1. Probably Aristotle does not mean to imply that inductive arguments (epaktikoi logoi) and general definition (a horizesthai kalholou) were original to Socrates, but that whereas earlier thinkers had displayed only instinctive adumbrations of them, Socrates had made them his central concern and had sought systematically to bring them into an explicit relationship; see further Guthrie, II, pp. 483–4, and III, p. 425 ff. For a comprehensive review of Aristotle’s account of Socrates, see T. Deman, Le Témoignage d’Aristote sur Soauu (Paris 1942).

2. For the character of induction in Plato’s early Socratic dialogues, see Robinson, pp. 33–8. Since it usually consists of only a small handful of items, it is ‘intuitive’ rather than ‘enumerative’ (Robinson’s terms). It is ‘not the same as modem induction, but more like a generalization from one or more convincing examples’ (]? Annas, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books M and N (Oxford 1976), p. 154, citing Protagoras 330, Laches 193, Gorgias 514 and Euthydemus 288–9).

3. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1393a26-b8, and Robinson, Chapters 4 and 12.

4. See, for example, Apology Iod ff., and compare the parallel between statue-making and general ship in the passage of Xenophon on p. 16.