CHAPTER 3

Selling the Invasion of Iraq

On March 19, 2003, the United States and Great Britain invaded Iraq with support from several other nations, thus beginning one of the longest wars in U.S. history. The invasion, codenamed “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” began with three weeks of traditional combat, including strikes against targets of “military importance” from U.S. bombers stationed in the Persian Gulf. On April 10, 2003, the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad fell to coalition forces, effectively ending the twenty-four-year rule of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. On May 1, 2003, U.S. president George W. Bush declared that major combat operations in Iraq had concluded. Despite the defeat of Iraq’s traditional military forces, however, the conflict was far from over. Almost immediately, coalition forces confronted a fierce insurgency from multiple groups, a reality that continued until the official U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011. In 2014, in the wake of the Syrian Civil War and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), President Obama redeployed American troops to Iraq. As of late 2020, thousands of U.S. troops remain in Iraq, and dialogue between the Iraqi government and the U.S. government regarding future troop levels is ongoing.

Today many consider the Iraq War to be a mistake on the part of U.S. policymakers, while others consider the conflict a complete and utter failure. When asked, “In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq,” nearly half of all U.S. respondents in a July 2010 Gallup poll responded with “moderately badly” or “very badly.”1 As of late 2007, some 20 percent of Americans believed that while the United States could win the war in Iraq, it would not. Another 37 percent stated the war was unwinnable.² That same year, 49 percent of people surveyed said the war with Iraq had made the United States less safe from terrorism, and another 10 percent thought the war had done nothing to improve U.S. safety.³

While contemporary support for past and present U.S. operations in Iraq may reflect serious skepticism on the part of the public, this was not always the case. For instance, when asked, “In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq” just after the beginning of the war in April 2003, 21 percent of respondents stated that things were going “very well” while another 64 percent responded “moderately well.” Only two percent believed operations were going “very badly.”4 That same poll found that 58 percent of Americans believed the Iraqi invasion made the United States safer from terrorism, and some 71 percent of those surveyed favored the war in Iraq.⁵

The stark contrast in the opinions of the American public between the time of the invasion of Iraq and subsequent polls may be attributed in large part to the use of propaganda by U.S. officials to “sell” the Iraq War to the American public. Taking full advantage of the information asymmetries between government officials and the general public and the secretive nature of war and issues of national security, the Bush administration became nearly the sole source of pre-invasion media material. From September 2002 to February 2003, more than 90 percent of all stories on ABC, NBC, and CBS regarding a possible invasion came from the White House.⁶ Government officials employed a variety of propaganda techniques—appealing to authority and patriotism, appealing to an “us versus them” mentality, and simple images and slogans—to frame the Iraqi conflict as a necessary and noble endeavor. These techniques worked to unify the populace around supporting the government’s initial military intervention.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was not the first time the U.S. government intervened in Iraqi affairs.⁷ In order to appreciate the motives facing elected officials regarding the 2003 Iraq War, it is imperative to understand the historical relationship between the two countries and, particularly, past interventions in Iraq by the U.S. government.

While private corporations with interest in Iraq’s oil reserves maintained a significant presence in the country since the early 1900s, U.S. government involvement in Iraq was largely limited. With the start of the Cold War the U.S. government looked to influence the country’s government, providing it with economic and military aid. Focused on preventing the spread of communism throughout the Middle East while maintaining its influence in the region, the U.S. government was integral in the creation of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), also known as the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) or the Baghdad Pact. Founded in 1955, the pact was a defensive organization similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and tied together the countries of Great Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey.8 Optimism that Iraq would serve U.S. government interests quickly evaporated, however, when Iraqi military officers launched a successful coup d’état in 1958. Other civil conflicts followed throughout the next two decades.⁹

Despite these internal clashes, the Iraqi government took a seat on the world stage and adopted a neutral stance regarding the Cold War. Although Iraq engaged with the Soviet Union throughout this period, the U.S. government sought to maintain political ties and influence with the Iraqi government, providing some $48.2 million in military aid between 1954 and 1957.¹⁰ A U.S.-government-backed coup in 1963 helped to put a relatively small political group—the Ba’ath Party—into power. According to New York Times journalist Roger Morris, the CIA provided lists of suspected communists and other political enemies to the officials of the new Iraqi government, who subsequently engaged in the systematic mass murder of their rivals.¹¹

