This book represents an opportunity to explore some of the theories concerning the ways in which the leaders of England and their armies in later Anglo-Saxon times fought their battles and waged war in general. It has also provided me with an opportunity to bring together material gathered over the years during the course of my own enquiries. The period covered in this book ranges from the rise of the House of Wessex in the decades preceding the arrival of the Danish Great Heathen Army in 865 to the traditional finishing point of 1066. There is, of course, room for discussion on either side of these chosen dates given that nothing–not even the Norman Conquest–can change everything overnight.
Between the eighth and eleventh centuries warfare changed considerably in England as a response to external and internal threats. In particular, there was a great shift in the organisational capabilities of the king during the ninth century, resulting in grand strategic fortification schemes and a very well-organised naval force, which by the middle of the tenth century was allegedly patrolling the whole island of Britain in squadrons. Set against these remarkable advancements and achievements in defence provision must be placed the old traditional mechanism by which a man arrived at the battlefield. The lordship bond, ancient and rooted in the cultures of the Germanic Migration period, the giving and receiving of arms and the fostering of young warriors by high-ranking men–all these things meant that the people who fought the titanic battle against the Normans at Hastings in 1066 had come to the battlefield through a series of obligations which would not have been unrecognisable to their ancestors of five-hundred years past.
It must also be borne in mind that by the time of the second Viking invasions of the 990s much of what had been achieved in terms of military organisation and structure during the years of the reigns of Alfred the Great (871–900), Edward the Elder (900–24), Athelstan (924–39), Edmund I (939–6) and Edred (946–56) had experienced the complications of urban and social development. The reign of King Edgar (959–79) was a period often regarded as a Golden Age in Anglo-Saxon history. Edgar was given the name ‘the peaceable’ not because he was a pacifist, but because the armies and navies of Anglo-Saxon England were so well organised that potential foreign enemies chose to look elsewhere for spoils. The resulting peace in England during the tenth century, however, led to a rise in the independence of regional leaders. Through the influence of political factions competing against each other the Kingdom of the English became a victim of its own extraordinary success. Peace bred instability. By the time of the reign of Æthelred II (979–1016) the grand schemes of previous rulers such as the fortifications, the standing armies and the patrolling navies had changed in their nature. England’s defences were left in the hands of brave, but sometimes unpredictable regional leaders. The period between c. 990 and 1066 was in some ways quite different than what had gone before.
There are some myths to explode and other reputations both good and bad to uphold. The question of how the Anglo-Saxons used their horses throughout this period is an argument that has raged for centuries. The mere existence of a true ‘cavalry’ in pre-Conquest England is still hotly debated. This subject forms a key part of the book. The ways in which leaders fought wars of psychology and bound their agreements with hostages are also examined closely.
Each section of the book covers an individual topic in detail. The subsections can be read independently or the whole work from start to finish. I have approached each topic in a broadly chronological way where the evidence allows for such an approach. For example, where there is enough material to examine the way certain things changed over time, this is brought out in these sections. The complex and sometimes unfathomable matter of army recruitment is such a case. Similarly, changes in the use of weapons and armour are dealt with by the same chronological approach. Where it is not possible to draw such a broad picture from the limited evidence, I have concentrated on what the available material can tell us.
I have tried to set out every method of warfare, every tactic employed, every weapon used and link it to the direct literary, archaeological and pictorial evidence throughout the period. The battles, sieges and campaigns I have chosen have been selected for a reason. Each individual case highlights something either typical or unique about Anglo-Saxon warfare, or serves as a good example of one or more of the mechanisms of warfare outlined in Chapters 1 to 4 of the book. Each example brings to light the Old English approach to such concepts as strategic awareness, naval capabilities, set-piece battles, long-term campaigns in the landscape, wars of attrition and the seldom-approached subject of Anglo-Saxon siege warfare.
The weapons and armour of the Anglo-Saxon world have fascinated me for years. I have set out as much as I can find on each subject area. However, with a book that covers such a wide variety of research over a long chronological period I can in most cases only refer the reader to the labours of many scholars. I urge readers to turn to the bibliography as often as they can. It is upon these sources and interpretations that a great deal of this present volume is inevitably based.
Throughout the book nothing is discussed without some recourse to the evidence in whichever form it takes. Readers will forgive me then, where the evidence is scant, if I very occasionally, after many years of looking into the subject of Anglo-Saxon warfare, make a few guesses to which I feel entitled.