G. L. Archer Jr., Encyclopedia of Biblical Difficulties.
J. Bimson and D. Livingston, "Redating the Exodus.”
D. A. Courville, The Exodus Problem and Its Ramifications.
N. L. Geisler and R. M. Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, chap. 9.
R. K. Harrison, A« Introduction to the Old Testament.
I. Velikovsky, Worlds in Collision.
Philo Judaeus. Philo Judaeus (ca. 20 BC-AD 50) was a Jewish philosopher and exegete from Alexandria, Egypt. Because of his affinity to Platonic philosophy, he is known as the Hebrew Plato. His numerous writings include Against Flaccus, Procurator of Egypt; Legum Allegoriae; On Providence; On the Eternality of the World\ Questions and Solutions in Genesis and Exodus; The Contemplative Life (De Vita Contemplativa); and The Life of Moses.
Philo had a considerable influence on Christian leaders of the “Alexandrian school,” such as *Clement of Alexandria and *Justin Martyr. His allegorical method for interpreting Scripture also influenced *Origen, Ambrose, *Augustine, and others. Other elements of his philosophy made an impact on later Christian thinking, including his use of proofs for God’s existence, his Logos doctrine, and his views of the unknowability of God, negative language about God, ex nihilo creation (see Creation, Views of), and particular providence.
Philo9 s Philosophy. Philo attempted to interpret Scripture in terms of Greek philosophy. His approach was eclectic and innovative.
Concept of God. Philo taught that human beings can know God, whether directly from divine revelation or indirectly through human reason. Various forms of proof for God included *Plato’s argument for a Demiurgos in Timaeus and *Aristotle’s *cosmological argument for an Unmoved Mover. Philo applied the Unmoved Mover to the existence of the world, not just motion. He even adopted the stoic argument for a Mind (God) within nature to show there was a transcendent God beyond nature.
Philo believed such arguments could show only the existence of God, not his nature. For him, God was ineffable and unnamed. Only negative knowledge was possible. Positive terms can describe only God’s activity, not his essence.
Mysticism and Allegorism. Since God cannot be known in a positive way, Philo, as other Platonists (see Plato) and Neoplatonists (see Plotinus), resorted to mysticism Even God’s revelation in Scripture yielded no positive knowledge of God’s nature and could not be taken literally when it spoke of God. Only an allegorical interpretation could yield the true meaning.
Creation and Providence. As a Jewish theist (see Theism), Philo believed in ex nihilo creation (see Creation, Views of). As a Platonist, he held that matter existed before creation. In a creative attempt to reconcile these views, he posited that there were two creative acts of God, one by which he brought matter into existence and the other by which he created the world out of preexisting matter.
Since God is all-powerful, he is able to intervene miraculously in the laws of nature he established. However, he does so purposefully. Contrary to Greek philosophy, God has not only general providence over the world but also special and particular providence.
Logos. In interacting with Greek philosophy, Philo borrowed certain Platonic concepts to express his owntheistic views. His concept of the Logos is a case in point. InDe Opificio, he describes the Logos as a cosmological principle:
God, assuming, as God would assume, that a beautiful copy could never come into existence without a beautiful model. . . when He willed to create this visible world, first blocked out the intelligible world, in order that using an incorporeal and godlike model he might make the corporeal world a younger image of the older. . . . When a city is being founded . . . sometimes there comes forward a man trained as an architect, and after surveying the favorable features of the site he first makes an outline in his mind of almost all the parts of the city that is to be built. . . . Then, receiving an impression of each of them in his soul, as if in wax, he models a city of the mind. Looking to this model he proceeds to construct the city of stone and wood, making the corporeal substance resemble each of the incorporeal ideas. In like manner we must think of God. (Dodd, 67)
The similarities and differences between Philo’s Logos and that of John 1 are instructive (see Logos Theory). For both the Logos is the image of God, the medium of creation, and the means of God’s governance of creation. Only in John, however, is the Logos truly personal, who became a truly incarnate human being and yet is identical with God in nature (John 1:1-14). C. H. Dodd notes as a decisive difference that John “conceives of the Logos as incarnate, and of. . . actually living and dying on earth as a man. This means that the Logos, which in Philo is never personal... is in the gospel fully personal, standing in personal relations both with God and with men, and having a place in history.” Further, “the Logos of Philo is not the object of faith and love. The incarnate Logos of the fourth Gospel is both lover and beloved” (ibid., 73).
Evaluation. Philo is to be criticized for his purely negative theology (see Analogy, Principle of), his *mysticism, his allegorical method of interpretation, and his excessive attraction to Greek philosophy, which led him into errors. His Logos doctrine was wrongly applied to Christ (see Logos Theory) by later writers.
N. Bentwich. Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria.
C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel.
J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus.
R. Nash, Christianity and the Hellenistic World.
Philo Judaeus. I)e Vita Contemplative1.
F. E. Walton, Development of the Logos Doctrine in Greek and Hebrew Thought.
H. A. Wollson. Philo.
Plato. Plato was born in 428 BC, the year of Pericles’s death. He became a disciple of Socrates at the age of sixteen. Plato was twenty-nine when his mentor died. His greatest pupil was Aristotle. Plato’s writing career is divided into four periods. In the first period, he wrote Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Republic (bookl). In the second period, he composed Cratylus, Gorgias, and Lysis. Between the second and third period, he founded his academy. In this third period, he produced Memo, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, and the rest of the Republic. In his fourth and final period of literary composition, Plato wrote Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws.
Alexander the Great, whom Aristotle taught, was born when Plato was seventy-two (in 347 BC). Just fourteen years later (in 333 BC), Alexander began to conquer the world and spread the Greek language and culture that have dominated so much of thought since that time.
