenthetical reference, 2:13 could have been a later, non-Mosaic interpolation into the original text. Whatever evidence this provides for later editing, it does not support J-E-P-D authorship nor negate Mosaic authorship of the original inspired text.

Mosaic Authorship of Exodus. There is strong evidence that Moses wrote Exodus. First, no other known person from that period had the time, interest, and ability to compose such a record. Second, Moses was an eyewitness to the events of Exodus through Deuteronomy and so was uniquely qualified. Indeed, the record is a vivid eyewitness account of spectacular events, such as the crossing of the Red Sea, the receiving of the commandments, and the wanderings.

Third, from the earliest known rabbinical records, these books have unanimously been ascribed to Moses. This is true of the Talmud, as well as the works of such Jewish writers as *Philo and *Flavius Josephus.

Fourth, the author reflects a detailed knowledge of wilderness geography (see, e.g., Exod. 14).

This is highly unlikely for anyone other than Moses, who spent forty years as a shepherd, as well as forty years as a national leader, in the region. The same argument can be used of the detailed reflections of customs and practices of a variety of peoples described throughout the Pentateuch.

The book’s internal claim is that “Moses wrote all the words” (Exod. 24:4). If he did not, it is a forgery. Moses’s successor, Joshua, claimed that Moses wrote the law. In fact, when Joshua assumed leadership, he reported that he was exhorted by God, “Do not let this book of the Law depart from your mouth” (Josh. 1:8); he was told to “be careful to obey all the law my servant Moses gave you” (1:7). After Joshua, a long chain of Old Testament figures attributed the books of the law to Moses, among them Josiah (2 Chron. 34:14), Ezra (Ezra 6:18), Daniel (Dan. 9:11), and Malachi (Mai. 4:4). Jesus and New Testament writers also attributed the words to Moses. Scripture in other contexts refers to the Pentateuch as the books or law of Moses.

Jesus, quoting from Exodus 20:12, used the introduction, “for Moses said” (Mark 7:10; cf. Luke 20:37). The apostle Paul declared that “Moses describes in this way the righteousness that is by the law” as he cited Exodus 20:11 (Rom 10:5). So there is confirmation of Jesus, who by miracles was attested to be the Christ, the Son of God (see Christ, Deity of; Miracles, Apologetic Value of). And there is apostolic authority, which was also confirmed (see Miracles in the Bible).

Sources

G. L. Archer Jr .,A Survey of Old Testament Introduction.

F. Josephus, Against Apion.

--, The Antiquities of the Jews.

N. L. Geisler and W. E. Nix. A General Introduction to the Bible.

R. K. Harrison,^« Introduction to the Old Testament.

C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Commentary on the Old Testament, vol. 1. M. G. Kline, Treaty of the Great King.

M. Unger, Introductory Guide to the Old Testament.

Pharaoh, Hardening of. In Exodus 4:21, God declares, “I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, so that he will not let the people go.” But if God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, then Pharaoh cannot be held morally responsible for his actions, since he did not do them of his own free will but out of constraint (cf. 2 Cor. 9:7; 1 Peter 5:2). There appears to be a serious problem here for God’s love and justice (see Evil, Problem of). If God loves everyone, then why did he harden Pharaoh’s heart so he would reject God’s will? If God is just, why blame Pharaoh for his sin when it was God who hardened his heart to sin?

Proposed Solutions. There are two basic responses to this problem from differing theologies. We begin with the strong Calvinist response.

Strong Calvinist View. Calvinists or hard determinists emphasize God’s sovereignty and claim he has the right to harden or soften any heart as he chooses. As for the justice of God, the answer is Paul’s in Romans 9:20: “But who are you, O man, to talk back to God? Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?”’ God’s salvific love is given to the elect.

Again, citing Paul, they insist that “God has mercy on whom he wants to have mercy, and he hardens whomhe wants to harden” (Rom 9:18-19). The strong Calvinist’s answer to the problem, then, is that Pharaoh was a hardened unbeliever to begin with, and God merely hardened him by withdrawing the common grace that softens the effects of the fall in the unbelieving heart. He allowed Pharaoh to intensify his rebellion, as an unbeliever will do without divine restraint. God did this for the purpose of showing his power and glory. Pharaoh would not have truly repented without positive intervention from God’s saving power.

