CHAPTER 5

Paid Patriotism

Propaganda Takes the Field

In January 2014 two teams from the National Hockey League (NHL), the Minnesota Wild and the Colorado Avalanche, met for a regular season game at the Xcel Energy Center in St. Paul, Minnesota. The contest began with a “ceremonial puck drop” in which an honored guest drops a hockey puck at center ice to mark the end of pre-game activities and the start of the official game. In a video of the ceremony, the announcer directs the attention of fans to the center of the arena.1

Wild fans, tonight we are paying tribute to the trusted men and women who serve us each and every day with the Minnesota National Guard. Right now, please direct your attention high above the scoreboard and welcome Sgt. First Class Richard Babineau as he rappels down from the arena catwalk for tonight’s ceremonial puck drop. SFC Babineau has been serving in the Army for over 24 years!

Fans cheered wildly as Babineau, clad in camouflage, hung upside down from the ceiling and quickly descended toward the ice. Flipping to his feet, he removed his helmet and exchanged it for a puck held by another guardsman waiting on the ice. Stepping between the team captains, Babineau removed one of his gloves and posed for pictures before dropping the puck on the ice. The feat has been called one of the “greatest ceremonial puck drops of all time.”²

This is certainly not the only instance where a national sports league like the NHL has prioritized honoring the military. In fact, nearly every U.S. sporting event, both at the professional and college levels, contains some sort of effort to honor or recognize the military, its members, or a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. From the singing of the national anthem and “God Bless America” by various military-affiliated groups to full-field flag displays, surprise homecomings of deployed troops, and on-field enlistment ceremonies, the military is highly integrated into American sports.

While the announcer at the Wild game was sure to point out SCF Babineau’s military credentials and the team’s tribute to members of the military, fans were unaware of one critical detail—that the Minnesota Army National Guard (MNARNG) had paid the Wild for the stunt. It was far from the only instance. In fact, the Department of Defense (DOD) paid the Minnesota Wild some $570,000 between 2012 and 2015 for not only the “opportunity for a MNARNG soldier [to] rappel from the catwalk to deliver the game puck” but also for an on-ice “soldier appreciation ceremony” and recognition of a “MNARNG soldier of the game” and flag bearer on the center scoreboard at every Wild home game in 2012, 2013, and 2015.3 Five other NHL teams received similar contracts totaling more than $1 million over a four-year period.⁴

This dollar figure pales in comparison to the amount received by the teams of the National Football League (NFL). Between 2012 and 2015, more than half (18) of the NFL’s 32 teams received at least $6 million of taxpayer funds from the DOD to host a variety of “patriotic displays.” Once exposed, the contracts received intense scrutiny from the public as well as lawmakers. A report from the offices of the late Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Senator Jeffry Flake (R-AZ) provided the details of some of these contracts, prompting an apology and an “external audit” of the partnership between the DOD and NFL. In a letter to McCain and Flake, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell offered to repay more than $700,000 that “may have been mistakenly applied to [military] appreciation activities.”⁵

While the report and stories surrounding the controversy have been dubbed “paid patriotism,” such a moniker fails to capture the true nature of these activities. These displays are propaganda by another name. The effects of these programs may be observed throughout the history of sports in the United States and following 9/11 and the start of the war on terror. By paying major sports teams and other enterprises to engage in seemingly voluntary displays of patriotism and by working to link ideas of patriotism and “Americanism” with sports, the DOD and other government officials sought to deliberately and systematically shape the perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors of sports spectators. In particular, the use of propaganda in sports in the post-9/11 period sought to reinforce and extend a general culture of militarism while garnering support for U.S. military operations overseas.

A HISTORY OF MILITARY AND SPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES

While the recent controversy regarding paid patriotism has renewed interest in how the military interacts with some of the nation’s leading sports franchises, the relationship between the Armed Forces and sports dates back more than a century. In order to appreciate the contemporary usage of sports as a propaganda tool, it is important to understand this historical context. Sports have historically served multiple, sometimes overlapping functions as state propaganda tools to shape the thoughts, ideas, and actions of both enlisted military personnel and the broader public. We first explore how officials historically used sports to normalize militarism and shape public opinion on U.S. military policy through the cultivation of a shared “American” identity. We discuss these elements within their appropriate historical contexts before returning to specific post-9/11 cases.

Going back to at least World War I, sports provided a clear bridge between foreign policy and the American public. Baseball, for instance, long known as “America’s favorite pastime,” was a relatively easy way for government officials to reach a large number of Americans.6 So popular was the sport that by 1869, a mere thirty years after the game’s invention, the first professional team in the United States took the field. By 1876, the National League was established.⁷

When the U.S. entered World War I in April 1917, such iconic stadiums as Fenway Park had opened to the public.⁸ It is at this juncture we observe a clear connection between war, sports, and influencing public perception. The choice of players to either continue their athletic pursuits or join the war effort was frequently displayed in a manner that praised those fighting and disparaged those who stayed behind. Highlighting the connection between “citizen and soldier,” many major and minor league players ultimately joined the armed forces during the conflict. Those who did received praise from the military and general public, while those who abstained from the conflict saw their patriotism questioned. Stars and Stripes made the following statement regarding those players who chose to fight and those who chose to remain Stateside, stating, “[those men] who are today throwing grenades instead of baseballs, who are wielding bayonets instead of bats, will be adjudged the men who played the game ‘for the good of baseball.’”9 To offer another example of the infusion of patriotism into baseball during the war, consider that it was not until 1918 that the “Star-Spangled Banner” was heard at a professional game—a full eighty years after the game was invented and forty years following the creation of the National League.¹⁰

It is also at this time that clear connections developed between the military and a variety of private organizations throughout America. Looking to send equipment to overseas troops for entertainment and as a means of maintaining physical fitness, the military contracted with sporting goods manufacturers to supply different products. Recognizing the opportunity to “take advantage of the situation by tying their products into the patriotism growing out of the war effort,” companies placed advertisements showing American doughboys using their equipment and boasted about being awarded government contracts to supply sports equipment to members of the military.¹¹ It wasn’t just those firms making balls, bats, and mitts that looked to bolster the sports-patriotism connection. Organizations like the YMCA, the Knights of Columbus, and others also sought to provide troops with equipment and publicly link their organization with the war effort. Per the military’s request, the YMCA became an integral part of creating athletics programs on behalf of the government, a partnership the association proudly displayed.¹²

As part of the military buildup before the U.S. government’s entry into World War II, political leaders and the military confronted a divided population. While many were keen to join the fight against fascism in Europe, others were entirely uninterested in engaging in another European conflict with such fresh memories of the Great War.¹³ The buildup of the military, particularly the expansion of existing military bases and the creation of new ones, raised concerns within many communities regarding how a sudden influx of young male soldiers would affect their communities. Looking to bridge the gap between the new and expanding military bases and the general public throughout the country, the military looked to sports as a means of cultivating patriotism as well as normalizing interactions between members of the military and civilians.

