T. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles.
H. Dooyeweerd. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought.
J. M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til.
I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.
C. Van ΤΠ, The Defense of the Faith.
Trinity. Trinity simply means “triunity.” God is not a simple unity; there is plurality in his unity. The Trinity is one of the great mysteries (see Mystery) of the Christian faith. Unlike an antinomy (see Kant, Immanuel) or paradox, which is a logical contradiction (see Logic and God), the Trinity goes beyond reason but not against reason. It is known only by divine revelation, so the Trinity is not the subject of *natural theology but of revelation (see Revelation, Special). The term Trinity was first used by the second-century church father Tertullian.
The Basis for the Trinity. While the word Trinity does not occur in the Bible, the concept is clearly taught there. The logic of the doctrine of the Trinity is simple. Two biblical truths are evident in Scripture, the logical conclusion of which is the Trinity:
1. There is one God.
2. There are three distinct persons who are God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
One God. The central teaching of Judaism called the Shema proclaims, “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one” (Deut. 6:4). When Jesus was asked the question, “What is the greatest commandment?” he prefaced the answer by quoting the Shema (Mark 12:29). In spite of his strong teaching on the deity of Christ (cf. Col. 2:9), the apostle Paul said emphatically, “there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things came and for whom we live” (1 Cor. 8:6a). From beginning to end, the Scriptures speak of one God and label all other gods as false (Exod. 20:3; 1 Cor. 8:5-6).
The Bible also recognizes a plurality of distinct persons in God. Although the doctrine of the Trinity is not as explicit in the Old Testament as in the New Testament, nonetheless, there are passages in which members of the Godhead are distinguished. At times they even speak to one another (see Ps. 110:1).
The Father Is God. Throughout Scripture God is said to be a Father. Jesus taught his disciples to pray, “Our Father in heaven” (Matt. 6:9). God is not only “our heavenly Father” (Matt. 6:32) but also the “Father of our spirits” (Heb. 12:9). As God, he is the object of worship. Jesus told the woman of Samaria, “Yet a time is coming and has now come when the true worshippers will worship the Father in spirit and truth, for they are the kind of worshippers the Father seeks” (John 4:23). God is called not only “our Father” (Rom. 1:7) many times but also “the Father” (John 5:45; 6:27). He is also called “God and Father” (2 Cor. 1:3). Paul proclaimed that “there is but one God, the Father”
(1 Cor. 8:6). Additionally, God is referred to as the “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom 15:6).
Indeed, the Father and the Son are often related by these very names in the same verse (Matt. 11:27;
1 John 2:22).
The Son Is God. The deity of Christ is treated in the article Christ, Deity of. As a broad overview, it should be noted that Jesus claimed to be Yahweh God. YHWH, translated in some versions Jehovah, was the special name of God revealed to Moses in Exodus 3:14, when God said,
“I AM WHO I AM.” In John 8:58, Jesus declares, “Before Abraham was, I am” This statement claims not only existence before Abraham but also equality with the “I AM” of Exodus 3:14. The Jews around him clearly understood his meaning and picked up stones to kill him for blaspheming (see Mark 14:62; John 8:58; 10:31-33; 18:5-6). Jesus also said, “I am the first and the last (Rev. 2:8).
Jesus took the glory of God. Isaiah wrote, “I am the Lord [Yahweh], that is my name; I will not give my glory to another, or my praise to idols” (42:8) and, “This is what the Lord [Yahweh] says ... I am the first, and I am the last; apart from me there is no God” (44:6). Likewise, Jesus prayed, “Father, glorify me in your presence with the glory I had with you before the world began” (John 17:5). But Yahweh had said he would not give his glory to another.
While the Old Testament forbids giving worship to anyone other than God (Exod. 20:1-4; Deut. 5:6-9), Jesus accepted worship (Matt. 8:2; 14:33; 15:25; 20:20; 28:17; Mark 5:6). The disciples attributed to him titles the Old Testament reserved for God, such as, “the first and the last” (Rev.
1:17; 2:8; 22:13), “the true light” (John 1:9), the “rock” or “stone” (1 Cor. 10:4; 1 Peter 2:6-8; cf. Pss. 18:2; 95:1), the “bridegroom” (Eph. 5:28-33; Rev. 21:2), “the chief Shepherd” (1 Peter 5:4), and “the great shepherd” (Heb. 13:20). They attributed to Jesus the divine activities of creating (John 1:3; Col. 1:15-16), redeeming (Hosea 13:14; Ps. 130:7), forgiving (Acts 5:31; Col. 3:13; cf. Ps. 130:4; Jer. 31:34), and judging (John 5:26). They used titles of deity for Jesus. Thomas declared, “My Lord and my God!” (John 20:28). Paul calls Jesus “the one in whom the fullness of deity dwells bodily” (Col. 2:9). In Titus, Jesus is called “our great God and savior” (2:13), and the writer to the Hebrews says of him, “Thy throne, O God, is forever” (Heb. 1:8). Paul says that before Christ existed as a human being he existed as God” (Phil. 2:5-8). Hebrews 1:5 says that Christ reflects God’s glory of God, bears the stamp of his nature, and upholds the universe. The prologue to John’s Gospel also minces no words, stating, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word [Jesus] was God” (John 1:1).