Plato’s Epistemology. Plato believed in innate ideas. Indeed, he believed these were the ideas the mind beheld in the world of pure Forms before birth. The ideas were irreducibly simple, eternal Forms (Eidos) that flowed from the one absolute Form, the Good (Agathos). Since they were beheld by the soul in a preincarnate state, all that was necessary was to recollect them This was accomplished by a dialectical method dialogue illustrated in Meno, when even a slave boy was able to do Euclidean geometry by simply being asked the right questions. Of course, if someone does not get it right in this life, there is another reincarnation.
When one reasoned back to the foundation of thought, he found absolute *first principles of knowledge that served as the foundation of all knowledge. Skepticism, *agnosticism, and relativism (see Truth, Nature of) are self-defeating.
Plato’s Metaphysics. Plato believed the universe is eternal, an eternal process by which the Creator (Demiurgos) beheld the Good (the Agathos) and overflowed with Forms (Eidos), which informed the material world (chaos) forever, forming it into a cosmos. Creation, then, is an eternal process of ex materia creation (see Creation, Views of). Thus, reality is a basic *dualism of Form and matter, both being coeternal.
As Plato set forth in the famous cave analogy in his Republic, the physical world is a world of shadows. The real world is the spiritual world of pure Forms. Each physical thing is structured or shaped by these Forms or universals, as opposed to nominalism, which denies the reality of universals or essences. For example, all human beings share in the one Form or Essence of humanness. And humanness exists as a pure Form in the real world, the spiritual one behind this material world. And each of these pure Forms come from the Form that contains all Forms in its absolutely perfect nature.
Plato’s View of God. For Plato, God was not the absolute Form (Agathos) but the Former (the Demiurgos). His argument for a Demiurgos took the following form:
1. The cosmos would be a chaos without forms. Pure stuff without structure is shapeless.
2. Chaos (formless) is evil, and cosmos (form) is good.
3. All forms of good in the world come from a Good Former beyond the world (chaos cannot form itself into cosmos).
4. The Former cannot make good forms without a Form of Good after which to pattern them
5. The Form after which changing forms are formed must be an unchanging Form Only the unchanging can be the basis for the changing. Only the Intelligible (Ideal) can be the basis for Ideas.
6. Therefore, there is both a Former (Demiurgos) and the Form (Good) after which all things are formed.
To complete his triad of ultimates, Plato offered an argument for a First Mover (or World Soul). Just as the Form is needed to explain the source of pure Forms, and the Former is necessary to account for the existence of formed things, so a First Mover is needed to explain the existence of motioninthe world. Plato’s reasoning takes this shape:
1. Things move. This is known by observation.
2. But whatever moves is either moved by another or else is self-moved.
3. Self-mo vers (souls) are prior to non-self-movers. For what does not move itself is moved by what does.
4. Self-movers are eternal; otherwise there would be no motion, since something inert cannot move itself.
5. There must be two self-movers in the universe, one to account for the regular motion (good) and another to explain the irregular motion (evil).
6. The one who accounts for the good motion is the best, because it is the Supreme Mover, which is World Soul.
7. Hence, there is a Supreme Mover (Soul).
The Influence of Plato on Later Thought. Alfred North *Whitehead said Western philosophy is a series of footnotes on Plato. This is largely true. Specific influences are manifest in *Plotinus, *Augustine, *Gnosticism, asceticism, *mysticism, innatism, *dualism, allegorism, and *panentheism Since Plato held a form of *finite godism, John Stewart Mill, William *James, Brightman, Peter Bertocci, Whitehead, and Charles Hartshorne were also influenced by Plato. Likewise, Friedrich *Schleiermacher, Adolph Harnack, and other liberals and humanists (see Humanism, Secular) who hold to man’s inherent perfectibility stem from Plato, who believed that to know the good is to do the good. Salvation is by education.
An Evaluation of Plato’s Views. Positive Dimensions. Plato’s views have numerous enduring values, many of which have been helpful in expressing and defending the Christian faith. An incomplete list would include at least the following.
*Foundationalism. Plato’s defense of *first principles has been a great help to Christian
apologists in arguing against *agnosticism and *conventionalism
Truth as correspondence. Like other classical philosophers, Plato defined truth as correspondence, thus lending support to the Christian conviction that metaphysical truth is what corresponds to reality. Truth is objective and not merely subjective (see Truth, Nature of).
Epistemological absolutism. Not only was truth objective for Plato, but it was also absolute. Plato’s arguments are still used by Christian apologists to defend their belief in absolute truth.
Moral absolutism. Plato also believed in absolute values. This too is in accord with the Christian apologetic task of defending moral absolutes (see Morality, Absolute Nature of).
Ethical *essentialism. Not only did Plato believe in moral absolutes but he also held that they are anchored in the unchanging nature of the Form (the Good).
Universals. Contrary to nominalism, Plato argued, as do orthodox Christians, that there are universals and essences. Indeed, it is part of Christian belief that God has one essence and three persons and that Christ has two essences or natures united in one person (see Christ, Deity of).
Proofs for God. Plato’s proofs for God were a forerunner of later Christian forms of the *cosmological argument or the argument from perfection (see God, Evidence for) used by *Augustine, *Anselm, and *Thomas Aquinas.
Immortality. Plato defended what all orthodox Christians believe, namely, that human beings have a spiritual dimension to their makeup that is immortal (see Immortality).
A life beyond this one. Another dimension of Plato’s thought acceptable to Christians is his belief in a spiritual world beyond this one to which people eventually go after death. Plato posited both a heaven and a *hell.