In 1967, a group of young Iraqi military officers, including a young Saddam Hussein, came to the United States for the explicit purposes of studying weapons. According to Neil Livingstone, a security and counterterrorism expert, “Saddam came here . . . and was taken to all our principal chemical weapons facilities—Aberdeen, Edgewood, Dougway and Ainnistown. And he went through the process of seeing the design of weapons—at least, seeing something about the design—the manufacture of weapons, and their actual use and deployment on a battlefield.”¹² That same year, Iraq cut its diplomatic ties with the United States during the Six Days War and later nationalized many U.S. oil interests and collaborated with Soviet partners.¹³ From this point through the late 1970s, the U.S. government equipped Kurdish rebel groups in efforts to weaken the Iraqi government.14

In 1979, Saddam Hussein seized power in Iraq. He left no room for resistance. In a videotaped meeting with hundreds of party officials shortly after gaining power, Hussein publicly announced the names of individuals who he believed had plotted against him. The accused were taken out of the room and executed.¹⁵ Though highly publicized, these executions were only a small fraction of the people killed under Hussein’s regime. The U.S. State Department estimates that Saddam had thousands of his political rivals murdered.¹⁶

The year 1980 marked the beginning of an eight-year war between Iraq and Iran resulting from territorial disputes between the two countries as well as Iran’s Islamic Revolution. During this period, the Hussein regime was responsible for the disappearance of some five thousand Iraqi males, some as young as age ten. Thousands of Kurds (an ethnic group native to the mountainous region of western Asia known as Kurdistan) were expelled to Iran or executed.¹⁷ Toward the end of the war in 1988, Saddam ordered what has been referred to as a genocide against Iraq’s Kurdish and Shi‘a Muslim populations, resulting in an estimated hundred thousand deaths.¹⁸ According to Human Rights Watch, Iraqi forces began their extensive use of chemical weapons in 1983–1984. They estimate that twenty thousand people were killed with mustard gas and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun.¹⁹

Although the U.S. government officially maintained a position of neutrality during the war, and despite consistent protests over Iraq’s human rights record, the United States supported Hussein and the interests of Iraq in the conflict, fearful that Iran’s staunch anti-American Islamist sentiments and the Islamic Revolution would spread throughout the Middle East. In 1981, the U.S. government announced an embargo on arms sales to Iran. The following year Iraq was removed from the list of states sponsoring terrorism. Between 1983 and 1987, the Reagan administration offered Iraq $2 billion in agricultural purchase credits. The sale of items with dual civilian and military uses—that is, ambulances, electronics, automobiles, and helicopters—was authorized.²⁰

In 1984 the United States began to share intelligence with Iraq, including communication intercepts and satellite images. President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114 in November of that year, stating that the United States should engage in “whatever measures may be necessary” to maintain Iraq’s oil supply. “Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system,” it reads, “we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic.”21 Another NSDD (139) issued in 1984 stated that U.S. officials would “prepare a plan to avert Iraqi collapse.”²² The United States helped to broker a ceasefire between the two countries in 1988 and maintained relations with Iraq despite high tensions over the Iran-Contra affair, in which members of the Reagan administration sold weapons to Iran despite the official embargo.

United States officials had hoped that the end of the Iran-Iraq War would bring peace and stability to the region along with continued good relations with Iraq. Such hopes were short lived. In 1990 Hussein’s forces invaded the neighboring country of Kuwait. When he refused to withdraw his forces by the deadline imposed by the United Nations, U.S. forces, under the command of President George H. W. Bush, led a military campaign to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. After one hundred hours of combat, the war concluded. Hussein, however, remained in power. According to former deputy director of National Intelligence David Gompert and political scientists Hans Binnendijk and Bonny Lin, while the “United States would have preferred a regime change in Baghdad [following the Gulf War] . . . it settled for containment.”²³ While President George H. W. Bush would authorize the CIA to engage in activity to overthrow Saddam, attempts during this period were ultimately unsuccessful.²⁴