Jesus claimed equality with God in other ways. He claimed the prerogatives of God. He claimed to be Judge of all (Matt. 25:31-46; John 5:27-30), but Joel quotes Yahweh as saying, “For there I will sit to judge all the nations on every side” (Joel 3:12). He said to a paralytic, “Son, your sins are forgiven” (Mark 2:5b). The scribes correctly responded, “Who can forgive sins but God alone?”
(v. 7b). Jesus claimed the power to raise and judge the dead, a power that only God possesses (John 5:21, 29). But the Old Testament clearly taught that only God was the giver of life (Deut. 32:39;
1 Sam 2:6) and the one to raise the dead (Ps. 2:7).
Jesus also claimed the honor due God, saying, “He who does not honor the Son does not honor the father, who sent him” (John 5:23b). The Jews listening knew that no one should claim to be equal with God in this way and again they reached for stones (John 5:18). When asked at his Jewish trial, “Are you the Christ [Messiah], the Son of the Blessed One?” Jesus responded, “I am, and you will see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of the Mighty One and coming on the clouds of heaven” (Mark 14:6 lb-62).
The Holy Spirit Is God. The same revelation from God that declares Christ to be the Son of God also mentions another member of the triunity of God called the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit. He too is equally God with the Father and the Son, and he too is a distinct person
The Holy Spirit is called “God” (Acts 5:3-4). He possesses the attributes of deity, such as omnipresence (cf. Ps. 139:7-12) and omniscience (1 Cor. 2:10-11). He is associated with God the Father in creation (Gen. 1:2). He is involved with other members of the Godhead in the work of redemption (John 3:5-6; Rom. 8:9-17, 26-27; Titus 3:5-7). He is associated with other members of the Trinity under the “name” of God (Matt. 28:18-20). Finally, the Holy Spirit appears, along with the Father and the Son, in New Testament benedictions (e.g., 2 Cor. 13:14).
Not only does the Holy Spirit possess deity but he also has a differentiated personality. That he is a distinct person is clear in that Scripture refers to “him” with personal pronouns (John 14:26; 16:13). Second, he does things only persons can do, such as teach (John 14:26; 1 John 2:27), convict of sin (John 16:7-7), and be grieved by sin (Eph. 4:30). Finally, the Holy Spirit has intellect (1 Cor. 2:10-11), will( 1 Cor. 12:11), and feeling (Eph. 4:30).
That the three members of the Trinity are distinct persons is clear in that each is mentioned in distinction from the others. The Son prayed to the Father (cf. John 17). The Father spoke from heaven about the Son at his baptism (Matt. 3:15-17). Indeed, the Holy Spirit was present at the same time, revealing that they coexist. Further, the fact that they have separate titles (Father, Son, and Spirit) indicate they are not one person. Also, each member of the Trinity has special functions that help us to identify them. For example, the Father planned salvation (John 3:16; Eph. 1:4), the Son accomplished it on the cross (John 17:4; 19:30; Heb. 1:1-2) and at the resurrection (Rom. 4:25; 1 Cor. 15:1-6), and the Holy Spirit applies it to the lives of the believers (John 3:5; Eph. 4:30; Titus 3:5-7). The Son submits to the Father (1 Cor. 11:3; 15:28), and the Holy Spirit glorifies the Son (John 16:14).
A Philosophical Defense of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity cannot be proven by human reason; it is only known because it is revealed by special revelation (in the Bible). However, just because it is beyond reason does not mean that it goes against reason (see Mystery). It is not irrational or contradictory, as many critics believe.
The Logic of the Trinity. The philosophical law of noncontradiction informs us that something cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same sense. This is the fundamental law of all rational thought. And the doctrine of the Trinity does not violate it. This can be shown by stating first of all what the Trinity is not. The Trinity is not the belief that God is three persons and only one person at the same time and in the same sense. That would be a contradiction. Rather, it is the belief that there are three persons in one nature. This may be a mystery, but it is not a contradiction. That is, it may go beyond reason’s ability to comprehend completely, but it does not go against reason’s ability to apprehend consistently.
Further, the Trinity is not the belief that there are three natures in one nature or three essences in one essence. That would be a contradiction. Rather, Christians affirm that there are three persons in one essence. This is not contradictory because it makes a distinction between person and essence. Or to put it in terms of the law of noncontradiction, while God is one and many at the same time, he is not one and many in the same sense. He is one in the sense of his essence but many in the sense of his persons. So there is no violation of the law of noncontradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity.
A Model of the Trinity. By saying God has one essence and three persons it is meant that he has one what and three whos. The three whos (persons) each share the same what (essence). So God is a unity of essence with a plurality of persons. Each person is different, yet they share a common nature.