Innate intellectual capacity. Most Christian apologists believe there is an innate, God-given capacity of the human mind. We are not born absolutely blank but with certain rational capacities and abilities given by God. These are manifest in the universality of first principles such as the law of noncontradiction.
Negative Dimensions. Despite the many positive features of the Platonic system, many of Plato’s ideas have been a continual nemesis to Christianity. A few of these are noteworthy.
Metaphysical dualism. Unlike Christianity, which holds to a monarchial creation ex nihilo (out of nothing), Plato affirmed a *dualism of creation ex materia, out of preexisting matter (see Creation, Views of). Thus, for Plato the material universe is eternal, not temporal as Christians believe and offer good evidence to support (see Kalam Cosmological Argument; Big Bang Theory).
*Finite godism. Unlike the theistic God of Christianity, who is infinite in power and perfection, Plato’s God was finite. But there is ample evidence to show that God is infinite.
Anthropological dualism. One of Plato’s most enduring but troublesome legacies among Christians is his dualistic view of human beings. According to Plato, man is a soul and only has a body. In fact, humans are imprisoned in their bodies. From this both asceticism (denial of the body) and otherworldliness result, neither of which is endorsed by Christianity.
Allegorism. Because Plato believed that matter was less real and less good than spirit, he downplayed the literal understanding of things. In the field of interpretation, this leads to looking for a deeper, more spiritual or mystical understanding of a text. From this both Neoplatonism (see Plotinus) and medieval allegorism developed (see Origen), problems still beleaguering the Christian church.
Innatism of ideas. While Plato correctly pointed to an innate dimension of the human mind, many Christians, following Aquinas, reject Plato’s belief in innate ideas. Some great Christian thinkers, like Augustine, even went so far as to affirm Plato’s concomitant idea of recollection of these ideas from a previous existence, only later to have to retract the view.
Reincarnation. Plato’s concept of reincarnation, like that of Eastern views, has been condemned by the Christian church and is refuted by good evidence, both biblical and rational (see Reincarnation).
Humanistic optimism. In some respects, Plato is the father ofWe stern humanism (see Humanism, Secular). His belief that human beings are perfectible by education is contrary to both the teaching of Scripture and universal human experience.
Pluralistic dilemma. Like other philosophers following Parmenides, Plato never solved the problem of the one and the many (see Monism). He ended up with many irresolvably simple Forms that could not differ from one another in any real way (see Pluralism, Metaphysical).
Theological inadequacy. Some Christians have seen more Christian truth in Plato than there is to see. Plato’s triad of the Form, the Former, and the World Soul is by no means the Christian *Trinity, as some have claimed. For one thing, two of them (the Form and the World Soul) are not even persons in any significant sense of the term For another thing, they do not all share one and the same nature.
Further, Plato and the other Greek philosophers never got their God and their highest metaphysical principle together, as did Christians (see Gilson). In Plato, for example, the Good is the highest metaphysical principle, but the Good is not identified with God. Rather, the Demiurgos, who is inferior to the Good, is God in Plato’s system
Sources
E. Gilson, God and Philosophy, chap. 1.
J. Owens ,A History of Ancient Western Philosophy.
Plato, "Apology,” in Collected Dialogues.
--,Laws.
--, The Republic of Plato.
--, Timaeus.
A. E. Taylor ,Plato.
Platonic View of God. See Cosmological Argument; Plotinus.
Plotinus. Plotinus (ca. 204-270) was born in Egypt, and in his late twenties, he began to study philosophy at Alexandria. Eventually, he studied under Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of *Origen, for eleven years. Plotinus did not begin to write his only book, The Six Enneads, until he had taught philosophy in Rome for ten years. His work has been extremely influential in both philosophical and religious thought. He developed the worldview of emanational *pantheism
God and the World. Contrary to vedanta pantheism (see Hinduism, Vedanta), Plotinus held that being or reality is multiple or many. He counted three levels or planes of being. But prior to and beyond being is the One.
The One is absolutely simple, that is, it has no parts, and it is absolutely necessary, that is, it must exist. The One has not just “happened,” but it exists by necessity. This absolute Unity must exist, because multiplicity presupposes a prior unity. We can only know what is many if we know the One. “Unity must precede Reality and be its author” (Enneads, 6.6.13; all further citations are from this source). The One, therefore, is the absolute source of being. The One is beyond and prior to being.
The Indescribable and Unknowable. Plotinus argues that the One transcends all of which it is the source, which is everything in reality: “Certainly this Absolute is none of the things of which it is the source—its nature is that nothing can be affirmed of it—not existence, not essence, not life—since it is That which transcends all these.” Even its own name, the One, it transcends: “And this name, the One, contains really no more than the negation of plurality. ... If we are led to think positively of the One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence” (3.8.101).
If the One is truly indescribable, why does Plotinus attempt to describe it? His writing, he says, is a call to vision, which urges on toward the One that is beyond being.
We can know something about the One through its offspring, being (6.9.5). Though we cannot speak or know the One, we can speak or know of the One in terms of what has come from the One.
We must keep in mind, however, that our words and thoughts are only pointers, not truly descriptive but only evocative.
Levels of Reality. Nous. The first level of being is Nous (“Mind”). Nous is the Divine Mind; it is God but not the highest God. It is pure Being. Of the emanations from the One, Nous is the first (5.1.4, 8). When the One emanates outward, and this emanant looks backward upon its source, there arises the simple duality of Knower and Known (6.7.37). This simple duality is Nous. Nous in turn gives rise to further emanations by bending inward upon itself. It produces particular intellects or forms that turn outward, producing the World Soul, which in turn produces the species of individual souls (6.2.22; 6.7.15). The One, Nous, and World Soul form not a Trinity but an emanational triad. From this tri-level God flow all other things. Creation is ex Deo, both emanationally and necessarily (see Creation, Views of).
