Don’t follow the pattern of this age; instead, be transformed by your mind being made new. This way you’ll be qualified to evaluate what is good, pleasing, and perfect—and so recognize God’s will.
—Romans 12:2
In Romans 12 Paul revisits the issue of proper thinking.1 Whereas humanity did not judge it valuable to keep knowing God, and God therefore gave them over to a mentality that failed his own evaluation (1:28), God here renews the minds of those devoted to him so that they can truly evaluate the good things that are his will (12:2).2
This chapter surveys elements of Romans 12:1–3 relevant to Paul’s interests in the mind there. Paul introduces the matter of reason already when exhorting believers to offer their bodies as spiritual sacrifices for God’s work (12:1). Paul develops this theme further when he warns believers not to follow the pattern of the present age, a fallen age in which sinful choices have corrupted moral discernment (12:2; cf. 1:28). Instead, believers are transformed as their minds follow the pattern of a new age; thus, they become able to evaluate what is truly good, so discerning God’s will (12:2). The renewal of their minds evokes the divine mind of 11:34. It also enables them to think (12:3) in the wider context of Christ’s diversely gifted body (12:4–6).
Ideally, even admonitions ordinarily should be gentle.3 Παρακαλέω (12:1, translated in the NRSV as “I appeal”; the NIV and NASB as “I urge”; in the KJV and ASV as “I beseech”) appears often with requests in letters.4 It has a wide range of meaning, including not only “strongly urge” or “exhort,” as here, but also even “comfort.” As such, it served as a much gentler term than terms usually translated “admonish” or “warn.”5
Paul is surely gentle here, exhorting the Roman believers not as one assuming authority but as one gifted to exhort. “Through the grace given me” (12:3) evokes the grace given to each believer for their varied gifts in 12:6. Most important, “exhort” appears in the list of gifts in 12:6–8 (v. 8). Paul exhorts them as “siblings”6 and as one whose act of exhortation reflects a God-given ministry shared by some others in Christ’s body (12:8).7
Presenting Bodies as Sacrifices
Believers here not only are priests offering sacrifices (cf. Paul’s role in Rom. 15:16 and his doxology in 11:33–36)8 but are themselves the sacrifices to be offered up.9 The image of spiritual sacrifices was a familiar one, and the language of “presenting” (12:1) is appropriate for sacrifices,10 but the verb must also be taken with Paul’s earlier usage in the letter. Presenting one’s body continues the image of presenting one’s members as instruments or weapons for God in 6:13, 19 (cf. 6:16).11 They are thus to be totally consecrated for God’s purposes.12
Presenting bodies for good purposes confirms that for Paul, the body is an instrument that can be used for good (Rom. 6:13; cf. 8:11, 23; 1 Cor. 6:13, 15, 19–20; 2 Cor. 4:10; 5:10; Phil. 1:20; 3:21; Col. 2:23) as well as for evil (Rom. 1:24; 6:6; 7:24; 8:10, 13; 1 Cor. 6:16; 2 Cor. 5:10).13 The body is not itself evil; it is simply that Christ- and Spirit-enlightened minds, rather than morally directionless physical desires (Rom. 1:24; 6:12), should control one’s behavior (cf. possibly 1 Cor. 9:27, depending on how far one wants to press Paul’s illustration).
Ultimately, the purpose of our body is not to fulfill its autonomous desires but to serve Christ’s greater body (Rom. 12:4–6; cf. 7:4), just as the renewed mind (12:2) thinks in terms of the greater body (12:3).
Sacrifices, including animal sacrifices, characterized ancient religion; most temples required animal sacrifices.14 Sacrifices appear commonly, for example, on coins15 and on reliefs.16 Many Gentiles viewed sacrifice as an exchange with the gods, who were expected to reciprocate with benefits;17 as a later orator puts it, “Sacrifices elicit the goodwill of the gods.”18
Some intellectuals did, however, oppose sacrifices.19 Scholars debate whether Zoroaster opposed them or merely opposed their abuse.20 Some thinkers opposed sacrifices in principle, though not always in practice.21 Others were more consistent. Pythagoras and Pythagoreans opposed animal sacrifices (and eating meat);22 they felt that even the less committed ought to avoid sacrificing (and eating) higher, ensouled animals.23 Apollonius of Tyana reportedly followed Pythagorean practice on this matter.24 Some mythographers and later intellectuals believed in a primeval golden era before animal sacrifices.25
Some valued thank offerings more highly than danger-averting sin offerings.26 True piety, some aver, would expend less on so many sacrifices and so much frankincense.27 A classical orator opines that the gods are more pleased with goodness and justice than with many sacrifices; such virtue is the best sacrifice.28
Figurative or metaphoric sacrifices appear frequently in ancient sources. (For corresponding spiritual temples, see 1 Cor. 3:16–17; 6:19; 2 Cor. 6:16; Eph. 2:18–22; 1 Pet. 2:5; Rev. 3:12; cf. John 4:23–24; Rev. 21:2; and esp. 21:22.)29 Although Stoics participated in public cults, in principle they affirmed that the wise “are the only [genuine] priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also the building of temples, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods.”30
Similar ideas appear in the Pythagorean Sentences: “The wise man alone is a priest, alone is dear to the gods, and alone knows how to pray.”31 Likewise, “Votive gifts and sacrifices do not honor God; offerings are not an honor to God. But the inspired mind which is completely secure meets God, for like must come to like.”32 For Porphyry, a Neoplatonist, the true temple of the divine is the wise man’s mind;33 God is honored not by sacrifices but by a God-filled frame of thinking.34
Certainly, the priority of spiritual sacrifices was biblically supportable, already appearing in the Old Testament.35 In early Jewish circles, praise,36 alms,37 and other righteous deeds38 were sacrifices. Some Jews also opposed animal sacrifices, though perhaps especially to critique pagan ones.39 Some Diaspora Jews, who had less access to the Jerusalem temple, may have adopted wider arguments for praise being the only true sacrifice.40 For Philo, piety,41 or the mind devoted in love to God,42 or truth from the soul,43 was the best sacrifice.44
Outsiders differed as to whether Essenes offered their own sacrifices away from the temple45 or did not sacrifice at all, dedicating their minds in reverence instead.46 Although the covenanters probably did value literal sacrifices,47 the Qumran texts also suggest spiritual sacrifices.48 The sectarians may have believed that their spiritual sacrifices functioned as the true equivalent of temple sacrifices until the expected new temple of the future era.49
Already in the Hellenistic era, Aristotle’s student Theophrastus apparently knew of the spiritualization of Jewish sacrifices.50 Such an attitude appears in the Letter of Aristeas: “To honor God . . . not by offerings and sacrifices but by purity of spirit.”51 In the Wisdom of Solomon, God accepts martyrs as sacrifices.52 The idea of spiritual sacrifices was thus by no means merely an accommodation to the temple’s destruction.53 Nevertheless, the idea necessarily became more central after the temple’s destruction.54 Jewish teachers then continued the tradition of prayer,55 confession of sin,56 a contrite heart,57 potential martyrdom,58 suffering,59 acts of mercy,60 study of the Torah,61 and other activities as spiritual sacrifices.62
But whereas among Gentiles only some members of the intellectual elite really eschewed sacrifices, Christian groups lacked the physical sacrifices typically associated with religion.63 In this respect they more resembled a philosophic school than what outsiders normally considered a religion.64 Whereas Jesus’s Judean followers in this period retained access to sacrifices in the temple,65 his followers in the Diaspora lacked anything of the sort.
A Living Sacrifice
In Romans 12:1 Paul describes the sacrifice of their bodies with three adjectives: living, holy, and pleasing or acceptable to God.
That the sacrifice is living might allude to a special kind of Old Testament offering66 but more likely functions here as an oxymoron or paradox meant to grip attention.67 Greeks had stories of animals that offered themselves willingly for sacrifice,68 but human sacrifice was abhorrent to most peoples.69 Martyrdom would be an acceptable sacrifice,70 but Jesus’s followers must live each day as if their lives are forfeit for his cause, showing the same commitment as martyrs not only by how they die but by how they live.71
People often spoke of what was “pleasing” to a deity,72 and sacrifices had to be “acceptable” or pleasing to a deity.73 Scripture sometimes declares, using various expressions, that God accepted or was pleased with sacrifices offered to him74 or, conversely, that he found them unacceptable.75 Paul also speaks figuratively of an acceptable sacrifice to God, in this case of a gift for Paul, in Philippians 4:18.
Because Paul employs this same adjective (“pleasing”) among his three descriptors of God’s will in Romans 12:2, it seems clear that Paul ties the acts together: God’s will in verse 2 is the purpose for which we present our bodies. Likewise, our minds are renewed to discern God’s will in terms of how we can use our bodies on behalf of his greater body.
A Rational Sacrifice
The Greek term λογικός has a wide semantic range and can be translated various ways in various contexts; the RSV, NRSV, ASV, the revised version of the NAB, and the ESV render it “spiritual” both here in Romans 12:1 and in 1 Peter 2:2; the NIV renders it “true and proper” in Romans 12:1 and “spiritual” in 1 Peter 2:2; the CEB as “appropriate” in the former and “of the word” in the latter; both the NASB and the earlier version of the NAB preserve “spiritual” in the former and “of the word” in the latter (the NASB retaining the KJV rendering in the latter); the GNT renders it as “true” in the former and “spiritual” in the latter; the NCV renders it “spiritual” in the former and “simple” in the latter; the KJV renders it “reasonable” in the former and “of the word” in the latter (retaining the connection with λόγος in 1 Pet. 1:23); and the Douay-Rheims “reasonable” in the former and “rational” in the latter.
Translations of λογικός in Romans 12:1 and 1 Peter 2:2
| Bible Version | Romans 12:1 | 1 Peter 2:2 |
| RSV, NRSV, ASV, ESV, NAB | spiritual | spiritual |
| NIV | true and proper | spiritual |
| CEB | appropriate | of the word |
| NASB | spiritual | of the word (retaining the KJV reading) |
| GNT | true | spiritual |
| NCV | spiritual | simple |
| KJV | reasonable | of the word (retaining the connection with λόγος in 1 Pet. 1:23) |
| Douay-Rheims | reasonable | rational |
In contexts referring to the mind, however, like this one (Rom. 12:2–3), the term often implies reason (i.e., the rational element), in this case unexpectedly captured by the older KJV rather than by many of the newer translations.76 Thus, for Stoics, for example, any act that was not appropriate was wrong for a “rational” (λογικῷ) being,77 by which they meant humans.78 Stoics saw a relation between humans as λογικός and God as λόγος—in other words, between human reason and the reason that structured the cosmos.79 On this basis, some Stoics viewed “only logikos [i.e., rational] worship” as genuine worship, in contrast to the masses’ superstitions.80 Nor was such language limited to Stoics,81 although as the most popular philosophic school of Paul’s day they remain relevant as a reflection of the period’s intellectual milieu. Some Diaspora Jews thus also applied the language to appropriate sacrifice.82
In other words, in Romans 12:1 the way one offers one’s body as a sacrifice to God is rationally, through reason—one’s mind dictates how the body will serve.83 In view of 12:2–3, this means that one’s renewed mind discerns God’s will (12:2), including one’s useful place in Christ’s body (12:3–8).
