The Indo-Pak Wars
‘….close to the area, we descended fast, looking all around and below us for the enemy aircraft. At about this time we also learnt that the C-in-C was flying around the area in a L-19. We did not see him; we later on discovered that he left well before we got there. Our search succeeded and I saw two enemy aircraft. They were crossing underneath us and I informed Rafiqui about it. He immediately acknowledged it ‘… contact’. Rafiqui said he was going for them. While covering his tail, I spotted two Canberras 9 o’clock from me at 5,000-6,000 feet. Then I spotted another two Vampires trying to get behind Rafique. I instinctively broke off and positioned myself behind these two. In the meantime, Rafiqui had knocked down one of his two targets and was chasing the other. About now I had my sights on one of my own and was holding my fire. I was anxiously waiting for my leader to bring down his second and clear out of my way. When the Vampire I had targeted closed in on Rafiqui too dangerously, I called out to him break left. Within the next moment Rafiqui shot down his second, reacting to my call and broke left. Simultaneously I pressed my trigger and hit one of them. Having disposed of one I shifted my sight on the other and fired at him. In the chase I had gone as low as 200 feet off the ground when I shot my second prey, he ducked and went into the trees. We had bagged four in our first engagement with the Indians…’
Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti, F-86 Sabre pilot, 5 Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Squadron, 1 September 1965. As an exchange pilot in the UK his OC, Squadron Leader Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui flew Hunters for two years. Sarfraz’s OC on 19 Squadron RAF, reporting on his flying abilities, wrote: ‘In the air his experience and skill combine to make him a very effective fighter pilot and leader who creates an impression of disciplined efficiency in all that he does’. On return to Pakistan in 1962 he was given command of 14 Squadron. A year later, he was given command of the elite 5 Squadron. He became well known for his highly assertive and effective control of the unit as much as for his spirited attitude towards flying.
Sunset was only about an hour and a quarter away on 1 September 1965 when a forward airfield in the Punjab suddenly came to life with the noise of jet engines starting up. In sections of four, with a few minutes interval between each section, twenty-eight fighter-bombers of the Indian Air Force took off for the Chamb sector in the Jammu and Kashmir area, to help stem the unexpected thrust of Pakistani armour which had crossed the international border into Jammu. This was the start of the air action by the Indian Air Force which, when it ended on 23 September, had cost the Pakistan Air Force seventy-three aircraft destroyed in the air and by ground fire. This figure does not include aircraft destroyed or damaged during the numerous night attacks carried out by Indian bombers on Pakistani air bases. Indian losses during the same period were only thirty-five aircraft. The need for the Indian Air Force to go into action had been made imperative by the Pakistani action in spearheading its attack across the international border and the cease-fire line with almost two regiments of tanks in the Chamb sector. In this first strike by the Indian Air Force, fourteen tanks were destroyed or damaged; eleven were actually seen burning. In addition thirty to forty heavy vehicles were also destroyed. After this engagement, however, two Indian Vampires were missing and two more had been damaged.26
Camera-gun sequence showing the destruction of a PAF F-86 over Halwara on 6 September 1965 by Flying Officer V. K. Neb of 27 Squadron IAF who was flying a Hunter F.56 on a dusk patrol with Flight Lieutenant D. N. Rathore when an emergency call that Halwara airfield was under attack made them rush to base. About the same time two Sabres flown by Flight Lieutenants’ Yunus Hussain and Cecil Choudary were exiting the raid. As the Hunters jumped them Neb latched onto Hussain’s Hunter and destroyed it with a one and a half second cannon burst, earning his first Sabre Kill. Neb had to wait another six years until he could claim another IAF Hunter.
On 3 September 1965 an IAF Gnat (seen in left with a F-86 Sabre) flown by Squadron Leader Brijpal Singh Sikand surrendered to a 9 Squadron F-104 Starfighter during an air combat. The Indian pilot landed at Pasrur airfield near Gujranwala and was taken prisoner. Later Squadron Leader Saad Hatmi flew the captured Gnat from Pusrur to Sargodha and it is now in the PAF museum in Karachi.
Since Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues, not least the disputed region of Kashmir. On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August. Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. At that time the Pakistan Air Force had about 140 combat aircraft, mostly American-built, including the F-104As of 9 Squadron. Pakistan acquired its Starfighters as a direct result of the Soviet downing of an American Lockheed U-2 spy plane that had been based at Badaber (Peshawar Air Station) on 1 May 1960. The aircraft, flown by Central Intelligence Agency pilot Francis Gary Powers, was performing aerial reconnaissance when it was hit by an S-75 ‘Dvina’ (SA-2 ‘Guideline’) surface-to-air missile and crashed in Sverdlovsk.27 Understandably annoyed at the Pakistanis for allowing the Americans to use their country as a base for espionage missions, the Soviets threatened to target Pakistan for nuclear attack if such activities continued. Taking the threat seriously, the United States agreed to provide Pakistan with enough surplus F-104A interceptors to equip one squadron. Although the F-104As were intended to defend Pakistan against high-flying Soviet bombers coming over the Hindu Kush Mountains, their actual combat use would be under quite different circumstances. The PAF’s fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and twelve F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 Martin B-57 Canberra bombers.28 B-57s flew 167 sorties, dropping over 600 tons of bombs. Three B-57s were lost in action, along with one RB-57F electronic intelligence aircraft. However, only one of those three was lost as a result of enemy action. During the war, the bomber wing of the PAF was attacking the concentration of airfields in north India. In order to avoid enemy fighter-bombers, the B-57s operated from several different airbases, taking off and returning to different bases to avoid being attacked. They would arrive over their targets in a stream at intervals of about 15 minutes, which led to achieving a major disruption of the overall IAF effort. The unknown Pakistani flying ace, ‘8-Pass Charlie’, was named by his adversaries for making eight passes in the moonlight to bomb different targets with each of the B-57’s bombs.
On 13 September 1965 Squadron Leader Alauddin ‘Butch’ Ahmed of 32 Wing, PAF was flying an F-86 in a low level raid against the freight wagons in the goods yard at Gurdaspur Station. On a second pass at very low level through smoke from previous strikes his aircraft was hit by fragments from the exploding trucks and twelve miles away from Pakistani territory he reported that his cockpit was full of smoke. He continued to fly his damaged aircraft westwards before finally ejecting from his burning Sabre. He did not survive. There is conjecture as to whether he was shot while descending in his parachute in the combat area.
Facing the PAF was the Indian Air Force (IAF), with about 500 aircraft of mostly British and French manufacture.29 In January 1957 India placed a large order for the Canberra; a total of 54 B(I)58 bombers, eight PR.57 photo-reconnaissance aircraft and six T.4 training aircraft were ordered, deliveries began in the summer of that same year. Twelve more Canberras were ordered in September 1957; as many as thirty more may have also been purchased by 1962. First used in combat by the IAF in 1962, the Canberra was employed during the UN campaign against the breakaway Republic of Katanga in Africa. The most audacious use of the bomber was in the raid on Badin when the IAF sent in the Canberra to attack a critical Pakistani radar post in West Pakistan. The raid was a complete success, the radars in Badin having been badly damaged by the bombing and put out of commission. A later raid by the IAF was attempted on Peshawar Air Base with the aim of destroying, amongst other targets, several Pakistani American-built Canberras. Due to poor visibility, a road outside of the base was bombed, instead of the runway where PAF B-57 bombers were parked. The IAF had also begun to acquire MiG-21Fs, new Soviet interceptors capable of Mach 2, but only nine of them were operational with 28 Squadron in September 1965 and they saw little use.
Captain (later Air Commodore) Rahat Hussain PAF.
IAF Gnat pilots in front of one of their aircraft.
On 1 September Pakistan launched a counter-attack, called Operation ‘Grand Slam’ with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces that were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. That evening saw hectic and desperate attempts by the IAF to stop the rapid advance of PAK Army’s 12th Division offensive against Akhnoor. Vampire Mk 52 fighter-bombers of 45 Squadron, which moved from Poona to Pathankot were hastily called into action. The obsolescent Vampires had been considered suitable for providing close support in the valleys of Kashmir but though they were put on high alert during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 they did not see any action, as the air force’s role was limited to supply and evacuation. The grim situation on the ground found the Vampires at work immediately. Three strikes of four Vampires each (along with some Canberras) had been launched in succession that evening and were successful in slowing the Pakistani advance. Major General G. S. Sandhu in his book ‘History of Indian Cavalry’ recounts how the first Vampire strike of four ‘leisurely proceeded to destroy three AMX-13 tanks of India’s own 20th Lancers, plus the only recovery vehicle and the only ammunition vehicle available during this hard-pressed fight. The second flight attacked Indian infantry and gun positions, blowing up several ammunition vehicles’. One was shot down by ground fire. Then an element of two Sabres armed with air-to-air missiles arrived on the scene; in the ensuing dogfight, the outdated Vampires were outclassed.
Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqui, the plucky and outstanding OC of 5 Squadron, and Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti were patrolling at 20,000 feet near Chamb. On being vectored by the radar, they descended and picked up contact with two Vampires in the fading light. Rafiqui closed in rapidly and before another two Vampires turned in on the Sabres, made short work of the first two with a blazing volley from the lethal 0.5 Browning six-shooter. Then, with a quick-witted defensive break he readjusted on the wing of Bhatti, who got busy with his quarry. While Rafiqui cleared tails, Bhatti did an equally fast trigger job. One Vampire nosed over into the ground which was not too far below; the other, smoking and badly damaged, staggered for a few miles before its pilot, Flying Officer Pathak, ejected. The less fortunate Flight Lieutenants A. K. Bhagwagar, M. V. Joshi and S. Bhardwaj went down with their Vampires in full view of the horrified Indian troops. The IAF immediately withdrew from front-line service about 130 Vampires, together with over fifty Dassault Ouragan ‘Toofani’ jet fighter-bombers.30 The IAF was effectively reduced in combat strength by nearly 35% in one stroke, thanks to Rafiqui and Bhatti’s marksmanship.
Chandrakant Nijanand Bal, a young pilot on 31 Squadron IAF who flew the Mystère IVa fighter bomber during the 1965 war, distinguished itself operating from Pathankot on 1 September.
‘Time 1730 hours. Twenty odd faces could be seen in the briefing room. The Officer-in-charge flying entered the room and closed the door behind him. He paused, head cocked to one side in his usual fashion. ‘Boys, we have got the green light. The Pak army, with 90 tanks crossed the border this morning in the Chamb Sector’ and he indicated a small bulge on the quarter inch map. ‘Your job is to stop them. The Ground Liaison Officer will take over from now.’ The GLO completed his briefing and the pilots took down the details on their maps and hurried to their respective squadrons. I had been recalled from leave some days previously. I had just spent about three weeks at home. The daily newspaper used to bring news of ‘kills’ by our security forces. One could feel the mounting tension. I reached my squadron on 27 August. Sethi was the first to meet me. ‘You missed some sorties over the valley while on leave” he said. I knew he meant the Srinagar Valley. I was looking forward to some good flying. However, things worked out differently. Flying was stopped and the airmen worked feverishly to get the maximum number of aircraft on the flight line. The Navigation Officer of the Squadron was burdened with the number of maps being issued. We were giving the final touch to the ‘cutting edge.’
Footage captured by Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti’s gun-camera on 1 September 1965 of Squadron Leader Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui reacting to Bhatti’s ‘break’ call near the River Tawi at the foothills of the Parmandal Range after he had shot down two Vampires.
‘Early morning, 1 September I was standing by for a patrol sortie in the Valley. I listened to the briefing, inwardly wishing I were in the formation. The sortie went off without a hitch. It’s 10 o’clock and Tony passes the word that Gurdaspur has been shelled. We celebrated our Squadron’s second anniversary by a special lunch. There is a cake for the occasion baked by ‘Mrs Boss’ [Wing Commander Jimmy Goodman’s wife] and we made short work of the ceremony. Five o’clock and the word goes around. I leapt to my feet and made it towards the briefing room. Tony reminded me that I have forgotten my map. I ran back and fetched it, not wishing to miss any part of the briefing.
Squadron Leader Amjad Yunus Hussain Khan fought in air battles aggressively, fearlessly and with great professional skill. During one such engagement he fought singly against six IAF aircraft and claimed two Hunters. Though his own aircraft was damaged in this encounter, he managed to bring it back to base safely. On 6 September 1965, while attacking Halwara airfield, his small formation was intercepted by a large number of IAF and, although his aircraft was hit, he refused to break off the engagement, in complete disregard of personal safety, and was reported missing from this mission. For his gallantry, valour, professional skill and devotion to duty he was awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat.
‘I was once again standing by for the first section, and felt bad about it. It must have shown on my face for Tony said that I could join the second section. I went to my aircraft well before time and inspected it. Under each wing is a pod containing rockets. I had never fired this before and mentally go through the briefing, ‘Circuit breaker IN, Wing Master ON, lift flap and press.’ I was pleased with myself. I now saw the first section of Vampires getting airborne. It was time to strap-up. My section took off and I switched off the engine. Peachy came on my scooter and asked me to hop on. I am to fly another aircraft. I strap-up for the second time. Just as I started the engine Tony came running to my aircraft. He was supposed to be in the first section but I did not think of that then. He signalled me to get out. Something must have gone wrong. I did as I was told and cursed, and went back fuming to the Squadron. I must have looked a sight.
Gun-camera sequence showing a PAF Sabre going down in flames.
‘That day twenty-eight sorties were flown. That must have been a good blow to the advancing tanks, for their progress was slowed down. We lost Horsey Bharadwaj that day. News of three others was yet to come.’
The next day, Pakistan retaliated; its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. Chandrakant Bal started the next day early. ‘The duty bearer woke me up at three o’clock. I dressed quickly and reported to Wing Commander Goodman in the Mess, as instructed. Both the Station Commander and he had been busy during the night. I could see that plainly, as fatigue is quite visible on their faces. The Station Commander explained the situation to me. I am to go with the Boss to Chamb at first light for a reconnaissance of yesterday’s battlefield. We are to have escorts for our protection. A final briefing and a time check and we were off to our aircraft. We took off at dawn and made for the target area, flying low, just above the trees to avoid enemy radar detection. As we neared Chamb I spotted four Sabres but kept quiet, as there was no immediate danger. The Sabres were orbiting the battle area. A quick check on the sabres and we started our reconnaissance ‘literally under their noses.’ The enemy aircraft had not yet seen us and Boss called ‘Buster port’ and all of us veered sharply to the left and opened up power. We are now on our way back. After reaching base I climbed out of the cockpit soaked in sweat. I breathed in the cool morning air and felt good. A few words of praise to the airmen and I was on my way for the debriefing. I met Sethi after the debriefing. He had flown yesterday and got a tank. He asked how the mission had gone and I narrated the tale. The next three days saw little other activity except more strikes in the Chhamb Sector. Every day the scores went up a little. We were hitting anything on wheels. Even a few camps were detected and fired upon. These especially were very difficult to see from the air as they were well camouflaged.’
On 3 September came the break-through, which marked the start of the superiority which the Indian Air Force maintained throughout the rest of the campaign. At 7 am that day a formation of Pakistani fighters was reported to be circling over Indian Army positions in the Chamb sector. A section of Gnats was scrambled to intercept the enemy. Thirty-four year old Squadron Leader Trevor Keeler VSM,31, born on 8 December 1934 in Lucknow who was leading the section, sighted the enemy and identified them as F-86 Sabres. Trevor, who had an elder brother, Denzil, who would also be honoured for his service in the IAF, immediately engaged them. While Keeler was jockeying for position, the F-86s were joined by some Pakistan Air Force F-104s. But in spite of being face to face with reputedly superior aircraft, Keeler refused to break off and finally lining up a Sabre in his sights, shot it down. The next day another two Pakistani Sabres were shot down over the same area.
On 6 September when the Indian Army marched into the Lahore sector to forestall an attack in the Punjab the IAF was called upon to give ground support and try to disrupt the logistics of the Pakistani Army. Until then the IAF had not attacked any air bases. Chandrakant Bal recalled:
‘We woke to the sound of artillery guns. The western horizon was aglow and we were informed about the advances being made by our ground forces in the various sectors. The very same evening PAK Sabres visited our Base with unfriendly intentions. We were all sitting outside our crew room talking shop. One of our missions was seen returning. For a few moments aircraft were seen all over the circuit and they landed one behind the other. We were about to resume our discussions when Tony spots an unfamiliar looking aircraft rolling into a dive. ‘Here they come!’ he said and strode into the crew room. There was more than a little confusion with bodies colliding with one another as an effort was made to head for protection. I ran for a trench, tripped over, fell, scrambled on all fours and finally dived into it. This is done to the tune of machine gun fire from the Sabres.
‘Others later remarked that this reminded them of a scene from the film ‘From Here to Eternity.’ A moment later I felt a heavy weight crushing my legs. Looking back I saw Chandru who sheepishly said, “I hope your leg is not hurting.’ Roundy, the Squadron’s only pilot attack instructor was coolly assessing the Sabre tactics and score, sometimes saying with a frown “That’s not how it should be done.” After the raid was over we trickled out of hiding, all dusty, but with false smiles on our faces.