World Soul. The second level of reality, the World Soul, is a middle position between Nous and the corporeal world. It reflects the Nous and organizes the corporeal. The World Soul is even more multiple than Nous, for it is further from the absolute Unity of the One. The World Soul emanates forth when Nous reflects upon itself (6.2.22). The World Soul animates the universe in all its multiplicity, giving it a unity or wholeness (3.1.4, 5).
Matter. The third level of reality is matter, the most multiple of all. Since the entire emanational process is a necessary unfolding from unity to multiplicity, it is necessary that the last stage is one step away from complete nonexistence. Plotinus describes matter as nonbeing but adds that this should not be understood to mean nonexistence. Rather, matter is an image of being, or something farther removed than even an image. The farther removed something is from the source of being, the One, the less unity and being it has (6.9.1). Since matter is the most multiple, it “has no residue of good in it” (1.8.7). Since the absolute Unity is absolutely good, each further degree of multiplicity is less good and capable of greater evil (1.8.5). Matter has no good in it, but it does have the capacity for good. Matter is not pure evil itself. It is simply privated of all good (1.8.3), having only the mere capacity for good left in it.
That which is beyond and prior to being, the One, eternally and necessarily unfolds itself as a seed unfolds into a flower. This produces Nous, or what Plotinus calls “One-Many.” Nous is the One becoming self-conscious, that is, discovering itself. Now when Nous reflects inward upon itself, it produces knowing beings, and when it reflects outward, it produces World Soul, or what Plotinus calls “One-and-Many.” From World Soul all else flows, including matter or the “many.”
The One flows outward from unity to multiplicity. And for Plotinus, there is also a return flow back to unity. Just as there is a necessity for the many to unfold from the One, there is a need for the many to return to the One. The process is like the stretching of a gigantic elastic band. It can be stretched so far before it snaps back to the source.
Human Beings. Plotinus believes that a human being is a soul that has a body. The true self is the eternal soul (see Immortality), which is temporarily coupled with a material shell. Through this attachment with matter, the soul becomes contaminated (1.2.4). If a person does not strive toward the ultimate good and unity, and instead is concerned only with matter, the self will become absolutely evil (1.8.13). To be saved and attain ultimate perfection, the person must turn Ifom matter and toward the One. Salvation consists in overcoming the body-soul dualism This normally requires many cycles of reincarnation. To escape the cycle, a person must turn to the inner by asceticism and meditation.
The first step toward deliverance begins in the realm of sense, where some unity has been imposed by the Absolute above (1.6.2-3). By looking at the “beauties of the realm of sense, images and shadow-pictures, fugitives that have entered into Matter,” one comes to realize that “there are earlier and loftier beauties than these” (1.6.3-4). These objects of sense point us to the source (6.9.11). We are not to stop with them but ascend beyond them So the first step is from the sensible world to the intellectual world of Nous.
As the first step involved a move from the external, the second step continues the ascent from the internal, the soul, toward the eternal, Nous. This movement is from the lower soul to a higher soul, and then to Nous, which is above the soul. Human mind must identify with Mind. Knower and known must become one. This is done through meditation. Even now, however, ultimate Unity has not yet been attained.
The third and last step leads to the highest possible union—oneness with the One. It can be attained only by a mystical (see Mysticism) union that puts away all multiplicity, even intellect and reason. Says Plotinus, “One wishing to contemplate what transcends the intellectual attains by putting away all that is of the intellect.” The way journeys past knowing, even the highest objects of knowledge, to the intuitional and mystical. In this last stage, everything is absolute unity again. What emanated out has returned. All that flowed from God has and must return (5.5.6; 6.9.4).
Evaluation. Despite positive features in his system (such as God’s transcendence and human immortality), Plotinus’ views are subject to the same criticisms as other forms of pantheism A few of his essential premises need special evaluation.
The One and Nonbeing. For Plotinus, the Ultimate (One) is beyond being. But the One must be in the realm of either being or nonbeing. There is nothing in between something and nothing. Since the One is not in the realm of being, it must be nonbeing or nothing. But nothing cannot produce something. Yet Plotinus contends that the One produced all being. This is the ultimate metaphysical absurdity.
Effect and Cause. In the Plotinian system, the effect turns out to be greater than the cause. For the One produced being but has no being. Mind emerges from the One, but the One as such has no mind. However, water cannot rise higher than its source. An effect cannot be greater than its cause (see Analogy, Principle of; Causality, Principle of).
Following from the principle of causality is the principle of analogy. Since the cause cannot produce what it does not possess, the effect must resemble its cause. Of course, it cannot be identical, since one is producer and the other the produced. One is superior. But since only being produces being, there must be some actual similarity between cause and effect. The infinite, uncaused Cause of all other being is Being, though it is not finite, nor is it caused. For Plotinus, the One does not share any characteristics with its offspring. It is totally “other.” This violates the principle of *analogy (see First Principles).
Knowledge of the Ultimate. Plotinus could ascertain no knowledge of the One. It is beyond being and beyond description. All statements about it are negative or equivocal. However, even Plotinus admitted that we cannot know something is “not that” unless we know what “that” is. Negative knowledge presupposes positive knowledge (6.7.29; 6.9.4).
Summary. Plotinus’s emanational pantheism begins in unity, which gives rise to increased multiplicity until being almost reaches the point of nonexistence. Then all returns toward increasingly greater unity, until the greatest unity is reached in the absolute unity of the One. Here one becomes one with the One and all with the All.