Transformed versus Conformed
Paul opposes two antithetical models for life: being conformed to this present age or being transformed in connection with the new age in Christ.84 Some infer from the present tenses of each of the verbs that they refer to “an ongoing process”85 and also note that they are passive,86 perhaps suggesting natural socialization in the former case and God’s work in the latter case.87 Thinkers often valued not being like the masses or sharing their values.88 To hold their beliefs revealed ignorance.89
The New Age versus the Old
Interpreters often rightly contrast “this age” in this passage with the promised messianic age to come.90 Paul’s usage would have been particularly clear to those familiar either with Judean tradition or with Paul’s own teachings. Traditional Judean thought often distinguished the present age of evil and suffering from the coming age of deliverance,91 emphasizing an eschatological reversal of roles.92 Thus, elsewhere Paul declares that Christ has delivered us from the present evil age (Gal. 1:4) and that the Spirit provides a foretaste of the coming age (1 Cor. 2:9–10; 2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Gal. 5:5). Elsewhere in Romans Paul employs αἰών (“age”) as simply part of the idiom “forever,” but in other letters he devalues the wisdom of this age (1 Cor. 1:20; 2:6, 8; 3:18) and the hostile “god of this age” (2 Cor. 4:4).93 In Pauline language, not being “conformed” (συσχηματίζεσθε) to this age may include not investing heavily in the transitory values of “this world” that is passing away (1 Cor. 7:31, speaking of the “form” [σχῆμα] of this world).94
Paul’s use of ἀνακαίνωσις in this connection reinforces the point. Of course, philosophers also spoke of becoming new in some respects through conversion to philosophy,95 but Paul’s use of such language elsewhere suggests that he may also use renewal language in light of the eschatology prominent in his Jewish heritage. In 2 Corinthians 4:16 Paul employs the verb cognate of this noun (ἀνακαινόω) for inner renewing in contrast to outer deterioration; the context contrasts the temporal with the eternal (4:17–18) and the present body with the future resurrection body (5:1–5).96 Earlier in Romans Paul employs the cognate καινότης for new life in Christ (Rom. 6:4), which promises future resurrection (cf. 6:5) and new life in the Spirit (7:6).
Thus, Paul may evoke the new creation in Christ (2 Cor. 5:17; Gal. 6:15), which in the present includes a new worldview or approach to current reality (2 Cor. 5:16).97 This new worldview is based on being dead with Christ so that believers may live for Christ, who died and rose for them (5:14–15).
Some also connect “renewing” or the implied new era here with being in Christ, the new Adam.98 Paul has earlier connected what is “old” not only with an approach to the law (Rom. 7:6; cf. 2 Cor. 3:14) but with the old humanity in Adam (Rom. 6:6; cf. Col. 3:9). In Colossians 3:10 the new person is being renewed according to the image of the one who created it, thus probably evoking Genesis 1:26–27.99
Renewal for a New Age
Paul’s choice of words regarding the reorientation of the mind is not accidental. The new mind is affected by its foretaste of the coming world in Christ. As noted above, “renewing” (ἀνακαινώσει) undoubtedly alludes to the “new” life obtained by union with the risen Christ (cf. καινότης in Rom. 6:4; contrast the “old person” in 6:6) and by the Spirit (cf. καινότης in 7:6; contrast the oldness of the written code also in 7:6).
The renewed mind thus views the world from the standpoint of the coming age (cf. 1 Cor. 2:6–10); present actions and inactions must be evaluated in light of their eternal consequences (Rom. 13:11–14, esp. in light of 1 Thess. 5:2–9; cf. Rom. 2:6–10; 14:10–12).100 More than this, however, it experiences a foretaste of the coming world, an experience that Paul associates with those in whom the Spirit dwells (1 Cor. 2:9–10; 2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5).
The renewed mind of Romans 12:1–3 contrasts starkly with the corrupted mind of Romans 1.101
| Romans 1:18–32 | Romans 12:1–3 |
| Humanity failed to thank God (1:21) and eventually worshiped idols (1:23) | Believers worship God, dedicating themselves as sacrifices (12:1)* |
| They corrupted their bodies (1:24) | They offer their bodies (12:1) to serve Christ’s body (12:4–8) |
| They belong to the present age (cf. verb tenses in 1:18–32) | Not conforming to this age, their minds are made new (12:2) |
| They did not approve knowledge of God, so God allowed their minds to be corrupted (1:28) | God renews their minds so they may approve his will (12:2) |
| Their corrupted minds yielded selfish vices (1:28–31) | The renewed mind yields acts of service to Christ’s body (12:1–8) |
| *For the contrast between reasonable worship here and irrational worship in Rom. 1, cf. also Palinuro, “Rm 12,1–2.” | |
The renewed mind accomplishes what the law intended; the person who in Romans 2:17–18 boasts in the law is confident that he knows God’s will, but the renewed mind in 12:2 truly recognizes and lives by God’s will. It is not the self-focused struggle under the law in 7:14–25 but rather the others-focused character of love in 13:8–10 that fulfills the law.
A renewed mind, then, evaluates matters of this age in light of the coming age, valuing God’s opinions rather than the world’s and valuing what counts eternally. Perhaps because some Corinthian Christians understand Paul’s teaching in light of typical Greek incomprehension of a future resurrection, Paul often calls believers to an eschatological perspective especially in the letter that we call 1 Corinthians (cf. 1 Cor. 3:4–15; 4:5; 5:5; 6:2–3; 7:26, 29–31; 9:22, 24–27; 10:33; 11:26, 32; 13:8–13; 15:20, 30–32).102 This approach will invite further comment in my treatment of 1 Corinthians 2 in chapter 6.103 Such an interest is clearly not, however, limited to that letter.
The means of transformation is the renewal of the mind. This suggests that the mind itself is somehow transformed in a manner that facilitates the transformation of one’s life. Some have suggested Hellenistic backgrounds for the idea of the mind “being transformed.”104 The most relevant Gentile ideas regarding a transformed mind appear in philosophers, who were the ones who addressed such issues. Thus, for example, Seneca insists that merely learning what to do and not to do is insufficient; one becomes a true wise person only when one’s “mind is metamorphosed [transfiguratus est] into the shape of that which he has learned.”105 The Platonic tradition also valued being conformed to the divine likeness.106 The wise person became good only “by thinking the good and noble thought which emanated from the divine.”107 Like some other philosophers,108 the Jewish philosopher Philo emphasizes being conformed to God.109
Ancient philosophic language would allow Paul’s audience to understand some of his language, but they might also have recognized that he employs it somewhat differently. Stoics too recognized that wisdom should “transform” one’s mind, conforming it to wisdom.110 For Paul, of course, the transformation is into Christ’s image (cf. Rom. 8:29; 2 Cor. 3:18).111 Imitation of God is also prominent in philosophic discourse;112 but in the context of Romans, it is the Spirit rather than human ability that effects the transformation. Most philosophers emphasized that one should not follow the views of the masses;113 but for Paul, lack of conformity to this “age” belongs to his realized approach to the traditional Jewish “two ages” schema (cf. Rom. 8:11, 23; 1 Cor. 2:9–10; 10:11; 2 Cor. 1:22; Gal. 1:4).
Some sought to discipline their minds toward God. Thus, for Stoics right thinking about what truly mattered was paramount.114 Both Stoics and Platonists believed that self-mastery was necessary to achieve happiness;115 disciplining the mind was needed for self-mastery.116 Pythagoras “purified his intellect.”117 A later Platonist advises focus on mathematics to accustom a student to thinking about immaterial matters.118 Whereas for some thinkers such transformation was a matter of self-discipline, not bad in itself (cf. Gal. 5:23), the context of Romans also suggests dependence on God. This idea should have been intelligible to Paul’s audience. Some Diaspora Jews recognized that only God could dispose the mind toward wisdom; only God could guide the mind toward what was best.119
Although Paul’s language relates to some philosophic ideals,120 his thinking here also fits apocalyptic conceptions, since he applies related language to eschatological transformation (Rom. 8:29; Phil. 3:21). The image of eschatological transformation was at home especially in Jewish apocalyptic sources.121 In a Diaspora Jewish source a martyr seems “transformed” (μετασχηματιζόμενος) by suffering for immortality (4 Macc. 9:22).122 (Paul’s understanding of transformation also draws conceptually on the experience of Moses, although he does not articulate this connection for the believers in Rome; see discussion of 2 Cor. 3:18 in chap. 6.)123
To whose mind are believers’ minds to be conformed? Eschatologically, believers are conformed to Jesus in Philippians 3:21; in the present they are transformed to share his glory within in 2 Corinthians 3:18; and Paul refers to the mind of Christ in 1 Corinthians 2:16.124 The same verb (μεταμορφόω) that Paul uses in Romans 12:2 and 2 Corinthians 3:18 appears in another early Christian source for Jesus’s transfiguration (Mark 9:2; also Matt. 17:2), thus revealing glory as in 2 Corinthians 3:18.125
Suffering may facilitate the process. Paul applies cognate terms for ultimate conformity to Jesus in Romans 8:29 (in a context of preceding suffering) and (with respect to bodily resurrection) Philippians 3:21, and to present conforming to Jesus’s suffering and death (Phil. 3:10) to prepare to share his resurrection (cf. 3:11).126 That is, sufferings often facilitate external opportunities for conformity, just as internal submission to the transformation process does. The end product will be full conformity to Christ when God raises the dead, but the process itself also constitutes an opportunity.
