The adjective authoritarian has been applied to Donald Trump hundreds of thousands of times in the first few months of his presidency. Phrases like “Trump’s authoritarian vision,” “Trump is drifting toward authoritarianism,” and “Trump is following the authoritarian playbook” are casually used by pundits and editors seeking clicks and shares. There are certainly a number of actions in the Trump presidency that are cause for concern. However, labeling Trump an authoritarian merely because of these actions demonstrates a simplistic understanding of authoritarianism and a lack of faith in the democratic institutions as well as the American people.
Pundits have cited Trump’s “consolidation of power” as an example of his authoritarian tendencies. Yet, his supposed consolidation of power has not been well explained and, more importantly, the current American political climate does not resemble that of an authoritarian regime at all. When an authoritarian leaders consolidate power, they really consolidate power, through repression and co-optation (Levitsky and Way 2002). Co-optation occurs through patronage systems where the placating of potential rivals via distribution of limited perks is essential for maintaining power (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Schatz 2009; Geddes 2005). The ideal way to distribute benefits is via legislative seats, where resources can be legally transferred and regular demonstration of support for the regime is available (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Because votes show support for the regime, the executive gets what it wants from its legislature. So while legislatures are not window dressing, as some may believe (Gerschewski 2013), the legislature has very little formal influence. The relationship between the American executive and legislative branches is nothing like this relationship under authoritarianism. Unlike in authoritarian regimes where members of the legislature demonstrate their loyalty to the leader, American presidents tend to adapt to the views of Congress in order to advance their own agendas. Moreover, American congresspeople are beholden to a variety of interests—constituents and lobbyists most of all—not the executive. And currently, Trump’s relationship with the Republican Party and Congress, in particular, is weak at best.
Another frequently noted example of authoritarian-like consolidation of power is Trump’s use of executive orders. But executive orders are not unilateral power—they are limited in a number of ways. The federal judiciary consistently reviews executive orders and sometimes overturns them. And while executive orders are design to bypass Congress, Congress can refuse to fund the effort, as it did with Obama’s executive order to close Guantanamo. There is also the Office of Legal Counsel within the Department of Justice that is tasked with evaluating the legality of executive orders and can prevent them from being issued, as was the case during the Iran hostage crisis. These limits simply do not exist in authoritarian states. Nonetheless, Trump’s assailing of judges that rule against him is concerning, as is his call for breaking up the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Yet, breaking up a federal court is a difficult process that requires working with Congress through a reorganization. This happened in 1980 when a single court was overloaded with cases and the creation of an additional court was justified. But it would be difficult to defend a reorganization now without a clear reason other than creating a more favorable judicial climate. Authoritarian leaders do not have such limits.
Perhaps it is Donald Trump’s relationship with the mass media that is most often cited as an example of his authoritarian tendencies. In this, he does have some strong similarities to authoritarian leaders. Attacking opposition media appears to be one resemblance, but in fact, Trump’s approach is far different from authoritarian leaders. Donald Trump attacks mainstream media. When he called the New York Times, NBC News, ABC News, CBS News, and CNN “fake news” and labeled them “the enemy of the American People!”1 on Twitter on February 17, 2017, and called the press “dishonest” and “out of control” in a press conference on February 16, 2017, many were alarmed. But while oppositionists are humiliated and discredited through formal campaigns in authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2002), opposition media is not discredited, rather it is eliminated so that the regime can exert exclusive control of information. Control of the mass media has been a key tool in authoritarian leaders’ toolkits for centuries (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1963) and is an important part of social control (Schatz 2009; Whitten-Woodring and James 2012), even on social media (Hyun and Kim 2015; Pearce 2015). An authoritarian leader can use the mass media to project images that strengthen his position (Schatz 2009), portray that the regime is doing a good job (Brady 2009; Stein 2012), suggest that there is greater support for the regime or a particular policy than there actually is (Chen and Xu 2017), and limit the diversity of citizens’ opinions (Lu, Aldrich, and Shi 2014). So, while Donald Trump has tried to discredit media opposing him, and he does engage in a number of the same goals as authoritarian leaders, the fact that he has not eliminated the media is a core difference between him and authoritarian leaders.
