People, whether ordinary citizens or leaders, may soon be forgotten after their lifetimes. Institutions, on the other hand, the irreplaceable backbone of the state, remain for as long as they are useful and well designed. Laws are necessary to foster the proper relationship between people and institutions. Unfortunately for Europeans, typical international organizations could not effectively prevent conflict during the first half of the 20th century. This serious shortcoming would eventually have to be addressed and corrected.
Jean Monnet was the heir of a cognac-making family and a seasoned businessman dealing in world trade. He skillfully planned and implemented commercial and development enterprises on three continents, not only designing the programs but convincing the appropriate leaders at the highest levels of the advantages of the proposed actions. Having achieved much success in these endeavors, Monnet was sent by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to negotiate the United States (U.S.) contributions to the war effort with U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. According to economist J. M. Keynes, the launch of the negotiated plan (known as the Victory Program) shortened World War II by one year.
Monnet had a favorite bedtime reading: an anthology of philosophers and poets.1 Some lines of the Swiss philosopher Henri-Frédéric Amiel2 attracted his attention and influenced his proposals regarding the uniting of Europe and the foundation of the original European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Biographers, friends, and colleagues seem to agree that central to Monnet’s strategic thinking was this annotation in Amiel’s diary: “Each man’s experience starts again from the beginning. Only institutions grow wiser; they accumulate collective experience; and owing to this experience and this wisdom, men subject to the same rules will not see their own nature changing, but their behavior gradually transformed. . . . Institutions govern relationships between people. They are the real pillars of civilization.”3
Following the end of World War II, Monnet designed the French reconstruction plan, and inspired French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman’s historic Declaration that provided the impetus for the birth of today’s European Union (EU). In Monnet’s vision, institutions were the mechanism to correct the mistakes of Europe’s past: “Europeans had gradually lost the ability to live together and combine their creative strength. There seems to be decline in their contribution to progress and to the civilization, which they themselves had created—doubtless because in a changing world they no longer had institutions capable of leading them ahead. National institutions had proved that they were ill adapted to this task. The new Community institutions, it seems to me, were the only vehicle through which Europeans could once more deploy the exceptional qualities they had displayed in times past.”4 Unmatched in his conviction, Monnet declared: “Nothing is possible without men: nothing is lasting without institutions.”5 As a consequence, the ECSC was born out of the Treaty of Paris with the idea of having common and supranational institutions.
Monnet prophetically set the record straight regarding the aims of the new European Community: “We can never sufficiently emphasize that the six Community countries are the forerunners of a broader united Europe, whose bounds are set only by those who have not yet joined. Our Community is not a coal and steel producers’ association: it is the beginning of Europe. . . . The beginning of Europe was a political conception; but even more, it was a moral idea.”6 The primary objective of the European Community (EC) was political, as the Schuman Declaration explicitly states: “A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.”7 In light of this failure and its tragic consequences, “the pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.”8 In sum, “the solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”9 The state, in fact, was created in war; the EU was born in peace to guarantee a lasting peace.10 This foundational raison d’etre is often forgotten by new generations of Europeans.
Practical as he was, Monnet not only proposed the original idea of pooling the steel and coal resources and designed the original institutions to administer the resulting shared sovereignty, but also supervised the process. He was named president of the High Authority, the executive body intended to manage the integration of the coal and steel industries.
The EU’s founding fathers, and certain of its subsequent leaders, sincerely shared Monnet’s fundamental ideas. They took advantage of an environment conducive to integration and constructed a peaceful Europe based on institutions, laws, symbols, and people, all of which are irreplaceable. In this context, Monnet’s words have not been forgotten, especially in terms of the importance of lasting institutions.
As a metaphorical aid, the structure of the EU has been presented as a sort of Greek–Roman temple, sustained by three pillars.11 This symbolism was enshrined in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU).