The U.S. government’s policy toward Iraq in the following years remained one of containment. No-fly zones were enacted in northern and southern parts of Iraq with the goal of protecting Shi‘a and Kurdish groups. The United Nations imposed economic sanctions, and Iraq was ordered to undertake a disarmament program. As part of this program, the regime was required to allow inspections of its facilities to ensure compliance. During his tenure in the White House, President Clinton ordered several air strikes on targets throughout Iraq. At one point in 1994, when Hussein sent troops to the Kuwaiti border, Clinton deployed some thirty-six thousand troops and one hundred aircraft to the area. He broadened the southern no-fly zone and ordered air strikes against targets in the newly prohibited territory.25

Conservatives pressured Clinton to pursue a more aggressive strategy in Iraq. Publishing an open letter to the President, eighteen prominent political figures, including individuals who would later be important in the 2003 invasion, such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, called on the President not to contain the Iraqi leader but to overthrow him. They wrote,

We urge you to seize that opportunity [the State of the Union Address], and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. . . . That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. . . . This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political, and military efforts. Although we are aware of the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy, we believe the dangers of failing to do so are far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority . . . to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. . . . We urge you to act decisively.²⁶

Clinton did not pursue a military overthrow of the Iraqi regime but rather adopted other policies to destabilize the Iraqi government and oust Saddam Hussein. In October 1998, Clinton signed the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, making $8 million available “for assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition.”²⁷ Later that month he signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law, allowing for U.S. government support of radio and television organizations in Iraq and military assistance to rebel groups, among other items, for the express purpose of “establish[ing] a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.”²⁸ Two months later, Hussein stopped allowing weapons inspectors into Iraq, resulting in four days of air strikes by U.S. forces. Between January and August of 1999, the United States struck four hundred targets in Iraq.

George W. Bush was elected president in 2000 and took the oath of office on January 20, 2001. While on the campaign trail, he had clearly discussed the “threat” imposed by Iraq and argued that this danger would “require firmness” on the part of the U.S government.29 In other speeches, Bush also laid the groundwork to continue and expand military intervention abroad, painting the U.S. military as a force who would not only “protect our homeland” but one that would also spread U.S. ideals globally.

We must master the new technology of war—to extend our peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the years. In the defense of our nation, a president must be a clear-eyed realist. There are limits to the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and missiles are not stopped by stiff notes of condemnation. They are held in check by strength and purpose and the promise of swift punishment. . . . American foreign policy must be more than the management of crisis. It must have a great and guiding goal: to turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace.³⁰

It would not be long before events would present an opportunity to use military force against the Iraqi regime. The Bush administration would utilize the same sentiments and its exclusive ability to disseminate information to rally domestic popular support for the overthrow of Iraq’s government following the September 11 attacks on U.S. soil.

INVADING IRAQ: PROPAGANDA VERSUS THE KNOWN REALITIES

On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four California-bound commercial aircraft leaving from the northeastern United States. Two of the aircraft crashed into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The third crashed into the Pentagon outside of Washington, DC, and the fourth plane crashed in a field southeast of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, along with several others, were taken to a safe bunker under the White House. From almost the moment the attacks occurred, government officials surmised that the terrorist group al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden were responsible for the attacks. In a 2001 interview, Rice stated that “everyone assumed it was al-Qaeda because the operation looked like al-Qaeda, quacked like al Qaeda, seemed like al-Qaeda.”31 The terror group, however, was not the exclusive focus of Bush administration officials. According to Sir Christopher Meyer, U.K. Ambassador to the United States from 1997 to 2003, in the hours following the attacks, Rice also stated that “one thing we need to look into is whether Iraq’s had anything to do with this.”³²

The National Security Advisor was not the only one with eyes on Iraq. A note from the Department of Defense, written just hours after the attacks, mentioned the Iraqi dictator directly as a potential target for military action. The note reads, “Judge whether to hit SH [Saddam Hussein] at the same time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden].”³³ Top officials, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, gathered for another meeting later that night, where Iraq was again a topic of discussion. According to investigative journalist Bob Woodward, “Rumsfeld actually puts Iraq on the table and says, ‘Part of our response maybe should be attacking Iraq. It’s an opportunity.’”³⁴