If words cannot express the Ultimate, why then did Plotinus himself write hundreds of pages describing his view of the Ultimate? Only absolute verbal and mental mutism is consistent for a mystic (see Mysticism). Even evocative language or pointers will not suffice. Unless they point to something we can understand, we still have no understanding.
A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus.
E. Brehier, The Philosophy of Plotinus.
D. Clark andN. L. Geisler ,Apologetics in the New Age, chap. 4.
G. H. Clark, Thales to Dewey.
N. L. Geisler and W. D. Watkins, Worlds Apart, chap. 3.
Plotinus, The Six Enneads.
Pluralism, Metaphysical Pluralism affirms that reality is found in many, as opposed to one. It stands in contrast to *monism, which claims that reality is one. Pantheism is a form of monism, and theism is a form of pluralism Monists hold a univocal or equivocal notion of being (see Plotinus). Theists hold an analogical view of being (see Analogy, Principle of).
Pluralism, Religious. To better understand religious pluralism, several terms related to religion need to be distinguished: pluralism, relativism, inclusivism, and exclusivism. Religious pluralism is the belief that every religion is true. Each provides a genuine encounter with the Ultimate. One may be better than the others, but all are adequate. Relativism (see Truth, Nature of) claims that there are no criteria by which one can tell which religion is true or best. There is no objective truth in religion, and each religion is true to the one holding it. Inclusivism claims that one religion is explicitly true, while all others are implicitly true. Exclusivism is the belief that only one religion is true, and the others opposed to it are false.
Christianity is exclusivistic; it claims to be the one and only true religion (see Christ, Uniqueness of). This places Christians at odds with the modern movements to study comparative religion and work at interfaith communing. Asks Alister McGrath, “How can Christianity’s claims to truth be taken seriously when there are so many rival alternatives and when ‘truth’ itself has become a devalued notion? No one can lay claim to possession of the truth. It is all a question of perspective. All claims to truth are equally valid. There is no universal or privileged vantage point that allows anyone to decide what is right and what is wrong” (McGrath, 365).
Equality among World Religions. Pluralist John Hick argues, “I have not found that the people of the other world religions are, in general, on a different moral and spiritual level from Christians.” For “the basic ideal of love and concern for others and of treating them as you would wish them to treat you is, in fact, taught by all the great religious tradition” (Hick, “A Pluralist’s View,” 39). Hick offers as proof the fact that statements similar to the “Golden Rule” of Christianity can be found in other religions (ibid., 39-40).
It is debatable whether practitioners in non-Christian religions can really display what Galatians 5:22-23 calls “the fruit of the Spirit”: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control. Certainly non-Christians do loving things and feel the heart emotion of attachment that we call love. And others are gentle, good, kind, and self-controlled. But are they able to manifest agape love? One can lead a philanthropic life and even die in a stand for personal beliefs yet not show God-founded holistic true love (see 1 Cor. 13:3). Christians are to have a qualitatively different kind of love for one another and especially for God. While God’s common grace enables evil people to do good (see Matt. 7:11), only the supernatural love of God can motivate a person to express true agape (cf. John 15:13; Rom 5:6-8; 1 John 4:7).
Before one concludes too quickly that William *James demonstrated the equality of all forms of saintliness in Varieties of Religious Experiences, Jonathan Edwards’s Treatise on Religious Affections should be perused. Edwards argues forcefully that manifestations of Christian godliness are unique, a difference in the highest level of Christian and non-Christian piety.
Even if one could demonstrate a kind of moral equality of practice among most adherents of the great religions, this would not in itself prove moral equality among the religions. A person perfectly practicing a lesser moral code may appear to be more moral than a person imperfectly living according to a higher ethical standard. In order to make a fair comparison, one must compare the highest moral teachings of the various religions. For another thing, one must compare the best examples of the adherents to each. A close comparison of the attitudes, goals, and motivations, as well as the actions, of Mother Teresa and Mohandas Gandhi would demonstrate the superiority of Christian compassion for the needy. On the modern religious scene, one must also sort out what is inherent to the moral system of another religion and what has become incorporated into it as the result of Christian missionary activity. Hinduism as a system did not generate social compassion in Gandhi. Gandhi was a student of Christianity who seriously considered conversion. He proclaimed his admiration for Jesus’s teaching in the Sermon on the Mount. The social compassion found in some forms of current Hinduism is a foreign import from Christianity, the influence of those like Gandhi who had been touched by Christian principles. Even then it fell short of the full-orbed Christian compassion of Mother Teresa.
Furthermore, finding a moral principle akin to the Golden Rule (cf. Matt. 7:12) is not enough to show moral equality. This is a manifestation of general revelation, the law written by God in the hearts of all (Rom 2:12-15). When it was lived out at moments of national spirituality, Christian morality produced dynamic social compassion, while Eastern religions have produced stagnant societies and Islam has brought intolerant ones (Pinnock in Okholm, 61).
What is more, Hick’s analysis begs the question. Only by assuming that the moral common denominator of all religions is the standard by which they should all be judged does he arrive at the not-surprising conclusion that they are all equal. But one had to negate the superior aspects of Christian morality or teaching in order to show that Christianity is not superior. Hick seems to acknowledge this tacitly when he confesses that the “acceptance of some form of the pluralistic view prompts each to de-emphasize and eventually winnow out that aspect of its self-understanding that entails a claim to unique superiority among the religions of the world” (Hick, 51).
Further, the moral manifestation of a belief does not settle the truth question. For example, the fact that there are outwardly moral Mormons does not prove that Joseph Smith was a true prophet. Indeed, there is strong evidence that he was not a true prophet (see Tanner and Tanner). Among evidence to the contrary are his demonstrably false prophecies (see Miracle; Prophecy, as Proof of the Bible). There is evidence for whether something is true other than the lifestyle of its adherents. Truth is what corresponds to reality (see Truth, Nature of), and, hence, a religion is true if its central tenets correspond to the real world, not merely whether its followers live a good life or even a better one than adherents of another religion.