Discerning God’s Will
When Paul expects the believer’s mind to be renewed to evaluate the good things that are God’s will, he counters the false claim of the hypocritical law-expert in Romans 2:18, who supposedly knows God’s will and thus evaluates what is best. Romans 2:18 and 12:2 are the only two uses of θέλημα (“will”) in Romans besides the framing verses about Paul’s desire to visit the believers in Rome (1:10; 15:32). These are also two of the only four uses of δοκιμάζω (“evaluate”) in Romans—one of the others being 1:28, to which 12:2 also alludes by way of contrast. Thus, the renewed mind of 12:2 contrasts with both the pagan mind uninformed by the law (1:28) and the fleshly mind informed but not transformed by the law (2:18; see also 7:23, 25, which offer two of the other uses of νοῦς besides 1:28; 11:34; 12:2; and 14:5).127
Doing God’s will was a paramount emphasis in early Judaism.128 Some felt that mortals could discern God’s will only by the gift of divine wisdom.129 Stoics emphasized readiness to submit to God’s will.130 Often this submission meant embracing their situation with a positive outlook, but knowing truth also could dictate action: a virtuous person would immediately know what they should do.131
How does the renewed mind think? Here the renewed mind recognizes God’s will as that which is good, acceptable, and perfect.132 Paul here uses conventional language for moral criteria.133 For Stoics, the mind was essential; only the reasoning faculty could actually examine and understand itself.134 Reason was from the gods and provided the means to evaluate whether something was good or bad, good or shameful.135
Evaluative Criteria
The renewed mind is able to “evaluate” what is good136—a clear contrast with the failed minds of Romans 1:28 that refused to judge God’s knowledge as appropriate.137 Evaluating worth was an essential element of ancient philosophy, not least in Stoicism, the dominant philosophy in northern Mediterranean cities in this period. Some things are intrinsically good; others are simply to be preferred to their alternative.138 Once one knows which things are preferred, these are close to what is intrinsically “good.”139 One who cannot discern good from evil is morally blind and ignorant.140 It is the mind that must engage in discernment,141 and this discernment therefore should characterize those trained in philosophy.142
Paul lists adjectives that describe what is positive, characteristics that identify and thus allow one to discern God’s will. Some of these adjectives also appear among philosophers and rhetoricians as ethical or legal criteria (other criteria not mentioned here include terms for “profitable,” as in 1 Cor. 6:12 and possibly Rom. 3:1,143 and “lawful,” as in 1 Cor. 6:12);144 others are more common in biblical idiom.
In biblical idiom one could use multiple adjectives virtually synonymously,145 which seems likely here.146 Gentiles could also accumulate positive characteristics; thus, for example, Pythagoras allegedly started a group in Samos where people contemplated “things noble, just, and advantageous.”147 Plato says that what is just is what is honorable, good, and expedient.148 Rhetorical handbooks could list various such criteria that would be widely accepted.149 An orator might seek to demonstrate that the proposed actions are “just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant and easily practicable.”150 Through wisdom or prudence, which is shared with deities,151 “we acquire discernment of what is good and advantageous and noble and their opposites.”152
Good, Pleasing, and Perfect as Criteria
One common ethical criterion was what was good,153 and this was often stressed among Stoics,154 who often emphasized seeking the supreme good.155 (Plato also emphasized the supreme good.)156 For Stoics, Virtue necessarily belongs to the chief good;157 it could be described as “good” and “pleasing” (among other positive adjectives).158 The sensible could distinguish good from bad;159 thus, “the good which true reason approves is solid and everlasting.”160 “All good (they say) is expedient, binding, profitable, useful, serviceable, beautiful, and just or right.”161 In the Cynic epistles, wisdom is defined as the ability to know the good.162 In the Alexandrian Jewish Letter of Aristeas, showing others goodwill and being rewarded by God is “the highest good” or “the best.”163 In Philo, God is the source of what is good164 but is above what is good.165 In various Jewish circles, God166 and Torah167 were good.
“Pleasing”168 also appears at times as an ethical criterion,169 although not as frequently; Paul borrows this term from his depiction of the sacrifice in Romans 12:1. It could often apply, as here, to what is pleasing to God.170 Hellenistic Jewish thinkers probably presumed that true wisdom could discern what met this criterion; in Wisdom 9:10, Wisdom shows what is “pleasing” to God.
Τέλειος (Rom. 12:2) has a wide range of meaning; Paul’s contemporaries often used it for what was “complete” or (within its designated sphere) “perfect.”171 (No one word in English encompasses its range of meaning.) Stoics valued what was τέλειος, perfect or complete, as superior;172 the ideal sage could be so described,173 though real sages normally did not claim to have met the ideal.174
Later Platonists emphasized intellect for achieving the perfect life.175 Still, finding a perfect life or person was difficult.176 Those in the Platonic tradition observed that nothing mortal contributes to the perfect life;177 self-control makes perfect by removing susceptibility to passion;178 virtue is “the perfection [τελειότης] of the soul.”179 The perfect mind yields perfect wisdom.180 In its ultimate form full perfection is changeless.181 The gods, deemed perfect, thus could not have direct contact with the imperfect world.182 In Platonism God was necessarily perfect, by definition.183
In Jewish circles only the more hellenized sources adopt some of the nuances of the Platonic usage. For Philo, irrational elements make people imperfect, but philosophic pursuit can lead to perfection.184 “Perfect” could depict the ultimate ideal, as it often did among some Gentile philosophers.185 Thus, biblical heroes functioned as ideal types of perfect virtue.186 In another Hellenistic Jewish work it was martyrdom that perfected a godly man in spite of his lifelong obedience to the law.187
Despite such ideal uses, “perfect” could also simply mean complete or without deficiency in the matter at hand.188 Some used such language for those who attained the most advanced stage in philosophy.189 The best students can be “perfected” in their skills.190 Jewish tradition also spoke of the blameless person as “perfect,” meaning that the person could not be charged with moral transgression.191 The Hebrew term that often is rendered this way appears frequently in the Dead Sea Scrolls, often with reference to the way of life;192 especially in prayer, however, the community recognizes their need for divine mercy.193 Thus, one can recognize that one’s way cannot be “perfected” without God’s help.194 Humans are sinful and do not walk in the perfect way, although God’s Spirit may perfect the way for them.195
For Paul, the adjective τέλειος and its cognates can mean “mature” (1 Cor. 2:6; 14:20; Eph. 4:13; Phil. 3:15), morally blameless (Col. 4:12), or “perfect” (Col. 3:14) and can refer to an ideal or goal (Phil. 3:12; Col. 1:28). In any case, ancient thinkers could recognize that Paul was employing a criterion appropriate to God’s will.
One thus can discern God’s will by discerning what is good, what pleases God, and what is “perfect” or “complete” in a positive way. As in much philosophic discourse, Paul speaks here in general terms, but he will define (or provide examples of) this way of thinking more concretely in the following context. Although this context includes all of the following paraenesis, my focus below will be how this relates to thinking in Romans 12:3.
The Literary Context for This Renewing of the Mind
Although reading Paul’s vocabulary here in light of his usage elsewhere is helpful,196 Paul obviously did not expect the believers in Rome to perform a concordance search of his other letters that would later remain extant. Although he probably expected his ideal audience to recognize the theme of the mind in his letter to the believers in Rome, he would not have expected them to only trace isolated words even within this letter. Instead, he expected them to hear the flow of thought in the letter as a whole.197
In view of the preceding context, Paul thinks partly of God’s own mind or wisdom revealed in salvation history reported in Scripture. God provides believers some retroactive insight into his purposes.198 If the preceding context offers God’s sovereign plan as a foundation for transforming the mind, the following context offers one objective of this transformation. The right way of thinking puts each of us and our gifts in the wider context of Christ’s body.
Stoic reasoning sought to transcend embodied individual limitations through recognizing God’s mind in the cosmos, viewing the universe and even the state as a body. For Paul, both salvation history and God’s people offer a context beyond ourselves. Unlike many modern Western expositors, however, Paul was not addressing a highly individualistic audience, although an individualistic perspective would be more common among Greek-speaking Gentiles in Rome than among Jesus’s Galilean hearers. Paul’s point is not simply a context beyond our own limited personhood, as in Stoicism, but rather a life beyond human autonomy in its willful rejection of God’s perspective.
For Paul, Christ dwells in his body, working through all believers. Although God works in the cosmos (Rom. 1:19–20; Col. 1:15–16) and in all of history, he is revealed most fully in the history of his people and in his current work among his people in Christ. Although Paul does not emphasize the point here in this connection, however, because greater revelation demands greater responsibility (Rom. 2:12; 5:13; 7:7), one might expect Paul to challenge believers with higher demands than outsiders to the faith (e.g., 1 Cor. 6:1–5, 15, 19).199
God’s Own Mind in the Preceding Context
“Therefore” (the postpositive conjunction οὖν in Rom. 12:1) connects the exhortation of 12:1 with the preceding context.200 Although Paul uses a different term in 12:1, God’s “mercies” or “expressions of compassion” there may well evoke the theme of God’s “mercy” in Romans 9:15–16, 18, 23 and 11:30–32.201 (Paul may exhort here by God’s mercies; one could exhort someone by a deity.)202 God has revealed his mercy in the history of salvation, dealing with both Jews and Gentiles, so believers should respond by giving themselves. This history of salvation emphatically reveals God’s wisdom (11:33–36).203
The connection between God’s wisdom in Romans 11:33–36 and the present text is important. As in 8:5, here again Paul probably implies more than a figurative reference to the divine mind as an example; the renewed mind recognizes God’s will in part because it is influenced by (or, ideally, suffused with)204 God’s own mind. That divinely influenced mind becomes explicit in 1 Corinthians 2:16, where Paul applies Isaiah 40:13 to Christ’s followers having the mind of Christ. Especially because 1 Corinthians 2:16 provides us access to Paul’s interpretation of the Isaian verse, we should expect that Paul, like his contemporaries we have surveyed earlier, did in fact believe that the divine mind was at work in renewing the minds of the wise.
Paul employs this particular term for “mind” (νοῦς) only six times in Romans (in five paragraphs: 1:28; 7:23, 25; 11:34; 12:2; 14:5), and one (11:34) is a quotation of Isaiah 40:13 just four verses before his present remark about renewing the mind. This proximity is likely no coincidence. In Romans 11:34 Paul’s point is that God’s plans in history (surveyed in 11:25–32, introduced with a “mystery”) are marvelously wise, beyond what humans would have designed.205 At the same time, in a manner consistent with his use in 1 Corinthians of the same Isaian verse to affirm believers having Christ’s mind, he here speaks of believers’ minds being renewed to discern God’s will.