Administration officials would continue to focus on the Iraqi regime as a possible military target in the days and weeks following the terrorist attacks. In a meeting at Camp David in Maryland shortly after the attacks, Iraq was again discussed. John McLaughlin, deputy director of the CIA from 2000 to 2001, said of the meeting, “There was a discussion of Iraq and whether Iraq was behind this [the 9/11 attacks] and whether Iraq should be included in any targeting.”³⁵ Speaking of the same meeting, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “Paul [Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense] put a case forward that, ultimately, Iraq would have to be dealt with.”³⁶

Ultimately, the Bush administration would “deal with” Saddam Hussein with the March 2003 invasion. Many reasons have been offered as to the “genuine” motive behind the U.S. government’s operations in Iraq. One frequent explanation is that the invasion and war were motivated by oil. While the U.S. government’s motivations were multifaceted, there is evidence that U.S. officials were indisputably concerned about securing Iraq’s petroleum production processes.

A 2001 report from the Baker Institute for Public Policy candidly recommended that officials “review policies toward Iraq with the aim to lowering anti-Americanism in the Middle East and elsewhere, and set the groundwork to eventually ease Iraqi oil-field investment restrictions.” It continued, “Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated his willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets. . . . The United States should conduct an immediate policy review towards Iraq including military, energy, economic and political/diplomatic assessments.”37 Other explanations for the war argue that George W. Bush was largely interested in revenge against Saddam plotting to kill his father, former president George H. W. Bush.³⁸ Still, others contend that the war in Iraq began based on honorable humanitarian motives—a concern for the Iraqi people and the supposed threat of terrorism posed by the regime.

Identifying the “true” motives behind the invasion is not of paramount importance for our analysis. What is critical is that the Bush administration, possessing information that was unavailable to the American public, deliberately misrepresented or concealed knowledge for the purposes of gaining popular support for military invasion and regime change in Iraq. In what follows we focus on three of the areas frequently offered as justifications for war by the Bush administration: (1) Iraq’s supposed connection to known terror groups, (2) the country’s supposed weapons programs, and (3) the idea that numerous countries desired military action in Iraq. In each of these cases, we examine the disconnect between what was known by U.S. government officials and what was presented to the public. In each case, officials deliberately misrepresented the actual state of affairs to sway the public toward supporting invasion.

Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda

One justification offered to the public for the Iraqi invasion was the supposed link between the Hussein regime and terrorism, particularly al-Qaeda and the 9/11 terror attacks. On November 7, 2002, President Bush stated that Saddam Hussein was “a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda. . . . A true threat facing our country is that an al Qaeda-type network trained and armed by Saddam could attack America.” In his State of the Union address in 2003, the president claimed that “evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.”39

Despite these claims, officials had in reality little to no evidence that a connection between Hussein and al-Qaeda actually existed. According to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, the Bush administration, including President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice, “made 61 misleading statements about the strength of the Iraq-Al-Qaeda alliance in 52 public appearances.”⁴⁰

In separate interviews with Meet the Press, for example, Vice President Cheney referenced specific connections between Hussein and al-Qaeda, including a meeting between Mohammed Atta (one of the leaders of the 9/11 attacks) and Iraqi leaders in Prague just five months before the attacks. In 2001 Cheney stated that “it’s been pretty well confirmed that he [Atta] did go to Prague and did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.”⁴¹ Later on, Cheney softened his claim, saying that “the Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker [of the 9/11 terror attacks], met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official . . . but we’ve never been able to develop anymore of that . . . in terms of confirming or discrediting it.” However, even these caveats didn’t reveal what the U.S. government knew to be fact.