In an allegory used by Enrique Barón, former president of the European Parliament (EP), the EU is like a medieval cathedral under construction.12 The first and most integrated pillar is the EC, composed of all areas in which the EU has competence, generally subject to qualified majority voting (QMV), rendering decision-making free from the threat of a single national veto. The second pillar is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third is Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
The spirit of pooled sovereignty, a trademark of the EU,13 has dominated the first pillar in which the member states have renounced their traditional autonomy. In contrast, the sensitive issues of the second and third pillars, even though they belong to the overall framework of the EU, are only shared in a regime of intergovernmental cooperation. While some competences of the third pillar have been gradually shifted to the first, the member states have been very reluctant to share control over issues encompassed by the second pillar, and, in fact, in some instances, have tried to regain competences located in the first Community pillar.
Since the dawn of the EC, the member states have delegated portions of their sovereignty to institutions that simultaneously represent the national, Community, and citizens’ interests.14 They are political entities run by officers, but that have accumulated their own powers over time, derived from the acquis communautaire, the EU treaties, laws, and regulations. These institutions have a unique mission: to manage the “interdependence” and integration of the EU member states. This is in essence what the EU does.
Of the major EU institutions, the European Commission has been recognized as entirely unique, unmatched in other organizations. It is the successor of the High Authority, the body that supervised the management of the two strategic products of the ECSC. It is the guardian of the treaties, which represent the “constitutional” documents of the EU. While the national governments are represented in the Council of the EU, previously known as the Council of Ministers, the citizens exert their influence when directly electing the members of the EP (MEPs).
The Commission promotes and defends the general interests of the Union.15 The president and the members of the Commission are nominated by the member state governments, appointed by the European Council, and approved by the EP for a period of five years. The Commission is the engine of the EU institutional framework as it possesses the right of legislative initiative, proposing future laws to the EP and the Council. This right of initiative is shared with the Council in the second and third pillars. It functions as an executive (as the Council acts in the second and third pillar competences) when guaranteeing the execution of the laws (directives, regulations, and decisions), manages the budget, and supervises programs adopted by the EP and the Council. Among its responsibilities, the Commission represents the Community to the rest of the world and negotiates international agreements on trade and development aid.
Each member state has one commissioner. The Treaty of Nice rules, however, stipulate that after the EU has 27 members, the number of Commissioners will have to be lower than the number of member states, a rotating formula which would then be decided by the European Council.
The EP is composed of 732 members, to be augmented to 786 with the expected membership of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. MEPs are elected for a period of five years by direct and universal suffrage, in democratic representation of the European citizens in 25 countries.16 Ideologically, it houses the main political tendencies existing in the member states, represented by pan-European political formations (social democrats, Christian democrat-conservatives, liberals, former Communists, Greens, nationalists, etc.). The EP’s main functions are legislative decision-making (along with the Council) and ultimately approving or rejecting the entire EU budget. The Commission is responsible to the EP, which must approve the appointment of the commissioners, may ask oral and written questions, and has the right to a vote of censure. The EP also appoints the European Ombudsman who receives complaints from citizens, residents, and representatives of registered companies in the EU regarding maladministration in the activities of the EU institutions.
The Council of the EU is the main decision-making body of the EU. The interests of the member state governments are represented in this institution.17 Depending on the issue to be decided, the Council meets in nine different formations: Economic and Financial Affairs; JHA; Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment; and Education, Youth and Culture. The Council shares most legislative power with the EP. It adopts decisions in the areas of the CFSP and JHA.
Two institutions share the label of “Court,” but one has strictly judicial functions, while the other deals with the control of expenses. The Court of Justice of the European Communities guarantees the uniform interpretation and respect of Community law, which has direct effect and supremacy over national laws.18 The Court hears cases submitted by member states, the EU institutions, companies, and citizens. The Court of Auditors oversees the legality and accuracy of the financial management of the EU’s budget.19
The European Investment Bank is the financial institution responsible for investment projects designed to promote development inside and outside the EU. The European Central Bank is the primary financial institution for the management of the euro, responsible for establishing and implementing the European monetary policy, managing exchange operations, and guaranteeing the efficacy of the payment systems.
Since its creation the EU has suffered from a sort of chronic identity crisis. In part, this is self-inflicted and results from its ever-changing official name: European Economic Community, European Communities, European Community, and European Union. Therefore, it is difficult for the rest of the world to understand its personality.