This position is based on an unacceptable voluntaristic view, wherein God can will either of two opposite actions. This seems to make God arbitrary about what is good. Contrary to the determinist, God is all-loving (John 3:16; Rom 5:6-8; 2 Cor. 5:14-15; 1 John 2:1) and does notwill that any should perish (2 Peter 3:9). Regardless of what the determinist says, God’s justice is impugned if he hardens people in sin against their will. Free choice and compulsion are contradictory. As Paul noted about giving, “Each man should give what he has decided in his heart to give, not reluctantly or under compulsion, for God loves a cheerful giver” (2 Cor. 9:7). Peter added that leaders of the church in serving God should work, “not because you must, but because you are willing” (1 Peter 5:2).

Moderate Free Will View. Others respond to the problem of the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart by pointing out that God did not harden Pharaoh’s heart contrary to Pharaoh’s free choice. Scripture makes it clear that Pharaoh hardened his own heart. It declares that Pharaoh’s heart “grew hard” (Exod. 7:13), that he “hardened his heart” (Exod. 8:15), and that “Pharaoh’s heart grew hard” the more God worked on it (8:19). Again, when God sent the plague of the flies, “Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time also” (8:32). This same or like phrase is repeated several times (see 9:7, 34, 35). In fact, with the exception of God’s prediction of what would happen (Exod. 4:21), the fact is that Pharaoh hardened his own heart first (7:13; 8:15; etc.), and God hardened it later (cf. 9:12; 10:1,

20, 27).

Scholars have pointed out that different Hebrew words for “harden” are used in this passage (Forster and Marston, 1,555-68). Oashah, meaning “stubbornness,” is used twice, once where God is the agent and once where Pharaoh is (7:3; 13:15). In both cases, it is used of the overall process, not a particular act. Kabed, meaning “heavy” or “insensitive,” is used many times, not only of Pharaoh’s heart but also of the plagues. God sent a “heavy” swarm of flies, hailstones, and swarm of locusts. Chazaq, meaning “strength” or “encouragement,” is used of Pharaoh’s heart. When Pharaoh is the agent of hardening, kabed is used. When God is the agent, chazaq is used. “Although Pharaoh is making his own moral decision, God is going to give him the strength to carry it out” (ibid., 72). On this understanding, there is nothing morally sinister about God “hardening” Pharaoh, and it is an understanding with which moderate Calvinists and Arminians could concur.

The sense in which God hardened Pharaoh’s heart is similar to the way the sun hardens clay and also melts wax. If Pharaoh had been receptive to God’s warnings, his heart would not have been hardened by God. But when God gave Pharaoh a reprieve from the plagues, he took advantage of the situation. “But when Pharaoh saw that there was relief, he hardened his heart and did not heed them [Moses and Aaron], as the Lord had said” (Exod. 8:15).

The question can be summarized as follows:

God does not harden he arts	God hardens hearts
initially	subsequently
directly	indirectly
against free choice	through free choice
as to their cause	as to their effect

Conclusion. If God is hardening Pharaoh’s heart (or anyone else’s) in accordance with their own inclination and choice, then God cannot be charged with being unjust, unloving, or acting contrary to their God-given free choice. And Scripture is clear that Pharaoh hardened his own heart. So what God did was in accord with Pharaoh’s own free choice (see Free Will). Events can be determined by God in his foreknowledge yet free from the standpoint of human choice. Jesus hit this balance when he said in Matthew 18:7, “Such things must come, but woe to the man through whom they come.”

Sources

Augustine, On Free Will.

--, On Grace and Free Will.

J. Edwards, The Freedom of the Will.

J. Fletcher, Checks to Antinomianism.

T. R. Forster and P. Marston, God's Strategy in Human History.

N. L. Geisler, Chosen bat Free.

M. Luther, Bondage of the Will.

J. Piper, The Justification of God.

R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God.

Pharaoh of the Exodus. The predominant view of modern biblical scholars is that the pharaoh of the exodus was Rameses II (see Bible Criticism). If so, the exodus tookplace about 1270 to 1260 BC. However, the Bible (Judg. 11:26; 1 Kings 6:1; Acts 13:19-20), dates the exodus to about 1447 BC. Given the commonly accepted dating, that would make the pharaoh of the exodus Amenhotep II, an identification archaeologists and biblical scholars have traditionally rejected.