God is one in his substance. The unity is in his essence (what God is), and the plurality is in God’s persons (how he relates within himself). This plurality of relationships is both internal and external. Within the Trinity each member relates to the others in certain ways. These are somewhat analogous to human relationships. The Bible’s descriptions of Yahweh as Father and Jesus as Son say something of how the Son relates to the Father. Also, the Father sends the Spirit as a messenger, and the Spirit is a witness of the Son (John 14:26). These descriptions help us understand the functions within the unity of the Godhead. Each is fully God, and each has his own work and interrelational theme with the other two. But it is vital to remember that the three share the same essence, so that they unify as one Being.
Some Illustrations of the Trinity. No analogy of the Trinity is perfect, but some are better than others. First, some bad illustrations should be repudiated. The Trinity is not like a chain with three links. For these are three separate and separable parts. But God is neither separated nor separable. Neither is God like the same actor playing three different parts in a play. For God is simultaneously three persons, not one person playing three successive roles. Nor is God like the three states of water: solid, liquid, and gaseous. For normally water is not in all three of these states at the same time, but God is always three persons at the same time. Unlike other bad analogies, this one does not imply tritheism. However, it does reflect another heresy known as modalism
Most erroneous illustrations of the Trinity tend to support the charge that trinitarianism is really tritheism, since they contain separable parts. The more helpful analogies retain the unity of God while they show a simultaneous plurality. There are several that fit this description.
A mathematical illustration. One aspect of the problem can be expressed in mathematical terms. Critics make a point of computing the mathematical impossibility of believing there is a Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the Godhead, without holding that there are three gods. Does not 1 + 1 + 1 = 3? It certainly does if you add them, but Christians insist that the triunity of God is more like 1 χ 1 χ 1 = 1. God is triune, not triplex. His one essence has multiple centers of personhood. Thus, there is no more mathematical problem in conceiving the Trinity than there is in understanding 1 cubed (13).
A geometric illustration. Perhaps the most widely used illustration of the Trinity is the triangle. One triangle has three corners, which are inseparable from and simultaneous to one another. In this sense, it is a good illustration of the Trinity. Of course, the triangle is finite and God is infinite, so it is an imperfect illustration.
Another aspect of the Godhead is that Christ is one person (shown as one corner of the triangle), yet he has two natures, a divine nature and a human nature. Some show this aspect graphically by symbolizing Christ’s divinity by the corner of the triangle and using another geometric figure, a circle for instance, to illustrate the human nature. At the point of the person of Jesus Christ, the circle is welded onto the triangle, human nature touching but not mixed with divine. Human and divine natures exist side by side without confusion in the Son. His two natures are conjoined in one person. Or in Christ there are two whats and one who, whereas, in God there are three whos and one what.
A moral illustration. *Augustine suggested an illustration of how God is both three and one at the same time. The Bible informs us that “God is love” (1 John 4:16). Love involves a lover, a beloved, and a spirit of love between lover and loved. The Father might be likened to the lover, the Son to the one loved, and the Holy Spirit to the spirit of love. Yet love does not exist unless these three are united as one. This illustration has the advantage of being personal, since it involves love, a characteristic that flows only from persons.
An anthropological illustration. Since humankind is made in the image of God (Gen. 1:27), it would seem reasonable that men and women bear some snapshot of the Trinity within their being.
One illustration that causes more problems than it solves visualizes the human being as a “trichotomy” of body, soul, and spirit. Whether the trichotomist position is accurate, this is not a helpful illustration. Body and soul are not an indivisible unity. They can be (and are) separated at death (cf. 2 Cor. 5:8; Phil 1:23; Rev. 6:9). The nature and persons of the Trinity cannot be separated.
A better illustration based in human nature is the relation between the human mind and its ideas and the expression of these ideas in words. There is obviously a unity among all three of these without there being an identity. In this sense, they illustrate the Trinity.
An Islamic illustration of plurality in God. When talking with Muslims, the best illustration of a plurality is the relation between the Islamic conception of the Qur’an and God. Yusuf K. Ibish in an article titled “The Muslim Lives by the Qur’an,” cited by Charis Waddy in The Muslim Mind, described it this way: The Qur’an “is an expression of Divine Will. If you want to compare it with anything in Christianity, you must compare it with Christ himself. Christ was the expression of the Divine among men, the revelation of the Divine Will. That is what the Qur’an is.”
Orthodox Muslims believe the Qur’an is eternal and uncreated. It is not the same as God but is an expression of God’s mind as imperishable as God himself. Surely, there is here a plurality within unity, something that is other than God but is nonetheless one with God in essential characteristics.
Attacks on the Trinity. The Trinity is at the heart of orthodox Christianity. But many critics—Jews and Muslims in particular—contend that it is incoherent and contradictory. Orthodox Christians insist that the teaching that God is one in essence but three in personhood is complex but not contradictory.
The central issue is the deity of Christ (see Christ, Deity of), a doctrine inseparable from the Trinity. If one accepts the biblical teaching about the deity of Christ, then a plurality in the Godhead has been acknowledged. Conversely, if the doctrine of the Trinity is received, the deity of Christ is part of the package. Of course, strict monotheists (see Islam), such as Muslims and Orthodox Jews, reject both the deity of Christ and the Trinity as a denial of the absolute unity of God.