In scope and means, aims and objectives, structure and spirit, the EU is a unique entity. Consequently, precisely identifying it in the realm of standard political entities is continuously a topic of scholarly debate. Misunderstandings are numerous amongst the general public.
Even experienced scholars often fell into the temptation of labeling the EU with subjective and metaphorical illustrations, such as the “dizzying complexity” of the framework and the “inimitable and mystifying” EU institutions.20 Unable to arrive at an explanation, it is no wonder that Jacques Delors, a former president of the Commission, one day offered the apparent perfect definition: the EU is a UPO, an Unidentified Political Object.21 It is not surprising, therefore, that the EU also seems incomprehensible to outsiders. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, weary of dealing with the different EU high-level officials responding to varied interests, once allegedly exploded in frustration: “to understand the European Union you must be French or very intelligent . . . or both.”
On a practical level, for millions of citizens in Europe, the EU is simply seen as a development bank that provides grants and loans. Many still talk about the Common Market as a territorial entity. For others, “Brussels” is a distant, wasteful bureaucracy. For thousands of well-educated and well-trained government officials and recent university graduates, the EU is the place to obtain a highly paid job, with generous benefits, long vacations, and a secure retirement. For idealists, the EU is a worthy political project that guarantees peaceful coexistence. For many Third World leaders it is the culprit of agrarian protectionism. For many anonymous downtrodden in developing countries it is the source of aid that alleviates hunger and poverty. For economic competitors and political allies the EU is a fortress, an obstacle, a partner.
One of the EU’s supplemental benefits can be described as a recovery of power.22 Following the end of World War II (if not earlier), states began to experience a decrease in national control. On the one hand, power was “lost” upwards through regional and international economic integration. On the other hand, “devolution” on the domestic level produced a “loss” of power to lower levels of government. Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War generated an environment in which the world powers and the only remaining superpower now enjoy relatively less influence than when the world was governed by some unwritten rules of mutual deterrence. In this apparently confusing panorama, the EU appears to be a mechanism for the recovery of long lost European influence and power.23
Although a somewhat theoretical and still imperfectly defined entity, the EU has a distinct character and structure, composed of institutions, agencies, representatives, and offices. Not a typical, impersonal international organization, chats and briefings in any of the EU institutions have a flair that is completely absent from the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York and Geneva. Famous for their internal culture of intrigue (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]), or plagued by intra-regional clashes among staff and government representatives (Organization of American States [OAS], World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF]), most international organizations share an atmosphere of coldness and a lack of common purpose. In Brussels, with a myriad of think tanks, business lobbies, non-governmental organizations, and government representations, there is a feeling of distinction. There is a sense of community, of belonging to a special mission, transcending state borders but not resembling the typical profile of other international and regional organizations.
The existence of this sort of “culture,” difficult to prove with an empirical methodology, is rather easy to detect in comparative terms when visiting or attending briefings in the other major organization based in Brussels, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In fact, NATO officials refer to the EU as “them.” This shocks and intrigues the observer particularly because most NATO signatories are also members of the EU. European states behave differently in the EU setting than they do in the NATO environment, or for that matter in any other international organization. In the daily exchanges within the EU, any minister of a given member state knows that a decision made one day, a vote cast in a peculiar manner, or a veto will have strategic consequences. The pooling of sovereignty combined with the exclusive and shared competences of the EU and the member states makes the EU unique, and consequently, inherently different than NATO. Hence, the awkward use of “they” and “us” in Brussels by governments that share the most common values.
The Commission (the most clearly executive branch of the EU) is sometimes referred to by insiders as “this place.” The extended family, the framework of EU institutions, demonstrates that the EU has a dynamic of its own.