The supposed connection between the Iraqi leader and al-Qaeda was tenuous from the start. According to Daniel Benjamin, who served on the National Security Council from 1994 to 1999 and as the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism from 2009 to 2012, “Iraq and al Qaeda are not obvious allies. In fact, they are natural enemies.”⁴² He goes on to discuss that a major focal point of al-Qaeda’s ideology is that secular Muslim leaders have “oppressed the believers and plunged Islam into a historic crisis” and that, “to contemporary jihadists, Saddam Hussein is another in a line of dangerous secularists, an enemy of the faithful.”⁴³ Official documents likewise cast doubt on a Hussein–al-Qaeda link. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) gave a “low confidence” rating as to “whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with al Qaeda.”⁴⁴

Other reports from a variety of intelligence agencies cast serious doubt on the “nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network,” though the White House did not disclose this information to the general public. Speaking of the CIA’s efforts to link the Iraqi regime with al-Qaeda, Michael Scheuer, a former CIA analyst who led the intelligence gathering effort stated that, “[George] Tenet [the CIA Director], to his credit, has us go back 10 years in the agency’s records and look and see what we knew about Iraq and al Qaeda. . . . And we went back 20 years. We examined 20,000 documents, probably something along the lines of 75,000 pages of information. And there was no connection between [al-Qaeda] and Saddam.”45

While Vice President Cheney stated that officials were unable to “confirm or discredit” the supposed meeting between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi leaders before 9/11, both the FBI and CIA knew very early such a meeting never occurred. John McLaughlin, former director and deputy director of central intelligence, stated, “We went over that [supposed connection between Atta and Iraq] every which way from Sunday. I mean, we looked at every conceivable angle.”⁴⁶ Former FBI director Robert Mueller would similarly discredit the idea: “We ran down literally hundreds of thousands of leads and checked every record we could get our hands on.”⁴⁷ Soon, officials would learn that a meeting between Atta and an Iraqi official in Prague would have been impossible. Vincent Cannistraro, former director of intelligence for the National Security Council and chief of operations and analysis at the CIA’s counterterrorism center, said of the supposed Atta meeting, “Very early on, both CIA and FBI knew it wasn’t true because the FBI had Atta in Florida at the time.”⁴⁸

Even though no true connection could be made between al-Qaeda and Iraq, U.S. officials continued to report misleading information publicly to make the case for war. Speaking to the United Nations on Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “What I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network. . . . Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network.”⁴⁹ At a press conference on March 6, 2003, just days before the war began, President Bush “conflated 9/11 with the war in Iraq eight times.”⁵⁰

Propaganda statements from U.S. government officials had the desired effect. A series of polls conducted in 2003 by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and Knowledge Networks (KN) found that while the U.S. Intelligence community had serious doubts regarding the Iraq–al-Qaeda connection, an overwhelming number of Americans believed the White House narrative. The PIPA/KN poll from January 2003 found that 68 percent of those polled “believed Iraq played an important role in September 11, with 13 percent even expressing the clearly mistaken belief that ‘conclusive evidence’ of such a link had been found.”51

Another poll the following month offered respondents more choices but found a plurality of Americans had perceptions that did not comport with the known facts. Some 20 percent believed that “Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the September 11th attacks.” However, another 36 percent responded, “Iraq gave substantial support to al Qaeda, but was not involved in the September 11th attacks,” a position that PIPA notes is “still at odds with the dominant view of the intelligence community.” Twenty-nine percent of those surveyed said there was some evidence of an Iraq–al-Qaeda connection and that “a few al Qaeda individuals visited Iraq or had contact with Iraqi officials.” Only 7 percent of respondents said there was no connection between the two groups.⁵² Other polls found that 32 and 37 percent of Americans, respectively, believed it was “very” or “somewhat likely” that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September 11th attacks.⁵³

Other surveys found similar results—that many Americans believed officials had found hard evidence of a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Polls in June, July, and September 2003 asked individuals, “Is it your impression that the US has or has not found clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the Al Qaeda terrorist organization?” In the successive polls, 52 percent, 49 percent, and 48 percent answered that the United States had found such evidence.⁵⁴

Saddam Hussein and Weapons of Mass Destruction

In addition to the supposed link between Iraq, the 9/11 attacks, and terrorism, the justification for the invasion of Iraq largely hinged on Saddam Hussein’s supposed possession and pursuit of “weapons of mass destruction,” or WMDs. In the 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush left no room for doubt of Iraq’s capabilities.