But like in an authoritarian regime’s controlled media environment, in 2017, the “truth” is hazy. In an authoritarian regime the “truth” is hazy because institutions such as media commentators are too weak to provide the scaffolding for it (Ortmann and Heathershaw 2012). This is even more powerful because citizens in authoritarian regimes live with a great deal of uncertainty already (Schedler 2013) and the hazy truth merely adds to this uncertainty. And this is important because authoritarian states draw their social control–derived power from uncertainty. By disallowing citizens the “gift” of knowing what to expect day-to-day, authoritarians keep people on their toes and discourage anyone from making plans or having the luxury to dedicate mental energy to thinking about criticism of the regime. Additionally, in such a hazy environment, rumors, scandals, and conspiracy theories are given greater weight, due to the inability to make sense of what is truly going on (Ortmann and Heathershaw 2012; DiFonzo and Bordia 2007; Huang 2017), and this provides opportunities for authoritarian leaders to demonize any opposition to their rule (Schatz 2009), especially through anonymous channels like the Internet (Pearce 2015; Pearce and Hajizada 2014).
So while there is not the same type of controlled media environment, there are elements of a hazy truth in the 2017 American media environment. It is not a coincidence that Donald Trump’s victory came at a time of great change in the American media landscape. While partisan media has grown over the past two decades, the addition of Internet-based and social media news led to a 2016 presidential campaign with a host of new issues like “fake news,” “filter bubbles,” and increased populist rhetoric (Groshek and Koc-Michalska 2017). When considering former candidate, now-President, Trump’s relationship with the media, it is impossible to ignore these changes to the media environment. While ownership of media outlets is not a characteristic of the current US administration, the challenges presented are similar to those in a hazy information environment. The proliferation of “fake news”—where source credibility cannot be easily established—in combination with social endorsement of news (“My friend posted this story, and they’re smart, so it is probably true.”) has had a significant impact on many US social and political issues. The 2016 presidential election notwithstanding, the role that “fake news” has had on public health alone is cause for concern. Stories like Pizzagate raise a red flag. Donald Trump’s tweets are particularly interesting. He can instantly make claims such as accusing former President Obama of a crime. Many argue that provocative tweets from Trump serve other purposes such as preemptive framing, reflection, diversion, and trial balloons.2
Another common method of social control by authoritarian regimes is making it socially risky to engage in any action perceived to be disloyal to the leader or the state (which under authoritarianism are one in the same). First, authoritarian regimes create an environment where loyalty to the rulers is the only path for upward mobility. Individuals interested in moving up spend much energy greasing the wheels of their networks in an effort to get closer to the top. Merit is not the primary consideration of a potential employee, rather the consideration of the networks and possible access an individual brings is paramount. Grand gestures of dedication to the rulers are essential in the performance of loyalty. This takes on greater importance because in authoritarian environments, silence is perceived as disloyalty and, as such, one must be constantly vigilant in demonstrating allegiance to the ruler. Social media provide another space for this demonstration, particularly with a larger and broader audience.
Related to the performance of loyalty is the rational decision to not share one’s opinions publicly or even privately. Citizens of authoritarian regimes are trained to watch for disloyalty in others, thus engaging in the exhausting task of attending to one’s expression becomes second nature. The tendency to self-censor is great, especially among those with less power. And this is, even more, the case on social media, where the ability to record and share disclosures with broad and unintended audiences, and with some degree of anonymity, has dramatically altered expression. On social media, the stakes are higher, and thus the likelihood for self-censorship is greater.
As such, deviating from the norm—political or otherwise—is dangerous in authoritarian regimes. In combination with the culture of self-censorship, keeping one’s head down is a dominant organizing structure in authoritarianism, especially because reputation and connections are more important than merit. Those brave enough to dissent are severely punished, but from an unexpected source—not the state, but from their own loved ones. The reputational effects of having a dissenting family member are too great for many, and individuals are ostracized. This is even more problematic where access to resources is dependent upon connections. Once those ties are severed, it is permanent. Social media can provide a space for those that deviate to find likeminded others, but can also potentially “out” those that deviate.
In conclusion, as a scholar of authoritarianism, I am not terribly worried about the United States turning into Russia, much less North Korea. However, I am concerned about general trends in both hazy information and self-censorship, which are characteristic of authoritarian regimes and have severe consequences on individuals’ ability to think critically and civically engage. There is no question that these are powerful methods of social control that are at the disposal of the best “political technologists” (parapolitical professionals with the task to set and change the agenda and “construct” politics by applying whatever “technologies” available to them, especially manipulation of the media) (Etkind and Shcherbak 2008; Wilson 2005). While I hope that the current US administration’s “political technologists” are not so explicit in their aims, I fear that they may, in fact, be engaging in such actions intentionally. And it is entirely possible that some knowledge transfer has occurred between authoritarian regimes and the administration. But without the repercussions that citizens face in authoritarian regimes holding them back, American citizens can fight against these actions. It is once that ability is gone that the label of authoritarian may accurately fit.