Muslim Misunderstanding. Obstacles in the Muslim mind hinder acceptance of the triunity of God. Some are philosophical, some biblical. Islamic scholars often engage in an arbitrary and selective use of the biblical texts as it suits their purposes. However, even the texts they pronounce “authentic” are twisted or misinterpreted to support their teachings (see New Testament, Historicity of).
Christ as “begotten ” of God. Perhaps no Christian concept draws so violent a reaction among Muslims than that of Jesus as the “only begotten Son of God.” This raises red flags immediately, because Muslims understand the words in a grossly anthropomorphic way. Evangelical Christians likewise would be offended to hear what Muslims think they hear in this term. Clearing away this misunderstanding is necessary.
The King James Version Bible refers to Christ as the “only begotten” Son of God (John 1:18; cf. 3:16). However, Muslim scholars often misconstrue this in a fleshly, carnal sense of someone who literally begets children. To “beget” implies the physical act of sexual intercourse. This they believe, and Christians agree, is absurd. God is a Spirit with no body. As the Islamic scholar Anis Shorrosh contends, “He [God] does not beget because begetting is an animal act. It belongs to the lower animal act of sex. We do not attribute such an act to God” (Shorrosh, 254). But only a few cults, notably the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) have a teaching that approaches this view of “begetting.”
Further, to the Islamic mind, begetting is “creating.” “God cannot create another God. ... He cannot create another uncreated” (ibid., 259). Once again, Christians would agree fully. The foregoing statements reveal the degree to which the biblical concept of Christ’s Sonship is misunderstood by Muslim scholars. For no orthodox Christian equates the King James Version translation of “begat” with “made” or “create.” Arianism taught that and was strenuously fought wherever it appeared in church history. Its primary adherents today belong to another cult, the Jehovah’s Witnesses. No wonder AbduL-Ahad Dawud concludes that from a “Muslim point of belief the Christian dogma concerning the eternal birth or generation of the Son is blasphemy” (Dawud,
New, more accurate English translations have been more careful to say in English what was originally meant in Greek. Only begotten does not refer to any physical generation but to a special relationship between the Son and the Father. It means a unique relationship or could be translated, as the New International Version does, “one and only Son.” It does not imply creation by the Father or any other sort of generation. Just as an earthly father and son have a special filial relationship, so the eternal Father and his eternal Son are uniquely and intimately working in concert with one another. It does not refer to physical generation but to an eternal procession from the Father. Just as for Muslims the Word of God (Qur’an) is not identical to God but eternally proceeds from him (sura 4:171), even so for Christians, Christ, God’s “Word” eternally proceeds from him (see Qur’an, Alleged Divine Origin of). Words like generation and procession are used of Christ in a filial and relational sense, not in a carnal and physical sense.
Some Muslim scholars confuse Christ’s sonship with his *virgin birth. Michael Nazir-Ali noted that “in the Muslim mind the generation of the Son often means his birth of the Virgin Mary” (Nazir-Ali, 29). As Shorrosh notes, many Muslims believe Christians have made Mary a goddess, Jesus her son, and God the Father her husband (Shorrosh, 114). With such a carnal misrepresentation of a spiritual reality, there is little wonder Muslims reject the Christian concept of eternal Father and Son.
Islamic misunderstanding of the Trinity is encouraged by the misunderstanding of Muhammad, who said, “O Jesus, son of Mary! didst thou say unto mankind: Take me and my mother for two gods beside Allah?” (sura 5:119). Hundreds of years before Muhammad, Christians condemned such a gross misunderstanding of the sonship of Christ. The Christian writer Factantius (240-320), writing in about 306, said, “He who hears the words ‘Son of God’ spoken must not conceive in his mind such great wickedness as to fancy that God procreated through marriage and union with any female,—a thing which is not done except by an animal possessed of a body and subject to death.” Furthermore, “since God is alone, with whom could he unite? or [sic], since He was of such great might as to be able to accomplish whatever He wished, He certainly had no need of the comradeship of another for the purpose of creating” (Pfander, 164).
Distortion of John 1:1. If rejection of the eternal sonship of Christ is based on a serious misunderstanding of the Christian concept of Christ as God’s Son, another text proclaiming Christ’s deity is often distorted: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). Without textual support from even one of the fifty-three hundred plus Greek manuscripts, Muslims render the last phrase “and the Word was God’s.״ Dawud declares, without any warrant, “The Greek form of the genitive case ‘Theou,’ i.e., ‘God’s’ was corrupted into ‘Theos’; that is, ‘God,’ in the nominative form of the name!” (Dawud, 16-17).
This translation is not only arbitrary but also contrary to the rest of the message of John’s Gospel, in which the claims that Christ is God are made multiple times (cf. John 8:59; 10:30; 12:41; 20:28).