An Early Exodus. Modern scholarship has raised Rameses II and the mid-thirteenth century to the level of unassailable doctrine, but there is sufficient evidence to challenge conventional wisdom about the exodus, as well as the traditional dating for many pharaohs. Alternative explanations are providing a better accounting of all the historical data and making 1447 BC look like a credible departure date for the Israelites.

The Bible is very specific in 1 Kings 6:1 that 480 years passed from the exodus to the fourth year of Solomon’s reign, about 967 BC. This would place the exodus around 1447. This also fits with Judges 11:26, which affirms that Israel spent 300 years in the land up to the time of Jephthah (about 1100). Likewise, Acts 13:20 speaks of 450 years of judges lfomMoses to Samuel, who lived around 1000. Paul said in Galatians 3:17 that there were 430 years from Jacob to Moses. That would be from 1880 to 1450. The same figure is used in Exodus 12:40. If the Bible is wrong at this point, it is certainly consistent and allows for no thirteenth-century exodus.

Possible Solutions. There are at least three ways to reconcile the biblical data with the fifteenth-century date. The first posits the possibility of an early Rameses. The second offers a basis for adjusting the archaeological periods, and the third reinterprets the chronology of Egyptian rulers (see Archaeology, Old Testament). Because these changes would shake up many widely held opinions about ancient history, they have faced much opposition, but the evidence is strong.

The generally accepted date was based on three assumptions:

1.    “Rameses” in Exodus 1:11 was named after Rameses the Great.

2.    There were no building projects in the Nile Delta before 1300 BC.

3.    There was no great civilization in Canaan from the nineteenth to the thirteenth centuries BC.

All of these, if true, would make the conditions described in Exodus impossible before 1300. However, the name Rameses runs throughout Egyptian history, and the city mentioned in Exodus 1 may have honored an earlier nobleman by that name. Since Rameses the Great is Rameses II, there must have been a Rameses I, about whom nothing is now known. In Genesis 47:11, the name Rameses is used to describe the area of the Nile Delta where Jacob and his sons settled. This may be the name that Moses normally used to refer to the entire geographical area. Rameses, then, need not refer to a city named after a king at all.

Second, building projects have now been found at Pi-Ramesse (Rameses) and at both possible sites for Pithom dating from the nineteenth to the seventeenth centuries BC, the era in which the Israelites arrived. These show strong Palestinian influence. Digging done in 1987 shows that there was building at Pi-Ramesse and one of the Pithom sites in the 1400s. So whether Exodus 1:11 refers to the building projects that were going on at the time the Israelites became slaves or what they were working on at the time of the exodus, there is evidence building was underway. Surface surveys yielded no signs of civilizations like the Moabites and the Edomites prior to Israel’s entrance to the land, but deeper digging has revealed many sites that fit into the period. Even the man who did the initial research changed his position later. So all three of the arguments for dating the exodus after 1300 have been proven false. Now if these three assumptions are wrong, then there is no reason to suppose a late date for the exodus, and we can look for evidence to support the Bible’s date of about 1447.

Bimson-Livingston Revision. John Bimson and David Livingston proposed in 1987 that the date of

the shift from the Middle Bronze Age to the Late Bronze Age has been inaccurate and must be moved. At issue is evidence of destroyed cities in Canaan. Most signs of a serious invasion or conquest have been dated to about 1550 BC—150 years too early. This date is assigned to these ruins because it is supposed that they were destroyed when the Egyptians drove out the Hyksos, a hostile nation that dominated Egypt for several centuries. Bimson suggests that moving the end of the Middle Bronze Age would show that this destruction was done by the Israelites, not the Egyptians.

Can such a change be justified? The Middle Bronze Age was characterized by fortified cities; the Late Bronze Age had mostly smaller, unwalled settlements. So whatever caused the destruction of these cities gives us our date for the period division. The evidence is sparse and unclear. Also, there is doubt that the Egyptians, just establishing a new government and armies, were in any position to carry out long sieges throughout Canaan. Positive evidence has come from recent digs that has shown that the last phase of the Middle Bronze Age needs more time than originally thought, so that its end is closer to 1420.