According to historian Wanda Ellen Wakefield, “the military’s sports program served as a mechanism for relieving civilian concerns about the soldiers in their midst.”14 Men and women living in communities surrounding military bases were invited to attend athletic contests on base while soldiers were encouraged to attend civilian contests.¹⁵ At least in some instances, these methods appear to have had the intended effect. At Bowman Field, a base in Louisville, Kentucky, an anonymous civilian donated a trophy to the winning team of an intersquad baseball tournament. The civilian was said to be “interested in the morale of the men stationed at Bowman Field.”¹⁶ When the field’s softball diamond was destroyed because of construction, a neighboring park opened its facilities to host the base’s contests. The University of Louisville and a number of local high schools reduced their admission prices in an effort to encourage the attendance of enlisted servicemen.¹⁷

Perhaps the clearest illustration of the use of sports to sway public opinion and normalize conflict comes in the years following World War II. The Smith-Mundt Act, passed in 1948, prohibited the creation and dissemination of formal government-produced propaganda (e.g., posters) domestically, leaving officials to seek out alternative means of influencing the minds of the public. In addition, ever more complicated geopolitical issues (e.g., the rise of permanent, global war in the form of the Cold War) made sports an attractive means of communicating political agendas. Writing on the use of sports in politics in the 1960s, political scientist Richard Lipsky argued that “the increasing complexity of American society functioned to hinder effective communications between highly-specialized sub-groups of people, each having its own unique language. . . . Sport language and metaphor, then, was said to fill this linguistic gap . . . presumably supplanting an otherwise uninteresting and uncompelling political discourse.”¹⁸

As the Cold War firmly gripped both political officials and the American public, sports were used extensively as a means to put U.S. government activities in a common language, cultivate support for American policies, and promote a common “American” identity. Sports—particularly on the international stage—provided an opportunity for government officials to establish a clear “us versus them” mentality among the population through the creation of clear “in groups” and “out groups.” Political scientist Michael Shapiro captures this idea clearly: “The depth of the social penetration of sports discourse,” he notes, “relates two opposed aspects of the social body: those processes that produce consensus and solidarity and those that produce or reinforce cleavage and difference.”19 Writing on this effect, anthropologist and ethnologist Claude Lévi-Strauss noted that games “have a disjunctive effect: they end in the establishment of a difference between individual players or teams where originally there was no indication of inequality. And at the end of the game they are distinguished into winners and losers.”²⁰

The Olympic contests during this period offer numerous examples of this dynamic. While engaged in “friendly” athletic competition, the games were often used as a way to establish superiority between the two superpowers, a mechanism through which the U.S. populace could be unified behind a common team while simultaneously painting the Soviet Union (USSR) as the “other.” Writing on the issue of propaganda, the Olympics, and U.S. foreign policy, American studies expert Allen Guttmann noted that, “from [the Olympic Games in] Helsinki in 1952 to Montreal in 1976, there was a widely held perception that the games were a continuation of politics by other means.”²¹

To offer but one example from the period, the U.S. government was the first to “weaponize” the Olympics during the Cold War. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, the Carter Administration faced few viable options. According to Guttmann,

Diplomatic protests are useless. Economic reprisals bear political costs. The Soviet Union can veto [U.N.] Security Council resolutions. An Olympic boycott is obviously a weak and ineffectual weapon, but it was attractively available and relatively inexpensive in political as well as economic terms. . . . He [Carter] indicated the possibility of an Olympic boycott on 4 January and announced his ultimatum on the twentieth: Soviet withdrawal or American boycott.²²

The House of Representatives voted to support the boycott in late January by a vote of 386–12. The Senate also affirmed the policy 88–4. Although the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) initially opposed the measure, they quickly backed down after the White House “threatened to not only cut off federal support for Olympic sports but also tax the USOC on its other sources of income.”23 In April, the USOC voted 1604–797 in favor of the boycott, arguing that the decision had ultimately been a matter of national security.²⁴

Backing the boycott quickly became a hot political issue. Support for the measure came to be seen as patriotic, as supporting the “greater good” and the broader U.S. cause in the Cold War. Opposition came to represent dissention from U.S. policies related to the nation’s security. Ultimately, American public opinion was overwhelmingly supportive of the administration, with some 73 percent of survey respondents supporting the boycott.²⁵ Some sixty-two countries joined the boycott—creating a clear distinction between allies of the United States and allies of the USSR.²⁶

Other examples from the Olympics abound. Consider, for instance, the Winter Olympics of 1980. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution, and the concurrent Iranian hostage crisis, the matchup between the United States and Soviet hockey teams was seen as an extension of Cold War competition between the two superpowers. When the young, relatively inexperienced American team beat the USSR—which had won four consecutive gold medals in hockey—the players, the public, and elected officials were stunned.²⁷ The “Miracle on Ice,” as it came to be known, continues to be a source of patriotic fervor. Writing of the “miracle” in 2018, nearly forty years later, journalist and former congressional political aide Brent Budowsky stated, “Let’s remember that moment in Lake Placid [New York] when Americans stood together, and American patriotism lit the skies. Let’s remember the history of the 20th century when we consider how to respond to the Russian challenge to American democracy today.”²⁸

The Olympic contests are not the only example of the use of sports to rally support for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The use of “sports-speak” and sports metaphor as a way to justify and discuss policies became a popular and often utilized tactic of many government officials. Communications scholars have long recognized the ability of sports metaphors to both describe events outside of sports and to shape the broader public’s understanding and framing of political issues. Analyzing the use of sports rhetoric in the American presidency, Michael Hester finds that

The ability of sports symbolism to be both politically useful while appearing to be apolitical would explain how sports has become so influential as a rhetorical resource. Sports language is both easy for the public to comprehend and a subject they find interesting. The values emanating from the sports can supplement the ideological arguments of both conservatives and liberals, and politicians of various stripes in between. . . . Sports have an “in-between” quality, able to serve the interests of the dominant ideology without being overtly associated with it.29