Misconstruing Thomas’s confession. When Jesus challenged Thomas to believe after seeing him in his physical resurrection body (see Resurrection, Evidence for), Thomas confessed Jesus’s deity, declaring, “My Ford and My God” (John 20:28). Many Muslim writers diminish this proclamation of Christ’s deity by reducing it to an ejaculatory exclamation, “My God!” Deedat declares, “What? He was calling Jesus his Ford and his God? No. This is an exclamation people call out. . . . This is a particular expression” (Shorrosh, 278).
Deedat’s alternative reading is not viable. First, in an obvious reference to the content of Thomas’s confession of Jesus as “my Ford and my God,” Jesus blessed him for what he had correctly “seen” and “believed” (John 20:29). Thomas’s confessionof Christ’s deity comes in the context of a
miraculous appearance by the risen Christ, not to mention at the climax of the postresurrection ministry, when Jesus’s disciples were gaining increasing belief in Christ, based on his miraculous signs (cf. John 2:11; 12:37). Thomas’s confessionof Christ’s deity fits with the stated theme of the Gospel of John “that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his Name” (John 20:31). Even putting all this aside, Thomas was a devout Jew who revered the name of God. He simply would not have used God’s name in so profane an ejaculation. No doubt there was an amazed note in Thomas’s voice as he pronounced Christ’s deity, but to reduce it to an emotional ejaculation is to claim that Jesus blessed Thomas for breaking the commandment against using God’s name in vain.
David’s son and David’s Lord. In Matthew 22:43, citing Psalm 110, Jesus said, “How is it then that David, speaking by the Spirit, calls him ‘Lord’ [Messiah]?” According to Dawud, “By his expression that the ‘Lord,’ or the ‘ Adon,’ could not be a son of David, Jesus excludes himself from that title” (Dawud, 89).
However, a careful look at the context shows that Jesus is saying just the opposite. Jesus stumped his skeptical Jewish questioners by presenting them with a dilemma that blew their own neat calculations about the Messiah out of the sky. How could David call the Messiah “Lord” (as he did in Ps. 110:1), when the Scriptures also say the Messiah would be the “Son of David” (which they do in 2 Sam. 7:12ff.)? The only answer is that the Messiah must be both a man (David’s son or offspring) and God (David’s Lord.) Jesus is claiming to be both God and human. The Islamic mind should have no more difficulty understanding how Jesus can unite in one person both divine and human natures than their own belief that human beings combine both spirit and flesh, the enduring and the transient in one person (sura 89:27-30; cf. 3:185). Even according to Muslim belief, whatever Almighty God, the Creator and Ruler of all things, wills in his infinite wisdom he is also able to accomplish, for “He is the irresistible” (sura 6:61).
Only God is good. Many Islamic scholars claim that Jesus denied being God when he rebuked the rich young ruler, saying, “Why do you call me good? No one is good—except God alone” (Mark 10:18). A careful look at this text in its context reveals that Jesus was not denying his deity. He was rather warning the young man to consider the implications of his careless appellation. Jesus does not say, “I am not God, as you claim” or “I am not good.” Indeed, both the Bible and the Qur’an teach that Jesus is sinless (cf. John 8:46; Heb. 4:14). Rather, Jesus challenged him to examine what he was really saying when he called Jesus “Good Master.” In essence, Jesus was saying, “Do you realize what you are saying when you call Me ‘Good Master’? Only God is good. Are you calling me God?” The fact that the young ruler refused to do what Jesus said proves that he did not really consider Jesus his Master. But nowhere did Jesus deny that he was either the Master or God of the rich young ruler. Indeed, elsewhere Jesus freely claimed to be both Lord and Master of all (Matt. 7:21-27; 28:18;
John 12:40).
The Father is greater. Jesus’s assertion that “my Lather is greater than I” (John 14:28) is also misunderstood by many. It is taken out of its actual context to mean that the Lather is greater in nature, but Jesus meant only that the Lather is greater in office. This is evident from the fact that in this same Gospel (of John) Jesus claimed to be the “I AM” or Yahweh of the Old Testament (Exod. 3:14). He also claimed to be “equal with God” (John 10:30, 33). In addition, he received worship on numerous occasions (John 9:38; cf. Matt. 2:11; 8:2; 9:18; 14:33; 15:25; 28:9, 17; Luke 24:52). He also said, “He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Lather who sent him” (John 5:23).
further, when Jesus spoke of the Lather being “greater,” it was in the context of his “going to the Lather” (John 14:28). Only a few chapters later Jesus speaks to the Lather, saying, “I have completed the work you gave me to do” (John 17:4). But this functional difference of his role as Son in the very next verse reveals that it was not to be used to diminish the fact that Jesus was equal to the Father in nature and glory. For Jesus said, “And now, Father, glorify me in your presence with the glory which I had with you before the world began” (John 17:5).
Jesus was not omniscient. God knows everything, but Jesus admitted he did not know the time of his return (Matt. 24:36). How then could he be God? Jesus had two natures, one divine, in which he knew everything, and one human, in which he did not know everything. As God, he was omniscient. As man, he was limited in knowledge.