The aims of the EU, created since birth to guarantee a lasting peace on the continent, set it apart from other members of a generally broad species. The plan was to accomplish this mission not by the traditional methods of interstate cooperation, but through (for lack of a better term) “supranationalism.” This quality is contrasted with its nemesis, “intergovernmentalism.” “Supranational” is generally defined as a method of decision and policy making whereby the individual member states pool their sovereignty under a higher authority. It is an innate ingredient in the political DNA of the EU. Taken as in a photograph, the EU seems to show this quality as a “set of laws or institutions that are above the state. The power and authority they exercise is not confined to one state but to many. Thus, supranationalism refers to decision-making bodies which supercede or override the sovereign authority of individual states who are constituent members of the organization involved.”24 As in a motion picture film, supranationalism appears as “a process in which the EU institutions enjoy political autonomy and authority.”25
The clearest example of supranational institutions in the EU are those that have “a common political structure authorized to make decisions within the prescribed areas for Member States.”26 Many observers consider the Commission to be the most supranational of the EU institutions, with its executive-style responsibilities and monopoly on legislative proposals associated with the Community competences. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) can also be considered highly supranational as this independent institution uniformly interprets and applies Community law and makes decisions that are binding in all member states. The Council of the EU can be considered either more supranational or more intergovernmental, depending on the topic at hand. Here we have two basic decision-making methods: unanimity and QMV. When the Council is making a decision based on a competence in the first pillar, by QMV, the Council can be considered more supranational because binding decisions can be made without the approval of all of the member states. In contrast, when the Council makes a decision based on a competence in one of the other two pillars, by unanimous vote, the Council can be considered more intergovernmental because no decisions can be made without the consent of all involved.
This supranationality, however, does not eliminate the existence, influence, and power of the EU’s member states. This dual notion is explicitly illustrated through the EU’s official declarations, released by “The European Union and its Member States.”
This hybridism has forced scholars to oscillate between different poles of comparative points of reference.27 On the one hand, common sense indicates that the EU is more than a standard intergovernmental organization, but on the other (despite the efforts of the most ardent integrationists) it is not a typical federation.28 Some label the EU as a confederation. Most resist comparing it to a nation-state, although some scholars have skillfully pointed out that the state and the EU are similar in the sense that they are a means to an end, not a finished product.29
In the EU there is multilevel governance, characterized by a web of interconnected institutions, policy-making processes and decision-making procedures. There is also a principle of subsidiarity, present in any federal structure, that intends to ensure decisions are made at the closest possible level to the citizen.30 From a theoretical point of view, this combination supports the aims of the European federalists and lobbyists pressuring for a “closer Union” and deeper integration in the EU. However, the term “federation” (the “F” word, as Margaret Thatcher used to refer to it) and its spirit are vigorously opposed by intergovernmentalists who explicitly insist on banning it from the EU treaties.
In sum, there is no accepted consensus on the nature of the EU. A practical and easy solution is to refer to the spirit and the letter of the treaties. What exists in essence is the EU and its member states. The problem lies in the fact that in practice “the European Community,” also known as the first pillar, has competences for which the Commission is basically in control and defends the collective interests, whereas the member states maintain complete sovereign control over most other issues and decisions. The EU is an experiment in which the national interests are embedded in the European entity, and the European ethos is inserted in the national state.31 For this reason, energetic Europeanists have been pressuring for a single personality for the EU, as a legal actor and a juridical entity.32
In any event, from whatever angle one may look at the EU, observers and researchers have four basic options for classifying the entity as a form of political cooperation. Rejecting erroneous or risky comparisons with state entities and typical international organizations, there remain two reasonable alternatives.
One choice is simply to accept the EU as a mixture of a state and an intergovernmental international organization. The other is the bold proposition that the EU is a new polity species, the only one of its kind today, although several modest imitations have been experimented with at least on a partial scale. In this line of thought, the EU is proposed as a “regional state, a union of nation-states in which the creative tension between the Union and its member-states ensures both ever-increasing regional integration and ever-continuing national differentiation.”33 The uniqueness of the EU as such a regional state is that its sovereignty is “shared with its constituent members . . . dependent upon internal acceptance by EU member-states as well as on external recognition by other nation-states, policy area by policy area. On these bases, the EU has already been accepted and recognized as a sovereign region in international trade and competition and competition policy but certainly not in defense and security policy.”34
Regardless of the federalists who have been enthusiastically pushing for this solution, the fact remains that the EU in many ways parallels the state and international organizations. Hence, a solution has been gaining ground in the scholarly literature and in the sophisticated EU jargon: intergovernmental federalism. Magic words, a sort of talisman, they compose in principle an oxymoron, an attempt to square the circle.