The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. . . . States like these [Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.55

In other statements, the president made specific claims regarding Iraq’s actions, saying, “Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium [for nuclear weapons] from Africa.”⁵⁶ In March 2002, Vice President Cheney publicly stated that “we know the Iraqis have been engaged in such efforts [developing WMDs] over the years. We know they have biological and chemical weapons. . . . And we also have reason to believe they’re pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.”⁵⁷ By September of that year, he had strengthened his position, saying that, “we do know, with absolute certainty, that he [Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs . . . to build a nuclear weapon.”⁵⁸ Other White House officials, like Secretary Powell, said with regard to Iraq’s WMD capabilities that “there is no doubt in our minds now that those vans [possible locations for mobile weapons laboratories] were designed for only one purpose, and that was to make biological weapons.”⁵⁹

The idea that the Iraqi regime either possessed or could build WMDs, including biological and chemical weapons or nuclear weapons, was not new. Following the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687, which required the elimination of Iraq’s WMDs. Under the terms of the resolution, Iraq offered a detailed accounting of its weapons inventory and programs and allowed for inspections by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Over the coming months and years, Iraq would be less than cooperative with UN inspectors, stopping all UNSCOM inspections in the fall of 1998. Inspectors would return to Iraq in November of 2002 following the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.⁶⁰

According to the UN, Iraq had possessed chemical weapons as late as the early 1990s and had undeniably used them throughout the 1980s.⁶¹ Despite the statements of President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other officials, however, it was far from clear that Saddam Hussein still possessed chemical weapons or was actively seeking to develop WMDs. Regarding Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, for example, the intelligence community was deeply divided. The Bureau of Intelligence Research, for instance, found that the evidence did not “add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR [Institute for Nuclear Research] would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.”62 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) likewise found “no indication of resumed nuclear activities . . . nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities.”⁶³

The supposed attempts by Iraq to procure uranium from Africa were often used by White House officials as clear evidence of Iraq’s WMD program. However, there was no clear evidence that such a transaction ever occurred. The CIA sent Ambassador Joseph Wilson to investigate the claims and reported that it was “highly doubtful that any such transaction has ever taken place.”⁶⁴ Moreover, the documents that purportedly showed that Iraqi officials were attempting to buy uranium from Africa were deemed “not authentic” after careful inspection by the United Nations.⁶⁵

This was later acknowledged by the Bush administration, but officials pled ignorance. In July 2003, Condoleezza Rice stated, “If there were doubts about the underlying intelligence [with respect to the uranium] . . . those doubts were never communicated to the President, Vice President, or to me.”⁶⁶ According to the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, however, “This statement [by Rice] is false because, as Ms. Rice’s deputy Stephen Hadley subsequently acknowledged, the CIA sent Ms. Rice and Mr. Hadley memos in October of 2002 warning against the use of this information.”⁶⁷

In 2001 and 2002, shipments of aluminum tubes destined for Iraq were intercepted. These tubes were, like the uranium, treated as hard and clear evidence of Iraq’s ambitions to develop WMDs. From the outset, however, the intelligence community debated the likely purposes of the tubes. While it was possible for the tubes to be used for nuclear centrifuges with modification, tubes of that specific size were most often used in conventional rockets. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the IAEA both doubted that the tubes were particularly suited for nuclear use. The DOE concluded, “the tubes probably are not part of the [nuclear] program.”⁶⁸ The IAEA found that “there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment.”69 The State Department likewise expressed doubts regarding the use of the aluminum tubes as evidence of a nuclear program, stating that “the very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors . . . that lead the INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq’s nuclear weapon program.”⁷⁰

White House officials failed to publicly acknowledge or emphasize these doubts, however, instead arguing that the tubes were clear evidence of Iraq’s nuclear ambitions. In September of 2002, Vice President Cheney stated that “[Saddam Hussein] now is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium to make the [nuclear] bombs . . . specifically aluminum tubes.”⁷¹ That same day, Secretary Rice stated that “we do know that there have been shipments [of aluminum tubes to Iraq that] are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.”⁷²

The effect of these and similar repeated, coordinated public statements is evident in polls conducted during the period. When asked, “Do you think that Saddam Hussein does or does not have the capability to use chemical or biological weapons against targets in the US?,” an overwhelming 79 percent of respondents answered that he “Does have [the] capability.”⁷³ A poll by CNN/USA found that 95 percent of Americans felt that Iraq either already had (55 percent) or was trying to obtain (40 percent) WMDs. Another poll reported by The New York Times asked, “To the best of your knowledge, do you think Iraq currently possesses weapons of mass destruction, or doesn’t it have those?” Eighty percent of respondents answered “yes,” while only eleven percent answered “no.”⁷⁴