This corresponds with the Bible, where the cities in Canaan are “great and fortified up to heaven” (Deut. 1:28) just as Moses said. Also, the extent of destruction, with only a few exceptions, matches the biblical description. “Indeed, generally speaking, the area in which destruction occurred at the end of [the Middle Bronze Age] corresponds with the area of Israelite settlement, while cities that survived lay outside that area.”

Some archaeologists ask where the evidence is of Israelite dominance of the culture in the Late Bronze Age. We have always held them responsible for the shift from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age in 1200. The problem with that view is that those changes are the same all over the Mediterranean, not just in Palestine. The Hebrews could not be responsible for such widespread change. In fact, as nomads, they probably brought nothing with them, lived in tents for some time, and bought their pottery at the Canaanite markets. Besides, the book of Judges shows that after Israel entered the land, they did not dominate anybody for several hundred years. They were dominated by everyone around them

Bimson and Livingston summarize their proposal in this way:

We have proposed: (1) a return to the Biblical date for the conquest of Canaan (i.e., shortly before 1400 BC), and (2) a lowering of the date for the end of the Middle Bronze Age, from 1550 BC to shortly before 1400 BC. The result is that two events previously separated by centuries are brought together: the fall of Canaan’s MB II cities becomes the archaeological evidence for the conquest. These twin proposals create an almost perfect match between the archaeological evidence and the Biblical account. (Bimson and Livingston, 51)

Velikovsky-Courville Revision. A third possible solution sees a problem in the traditional view of Egyptian history. The chronology of the whole ancient world is based on the order and dates of the Egyptian kings. Mostly, we know this order from an ancient historian named Manetho, who is quoted by three other historians. There are also monuments that give partial lists. This order has been considered unassailable; however, the only absolutely fixed date is its end, when Alexander the Great conquered Egypt. Immanuel Velikovsky and Donovan Courville assert that six hundred extra years in that chronology throw off the dates for events all around the Near East.

If we set aside the idea of Egyptian history as fixed, there are three pieces of evidence in which the history of Israel matches up with the history of Egypt. This kind of match, where the same event is recorded in both countries, is called a synchronism The three places we find synchronisms are the plagues of Moses, the defeat of the Amalekites, and the reign of Ahab.

A very old papyrus written by an Egyptian priest named Ipuwer tells of two unique events (though various interpretations have been given): a series of plagues and the invasion of a foreign power. The plagues match very well with the record of Moses’s plagues in Exodus 7-12. The papyrus speaks of the river turning to blood (cf. Exod. 7:20), crops consumed (Exod. 9:25), fire (Exod. 9:23-24;

10:15), and darkness (Exod. 10:22). The final plague, which killed Pharaoh’s son, is referred to also: “Forsooth, the children of princes are dashed against the walls. . . . The prison is ruined. ... He who places his brother in the ground is everywhere. ... It is groaning that is throughout the land, mingled with lamentations” (Papyrus 2:13; 3:14; 4:3; 6:13). This parallels the biblical account, which says, “The Lord struck all the first-born in the land of Egypt, from the first-born of the Pharaoh who sat on his throne to the firstborn of the captive that was in the dungeon. . . and there was a great cry in Egypt, for there was no home where was not someone dead” (Exod. 12:29-30). Immediately following these disasters, there was an invasion of “a foreign tribe” that came out of the desert (Papyrus 3:1). This invasion must have been the Hyksos, who dominated Egypt between the Middle Kingdom and the New Kingdom.

The monolith of el-Arish tells a similar story of darkness and suffering in the land in the days of King Thom. It also relates how the pharaoh “went out to battle against the friends of Apopi (the god of darkness),” though the army never returned: “His majesty leapt into the so-called Place of the Whirlpool.” The place of the incident is Pi-Kharoti, which may be equivalent to Pi-ha-hiroth, where the Israelites camped by the sea (Exod. 14:9). This is very interesting because the name of the city built by the Israelites is Pi-Thom, “the abode of Thom” And the king who reigned just before the Hyksos invasion was (in Greek) Timaios. But the Egyptian date for King Thom is about six hundred years too early, around 2000 BC. Either the Egyptian chronology is wrong, or history repeated itself in very unusual ways.