In the EU there is not one institution that monopolizes customary functions of governance and decision-making, as is the goal of modern democracy based on the sacrosanct division of power in the Montesquieu tradition.35 Several bodies share real and legal power, to an intriguing extent, while the EP, which in principle should have a first choice and voice, plays only a secondary role. The Council of the EU, composed of representatives of the member state governments, plays the role of a legislature in the decision-making process of the equivalent of EU federal laws. The Council has no political responsibility to the EP. Meanwhile, the directly elected representatives of the peoples of Europe, MEPs, have the least amount of power when acting independently. The EU is supervised by periodic gatherings of heads of state or government who make crucial decisions (general guidelines and strategies) for the collective body of European citizens, yet they do not respond to any court for their actions. The ECJ has jurisdiction only on matters of Community competence, but does not act as an appeals court above the national courts.
This raises questions from the constitutional and strictly legal point of view about the apparently absurd hypothesis: If the EU applied for EU membership, it would be rejected based on the democratic criteria. Part of the so-called democratic deficit is based on this assumption. However, there is no political or scholarly consensus on this issue, with bands as far apart as federalists and intergovernmentalists. While many scholars claim that the more supranational the EU becomes, the less democratic and the more distanced from the people it becomes, others do not see this as a problem provided the citizens receive the benefits of a deeper pooled sovereignty,36 while some innovative views point out that in the EU, “democracy is more fragmented than that of any nation-state. Instead of having a central government by, of, and for the people—through political participation, electoral representation, and governing effectiveness—as well as . . . government with the people—through interest consultation—the EU level emphasizes governance for and with the people while leaving to national level government by and of the people.”37
National ministers sitting in the Council have been responsible to their national parliaments. When most of the decisions were taken by unanimity, members of national parliaments could always question ministers regarding their positions in the Council. Since the increased use of QMV following the adoption of the Single European Act, members of the Council can hide behind the majority. They can, for example, argue that they were actually against a decision but that they were out-voted.
Perceptions of a democratic deficit and a lack of legitimacy have emerged in the context of the EU and its institutional framework. These problems are also associated with the idea that the European citizens are distanced from the EU. The responsibility of these alleged shortcomings also lies, however, in the hands of national leaders, who have been unable (or unwilling) to explain this complex, multifaceted organization.
Domestic pressures and/or ambitions have resulted in postponements and failures to reach crucial agreements, such as in the case of the European Defense Community in the 1950s, the completion of Economic and Monetary Union by 1980 as proposed in the 1971 Werner Plan, and the delay in approving, and after the negative results in the Dutch and French referendums, ultimately the ratification of the constitutional treaty. Although not the only case, a recent illustration was the role of Spain in the Convention and the intergovernmental conference (IGC) on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Unable to weaken the solid coalition formed by Germany and France, the Spanish government in conjunction with Poland opposed the new distribution of votes in the QMV system, insisting on the continuation of the advantageous framework negotiated in the Treaty of Nice. (The result was a continuation of the IGC into the first semester 2004 during which time agreement was reached.) While this type of political behavior may be interpreted as an aggressive defense of national interest, citizens often get a reinforced image of an EU beyond their control, in constant flux, and far from becoming a consolidated entity.38
As in one rare cosmic coincidence, 2002 encompassed two crucial events: the completion of the original term of the ECSC and the 150th anniversary of the birth of architect Antoni Gaudí. The Holy Family temple, the most emblematic work of this Catalan architect, is best-known for its perennial state of construction. Since the beginning of the 20th century, it has been tenaciously rising, stone by stone, tower after tower, over the city of Barcelona. While with some disdain, critics would dismiss Gaudí’s temple as the last of the medieval cathedrals, others would respond that it is the first of the 21st century. In a way, it shares its destiny with the EU. Both are fascinating, enigmatic, and unfinished. Apparently, they are both incomparable and inimitable. As others of Gaudí’s works that have puzzled architectural experts, the EU has challenged the definitions of political scientists.