Moreover, respondents believed that the Iraqi regime could use these weapons against the United States. Of those who answered in the affirmative that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons, 62 percent believed that Iraq was “planning to use those weapons against the United States.”⁷⁵ By June 2002, 86 percent of Americans polled thought that the development of WMDs by Iraq was a “critical” threat to the interests of the United States.⁷⁶

The Coalition of the (Un)Willing

In the run-up to the war in Iraq, many Americans were concerned that the U.S. government would take unilateral action. Although many supported the removal of Saddam Hussein and believed that the regime was pursuing or possessed WMDs, was directly linked to known terror groups, or was a direct threat to the United States, polls indicated that Americans were leery of the idea of “going it alone.” A report by the RAND Corporation on the public support of U.S. military operations, for instance, found that “Some polling—and even more commentary—seemed to suggest that the American public would not support a U.S. war in Iraq without a United Nations authorization.”77

Indeed, there is evidence that most Americans wanted UN or other allied support before undertaking military operations. For example, a Gallup poll from September 2002 asked, “Do you think it is necessary for the Bush administration to get a resolution of support from the United Nations before it attacks Iraq, or not?” Some 68 percent of respondents said “yes, it is necessary,” while 30 percent said “no.”⁷⁸ Analysis from the same period described similar sentiments.

Public support for sending U.S. ground troops to Iraq is highly contingent on the role that U.S. allies and the United Nations play in sanctioning and participating in the invasion. If the United Nations sanctions the invasion, or if other countries join with the United States in sending troops, then public support could soar to nearly 80%. On the other hand, without these elements, a majority of Americans generally say the United States should not invade Iraq. Only 38% would favor an invasion if the United States has to do it alone, and 37% favor it if the United Nations were opposed.⁷⁹

Many Americans were particularly concerned with the stance of the UN. In addition to the Gallup poll mentioned above, a PIPA/KN poll from September 2002 found that 68 percent of respondents agreed that if Iraq allowed for unrestricted UN inspections, the U.S. government should agree not to invade Iraq or remove Saddam Hussein and that military action should only be used as a “last resort.”⁸⁰ Although Congress passed the Iraq Resolution (also known as the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002), the administration recognized it needed to promote the idea of allied support if domestic popular opinion were to remain favorable to the invasion.

It was within this context that Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke to the UN Security Council in February 2003. Reflecting on his address in an interview in 2016, Powell stated that, “You have to remember that at the time I gave the speech [to the UN], the president had already made the decision for military action. The dice had been tossed. That’s what we were going to do. . . . The reason I went to the U.N. is because we needed now to put the case before the entire international community in a powerful way, and that’s what I did that day.”81

Despite the lack of UN endorsement or approval of the use of force against Iraq and (as will be discussed below) the fact that the U.S. faced vast international opposition, officials worked to cultivate the idea that the international community supported U.S. government actions. In fact this idea of international unity had been an official talking point well before the invasion. Speaking at a news conference with Czech president Václav Havel in Prague in 2002, President Bush made clear that any military action would be done with broad international support.

As to Iraq, it’s very important for our nations, as well as all free nations, to work collectively to see that Saddam Hussein disarms. If the collective will of the world is strong, we can achieve disarmament peacefully. However, should he choose not to disarm, the United States will lead a coalition of the willing to disarm him. And at that point in time, all our nations—we will consult with our friends, and all nations will be able to choose whether or not they want to participate.⁸²

The supposed support of the international community was a consistent talking point. In a press statement on March 18, 2003, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that “there are 30 countries who have agreed to be part of the coalition of the immediate disarmament of Iraq.” The following day, President Bush again mentioned the coalition, stating that “Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of serving our common defense.”⁸³ Bush and other U.S. officials would frequently reference the collective action of “coalition” forces and even invoked the name of the UN in discussing U.S. operations. Following the start of the war, President Bush made a variety of statements to this effect. For example, he stated, “Our coalition enforced the demands of the U.N. Security Council in one of the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history.”84 In another instance, he made a similar point, stating, “I have concluded, along with other coalition leaders, that only the use of armed forces will . . . restore international peace.”⁸⁵

These statements failed to reflect the true nature of the “coalition” or the state of global public opinion. The “coalition of the willing” was largely symbolic. Bush’s statements conjuring images of multinational forces working in joint, legitimate offensive operations were at best wishful thinking. There were no requirements to be a part of the coalition. In fact, merely asking to be named to the coalition or nominally agreeing to the request was sufficient grounds for inclusion.