According to Velikovsky, the Hyksos should be identified as the Amalekites, whom the Israelites met before they even reached Sinai (Exod. 17:8-16). They might have reached Egypt within days after the Israelites left. The Egyptians referred to them as Amu, and Arabian historians mention some Amalekite pharaohs. But the scriptural parallels are quite convincing. As the false prophet Baalam faced Israel, he blessed them despite his instructions, but when he turned, facing Egypt, “he looked on Amalek. . . and said, ‘Amalek was the first of the nations’” (Num 24:20). Why did he curse Amalek rather than Egypt, unless Egypt was under Amalekite domination? Also, the names of the first and last Amalekite kings in the Bible (Agag I and II, see Num 24:7; 1 Sam 15:8) correspond to the first and last Hyksos kings. This would indicate that the Hyksos entered Egypt just after the exodus and remained in power there until Saul defeated them and released the Egyptians from bondage. This would explain the genial relations that Israel had with Egypt in David and Solomon’s time. In fact, Velikovsky shows striking similarities between the Queen of Sheba and the Egyptian queen Hatshepsut. She is said to have journeyed to the Divine Land, and the gifts she received there are much like those of Solomonto his visitor (see 1 Kings 10:10-22). She also built a temple in Egypt that is similar to the temple of Solomon. But according to Egyptian chronology, she lived before the exodus. Only if this chronology is revised can this parallelism be explained. The invasion of Thutmose ΙΠ into Palestine might also be equated with the attack of Shishak (2 Chron. 12:2-9).

The third synchronism is a series of letters (on clay tablets) called the el-Amarna letters. These are correspondence between the rulers in Palestine (Jerusalem, Syria, and Sumur) and the pharaohs Amenhotep III and his son Akhnaton. The Palestinians were concerned about an army approaching from the south called the Habiru, who were causing great destruction. On the basis of such a description, it has traditionally been held that these letters speak of the Israelites entering Canaan. Velikovsky shows that a closer look at these tablets reveals another picture entirely. First, Sumur can be identified as the city of Samaria, which was not built until after Solomon (1 Kings 16:24). Second, the “king of Haiti” threatens to invade from the north, which seems to be a Hittite invasion Third, none of the names in the letters match the names of rulers given in the book of Joshua. In other words, the political situation is all wrong for these letters to have come from the time of the exodus. If we move their date to the time when Ahab ruled from Samaria and was threatened by both the Moabites and the Hittites, then all of the names, places, and events can be located in Kings and Chronicles, even to the names of the generals of armies. But this dates Amenhotep III five hundred years later than the standard chronology. Either the chronology is wrong or one has to maintain that history repeated itself exactly half a millennium later.

The picture that emerges is a consistent one only if the Israelite history is used to date Egyptian events. Such an interpretation also requires a new chronology for Egyptian history. Courville has shown that the lists of Egyptian kings should not be understood as completely consecutive. He shows that some of the “kings” listed were not pharaohs but local rulers or high officials. Among those mentioned are Joseph (Yufni) and Moses’s adopted father Chenephres, who was a prince only by marriage.

Recognition that “kings” of the Thirteenth Dynasty were actually princes over local regions or subrulers provides us with insight into what Manetho regarded as comprising a dynasty. It was evidently not outside his thinking to give the names of the main line of kings as composing one dynasty and then to return on the time scale to pick up a line of secondary rulers as a distinct dynasty. By labeling these secondary rulers as kings the ancient historian caused an erroneous and grossly expanded chronology of Egypt. Working out this new chronology places the exodus about 1440 BC and makes the other periods of Israelite history fall in line with the Egyptian kings mentioned.

Conclusion. The evidence is strong for a fifteenth-century BC date for the exodus. This is at odds with the generally accepted date for Egyptian kings. But it may be that the conventional wisdom for Bronze Age dating, and certainly the chronology of Egyptian rulers, may need to be drastically changed. More research and excavations will be needed to learn what theories come closest to describing the flow of events in Egypt and Canaan, but it appears that Bible dating is more accurate than had been suspected, even more accurate than the knowledge collected in the field of study.