The Trinity and heresy. There are two primary heresies from which the Trinity is to be distinguished: modalismand tritheism The heresy of modalism, also called Sabellianism, denies there are three distinct eternal persons in the Godhead. It believes that the so-called persons of the Trinity are modes of God substance, not distinct persons. Like water with its three states (liquid, solid, and gaseous), the Trinity is said to be only three different modes of the same essence. Unlike modalists, trinitarians believe there are three distinct persons (not just modes) in the one substance of God.
Both Islam and Christianity proclaim that God is one in essence. What is in dispute is whether there can be any plurality of persons in this unity of nature. The inadequacies in the Muslims’ view of God arise in part out of their misunderstanding of Christian monotheism (see Theism). Many Muslims misconstrue the Christian view of God as tritheism rather than as monotheism The opposite error of tritheism affirms that there are three separate gods. Few, if any, Christian theologians or philosophers have held this view, but it often has been attributed to trinitarians. Unlike tritheists, trinitarians do not affirm a god with three different substances; they confess that God is three distinct persons in one substance.
The Bible declares emphatically, “The Lord our God, the Lord is one” (Deut. 6:4). Both Jesus (Mark 12:29) and the apostles repeat this formula in the New Testament (1 Cor. 8:4, 6). And early Christian creeds speak of Christ being one in “substance” or “essence” with God. The Athanasian Creed reads, “We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding the Persons; nor divining the Substance (Essence).” So Christianity is a form of monotheism, believing in one and only one God.
The Trinity and complexity. Many Muslims complain that the Christian concept of the Trinity is too complex. They forget, however, that truth is not always simple. As C. S. *Lewis aptly puts it, “If Christianity was something we were making up, of course we could make it easier. But it is not. We cannot compete, in simplicity, with people who are inventing religions. How could we? We are dealing with fact. Of course anyone can be simple if he has no facts to bother about” (Lewis, 145).
The fact confronting Christians that led to their formulating this complex truth was, of course, the claims and credentials of Jesus of Nazareth to be God (see Christ, Deity of). This led them of necessity to posit a plurality within deity and thus the doctrine of the Trinity, since this Jesus was not the same as the one whom he addressed as Father. So Christians believe that there are three persons in this one God.
Confusion Regarding the Trinity. Confusing unity with singularity. The Muslim God has unity and singularity. But these are not the same. It is possible to have unity without singularity. For there could be plurality within the unity. Indeed, the Trinity is precisely a plurality of persons within the unity of one essence. Human analogies help to illustrate the point in a superficial way. My mind, my thoughts, and my words have a unity, but they are not a singularity, since they are all different. Likewise, Christ can express the same nature as God without being the same person as the Father.
In this connection, Muslim monotheism sacrifices plurality in an attempt to avoid duality. In avoiding the extreme of admitting any partners to God, Islam goes to the other extreme and denies any personal plurality in God. But as Joseph Ratzinger observed, “Belief in the Trinity, which recognizes the plurality in the unity of God, is the only way to the final elimination of dualism as a means of expanding plurality alongside unity; only through this belief is the positive validation of plurality given a definite base. God stands above singular and plural. He bursts both categories”
(Ratzinger, 128).
Confusing person (who) and nature (what). That Christ “bursts the categories” explains why Christian and non-Christian alike have struggled to understand the two natures of Christ. One of the better explanations of what Christians believe, though it doesn’t go far toward explaining it, is found in one of the sixteenth-century Reformation statements of faith, the Belgic Confession, chap. 19:
We believe that by this conception [of two natures], the person of the Son is inseparably united and connected with the human nature; so that there are not two Sons of God, nor two persons, but two natures united in one single person; yet each nature retains its own distinct properties. As, then, the divine nature has always remained uncreated, without beginning of days or end of life, filling heaven and earth, so also has the human nature not lost its properties but remained a creature, having beginning of days, being a finite nature, and retaining all the properties of a real body. . . . But these two natures are so closely united in one person that they were not separated even by his death. . . . Wherefore we confess that he is very God and very man: very God by His power to conquer death; and very man that He might die for us according to the infirmity of His flesh.
Orthodox Christianity does not believe Jesus Christ was like a milkshake, the two natures blended together in an indistinguishable mass. Neither do Christians believe Jesus had a schizophrenically split identity in which divine and human natures were so distinct that they would have had to call one another long-distance. These views and other equally wrong ideas have muddied Christian theology throughout its history.
The orthodox view of the two natures of Christ is that one person is both God and human. The two natures commune intimately but do not overlap. Christ possesses two natures united. Hence, when Jesus died on the cross for our sin, he died as the God-man. It is not going too far, said John *Calvin, to say that at the moment Jesus was hanging on the cross his power as Creator God was holding together the hill on which the cross stood. Unless Jesus is God and human, he cannot reconcile God and humanity. But the Bible says clearly, “There is one God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tim 2:5).