‘Back after our day’s work I was in the bath and have just about soaped myself when I heard the anti-aircraft guns firing. I grabbed a towel and was in a trench in no time. It turns out to be a false alarm and a kind soul gives me a handkerchief to wipe the soap out of my eyes. The soapy episode was followed the same night by the first night raid of the war. Though it stood nowhere when compared with the London or Berlin air raids of the last war, it still qualified to be classed as an air raid by virtue of the fact that a bomb fell a little to one side of the runway, causing a high degree of excitement among us. Those still clinging to the bar by candle light managed to reach the nearest trench, not forgetting to bring their glasses with them. The sky filled with red fireballs, which indicated the individual lines-of-fire of the anti-aircraft guns. In the dim light of a rising quarter moon we had a glimpse of the B-57. The raid did no damage other than disturb our sleep. This practice was to follow in all future night raids. During one such night we were disturbed three times within an hour or two in between. These raids demonstrated the unique human quality of adaptation. Never did anyone feel that this was his last day in spite of heavy odds against him. We used to sleep with one ear tuned to the siren and could sprint to the trenches in total darkness if called to do so.
‘The war had been going on for over a week now. The army was fighting a determined enemy on the ground while the Air Force battled for air superiority. Many a pilot made a ‘Nylon descent’ to safety or captivity. In this grim struggle one of our tasks was to find out what was going on behind the enemy lines. On one such mission the pilots returned and excitedly reported seeing a railway train carrying a load of tanks. This vital information was used later in an extremely successful strike on the train, thus denying to the enemy these tanks at a critical time.’32
That evening Pakistani aircraft attacked two Indian air bases. One of these attacks was on Halwara and was carried out by four F-86 Sabres. It was to prove an extremely costly venture for the Pakistanis, for none of the four Sabres returned; three F-86s were shot down by IAF Hunters and one fell victim to anti-aircraft fire. When the Pakistanis raided Kalaikunda in the Eastern sector, again with a section of four F-86s, the story of Halwara was repeated; all four were shot down, two by Hunters and two by AA. After that, the Pakistanis never ventured to attack Indian air bases in daylight. But these raids did open the way for Indian pilots to attack Pakistani airfields in retaliation. The first to be attacked by the Indian bombers were Sargodha and Chaklada on the night of 6/7 September. From then on until the cease-fire on 23 September a heavy toll in the air battles, Indian Army gunners were doing wonders with their anti-aircraft guns. Taking only one example of a single battery at Amritsar, the first attack by the PAF against this installation came on the evening of 5 September; it was driven off. In the next attack, on the 8th, one PAF aircraft was shot down. Further successes followed and by the time hostilities ceased this battery had a ‘bag’ of ten Pakistani aircraft confirmed, including B-57 bombers.
IAF Hawker Hunter F.Mk.56s of 14 Squadron with BA209 in the foreground before delivery to India.
While the Pakistanis had been effectively deterred from carrying out daylight attacks on Indian airfields and installations and targets inland, the IAF fighter-bombers ranged far and wide, attacking military targets and air bases. Sargodha airfield was attacked several times in broad daylight by Indian Mystère IVAs and Hunters. Considerable damage to the installations was done and, besides other aircraft, at least two F-104 Starfighters were destroyed or damaged. In offensive fighter sweeps, tanks, heavy guns, armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, heavy motorised transport and formation headquarters fell victim to Indian rockets, bombs and cannon. During the twenty-three days’ fighting the IAF destroyed no fewer than 120 Pakistani tanks alone. In one particularly effective strike on 8 September four IAF Hunters destroyed a goods train - which action eventually resulted in the blunting of the Pakistani armour attack in the Khem Karan sector and, in addition, knocked out four tanks and over sixty vehicles. While the IAF fighter-bombers continued to give ground support to the Army, Indian fighters were busy clearing the skies of the Pakistani Sabres. Every time the F-86s were engaged by Gnats or Hunters, the Sabres were never able to get away without loss. The reputedly deadly Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, on which the PAF depended so heavily for air combat, proved ineffective because of the low altitudes at which most of the air battles were fought. More often than not, the enemy fighters had to jettison these missiles when engaged by the Gnats.
In fact the greatest single deterring factor in the air battles proved to be this British-designed lightweight high-performance fighter which has been under licence-manufacture in India since 1956. It was soon nicknamed ‘Sabre Slayer’ and not without reason. Its performance in the air battles was so impressive that even the supersonic F-104s refused to engage it and almost invariably decided to break off combat by cutting in their afterburners, when chased by a Gnat.
Learning that daylight operations against Indian airfields were costly, the enemy started visiting these places at night with their Martin B-57 Canberras. But here again accurate antiaircraft fire usually made the Pakistani pilots drop their bombs in a hurry and scuttle away. While the fact was that the B-57 night raids failed to hit any worthwhile installation, Pakistan continued to churn out fantastic claims of aircraft destroyed and airfields put out of action. For example, after a night raid on Ambala the enemy claimed twenty-seven Indian aircraft destroyed on the ground, whereas in reality, except for a section of the old flying control tower, none of the airfield installations, let alone a single aircraft, had even been damaged. All the enemy bombs had fallen on non-military targets. Then again, the airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara were claimed to have been put out of action.
The Air Attachés of foreign countries who were taken round all the airfields in the Punjab after the cease-fire were able to see at first-hand that none of these airfields had been put out of commission or rendered inoperative for even a single day.
The destruction of MiGs was another fantastic claim, which was floated by the Pakistani propagandists. They claimed that the Pakistan Air Force had destroyed nine MiG-21s. In fact the IAF started the operations with only nine MiG-21s and was prepared to show eight of these aircraft at the end of the campaign. On the other hand, the destruction of seventy-three Pakistani aircraft in air battles and by ground fire has been conclusively corroborated by cine gun film records, supported by eye-witness accounts of pilots and recovery of wrecks on the ground.
After the first few skirmishes PAF efforts flagged and resistance to Indian daylight attacks declined. The last raid put in by the IAF, for example, with a section of Canberras on the vital radar installation at Badin in Sind, did not meet any aerial resistance at all, but only ack-ack - which did not, however, stop the Canberras from destroying this installation with rockets.
Ground personnel re-arm the 20mm cannon service on this PAF Sabre.
Mohammad Mahmood Alam was a scrap of a man who appeared almost lost in the none-too roomy cockpit of a Sabre. Yet on 7 September, this Pakistani squadron commander established a combat record which has few equals in the history of jet air warfare. Alam was born on 6 July 1935 to a well-educated family of Kolkata, British India. Although born and raised in the Bengal region, Alam was not ethnically Bengali, contrary to common perception. Alam’s family was of Urdu-speaking Bihari origin, having emigrated from Patna and settled in the Bengal province of British India for a long time. The family migrated from Calcutta to eastern Bengal which became East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) following the formation of Pakistan in 1947. Alam completed his secondary education in 1951 from Government High School, Dhaka in East Pakistan. He joined the then RPAF now PAF in 1952 and was granted commission on 2 October 1953.
Many pilots have scored several air victories in one sortie and have equalled or exceeded Alam’s claim of shooting down up to five enemy aircraft of superior performance within a few minutes. But few are likely to be able to match his record of destroying at least three opponents-Hunters of the Indian Air Force - within the space of somewhere around 30-40 seconds. Admittedly, confirmation of Alam’s claims had been difficult to obtain, despite close-range observations of this encounter by several PAF pilots and some gun camera evidence. Nearest of these observers was his wingman, Flying Officer Masood Akhtar, who, protecting his leader’s tail, clung like a leech throughout the action. Another section of PAF Sabres, led by Flight Lieutenant Bhatti, was attempting to engage the Hunters but Alam got there first. Flying top cover in an F-104 was Arif Iqbal who, with intense fascination and frustration watched the brief combat.
On this basis, Alam was originally credited with five IAF Hunters destroyed, although the wreckage of only two could be found in Pakistani territory, within two or three miles of Sangla Hill railway station. The bodies of the pilots - one Hindu and one Sikh - were reportedly burnt beyond recognition. The area of the main engagement however, thirty miles east of Sargodha airfield, was only about fifty-five miles inside the Pakistan border - seven or eight minutes at jet speed. Thus only the IAF is in a position to verify, some day, its actual losses on the second day of its war with Pakistan. The clear ascendancy established by the PAF pilots in this encounter and those that would follow on that fateful day was a powerful factor in heightening both morale and fighting spirit in Pakistan’s outnumbered but resolute air arm. Alam takes up his account of that engagement:
‘As we were vectored back towards Sargodha, Akhtar called, ‘Contact - four Hunters’ and I saw the IAF aircraft diving to attack our airfield. So I jettisoned my drops (underwing tanks which can be quickly released, for greater combat agility, before going into action) to dive through our own ack-ack after them. But in the meantime I saw two more Hunters about 1,000 feet to my rear, so I forgot the four in front and pulled up to go after the pair behind. The Hunters broke off their attempted attack on Sargodha and the rear pair turned into me. I was flying much faster than they were at this stage - I must have been doing about 500 knots - so I pulled up to avoid overshooting them and then reversed to close in as they flew back towards India.
‘I took the last man and dived behind him, getting very low in the process. The Hunter can outrun the Sabre - it’s only about fifty knots faster - but has a much better acceleration, so it can pull away very rapidly. Since I was diving, I was going still faster and as he was out of gun range, I fired the first of my two Sidewinder air to air missiles at him. In this case, we were too low and I saw the missile hit the ground short of its target. This area east of Sargodha, however, has lots of high tension wires, some of them as high as 100-150 feet and when I saw the two Hunters pull up to avoid one of these cables, I fired my second Sidewinder. The missile streaked ahead of me, but I didn’t see it strike. The next thing I remember was that I was overshooting one of the Hunters and when I looked behind, the cockpit canopy was missing and there was no pilot in the aircraft. He had obviously pulled up and ejected and then I saw him coming down by parachute. This pilot (Squadron Leader Onkar Nath Kakar, commander of an IAF Hunter squadron) was later taken prisoner.
Napalm bombs dropped by two PAF F-86 Sabres exploding on target.
‘I had lost sight of the other five Hunters, but I pressed on thinking maybe they would slow down. (There were, of course, still only two Sabres pitted against the remaining five IAF aircraft). I had lots of fuel so I was prepared to fly 50-60 miles to catch up with them. We had just crossed the Chenab River when my wingman called out, ‘Contact Hunters 1 o’clock’ and I picked them up at the same time - five Hunters in absolutely immaculate battle formation. They were flying at about 100-200 feet, at around 480 knots and when I was in gunfire range they saw me. They all broke in one direction, climbing and turning steeply to the left, which put them in loose line astern. This, of course, was their big mistake. If you are bounced, which means a close range approach by an enemy fighter to within less than about 3,000 feet, the drill is to call a break. This is a panic manoeuvre to the limits of the aircraft’s performance, which splits the formation and both gets you out of the way of an attack and frees you to position yourself behind your opponent. But in the absence of one of the IAF sections initiating a break in the other direction to sandwich our attack, they all simply stayed in front of us.
‘It all happened very fast. We were all turning very tightly-in excess of 5g or just about on the limits of the Sabre’s very accurate A-4 radar ranging gunsight. And I think before we had completed more than about 270 degrees of the turn, at around twelve degrees per second, all four Hunters had been shot down. In each case, I got the pipper of my sight around the canopy of the Hunter for virtually a full deflection shot. Almost all our shooting throughout the war was at very high angles off - seldom less than about thirty degrees. Unlike some of the Korean combat films I had seen, nobody in our war was shot down flying straight and level. I developed a technique of firing very short bursts-around a half second or less. The first burst was almost a sighter, but with a fairly large bullet pattern from six machine guns, it almost invariably punctured the fuel tanks so that they streamed kerosene. During the battle on 7 September, as we went around in the turn, I could just see, in the light of the rising sun, the plumes of fuel gushing from the tanks after my hits. Another half second burst was then sufficient to set fire to the fuel and, as the Hunter became a ball of flame, I would quickly shift my aim forward to the next aircraft. The Sabre carried about 1,800 rounds of ammunition for its six 0.5 inch guns, which can therefore fire for about fifteen seconds. In air combat, this is a lifetime. Every fourth or fifth round is an armour piercing bullet and the rest are HEI - high explosive incendiary. I’m certain after this combat that I brought back more than half of my ammunition, although we didn’t have time to waste counting rounds.
‘My fifth victim of this sortie started spewing smoke and then rolled on to his back at about 1,000 feet. I thought he was going to do a barrel roll, which at low altitude is a very dangerous manoeuvre for the pursuer if the man in front knows what he’s doing. I went almost on my back and then realised I might not be able to stay with him so I took off bank and pushed the nose down. The next time I fired was at very close range-about 600 feet or so - and his aircraft virtually blew up in front of me.’ 33
According to Fizaya in Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force by Pushpindar Singh and Ravi Rikhye, ‘In the Pakistan-India conflict of 1965, the first 48 hours established the superiority of PAF over its much larger adversary. The major successes which contributed towards the PAF getting the better of IAF are its lightning action on the Grand Trunk Road by F-86s of 19 Squadron, when on 6 September the Indian Army was prevented from crossing the last defence before Lahore, the BRB Canal just in time as the lead brigade of Indian 15th Infantry Division was about to throw a bridgehead across the BRB Canal when it was attacked by the F-86s that strafed it and other elements of the Division up and down the Grand Trunk Road, throwing the Indians into confusion, delaying the advance and thus allowing Pakistan’s 10th Division to assume its forward positions, which ended the Indian hope of a quick victory.
‘The other missions which deserve special credit along with PAF’s successful defence of Sargodha on 7 September are the attacks on Kalaikunda, where 14 Squadron F-86s from Dhaka destroyed numerous Canberras lined up on the tarmac; 19 Squadron’s famous raid on Pathankot in which IAF MiG-21s, Gnats and Mystères were caught off guard on the ground; and 5 Squadron’s ill-fated strike over Halwara, which ended in tragedy but had far reaching consequences.
Having set off to a flying start by enabling the destruction of the Indian Vampires on 1 September, Squadron Leader Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui had set very high standards. On 6 September, when the Indian Army launched its three-pronged offensive, like the other squadrons at Sargodha, Rafiqui’s pilots too were kept busy in ground support sorties to stop the Indian onslaught. At 1300 hours, tasking orders were received for the implementation of the pre-designated strike plan. For a Time Over Target (TOT) of 1705 hours, Squadron Leaders Mohammad Mahmood Alam and Rafiqui were to attack Adampur and Halwara with F-86s from Sargodha while from Peshawar, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider’s squadron was to strike Pathankot with eight F-86s and two as armed escorts. Halwara was situated southwest of the industrial township of Ludhiana, Punjab, not far from the border and surrounded by numerous agricultural fields. At this airbase were Nos. 7 and 27 Hunter Squadrons. 7 Squadron had moved to Halwara from Ambala in August. The war was expected to come so from the second half of August Combat Air Patrols (CAP) were flown regularly.
All the three Pakistani F-86 squadrons got busy in preparing for the strikes. When Rafiqui learnt that only four Sabres would be available for the strike on Halwara, he detailed himself as Leader with Flight Lieutenant Cecil Chaudhry as No.2, his Flight Commander Flight Lieutenant Younus Hussain, Sitara-e-Jurat, another outstanding pilot as No.3 and Flight Lieutenant Saleem as No 4. Rafiqui reached the flight lines along with his pilots at 1600 hours to get airborne at 1615 for attacking Halwara at 1705 but to his surprise, he discovered that none of the allocated aircraft was ready. The morning’s defence of Lahore had taken its toll and there were minor unserviceabilities or the aircraft had landed late and were yet to be turned around. He informed the Station Commander of the delay and was advised to make good whatever TOT was possible. The same was the case with Mohammad Mahmood Alam as his aircraft were not ready on time either. Meanwhile, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider struck Pathankot exactly on time and achieving complete surprise, carried out textbook pattern attacks and devastated his target.
Squadron Leader Najeeb Khan, OC 7 Squadron during the 1965 war walks away from his B-57 after a sortie. He was leading a flight of two B-57 bombers to Ambala on the night of 18 September, one of the heavily defended air base of the Indian Air Force. (Air Commodore (Retd) Rais A Rafi).
Alam’s formation got ready before Rafiqui’s and he took off with Flight Lieutenants’ Syed Saad Akhtar Hatmi, Sitara-e-Jurat, Alauddin ‘Butch’ Ahmad34 and Murtaza to attack Adampur. As Rafiqui approached the aircraft to start up at 1715 hours, his heart was full of remorse. He was not concerned about himself but realizing the suicidal nature of his mission, he was thinking of Younus, who had been blessed with a second son the previous week but had not been able to go home to see him and Cecil Chaudhry who had recently been married. With grief in his eyes but determination on his face, Rafiqui tapped them on the shoulders and wishing them luck, climbed aboard his aircraft. During taxi, No 4’s generator packed up and Saleem was ordered by Rafiqui to abort the mission.