Along similar lines, Richard Lipsky articulates how both the political right and the political left have used, and continue to use, sports to advance their goals and to influence public framing. “By using sports symbolism in political discourse,” he argues, “the politician or commentator tends to transpose sports’ ideologically unproblematic nature onto politics. This has the effect of underscoring the organization (instrumental) imperatives at the expense of articulating substantive goals.” He continues, “It promotes an interest in who is ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ without looking at the reasons why one side should win and the other side should lose.”³⁰

As an illustration, the Nixon administration frequently adopted sports language in articulating and defending policies regarding the war in Vietnam. Discussing the intensified bombing campaign in Vietnam, Defense Secretary Mel Laird referred to the South Vietnamese allies as a “sort of expansion ball-club. . . . The South Vietnamese will not win every battle or encounter, but they will do a very credible job.”³¹ In perhaps the clearest illustration of the intensive use of sports language by the Nixon “team,” the new offensive strategy in Vietnam was given the name “Operation Linebacker.” Nixon himself was given the codename of “Quarterback.”³² Discussing the use of sports metaphor during the Nixon years, political theorist Ike Balbus noted that

This corruption of the discourse of politics by the discourse of sports alerts us to a possibly profound transformation in the way in which governmental activity in America is defined and understood: to envelop politics with the symbolism of sports is to transfer the meanings which we attribute to the latter to the former. Thus the political ascendency of the sports metaphor may well signal the increasing importance of sports as a legitimating mechanism of the American state.33

The use of sports to describe military conflict was also prominent throughout the first Gulf War. Speaking about the strategy used in the conflict, General Norman Schwarzkopf stated that “once we had taken out his [the enemy’s] eyes, we did what could best be described as the ‘Hail Mary’ play in football.”³⁴ Lance Corporal Scott Cornell stated in an interview that “it [confronting the Iraqi army in Kuwait] will be like the Super Bowl to end Super Bowls.”³⁵

Officials involved in subsequent conflicts used sports metaphors as well. In 1998, during his State of the Union address, President Clinton likened U.S. operations in Bosnia to a football game. “This is like being ahead in the fourth quarter,” he said. “Now is not the time to walk off the field and forfeit the victory.”³⁶

By adopting the language of sport to describe military action and other policies, political leaders like Nixon, Schwarzkopf, Clinton, and others were attempting to convey particular messages and shape public attitudes regarding foreign policy. In doing so, they were only the latest to appreciate that sports “is indeed a prominent institution through which ideology is communicated and politics is engaged and enacted.”³⁷ To this day, sports continue to be used as part of the war on terror as a means to both disseminate partial and sometimes false information to the public and foster militaristic attitudes.

SPORTS PROPAGANDA IN POST-9/11 AMERICA

From World War I onward, members of the U.S. government have utilized the language of sports, and the culture surrounding sporting events, to shape the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of U.S. citizens, particularly as they relate to the military, while fostering a general culture of militarism and nationalism. Speaking to this link, sociologist Alan Bairner states that “sports is frequently the vehicle for the expression of nationalist sentiment to the extent that politicians are too willing to harness it.”38 In what follows, we explore this connection between sports and propaganda in the post-9/11 period. We begin by returning to the controversy that opened this chapter—“paid patriotism.” We explore how officials utilized various sports leagues—particularly the NFL—to cultivate and maintain support for U.S. military and foreign policies. We then examine a striking and specific example of propaganda relating to football and the war in Iraq by analyzing the reporting and subsequent scandal surrounding the enlistment, deployment, and death of former NFL player and Army Ranger Pat Tillman.

The NFL, Propaganda, and Nationalism

The United States is a country of sports spectators. Since the year 2000, an average of six in ten Americans describe themselves as sports fans.³⁹ While individuals from upper-income households are more likely to say they like sports, general enjoyment of athletic contests spans a number of divides. According to data from 2015, 58 percent of whites and 62 percent of nonwhites described themselves as sports fans. Various age demographics between eighteen and sixty-five and over reported their sports fandom with similar frequency. Individuals from all parts of the United States and across all education levels likewise report being sports fans at similar rates. Particularly relevant to our analysis, sports cross the political divide. The same study found that 59 percent of those who identified as “conservative” were self-reported sports fans. For “liberals,” that number was 58 percent. Of those who reported their political affiliation, 64 percent of Republicans and 60 percent of Democrats stated they were sports fans.⁴⁰

While the use of sports as a propaganda tool in the post-9/11 period is widespread, we focus our analysis on professional American football for two reasons. First, the greatest controversy surrounding the aforementioned “paid patriotism” centered on the interplay between the DOD and the NFL. While other sports outfits received funding, the lion’s share of taxpayer dollars went to the NFL. Second, of the sports played throughout the United States, professional football is by far the most popular. Some 37 percent of Americans surveyed by Gallup in 2017 indicated that football is their favorite sport to watch.⁴¹ To put this in perspective, basketball came in a distant second with 11 percent, followed by baseball and soccer at 9 and 7 percent, respectively.42

Just as sports fandom, in general, crosses a variety of gender, educational, and other socioeconomic divides, so, too, does football. For perspective, a 2011 poll from Adweek/Harris found that nearly two thirds of U.S. adults watch NFL football. Accounting for gender, the poll found some 55 percent of American women and 73 percent of American men tune in to NFL games.⁴³ Over a quarter of U.S. adults report they spend between six and ten hours a week watching game coverage during the NFL season, while 13 percent report spending more than 11 hours per week watching.⁴⁴ Nineteen of the twenty most watched U.S. television broadcasts of all time are Super Bowl broadcasts. The 2018 Super Bowl, for instance, drew an average of 111.3 million viewers—more than a third of the U.S. population.⁴⁵ Total revenue from broadcasting, ticket sales, and the purchase of official NFL merchandise is staggering. In 2001 the NFL reported some $4.28 billion in revenue. By 2008, that number had climbed to $7.57 billion. In 2016, the NFL reported $13.16 billion in revenue.⁴⁶

Given its popularity among Americans, it should come as no surprise that U.S. government officials focused a great deal of effort and resources on cultivating and coordinating public attitudes regarding U.S. policy decisions through the use of football and the NFL. With such a large segment of the U.S. population attending or tuning into games, the NFL presents officials with a ready-made means of reaching citizens with information related to U.S. foreign policy and the military, allowing for the cultivation of shared expectations among the populace.