Since Christ is one who (person) with two whats (natures), whenever one question is asked about him it must be separated into two questions, one applying to each nature. For example, did he get tired? As God, no; as human, yes. Did Christ get hungry? In his divine nature, no; in his human nature, yes. Did Christ die? In his human nature, he did die. His divine nature is eternally alive. He died as the God-man, but his Godness did not die.
Conclusion. The doctrine of the Trinity is one of the great mysteries of the Christian faith. That is, it transcends reason without being contrary to reason (see Faith and Reason). It is not known by reason (see Revelation, General) but only by special revelation (see Revelation, Special). God is one in essence but three in persons. He is a plurality within unity. God is a triunity, not a rigid singularity.
Augustine, On the Trinity.
T. Aquinas, On the Trinity.
E. C. Beisner, God in Three Persons.
A. L. Daw ud. Muhammad in the Bible.
J. N. D. Kelly. Early Christian Doctrines.
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity.
M. Nazir-Ali, Frontiers in Muslim-Christian Encounter. C. G. Pfander, The Mizcinu 7 Hciqq.
Plotinus, The Six Enneads.
G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought.
J. Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity.
A. Shorrosh, Islam Revealed.
C. Waddy, The Muslim Mind.
Troeltsch, Ernst. Ernst Peter Wilhelm Troeltsch( 1865-1923) was born in Haunstetten and educated at Gottingen, Berlin, and Erlangen. He was a liberal theologian who was intensely involved in social and political issues, as well as a historian and philosopher. His work dismissed the Bible and regarded all religion as culturally conditioned, yet he detested the relativism his ideas promoted. Troeltsch believed Christianity to be the religion best suited for the Western world, and he sought to legitimize it through social action in modern history rather than through supernatural action in the ancient world. Among his works were Christian Thought in History and Application (1924, trans. 1923) and The Social Teaching of the Christian Church (1912, 1931).
Troeltsch laid down the rule of analogy: The only way one can know the past is by analogies in the present. The unknown of the past is arrived at only through what is known. On this principle, some argue that the miracles of the Bible should not be believed, since they do not relate to anything happening now (see Miracles, Arguments Against). A proper historical method, thus, eliminates the miraculous. Antony *Flew added his own twist to the “critical historical argument.”
Troeltsch used the principle of analogy and Flew the principle of critical history against miracles. Both have the same naturalistic basis (see Naturalism).
It should be noted that the term principle of analogy is used in two entirely differing senses. For a discussion on the principle of analogy related to reason and knowledge of God, see the article Analogy, Principle of.
The Principle of Analogy. This principle of analogy, according to Troeltsch, asserts that “on the analogy of the events known to us we seek by conjecture and sympathetic understanding to explain and reconstruct the past.” Without uniformity of the past and present, we could not know anything from the past. For without analogies from the present, we cannot understand the past (Troeltsch, Historicism and Its Problems).
On the basis of this principle, some have insisted that “no amount of testimony is ever permitted to establish as past reality a thing that cannot be found in present reality.” Even if the witness has a perfect character, the testimony has no power as proof (Becker, “Detachment and the Writing of History,” 12-13). This means that unless one can identify in today’s world such miracles as are found in the New Testament, we have no reason to believe they occurred in the past either. The philosopher F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) stated the problem this way:
We have seen that history rests in the last resort upon an inference from our experience, a judgment based upon our own present state of things;. . . when we are asked to affirm the existence in past time of events, the effects of causes which confessedly are without analogy in the world in which we live, and which we know—we are at a loss for any answer but this, that... we are asked to build a house without a foundation. . . . And how can we attempt this without contradicting ourselves? (Bradley, 100)
It is widely admitted on all sides of the issue that no virgin births, no raising the dead, and no walking on water are occurring today. Then it follows by the principle of analogy that such events cannot be known to have happened in history. So biblical miracles are historically unknowable.
Similar to Troeltsch’s principle of analogy is Flew’s critical history. Critical history owes its existence partly to two principles stated by David *Hume that attempt to undermine the credibility of miracles (Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, 2.3.1; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 8; see Miracles, Arguments Against). Flew comments:
1. “The present detritus [remains] of the past cannot be interpreted as historical evidence at all, unless we presume that the same basic regularities obtained then as today.”
2. “The historian must employ as criteria all his present knowledge, or presumed knowledge, of what is probable or improbable, possible or impossible” (Flew, 350).
Only by presuming that the laws of today also governed reality in the past can the historian rationally interpret evidence and construct an account of what actually happened (ibid., 351).
Flew concludes that the critical historian dismisses a story of a miracle. With Hume, he argues that reasonable people regard the “absolute impossibility of a miraculous nature” as sufficient to refute reported occurrences (ibid., 352). Miracles are possible in principle, but in practice the historian must always reject them. The very nature of the historical method demands that the past be interpreted in accordance with the (naturalistic) regularities of the present. In logical structure, this argument against miracles can be summarized:
1. All critical history depends on the validity of two principles:
a. The remains of the past can be used as evidence for reconstructing history only if we presume the same basic regularities of nature held then as now.
b. The critical historian must use today’s knowledge of the possible and probable as criteria for knowing the past.