About the time of the attack on Pathankot, four Hunters of 7 Squadron were on patrol near Taran Taran. This formation code-named ‘Grey’ was led by the Squadron’s CO, Wing Commander A. T. R. H. Zachariah and consisted of Squadron Leaders A. K. Rawlley and M. M. Sinha and Flight Lieutenant S. K. Sharma. The patrol reached Taran Taran when they spotted some Sabres coming in at low level. The Sabres, led by Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam, had been unable to reach Adampur as there was stiff opposition by the Indian Air Force, who were alerted by the raid on Pathankot. Down to only three aircraft, the formation had pressed on in the fading light. The Sabres on spotting the Hunters, shed their drop tanks and started gaining height, while the Hunters did the same. In the fight that followed, Rawlley was shot down and killed by Alam who then aborted the attack and extricated his aircraft from the fight. Alam’s Sabre formation exiting out of the area crossed the Sabre formation led by Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqui. Alam had warned Rafiqui’s formation about the presence of the Hunters but Rafiqui carried on with his strike mission on Halwara airbase. The Hunters being low on fuel left the Sabres and started making it back to the base. Zachariah reported the loss of Rawlley and the two Hunters on the Operational Readiness Platform were ordered to take off.
Martin B-57B 33-941 call-sign ‘Zulu 6’ on 8 Squadron, 31 Bomber Wing based at Pakistan Air Force Station Mauripur (now Base Masroor) at Karachi, flown by 31 year old Squadron Leader Mohammad Shabbir Alam Siddiqui and the 32 year old navigator Squadron Leader Muhammad Aslam Qureshi which was shot down on the night of 6/7 September 1965.
That evening, two pairs of Hunter CAPs (Combat Air Patrols) were airborne, one from 7 Squadron with Flying Officers A. R. Gandhi and Prakash Sadashiv Rao Pingale35 and the other from 27 Squadron with Flight Lieutenant D. N. Rathore and Flying Officer V. K. Neb. Gandhi who joined 7 Squadron in May 1965 was flying his fourth sortie of the day and Pingale was on his first. The two Hunters took off for their CAP over Halwara. Ten minutes later Halwara Air Control informed them that they were under attack by F-86s. The Hunters arrived over the airfield and could not figure out anything in the confusion. The airfield’s ack-ack guns shot down one of the F-86s which dived headlong into the ground near the airfield. Rafiqui’s formation had reached Halwara at 1800 hours. By then visibility had reduced considerably and they were having difficulty in locating the target. As they were positioning themselves to execute the attack, they spotted the two Hunters being flown by Gandhi and Pingale in front of them, Chaudhry and Younus who were criss-crossing behind their leader to keep them clear of the enemy threat from the rear, saw the Hunters as soon as Rafiqui called contact with them. Rafiqui positioned himself behind them and called to Chaudhry to take the Hunter on the left while he would take the one on the right. Since Younus was in a better position and Chaudhry had lagged slightly behind, Younus suggested that the leader should take the one on the left and he could take the one on the right. Rafiqui agreed and while Chaudhry cleared the tails of both the Leader and No.3, Rafiqui’s guns found their mark before Younus could shoot. The first indication the Hunter pilots had that the Sabres had jumped them was when bullets fired out of nowhere slammed into Pingale’s Hunter. Pingale suffered systems failure and loss of engine power. He ejected from his stricken aircraft safely and was picked up later. Younus saw his target break viciously to the right. He followed him in the turn and just then two more Hunters appeared from the right. Both Chaudhry and Rafiqui spotted them and as Rafiqui manoeuvred to position himself for the kill, Chaudhry took up a defensive position behind him. Chaudhry was wondering why the leader hadn’t commenced firing, when Rafiqui’s calm and confident voice called out that his guns had jammed and Chaudhry should take over lead. At that time they were heading west and could have easily disengaged from the combat taking advantage of the fading light heading into the setting sun. This would have meant abandoning Younus, whom they had lost in the melee while he was chasing his target.
Squadron Leader Shabbir Alam Siddiqui, pilot of the Martin B-57 Canberra on the night of 6/7 September 1965 and Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi, navigator who did not return from their third bombing mission when they were shot down shortly before dawn on 7 September after dropping two bombs on Jamnagar airfield. They were in the circuit to drop the remaining load when they were hit by AAA fire and crashed. Both crew died on impact and were buried in nearby fields.
Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi, navigator of the Martin B-57 Canberra on the night of 6/7 September 1965.
Rafiqui attacked Gandhi’s aircraft and overshot him. Presented with a nice target, Gandhi manoeuvred behind it and started firing his cannon. Even though he did not take good aim, the 54 foot spread of the Hunter’s four 30 mm cannon shells took care of the Sabre. Gandhi could see the Sabre was streaming smoke and was at 150 feet, when the cockpit canopy flew off. The Pakistani pilot had pulled his ejection lever and before the ejection sequence began, the Sabre nose-dived into the ground and blew up. Flying Officer Gandhi had got the first kill for the ‘Battleaxes’. Before he could revel in his triumph, the remaining three Sabres made a beeline for his aircraft. His right wing got hit repeatedly. The Hunter lazily rolled to the right and entered into a spin. Gandhi ejected and landed on the outskirts of Halwara. Chaudhry overshot from the left, throttling forward. As he positioned himself behind the trailing Hunter, he saw the Hunter Leader pull away but by then he had opened fire and to his satisfaction he saw the enemy aircraft streaming smoke and the pilot eject. Chaudhry suddenly became aware of the eerie silence surrounding him. He looked around for his Leader and called him on the RT but received no response. The next instant he observed an F-86 in a classic scissors manoeuvre with a Hunter and thought it was Rafiqui but when he saw its guns blazing, he realized it must be Younus since Rafiqui’s guns had jammed. Before Younus could get his target, another Hunter pounced on him and Younus was shot down. Left alone and running short of fuel, Chaudhry bravely fought his way out and managed to reach base to narrate the details of the courage and determination displayed by Rafiqui and Younus.
Flying Officer Waleed Ehsanul Karim, Shaheed (Martyr) born July 1944, Harbang, Chakaria, Cox’s Bazar, British India in front of his F-86 54989, one of the youngest Sabre jet pilots in the world was killed on 19 April 1965 when his recently repaired aircraft (which was hit by anti-aircraft guns at Rann of Kutch in the morning sortie) developed engine trouble and plunged into the Arabian sea about 10-15 miles off the south coast of Karachi when he was returning from a reconnaissance mission over Gujarat.
The last two Sabres were continuing their strafing when the two Hunter F.56s, flown by Flight Lieutenant D. N. Rathore and Flying Officer V. K. Neb as No.2, returning from a sortie, were directed towards the Sabres at about 18.40 hours, when the sun had gone down and the horizon was lit only by twilight. Rathore, who was about three miles from Halwara airfield, caught a flash in the air in the vicinity of the base. A second look confirmed that the base was under attack by Pakistani Sabres and that a dogfight was in progress with another section of two Hunters led by Gandhi. Rathore, warning Neb, immediately turned towards the airfield. The remaining two Sabres were strafing the airfield and bombing it from a very low level. Jockeying for position was not difficult as the two Pakistani pilots were concentrating on their ground attacks. Getting behind the Sabre, which was on his right, Rathore closed in to 1,000 yards, at the same time instructing Neb to take on the Sabre on the left. Overtaking his victim fast, Rathore closed in to 650 yards before opening fire. He saw the hits, registering on the Pakistani Sabre and it abandoned its ground attack. Closing in still further, Rathore fired again, from 500 yards. This time the Sabre was mortally hit. It started banking to the left and then turned into the ground, exploding in a huge sheet of flame five or six miles away from the airfield. Meanwhile, Neb had closed in behind the second Pakistani Sabre which, like the first one, was intent on strafing the airfield below. Neb, incidentally, had not carried out any air-to-air firing before and at the time of this engagement was still under operational training. Aiming and firing he lost no time closing in on the Pakistani Sabre to about 400 yards. The Pakistani pilot at once abandoned his attack on the airfield and pulled up sharply. Neb, unsure of his accuracy because of lack of any practice, rapidly closed in to less than 100 yards and fired again on the sharply climbing Sabre, which presented a much better target this time. He saw pieces fly off the Sabre, as his cannon shells found their mark and shredded the Sabre’s left wing in an instant. There was a puff of smoke which rapidly turned into a sheet of flame as the last of the four Pakistani Sabres disintegrated in mid-air and fell to the ground. Both the Hunters formed up and flew back to base.
It has been said that it was difficult to assess how many Indian aircraft were in the air to defend Halwara when Rafiqui’s strike formation arrived and that ‘it is beyond comprehension that after being alerted by the successful PAF attack with ten F-86s on IAF Base at Pathankot they would have only two in the air and later divert two more.’ Sarfraz Rafiqui’s determination to lead the attack on Halwara, deep inside enemy territory, being heavily outnumbered and having lost the element of surprise, speaks volumes for his sense of duty and courage. Although he would have been perfectly justified to leave the battle area, his decision to continue the engagement with the enemy despite his guns being jammed is in the highest traditions of chivalry. For him the end was never in doubt.36
Sarfraz Rafiquis’ parents’ grief over the earlier loss of their elder son Ijaz in a Hawker Fury crash many years ago had not quite subsided when a poignant message addressed to Mr. B. A. Rafiqui arrived by telegram at 22 ILACO House, Victoria Road, Karachi. It read, Regret to inform, your son Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Rafiqui failed to return from a mission against enemy…Any further news about him will be conveyed immediately. Letter follows. His fate was officially known only after the war when, dreadfully, he was not amongst the PoWs being exchanged.
On 8 September four IAF Hunter pilots were briefed to carry out an offensive sweep over the Raiwind-Khem Karan sector. Composition of the formation was: Flight Lieutenant C. K. K. Menon, leader; Flight Lieutenant A. S. Kullar, No. 2; Flight Lieutenant D. S. Nagi, No. 3 and subsection leader; and Squadron Leader. B. K. Bishnoi, No. 4. The planes were armed with rockets and 30mm cannon. The section of four took off at 1800 hours for the target area. The aircraft kept low, flying between fifty and one hundred feet above the ground, the fertile green countryside of the Punjab passing under their wings as a blur. As the section approached Raiwind railway station, all four pilots saw a goods train which had pulled in. Menon decided that it was carrying military stores because the locomotive was attached to that end of the train which pointed towards Kasur, in the battle area. Simultaneously the layout of the station and the area around the train was firmly implanted in his memory. All this had to be assimilated in about a second as the aircraft swept past.
A formation of IAF Hawker Hunter F.Mk.56s BA360A and A489 on patrol over Ladakh.
Menon as the leader asked his pilots whether they should take on the train. The reply was a unanimous affirmative. As the section had passed over the station, anti aircraft guns had opened up. To confuse the Pakistani gunners and also to utilise the section of Hunters to the best effect against the train, Menon decided to approach the goods train from a different direction. He therefore led the section well past the railway station till he was quite certain that the aircraft would be out of sight of those watching from the station. He then put his section in a wide left-hand turn. This ruse was to give the impression that the Hunters had missed seeing the goods train. The wide turn also enabled him to place his pilots in the best position for attack.
Coming out of the turn, Menon led his section on a course parallel to the length of the train, but still low. Judging the section’s position to be abreast of the goods train, Menon pulled up his aircraft signalling the start of the attack. Almost simultaneously the other three Hunters pulled up. At the same time, the Pakistani anti-aircraft guns, sighting the Hunters, opened up again. At the top of their climb the aircraft were in their most vulnerable position, their speed having fallen off, before diving for their rocket attack. The positioning of the section by Menon had been excellent. As they pulled up and rolled to the left in the attacking dive, the section faced the train broadside and was evenly spaced out along the entire length of the target. Going in first, through the mushrooming flak, Menon concentrated on the extreme left of the train. He released his rockets at about 500 feet and levelling out from the dive a bare 100 feet above the ground he flashed over the train. He could not see his rockets hit the target. But Bishnoi, who as No. 4 was the last to go in, could see clearly the effect of the other three pilots’ strikes. Bishnoi saw Menon’s rockets strike the wagons on the extreme left. The explosion lifted them off the rails and set fire to them.
Kullar attacked the middle left of the target and Bishnoi saw his rockets also hit their mark and turn that section of the train into a blazing inferno. As Kullar hurtled low, over the train with ack-ack puffs chasing him, Nagi’s rockets hit home in the middle right of the goods train. A powerful explosion ripped through the wagons, although as in all rocket attacks Nagi was not able to see the result of his attack. Bishnoi however, being the last in, saw Nagi’s rockets hit home. Putting the extreme right end of the train in his sights, Bishnoi then fired his own rockets from about 400 feet. He watched their smoke trails heading towards the target, but then he too was very low and had to level out of the dive. He went over the train at about 100 feet and then turned to see the effect of his attack. Bishnoi’s rockets had also found their mark and the wagons at the extreme right were also burning furiously.
By now explosions had started ripping the train apart and the whole area was enveloped in smoke and flames. Bishnoi called up his leader, Menon, on the R/T who also turned to see the success of their attack. Kullar and Nagi too had a glance at the now completely destroyed goods train and then the section turned to fly up the railway line from Raiwind towards Kasur. Menon and Kullar still had some rockets left and all four had their front-gun ammunition intact.
Nearing Kasur the pilots noticed a huge cloud of dust slightly to one side, so Menon led his section, flying very low, in that direction. Menon and Kullar picked up two groups of tanks as their target and pulled up to attack them. As their aircraft gained height rapidly, a murderous fire opened up on them from the ground. Undeterred, Menon went into a dive, latching on to one group of tanks and fired his remaining rockets. Three tanks burst into flames. Kullar who had followed Menon in the attack concentrated on the second group of tanks and fired. He could not confirm the damage caused by his rockets but was certain that he had damaged a few. While Menon and Kullar were attacking the tanks, Nagi and Bishnoi, who had expended all their rockets in the train attack, took on some armoured vehicles with their cannon. Despite the very heavy ack-ack fire, they made two passes each at the armoured vehicles and saw a considerable number catch fire and blow up.
All this while the four aircraft were being subjected to very heavy ground fire. Not only were the regular ack-ack guns firing, but also the anti-aircraft guns mounted on Pakistani tanks and other automatic weapons were blazing away at the Hunters. Nevertheless, Menon, after attacking the tanks, spotted two convoys of vehicles. Pulling up, he engaged the nearest with his cannon. Then, pulling up again, he attacked the second convoy. In these two attacks, he saw that he had set fire to thirty vehicles which, with their inflammable stores, were now bursting and exploding. Kullar, the No. 2, after his rocket attack on the second group of tanks, pulled up again in the teeth of heavy ack-ack fire, ranged another tank in his gunsight and went for it with his cannon. He managed to disable it.
With their ammunition almost expended, the section turned back to base at very low level, re-forming at the same time. Assessing the damage to their own aircraft, Menon found that his fuel state was lower than it should have been; ack-ack had punctured his port wing tank and the fuel had leaked out. Another bullet had damaged his airspeed indicator. Kullar had been slightly more unlucky, a bullet had found his main fuel tank and punctured it, so his reaching the base was a touch-and-go affair. However, all four pilots reached base safely, although Menon had to be shepherded in because of his unserviceable ASI.
F-86 Sabre and B-57 bombers of the Pakistan Air Force.
He had gathered an impressive tally of one-quarter goods train destroyed, three tanks destroyed and thirty vehicles set on fire - all in about half an hour. How important that goods train was to the Pakistanis only came to light later. The train was carrying petrol and ammunition for the Pakistani tanks in the Khem Karan area and the enemy armour was depending for replenishment on this train. With its destruction, the Pattons in the Khem Karan sector were forced to go into battle with only thirty shells each and a limited amount of petrol. When their initial thrust was stopped by Indian armour, the Pakistani tanks had to withdraw, suffering heavy losses, because they did not have the fuel or ammunition to continue the fight.
On the morning of 9 September the Pakistanis were building up for an armoured thrust in the Khem Karan area and Indian troops were under great pressure. To relieve this pressure IAF Hunters had been called upon for ground strikes against Pakistani gun and armoured positions; two sorties had already gone out for this purpose.
For the third strike of the day, four pilots had been briefed. The section was to be led by Squadron Leader. B. K. Bishnoi, who only the previous evening had taken a hand in destroying the goods train at Raiwind station. The other pilots assigned were Flight Lieutenant G. S. Ahuja as No. 2, Flight Lieutenant S. K. Sharma as No. 3 and sub-section leader and Flying Officer Parulkar as No. 4. During the briefing these pilots were told to attack enemy tanks, armoured vehicles and gun positions in the Khem Karan area.
The take-off in sections of two was smooth. Bishnoi and Ahuja pulled up sharply after getting airborne to enable Sharma and Parulkar to avoid the jet blast on their take-off run. Settling down at about one hundred feet above ground, in tactical formation, they proceeded towards their target. Ahuja was on Bishnoi’s left and slightly behind him, while Sharma and Parulkar came up on their leader’s right about 500 yards away and slightly behind. This loose formation enabled everyone to concentrate on accurate low-level flying, navigation and at the same time keep a look-out for enemy aircraft and ground targets.
