I, me
these thoughts accompany most of my experiences
I am sad, I see, I walk, I think
this book is mine
the word rose is generic
it designates flowers of very different colors
it does not change when the flower blooms
or wilts
the words me, I
can be applied to many aspects of my life
that have little in common
I is the one who went to school
at the age of 5
the one who travelled at 20
and the one who is writing now
despite all the changes
physical and psychological
I has not changed
how old is I?
five, twenty, fifty?
I has no age, even at this moment of my life
it is only a representation
while it is useful to give a name
to this psychosomatic process
in constant transformation
to think that this I is an autonomous entity
completely separated from this process
is a mistake with far-reaching consequence
the word me, even more than the word rose
denotes uncountable phenomena
since it is used by each person to designate herself
me is neither short nor tall
neither intelligent nor confused
neither Western nor Eastern
what is this I who is I for me
and not-I for you?
— Aryadeva
like here and there
I is a term adrift
the same label for different phenomena
a mere convention of speech
the notion I weighs down all experience
it is right to say I see
but wrong to believe that there is an I
autonomous with respect to vision
vision sees, as hearing hears, as thought thinks
I is neither consciousness, nor its owner
it is a thought formed by consciousness
so that it can make a stand among things
I makes consciousness into a thing
to take this representation for consciousness itself
is the source of the deepest disarray
to relativize the notion of I is essential for Buddhism
its claim to resolve the problem of life and death
only makes sense
insofar as this I, whose disappearance I fear
is seen to be nothing substantial or independent
since it has never, really, come into being
in meditation, the aim is not to hunt the self
but to remain close to experience
when I am sad
the concept I
veils the experience
but if I am interested in the emotion itself
in this particular way of being for consciousness
then, in the intimacy of the experience
there is no longer a notion of self
but simply a sad consciousness
it is the same with bodily sensations
if the meditator does not cling
to an image of a particular zone of the body
or to an evaluation of the sensation
if she is not its owner
or the witness, which always implies a distancing
if she simply feels it as a way of being
the notion of self does not arise
presence is not a device of consciousness
like the I
it is consciousness of one’s being
— self-consciousness —
it is necessarily impersonal
to attach the word I to presence
to distinguish it from other things
implies the intention to place it among things
but at the level of things there is no presence
thus presence is lost when held as I or mine
when thoughts are held as objects
they imprison us in an imaginary world
more solid than the harshest of realities
the me, the I
to which consciousness tends to reduce itself
is only the imaginary prisoner
of this imaginary world
imaginary world that is the world of generalities
as long as it takes itself to be this prisoner
consciousness will suffer profoundly
like a reader who identifies
with the tragic characters of a novel
from the three origins of the notion of I
confusion and pride must be eliminated
but convention must be respected
without this conventional I
there would be no responsibility
a play by the Greek poet Epicarmus
depicts this problem
a merchant seeks the person to whom he has lent money
to get his money back
when they meet
the person declares that
because everything constantly changes
it is no longer he who borrowed the money
surprised, the merchant thinks for a while
then smacks the debtor with a stick
the debtor, upset
asks the merchant why he is hitting him
the merchant replies that he is not responsible
because he is no longer the one who delivered the blow
and the one who received it is no longer here either
radical attempts to dispose of the self
always make a mess