In the aforementioned press conference given by Richard Boucher, for example, he was asked, “Can you, in any way, describe the functions of the 30 countries listed as part of the coalition? The first question, of course, would be, are more than a handful contributing troops?” Boucher replied, “I’d have to say these are countries that we have gone to and said, ‘Do you want to be listed [as a member of the coalition]?’ and they have said, ‘yes.’”⁸⁶ He went on to say that each country was assisting in their own ways but did not directly answer the question regarding combat troops.

In actuality, the United States and Great Britain (and to a smaller degree Australia and eventually Spain) were the only countries supplying substantial numbers of combat troops.⁸⁷ Countries like Japan had agreed to be a part of the coalition but would only participate in reconstruction efforts. Others agreed to offer intelligence or allow U.S. and British planes to fly over their airspace. Emma Brockes, a journalist, phoned various embassies of the countries in the coalition to ask about their level of support. Despite being on the coalition list, when asked how Panama would support United States and British operations, embassy personnel replied, “We aren’t sending anyone to the Gulf.” When asked whether Panama was offering the coalition moral support, the spokesman said, “Not really. No. Not really.”⁸⁸

Eritrea, a country with a GDP per capita of US$1,300 in 2016 and some 50 percent of its population living below the poverty line, was also a part of the coalition.89 Brockes described the response to her call to the Eritrean embassy, in which she asked how the country intended to show its support. “There is a long, stunned pause,” she says, “before the spokeswoman says: ‘Can I call you back tomorrow morning?’”⁹⁰ Although eventually more than 40 countries would be listed as part of the coalition, private security firms would provide the war effort with nearly the same amount of combat forces as coalition nations (around twenty-five thousand troops).⁹¹

Global opinion polls indicated people in most countries strongly opposed the war. A January 2003 Gallup poll found that out of thirty-eight countries surveyed, none showed majority support for unilateral military action on the part of the United States. Another question asked, “If military action goes ahead against Iraq, do you think [survey country] should or should not support this action?” Of the thirty-eight countries polled, the majority in thirty-four of them said they would oppose their country’s support of military action.⁹² Polls from March 2004 of the “unwilling” countries found that between 68 and 88 percent of those surveyed were pleased with their country’s decision to abstain from supporting the U.S. government’s use of force in Iraq.⁹³

CONCLUSION

The 2003 invasion of Iraq continues to be mired in controversy. While some 72 percent of Americans favored the war in March of 2003, this number fell to 36 percent by January 2007.⁹⁴ Many Americans now believe that government officials deliberately misled the public regarding the Iraq War and occupation. A February 2008 poll found that 53 percent of those surveyed believed “the Bush Administration deliberately misled the American public about whether Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.”⁹⁵ A report by the Committee on Government Reform, released in 2004, concluded that the White House had used its advantageous position to deliberately sway public opinion to support the desired policy outcome. Highlighting the issues of secrecy and information asymmetry that enable the dissemination of government propaganda, the committee concluded that, Because of the gravity of the subject and the President’s unique access to classified information, members of Congress and the public expect the President and his senior officials to take special care to be balanced and accurate in describing national security threats. It does not appear, however, that President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice met this standard in the case of Iraq. To the contrary, these five officials repeatedly made misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq. In 125 separate appearances, they made 11 misleading statements about Iraq’s nuclear activities, 84 misleading statements about Iraq’s chemical and biological capabilities, and 61 misleading statements about Iraq’s relationship with al Qaeda.96

The Bush administration’s propaganda was integral in rallying popular support behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The start of the war, however, would not be the end of elected officials manipulating the flow of information. As the next chapter makes clear, throughout the war White House officials utilized their control of information related to the war to their advantage.