In the final analysis, the moral superiority of Christianity does not rest on our imperfection as Christians but on Christ’s unique perfection as our exemplar. It is not based on our fallible moral character but on his impeccable character (John 8:46; 2 Cor. 5:21;Heb. 4:15; 1 John3:3). In this context, there is clearly a moral superiority of Christianity over all other religions.
Redemptive Equality of Religions. As for the Christian claim of a superior mode of salvation, Hick believes this either begs the question or is not evident in practice. “If we define salvation as being forgiven and accepted by God because of Jesus’s death on the cross, then it becomes a tautology that Christianity alone knows and is able to preach the source of salvation” And “if we define salvation as an actual human change, a gradual transformation from natural self-centeredness (with all the human evils that flow from this) to a radically new orientation centered in God and manifest in the ‘fruit of the Spirit,’ then it seems clear that salvation is taking place within all of the world religions—and taking place, so far as we can tell, to more or less the same extent” (ibid., 43). Further, what is common to all world religions is an adequate response to the Ultimate. “But they seem to constitute more or less equally authentic human awareness of and response to the Ultimate, the Real, the final ground and source of everything” (ibid., 45). There are, of course, “a plurality of religious traditions constituting different, but apparently more or less equally salvific, human responses to the Ultimate. These are the great world faiths” (ibid., 47).
Hick’s analysis of salvation beliefs is based on the assumption that all religions have a proper relation to what is really Ultimate. This begs the question. Maybe some are not connected at all to what is really Ultimate (i.e., the true God). Or perhaps they are not properly related to what is really Ultimate (God).
Hick wrongly assumes that all religions are merely a human response to the Ultimate. But this assumes an anti supernatural view of religion. In fact, it assumes an Eastern pantheistic view of the Ultimate as what transcends all particular cultural manifestations in the various world religions.
This denial of the truth of any particular religion is itself a form of exclusivism It favors the particular view known as pantheism in order to deny the particularity of a view known as Christian theism To assume this kind of pantheistic position as a basis for one’s analysis of all religions, including nonpantheistic ones, simply begs the question. Or to put it another way, the pluralist who denies that any particular religion is any more true than others is making a particular truth claim
The pluralist view often degenerates to the position that whatever is sincerely believed is true.
This means that it matters not whether one is a passionate Nazi, satanist, or member of the Flat Earth Society. Any view would be truth. Sincerity is clearly not a test of truth. Many people have been sincerely wrong about many things.
Finally, this implies that all truth claims are a matter of both-and rather than either-or. By this reasoning, there could be square circles, wise fools, and educated illiterates. Mutually exclusive propositions cannot both be true. Opposing truth claims of various religions cannot both be true (see Logic and God; First Principles). For example, Hindu pantheism and Christian theism affirm mutually exclusive worldviews. Islam denies and Christianity proclaims Jesus’s death on the cross and resurrection from the dead three days later. One or the other must be wrong.
The Uniqueness of Christ. As for the Christian dogma about the uniqueness of Christ (see Christ, Uniqueness of) to be God incarnate in human flesh, Hick contends that there are two main problems: First, Jesus did not teach this uniqueness himself. Second, the concept that Jesus was both God and human lacks coherence.
Hick rejects apparent statements about the uniqueness of Christ in the Gospels because he sees New Testament scholars doing the same thing. “Among mainline New Testament scholars there is today a general consensus that these are not pronouncements of the historical Jesus but words put in his mouth some sixty or seventy years later by a Christian writer expressing the theology that had developed in his part of the expanding church” (ibid., 52-53). Hick cites a list of biblical writers who allegedly agreed that “Jesus did not claim deity for himself’ (ibid.).
Hick is misinformed on both points. The historical reliability of the Gospels is now beyond serious dispute (see Acts, Historicity of; New Testament, Dating of; New Testament, Historicity of). Claims that Jesus’s statements were edited many years later to fit a religious program simply do not square with the facts. The Gospels were available in the forms we now know within the lifetimes of eyewitnesses and contemporaries of the events. Recent evidence seems to be pushing dates earlier. John, thought to be the last Gospel written, was written by a participant of the events (John 21:24). Luke was written by a contemporary disciple who knew the eyewitnesses (Luke 1:1-4). The Gospels are reporting, not creating, the words and deeds of Jesus. There is firm support for his unique claims to be God incarnate (see Christ, Deity of).
Hick’s second allegation is that “it has not proved possible, after some fifteen centuries of intermittent effort, to give any clear meaning to the idea that Jesus had two complete natures, one human and the other divine?” (ibid., 55). Hick asks, “Is it really possible for infinite knowledge to be housed in a finite human brain” (ibid., 55). Again, “Do we really want to claim that Jesus was literally omnipotent but pretended not to be, as in Mark 6:5?” And “while he was good, loving, wise, just, and merciful, there is an obvious problem about how a finite human being could have these qualities in an infinite degree. ... A finite being cannot have infinite attributes” (ibid., 56).
Hick falls short of claiming that the incarnation involves an outright logical contradiction, though his language could imply that. If it is not a logical contradiction, there is no demonstrated incoherence in the view. Indeed, Hick himself admits that “it is logically permissible to believe anything that is not self-contradictory” (Hick, Metaphor of God Incarnate, 104). As for the claim that it is difficult to show just how this is so, on the same grounds one would have to reject both much of our common experience as well as modern science (which has difficulty explaining just how light can be both waves and particles).