Writing on sports in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Shaun Scott argued that “in the campaign for America’s hearts and minds . . . baseball only won the battle. Football has won the . . . war. . . . Football has been more than a sport these last 15 years; it’s been the medium to relay America’s military response to the trauma of terrorism.”⁴⁷ Other scholars echo Scott’s analysis, suggesting that football has become the “root metaphor of American political discourse.”⁴⁸ Just as the YMCA, Knights of Columbus, and other organizations sought to highlight their connections to the armed forces during the World Wars, the NFL actively boasts of its close connections with the military today. The NFL’s website states that “the National Football League and its players have answered America’s call during times of crisis and military conflicts.” It further discusses the organization’s past “support for America’s fighting forces in Vietnam,” and their enduring relationships with the United Service Organizations (USO) and the Wounded Warrior Project.49

The first Sunday after the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, the NFL canceled its games. Describing the first games after the attacks, former NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue referred to the contest in which the Kansas City Chiefs hosted the New York Giants: “You didn’t know when the teams took the field if it would be a somber cloud of tragedy over the entire situation or whether there would be this vocal support for the people of New York.”⁵⁰ As the Giants took the field, the stadium erupted in loud support for the opposing team. Chiefs fans hung banners reading “KC loves NY.”⁵¹ Sportswriter Bill Reiter said of the warm reaction, “People cried. Players knew this moment was different. And the NFL, perhaps by waiting, had given its fans enough time to turn a football game in the heartland into so much more.”⁵²

“So much more” would soon follow. Over the coming years, NFL games would become awash in patriotic fervor. National Guard units singing the national anthem, full-field flag displays, surprise homecomings, and soldier recognitions at every home game for some franchises would become the norm. Military appreciation nights, salutes to “hometown heroes,” and on-field enlistment ceremonies would likewise look to link Americans’ obsession with football to the increasingly militarized U.S. foreign policy. Football became synonymous with patriotism and support for “the country.”

The patriotic pomp and circumstance surrounding the resumption of NFL gameplay on September 24, 2001, demonstrates the ability of sports to unify people around a shared national identity. The NFL purchased a million miniature American flags, which were distributed to all fans entering stadiums. Full-field flag ceremonies were conducted at several games, and each end zone was decorated with red, white, and blue bunting. All hats worn by coaches and players were affixed with American flag details. Special pre-game ceremonies were arranged for every game, including the distribution of pamphlets to every fan with the words to the national anthem as well as “God Bless America” and “America the Beautiful.”53

When the time came for the Super Bowl a few months later, Fox Sports worked with the NFL to change the format for the game to focus on the terror attacks, American patriotism, and the war on terror. Sports anchor James Brown opened the broadcast by stating, “We are united more than ever as we fight the war on terror.” Following a commercial break, Brown returned to the screen and spoke of the Declaration of Independence before showing a reading of the document by past and present NFL players.

Following another sponsor break, the Boston Pops began a musical performance while former presidents Ford, Carter, Bush, and Clinton, as well as former first lady Nancy Reagan, read words from Abraham Lincoln while images from the World Trade Center site and patriotic scenes showed on the screen.⁵⁴ A video of players from both Super Bowl teams reading the words of former presidents, concluding with the words of former President John F. Kennedy, “ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country,” was shown.⁵⁵ Following the singing of the national anthem, during which “the flag raising ceremonies from Iwo Jima and the Trade Center were again re-enacted side-by-side,” former president George H. W. Bush, described as a “World War II hero,” emerged onto the field for the ceremonial coin toss.⁵⁶

While such extreme patriotic displays could be attributed to the recent attacks, such a characterization would ignore the long history of the NFL partnering with U.S. government officials to promote patriotism. This intimate, though perhaps not commonly understood, connection between football and foreign policy, particularly war and general politics, has been studied in detail and recognized by scholars, government officials, and the NFL alike. Speaking about the upcoming Super Bowl at a news conference in January 1991, Paul Tagliabue, for example, stated that “we’ve [the NFL and the Super Bowl] become the winter version of the Fourth of July celebration,” implying that the game had become just as much about patriotism as leisurely entertainment.⁵⁷

Communications scholar Michael Real argues that football (particularly the Super Bowl) serves the same function as other mythical rituals. “In the classical manner of mythical beliefs and ritual activities, the Super Bowl is a communal celebration of and indoctrination into specific socially dominant emotions, life styles, and values. . . . Rather than mere diversionary entertainment, it can be seen to function as a ‘propaganda’ vehicle strengthening and developing the larger social structure.”58

The use of military language in football following the 9/11 attacks was, and continues to be, prevalent. Writing just weeks after the attacks, journalist Scott Stossel noted that “after September 11 it wasn’t long before martial terminology returned to the airwaves: There was once again talk of blitzes and bombs, of aerial assaults and ground attacks.” He continued, “There was talk of heroes and warriors, of duty and sacrifice, of trying to penetrate deep into enemy territory. I refer, of course, to the language of football.”⁵⁹ During a broadcast on the second day of the Iraq War in 2003, Vietnam veteran David Christian compared the U.S. “professional” army to Iraqi resistance, associating the latter with a high school football team.

The use of this language has clear links to one of the three functions of propaganda. By framing discussions of football in terms of war and vice versa, the two activities are effectively equalized in terms of importance and complexity. By comparing the U.S. military and Iraqi resistance to football teams, for instance, the conflict in Iraq and the complexities surrounding the insurgency were reduced to the simplicity of a game. As opposed to appreciating the fierce (and ongoing) opposition to the U.S. occupation, Iraqi fighting forces were portrayed as fumbling adolescents. War is transformed into the sort of entertainment Americans consume on a regular basis.

Another important function of sports-speak, sports metaphor, and patriotic images during this period was that they served to cultivate a common identity and expectations among the larger population. The use of sports propaganda has been remarkably effective in the creation of clear “in groups” and “out groups,” reducing the overwhelming intricacies of international and domestic issues into something seemingly simple and generating shared expectations of self and others.