A Mind for the Body of Christ in the Following Context
Believers offer up their bodies as sacrifices for God’s purposes (Rom. 12:1–2)—ultimately, their bodies for Christ’s body (12:4–6). In context, the new way of thinking articulated in 12:2 forms how believers think about themselves in the context of the Christian community, shaping their relationships there.206 Continuing his interest in the mind from 12:1–2, Paul goes on in 12:3 to emphasize “sober” thinking, playing on φρονεῖν and σωφρονεῖν.207 Although the verb σωφρονέω need not imply the cognate noun σωφροσύνη, the semantic ranges overlap considerably. The usage of σωφροσύνη and its cognates in moral discourse extended far beyond philosophers, but in keeping with our discussion of philosophy, some summary comments about typical philosophic usage may be in order here. Plato’s Socrates was known for emphasizing this virtue,208 as were philosophers in the early empire.209 Like “prudence,” σωφροσύνη was one of the four chief Aristotelian virtues,210 and Stoics continued to treat it as one of the traditional virtues.211
Stoics employed this word group especially for self-control over the passions, the baser emotions.212 It could be used to summarize virtue.213 It should characterize the reign of the ideal ruler214 but particularly should typify the philosopher.215 In women, philosophers associated this virtue with chastity and avoiding unlawful relations.216 The virtue was widespread among philosophers far more broadly than in Stoicism217—for example, among Pythagoreans.218 Although outsiders might question the σωφροσύνη of someone who abandoned everything for philosophy, many intellectuals countered that such a person was genuinely wise.219
How does Paul apply σωφρονέω specifically in Romans 12:3? The renewed mind of 12:2 does not view itself more highly than it ought (ὑπερφρονεῖν,220 12:3; cf. 12:16);221 wisdom often was opposed to arrogantly overstepping one’s bounds.222 Instead, the renewed mind should view itself in the context of Christ’s body (12:4–6) and hence ultimately in a way that supports believers’ unity (cf. 15:5). This renewed mind recognizes that each believer has been apportioned faith for particular activities (12:3, 6),223 so that no member is more or less valuable than any other member. Specific roles may differ, but each member is gifted for serving the rest of the body of Christ. The renewed mind should thus look for ways to serve others, not boasting224 but fulfilling our role from God faithfully as his gift to the body. That is, Paul’s emphasis on the right way to think in Romans fits his larger emphasis on unity, as he probably seeks to reconcile Jewish and Gentile believers (an emphasis that many scholars find in this letter).225
This larger context of Romans reinforces my earlier suggested additional meaning of “peace” beyond “tranquility,” despite the plausibility of emphasis on the latter in ancient discussions of the mind. Presumably for Paul, the mind-frame of the Spirit also leads believers to peace with one another, whether across ethnic lines (as in Romans as a whole) or in the diversity of believers’ ministry gifts (as in Rom. 12:4–8).
Paul’s image of the body226 would not be lost on believers in Rome; both philosophers and orators had long employed the image.227 Thinkers sometimes depicted the entire cosmos228 or humanity229 as a body, emphasizing its unity. Orators230 and philosophers231 also depicted the state in this way, sometimes showing how all parts were necessary for the whole.232 (As has long been observed,233 this image had been popular in Roman political usage since the speech of Menenius Agrippa in which he exhorted the plebeians to value their productive—yet subordinate—role in the state.)234
Contrary to the views of some scholars,235 points where Paul’s depiction differs do not argue against his drawing on this wider usage; they suggest instead that he adapted it for his own purposes, as various other writers also did. Nevertheless, Paul’s purposes are surely distinctive in applying the image not to a political or natural body but to those united with Christ. Scholars also often note his reorientation of an originally hierarchical political image to emphasize interdependence without a note of hierarchy.236
Paul ideally wanted believers to care for and live for God’s concerns rather than for their own (2 Cor. 5:14–15; Phil. 2:20–21; cf. 1 Cor. 4:11–16; 7:29–35; Mark 8:33–38). Granted, most believers in Paul’s churches did not live this way, and Paul did not therefore deny that they were in Christ. For example, Paul praises Timothy to the faithful Philippian church by noting that Paul has no one like him, since others care for their own concerns rather than those of Christ (Phil. 2:20–21).
There undoubtedly is hyperbole in Paul’s exclusion of all others in that praise; writers of letters of recommendation could occasionally indulge in superlatives for more than one person,237 just as rabbis could.238 Moreover, it is clear from the same context that Epaphroditus risked his life for the work of Christ (Phil. 2:30). Still, Paul seems convinced that most believers fall short of single-minded devotion to Christ, and Paul is disappointed by this state of affairs.
Despite these caveats, however, several points remain clear: first, Paul especially values living wholly for Christ’s concerns (Phil. 2:21); second, Christ’s concerns in the context in Philippians refer especially to the welfare of God’s people (2:20); and third, such concern was praiseworthy because it was, unfortunately, unusual.239
Conclusion
Paul exhorts his hearers to decide “rationally” to present their bodies as sacrifices that please God in how they live. He goes on to describe the rational element more fully. Believers will be transformed by the renewing of their minds; this renewal enables them to evaluate the present age from the values of the perfect world to come, and thus not to be pressured into conformity with the character of the present age. A believer can often identify God’s will rationally by recognizing what is good, pleasing, and perfect in God’s sight.
The preceding context reveals God’s mind in his plan in history, which provides a basis for how believers should express devotion to him. The following context also reveals how the renewed mind should think: each one should consider how he or she can best serve Christ’s body, and every member should value every other member. Each one thus offers up her or his own body to serve Christ’s body.
Neglecting the critical role of the renewing of the mind (Rom. 12:2) can leave believers with a legalistic anxiety or fear of the power of the “flesh”—fear of old patterns or impulses (cf. Rom. 8:15). The renewing of the mind occurs alongside growing in God- and Christ-directed faith, or trust, which inherently involves a relationship with God and Christ. As is particularly emphasized in 2 Corinthians 3:18 (see chap. 6),240 such trust and renewal in God’s likeness grow in proportion to a living experience of God.
1. This passage (Rom. 12:1–2) also appears as strategic for the section; many or most scholars view it as the thesis statement for 12:1–15:13 (Crafton, “Vision,” 333–35, esp. 335; for a summary of the consensus, see Jewett, Romans, 724). Some even view it as one of Paul’s two key exhortations in the letter, revealing its joint purpose (Smiga, “Occasion”). Most scholars recognize the importance of cognition here (e.g., Keefer, “Purpose”).
2. As noted above on pp. 26–27, Rom. 1:28 plays on cognates of δοκιμάζω: ἐδοκίμασαν and an ἀδόκιμον νοῦν; here the νοῦς is renewed so that it may instead δοκιμάζειν. Cf. 1 Cor. 2:15–16, where (in different words) a person of the Spirit may evaluate all things because she has the mind of Christ.
3. Cf. Rom. 15:14; Gal. 6:1; Plut. Old Men 22, Mor. 795A; 23, Mor. 795BC; Iambl. Pyth. Life 22.101; 33.231; 1QS 5.25; b. Sanh. 101a; cf. even harsher genres in Rhet. Alex. 37, 1445b.17–19; t. Kip. 4:12.
4. Aune, Environment, 188; Stowers, Letter Writing, 24, 78.
5. Following categories articulated in later handbooks, protreptic or hortatory correspondence (Stowers, Letter Writing, 112–25) did not require the level of harshness found in letters of admonition (125–32) and especially rebuke (133–38) and, most harshly, reproach (139–41). Urgent requests could be worded as entreaties. Thus, e.g., even honorable people could “beg” on behalf of another, as in Cic. Fam. 13.14.2; 13.20.1; 13.24.3; 13.26.2; 13.30.2; 13.32.2; 13.35.2; 13.54.1; 13.72.2; 13.74.1; or “I beg of you again and again” (13.28b.2; 13.41.2; 13.43.2; 13.45.1; 13.47.1; 13.73.2; 13.76.2). Cf. a loving exhortation in a nonrecommendation letter: “I implore you again and again, my dear brother, to keep well” (Cic. Quint. fratr. 3.1.7.25; trans. W. G. Williams). Longenecker (Introducing Romans, 218) similarly cites affectionate or urgent request formulas (BGU 846.10; P.Mich. 209.9–10). On Paul’s gentleness here, see, e.g., Aquinas, lecture 1 on Rom. 12:1, cited in Levy, Krey, and Ryan, Romans, 247.
6. Also in Rom. 1:13; 7:1, 4; 8:12; 10:1; 11:25; 15:14, 30; 16:17; also applied to the Jewish people in 9:3. For the range of senses, see Keener, Acts, 2:1663–64, with references from ancient sources; here it expresses affection to fellow believers, as often in early Christianity (cf. Rom. 14:10, 13, 15, 21). Paul opens this section of the letter with “two rather standard epistolary conventions . . : a request formula . . . and a vocative of direct address” (Longenecker, Introducing Romans, 422).
7. Elsewhere in Romans, the verb appears only in 15:30; 16:17.
8. Others also connect Rom. 12:1 and 15:16; see, e.g., Dillon, “Priesthood”; cf. 1 Pet. 2:5. In Roman religion, in contrast to Israel’s Levitical class, any person of status could be a priest, and cultic practices were open to all; see Rives, Religion, 43. Sacrifice was an individual matter; see Judge, First Christians, 614. Still, killing of sacrifice was “typically performed by a professional” (Rives, Religion, 25).
9. Cf. Aker, “Charismata,” who also connects the ministries of Rom. 12:6–8 with spiritual temple imagery here. Grieb (Story, 117) plausibly suggests that Paul revisits a cultic metaphor (sacrifice, atonement) used in Rom. 3:21–26. For cultic metaphors in Paul, see especially Gupta, Worship.
10. On “presenting” with sacrifices, see Jos. Ant. 7.382; Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 352 (citing Jos. Ant. 4.113); Dunn, Romans, 709 (citing Moulton and Milligan, Vocabulary; and BDAG).
11. The verb παρίστημι connects the texts; its other two uses in Romans bear an unrelated sense. See also other scholars, e.g., Dunn, Theology, 58. The aorist infinitive may invite an act of commitment (cf. 2 Cor. 11:2; Col. 1:22; 2 Tim. 2:15), though perhaps as one always appropriate rather than implying a once-for-all moment. This construction need not suggest a once-for-all single event; cf. Combs, “Doctrine.” (Jewett [Romans, 728–29] reads the aorist here too specifically, for Paul seeking help for his mission to Spain; the aorist imperative of the same verb in Rom. 6:13, 19 has broader ethical connotations.)