As the section approached the target area, still maintaining 100 feet above ground, Bishnoi spotted well to his left the tell-tale cloud of dust which indicated tank and vehicle movement. Bishnoi warned the others in the section that they were approaching enemy armoured concentrations and that everyone should choose his target. Ahuja, Sharma and Parulkar acknowledged the transmission. All four pilots switched on the electrical circuits for releasing their rockets and tested their front guns by firing a short burst. Bishnoi from his previous day’s experience over the same area was expecting enemy anti-aircraft fire - but not the kind of concentration that opened up as the four Hunters approached the tanks. The familiar black puffs of 40-mm. ack-ack almost blackened the sky around them and the Patton-tank-mounted guns sprayed the airspace with their lethal loads. There was one favourable factor, however. The 40-mm shells were bursting above the Hunters. The enemy gunners had not got the correct height, but then they were anticipating the pilots’ next move. The aircraft would have to pull up for a rocket attack and that would take them to a height where the sky was already pock-marked by ack-ack puffs. There was such a concentration of tanks, armoured cars and other vehicles that choosing targets was not difficult. Bishnoi selected a group of three tanks which were in a ‘U’ formation a little to his left. He pulled up to 300 feet and rolled into his attacking dive. Now the ack-ack fire seemed to be all round him and at the same height. Ignoring this Bishnoi settled his gunsight on this group of three tanks and then from about 400 yards distance, fired a salvo of eight rockets. Levelling out at about 50 feet he hurtled over the tanks and then turned to have a look. All three tanks had been hit and had blown up; they were burning furiously.
Following their leader’s example, the other three, Ahuja, Sharma and Parulkar, also selected tanks as their targets and pulling up, one by one, in the deadly danger zone of exploding anti-aircraft shells, delivered their rocket attacks. Between the three of them, they hit and destroyed seven more tanks. Having expended their rockets, all four Hunter pilots now decided to take on the armoured cars and other vehicles with their nose-mounted cannon.
After attacking the tanks Bishnoi had spotted a group of vehicles, to which he now turned his attention. Leaving the safety of low altitude, he pulled up again before engaging his new target. With heavy ack-ack fire following him, Bishnoi rolled into his attack from the apex of his pull-up and fired his cannon. He saw his shells hit and explode on the vehicles; in an instant the vehicles were on fire and the ammunition in them started exploding. By this time, however, Bishnoi had levelled out and, hugging the ground, had sped past the target. Ahuja in the meantime engaged some armoured cars with his cannon, while Sharma and Parulkar took on some more vehicles carrying supplies. Again and again pulling up in the face of murderous flak, all four went in for their strafing attacks until their ammunition was exhausted. After their last attack, the section remained low and sped out of the enemy area. Once out of range of the enemy ack-ack, the Hunters formed up again in tactical formation and set course for base.
Mohammed Shaukat-ul-Islam of the Pakistan Air Force. (Group Captain Mohammed Shaukat-ul-Islam)
Just as they were clear of the target area, Parulkar called up his leader, Bishnoi and told him that he had been hit in his right arm. Bishnoi was really concerned because, although Parulkar could probably manage to fly with his left hand till they reached their base, on landing he would need both hands and especially the right for coaxing the fighter down on to the runway. Throughout the flight back to base, Parulkar, who incidentally was on his first operational sortie, kept on assuring Bishnoi that he was all right. The section reached their base and immediately the first three landed.
All were now waiting for Parulkar. He made a normal turn on to the final approach and started coming lower and lower. With a sigh of relief, everyone saw him make a perfect touch-down and hurtle down the runway on his landing run. If his right hand was badly hurt, his troubles were not yet over. He would have to apply the brakes with his right hand to stop the aircraft. This too, Parulkar managed and, ignoring the ambulance and crash tender, turned on to the taxi track and taxied back to dispersal. It was only when he got out of the aircraft that his fellow pilots and his ground crew saw the seriousness of his wound. A bullet had hit his right upper arm and torn through the flesh, baring the bone. His overall was drenched with blood. He must have been in extreme pain and it was a wonder that he had not fainted due to lack of blood. Parulkar was of course rushed to hospital where the doctors put in nine stitches to close the wound. But such was his excitement that he was soon in the crew room recounting the day’s adventure to his squadron mates.
Muhammad Mahmood Alam (known as M.M. Alam), a F-86 Sabre flying ace and one-star general who served in the PAF, commanding 11 Squadron and was awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat (‘The Star of Courage’) for his actions during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Alam holds the record of having downed five Indian aircraft in less than a minute.
Low-level dogfights in the modern jet age are said to be impossible - or at least improbable. But in the heat of battle even the improbable comes to pass. Such was the case on 19 September when an air battle was fought over the Chawinda Sector between Indian Gnats and Pakistani Sabres which started at about 1,500 feet and ended at tree-top height. Squadron Leader Denzil Keelor, born 7 December 1933 and his section of four Gnat aircraft was detailed to provide cover to four IAF Mystère IVAs which were going out for a close-support sortie to Chawinda. With Keelor were Flying Officer Rai his No. 2, Flight Lieutenant V. Kapila as sub-section leader and Flight Lieutenant Maya Dev as the No. 4. Taking off in their Gnats, they followed the Mystères at low level towards Chawinda. As they arrived over the target the enemy flak opened up and being very low, they could see the flak bursts near and above them. Suddenly Maya Dev called out a warning that four Pakistani Sabres were approaching to attack the Mystères. The four Gnat pilots spotted the Sabres on their left above them at about 4,000 feet. Denzil Keelor and his pilots were a bare 300 feet above the ground. He put his section into a shallow left-hand climbing turn so as to place himself behind the Sabres. As the distance between the two formations closed rapidly, Keelor saw that Kapila, with Maya Dev looking after his tail, was in the best position for an attack on the Pakistanis. He ordered Kapila to engage the nearest Sabre. As Kapila with commendable adroitness latched on behind one of them, the Pakistani became aware of this threat and started taking violent evasive action. He went into a hard turn to the left and Kapila followed him, but still could not get into a favourable firing position. Suddenly the Sabre reversed his turn and went into a steep turn to the right. This was the opportunity Kapila was waiting for. Jettisoning his drop tanks, he easily slipped into a firing position and, reducing the distance to 500 yards, gave a short burst, which at once went home.
The engagement which had started at about 1,500 feet was now getting lower and lower as the Sabre, in order to get away, was executing descending turns. With Kapila’s first burst striking the Sabre, it slowed down a bit. Getting nearer still, Kapila fired again from 300 yards. Again his shells found their mark. But by now being a bare 300 feet above the ground, he had to pull up; he did not see the Sabre spin and crash to the ground. But Keelor with Rai - who had been following Kapila and Maya Dev through this engagement to guard them against possible rear attacks - watched the end of the Sabre, which after Kapila’s second burst spun and hit the ground, exploding on impact. Keelor called out to Kapila confirming his kill. Just as Keelor had finished transmitting to Kapila he saw a Sabre which had been separated from his section in the melee, trying to get away from the scene. The Sabre apparently had not seen Keelor, as it did a hard turn to the right. This was a manoeuvre which gave Keelor the opportunity of quickly slipping behind the Sabre in a favourable firing position. Reducing the distance to less than 500 yards, Keelor fired a couple of bursts which were enough to send the Sabre crashing to the ground. It was only when the Sabre hit the ground that Keelor realised that he himself was skimming the tree tops. 37
India’s decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, English Electric Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s.
Pakistan used the F-104As primarily for combat air patrols, usually consisting of two Sidewinder-equipped F-86F Sabres, with a Starfighter to provide top cover. The F-104s occasionally provided escort to PAF Martin B-57B Canberra bombers or reconnaissance aircraft and sometimes flew high-speed photoreconnaissance missions themselves. No other aircraft in the history of aviation has engendered more controversy such notoriety and suffered such a high loss rate over a short period as the Starfighter. Pakistan, which remained an important ally of the United States through the Cold War, was the first non-NATO country to equip with the Starfighter. By September 1965 the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had only 150 aircraft (including 102 F-86Fs), while the Indian Air Force (IAF) possessed approximately 900 aircraft. Twelve of the aircraft in the PAF inventory were Starfighters, the bulk of which were received in August 1961. These consisted of ten refurbished F-104As and two F-104Bs, all supplied under the US Military Defense Assistance Programme (MAP). At PAF’s request, all its F-104s were refitted with the M-61 gun, whereas the USAF had removed the weapon on the assumption that air combat after Korea would occur at high speeds where only AAMs would be effective. This and the more advanced GE-J-79-II engine made the PAF F-104s unique - they had the gun and being the lightest of the F-104 series therefore enjoyed the best thrust-to-weight ratio. All were used to equip 9 Air Superiority Squadron. This became an elite unit, its personnel handpicked from F-86 Sabre squadrons. The PAF Starfighters, which were each armed with two AIM-9B Sidewinder AAMs, were the first Mach 2 capable aircraft in Asia. Even in Europe at this time, most countries were still flying subsonic aircraft. Even before its introduction to combat, the Starfighter had gained such a reputation in the IAF that it was known as the ‘hadmash’, ‘scoundrel’ or ‘wicked one.
Many questioned Pakistan’s ability to fly and maintain such a sophisticated aircraft as the F-104A/B. (The in-commission rate of the F-104 during the first five years of service was over 80 per cent and all systems performed with high reliability). 9 Squadron lost only one Starfighter during training, when Flight Lieutenant Asghar ‘pitched up’ and went into an uncontrollable spin during an air combat training sortie. This F-104A was replaced under the MAP programme. Also, Flight Lieutenant Khalid managed a ‘dead stick’ landing after an engine flame out in another F-104A. PAF Starfighters were used throughout the wars with India in 1965 and in 1971.
During the 1965 conflict the PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1. The PAF’s aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF’s American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, but according to some experts this is untrue because the IAF’s MiG-21, and Hawker Hunter fighters actually had higher performance than their PAF counterpart, the F-86 Sabre. Although the IAF’s de Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Commodore Sajjad Haider, who led the PAF’s 19 Squadron in combat during the war.
Group Captain Zafar Masud the PAF station commander at Sargodha debriefing some of the pilots of 32 Wing.
Group Captain Mohammed Shaukat-Ul Islam recalls: ‘In November 1964 I was posted to 11 (F) Squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam at Sargodha. I became operational in August 1965 and was allowed to take part in the 6-23 September 1965 war with India. I considered myself very lucky to have taken part in the war as a Flying Officer with only about eighty hours on the F-86F with a grand total of about 400 hours. At the outbreak of the war 11 Squadron was tasked to carry out a dawn strike against the Indian Army in Chamb-Jurian sector with two formations of eight F-86 aircraft. Each aircraft carried 32 x 5.75-inch rockets and 1,800 x .50 inch ammunition. We exhausted all the weapons on the convoy of the Indian army and returned to Sargodha safely. As it was a surprise dawn strike we faced only small arms fire from the enemy. By the time I landed and cleared the runway my aircraft flamed out because of shortage of fuel.
‘On 9 September four F-86Fs were tasked to provide a low level escort mission for three B-57 bombers attacking a train carrying ammunition at Gadro. The bombers carried out four attacks each and all seven aircraft remained within heavy ack-ack fire for about fifteen minutes. All aircraft exited low level after the successful delivery of weapons. The three bombers recovered at Peshawar and we four fighters came back to Sargodha safe and sound. It was my first experience of remaining within such heavy anti-aircraft fire for such a long time.
‘On 11 September, I was in a formation of four F-86Fs who took part in an escort mission at day time to give air protection to a train carrying ammunitions from Lahore to Sialkot sector. It might sound very easy but to give protection to such a slow moving train by so fast moving aircraft at low level by four aircraft for such a long time was very demanding. The train reached its destination and got its cargo off-loaded.’
On the night of 13/14 September Squadron Leader Mervyn Leslie Middlecoat achieved the first blind night interception in an F-104, firing a Sidewinder at a Canberra from a distance of 4,000 feet and reporting an explosion, but failing to obtain a confirmation. Another Starfighter was lost on 17 September, when Flying Officer G. O. Abassi tried to land in a sudden dust storm, undershot the runway and crashed in a ball of fire. Miraculously, he was thrown clear, still strapped in his ejection seat and he survived with only minor injuries.
On 16 September Group Captain Mohammed Shaukat-Ul Islam took off from Sargodha as Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam’s wingman to carry out a high level offensive patrol mission deep inside Indian territory.
‘We were flying in battle formation at 23,000 feet between two Indian Air Bases, Halwara and Adampur. The aim was to invite the Indian fighters to come and fight with us. We could take such a venture because by then the PAF already had established air-superiority over the IAF. It was about 2 pm with clear blue sky when our ground controller from a radar station transmitted that two IAF Hunters had taken off from Halwara and were approaching to intercept us. When they came in sight we jettisoned our drop tanks and entered into close air combat. The air battle became intense and under such high ‘g’ manoeuvres I could not stay on the tail of my leader. As it turned out, my leader shot the No.2 of the other formation and their leader shot me. My aircraft caught fire and I ejected through the shattered canopy at about 12,000 feet. I lost consciousness for a couple of seconds and by the time I got my senses back I was floating in the air and that the small parachute was pulling out the bigger one. As I settled down with my parachute I saw a Hunter with streaming fuel and crash with a big explosion. The Hunter pilot was shot in the cockpit. When I looked down to locate my probable landing spot, I noticed with horror that a man in uniform was pointing a .303 rifle at me and a civilian was aiming a double barrel shot gun. I heard three shots and within seconds my feet touched the ground. I got up, released the parachute and was surrounded by a crowd of people. The name of the place was Taran Taran. The local police rescued me from the crowd and took me quickly to a nearby police station and then to a hospital. I was bleeding profusely from my back. A doctor operated on me and showed me a .303 bullet taken out of my back. Next day I was taken to IAF Base, Adampur and flown to Delhi in an Antonov An-32 and admitted to the Combined Military Hospital (CMH). The cease-fire was declared on 23 September when I was still in the CMH. Later, I joined another pilot and a navigator of the B-57, which was shot down by AA fire on 15 September in a night raid over IAF Base Adampur. We three returned to Pakistan after being released in a prisoner exchange in February 1966.
‘In the war of 1965 I flew a total of nineteen missions including the Air Defence missions day and night up to 16 September. The story of my time as a PoW was a different chapter of my life. However, I can say that the IAF treated me very well. In the later days when I joined the Bangladesh Air Force in 1972, I had the opportunity to visit the IAF as official guest and met many friends whom I came in contact as a PoW. After returning from India, I was posted back to 11 Squadron. From then on it became my passion to be a master in the air combat. In my later days I could fly the F-86 like a toy and used to manoeuvre it to its design limits. In the early sixties we used to comment by saying that a pilot who had not flown the F-86 did not enjoy the charm of fighter flying. I was later posted to 14 Squadron, Dhaka and 26 Squadron, Peshawar where I continued flying the F-86F. In 1968 the PAF introduced the F-86E and soon it became a very popular fighter aircraft. I continued flying both models till 1970 and logged about 1200 hours on the F-86F and E combined. In total I had flown thirteen types of aircraft in my career including the MiG-21MF and the F-5.’
India claimed that the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed ‘Sabre Slayer.’ The PAF’s F-104 Starfighter was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as ‘the pride of the PAF’. However, according to Sajjad Haider the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being ‘a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet’ rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes it was ‘unsuited to the tactical environment of the region.’ In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF’s far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter. Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. In their first aerial encounter on 3 September, two PAF F-86s battled six IAF Gnats while an F-104A, flown by Flying Officer Abbas Mirza, darted around above, vainly trying to get a shot at one of the elusive Gnats. When a second F-104A arrived, however, one of the Gnats, flown by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, suddenly descended and landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the Pakistan Army. The pilot claimed that most of his equipment failed and even if he could get some chance on that, the star-fighters snuffed it. This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Squadron Leader Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha and later tested and evaluated its flight performance was of the view that the Gnat was no ‘Sabre Slayer’ when it came to dog fighting.
The Martin B-57B Canberra in PAK service had an ejection seat for both the pilot and navigator whereas in IAF service the Canberra had only an ejection seat for the pilot, which meant certain death in combat for a navigator.
PAF Martin B-57 Canberra, two F-86F Sabres and a RT-33 photographed from another RT-33 from Masroor AB before the 1965 war with India. (Taimur Khan)
India and Pakistan made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF aircraft and lost nineteen of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down seventy-three PAF aircraft and lost fifty-nine. According to one independent source, the PAF flew eighty-six F-86 Sabres, ten F-104 Starfighters and twenty B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF’s claim of downing seventy-three PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani frontline fighter force. Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within ten days of the beginning of the war. But this could be explained by the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF. India retained much of its air force in the East, against the possibility of Chinese intervention and, as a result, the air forces were quite evenly balanced in the West.
During the 1965 war, 9 Squadron was commanded by Squadron Leader Mervyn Leslie Middlecoat who, as a flight lieutenant, was, with Squadron Leader Mian Sadruddin, one of the two pilots to land the first pair of PAF Starfighters at Sargodha in 1962. India had radar cover above 5,000 feet, which made it virtually impossible for the Starfighter to achieve surprise, while subsonic aircraft operating under radar cover could easily defend themselves. At first, most thought that the chance of a real war breaking out between the two countries was high and a morning Combat Air Patrol (CAP) was flown before dawn. The F-104s would fly to 30,000 feet and patrol the area near the disputed territory of Indian-held Kashmir.