To give but one example, while interviewing former Beatle Paul McCartney before his performance at the Super Bowl in 2002, former NFL wide receiver turned sports broadcaster Cris Collinsworth made it a point to question McCartney’s (a British citizen) allegiance to the United States—“You weren’t born in America . . . but you are proud to be here, right?”60 The implications were clear. Failure to express pride in being in the United States was a one-way ticket to the “out group”—those “against us.” Writing on this issue, a team of communications scholars notes that

Sports metaphors . . . risk equating good citizenship with good fanship. If good fans wear their team’s colors and root for their favorite players in good times and bad, and despite any questionable decision making, then the language of sport in politics may also position citizens to acquiesce to the decisions of their elected leaders, whether or not these decisions are the best interests of the people. . . . [Using sports language in these contexts] may end up limiting, or even eliminating, the open discussions of policy that are essential in a free society.⁶¹

Nowhere is the creation of shared expectations regarding support for the military and patriotism more apparent than in observing the relationship between the NFL and the U.S. government in the post-9/11 period. Writing on the ties between the Bush administration and football, Samantha King, a scholar of cultural studies and sociology, states, “events such as the Super Bowl are only the most visible expressions of the variety of ways in which sport has been harnessed to the Bush administration’s agenda both at home and abroad.” She continues, “A variety of sporting events . . . have become key vehicles for reproducing and channeling military and nationalist identifications . . . since 2001. . . . The NFL incorporate[s] Bush administration policy into their business strategy with the aim of enhancing brand identification and capital accumulation.”⁶²

Take, for example, the launch of the NFL’s 2003 season. In May of that year, Tagliabue met at the Pentagon with General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to pitch a plan for a kickoff event in Washington, DC, and discuss the NFL’s support of the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Pentagon (which is forbidden to engage in commercial enterprise) did not officially endorse the NFL or its sponsors, the DOD did incorporate the events into its own project—“Operation Tribute to Freedom,” heavily promoting the event on its website. The operation, according to the DOD, was intended to “thank servicemen and women, strengthen the tie between citizens and military, and recognize that the war on terror is not over yet.”63

In September, the NFL (partnering with Pepsi), under the auspices of the DOD’s Tribute to Freedom program, hosted their Kickoff Live event on the National Mall in Washington, DC. The week of activities began with a meeting in the Oval Office with NFL executives, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. The NFL officials presented President Bush with an inscribed football.⁶⁴ The week ended with the event on the National Mall. It was the first time in history that a private company had been permitted to take over most of the space between the Washington Monument and the Capitol grounds.

The three-hundred-thousand-person crowd included some twenty-five thousand members of the military and their families “shipped in for the event by the Department of Defense with the promise of a free t-shirt and prime concert viewing.”⁶⁵ “The purpose of this ‘new tradition,’” writes Samantha King, “was to ‘celebrate the resilient and indomitable spirit of America’ through a focus on the veterans of the Global War on Terror.”⁶⁶ Indeed, the presence of military members was carefully managed. Writing on the event, journalist David Montgomery commented, “This week the Mall is going to be the physical incarnation of that powerful place in the American psyche where sports and war . . . intersect.”⁶⁷

While military members attending the event were not required to wear their uniforms, the Pentagon strongly encouraged military personnel to wear their short-sleeve, open collar uniforms “to make a good impression on tv.”⁶⁸ NFL spokesperson Brian McCarthy stated that the push for placing military members in uniforms was “for visual effect.”⁶⁹ Discussing the event, John Collins, former NFL senior vice president of marketing and entertainment, stated, “We also have an opportunity to inspire the mood of the country. . . . It’s an inspiring celebration of American values.” Addressing the issue of linking NFL events with the ongoing war, he responded, “I guess you could cynically look at it and say, well, the NFL is exploiting [the war]. . . . We look at it as an opportunity to celebrate and thank everyday heroes who protect and support our American values. . . . At the NFL we do two things pretty well. . . . We bring people together . . . [and] we do a pretty good job of wrapping ourselves in the American flag.”70 It was these two strengths that served as the foundation for the paid patriotism relationship between the NFL and DOD.

Activities associated with paid patriotism sought to create common knowledge and shared expectations among sports spectators that being “American” correlated with supporting the war on terror and the military. To do otherwise placed dissenters in an “out group,” labeled as “un-American,” “unpatriotic,” and so on. Legal scholar Peter Gabel describes the social pressures created by the use of patriotic displays at sporting events during this period.

The crowd of some 50,000 was instructed to stand and remove our hats for the Star Spangled Banner. . . . The National Anthem was accompanied by the unfurling of a gigantic American flag. . . . As an opponent of the war in Iraq and coercive patriotism, my son never wants to stand for the Anthem, and I’ve had to go through verbal contortions to persuade him that in spite of our common feelings about this matter, he should still stand in order to not appear to show contempt for others around us or at least to avoid being punched in the mouth, but that we could do so without standing at attention or putting our hats over our hearts, as is the custom of true believers.

At a higher level we had participated in a ritual that had reaffirmed our national unity. The point is even more telling when you consider that since the game was in Los Angeles, and even factoring in . . . more than half that crowd likely voted for [John] Kerry, opposed the war, and felt confusedly pulled along by some iconic larger “We” that overpowered and more-than-half-silenced them. The point here is that sports . . . [are] an important public activity saturated with moral meaning that plays a role in shaping the popular consciousness.⁷¹

Sports journalist Howard Bryant echoes similar sentiments.

The atmospheres of the games [after 9/11] are no longer politically neutral but decidedly, often uncomfortably, nationalistic. The [patriotic displays] are no longer spontaneous reactions to a specific event, but fixtures.

For a dozen years, public support [for U.S. policies]—at least at a surface level—has been forced upon anyone who chooses to buy a ticket to a sporting event or watch on television. The indirect message goes unmentioned: codifying these elements into the sports experience is forcing the fan to tacitly endorse them. . . . The selling [of patriotism in sports and elsewhere] comes with the same subtle, customary intimidation that permeated the aftermath of 9/11: anyone who disagrees with this trend is immediately branded as unpatriotic.72

In each of these cases, even if the individuals involved did not fully believe the underlying messages being offered, the desire to conform, cooperate, and avoid conflict with fellow fans incentivized them to act as though they agreed with the underlying idea, thus creating and reinforcing the common knowledge that everyone believed and supported the war effort.

It is important to note that the full extent of the partnership between the DOD and NFL is unknown. According to the report by Senators McCain and Flake, the “DOD still cannot fully account for the nature and extent of paid patriotism activities. In fact, more than a third of the contracts highlighted in this report were not included in the DOD’s list. . . . Our offices discovered the additional contracts through our own investigative work.”⁷³ Further, the report from McCain and Flake, acknowledged as incomplete, covers only the period from 2012 to 2015, leaving over a decade of contracts and activities unaccounted for. What is known, however, is that the DOD paid at least $6 million to NFL teams for such activities between 2012 and 2015.⁷⁴ All the while, taxpayers, game attendees, and viewers were completely unaware that these patriotic displays were bought and paid for by the U.S. government as a form of propaganda.