12. Cf. the ideal in the Dead Sea Scrolls community, namely, devoting one’s resources, bodily strength, and attitudes to God (Betz, Jesus, 72, cites 1QS 1.11–13; 5.1–3; 6.19).
13. Because “bodies” is plural here, Jewett (Romans, 728) argues that Paul is calling for a communal sacrifice; Paul could have made the argument even more forcefully, however, had the term been singular. When he employs the plural for “bodies” in 1 Cor. 6:15, he refers to individual bodies (see 6:16–18), even though his argument also has corporate implications.
14. On sacrifices, see, e.g., Burkert, Religion, 68–70; Smith, Symposium, 67–69; Siebert, “Immolatio,” 745; most intellectuals practiced sacrifices, e.g., Pliny Ep. 9.10.1. Not all sacrifices, of course, were of animals; cf., e.g., Malkin, “Votive Offerings,” 1613; earlier, e.g., ANET 420.
15. Williams, “Religion,” 150–54.
16. Moede, “Reliefs,” 165–68, 173–75.
17. Klauck, Context, 38. On the principle of reciprocation in ancient Roman ethics, see, e.g., Pliny Ep. 6.6.3; Statius Silv. 4.9; Libanius Anec. 1.20; Symm. Ep. 1.104; more fully, Keener, Acts, 3:3314n1610.
18. Libanius Maxim 3.4 (trans. Gibson, 103). Greeks shrewdly waited to sacrifice sheep until they were shorn and had borne young (Androtion Atthis frg. 55).
19. Lucian ridicules the practice in Sacrifices. He presents Demonax as opposing sacrifice in Lucian Dem. 11. Porph. Marc. 19.316–17 denounces the sacrifices of the ignorant.
20. Yamauchi, Persia, 448.
21. E.g., Plut. Stoic Cont. 6, Mor. 1034C. Some regarded even images to be valuable only as reminders of deity (Max. Tyre Or. 2.1–2); deities do not need human service (Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 95.48).
22. Diog. Laert. 8.1.22; Philost. Vit. Apoll. 1.1; 6.11; Iambl. Pyth. Life 11.54; 24.108. See also Aristotle’s student Theophrastus (as cited in Porph. Abst. 2.32; so Ferguson, Backgrounds, 271).
23. Iambl. Pyth. Life 18.85; 28.150. Ethiopia’s sages disapprove of animal sacrifice in Heliod. Eth. 10.9.
24. Philost. Ep. Apoll. 27; Vit. Apoll. 1.31–32; 2.38; 4.11; 5.25; 8.7. He preferred Helios worship (Vit. Apoll. 2.24, 32, 38, 43; 3.15, 48; 7.10, 31).
25. Ullucci, “Sacrifice.”
26. Fronto in Ep. graec. 8.3. Cf. sacrifices of praise in Philost. Vit. Apoll. 1.1. According to some later Jewish traditions, other offerings will become unnecessary, but the thank offering will remain forever (Pesiq. Rab Kah. 9:12).
27. Dio Chrys. Or. 13.35.
28. Isoc. Ad Nic. 20. Cf. Porph. Marc. 17.282–84, 287–88: pious deeds and a disposition resembling the divine matter more than sacrifices.
29. See, e.g., 1QS 8.5; 4Q511 frg. 35.2–3; Let. Aris. 234; Philo Rewards 123; Tac. Ann. 4.38.2 (in Sinclair, “Temples”); Porph. Marc. 19.318–19; the universe as a temple in Cic. Resp. 6.15.15; cf. Davila, “Macrocosmic Temple”; one’s home figuratively as a temple in Hierocles Marr. (Stob. Anth. 4.79.53); further information in Gärtner, Temple; Keener, Acts, 1:1033–34; 2:1323, 1417; 3:2639–40, 2643, and esp. 3151–52. My doctoral student Philip Richardson has begun to research this question further.
30. Diog. Laert. 7.1.119 (trans. Hicks, LCL, 2:225). Hierocles Marr. (Stob. Anth. 4.79.53, p. 83) urged that parents be honored as deities, making their children thus like priests ordained by nature.
31. Pyth. Sent. 15 (in Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 110).
32. Pyth. Sent. 20 (in Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 111). For the purity of soul as well as body that was required in some sanctuaries, see the sources in Nock, Christianity, 18–19.
33. Porph. Marc. 11.191–93, 196–98; 19.318–19.
34. Porph. Marc. 19.313–16.
35. E.g., Kelly, Peter, 91, cites Pss. 50:14; 51:16–19; 69:30–31; 141:2; Hosea 6:6; Mic. 6:6–8; cf. also 1 Sam. 15:22; Isa. 1:11–17; 58:3–7; Amos 5:21–24. Fearing God is better than mere sacrifice (Jdt. 16:16).
36. Ps. 154:10–11 (11QPsa 154); 4Q403 frg. 1, col. 1.39–40.
37. Sir. 3:30; 29:12; 35:4. Cf. also alms in Islam (Mbiti, Religions, 330).
38. Sir. 35:1–5.
39. See Sib. Or. 4.29–30, possibly from the Hellenistic age.
40. Cf. Philo Plant. 126; cf. Knox, Gentiles, 32. Philo’s interest, however, may be especially in opposing the futile sacrifices of the wicked (Plant. 108, 124), since elsewhere he does speak favorably of pious sacrifices. Philo attests that some others allegorize all the laws, a practice of which he disapproves (Migr. 89–93; Sanders, Judaism, 53).
41. Philo Mos. 2.108.
42. Philo Spec. Laws 1.201, 271–72, 290; cf. Alleg. Interp. 2.56; Unchangeable 8.
43. Philo Worse 21; cf. Sacr. 27; Dreams 2.72. The soul of the one who sacrifices must be free from passions (Spec. Laws 1.257).
44. See now more fully also Richardson, “Sacrifices,” 9–14.
45. So Jos. Ant. 18.19; some think that Josephus merely wished to present the Essenes as having a positive attitude toward the temple, which he valued (Nolland, “Misleading Statement”). Some suggest that the animal bones at Qumran, which others attribute to sacrifice, come instead from a communal meal (Laperrousaz, “Dépôts”) or merely a rare sacrifice, such as an annual covenant renewal (Duhaime, “Remarques”). There is no clear evidence that the bones found there were used in ritual (Donceel, “Khirbet Qumrân”).
46. Philo Good Person 75. This may be Philo’s idealization. Heger, “Prayer,” argues that the idea that prayer replaced sacrifice is a case of reading later rabbis into the Dead Sea Scrolls.
47. See CD 9.14; 11.17–19; 16.13; Davies, “Ideology.”
48. 1QS 9.4–5; CD 11.21; Gärtner, Temple, 30, 44–46. For offerings of praise, see, e.g., 1QS 10.6.
49. Flusser, Judaism, 39–44. Cf. Arnaldich, “Sacerdocio.”
50. Stern, Authors, 1:8–11.
51. Let. Aris. 234 (trans. Hadas, 193).
52. Wis. 3:6; see also 4 Macc. 17:22.
53. Gathercole, Boasting, 205; cf. Sanders, Judaism, 253. Roetzel (Paul, 7) even suggests Pharisaic influence on Paul’s idea of spiritual sacrifice. Pharisees were meticulous about purity but did not try to achieve it on the priestly level (Sanders, Jesus to Mishnah, 131–254).
54. Judaism already affirmed spiritual sacrifices, but Guttmann (“End”) probably overstates Pharisaic distaste for the temple establishment.
55. E.g., b. Ber. 15a.
56. B. Sanh. 43b.
57. Pesiq. Rab Kah. 24:5.
58. Gen. Rab. 34:9.
59. Sipre Deut. 32.5.2.
60. Abot R. Nat. 4 A; 8, §22 B. Among Christians, cf. Sent. Sext. 47.
61. Abot R. Nat. 4 A; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 6:3; Pesiq. Rab. 16:7; cf. Sipre Deut. 306.20.3.
62. Cf. the continuing thought among Christians, e.g., Jerome Hom. Ps. 1 (trans. Bray, Corinthians, 102): “If I do what is prescribed, I am praying with my whole body what others are praying with their lips.” For a different but useful list of spiritual sacrifice language in antiquity, see Talbert, Romans, 283–84.
63. With Dunn, Romans, 710; Witherington, Acts, 398; cf. also Nock, “Vocabulary,” 134.
64. Wilken, “Christians,” 107–10 (yet also as a religious association devoted to Christ, 110–18); Wilken, “Social Interpretation”; Keener, Acts, 3:2610–11. By the second century many viewed Christianity as a philosophic school; see Wilken, “Social Interpretation,” 444–48; Schmeller, “Gegenwelten.”
65. As in Acts 21:23–26; cf. Luke 24:53; Acts 2:46; 3:1; 5:42.
66. For the Azazel goat, see Kiuchi, “Azazel-Goat.” This is the likeliest option among the OT sacrifices that do not require death (such as grain offerings or libations, e.g., Jewett, Romans, 729); sacrifices that require death would less easily be depicted as “living.”
67. E.g., Krentz, “Oxymora.” On oxymora, see Rowe, “Style,” 143; Aune, Dictionary of Rhetoric, 327; in Paul, see Anderson, Rhetorical Theory, 227; Porter, “Paul and Letters,” 582.
68. E.g., Philost. Hrk. 17.4; 56.4.
69. E.g., Sil. It. 4.791; Plut. Cic. 10.3; Themist. 13.2–3; Lucian Dial. G. 274 (3/23, Apollo and Dionysus 1); Philost. Vit. Apoll. 8.7; Rives, “Human Sacrifice”; Garnsey and Saller, Empire, 169. Accounts of the practice appear in, e.g., Hom. Il. 23.175–76; Aeschylus Ag. 205–26; Apollod. Bibl. 2.5.11; 3.15.8; Lycophron Alex. 229; Ovid Metam. 13.447–48; Virg. Aen. 10.517–20; Livy 22.57.6; Sen. Y. Troj. 360–70; Quint. Curt. 4.3.23; Appian C.W. 1.14.117; Arrian Alex. 1.5.7; Dio Chrys. Or. 8.14; Tac. Ann. 14.30; Plut. Par. St. 35, Mor. 314CD; Tert. Apol. 9.2. In Jewish thought, individual death might atone on behalf of others (see, e.g., Schenker, “Martyrium”; Baslez, “Martyrs”; Thoma, “Frühjüdische Martyrer”; Haacker, Theology, 133–34; Mek. Bah. 6.142–43; Sipre Deut. 32.5.2, 5; 310.4.1; 311.1.1), but “sacrifice” (as here) is a larger category than atonement.