Second, Hick appears to be misinformed about the orthodox view of the two natures of Christ. His objections assume an unorthodox view known as the monophysite heresy, which confuses the two natures of Christ. His question “Is it really possible for infinite knowledge to be housed in a finite human brain?” (ibid., 55) reveals this confusion. The orthodoxview does not claim that there was infinite knowledge in the finite brain of Christ. Rather, it affirms that there were two distinct natures of Christ, one infinite and the other finite. The person of Christ did not have infinite knowledge. He had infinite knowledge only in his infinite nature. As God, he knew all things. As human, Jesus grew in knowledge (Luke 2:52). The same thing applies to Jesus’s other attributes. As God, he was omnipotent. As human, he was not (see Christ, Deity of).
Allegations of Intolerance. Another charge is that exclusivism is intolerant. This is directed at the exclusivists’ view that one religious view is true and those opposed to it are false. This, to the pluralists, seems a bit of bigotry. Why should only one view have a franchise on the truth?
By this reasoning, pluralists are also “intolerant.” They claim their views are true to the exclusion of opposing views (including exclusivism). And they certainly would not tolerate the position that pluralistic and opposing nonpluraliStic views are both true.
If the charge of intolerance is leveled because of the manner in which some exclusivists express their views, nonpluralists have no monopoly on rudeness, intimidation, and poorly thought-out statements. As is demonstrated in the “politically correct” movement on university campuses, pluralists can be as intolerant as anyone else. In fact, there might be more exclusivists than pluralists who act with respect and restraint. However, it should be noted that the very concept of tolerance implies areal disagreement. One does not tolerate that with which he or she agrees. Tolerance presupposes a self-confident view of truth.
Narrow-Mindedness. The tolerance issue is closely related to a favorite allegation of pluralists that nonpluralists are narrow-minded. They claim that their view is true, and everyone else is in error. This seems presumptuous. Why should only exclusivists be in possession of the truth?
The response is that pluralists (P) and exclusivists (E) make an equal claim to truth and error. Both claim that their view is true and whatever opposes it is false. For example, if E is true, then all non-E is false. Likewise, ifP is true, then all non-P is false. Both views are “narrow.” All truth is narrow. After all, 2 plus 3 has only one true answer—5. That is the way truth is.
Intellectual Imperialism. Another charge is that exclusivists are guilty of intellectual imperialism. Exclusivists are totalitarian with regard to truth. They should be more open to input from many sources, not just to one. Some postmodern pluralists go so far as to claim that the very ideas of truth and meaning smack of fascism (cited in McGrath, 364).
This allegation has a certain appeal, especially to those of a particular political mind-set, but it is without merit with regard to determining what is true. The way this allegation is often made is as a form of the ad hominem logical fallacy. It attacks the person rather than the position.
This objection also makes an unjustified presumption that truth should be more democratic. But truth is not decided by majority vote. Truth is what corresponds to reality (see Truth, Nature of), whether the majority believes it or not. Do pluralists really believe that all views are equally true and good and should be settled on by majority rule? Is fascism or Marxism as good as democracy? Was Nazism as good as any other government? Should we have tolerated the burning of widows at Hindu funerals of their husbands?
Presuppositions of Pluralism. There Are Transreligious Moral Criteria. To make the moral equality argument work, one must assume a set of moral criteria not unique to any particular religion by which all can be evaluated. Pluralists generally deny that there is any universally binding moral law. If there were such absolute moral laws, there would need to be an absolute Moral Law Giver. But only theistic-type religions accept this criteria, and some of them reject the absolute perfect nature of God (for example, finite godists). If there is a moral law commonto all religions, then it is not unique to one, and no religion can be judged inferior for lacking it.
Finally, if there are no such universal moral laws, then there is no way to judge morally all religions from any standard beyond them And it is not fair to take the standards of one religion and apply them to another, claiming that the other falls short.
Phenomena Can Be Explained. Beneath the pluralist’s attack on exclusivismis a naturalistic presupposition. All religious phenomena can be explained naturalistically. No supernatural explanations are allowed. But this presumptive naturalism is without justification. Miracles cannot be ruled out a priori (see Miracles, Arguments Against). Neither, as David *Hume claimed, are miracles incredible. Nor are miracles without evidence. Indeed, there is substantial evidence for the greatest “miracle” of all, the ex nihilo creation of the world out of nothing (see Big Bang Theory; Kalam Cosmological Argument). There is also abundant evidence that the resurrection of Christ occurred (see Resurrection, Evidence for).
The World Is “Religiously Ambiguous. ” Hick believes that “the universe, as presently accessible to us, is capable of being interpreted intellectually and experientially in both religious and naturalistic ways” (Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 129). We cannot know the truth about God; what is real cannot be differentiated from what is false.
It is a self-defeating claim that we know that we cannot know the real. Simply because we do not know reality exhaustively does not mean we cannot know it truly (see Agnosticism; Realism). As Douglas Geivett notes, “To the extent that God is known at all, he is known truly.” The very notion of an undifferentiated Real is implausible, if not self-defeating. Hick’s claim that the Real can be symbolized by the concept of sunyata in Buddhism is a case in point. For if the Real is so undifferentiated, then how can any symbol represent it? Neither can the Real be manifested in various traditions, as Hick claims. In order for something to be manifested, at least some of its characteristics must be revealed. But the Real, if totally undifferentiated, has no discernible characteristics. Hence, it could not be manifested in our experience in any meaningful way. There is a kind of mystical epistemology presumed in this “God is unknowable” approach (see Mysticism). It rather imperiously decrees how God can and cannot reveal himself (Geivett in Okholm and Phillips, 77).