Propaganda and the Pat Tillman Scandal

In December 2019, former Arizona Cardinals cornerback, Army Specialist Jimmy Legree offered an interview to a local CBS affiliate in Arizona. In the article that followed, journalist Briana Whitney reported that Legree was inspired to join the army by the life and career of another former Cardinal—Pat Tillman. “It was Tillman’s passion for the game and his love of country that helped encourage him to join,” she wrote.⁷⁵ Whitney quotes Jeremy Staat, a former marine who played with Tillman at Arizona State University. “It really makes me excited to see there are still individuals ready to serve and put their own life on the line for this country. . . . Here we are, you know, 15 plus years after Pat’s death, and he’s still motivating and inspiring people to go in and serve and be the best that they can be.”76 The Army shared the story on its Facebook page with the caption, “#MotivationMonday From field goals to training exercises, this former NFL Arizona Cardinals cornerback trains with a new team, the #USArmy.”⁷⁷

This is but one example of the military using the “patriotism” of Pat Tillman as a means of recruitment and garnering support for military actions. Pat Tillman was a former NFL player and army ranger who was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan. From the moment of his enlistment, the military attempted to use Tillman and his connection to the NFL as a propaganda tool. Upon his death, officials deliberately withheld and concealed information about the specifics of his death and continue to use his military tenure, death, and connection to major league sports as a propaganda tool—one intended to boost recruitment and garner support for U.S. foreign policy.

In 1998, the Arizona Cardinals drafted Tillman, who quickly gained the respect and admiration of his fellow players and coaches.⁷⁸ In May 2002, Pat, along with his brother Kevin (who was under contract to play professional baseball with the Cleveland Indians), decided to enlist in the Army with the goal of joining the elite army rangers. His enlistment, for which he gave up a $3.6 million contract with the Cardinals, made news and immediately caught the attention of top Pentagon and elected officials. Senator John McCain bluntly stated that Tillman would be beneficial from a recruiting perspective. He said, “I don’t think there will be any doubts about his capabilities as a soldier but also as a recruiting tool. He’ll motivate other young Americans to serve as well.”⁷⁹

While Tillman was in basic training, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent a memo to Secretary of the Army Tom White containing a newspaper article about Pat. “Here is an article on a fellow who is apparently joining the [Army] Rangers,” read the memo. “We might want to keep an eye on him.”⁸⁰ This memo was followed up days later with a personal note from Rumsfeld to Tillman in which the Secretary praised his enlistment as “proud and patriotic.”⁸¹ Rumsfeld’s senior assistant, General Bantz Craddock, stated he could not recall another time the defense secretary wrote a personal note to commend an individual soldier.⁸² Just a month later, Tillman would receive yet another correspondence from military leaders, as Major General John Vines, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, wrote to Pat and Kevin and urged them to join his division as opposed to the rangers.83

The interest in Tillman on the part of senior military leaders was obvious. Here was a professional athlete giving up his individual success for the sake of the greater good of “the nation.” Unfortunately for the military, Tillman would have none of it. He took care to distance himself from his football celebrity and sought to prove himself on his own merits as a soldier. He detested the idea of being used as a poster boy for the military, telling a friend at one point, “I don’t want them to parade me through the streets.”⁸⁴ As he was deployed to Iraq and later Afghanistan, his journals expressed frustration and disappointment with the U.S. government’s conflicts overseas.⁸⁵ He refused to give interviews to the media.⁸⁶ Writing on the Tillman case, author Jon Krakauer notes how “the [Bush] administration had tried to make Tillman an inspirational emblem for the Global War on Terror when he was alive, but he had rebuffed those efforts.”⁸⁷ While he may have been able to prevent his situation from becoming fodder for the war effort during his life, however, his death provided officials with the opportunity to cultivate and disseminate a narrative that would serve the agenda of top officials—a narrative that was knowingly and patently false.

On April 22, 2004, Pat Tillman was killed in Afghanistan near the Pakistani border. It quickly became clear that Tillman’s death was not what it first seemed. As opposed to being killed in a firefight with enemy combatants, Tillman was killed by his fellow rangers in an instance of “friendly fire.” When Staff Sergeant Matthew Weeks, who was positioned just up the hill from where Tillman was shot, and others arrived on the scene, they were alerted to exactly what happened. According to later testimony from Weeks, Ranger Bryan O’Neal, “in a state of hysteria,” drenched in Tillman’s blood, and covered in pieces of bone and brain, shouted at them—“It was our guys who did it! . . . They fucking killed him! We were waving our arms! How did they not know we’re here?”⁸⁸

Immediately, word of the fratricide went up the chain of command. While some of the rangers, including Pat’s brother Kevin, were under the impression Pat had died at the hands of enemy forces, the truth was well known in other parts of the unit and by top officials in short order.89 In order to better understand the timeline of events and place individuals within the military hierarchy, a summary of the chain of command, from Commander in Chief George W. Bush down to Pat Tillman, is below. Ranks listed correspond to the individual’s role at the time of Tillman’s death.⁹⁰

· President and Commander in Chief George W. Bush

· Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

· General John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

· General Bryan Brown, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOC)

· Brigadier General Stanley McChrystal, Commander, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)

· Colonel James Nixon, Commander, Seventy-Fifth Ranger Regiment

· Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey, Commander, Second Ranger Battalion

· Major David Hodne, Cross-functional Team Commander, Second Ranger Battalion

· Captain William Saunders, Commander, Alpha Company

· Captain Kirby Dennis, Executive Officer, Alpha Company

· First Lieutenant David Uthlaut, Platoon Leader, Second Platoon

· Sergeant First Class Eric Godec, Platoon Sergeant, Second Platoon

· Staff Sergeant Matt Weeks, Squad Leader, Third Squad

· Specialist First Class Patrick Tillman, Acting Team Leader

By the end of the day on April 22, both Captain William Saunders and Major David Hodne knew that Tillman had most probably been killed by friendly fire.⁹¹ Around 8:30 a.m. on April 23, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey arrived on scene and, upon meeting with relevant personnel, concurred with fratricide as the likely cause of death. Bailey testified under oath that he phoned Colonel James Nixon in the afternoon of April 23, stating, “I’m sure it’s a fratricide, sir, but I think I owe you the details. Let me do this investigation [into the death] and I’ll give it to you as quickly as I can.”⁹²