There is no doubt that the present panorama of the European process of integration can be judged by the popular question: Is the glass half full or half empty? According to the optimists, the balance of the EU, after more than half a century, is impressive. From a chronological perspective, it is certain that the EU has never taken a dangerous step backwards. Qualitatively, in terms of competences transferred from the states to the Community, the volume of the common legacy has always expanded. The number of members continues to increase. Even in the persistent stage of uncertainty while the enlargements proceed on schedule, it does not seem that this will change. Its attractiveness is irresistible. As the late Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez ingeniously detected: “Outside of the EU it’s very cold.”
It is true that the EU has suffered periods of stagnation. However, shared sovereignty and geographical size have never been reduced. When compared politically and economically with other regional integration experiments, the EU is by far the most ambitious experiment in state cooperation. Nonetheless, European integration still has a long way to go to complete its architectural structure.
Architectural similes have been constant in the history of the EU. When it was resolved to convert the Community into a Union in the TEU, the text explicitly inserted the description of the new framework with the metaphor of the three pillars.
The most formidable challenge to a building under constant construction has been the EU’s decision to enlarge its membership.39 The cathedral was designed in 1950 for two faithful members (France and Germany), accompanied by another four (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands) committed to ending European wars. This Community of Six was gradually joined by nine more European countries, creating the EU-15 by 1995. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and rapid transitions to democracy and open market economies in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) created a new European dynamic and greatly increased the number of possible future EU member states. Although the EU was at first reluctant, it opted, once again, for unity rather than division, declaring that those CEECs that met the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria would be welcome to join the EU.
With this daunting backdrop, a European Convention was established to engage in a discussion and design of reforms for the EU institutions and procedures to accommodate the growing number in its ranks. This European Convention was composed of a Praesidium, representatives of the governments of the member states and the candidate countries, representatives of the national parliaments of the member states and candidate countries, and representatives of the European Commission and the EP. It was inaugurated on 28 February 2002, and worked in three phases during the span of three Council presidencies. The leading members of the European Convention justified the need for a thorough legal and institutional reform considering that the esthetically balanced image of the Greco—Roman temple did not reflect reality. The EU might be comparable to a cathedral in construction, but it was more like a baroque conglomerate, the result of the accumulation of elements according to timely circumstances, with no apparent effort to eliminate decorations or useful pieces of the past.40 In the opinion of Giuliano Amato, former Italian Prime Minister and co-vice-chairman of the Convention, cathedrals of other eras are beautiful to see, but Europe demands to function through a complete simplification of its structure.41 In this context, the European Convention submitted a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to the European Council during its meeting of 19–20 June 2003 in Thessaloniki, Greece.
The draft constitutional treaty was then discussed, as with all previous treaties, during an IGC that began during the Italian presidency in October 2003 and came to a conclusion during the Irish presidency of the first semester 2004. In June 2004 the European Council approved the draft constitutional treaty, and on 29 October 2004 its representatives signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in Rome, Italy, opening the door for the treaty ratification process to begin. All treaties must be ratified by every EU member state in order for them to enter into force. This ratification process may take place in the parliaments of the member states only, or a public referendum may also be held, depending on the individual country.
At the time this publication is going to press, a total of 14 countries have ratified this constitutional treaty (12 through parliamentary procedures and two through consultative referendum and parliamentary approval). This process has been postponed, however, due to negative outcomes in referendums held in France and The Netherlands, in May and June 2005, respectively. The results of these referendums are troublesome, not only because they create a possibly insurmountable obstacle to the ratification process but also because they emanate from two of the founding members of the EU, and because France, along with Germany, have been traditionally considered as the motor of European integration. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that the EU has experienced prior ratification crises (Denmark with the Treaty of Maastricht and Ireland with the Treaty of Nice) that were eventually overcome. The EU and its member states are currently engaged in a period of reflection and discussion regarding the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and while its future remains unclear, this project which has been in the making for four years, has not been abandoned.