70. In Pauline literature, cf. Eph. 5:2; Phil. 2:17; 2 Tim. 4:6; perhaps 1 Cor. 5:7.
71. Cf. Jesus’s teaching portrayed in Mark 8:34 and especially the application in Luke 9:23; cf. also the language of sharing Jesus’s baptism and cup of suffering (Mark 10:38–39; cf. 14:23–24, 36; Luke 12:50) and Paul’s image of baptism into Christ’s death (Rom. 6:3–4; cf. the cup in 1 Cor. 10:16; 11:26). For sacrificing here by how one lives, see Chrysostom Homily 20.1 (on Rom. 12:1), cited in Burns, Romans, 292.
72. E.g., Epict. Diatr. 2.14.12; 4.12.11; in Judaism, e.g., Jub. 2:22; 23:10; Tob. 4:21; Wis. 4:10; 9:10; T. Dan 1:3; T. Ab. 15:14 A; cf. Sir. 2:16.
73. In Gentile religion this could be determined by examining the sacrificed animal’s internal organs after the sacrifice (deSilva, Honor, 252). The phrase “acceptable to God” is not uncommon Koine (Moulton and Milligan, Vocabulary, 259, citing Priene 114.15; and, later, P.Fay. 90.17; P.Flor. 1.30.30; P.Stras. 1.1.9; P.Gen. 1.15.2; Jewett, Romans, 729, following Foerster, “Εὐάρεστος,” 456). For this and related language applied to sacrifices, see Porph. Marc. 17.282–86; for unacceptable sacrifices, see Lucian Sacr. 12–13 (sarcastically); Runaways 1.
74. E.g., Gen. 8:21; Exod. 29:18, 25, 41; Lev. 1:9, 13, 17 and passim; Num. 15:3; Ezra 6:10; Pss. 20:3; 119:108; Isa. 56:7; cf. also 1 Esd. 1:12; Sir. 35:8; 45:16; 50:15; Jub. 6:3; 7:5; 21:7, 9; 49:9; 1QS 3.11; 8.10; 9.4; 2Q24 frg. 4.2; 11QT 27.4; Philo Spec. Laws 1.201; Jos. Ant. 4.34, 311; 6.149; 7.334; 10.64; 12.146.
75. E.g., Gen. 4:4–5; Jer. 6:20; 14:12; Ezek. 43:27; Amos 5:22; Mal. 1:10; 2:13; Jub. 4:2; Philo Spec. Laws 1.223; Jos. Ant. 5.266.
76. For the rational element, connected with the mind in Rom. 12:2, see also, e.g., Cranfield, Romans, 2:602 (noting Stoic usage); Byrne, Romans, 366; Schreiner, Romans, 645; Cobb and Lull, Romans, 161; Bryan, Preface, 195n5 (citing Epict. Diatr. 2.9.2); Hultgren, Romans, 440; Kruse, Romans, 463; Barclay, Gift, 509; earlier, see, e.g., Aquinas, lecture 1, on Rom. 12:1, cited in Levy, Krey, and Ryan, Romans, 249. Some cite instead ancient usage supporting merely “spiritual” sacrifice as opposed to animal sacrifice (Hunter, Romans, 108) or think it refers to the entire life (Bornkamm, Experience, 41, opposing Stoic-like usage here).
77. Arius Did. 2.7.8a, p. 52.21–22. Only an appropriate act can have “a reasonable defence [εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν]” (2.7.8, pp. 50.36–52.1; trans. Pomeroy). Cf. 2.7.10a, p. 56.23–25 (though this passage notes that Stoic technical usage of terminology differs from common usage).
78. Epict. Diatr. 4.7.7; Arius Did. 2.7.6, p. 36.25; cf. 2.7.11m, p. 90.9–10.
79. Thorsteinsson, “Stoicism,” 23. Jewett (Romans, 730) rightly follows Cranfield (Romans, 2:602, citing Epict. Diatr. 1.16.20; 2.9.2; Marc. Aur. 2.16) in translating with respect to reason here, as in Stoicism, but unfortunately, Jewett then applies this too narrowly to the mission in Spain (731); contextually, it could apply more generally to unity (as in Rom. 12:4–6).
80. Moo (Romans, 752) cites here Kittel, “Λογικός,” 142; Ortkemper, Leben, 28–33.
81. Middle Platonists could distinguish “rational” and “irrational” parts of the soul (Dillon, Middle Platonists, esp. 174, on Philo); later, in Porphyry the “body” of the “mind” (νοῦς) is “the rational soul” (ψυχὴν λογικήν; Porph. Marc. 26.412). Philo speaks of the “rational” soul made in God’s image (Plant. 18) and “rational spirit-force within us which was shaped according to the archetypal form of the divine image” (Spec. Laws 1.171; trans. Colson, LCL, 7:197). In Plato, though developed far more in Philo, cf. Aune, “Duality,” 221.
82. Moo (Romans, 752) cites here Philo Spec. Laws 1.277. Cf. rational piety in 4 Maccabees (with Janzen, “Approach,” although the suggestion of dependence seems too optimistic).
83. For “rational” worship, though using different Greek terminology, see, e.g., Iambl. Pyth. Life 33.229: friendship “of gods with human beings through piety and scientific worship” (trans. Dillon and Hershbell, 227).
84. The two verbs do not include a wordplay as in English, but Paul might be using cognate roots as synonymous or close in sense (cf. both μορφή and σχῆμα, Phil. 2:7).
85. Bryan, Preface, 196. Cf. the Stoic Epictetus, who opines that no one’s mind changes instantly; it takes time to transform a person (Epict. Diatr. 1.15.6–8). Stoics still experienced the pull of old memories but were committed to retaining the right perspective (Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 72–73). Greek verb tenses are notoriously difficult to translate into English temporal categories, but the observation could be correct here.
86. Bryan, Preface, 196.
87. The verb “conformed” (συσχηματίζω), however, may function more as an active (cf. BDAG). For God’s work with human yielding or cooperation in transformation, see e.g., Cranfield, Romans, 2:607; Kruse, Romans, 464; Gorman, Cruciformity, 134. Cf. also the aorist passive subjunctive in Gal 4:19 (with Gorman, Inhabiting, 169, citing Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 284-85).
88. E.g., Philo Abr. 38; Max. Tyre Or. 1.7–8.
89. E.g., Mus. Ruf. frg. 41, p. 136.22, 24. Many philosophers believed that the nonphilosophic masses were “mad,” not thinking soundly; see, e.g., Epict. Diatr. 1.12.9; 1.21.4; Arius Did. 2.7.5b13, p. 26.28–30; 2.7.5b13, p. 28.1–2.
90. E.g., Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 353; Taylor, Romans, 92; Nygren, Romans, 418; Furnish, “Living,” 194–95; Gorman, Cruciformity, 354, 365; Hultgren, Romans, 441; cf. Cullmann, Time, 45.
91. See, e.g., 1QS 3.23; 4Q171 frgs. 1–2, col. 2.9–10; 4Q215a frg. 1, col. 2.4–6; 4 Ezra 4:35–37; 6:7–9, 20; 7:31, 47, 50, 113–14; 8:1, 52; 2 Bar. 15:8; t. Ber. 6:21; Peah 1:2–3; Sipre Num. 115.5.7; Sipre Deut. 29.2.3; 31.4.1; 32.5.10; 34.4.3; 48.7.1; Abot R. Nat. 5, 9 A; 22, §46 B; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 4:1; b. Hag. 12b; y. Hag. 2:1, §16; Pesiq. Rab. 16:6; 21:1; 25:2; Gen. Rab. 1:10; 53:12; 59:6; 66:2, 4; 90:6; 95 (MSV); Exod. Rab. 47:3; Lev. Rab. 2:2; 3:1; Deut. Rab. 1:20; 2:31; 3:4; Eccl. Rab. 4:6, §1; Song Rab. 2:2, §6; Lam. Rab. 1:5, §31; 3:3, §1; 3:18, §6; 3:22, §8; Tg. Ps.-Jon. on Gen. 25:32; cf. Sib. Or. 3.367–80; Pryke, “Eschatology,” 48; Ferch, “Aeons”; Charlesworth, Jesus within Judaism, 43; Grant, “Social Setting,” 140. Later, cf. also Qur’an 16.107, 122; 29.64. For the present age of evil, see, e.g., CD 4.8, 10, 12; 6.10, 14; 12.23; 14.19; 15.7, 10; 1QS 4.18; 4Q271 frg. 2.12; 4Q301 frg. 3ab.8; 4Q510 frg. 1.6; 4 Ezra 4:27.
92. For eschatological inversion, see, e.g., 1QM 14.4–7, 10–15; 4Q215a frg. 1, col. 2.3–6; 1 En. 46:5–6; 96:8; 104:2; Sib. Or. 3.350–55; 2 Bar. 83:5; t. Taan. 3:14; Sipra Behuq. pq. 3.263.1.8; Sipre Deut. 307.3.2–3; Abot R. Nat. 39 A; 22, §46; 44, §123 B; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 6:2; 9:1; b. Yoma 87a; y. Sanh. 6:6, §2; Gen. Rab. 21:1; Exod. Rab. 30:19; Lev. Rab. 13:3; 23:6; 33:6; 36:2; cf. 4 Ezra 6:20–24; T. Jud. 25:4.
93. It is possible that Paul also speaks of believers as being at the meeting of the ages (1 Cor. 10:11); see Epp, “Imageries,” 104; but for a different interpretation, cf. Ladd, Theology, 371.
94. For the connection with 1 Cor. 7:31, see also Jewett, Romans, 732, although he overspecifies the application here. Cf. Theodoret Commentary 12.2 (on Rom. 12:2), cited in Burns, Romans, 293.
95. See Stowers, “Resemble,” 92; on philosophic conversion, esp. Nock, Conversion.
96. I understand the present “have” in 2 Cor. 5:1 in connection with the certainty of possession in view of the presence of the eschatological Spirit in 5:5; see Keener, Corinthians, 179.