That same day, Nixon delivered the strong suspicions of fratricide in person to then Brigadier General Stanley McChrystal. McChrystal subsequently informed General Bryan Brown. While Donald Rumsfeld would later testify that he could not recall when he learned of suspicions of fratricide, it is unlikely such information would have been withheld once it reached Brown. Writing on the topic, journalist Jon Krakauer cites the words of a civilian DOD employee who interacted frequently with the defense secretary. “There is absolutely no way that Tillman’s fratricide would have been withheld from Rumsfeld” states the source. “You cannot overstate the fear that military people had of Rumsfeld. They would never withhold bad news from him. Never. To have it appear in the news and surprise him, that’s the worst thing that could happen. Something like that, damn right he would have been told.”93

Even if Rumsfeld was not informed on April 23, it is almost certain he knew by April 28. On that day, McChrystal, in anticipation of the president speaking at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner (discussed further below), sent a high-importance “Personal For” or “P4” memo to General Abizaid, General Brown, and Lieutenant General Kensinger, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He wrote,

It is anticipated that a 15–6 investigation [a specific type of investigation in which a commander appoints an officer to investigate misconduct, property loss, accidents, etc. The investigator reports back to the commander with suggested recommendations] nearing completion will find that it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire. This potential finding is exacerbated by the unconfirmed but suspected reports that POTUS [President of the United States] and the Secretary of the Army might include comments [about Tillman in their remarks]. . . . I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country’s leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death become public.⁹⁴

Although military officials were quick to learn of Tillman’s cause of death and quick to pass word up the chain of command, the narrative offered to the Tillman family and the public was far from the truth. Although Tillman’s wife Marie was informed of his death on April 22, she was never told that his death was under investigation (a direct violation of protocol). Pat’s brother Kevin, who had been present on the mission in which Pat was killed but who was separated from him at the time of the incident, was purposefully kept in the dark about his brother’s cause of death.

On April 26, Pat Tillman’s body arrived at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, accompanied by his brother Kevin—who was still unaware of the fratricide. Dr. Craig Mallak performed Pat’s autopsy and was immediately alarmed. The body had arrived naked, and his clothing was nowhere to be found. This was yet another direct violation of policy. Deceased soldiers were to be sent to Dover with their uniforms, helmets, body armor, and so forth, for examination, as these things were considered to be evidence.95 What Mallak didn’t know was that within hours of Pat’s death, on April 23, Sergeant James Valdez was ordered to burn Tillman’s personal effects. He testified that he was ordered to “burn what was in the bag for security purposes. . . . He [the captain] relayed he wanted me alone to burn what was in the bag to prevent security violations, leaks, and rumors.”⁹⁶

Mallak was not informed about the suspicions of friendly fire—another breech of protocol—but quickly became suspicious when examining the body. “The gunshot wounds to the forehead were atypical in nature, and . . . the initial story we received didn’t—the medical evidence did not match up with the scenario as described [the death being the result of enemy fire].”⁹⁷ Mallak and his colleague refused to sign the autopsy examination report and requested that the army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) investigate the death. The CID is responsible for examining crimes of military law within the army. Writes Krakauer, “Because fratricide is considered negligent homicide under military law, Army regulations obligated McChrystal, Nixon, and Bailey to notify the CID if fratricide was even expected . . . which would in turn compel the CID to launch an independent criminal investigation.”⁹⁸

When the CID sent a special agent to inquire further as the result of Mallak’s suspicions, Nixon’s legal counsel, Major Charles Kirchmaier, was sent to discuss the issue. He gave explicit instructions not to disclose any information from the 15–6 investigation to the investigator. After the CID, thrown off by Kirchmaier’s deception, concluded there was nothing to warrant further investigation, Kirchmaier received an email from Lieutenant Colonel Norman Allen—McChrystal’s legal advisor—offering him commendation for “keeping the CID at bay.”99

Within hours of Tillman’s death, paperwork was already in the works to award Tillman the Silver Star—the military’s third highest honor—awarded for valor and gallantry against an enemy of the United States. McChrystal signed off on the papers despite being shown the preliminary findings of the 15–6 investigation. None of the documents provided to support the Silver Star nomination mentioned anything about the possibility of fratricide. One of the witness statements, provided by Private O’Neal was, by his testimony, so altered after its writing that he refused to sign it. When investigated, the supposed provider of the second witness statement, Sergeant Mel Ward, stated he didn’t remember writing a recommendation at all. “It was unsigned,” he said, “which is a big red flag for me, because in the Army you can’t submit anything without signing it. . . . It [the statement] didn’t sound like my words. . . . It sounded really hokey . . . like something I’d never have written.”¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, Tillman was awarded the Silver Star on April 30 and posthumously promoted to the rank of corporal, the same day McChrystal sent the aforementioned P4 memo.

Why the military and other officials chose to conceal and deceive the Tillman family and the general public is still up for debate. Without a doubt, the circumstances surrounding Tillman’s fratricide would have been remarkably embarrassing for the army. However, there is evidence that both the army and other top officials sought to use the false narrative of Tillman’s death to promote the policies of the Bush administration regarding the war on terror and to garner support for the president’s re-election campaign.

By April 23, the U.S. news media learned of and began reporting on Tillman’s death. Officials were quick to realize the attention the story received. An internal “Weekend Media Assessment” created and distributed by the army chief of staff’s Office of Public Affairs on April 25 found that reports on Tillman had generated the most media interest in the army “since the end of active combat last year.”¹⁰¹ The report also stated that “the Ranger Tillman story had been extremely positive on all accounts.”¹⁰² A report by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform states that emails reviewed from this period show that the coverage of Tillman’s death was discussed by public affairs officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, and Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 23. These meetings potentially included a “front office” morning meeting led by Larry Di Rita, Rumsfeld’s public affairs chief.103

In subsequent investigations about what would eventually become the scandal surrounding Tillman’s death, McChrystal would testify that there was no deliberate cover-up only to tip his hand moments later to the reality facing the administration at the time of Tillman’s death. “As you remember, Senator, we were still in combat when we were doing all of that. . . . We were in the first battle of Fallujah at the time, so we were making mistakes.”¹⁰⁴ The administration was still recovering from the firestorm surrounding Private Jessica Lynch, in which the Pentagon had perpetuated the false narrative that she had heroically fought back against her captors after she’d been taken captive following an ambush of her convoy in Iraq. Just weeks earlier in Fallujah, four American security contractors were killed, burned, and dragged through the streets of the city by insurgents before their charred remains were hung from a bridge over the Euphrates river.¹⁰⁵

A week before Tillman was killed by his fellow Rangers, Donald Rumsfeld was notified that 60 Minutes II was going to air a broadcast about the torture of detainees by U.S. forces at Abu Ghraib prison (coincidentally, the broadcast would air on April 28, 2004, the same day McChrystal sent over the final paperwork for Tillman’s Silver Star). The now infamous images, also published by the New Yorker, show detainees cowering before dogs with smiling U.S. soldiers, naked detainees with dog collars and leashes around their necks, soldiers posing next to dead bodies, as well as a variety of other images of sexual assault and humiliation.¹⁰⁶ The domestic and international outrage over the torture was severe and swift.