On 3 September, before the war began, a single PAF F-104A, flown by Flight Lieutenant Hakimuilah, was vectored at supersonic speed to intercept an IAF Gnat, whose pilot, Squadron Leader Brijpal Singh Sikand, promptly lowered his undercarriage in surrender and landed at the abandoned PAF airfield of Pasrur. Sikand was made a PoW. On 6 September two Starfighters from Sargodha, with Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam Kahn leading and Flight Lieutenant Amjad Hussain Khan as his wingman, were vectored by Sakesar radar towards four IAF Mystères engaged in bombing and rocket attacks against a stationary passenger train at Gakkhar railway station near to the border with Kashmir. What followed was the first combat kill by a Mach 2 aircraft and the first missile kill for the PAF when a PAF F-104A shot down an IAF Mystère IV. It was also proven that the F-104 and the Sidewinder missile were an effective weapon system at low altitude. Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam Kahn recalls:
‘I was informed that the IAF had crossed the Pakistan border and were attacking ground positions approximately 80 nautical miles south of us. This meant that India had actually decided to start an all-out war. We were immediately vectored and were soon over the site where the Indian aircraft were attacking. While dawn was breaking at 15,000 feet, it was still dark down below and I asked for permission to descend to ground level, but was denied. The reason given was that radio contact would he lost. I, however, decided to descend and, leaving my wingman at 15,000 feet to act as radio relay, I dived down and headed towards some flashes. As I reached the area, I was surprised to see that I was flying head-on into a formation of four IAF Mystère IVA aircraft that were attacking ground targets. I was shocked more than I was surprised, as I felt a wave of anger leap through me. I had to shoot down these aircraft. I jettisoned my external fuel tanks and started to engage the Mystères as they turned into me. Manoeuvring started at treetop level. I kept my eves ‘glued’ on the target. I could feel the strain under high Gs, looking over the tail of the aircraft, keeping the enemy in sight and skimming the trees at high speed. One mistake and I would have hit the ground. If I had lost sight of the Mystères the fight would have been over. The F-104, with the afterburner blazing, at low altitude, was responding very well. I used the high-speed take-off flaps to improve the turning capability as required. The ‘stick shaker’ was a big help in flying the aircraft to its limit. The Mystères would have no problem keeping the F-104 in sight because of its afterburner.
‘After some hectic manoeuvering, I was positioned behind two aircraft, but the other two were still not visible. I then spotted them, further ahead. Joy leapt though me. I aimed my weapons and decided to shoot the first two with missiles and the next two with guns. I fully realized that a confidential order prohibited me from using the missile below 10,000 feet. However, I was sure the missile could he used effectively at any height provided the targets could he discriminated from the background heat sources. A distant increase in missile tone ensured this. I set the wingspan of the Mystère IVA and started to recall the missile-firing checklist: ‘Check Ranger, Check Tone, Check G’s, Squeeze the trigger and hold.’
‘I aimed the missile at the nearest aircraft and heard the loud pitched missile tone. The sight indicated that I was in range. With all the other requisite firing conditions met, I squeezed the trigger and kept it pressed. I waited, only to note that the missile had not fired. As I looked towards the left missile, I saw a big flash and the missile leaving the aircraft. The missile had taken, as stipulated in the manual, approximately 8/10ths of a second to fire after the trigger had been pressed but in combat, this seemed like an eternity. The flash of the missile blinded me for a few seconds. The radar controller [Flight Lieutenant Farooq Haider from Sakesar radar] who was also monitoring the radio of the Mystères immediately informed me that one Mystère had been shot down and that another had been damaged. I was then at once instructed to tutu tight and pick up visual contact with the other Mystères, which were exiting. I turned as directed but could not see them. On landing back, I was informed that the dogfight had taken place overhead the Rahwali airfield where low-powered radar was located. The Mystère wreckage had fallen close by. The other three had got away.’
In one of the early attacks, Flight Lieutenant Arif Iqbal in an F-104 was about to fire at a Mystère IVA, when he suddenly saw a PAF F-86 flight appear between him and the IAF aircraft and shoot down the Mystère. During an Indian attack on Sargodha air base, however, Flight Lieutenant Amjad Hussein Khan, who had missed his chance the day before, made amends. He made visual contact with the IAF Mystères and headed toward them. By the time he caught up with them, the Indian aircraft were 6-8 miles away from Sargodha, flying at 150-200 feet in a south-easterly direction towards India. As the Mystères jettisoned their drop tanks, Khan positioned himself behind one of them and released a Sidewinder missile, which went straight into the ground. The Mystère then began to dogfight with the Starfighter, which used its superior climb and acceleration to raise the combat from ground level to about 7,000 feet to gain room for manoeuvre. Khan fired his cannon and was delighted to see the shells hit the Mystère. The IAF pilot, Squadron Leader A. B. Devayya of 1 Squadron IAF, showed commendable courage in staying with the F-104 and despite being mortally wounded, scored several cannon strikes on the Starfighter. Hussain Khan managed to eject at low altitude. He had reason to be grateful that his F-104 did not have the original downward-firing ejection seat - otherwise, his subsequent award of the Sitara-e-Jurat would probably have been posthumous. (Six F-104 pilots received gallantry awards during the 1965 war). This was the only Starfighter to be lost to enemy action in the 1965 war. During attacks on Rawalpindi and Peshawar by IAF English Electric Canberras that night, three F-104s tried to intercept them but failed to get a target acquisition because the bombers were too low.
Two PAF F-104 Starfighters of 9 Squadron in formation.
At around 0515 hours on the morning of 7 September a large number of PAF F-104s and F-86s flew CAP in the vicinity of Sargodha waiting for the IAF to attack. The F-104s were assigned the outer perimeter, while the F-86s were kept closer to the airfield. The first IAF attack, at 0530, by six Mystère IVAs of 1 Squadron, got through without being intercepted. Six Hawker Hunter F.56s of Nos. 7 and 27 Squadrons IAF carried out the second attack on Sargodha, at 0610 hours. The third attack was made at 0947 hours, by four Mystères of 1 Squadron IAF and a fourth and final attack on Sargodha was carried out by two Mystères at 1030 hours.
Flight Lieutenant Aftab Slam Khan continues:
‘The pilots of 9 Squadron competed fiercely; to undertake as many combat missions as they could, never missing a chance to close with the enemy looking for combat. In the days that followed, the F-104 pilots noted that whenever they got airborne, the IAF grounded all its aircraft. This made it very difficult for the F-104 pilots to engage the enemy during the day. Flight Lieutenant Muchtaq, my brother, flying an F-104 in the same squadron, made contact with the enemy, only to note that as he approached the target, the IAF Hunters disengaged well in time. Flight Lieutenant ‘Mickey’ Abbas in an F-104 had a similar episode. This experience would be repeated for the F-104 pilots for all daytime interceptions. I personally patrolled in a lone F-104, at 30,000 feet, deep inside Indian Territory over the two Indian fighter airfields of Adamput and Halwara for one hour and there was no response from the Indian side. This was total air superiority and it displayed the supremacy of the Starfighter.
‘At medium and high altitudes the F-104 ruled the sky. The IAF refused to challenge the Starfighter. But below 5,000 feet a fierce battle raged between the F-86 and the IAF fighters, mainly the Hunters and Gnats. The F-86 was the workhorse of the PAF. It was under-powered, outnumbered and outgunned. Nevertheless, the F-86 pilots showed great courage as they fearlessly engaged their opponents and displayed an unusual skill for air combat, achieving an excellent kill ratio. The F-104, by controlling the sky at medium and high altitude, had reduced the workload for the F-86s to the extent that the numbers were manageable. The F-86s could now hold their own against the enemy at low altitude.
‘Immediately after the start of the war there was an urgent need for a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft. The PAF RT-33 was rendered obsolete with a speed of less than 400 knots. It was liable to be shot down as it crossed the border. At night we did standby duties, one bout in the cockpit and one bout off. In the off time I would go and receive the B-57 pilots returning from their bombing missions over Indian airfields. The battle damage from these missions needed to be assessed. I suggested to the Base Commander that if he authorized a recce mission by the F-104, I would have a photograph on his table by noon next day. He ordered the mission.
‘Low flying was not a part of the F-104 war plan - no training had been conducted, but while demonstrating the aircraft, I noticed that the Starfighter flew very well at low level. I planned the mission at 600 knots (10 miles/minute). Low flying was normally done at 420 knots in the F-86 squadrons. For the photograph I went to town early morning and bought a film for my personal Yashica 120 camera. I then requested Squadron Leader Middlecoat, the squadron commander, if he would allow me to fly while he took the pictures. He agreed. The mission was flown in an F-104B dual seater [57-1309]. Ten miles a minute made the DR navigation very easy. Over flat terrain, the height of the aircraft was lowered until Squadron Leader Middlecoat said that downwash was hitting the ground. This height was then maintained - a thrilling experience. We pulled up, slightly offset from the airfield. Pictures were taken and a visual recce made. The photographs were placed on the Base Commander’s table, as promised. The missions that followed were with bigger and better cameras but I was always told to fly. The F-104 had a new role.
‘The reconnaissance flights revealed that the forward IAF bases had only approximately forty aircraft each at Adampur and Halwara and even fewer than that at Pathankot. Where were the rest of the IAF aircraft? This got me thinking and I went on to study the map. Moving further east from the Indian airfields of Adampur and Halwara were Agra and Delhi. These airfields were 350 nautical miles from Sargodha. There was no attack aircraft in the PAF inventory that could reach these airfields flying at low level. If an aircraft approached at a high altitude level, it could easily be intercepted. I therefore presumed that the Indians would have the bulk of their aircraft at these bases and because they were sure they could not be attacked, the aircraft would be in the open. The F-104A’s J-79-11A engine, was very fuel-efficient. This gave the PAF F-104’s an extended range capability.38 I marked the route and was surprised to note that if we took off with four tanks and jettisoned them as they went empty, we could reach these bases while maintaining a speed of 540 knots at low level. It would also allow us to make two gun attacks, exit at 600 knots to the border; climb to attain height and land back with 1,000lbs of fuel remaining. The plan looked like a very exciting possibility to me. I thought of ‘Pearl Harbor’; complete surprise could be achieved. I stayed up all night, made the Flight plan and next morning made the proposal to my Squadron Commander. He told me that he was against submitting the proposal, as it was too risky. I then took the plan to the Wing Leader who had been my instructor on the Harvard T-6G. He said that it was a good plan but refused to take it any higher. I then went to the Base Commander. He said he liked it, but he would not make the proposal to the high command. There was nobody else to go to. Immediately after the war, the Air Chief ordered a high altitude recce mission of the airfields at Agra and Delhi. This was to be flown by the B-57F ‘Droopy’, a fanjet modified B-57 that had replaced the U-2 and was flown by Pakistani pilots. The recce flight revealed that Agra and Delhi were sprawling with aircraft. If the F-104 had attacked Delhi and Agra, it could have been a historic day for the PAF, as well as for the IAF to remember. This was the greatest chance missed by the PAF and the F-104. After the war I had a chance to discuss the plan with the Air Chief; he said that he would have definitely ordered the attack if it had been brought to his notice.’
During the 1965 war, the F-104s flew a total of 246 hours 45 minutes. Mostly; the missions flown were Air Defence and Air Superiority operations, but 42 were at night against IAF Canberra B (I) 58s. The Starfighter’s rudimentary AN/ASG-14T1 fire-control radar system met the Soviet high altitude bomber threat of the Cold War era for which it was designed, but it could not illuminate small targets against ground clutter. The standard high-speed intercept tactic employed by PAF F-104 pilots was to approach their targets from below, with a typical height differential of 2,000-3,000 feet, against a target they wished to acquire at a range of 10-15 kilometres. This limitation was well known to the Canberra jet bomber pilots of the IAF. They adopted a standard hi-lo-hi profile to minimize the threat of interception. During most of their inbound and outbound flight over Pakistani territory the IAF Canberra B (I) 58s of Nos. 5 and 35 Squadrons would stay below about 1,000 feet during their approach and exit phases. This posed a difficult night interception problem. The PAF F-104s had, in these circumstances, to be used in an unconventional low-altitude intercept profile that severely challenged the capabilities of its airborne radar. To pick up low-flying bombers on their scope, the F-104 pilots had to get down to about 300-500 feet ASL to point their radars upward and clear of the ground clutter at the IAF bombers. The problem was exacerbated by the Canberra’s tail warning audible alarm that would go off the moment an F-104 got to near astern position and enable the bomber to take timely evasive action to shake off its pursuer.
‘The F-104 was the only night fighter the PAF had’ says Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam Khan. ‘Its radar was good for high altitude, line astern missile attack, but was unusable below 5,000 feet, because of ground clutter. Also, if the target started to turn, it was not possible to deliver a missile attack. These were the limitations of the system. The IAF Canberra bombers would operate at night, usually below 500 feet. One aircraft would drop flares while others bombed the targets. After delivering their ordnance they would exit at low altitude, but as they approached the border, the Canberra’s would start climbing. At this time the F-104s would be vectored for the intercept. The IAF had also installed tail warning radars on their Canberras. As the F-104 started to get into a firing position, the bombers would start a defensive turn and radar contact would be lost. Twice, I had made radar contact but as I closed into missile range, the aircraft executed a defensive manoeuvre. On the night of 21 September Squadron Leader (later ACM) Jamal A. Khan, flying F-104A 56-874, intercepted an IAF Canberra B (I) 58 at about 33,000 feet. He executed a perfect ‘textbook’ attack and shot it down with a Sidewinder near Fazilka, inside Pakistani territory. The bomber pilot, Flight Lieutenant Manmohan Lowe, ejected and was taken prisoner but the navigator, Flying Officer A. K. Kapor, who could not eject, was killed in the action. (The British-built Canberra B (I) 58, unlike its American counterpart, the Martin B-57, which the PAF used, had no ejection seat for the navigator). The Canberra pilot stated that the tail warning radar made very annoying beeping sounds at low level. Therefore, he had switched it off and he had forgotten to switch it on again as he had climbed out. This was the first kill achieved by an F-104 at night after a number of near misses. Although the F-104 made only one night kill, it did prevent the enemy from doing damage. The threat or fear of the F-104, forced the Canberras to operate at low altitude levels, once over Pakistani airspace. This prevented the attacking pilots from making determined attacks. They did not, or could not properly identify their targets and thus dropped their bombs at random, doing little or no damage.
Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam PAF who claimed nine IAF aircraft and two damaged in the 1965 Indo-Pak war.
‘As the war progressed’ continues Aftab Alam Khan, ‘a radar controller assigned to the army gun radar unit told me that the army radar could see the IAF Canberras very clearly at night, but the track length was limited to approximately twenty nautical miles. I realized that this was good enough for the F-104 to make an interception. With its high speed it could position behind the target very fast. Once this was done, the F-104 could be aligned with the help of its infrared (IR) gun-sight for a missile or a gun attack. The Canberra tail warning radar was ineffective at low altitude. To get the system working only a radio had to be installed in the army radar unit. The war ended before the system was made effective and put into practice.
‘Flying the high speed F-104 at night in wartime conditions was hazardous. The environment was as hostile and dangerous as the enemy. When there was no moon, the nights were pitch-dark, as the blackout was complete. Haze and poor visibility were common. The runway lights were switched on once the aircraft was about to pitch out for a landing. We were lucky if we could see the airfield lights on downward and turning base. The landing conditions were severe. The TACANs were not aligned with the runways. There were no approach lights, IFS or VASI. It was under these conditions that Flight Lieutenant Abbasi, while making an approach, crashed short of the runway. The F-104 was destroyed, but miraculously, he escaped and survived to fly again.
The remains of a PAF Sabre shot down over the Punjab.
‘A cease-fire had been agreed and the fighting was to stop at 3am on 23 September 1965. I was told to confirm the same from the air. The visibility was excellent but it was like a dark night. From 30,000 feet I could see the firing along the bomb-line. It looked like a ping pong match. Exactly at 3am the firing started to slow down and then it stopped completely. I made the report and was ordered to land back at the home base. As I came on final approach, I noticed the runway was tilted to the left. I turned left and I was no longer aligned with the runway. I approached in a zigzag manner and decided to go-around and try again. I guess the stress, fatigue and landing conditions were creating illusions. I asked for my squadron commander, who came immediately. I explained the problem and he gave me the necessary instructions. The next approach was worse, after which I had fuel left for two attempts. I tried again and I was told to overshoot. My squadron commander then told me to eject on the downwind. He was getting the helicopter airborne. Now, I had only 200lb of fuel left, just enough for one last approach. At this time the air traffic controller requested permission to switch on the entire airfield lights, as the war was over. As soon as this was done, my senses returned to normal and a safe landing was carried out. Thus ended the 1965 lndo-Pak War. The F-104 and myself had seen the start and we saw the finish; a lucky and historic coincidence.
‘Pakistan got the better of the IAF, with odds of 1:6 or 150:900. Air superiority was maintained day and night. The genius and courage of Air Marshal Nut Khan and F-104/F-86 team had made this possible. Undoubtedly the F-86 was the workhorse, but the F-104 had a very special task. The PAF pilot/F-104 team had created a situation where the IAF pilots did not have the will to fight the F-104. When the F-104 was up, the IAF was ‘Down on the Ground’. This removed a major portion of the threat. The Starfighter and its pilots had contributed immensely to achieving this victory. The pilots fought very aggressively, never losing an opportunity to engage the enemy by day or night. Working long hours and flying under difficult flight conditions, the maintenance crews and the F-104s deserve a special accolade: not one technical abort or snag affected a mission! The F-104 was flown by determined pilots, maintained by efficient crew and supported by dedicated radar controllers. This made a tremendous team that helped win the battle for air superiority for the PAF. The F-104 Starfighter was in a ‘class of its own’; ‘superlative’ to say the least. Without the dozen Starfighters the outcome of the war may not have been so good. It definitely was a pleasure, a thrill and the ultimate experience to fly the F-104 in combat.’