97. With Byrne, Romans, 366; Schreiner, Romans, 647.
98. E.g., Matera, Romans, 287.
99. The LXX can apply a cognate to renewing a former state (Ps. 102:5 [103:5 ET]; Lam. 5:21) and use in parallel with God’s re-creative activity (Ps. 103:30 [104:30 ET]); Josephus applies it to rebuilding or repairing (Ant. 9.161; 11.107; 13.57). Dunn (Romans, 714) suggests that “renewing” indicates a measure of continuity in the personal identity as well as transformation of perspectives.
100. Cf. cherishing eternal values in Epicurus Let. Men. 135 (in Grant, Religions, 160), though Epicurus rejected an afterlife (124–26).
101. Others have also noted some contrasts with Rom. 1, e.g., Kim, “Paraenesis,” 124; Gorman, Inhabiting, 89.
102. A generation ago scholars often spoke of “overrealized eschatology” without always articulating the wider ancient intellectual factors that made such a perspective more appealing than Paul’s approach, which allows for both realized and future elements.
103. For the Spirit and the partial foretaste of eschatology in 1 Cor. 2:9–10, see the discussion on pp. 176–79, below.
104. This term does not appear in the LXX and therefore has sometimes been attributed to the mysteries (Reitzenstein, Mystery-Religions, 454, on 2 Cor. 3:18); the sense, however, is quite different in the mysteries (Sheldon, Mystery Religions, 86). The language was often used for transformation of deities and others in mythology (noted by Jewett, Romans, 732; see Blackburn, “ΑΝΔΡΕΣ,” 190; a range of transformation sources cited in Keener, John, 1189–90; Keener, Acts 1:667–68, 720; Keener, Matthew, 437). This meaning does not fit the present context as well as closer Jewish conceptions do.
105. Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 94.48 (trans. Gummere, LCL, 3:42–43). In Ep. Lucil. 6 (in Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 64), Seneca claims that he is experiencing a transformation, though it is not yet complete. Stoics emphasized transformed thinking (Thorsteinsson, “Stoicism,” 24–25). Vining (“Ethics”) views Paul’s emphasis on reason and ethics as parallel to, yet not dependent on, the same Stoic emphasis.
106. See Nock, Christianity, 55, regarding cognitive ideals, against the mystery religions idea. One honors God by making one’s thought like him (Porph. Marc. 16.265–67), through virtue, which draws the soul to what is like it (16.267–68); a mind like God gravitates toward him (19.315–16; for the divine law stamped in the mind, see 26.410–11, 419–20). Much less relevant is transformation through Platonic reincarnation (Athen. Deipn. 15.679A).
107. Porph. Marc. 11.199–201 (trans. O’Brien Wicker, 55).
108. E.g., Marc. Aur. 10.8.2 (and comparable sources cited by Haines in LCL, 270n1).
109. Philo Creation 144; cf. Abr. 87; Decal. 73; Virt. 168. Philo uses the verb ἐξομοιόω and its cognate noun forty-six times, sometimes with reference to nature’s conformity to God’s nature. Judeans also could emphasize the importance of right thinking about the law (e.g., 1QS 9.17; 4Q398 frgs. 14–17, col. 2.4).
110. Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 94.48.
111. These texts about Christ’s image employ cognate terms in a relevant manner. On Christ as God’s image embodying expectations for divine wisdom (cf. 2 Cor. 4:4; Wis. 7:26), see, e.g., discussion in Keener, Corinthians, 169–71, 174; cf. the logos in Philo Dreams 2.45.
112. See, e.g., Cic. Tusc. 5.25.70; Sen. Y. Dial. 1.1.5; Epict. Diatr. 2.14.12–13; Marc. Aur. 10.8.2; Heracl. Ep. 5; Plut. Borr. 7, Mor. 830B; Let. Aris. 188, 190, 192, 208–10, 254, 281; Philo Creation 139; T. Ash. 4:3; Mek. Shir. 3.43–44; Sipra Qed. par. 1.195.1.3; Sent. Sext. 44–45; Rutenber, Doctrine, chaps. 2–3; cf. Eph. 5:1.
113. E.g., Mus. Ruf. frg. 41, p. 136.22–24; Philo Abr. 38.
114. E.g., Sen. Y. Nat. Q. 3.pref.11–15; for a non-Stoic, see, e.g., Porph. Marc. 5.86–94.
115. Meeks, Moral World, 47; cf. Lutz, Musonius, 28, on Musonius Rufus.
116. Lutz, Musonius, 28, on Mus. Ruf. 6, p. 24.
117. Iambl. Pyth. Life 16.70. Others might seek to do the same (e.g., Libanius Speech Char. 18.3).
118. Plot. Enn. 1.3.3.
119. Let. Aris. 237–39. God rules human minds (227), and God directs the mind so it does good (243). God leads the mind of the king (the addressee of much of the book’s wisdom) in 246; cf. 251, 255, 267, 270, 276. One needs God’s help to behave rightly (252); to be a doer of good is a gift of God (231; cf. 278), for he guides human actions (195). God provides insight (Wis. 8:21; 1QS 4.22; 1QHa 18.29; 19.30–31; 20.16; 4Q381 frg. 15.8; 4Q427 frg. 8, col. 2.18).
120. See, further, the discussion on 2 Cor. 3:18 below on pp. 206–15.
121. Dunn (Romans, 713) cites here, with regard to future resurrection, Dan. 12:3; 1 En. 104:6; 1 Cor. 15:51–53; Phil. 3:21; Mark 12:25; 4 Ezra 7:97; 2 Bar. 51:5; and also an occasional transformation “consequential upon one being taken up to heaven while still alive, particularly Enoch (1 En. 71.11; 2 En. 22.8; Asc. Isa. 9.9).” Jewett (Romans, 732) cites apocalyptic parallels as more distant than Greek mythical ones; the distance, however, is primarily lexical (because most of these sources are not written in Greek), whereas conceptually they better fit Paul’s usage. Although the sense here may not involve future eschatology (Jewett, Romans, 733), it involves realized eschatology. Segal (Convert, 63–65) opines that Paul’s emphasis on present and future transformation probably reflects apocalyptic models. For transformation to the divine image in Jewish mysticism, see Morray-Jones, “Mysticism.”
122. The writer may adapt Greek mythological language for this purpose (cf. Philo Embassy 80). Paul employs the same term (μετασχηματίζω) for false appearances (2 Cor. 11:13–15) but also for eschatological transformation to be like Christ (Phil. 3:21); the term is cognate to Paul’s term for “conformed” in Rom. 12:2.
123. See again pp. 206–15 below, esp. 210–14.
124. Johnson, Romans, 191. See also Phil. 2:5.
125. Philo applies it to Moses’s inspiration in Exod. 2:17 (Philo Mos. 1.57) and for Gaius Caligula pretending to be a deity (Embassy 95), but not to Moses’s transfiguration, to which Paul alludes in 2 Cor. 3:18.
126. Possibly it also contrasts with mere religious “form” (Rom. 2:20); Paul uses cognates for Christ being formed in believers (perhaps in conversion, Gal. 4:19), and for the contrast between Christ’s divine and human “form” or “likeness” in Phil. 2:6–7.
127. The term νοῦς, which Paul finds in Isa. 40:13, appears often enough in the LXX (Dafni, “ΝΟΥΣ,” compares Homeric usage), most frequently in 4 Maccabees (1:15, 35; 2:16, 18, 22; 3:17; 5:11; 14:11; 16:13).
128. E.g., Jub. 21:2–3, 23; CD 3.11, 15–16; T. Iss. 4:3; m. Ab. 5:20 MSS; Sipre Num. 42.1.2; Sipre Deut. 47.2.9; 306.28.2; Israel faces judgments in the present when they disobey God’s will (Sipre Deut. 40.4.1; 40.6.1; 305.2.1; cf. 114.1.1; 118.1.1; Abot R. Nat. 34 A).
129. Wis. 9:13 in context (esp. with 9:17).
130. Sorabji, Emotion, 219; for submission to God’s (Fate’s) will, see, e.g., Sen. Y. Dial. 7.15.4; Epict. Diatr. 1.6.1; 1.14.16; Marc. Aur. 6.16, and some other texts in Keener, Acts, 3:2491–92; in Judaism, cf. 1 Macc. 3:59–60. For doing God’s will in philosophy outside Stoicism, see, e.g., Socrates Ep. 1; (later), Proclus Poet. 6.1, K107.16–17.
131. Diog. Laert. 7.1.125, recounting the Stoic view.
132. For Stoics too, reason enabled one to distinguish good from bad (Mus. Ruf. 3, p. 38.26–30). Such discernment was necessary to prevent utter folly (see Epict. Diatr. 2.24.19).
133. For moral criteria more broadly, see, e.g., Rhet. Alex. 1, 1421b.25–26.
134. Epict. Diatr. 1.1.
135. Mus. Ruf. 3, p. 38.26–30.
136. For δοκιμάζω here as “test,” “evaluate,” see Byrne, Romans, 366. Baumert (“Unterscheidung”) applies the passage to discernment but focuses on 12:6, which I understand differently (Keener, Romans, 146, regarding ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως as equivalent here to μέτρον πίστεως in 12:3, with, e.g., Fuller, “Theology,” 210n13; Harrison and Hagner, “Romans,” 187; Dunn, Romans, 728; Moo, Romans, 765–66; Osborne, Romans, 323–24; Schreiner, Romans, 656; Kruse, Romans, 469–71; I understand it to apply to the diverse applications of faith to different gifts rather than to diverse amounts).
137. Just as the right opinion here must be distinguished from that of “this age” (Rom. 12:2), ancient thinkers often recognized that one could reason more clearly without the emotionally driven views of the masses (Pliny Ep. 2.11.6–7).
138. Arius Did. 2.7.7f, p. 48.19–22.
139. Arius Did. 2.7.7f, p. 48.24–26.
140. Epict. Diatr. 2.24.19.
141. Porph. Marc. 26.413.
142. Mus. Ruf. 16, p. 106.10–12. Such intellectual discernment was not in principle incompatible with divine intuition or revelations (cf. Apul. De deo Socr. 162; in Paul, perhaps Rom. 8:14).