All the while, President Bush was in the midst of his re-election campaign. With near 50 percent approval ratings, the NFL star turned army ranger provided a much welcome distraction from compounding scandals and bad news abroad. “A narrative about Tillman was invented to distract the American public,” writes Krakauer. “The fact that Tillman had been cut down by his Ranger buddies rather than by the Taliban was potentially problematic for the White House, although there were ways to keep that information from entering the public domain.”107 Shortly after Tillman’s death, White House spokesman Taylor Gross made sure to highlight both Pat’s military service and football career, stating, “Pat Tillman was an inspiration on and off the football field, as with all who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror.”¹⁰⁸

The information in the P4 memo that McChrystal sent to other top military officials would indeed reach White House officials and prevent the president from making any direct references to Pat Tillman’s cause of death in his remarks at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. In his remarks, President Bush again praised Tillman for sacrificing his NFL career to join the Army.¹⁰⁹ On May 3, a memorial service for Tillman drew some two thousand people to the San Jose Municipal Rose Garden. Lieutenant General Kensinger personally attended, and while he knew of the fratricide, he did not tell Tillman’s family.

The only reason the truth surrounding Tillman’s death came to light was that too many people knew the actual details. A full month after Tillman’s death, weeks after the memorial service, and weeks after the final 15–6 report confirmed what had been known since April 23—that Pat had been killed by his fellow rangers—Lieutenant Colonel Bailey stated that he called Colonel Nixon. “We’re back, and I cannot separate these guys. I mean, you’ve got 600 Rangers. Everybody knows the story [about the actual cause of death]. This is going to get out.”¹¹⁰ Pat’s brother Kevin was notified on May 24 about his brother’s death and immediately called his sister-in-law Marie, Pat’s wife. The decision to disclose this information to Kevin came as an unwelcome surprise to the White House, especially Rumsfeld, who “wanted to come up with a plan for containing the damage before the news was released to the media.”¹¹¹

In an effort at damage control, the story was not made public until five days later, on Saturday, May 29. This happened to be the start of the Memorial Day weekend “when few reporters would be at their desks and not many Americans would be paying attention to the news.”¹¹² When the official announcement did finally come, it was stated that Tillman probably died as the result of friendly fire—despite the fact that fratricide had been suspected from the very beginning and already confirmed by the 15–6 report.

Perhaps the best summation of the deceit surrounding Pat Tillman’s death is provided in testimony offered by his brother Kevin.

Revealing that Pat’s death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster during a month already swollen with political disasters. . . . So the facts needed to be suppressed. An alternative narrative needed to be constructed. . . . Over a month after Pat’s death, when it became clear that it would no longer be possible to pull off this deception, a few of the facts were parceled out to the public and to the family. General Kensinger was ordered to tell the American public . . . that Pat died of fratricide, but with a calculated and nefarious twist.

There was specific fault [in Pat’s death], and there was nothing probable about the facts. . . . After the truth about Pat’s death was partially revealed, Pat was no longer of use as a sales asset, and became strictly the Army’s problem. . . . The handling of the situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of “missteps, inaccuracies, and errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.”. . . . Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye-witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. These are intentional falsehoods that meet the legal definition of fraud. Delivering false information at a nationally televised memorial service is not an error in judgment. Discarding an investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment. These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is concealment.113

Tillman’s military and NFL careers and death continue to be used as propaganda by public officials. In September 2017, President Donald Trump shared a photo of Pat Tillman on Twitter with the caption “He fought 4our country/freedom.”¹¹⁴ He was making a comparison between Tillman and contemporary NFL players protesting by kneeling during the national anthem. Marie Tillman, Pat’s widow, pushed back against the use of Pat’s image and time in the military, stating “Pat’s service . . . should never be politicized.”¹¹⁵ Yet it continues to be as one of many examples of state-produced propaganda in support of the government’s militaristic foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

The links between sports and U.S. foreign policy are deeply ingrained. By utilizing sports’ seemingly neutral space, government officials on both sides of the political aisle are effectively able to bolster support for their policies. Sports in the post-9/11 period, particularly American football, have been used as a means to frame and transmit information and to create shared expectations around foreign policy in the name of patriotism. Beginning in the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks in 2001 and continuing to today, football not only normalizes conflict in the minds of the American public but also works to frame and transmit information about U.S. actions, particularly as they relate to militarism, both domestically and abroad.

The links between patriotism and the NFL continue to make news. The aforementioned social media post by President Trump, in which he praised Pat Tillman’s military career, was a direct response to controversy surrounding NFL players kneeling during the national anthem to protest the treatment of black Americans in the criminal justice system.116 The president would go on to call for a boycott of the NFL for its lack of respect for America and supposed unpatriotic displays by some of its players. “If a player wants the privilege of making millions of dollars in the NFL, or other leagues, he or she should not be allowed to disrespect our Great American Flag (or Country) and should stand for the National Anthem. If not, YOU’RE FIRED. Find something else to do!”¹¹⁷

Writing about this controversy and the NFL response, sports commentator Charles Pierce points directly to the long-established use of sports as a tool for elected officials.

There’s a reason why the NFL was uniquely vulnerable to the emotional riptides currently roiling the country’s politics. The league enjoyed a free ride on glib patriotic display for more than 60 years, and now the bill is coming due. . . . [The NFL could regain its independence from this patriotic fervor by] demonstrating to its players that the NFL is committed to the values of the country as deeply as it is to the forms and pageantry that get draped over those values. But that would require the league to re-evaluate everything about how it perceives itself. . . . I believe that the NFL would do this about as much as I believe that champagne will fall from the sky like rain.118

If history is any indication, the use of sports as a propaganda tool is likely to remain as American as apple pie.