In the meantime, the EU’s institutional structure will remain solidly anchored in a legal framework, agreed upon democratically.42 It is a series of treaties that includes the Treaty of Paris, the Treaties of Rome,43 the Single European Act,44 Maastricht, and Amsterdam,45 and the Treaty of Nice of 2000.46 They form, in the absence of another text that reforms, frames, or replaces them,47 the existing European “Constitution” that governs this Community of law.48
The long road toward “an ever closer union” reveals one of the crucial innate characteristics of the EU. In the words of Jacques Delors, a Tour de France fan, it is like cycling—if one stops, one falls. As a consequence, the proper procedure to observe its anatomy is not by photographing it, like in a sort of juridical exercise in static scholarship. There is also a need to record it like in a film, by applying the more dynamic tools of international relations.
In the very near future, the EU will have become a really unique creature and cease to be a hybrid. From a traditional federal perspective, observers could say that the language continues to be hypocritical and prudent, always avoiding constitutional expressions that may indicate the limit of states’ sovereignty in “hard” competences.
Only time will tell the future of the EU, and we will all have to wait approximately until the moment in which the temple of Gaudí is finished. Even if in 2022 it has not met the planned schedule and the EU is still in construction, both dreams would be faithful to their essence. Both projects deal with architecture, artistic (in the case of Gaudí) and political (with respect to the EU). In any event, it would be advisable not to base all speculations on the future of the EU on the format of its architectural framework, but on the essence of its political ambition. Perhaps a commentary attributed to the impeccable diplomat, and current High Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana, will serve to clarify the point: when he was asked about the substance and modifications needed for the architecture of the EU, he opined rather modestly: “I am not an architect, just a physicist.”
1. Robert Seymour Bridget, The Spirit of Man: An Anthology in English & French from the Philosophers & Poets (New York: Green & Co., 1916).
2. Henri-Frédéric Amiel, Amiel’s Journal: Le Journal Intime de Henri-Frédéric Amiel (London: Macmillan, 1889).
3. Jean Monnet, Memoirs, 393.
4. Ibid.
5. Monnet, Memoirs (London: Collins, 1978), 304–5.
6. Ibid, 304.
7. Robert Schuman, “The Schuman Declaration,” 9 May 1950.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Gary Marks, “A Third Lens: Comparing European Integration and State Building,” European Integration in Social and Historical Perspective (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
11. Lawrence Gormley, “Reflections on the Architecture of the European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam,” Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Portland, Ore.: Oxford, 1999), 57; Cebada Romero, “La naturaleza jurídica de la Unión Europea: Una Contribución al Debate sobre su Personalidad Jurídica a la Luz de los Trabajos de la Convención Sobre el Futuro de Europa,” Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo (14, 2003), 281–304; Niels Blokker, “The European Union: Historical Origins and Institutional Changes,” The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 21; B. De Witte, “The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?” The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 64; Renaud Dehousse, “ ‘We the States’: Why the Anti-Federalists Have Won,” EUSA Review (16/4, 2003), 5–7; Guy Isaac, “Le pilier communautaire de l’Union Européenne, un pilier pas comme les autres,” Cahiers de Droit Européen (2001), 1–2,49,89.
12. Enrique Barón. Europa en el alba del milenio (Madrid: Acento Editorial, 2000).
13. Robert Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States,” Journal of Common Market Studies (40/4, 2002), 743–65.
14. Marks, “A Third Lens”; Eleanor Zeff, The European Union and the Member States: Cooperation, Coordination, and Compromise (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
15. Michelle Cini, The European Commission (Manchester: University of Manchester, 1997); Kieran Bradley, “The European Court of Justice,” The Institutions of the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 118–138; Neil Nugent, At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
16. Francis Jacobs, The European Parliament (London: Longman, 1992); Caroline Bradley, “European Court of Justice,” 118–38.
17. Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
18. Caroline Bradley, “European Court of Justice”, 118–38.
19. Brigid Laffan, “Financial Control: The Court of Auditors and OLAF,” The Institutions of the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 233–53.
20. John Peterson, “The College of Commissioners,” The Institutions of the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 71–94.
21. Helen Drake, Delors, Perspectives on a European Leader (London: Routledge, 2000); Joaquín Roy, “La Unión Europea: Historia, Instituciones, Políticas,” Europa en Transformación: Procesos Económicos, Políticos y Sociales (México: UNAM, 2000), 133–60; Phillipe Schmitter, “Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the Help of Past Theories,” Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996).