The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. The PAF lost twenty-five aircraft (eleven in air combat), while the Indians lost sixty (twenty-five in air combat). Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17% of its front line strength, while India’s losses amounted to less than 10%. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out and it has been estimated that another three week’s fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33% and India’s losses totalling fifteen percent. Air superiority was not achieved and was unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberras from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority. Most assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. The war proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defences in a ‘blitzkrieg’ fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long. Pakistan Air Force on the other hand gained much credibility and reliability among Pakistan military and international war writers for the successful defence of Lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation to India on the next day. Some pilots were scrambled six times in less than an hour on indication of Indian air raids. Pakistan Air Force along with the army is celebrated on Defence Day and Air Force Day in commemoration of this in Pakistan (6 and 7 September respectively). Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), particularly for West Pakistan’s obsession with Kashmir. Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir. Despite some PAF attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan, India did not retaliate in that sector, although East Pakistan was defended only by an under strength infantry division, sixteen aircraft and no tanks. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1971.39
Once again, the IAF outnumbered the PAF by nearly five to one. More significant, however, the qualitative advantage enjoyed by the PAF in 1965 had been considerably reduced. Indian, Bangladeshi and international sources consider the beginning of the war to have been Operation ‘Chengiz Khan’ (inspired by the success of Israeli Operation ‘Focus’ in the Arab-Israeli Six Day War) when Pakistan launched pre-emptive air strikes on eleven Indian airbases in north-western India, including Agra, 300 miles from the border on the evening of 3 December (the Moslem Sabbath) at about 1740 hours. Though PAF put up no more than fifty aircraft a total of 183 bombs were dropped rendering the Indian airfields useless for six hours to six days. At around 1743 hours in the twilight hours of 3 December a Mirage III of the PAF came over Pathankot airfield to drop bombs and strafe the Hawker Hunter Mk.56 base. Pathankot is a mere sixty seconds flying time from the border and offered the least amount of early warning to India. In 1965 the PAF managed to do considerable damage to the airfield in a surprise attack but this time all the aircraft were dispersed to rear airfields like Ambala, Palam and Hindon. Wing Commander Cecil Vivian Parker the 20 Squadron OC, was in a meeting with Air Commodore T. S. Brar, at the time of the PAF pre-emptive attack. All detachments returned to Pathankot in the early hours of 4 December. As the Commanding Officer, Parker exercised his privilege of mounting the first mission which was to attack Peshawar airfield. The attack was a classic in the air war of 1971. Erstwhile, only Canberras had dared to fly to Peshawar and bomb it.
During the 1965 War, Canberras of 5 Squadron managed a solitary raid on the night of 13/14 September to Peshawar. Canberras were chosen, as no other aircraft had the range to fly the distance. The Hunter Mk.56 was equipped with four 100 imperial gallon tanks to extend its range but even so and with no external weapons load, the aircraft did not have the range to fly to Peshawar and back. Between the wars, the Hunter Mk.56A was acquired which could carry two 100 gallon outboard and two 230 gallon tanks on its inner pylons, thus extending its range. Trials were made before the war, testing the aircraft’s range. On one occasion two Hunters were flown lo-hi-lo all the way from Pathankot to the Jamnagar firing range, overflying Agra and Ahmedabad, so the pilots had sufficient confidence in the Hunter’s ability to reach Peshawar and back. Even then, the aircraft would have to carry only cannons, dispensing with any external stores such as bombs or rockets. The allowance for air combat and evasive manoeuvres was marginal if non-existent. There being no Hunters on 20 Squadron at Pathankot on 3 December, Parker was authorised to borrow two aircraft from the neighbouring unit, the 27 ‘Flaming Arrows’ Squadron and the mission launch time was fixed at around 0430 hours on 4 December to enable both the pilots to reach Peshawar at first light.
Wing Commander Cecil Parker took Flight Lieutenant C. S. Dhillon as his No.2. When they went over to 27 Squadron’s dispersal area to pick up the Hunters, the OC was dismayed to find that the Hunters had rocket rails fixed under their wings. Flying at extreme range, the rocket rails would have been a tremendous drag on the aircraft’s performance. But time did not permit the ground crew to turn around the aircraft for their removal and Parker was eager to start at 0430 hours to avoid spending too much time in hostile territory in daylight. Both Hunters took off on time and after almost seventy-five minutes of flying, pulled up over Peshawar airfield, as dawn was breaking. Parker and Dhillon noticed three Sabres were already in the air at a distance. But due to the probability of the sun shining in the Pakistani pilots’ eyes, the Hunters were not spotted. After identifying the airfield, both Parker and Dhillon went in for the first strafing run. Dhillon noticed a Bulk Petroleum Installation (BPI) and made it a target for his second run. Parker identified two Sabres on the ground refuelling from a bowser and in his second run totalled it, with big plumes of black smoke confirming his hits. Two strafing runs were all that were allowed for this mission and both the Hunters rendezvoused to fly back to Pathankot, when the three Sabres which were noticed earlier vectored towards the returning Hunters. The Sabres slowly caught up with the Hunters and some hits were scored on them. With still a long way to go and the Sabres slowly making some headway in hitting the Hunters, Parker called for a break. Till then his objective had been to get himself and his wingman out safely, but with his Hunter already having bullet holes in its tanks and fuselage, the prospect of Parker rushing to help Dhillon was dim. On the order to split, Dhillon banked his aircraft hard port and headed towards Jammu. The F-86s split too, with one peeling off to chase Dhillon, while the other two stuck to Parker’s tail.
F-86 Sabre of the Pakistan Air Force.
Survivors of the section of four F-86F Sabres which attacked Amritsar radar on 11 September 1965 seen after their return. They are, from L-R: Flight Lieutenant Cecil Chaudhry, Wing Commander Anwar Shamin (now Air Marshal and C-in-C PAF) and Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti. Note the smoke-blackened gun panel of the Sabre.
‘This’ Parker recalls, ‘…was a godsend. If they had sent two Sabres to chase the less experienced Dhillon, they might have got him!’
With two Sabres on his tail, Parker arrived over the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The chase was at a low level. And just south of the two cities, Parker noticed some high ground approaching rapidly. He was faced with a dilemma, to increase power and pull up and in the process exhausted his reserves even more, or to turn around. He chose a manoeuvre which would probably have meant death in a dogfight; he turned his aircraft around, dropping half flaps and losing speed. The Hunter cleared the obstacle in a tight turn. The Sabre that was chasing him was flying too fast to follow a tight turn and the Pakistani pilot pulled back into a high-speed turn. Parker, on coming out of the turn, noticed that the Pakistani pilot had in fact overshot him and, having lost sight of his adversary, was searching frantically in the skies by jinking his aircraft around. Parker could not let go of this opportunity and he closed in and fired his little remaining ammunition into the Sabre which plunged into the ground and blew up. The second Sabre was nowhere to be seen and Parker never knew what happened to the second Pakistani pilot, who probably was lost in the chase. Now devoid of any adversaries on his tail, he set course for Pathankot. Parker received some sporadic ground fire just near the border, which could have come from either side. He had radioed to Pathankot about his precarious fuel situation and Pathankot ATC cleared him to land ‘at any runway, any place.’
Meanwhile Dhillon was coming in from the direction of Jammu, to Pathankot. He had received several hits from the Sabre but all the same shook him off and lost him. Dhillon too made a similar call to Pathankot and was approaching it with his fuel reserves at the minimum. Parker, being nearer to the airfield, landed first; his engine flamed out due to lack of fuel. Dhillon too landed with empty tanks. Both the aircraft had numerous bullet holes. Parker’s aircraft received twenty-two hits from the tail controls right up to the cockpit area. Two Sabres on the ground were confirmed destroyed, as was one Sabre in air combat.
Both the damaged aircraft were returned to 27 Squadron with gratitude as well as apologies. Meanwhile the aircraft of 20 Squadron had returned to Pathankot. One aircraft was fired at eagerly by the Indian air defence gunners. Luckily no damage was done.
The second strike of the Lightnings was already underway by the time the first strike had landed. Squadron Leader Jal Maneksha Mistry, the senior most pilot of the squadron after the CO, along with Squadron Leader Bajpai, flew to attack Kohat, which was also at the extreme range of the aircraft. Bajpai’s Hunter started too late, so Mistry flew alone to attack Kohat airfield. The target was identified and attacked, the aircraft being recovered successfully. Lieutenant Arun Prakash, Indian Navy, led the third mission with Karumbaya as his wingman to attack Chaklala Airfield. The aircraft arrived over Chaklala to find a number of unidentified aircraft, from light executive aircraft to C-130s. Arun Prakash identified and destroyed a C-130, with his colleague attacking and hitting several hangers and installations. Squadron Leader A. A. D. Rozario, another senior flight commander, led the attack to Murid airfield with Flying Officer Balasubramanian as his No.2 and Kailey and Flight Lieutenant Deoskar as his No.3 and No.4. Arriving over Murid airfield, the aircraft received the now familiar response of ack-ack fire. The first pair of pilots, Rozario and Balasubramanian immediately identified several targets and attacked them. One ‘needle-nosed aircraft’, in all probability an F-104 or a Mirage III, which was camouflaged, was identified and destroyed. Later a sortie by a PR Sukhoi-7 confirmed the destruction of this aircraft. The second pair of Kailey and Deoskar missed the target. So they carried out some interdiction before returning safely back to base.
Air Marshal Nur Khan, 6th chief of the PAF 23 July to 31 August 1969 prior to his first flight in a 9 Squadron F-104 Starfighter.
Back at Pathankot, the SASO, HQ WAC telephonically ordered a second strike on Peshawar airfield. Wing Commander Parker advised against it, as the gains may not be commensurate with the effort. The SASO overruled the CO and a second raid on Peshawar was launched. Two Hunters flown by Squadron Leader K. N. Bajpai and Flying Officer K. P. Muralidharan took off for Peshawar. Their standing orders were clear, at such an extreme range, all air combat was to be ignored and as feared both the pilots ran into air opposition, intercepted by Sabres as soon as they had completed their attack. Bajpai called for a break and a rendezvous to fly back to Pathankot, but Murali, instead of evading the attacking Sabres, got involved in a dogfight. Muralidharan was last seen flying north of Peshawar in combat with a Sabre. Bajpai had enough problems of his own with the Sabres taking shots at him. However Bajpai managed to shake off his pursuers, but found himself in a damaged aircraft, with diminishing fuel reserves. He knew he would never reach Pathankot. Base suggested that Bajpai land at Jammu, where a new airfield was being constructed. Jammu received the attention of the GREF just before the beginning of the war and an engineer force along with civilian labour was engaged in rebuilding the runway. Jammu was notified by Pathankot about Bajpai’s imminent arrival and all the construction equipment was cleared off the runway to enable the Hunter pilot to land safely.
Labourers cleared the debris and equipment as the smoking Hunter came into land. Bajpai put the Hunter down neatly, but the runway proved to be too short for him; the Hunter overshot at the Tawi end and placed itself snugly on a civilian truck which was unloading masonry, at the end of the runway. He climbed down safely, none the worse for his landing experience. The GREF personnel marvelled at the unique sight of the Hunter sitting on the truck. Later a driver came and drove the truck with the Hunter on it, to the repair shop!
Thus ended the first day strikes of Lightning squadron. Five missions were flown to four different airfields and at least four aircraft on the ground and an F-86 in the air were assessed to have been destroyed. The other Hunter squadron at Pathankot, 27, flew some missions to Pakistani airfields too. However they lost two of their Hunters to PAF’s F-6s on two different occasions. Both the pilots missing in action.
As dawn broke on 5 December the first raid of the day was already on the way. Squadron Leader Ravi Bharadwaj and Flight Lieutenant Gahlaut flew to attack Chaklala airfield. The pilots continued the good work done by Lieutenant Arun Prakash and his wingmen the day earlier and successfully knocked out some aircraft on the ground. Bharadwaj, adding a C-130 transport to the tally and Gahlaut, destroying a Twin Otter. The Twin Otter was admitted to have been destroyed by Radio Pakistan, but the Otter belonged to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) detachment with the UNMOGIP. Though the aircraft were observed as having been painted as white, it was difficult for the pilots to actually confirm that the aircraft belonged to the UN.
Parker was to lead the second raid of the day to Mianwali at around 1431 hours, with Dhillon as his No.2 and Balasubramanian and Arun Prakash as the No.3 and 4. Parker’s aircraft failed to start and Dhillon’s aircraft went unserviceable after getting airborne. Nevertheless the strike was underway with Bala as the leader. One C-130 was identified and Arun Prakash knocked the aircraft out, destroying it completely. Some other light aircraft too were destroyed. The attack on Mianwali was timed to coincide with another mission to Sakesar radar station. Sakesar was the air defence centre of the PAF which was instrumental in directing the air defence fighters of the PAF. Squadron Leaders Jal Mistry and Karumbaya were designated to take off for the mission, which was at the same time as the other raid on Mianwali. Karumbaya’s Hunter failed to start. Jal Mistry again decided to fly alone to Sakesar. The Indian Air Force strongly discourages pilots to fly on solitary missions alone. But Mistry decided to go alone. Parker himself was not available, being in the air himself. Mistry flew alone to Sakesar and successfully rocketed it. Bala and Arun Prakash, who were returning from Mianwali, got a radio call from Mistry announcing the damage to Sakesar. It was the last they ever heard from him. Mistry was intercepted by a Mirage III flown by Flight Lieutenant Safdar. The PAF pilot scored a hit with an air-to-air missile and reported the Hunter going down. Mistry was killed in the crash. Sakesar was to become a death trap for Hunters that day.
Much earlier in the day, another mission of two Hunters from 27 Squadron struck at Sakesar. These two Hunters were intercepted in the return leg by two MiG-19s from Mianwali and shot down, both the pilots being killed. Mistry was the third pilot to be shot down attacking the same target. Back at Pathankot, Mistry was declared missing. Later, a Pakistani broadcast was picked up specifying that Mistry was shot down over Pakistan. It appeared that either Mistry was a PoW or that the Pakistanis had recovered something to identify him, most probably his Identity Card, which incidentally pilots were not supposed to carry with them. However, much later on, the pilots at the Lightning Squadron came to know that Mistry was killed in the combat. Four Hunters flown by Flying Officers’ DeMonte, Suraj Kumar, ‘Bond’ Heble and Kailey flew a sortie to Lahore and Walton in search of opportunity targets. They found and attacked some railway installations and a train somewhere near Walton. They came back without damage. The last mission of the day was a two ship strike against Chak Jumra by Deoskar and A.K. ‘Bomber’ Sharma. By end of the second day of operations, No.20 Squadron had flown nine missions and destroyed more than six Pakistani aircraft on the ground for the loss of two Hunters and their pilots.
From 6 December onwards, 20 Squadron turned its attention from counter air to economic targets. Those were targets whose destruction would prove to be damaging to the Pakistani industry. Top of the list was the Attock oil refinery, which was situated South East of Rawalpindi. This target was defended by a good network of anti-aircraft guns controlled by the nearby airfield of Chaklala which was about twenty miles away. Destruction of the refinery or, at the very least, hampering its operations, would impose a severe crunch in the POL reserves of the Pakistanis. It was planned to send a four ship strike to Attock. Wing Commander Parker, along with Squadron Leader Bajpai, Flying Officers DeMonte and Karumbaya were the pilots on this mission. Technical snags prevented Karumbaya’s Hunter from starting. Finally Parker, DeMonte and Bajpai took off to attack the refinery. The actual routing of the Hunters took them over for a diversionary attack on to Chaklala, then executing a turnabout and hitting the Attock Oil Refinery from the west. The AA guns were caught napping at first. The refinery was shrouded in camouflage and the AA guns were defending it to the last inch. Parker was the first to dive in. The Hunters carried cannon ammunition and the first burst set fire to the fuel tanks. The fire spread quickly through the refinery fuelled by the vapours. The blaze spread so fast that their height was reaching the Hunters which were making their second run. The ack-ack fire could not make its presence felt and all the aircraft were recovered safely. Gun camera pictures of the raid prove the accuracy of the damage to the facilities. PR recce confirmed the damage to the refinery. The fire in the refinery resulted in a ‘beautiful blaze’ lasting several days and nights. Indian bombers flying in the stealth of the night reported the flames which served as a navigational aid for some days to come.
The first effort to attack a economic target was a success for the squadron. Focus soon shifted towards interdiction. A strike was launched against railway targets on the Wazirawali-Lahore railway axis and the raid was uneventful in terms of opposition encountered.
The next economic target on the list of 20 Squadron was the Mangla Hydel Dam which was attacked in the morning of 7 December. The strike was scheduled to be a four aircraft mission. Squadron Leader R. N. Bharadwaj led the raid, with Dhillon, Chowfin and Heble as his wingmen. All the Hunters were equipped with two 68mm rocket pods. Mangla Dam has been assigned as a target for the squadron as far back as October. Parker was briefed about the position and location of the dam and the objective was given as the destruction of the Hydro Electric Station at the foot of the dam. With no pictures to go by and instructions to knock out the Hydel Station, a trip for Parker was arranged to the Joginder Nagar Dam in Punjab. This dam was supposed to simulate the actual layout of Mangla dam and Parker was allowed to study the area in detail. Later, Parker and Bharadwaj, flew a dummy sortie to the Joginder Nagar Dam, to try and test their tactics. All the training paid off, when Bharadwaj led the actual raid on the Mangla Dam, he found the target exactly as they imagined it, with the Hydel station at the foot of the dam, with two AA guns on top of it. Again the enemy AA defences were caught napping. They could not respond effectively to stop the Hunters which, by that time, had set fire to and damaged the Hydel Station. The Hunters suffered several cannon stoppages and failure of the rocket pods to fire, but all in all, the power station was badly knocked about.