2. Belief in miracles is contrary to both these principles.
3. Therefore, belief in miracles is contrary to critical history.
Conversely, only the naive and uncritical can believe in miracles. The past can be known only in terms of the regular patterns of the present. And these patterns of nature in the present rule out any knowledge of miracles in the past.
Evaluation. It should be noted first that this argument does not claim to eliminate the possibility of miracles (see Spinoza, Benedict). It simply attempts to rule out their knowability by what Flew calls critical history. Further, the argument (as Flew admits) follows the basic form of Hume’s antisupernaturalism, which has been critiqued in the article Miracles, Arguments Against. That is to say, it assumes that to be truly critical and historical, one must be anti supernatural. Anyone who allows for the supernatural is automatically naive (incidentally, an ad hominem attack). However, one would think that closed-mindedness would not be lauded as a prerequisite for evaluating evidence and compiling history.
It is a valid principle that “the present is the key to the past” or that “the past is known by analogy with the present.” This is so since those living in the present have no direct access to the past. We were not there and cannot go back. We must depend, therefore, on comparing remains of the past with events in the present. This is precisely how origin science works (see Origins, Science of), whether applied to archaeology, biology, or geology. In geology, the principle of analogy is known as the principle of uniformity or uniformitarianism However, the two should be distinguished. For uniformitarianismis loaded with an extraneous anti supernatural bias. Whereas in sciences about the past, the principle of uniformity (analogy) is legitimate. When an archaeologist finds a piece of pottery, it helps to know what pottery is used for in the present, how different materials, forms, and glazes apply to different functions, and how the potter performs the craft. The archaeologist postulates from that what the origin of this potsherd might have been.
A valid application of the principle that “the present is the key to the past” is that “the kinds of causes known to produce certain kinds of effects in the present can be assumed to produce similar kinds of effects in the past.” But contrary to Troeltsch and Flew, this principle does not rule out a credible belief in past miracles, even if no such miracles exist in the present. This use misapplies the principle.
Problems with the Arguments. Several difficulties involved in the arguments against miracles are discussed in the section on arguments against miracles from analogy in the article Miracles, Arguments Against. In abbreviated form, those arguments are:
Both Troeltsch and Flew adopt historical uniformitarianism. They assume all past events are uniformly the same as all present ones. By uniformitarian logic, geology long overlooked the fact that many past processes were catastrophic and caused change faster than what can be observed. By the uniformitarian argument, scientists should not study the singular, unrepeatable events surrounding the origins of the universe and life on earth.
The historical argument confuses uniformity with uniformitarianism It does not follow that the object in the past cannot be a singularity. Unique finds by archaeologists can be studied by analogy to other finds. They may not be uniformly the same, perhaps nothing like, but that does not disqualify their study. The SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence) program is not unscientific in believing that receipt of a unique message from space will reveal the existence of intelligent life (see Sagan, Carl). The basis for knowing that a singular group of radio waves is produced by intelligence is their organized complexity, not receipt of more messages. Historical evidence provides ample grounds for affirming that the miracles of Christ occurred, even if none occur today.
It is special pleading to assume that no miracles are occurring. God may or may not still work in this way. Troeltsch and Flew do not demonstrate that miracles never happen today. If there are miracles, an analogy for knowing the past does exist.
In practice, Flew says that miracles are “absolutely impossible” and must be dismissed out of hand. This is the fallacy ofpetitio principii, or question begging. Why should a critical thinker be so biased against the historical actuality of a miracle as to begin with a mind closed to all other evidence?
By closing off discussion and mocking those who disagree with their assumptions, uniformitarians are actually betraying the foundations of science. A recent example is the time and energy wasted in avoiding the evidence that the universe had a beginning, though the explosive eruption of mass in the big bang is readily accepted today.
Why should exceptional events of the past be judged against normal events of today’s world?
The healing of a man born blind seemed as incredible in Jesus’s day as it would if it happened now (see Matt. 9). The only legitimate comparison of a past anomaly is comparison with today’s anomalous happenings, rather than the general run of life.
The uniformitarian argument proves that much of what uniformitarians believe about the past
cannot be true. Many historical events they do accept were exceptional or unique.
Critical history does not criticize the uncritical, unreasonable acceptance of presuppositions that
eliminate valid historical knowledge. It legislates, rather than seeks, truth.
Conclusion. Troeltsch sought to synthesize religion and social culture, but he seldom could come to a final conclusion about where the synthesis was headed, so he made a sometimes helpful but incomplete theology of Christian action in the world. Part of the problem was his theological liberal skepticism, which left unanswered the question of the foundations of Christianity and where this religion itself fit in the world of reality. Much of the problem with his historical philosophy related to his principle of analogy, a uniformitarian dogma that dismissed the uniqueness of Christ’s life and miracles. Who Christ was and what he did could not even be considered without similar occurrences repeating now. This historical *naturalism assumes that all events can be naturally explained. This, however, is contrary to rational thought in general and scientific thought in particular (see Origins, Science of).