22. Andrés Ortega, La Razón de Europa (Madrid: Aguilar-El País, 1994).
23. Richard Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe without Illusions,” Third Spaak Foundation Presentation: Harvard University Conference (Brussels, 2002), 3.
24. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics (Hertfordshire, UK: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1990), 382.
25. Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.
26. Evans & Newsham, Dictionary, 382.
27. Bradley, “European Court of Justice,” 2.
28. William Wallace, “Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a Political System,” Policy-Making in the European Community (John Wiley & Sons, 1983).
29. Marks, “A Third Lens,” 23–43.
30. Gary Marks, “An Actor-Centered Approach to Multilevel Governance,” Regional & Federal Studies (6/2, 1996), 21–36.
31. Brigid Laffan, Rory O’Donnell, and Michael Smith, Europe’s Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration (London: Routledge, 2000).
32. Natividad Fernández Sola, “La Subjetividad Internacional de la Unión Europea,” Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo (11, 2002), 85–112.
33. Vivien Schmidt, “Democratic Challenges for the EU as ‘Regional State,’ ” EUSA Review (17/1, Winter 2004), 4.
34. Ibid.
35. Araceli Martín Mangas, “La Unión Europea y su futuro: el debate competencial,” Noticias de la Unión Europea (218, 2003), 79–93.
36. Phillipe Schmitter, “The European Union Is Not Democratic—So What?” EUSA Review (17/1, Winter 2004), 3–4.
37. Schmidt, “Democratic Challenges.”
38. Josep Borrell, Carlos Carnero, and Diego López Garrido, Construyendo la Constitución Europea : Crónica política de la Convención (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003); Carlos Closa, “El fracaso del Consejo Europeo de Bruselas y el futuro de la Constitución,” Real Instituto Elcano (18/1, 2004).
39. Santiago Gómez-Reino, “La Actualidad del Pensamiento de Robert Schuman en el Contexto de la Convención Sobre el Futuro de Europa,” Working Paper, European Union Center, University of Miami, 2002.
40. Paul Magnette, “Coping with Constitutional Incompatibilities: Bargains and Rhetoric in the Convention on the Future of Europe,” Jean Monnet Papers (New York: New York University, 2003),14.
41. Ibid.
42. Joaquín Roy, “La Unión Europea: De la arquitectura a la alquimia,” Retos e interrelaciones de la Integración Regional: Europa y América (México: Plaza y Valdés, 2003), 53–77.
43. Action Jean Monnet, Europe 2004: De Grand Debat (Brussels: European Commission, 2002).
44. Jean De Ruyt, L’Acte Unique Européen (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1987).
45. Mario Telo and Paul Magnette, De Maastricht a Amsterdam: L’Europe et son nouveau tracté (Brussels: Université de Bruxelles, 2002); Andreu Olesti Rayo, Las incertidumbres de la Unión Europea después del Tratado de Ámsterdam (Barcelona: J. M. Bosch, 2000).
46. Blanca Vilà Costa, El horizonte institucional de la UE tras la Conferencia Intergubernamental (de Biarritz a Niza) (Barcelona: Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2001); José Ignacio Torreblanca, “El marco institucional y político en la Europa ampliada: más allá de Niza,” Papeles de Economía Española (91, 2002), 228–38; Kiernan Bradley, “Institutional Design in the Treaty of Nice,” Common Market Law Review (38, 2001), 1095–1124.
47. Mariola Urrea Corres, “El dilema de la Convención: La búsqueda de una solución alternativa al modelo clásico de reforma de los Tratados,” Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo (14, 2003), 265–80; Jo Shaw, “Flexibility in a ‘Reorganized’ and ‘Simplified’ Treaty,” Common Market Law Review (2, 2003), 279–311.
48. Albert Galinsoga Jordà, “El ‘modelo europeo’ en un mundo globalizado: un caracterización de la Unión Europea en el nuevo siglo,” Las Relaciones Exteriores de la Unión Europea (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2001), 45–66.