A second strike was planned later in the day. Bharadwaj deputed to lead the aircraft again, accompanied by Dhillon, Sharma and Chowfin. But Bharadwaj’s aircraft suffered problems, the engine refusing to start, and the remaining three carried out the raid, without damage or loss. Squadron Leader Rozario led a four-aircraft mission to Kohat, with DeMonte and Karumbaya as his wingmen. The fourth aircraft flown by Deoskar, returned to base as soon as it suffered some technical snags after takeoff. The raid was successful.
Meanwhile, Wing Commander Parker led a mission to Murid airfield, a forward station for a MiG-19 squadron and some Sabres. Arun Prakash and Bajpai flew with Parker on this mission. Gremlins made their presence felt yet once again, when the fourth aircraft, being flown by Balasubramanian was rendered unserviceable due to snags before takeoff.
Parker arrived over Murid and, identifying two Sabres on the ground, made a strafing run on them. One of the Sabres burst into flames emitting smoke, while the other did not. This left a doubt in the pilots’ minds that the aircraft could have been some dummy/decoy aircraft.
As the aircraft were pulling out of the raid, one of the pilots noticed an aerial mast dead ahead in their path, with wires dangling from it. This mast was not marked out in the map and its presence slightly unnerved the pilots, who thought it was some anti-aircraft measure.
Squadron Leader Munirudda ‘Munir’ ud-Din Ahmed PAF who was KIA while attacking a high-powered heavily defended radar station near Amritsar on 11 September 1965 when his F-86F was shot down by ground fire. Before his last sortie, ‘Munir’ flew eight combat missions and shot down an IAF Gnat on 10 September. He was posthumously awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat.
The aircraft had to take drastic evasive measures to avoid crashing into the mast or its wires. In all probability, it was an unmarked aerial on the Indian maps, but it did unnerve the formation for a brief moment. A second strafing run was made over Murid, including the hangers and installations which looked like housing some aircraft, was carried out. But the damage if any was difficult to assess.
Murid received further attention the very next morning. This time Squadron Leader Bharadwaj was leading the mission, with Heble, Karumbaya and Deoskar. This time they struck gold. A transport was destroyed by Bharadwaj, while Karumbaya and Deuskar attacked and destroyed two fighters, later identified as MiG-19s.
The squadron flew its next major number of sorties on 10 December. In response to the Indian Army’s call for close support in the Chamb sector, the Lightnings contributed to the support requests of the ground forces. First among the aircraft was a two-aircraft strike by Squadron Leader R. N. Bharadwaj and Karumbaya. They engaged some Pakistani tank and gun positions across the Manawar Tawi.
It was during one such attacking run that Karumbaya felt his Hunter shudder under the impact of bullets from a Sabre that had bounced him. Karumbaya broke left, with his tanks and aircraft holed, but Bharadwaj who was coming behind Karumbaya engaged the Sabre and shot it down. The aircraft, which crashed in Indian territory, confirmed the kill. Bharadwaj then shepherded Karumbaya who flew his damaged aircraft back to Pathankot.
PAF Sabres were very much active that day over Chamb. Hunters of 27 Squadron too flew missions to Chamb. One Hunter flown by Squadron Leader M. K. Jain was hit by ground fire and was lost along with the pilot. Ground fire also hit and damaged one of 20 Squadron’s aircraft. Squadron Leader Rozario and Heble were flying over the area when Rozario’s Hunter was hit repeatedly by ack-ack fire. Rozario with great difficulty flew the aircraft back to Pathankot, with Heble acting as a shepherd.
When Rozario put the aircraft onto the runway, he discovered that the tyres were punctured by ack-ack and the resultant force on the undercarriage sheared the landing gear off, as the aircraft hit the runway on its belly and slithered out of control over a distance. It finally came to a stop after some distance and Rozario walked out of the Hunter unscathed. The belly landed Hunter was badly damaged and was sent for repairs, flying only after the war. Meanwhile Heble had safely returned and landed.
The squadron carried out about ten sorties on 11 December. After a week of hectic operational flying from 4 to 10 December, the squadron was withdrawn from the forward base to Hindon, where it was to take a break from operations and give the pilots some rest. All the pilots were pulled back to Hindon, leaving behind the ground crew and about five of them. 20 Squadron was relieved by aircraft of 7 ‘Battle Axes’ Squadron and MiG-21s from 30 Squadron. The ‘Battle Axes’ in fact shared the ground crew facilities of the ‘Lightnings’. For the remaining six days of the war some of the five pilots left behind at Pathankot flew missions along with 7 Squadron in their aircraft. The Hunters also flew some air defence sorties from Hindon during the remaining days of the war. The general mood of the squadron was that after a brief rest period of a week or so the squadron would again be sent to the frontline. All the pilots were very eager to fly back to Pathankot and start operations again. But as the days went by the probability of the war coming to an end increased with the imminent collapse of the Pakistan Army in the Eastern Sector; the pilots felt somewhat disappointed at an opportunity being lost.
They would not know it, but fate had decried that the ‘Lightnings’ would soon face a bigger challenge and instructions were already being issued in that direction. Soon after the move to Hindon, Wing Commander Parker was brought to Air HQ for some top secret discussions. There at the meeting, he was asked, whether his Hunters would be able to operate out of an airfield in Visakhapatnam, off the coast of the Bay of Bengal in Andhra Pradesh. Parker had neither heard of Visakhapatnam’s airfield, nor had he ever been there, but by the demands of the situation, felt that the Hunters could land on the runway employing their drag chutes to cut their run short. The advent of the cease-fire made such a move unnecessary.
On 4/5 December 1971 Flight Lieutenant Naeem Atta of 5 Squadron flying a Mirage IIIEP shot down a IAF Canberra B(I) 58 with a Matra R.530 AAM during a night interception near Skardu, Pakistan. Flight Lieutenants Lloyd Moses Sasoon, pilot and Ram Netharam Advani navigator were killed.
Flying Officer (later Air Chief Marshal) Mushaf Ali Mir Shaheed a F-6 Shenyang pilot with one air-to-air victory in the 1971 war.
Squadron Leader Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui.
On 5 December 1971 Flight Lieutenant Safdar Mahmood flying a Mirage shot down a IAF Hunter (A 1014) of 20 Squadron piloted by Squadron Leader Jal Maneksha Mistry. The pilot ejected but it was too late.
On the 6 December 1971 when Flight Lieutenant Salimuddin Awan of 5 Squadron at Sargodha shot down a IAF Su-7 over Jammu sector. In total Flight Lieutenant Salimuddin flew 17 sorties during the war, including two Air Test flights to certify the airworthiness of the aircraft.
When a tally was compiled for the ‘Lightnings’ at the end of the war, the squadron turned out to be the highest scoring unit in the IAF during the 1971 conflict. Since its primary objective had been counter air, the unit had a total of thirteen enemy aircraft destroyed on ground. Two F-86 Sabres were also downed in air combat. There was one occasion when a hapless Mirage III found itself for a brief moment in the sight of one of the Hunters. The gun camera film is a treasured souvenir in the squadron reminding them of the discomfort of the Pakistani Mirage pilot, who jinked and weaved to get out of the firing line of the Hunter flown by A. K. ‘Bomber’ Sharma who had no ammunition left!
Squadron Leader Shabbir Hussain Syed in front of PAF F-86 Sabre 55-4029 a veteran of the 1965 and 1971 war with India. During this conflict, while flying with 14 Squadron, it saw heavy combat and scored several air-to-air and air-to-ground confirmed victories. It also participated in the decisive strike against IAF Base Kalaikunda, thus earning the unit the distinguished title of ‘The Tail Choppers’.
Including the eight days of operational flying, 20 Squadron had flown a total of 121 sorties throughout the war amounting to about 115:30 hours. In this period, they fired about 15,000 rounds of cannon ammo, dropped about 17,000 lbs of HE bombs, 1720 litres of napalm and 548 rockets at enemy targets. The claim of thirteen enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground included four C-130 Hercules, one Twin Otter, one Viscount and a light-executive aircraft. Renowned US pilot, Brigadier General Charles E. Yeager, who was then on deputation to the PAF as an Advisor,40 lost his USAF Beech Queen Air aircraft in Chaklala, which might well have been lost to the Lightning’s onslaught. 41
As the war progressed, PAF B-57s carried out many night missions. There was a higher attrition rate than in 1965, with at least five B-57s being put out of service by the end of the war. They were retired from PAF service in 1985.
The F-104 was used for deep penetration strikes against airfields and radars on 11 December. Two F-104s attacked Amritsar and Faridkot IAF radars. Wing Commander Arif Iqbal, who not only damaged the radar but also shot down a HAL HAOP-27 Krishak military observation aircraft, led the attack on Faridkot. The PAF admitted to losing just three aircraft and the onset of night prevented any further advantage the attackers may have had. In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with initial air strikes that very night. These air strikes were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning and thereafter, which followed interceptions by Pakistanis anticipating this action. This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Indira Gandhi ordered the immediate mobilisation of troops and launched the full-scale invasion. This involved Indian forces in a massive coordinated air, sea and land assault. Indian Air Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from midnight. The main Indian objective on the western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan.
Squadron Leader Mervyn L. Middlecoat (right) with AM Nur Khan, who led 9 Squadron Sabres of the PAF.
After the initial pre-emptive strike, PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. When the IAF struck back the next day, two of 9 Squadron’s F-104As flown by Squadron Leaders Amanullah and Rashid Bhatti attacked Amritsar radar. They met with stiff resistance but managed to shoot down two aircraft, an IAF Gnat and a Sukhoi Su-7 ‘Fitter’ over Sargodha. The pilot of the Gnat, Flight Lieutenant J. Preira, was killed.
The Gnats most notable action was the Battle of Boyra on 22 November, where the first dogfights over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) took place. Intruding PAF Canadair Sabre Mk.6s of 14 Squadron ‘Tail-choppers’ inadvertently crossed into Indian airspace while performing a close air support mission against the Mukti Bahini, the Bengali Guerrilla freedom fighters and a Battalion sized detachment of the Indian Army which were fighting in the Battle of Garibpur against the PAF as part of the Bangladesh Liberation War. The first intrusion of four Sabres was picked up in the Jessore area on Indian radar at 0811 hours. Four Gnats of 22 Squadron ‘Swifts’ based in Kalaikunda Air Force Station and tasked with the Air Defence of the Calcutta Sector were scrambled from Dum Dum but the Sabres had flown back to their territory by the time the Gnats could make it to Boyra. A second raid by the Pakistanis followed at 1028 hours. An interception again could not be carried out in time and the Sabres were able to escape to safety.
At around 1448 hours, Indian radar picked up the four Sabres as they pulled up in a north westerly direction to about 2,000 feet above ground level. Within a minute, the ORP at Dum Dum was scrambled. Four Gnats took off by 1451 hours led by the formation leader Flight Lieutenant Roy Andrew Massey. It was less than three minutes from the time the Sabres were detected by the radar. The Fighter controller in the sector was Flying Officer K. B. Bagchi who vectored the gnats to the Sabres and directed the interception. The Sabres already having carried out several attack runs in the eight minutes it took the Gnats to reach the Boyra Sailent, were commencing to start another dive - they were at about 1,800 feet and diving down to 500 feet in an attack run. The four Gnats separated into two sections and dived into the attack to bounce the Sabres. The first section of Gnats was of Massey and Flying Officer S. F. Soarez as his wingman. The second section consisted of Flight Lieutenant M. A. Ganapathy and Flying Officer D. Lazarus. As the Gnats dived in, a section of two Sabres pulled out of the attack and placed themselves in an awkward position, just in front of Ganapathy and Lazarus. Ganapathy called out on the R/T the Brevity code ‘Murder-Murder-Murder’. Both the pilots opened fire with 20mm cannon fire and both the Sabres were badly damaged. The Pakistani pilots Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Khaleel Ahmed ejected over Boyra and parachuted down safely and were taken prisoner. The wreckage of the abandoned Sabres fell near the village of Bongaon in India. Simultaneously Massey pulled up over Ganapathy and Lazarus to latch onto another Sabre piloted by Wing Commander Chaudhury, who, in a skillful dog-fighting move, broke into Massey’s attack forcing him to take a high angle-off burst which missed his target. After manoeuvering back into firing position and taking aim, Massey let off another burst at 700 yards and hit him in the port wing. By that time, Massey’s starboard cannon had stopped firing, but the Sabre streaked back into Pakistani territory billowing smoke and fire. Massey, realizing that he was well over East Pakistani airspace in his chase, turned around and regrouped with the rest of his formation which then proceeded back to base. Early on it was thought that the badly damaged Sabre must have crashed soon after. Once the war had ended, however, reports confirmed that Chaudhury, showing considerable courage, had managed to fly his badly damaged Sabre back to Tezgaon airfield near Dhaka. Chaudhury himself claimed to have shot down one of the Gnats, which was later proved false as all four Gnats landed safely.
Pilots of 14 Squadron PAF at either Masroor or Sargodha. L-R: Pilot Officer (later Wing Commander) Badrul Hassan Khan; Flying Officer (later Squadron Leader) Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui, Squadron Leader Gul Ahmed; Flying Officer (later Wing Commander) Hamid ‘Harry’ Anwar (who flew as an exchange pilot at Phoenix, Arizona.; the RAF as a member of the world-famous ‘Blue Diamonds’ aerobatic team and the Royal Jordanian Air Force where he formed his own team ‘The Hashemite Diamonds’); Flight Lieutenant (later Air Marshal) Abdul Azim Daudpota.
Another notable dogfight involving a Gnat was over Srinagar airfield on 14 December where a lone Indian pilot, twenty-eight-year old Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon of 18 Squadron ‘The Flying Bullets’ held out against six Sabres of 26 Squadron from PAF base Peshawar, scoring hits on two of the Sabres in the process, before being shot down. Sekhon was on readiness duty at that time. As soon as the first aircraft attacked, Sekhon rolled for take-off as No.2 in a two-Gnat formation, with Flight Lieutenant Ghumman in lead, just as the first bombs were falling on the runway. Only delayed due to dust kicked up by the preceding Gnat, Sekhon lost no time in singling out the first Sabre pair, which was re-forming after the bombing run. The Gnat Leader, Ghuman, lost visual with his wingman just after take-off, and remained out of the fight. In the ensuing air battle, Sekhon scored a direct hit on one Sabre and set another ablaze, though it has been denied by all the sources of PAF. The latter was seen heading away towards Rajauri, trailing smoke. Sekhon, after being hit, was advised to return to the base. He is said to have flown in straight, wings level for some time, before inverting and plummeting down, probably due to failure of the control system. He attempted a last-minute ejection, which did not prove successful, as his canopy was seen to fly off. The wreckage of the Gnat was found in a gorge, near the road coming from Srinagar town to the base, a few miles from the base. Despite many search efforts by Army and Air Force, his body was never found due to the mountainous terrain over which his fighter went down. Sekhon was posthumously honoured with the Param Vir Chakra (India’s highest gallantry award), becoming the only member of the IAF to receive it.
During an attack on the radar installation at Amritsar on 5 December, 9 Squadron suffered its first loss of the war to anti-aircraft fire. Flight Lieutenant Amjad Hussein Khan ejected from his F-104 and was taken prisoner. As the war progressed, the Indian Air Force continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number of sorties flown by the PAF gradually decreased day-by-day. The Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict. Though PAF did not intervene during the Indian Navy’s raid on Pakistan’s naval port city of Karachi, it retaliated with bombing the Okha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that attacked. In the east, the small air contingent of 14 Squadron was destroyed, putting the Dhaka airfield out of commission and resulting in Indian air superiority in the east. While India’s grip on what had been East Pakistan tightened, the IAF continued to press home attacks against Pakistan itself. The campaign settled down to a series of daylight antiairfield, anti-radar and close-support attacks by fighters, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by B-57s and C-130 (Pakistan) and Canberras and An-12s (India).
By 1971 the MiG-21 had become numerically the most important fighter in the IAF, with 232 in service, enough to equip nine squadrons. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd had been producing improved model MiG-21FLs under license. In addition, the IAF had six squadrons of Soviet-built Sukhoi Su-7BM supersonic fighter-bombers. The PAF had three squadrons of French-built Mirage IIIEJs from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally (who remains unknown) and three squadrons of Shenyang F-6s (illegal Chinese copies of Russia’s supersonic MiG-19F), which the Pakistanis had improved with British Martin-Baker ejection seats and American Sidewinder missiles.42 In addition, the Pakistanis had replaced their older model F-86Fs with five squadrons of a far more potent version; the Canadair Sabre Mark 6, acquired via West Germany and Iran. The F-6s were employed mainly on defensive combat air patrols over their own bases, but without air superiority the PAF was unable to conduct effective offensive operations and its attacks were largely ineffective. During the IAF’s airfield attacks, one US and one UN aircraft were damaged in Dhaka, while a Canadian Air Force Caribou was destroyed at Islamabad, along with US military liaison chief, Brigadier General Chuck Yeager’s USAF Beech U-8 light twin.
Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against Pakistan’s forward air bases in the West until the end of the war and large scale interdiction and close-support operations and were maintained. Indian Canberras flew a strategically important sortie against the Karachi oil tanks; this had the effect of helping the Indian Navy in their own operations, a series of missile boat attacks against the Pakistani coast.43
In 1971 the PAF had three squadrons of Mirage IIIEJs, Pakistan having purchased 18 Mirage IIIEs and three Mirage IIIRs and three Mirage IIIDs from France in 1967. An additional ten Mirage IIIRs were delivered in 1977.
On 8 December Flight Lieutenant Manzoor Bokhari intercepted an IAF Canberra B (I) 58 and shot it down during a low-level chase. On 10 December, while attacking the Indian harbour at Okha, Wing Commander Arif Iqhal shot down a Breguet Alizé ASW aircraft of the Indian Navy (one of twelve supplied for 310 Squadron aboard the carrier Vikrant) into the sea over the Gulf of Kutch. Lieutenant Commander Ashok Roy, Lieutenant H. S. Sirohi and ACO Vijayan, were killed. On 12 December the PAF became the only nation to use the Starfighter in air-to-air combat, when two F-104s flying at low level towards Indian airfields or port installations bordering the Gulf of Kutch were intercepted by two MiG-21FLs of 47 Squadron from Jamnagar. One of the F-104As broke off and fled northward. The other Starfighter, which was flown by Wing Commander Middlecoat, one of the veterans of the 1965 War, was pursued over the Gulf by one of the MiG-21s, flown by Flight Lieutenant Bharat B. Soni. Applying full afterburner, Soni fired a K-13 missile, but the F-104 evaded it and then turned sharply to the right. Cutting inside the Starfighter’s turn and closing to 300 metres, Soni fired three bursts from his GSh-23 cannon and then watched the stricken F-104 pull up. Middlecoat ejected and parachuted into the shark-infested Gulf of Kutch. Soni called for a rescue launch, but no trace of his opponent was found. Flight Lieutenant Arun K. Dutta, another MiG-21 pilot, was awarded the claim of having shot down Flight Lieutenant Samad Changezi. Both Wing Commander Middlecoat and Flight Lieutenant Samad Changezi were awarded the ‘Sitara-e-Jurat’ (approximately equivalent to the British DFC).
On the last day of the war, 17 December, when 9 Squadron’s Starfighters clashed with MiG-21s of 29 Squadron, Squadron Leader I. S. Bindra claimed an F-104, though in fact it escaped with damage. In a later fight over Umarkot, Flight Lieutenant N. Kukresa made a similar premature claim on an F-104, but when he was attacked in turn by another Starfighter, Flight Lieutenant A. Datta blew it off his tail, killing Flight Lieutenant Samad Ali Changezi. While no MiGs were downed by Starfighters during the war, one was reportedly shot down by an F-6 on 14 December and another MiG-21 lost a dogfight with a Sabre flown by Flight Lieutenant Maqsood Amir of 16 Squadron on 17 December. The Indian pilot, Flight Lieutenant Harish Singjhi, bailed out and was taken prisoner.
Formation of four PAF F-86 Sabres on patrol during the 1975 Indo-Pak war.
MiG 21 of the IAF taking off. By 1971 the MiG-21 had become numerically the most important fighter in the Indian Air Force with 232 in service, enough to equip nine squadrons.
Although the PAF scored a three-to-one kill ratio, destroying 102 IAF aircraft and losing 34 aircraft of its own, the war was only three days old when East Pakistan fell. After just thirteen days, on 16 December, the war between India and Pakistan ended when Pakistan agreed to Indian demands for an unconditional surrender. The Indian victory was achieved with significant help from the Soviet Union. Although there was a US Government embargo on arms sales to both India and Pakistan (which had been in force ever since the 1965 war began), no consideration was given to the fact that India, a long-time ally of the soviet Union, barely used any American military equipment and the sanctions exclusively degraded the combat potential of only the Pakistani armed forces. At least one Tupolev Tu-126 ‘Moss’ AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft, which would effectively have observed every move the PAF made or intended to make, was detached, with its crew, to serve with the IAF during the 1971 war. Indian ECM effectively knocked out the Pakistani ground radar and communications network.
Hostilities officially ended at 1430 GMT on 17 December, after the fall of Dhaka on 15 December. India claimed large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war), though the independence of Bangladesh was confirmed. India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in the West, while PAF flew about thirty and 2,840 respectively. More than 80% of the IAF’s sorties were close-support and interdiction and about sixty-five IAF aircraft were lost (fifty-four losses were admitted), perhaps as many as twenty-seven of them in air combat. Pakistan lost seventy-two aircraft (fifty-one of them combat types, but admitting only twenty-five to enemy action). At least sixteen of the Pakistani losses fell in air combat (although only ten air combat losses were admitted, not including any F-6s, Mirage IIIs, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors). But the imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF’s considerably higher sortie rate and its emphasis on ground-attack missions. The Instrument of Surrender of Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan was signed at Ramna Race Course in Dhaka on 16 December 1971.
The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger feared Soviet expansion into South and Southeast Asia. Pakistan was a close ally of the People’s Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and the regional position of America’s new tacit ally, China. Nixon encouraged Iran and Jordan to send their F-86, F-104 and F-5 fighter jets in aid of Pakistan while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan. Ironically, late in 1972 the PAF decided to phase the F-104 out of service after the inventory had been decimated as a result of a US Government arms embargo which made it increasingly difficult to maintain a reasonable in-commission rate on the F-104A/Bs.
Endnotes for Chapter 3
26 Review of IAF operations against Pakistan by the Indian Ministry of Defence, New Delhi.
27 Initially the United States government tried to cover up the U-2’s purpose and mission, but was forced to admit its military nature when the Soviet government came forward with the U-2’s intact remains and captured pilot as well as photos of military bases in Russia taken by the aircraft. Coming roughly two weeks before the scheduled opening of an East-West summit in Paris, the incident was a great embarrassment to the United States and prompted a marked deterioration in its relations with the Soviet Union. Powers was convicted of espionage and sentenced to three years of imprisonment plus seven years of hard labour but would be released two years later on 10 February 1962 during a prisoner exchange for Soviet officer Rudolf Abel.
28 A licence-built version of the English Electric Canberra that entered service with the USAF in 1953. The Glenn L. Martin Company later modified the design to produce several unique variants.
29 The first thirteen Folland Gnats for the IAF were followed by partly completed aircraft and then sub-assemblies as Hindustan Aircraft slowly took over first assembly and then production of the aircraft. The first flight of an IAF Gnat was in the UK on 11 January 1958. It was delivered to India in the hold of a C-119 and accepted by the Air Force on 30 January 1958. The first Gnat squadron was 23 (Cheetah), which converted from Vampire FB.52 on 18 March 1960 using six Folland-built Gnats. The first aircraft built from Indian-built parts first flew in May 1962. The last Indian-built Gnat F.1 was delivered on 31 January 1974.
30 While not equal in performance to the Soviet-built MiG-15/17 the Dassault MD.450 Ouragan (‘Hurricane’ or ‘Toofani’ (Hindi) had proven itself in action during the 1956 conflict. On 25 June 1953, India ordered 71 Ouragans with the slightly uprated Nene 105 engine, with deliveries starting that year and completed in March 1954. An additional order for 33 second-hand Ouragans in March 1957 brought the total to 104. Selection of the Ouragan at this time reflected the decision to initiate diversification of supply sources. The Indian ‘Toofanis’ faced combat in 1961 when they performed air strikes against the Portuguese territory of Diu on the western coast of the Indian sub-continent. They were also used in ground attack missions against anti-government rebels in Assam and Nagaland, and in 1962 for reconnaissance missions in the Sino-Indian War. One ‘Toofani’ strayed over the border with Pakistan on 24 April 1965 and was forced to land by a PAF F-104 Starfighter. While the pilot was returned to India the aircraft was retained and ended up being displayed at the PAF Museum at Peshawar. As was the case in France, the Ouragan started to be replaced in front-line service by the Mystère IVA in 1957, being withdrawn fully from front line service in 1965, although it continued in use for some years as advanced trainer and target tug.
31 Keelor had been awarded the Vayu Sena in 1964. On 5 February 1964 he was detailed to ferry a Gnat from Poona to Palam in a formation of five aircraft. The last part of the flight had to be undertaken at a height of 41,000 feet. While descending to land at Palam, he discovered, at a height of 15,000 feet that there was no response from the engine to the throttle movements. After informing the leader Kellor immediately broke off the formation and attempted a landing at Palam, knowing full well that previous attempts to force land a Gnat had resulted in fatal or serious injury to the pilot. With great presence of mind and careful handling, he accomplished the forced landing successfully without any damage to the aircraft.
32 ‘On 10 September we came to know that our Boss had been awarded the Maha Vir Chakra ‘for gallantry in the face of the enemy.’ We were all proud of him and there was much rejoicing. He in turn had taken the news with utmost modesty, reminding us of the unfinished task ahead of us. We felt all the more glad for it indicated that we were as a unit an efficient fighting force.’
33 Squadron Leader Onkar Nath Kacker, 27 Squadron (PoW); Squadron Leader A. B. Devayya, 7 Squadron (also claimed by Flight Lieutenant Amjad Hussain); Squadron Leader Suresh B. Bhagwat, 7 Squadron; Flight Lieutenant B. Guha, 7 Squadron; Flying Officer Jagdev Singh Brar, 7 Squadron (KIA), near Sangla Hill. The PAF figures have been disputed by Indian sources which claim that Alam made four kills, attributing one of the losses (Squadron Leader Onkar Nath Kacker’s aircraft) to technical failure or some other cause, including the possibility of ground fire. They also claim that gun camera footage of Alam’s kills is yet to be made public and therefore some of the kills cannot be confirmed. On 16 September Alam claimed his seventh and final victory of the war, a Hawker Hunter near Amritsar. Flying Officer Farokh Dara Bunsha of 7 Squadron was KIA. In 1967 Alam was transferred as the Squadron Commander of the first squadron of Dassault Mirage III fighters procured by the PAF. He was removed from Staff College based on a false pretext in May 1969. His family moved to West Pakistan in around 1971, after the secession of East Pakistan. Being the eldest among eleven siblings in his family, Alam never married as he had to share the financial responsibilities of his younger sisters and brothers. In 1972 he commanded 26 Squadron for two months. In 1982 Alam retired as an Air Commodore and took up residence in Karachi. Since retiring, The Air Force legend was admitted to Pakistan Naval Station Shifa Hospital in Karachi. He died in Karachi on 18 March 2013. He was 77. He had been under treatment for respiratory problems for about 18 months.
34 On 16 September Ahmed was flying an F-86 in a low level raid against raid against the freight wagons in the goods yard at Gurdaspur Station. On a second pass at very low level through smoke from previous strikes his aircraft was hit by fragments from the exploding trucks. Twelve miles away from Pakistani territory he reported, ‘My cockpit is full of smoke.” He continued to fly his damaged aircraft westwards and added, ‘It seems alright now.’ It was not and Ahmed ejected from his burning Sabre. He did not survive. There is conjecture as to whether he was shot while descending in his parachute in the combat area.
35 Later Air Vice Marshal Prakash Sadashiv Rao Pingale VrC.
36 All three participants of the ill-fated Halwara Strike were awarded Sitara-e-Jurat while Sarfraz Rafiqui Shaheed was also awarded Pakistan’s highest leadership award, the Hilal-e-Jurat for his outstanding qualities of Leadership and solidarity. The Government awarded 77 acres of prime agricultural land as recompense with the awards of HJ and SJ which was most generously bequeathed by Rafiqui’s parents to the Sarfraz Rafiqui Welfare Trust administered by the PAF to benefit widows, orphans and the needy. Younus Hussain Shaheed’s widow brought up her sons Sajjad and Fawad who later served in senior positions in PAF. Later, the PAF base at Shorkot Road was named after Rafiqui, a fitting tribute to a brave and dedicated young Pakistani. On the Indian side, Flying Officers Gandhi and Pingale were awarded the Vir Chakra and rose to the rank of Air Marshal. As narrated by Cecil Choudhry, he met Gandhi many years after the 1965 war in Iraq where both were on deputation. Gandhi duly acknowledged Choudhry as the victor and introduced him as such to his wife.
37 Review of IAF operations against Pakistan by the Indian Ministry of Defence, New Delhi. The Sabre kill by Denzil (later Air Marshal Denzil Keelor PVSM, AVSM, VrC, KC) earned the Keelor family a unique distinction. Both he and his brother Trevor now had Sabres to their credit and both earned the Veer Chakra, making it the first time brothers had been awarded the Veer Chakra for identical feats. Wing CommanderTrevor Keelor VrC died on 27 April 2002.
38 ‘The J-79-11A engine was sophisticated and complicated. It had inlet guide vanes in front of the engine and a variable nozzle system in the rear. These were liable to fail, but the PAF maintenance crew had mastered the equipment. We only had one engine flame out and the pilot Flight Lieutenant Khalid managed to make a ‘dead stick’ landing. This was a difficult manoeuvre requiring precise judgement. The pattern was flown at 240 knots and the landing flare started 300 feet above ground level, to make a touch down at 190 knots on a 9,000 feet long runway. Only one F-104 was lost during training - a training air combat sortie - in which Flight Lieutenant Asghar ‘pitched up’ and went into a spin. He ejected safely at high speed and received major bruises. The aircraft was replaced under the MAP programme. Operational training was fun. Flying at Mach 2 was an incomparable experience. The thrill of coming under radar control, attacking F-86 formations, that were denied radar help, was a fighter pilot’s dream come true. The F-104 zoomed out of nowhere and before the F-86 pilots could start their defensive manoeuvres, the F-104 had completed its simulated missile launch and was breaking off.’
39 East Pakistan had officially seceded from Pakistan on 26 March
40 In all, during and after the 1971 war PAF claimed the destruction of 107 IAF aircraft. Of these 51 were shot down in air engagements, 5 destroyed on the ground and 28 downed by airfield ack ack. The basis of the awards was stringent: each claim had to be confirmed by either gun camera film or an identifiable wreckage or a reliable eyewitness. Yeager who was at that time the US defence representative in Islamabad and who volunteered to join the PAF’s helicopter teams documenting downed IAF aircraft says in his autobiography: ‘…the Pakistanis scored a three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and losing 34 airplanes of their own. I’m certain about the figures because I went our several times a day in a chopper and counted wrecks on Pakistani soil, documented them by serial numbers, identified the components such as engines, rocket pods and new equipment on newer airplanes like the Soviet Su-7 fighter-bomber and the MiG-21J, their latest supersonic fighter.’ Of the 107 aircraft claimed the wreckages of 31 were documented and photographed, the destruction of 21 was recorded on gun camera films and 27 were seen to go down by reliable eye witnesses (i.e. accompanying pilots and/or ground witness). Nine of the latter categories were also confirmed by radio transmissions of IAF aircraft and ground stations. Nothing can be said with certainty about the fate of IAF fighters damaged in air engagements, but post-war intelligence indicated that the IAF had lost a further 20 aircraft due to battle damage including a MiG-21 shot down by another who took it to be a PAF fighter. Today, 20 Squadron is equipped with Sukhoi Su-30MKI and based at Lohegaon Air Force Station, Pune.
41 For this impressive performance Parker and Bharadwaj received the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC). Five pilots earned the Vir Chakra award. Arun Prakash, S. Balasubramanian, Jal Maneksha Mistry (posthumous), B. C. Karumbaya and A.L. Deoskar received the Vir Chakra. C. S. Dhillon recieved the Vayu Sena Medal (VSM). There were two Mentioned-in-Dispatches and ten commendations from the CAS/AOC. The ‘Lightnings’ take pride in the fact that Lieutenant Prakash was awarded the Vir Chakra under the ‘Air Force List’ rather than the ‘Navy List’. 20 Squadron moved back to Pathankot immediately after the rest period of the war. Parker handed over command to Wing Commander Lele in December 1972 and left to DSSC, Wellington as a Directing Staff (Air). The squadron stayed at Pathankot till 1975 when it moved back to Hindon. In 1981, a decision was taken to move the squadron to the East to Hashimara, where they formed the first formation aerobatics team of the Indian Air Force under Wing Commander Ben Brar. Then started almost a decade of flying as the IAF’s showpiece till March 1989, when the Thunderbolts flew their last public display. The Squadron received the President’s Colours in 1992, when it was based in Kalaikonda. In 1997 the Hunters were replaced with the MiG-27ML ‘Flogger’, the remaining ‘Lightning’ aircraft being dispersed as gate guardians around the country or kept in storage in Tezpur.
42 Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia.
43 On 21 May 1999, prior to the commencement of the Kargil War, the IAF Air HQ assigned a Canberra PR.57 aircraft on a photographic mission near the Line of Control, where it took a severe blow from a FIM-92 Stinger infrared homing missile on the starboard engine; the Canberra successfully returned to base using the other engine. The Canberra fleet was grounded and then retired following the crash of an IAF Canberra in December 2005. After 50 years of service, the Canberra was finally retired by the IAF on 11 May 2007.