Dialogue Is the Only Way to Truth. Another seriously flawed presupposition is the position that pluralistic interreligious dialogue is the only valid way to discover truth. No genuine religious dialogue is possible if one assumes his religion is true in advance of the dialogue. This is sure proof that he is not “open” to truth. True dialogue assumes one is tolerant, open, humble, willing to listen and learn, and engage in a shared search for truth and a self-sacrificing, other-oriented love (ibid., 239).
However, true dialogue is possible without adopting a pluralistic position on truth. One can have the attitude of humility, openness, and tolerance without sacrificing convictions about truth. Even the pluralist is not willing to give up a commitment to pluralism as a condition for such dialogue. This violates the pluralist’s own imperative. In fact, the call to dialogue is usually a disingenuous attempt at evangelism on behalf of the worldview of the one calling for dialogue.
Hick’s View Is Religiously Neutral. Hick feigns religious neutrality, but it does not exist. His alleged pluralism is patterned after Hinduism’s conception of the Transcendent. And it is antagonistic to the core principles of Christianity. It does not really encourage genuine dialogue between the traditions. Indeed, it renders virtually vacuous the concept of being “in a given religious tradition.” After all, according to pluralists, every tradition is essentially the same. So to accept pluralism is to reject one’s own tradition and accept the pluralist’s tradition.
A Relativistic View of Truth Is Correct. Beneath the pluralists’ assertion that all major religions have equal claim to the truth is a relativistic view of truth (see Truth, Nature of). But the denial of absolute truth is self-defeating. It claims that relativism is true for everyone, everywhere, and always. But what is true for everyone, everywhere, and always is an absolute truth. Therefore, the relativist claims that relativism is absolutely true.
Sources
M. J. Adler, Truth in Religion.
N. Anderson, Christianity and World Religions.
D. Clark and N. L. Geisler ,Apologetics in the New Age.
A. D. Clarke and B. W. Winter, eds., One God, One Lord.
W. Corduan, Neighboring Faiths.
W. V. Crockett and J. G. Sigountos, eds., Through No Fault of their Own?
K. Gnanakan. The Pluralistic Predicament.
J. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion.
---, The Metaphor of God Incarnate.
---, “A Pluralist’s View.”
A. McGrath, ‘The Challenge of Pluralism for the Contemporary Christian Church.”
R. Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior?
H. A. Netland, Dissonant Voices.
D. L. Okholm and T. R. Phillips, eds.,More Than One Way?, esp. contributions by D. Geivett et at, J. Hick, and C. Pinnock.
J. Sanders. No Other Name.
G. Tanner and S. Tanner, The Changing World of Mormonism.
Polygamy. First Kings 11:3 says Solomon had seven hundred wives and three hundred concubines. Other men God highly praised in the Bible had multiple wives (and/or concubines), particularly Abraham and David. And yet the Scriptures repeatedly warn against having multiple wives (Deut. 17:17) and violating the principle of monogamy—one man for one wife (cf. 1 Cor. 7:2; 1 Tim 2:2). This seems to many critics to be a contradiction (see Bible, Alleged Errors in).
The Problem of Polygamy. Monogamy is God’s ideal standard for the human race. There are many objections to polygamy:
1. It was never commanded by God; it was only tolerated by God.
2. From the beginning, God set the pattern by creating a monogamous marriage relationship with one man and one woman, Adam and Eve (Gen. 1:27).
3. This is evident in the subsequent statement that “a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife [singular], and they will become one flesh” (Gen. 2:24). Polygamy was never established by God for any people under any circumstances.
4. Following from this God-established example, this was the general practice (Gen. 4:1) until interrupted by sin.
5. The first recorded polygamist, Lamech, was a wicked man (Gen. 4:23).
6. Christ reaffirmed God’s original intention in Matthew 19:4, noting that God created one “male and [one] female” and joined them in marriage.
7. The law of Moses prohibits polygamy, commanding, “You shall not multiply wives” (Deut. 17:17).
8. The warning against intermarriage with unbelievers was repeated in the very passage that numbers Solomon’s wives (1 Kings 11:2). Solomon’s wives did irreparable damage to the house of David and to Israel.
9. The New Testament stresses that “Each man [should] have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband” (1 Cor. 7:2). This emphatically excludes polygamy.
10. Paul insisted that a church leader should be “the husband of one wife” (1 Tim 3:2, 12). Whatever else this may entail, it certainly implies a monogamous relation.
11. Monogamous marriage prefigures the relation between Christ and his “bride” (singular), the church (Eph. 5:31-32).
12. God’s judgment on polygamy is evident by example and implication:
a. Polygamy is first mentioned in the context of a society in rebellion against God where the murderer “Lamech took for himself two wives” (Gen. 4:19, 23).
b. God repeatedly warned polygamists of the consequences of their actions “lest his heart turn away” from God (Deut. 17:17; cf. 1 Kings 11).
c. God never commanded polygamy—like divorce, he only permitted it because of the hardness of their hearts (Deut. 24:1; Matt. 19:8).
d. Every polygamist in the Bible, including David and Solomon (1 Chron. 14:3), paid dearly for his sins.
e. God hates polygamy, as he hates divorce, since it destroys his ideal for the family (cf. Mai. 2:16).
Conclusion. Though the Bible records instances of polygamy, this does not mean God approved of it. Monogamy is taught in the Bible by precedent, since God gave the first man only one wife; by the equal proportion of males and females God brings into the world; by precept of Old and New Testament commands; by punishment, since God punished those who violated his standard (1 Kings 11:2); and by the prophetic picture of Christ and his pure bride, the church (Eph. 5:31-32).