143. In philosophy, Plato Alcib. 1.114E; Hipp. maj. 295E; Xen. Mem. 4.6.8; Cic. Fin. 3.21.69; Philod. Crit. col. 20 b; Sext. Emp. Eth. 2.22 (Stoics); Sen. Y. Dial. 7.8.2; Ben. 4.21.6; Mus. Ruf. 4, p. 46.36–37; 8, p. 60.16–17; 15, p. 96.25; 16, p. 102.33–35; 17, p. 108.35–36; 18B, p. 116.10–11; frg. 27, p. 130; frg. 40, p. 136.8–9; Epict. Diatr. 1.2.5–7; 1.6.6, 33; 1.18.2; 1.22.1; 1.28.5–6; 2.7.4; 2.8.1; 4.7.9; Arius Did. 2.7.5b2, p. 14.20–22; 2.7.10a, p. 56.26–27; 2.7.11h, p. 74.23–24, 29–30; Marc. Aur. 6.27; 9.1.1; Diog. Laert. 7.1.98–99 (Stoics); 10.150.31 (Epicurus); 10.151.36; 10.152.37; 10.153.38; Iambl. Pyth. Life 22.101; 31.204; in Plato, cf. Lodge, Ethics, 62–63; in rhetoric, Arist. Rhet. 1.7.1, 1363b; Rhet. Alex. 6, 1427b.39–1428a.2; Ael. Arist. Leuct. Or. 5.11–16; Theon Progymn. 8.45; Hermog. Issues 77.6–19; Progymn. 6, “On Commonplace,” 14; Hermog. Progymn. 11, “On Thesis,” 25–26; nontechnically, Arist. Pol. 1.2.8, 1254a; Phaedrus 3.17.13; Epict. Diatr. 3.21.15; 4.8.17. For the inexpedient or unhelpful, see Rhet. Alex. 4, 1426b.32; 34, 1440a.1–2; Quint. Decl. 261.6; Mus. Ruf. 18B, p. 116.23–25; Arius Did. 2.7.5d, p. 28.21; Hermog. Progymn. 5, “On Refutation and Confirmation,” 11. Cf. traditional Jewish wisdom in Sir. 37:28.
144. Rhet. Alex. 4, 1426b.32; 6, 1427b.39–1428a.2; Mus. Ruf. 12, p. 86.7–8, 12, 15; Epict. Diatr. 1.1.21–22; Encheir. 51.2; Hermog. Progymn. 6, “On Commonplace,” 14; Progymn. 12, “On Introduction of a Law,” 27; Aphthonius Progymn. 7, “On Commonplace,” 35S, 20R; Progymn. 14, “On Introduction of a Law,” 53S, 47R; Commentary on Aphthonius’s Progymnasmata Attributed to John of Sardis, 13, “On Thesis,” 240, 5; Nicolaus Progymn. 7, “On Commonplace,” 44; for custom, Ael. Arist. Leuct. Or. 5.6–11; for “permissible,” e.g., Hermog. Issues 67.2–6. For adequacy and self-sufficiency, see Lodge, Ethics, 68–72.
145. Such as “right and good” in Deut. 6:18 and 12:28; 1 Sam. 12:23; 2 Chron. 14:2; 31:20 (the combination is idiomatic, not distinctly theological—see Josh. 9:25; 2 Sam. 15:3; Jer. 26:14; 40:4; Jos. Ant. 13.431; parallelism in Job 34:4; Ps. 52:3). Their function in these passages is cumulative even if a slight difference of nuance is possible.
146. Some might place the three in ascending order here, but it seems difficult to rank the words hierarchically. Note, for example, that “good” is either identical with or superior to “righteous” in Rom. 5:7; cf. esp. Paul’s trio of adjectives “holy, just, and good” in 7:12, with “good” there taking the final position.
147. Iambl. Pyth. Life 5.26 (trans. Dillon and Hershbell, 49).
148. Plato Alcib. 1.115–27; see esp. 118A (just, noble, good, and expedient).
149. Rhet. Alex. 6, 1427b.39–41 and 1428a.1–2, listing justice, lawfulness, profitability, and pleasantness.
150. Rhet. Alex. 1, 1421b.25–26 (trans. Rackham, LCL, 277); or at least necessary (1421b.28); cf. also Rhet. Alex. 4, 1427a.26–27. Later, cf. categories for rhetorical use in Hermog. Issues 76.5–6 (trans. Heath, 52): “legality; justice; advantage; feasibility; honour; consequence”; Hermog. Progymn. 12, “On Introduction of a Law,” 27; Aphthonius Progymn. 7, “On Commonplace,” 35S, 20R; Aphthonius Progymn. 14, “On Introduction of a Law,” 53S, 47R; Nicolaus Progymn. 7, “On Commonplace,” 44.
151. Iambl. Letter 4.1–9 (Stob. Anth. 3.3.26).
152. Iambl. Letter 4.9–10 (Stob. Anth. 3.3.26; trans. Dillon and Polleichtner, 13).
153. Rhet. Alex. 1, 1421b.16–22; Cic. Fam. 15.17.3 (citing a Stoic maxim).
154. See, e.g., Mus. Ruf. 4, p. 46.36–37; 7, p. 58.25; 8, p. 60.10; 15, p. 96.25; 16, p. 102.35; 16, p. 104.35–36; Epict. Diatr. 1.22.1; 4.7.9; Arius Did. 2.7.5b1, p. 12.15; 2.7.5e, p. 30.1–2; 2.7.5g, p. 32.1–9; 2.7.5h, p. 32.19–24; 2.7.5i, p. 32.25–32; 2.7.5k, p. 32.33–34; p. 34.1–6; 2.7.5L, p. 34.17–20; 2.7.5m, p. 36.10–12; 2.7.6d, pp. 38.34–41.3; 2.7.7g, p. 50.23–26; Marc. Aur. 5.15; Diog. Laert. 7.1.92; Sext. Emp. Eth. 2.22 (on Stoics). For the good as a Stoic goal, see also Murray, Philosophy, 28–30, 36–38, 43.
155. E.g., Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 71. Only what is morally noble is good (Cic. Parad. 6–15, agreeing with Stoics); what is honorable is what is good (Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 87.25). In a nontechnical sense, one might claim that moral good rarely coincides with expediency (Polyb. 21.32.1), and in Soranus Gynec. 1.11.42, not everything useful is helpful; certainly not everything pleasant is helpful (Dio Chrys. Or. 3.9). But many philosophers defined the terms differently and as coinciding (Mus. Ruf. 8, p. 60.10–12; Epict. Diatr. 1.22.1; 2.8.1; Arius Did. 2.7.5d, p. 28.17–19, 25–29; 2.7.11i, p. 74.38; cf. again Plato Alcib. 1.115–27; also Aeschines Tim. 6).
156. See Lodge, Ethics, 343–477, esp. 442–55; for the relation between beauty and the highest good in Plato, see Gilbert, “Relation,” 290; Lodge, Ethics, 61. For good in a later moralist with Middle Platonist sympathies, see Plut. L. Wealth 10, Mor. 528A. Opposing Plato’s idea of the good, see Arist. N.E. 1.6.1–7.2, 1096a ff.; E.E. 1.8.1–22, 1217b–1218b.
157. Cic. Fin. 2.12.35–13.43; cf. also Long, Philosophy, 199; Frede, “Conception,” 71. Cicero agrees that virtue must belong to the chief good (Cic. Fin. 3.1.2), although thinkers could debate whether it was (3.7.26–9.31; 3.10.33–11.36) or was not (against the Stoics, 4.16.43) the only good. Epicurus made pleasure the chief good (Cic. Fin. 1.9.29); Stoics rejected that as a good (Mus. Ruf. 1, p. 32.22), though they could use it to advocate self-control (Mus. Ruf. frg. 24, p. 130).
158. Arius Did. 2.7.11h, p. 74.15–17.
159. Mus. Ruf. 3, p. 38.26–30; Arius Did. 2.7.5b2, p. 14.27–29.
160. Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 66.31 (trans. Gummere, LCL, 2:21).
161. Diog. Laert. 7.1.98 (trans. Hicks, LCL, 2:205).
162. Anacharsis (to Solon) Ep. 2.9–11.
163. Let. Aris. 225 (“the highest good,” trans. Shutt, OTP 2:27; “the best,” trans. Hadas, 189). Cf. καλός in Let. Aris. 7, 236 (esp. in Hadas); and esp. the best in 195, 212, 238, 322; cf. 287. For a good man, cf. T. Sim. 4:4; T. Benj. 3:1 (also a concern of Stoics, e.g., Epict. Diatr. 1.12.7; 3.26.27–28; 4.10.11; Marc. Aur. 6.30.1; 10.17, 32; 11.5; and others, e.g., Antisthenes, Diog. Laert. 6.12).
164. Isaacs, Spirit, 30, citing Philo Sacr. 54; Flight 131.
165. Isaacs, Spirit, 30, citing Philo Creation 8. She contrasts this with Plato, who identified the good with God (citing Rep. 6.504D; 508E); cf. Wolfson, Philo, 1:201–2.
166. Philo Names 7; m. Ber. 9:2; b. Ber. 45b, 46a, 48b, 49a, 59b, 60b; y. Taan. 2:1, §10; Gen. Rab. 13:15; 57:2; Oesterley, Liturgy, 61. For the suggestion that the “good” is God in Rom. 5:7, citing also other texts, cf. Martin, “Good.”
167. E.g., b. Ber. 5a; y. Rosh Hash. 3:8, §5; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 15:5; Abrahams, Studies (2), 186.
168. As with “good” but even more often here, I group together terms within the same semantic domain.
169. See, e.g., Arius Did. 2.7.5i, p. 32.25–26.
170. E.g., Sir. 2:16. See discussion concerning Rom. 12:1 above, p. 150.
171. Cf. “perfect” love in marriage (Mus. Ruf. 13A, p. 88.21), perfect character (Marc. Aur. 7.69), or perfect happiness (Diog. Laert. 7.1.9). The old, narrow association with the mysteries (as in Conzelmann, Corinthians, 60; Héring, First Epistle, 16; Ladd, Theology, 361) reflects inadequate acquaintance with wider usage and ignores the lack of key mystery terms in Paul (so also Sheldon, Mystery Religions, 77–78; Nock, “Vocabulary,” 134; Pearson, Terminology, 28). Appeal to the gnostic use (Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth, 179, citing Iren. Her. 1.13.6) is anachronistic.
172. Arius Did. 2.7.5b4, p. 16.29–31; 2.7.8, p. 52.7, 11; 2.7.11a, p. 63.31; 2.7.11b, p. 64.14; 2.7.11L, p. 87.18. Thus Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 66.8–12: true virtue is perfect and therefore, being superlative, cannot improve or be surpassed.
173. Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 109.1; Arius Did. 2.7.5b8, p. 22.13; 2.7.11g, p. 70.1–3 (for the converse, see 70.31–33); 2.7.11m, p. 94.13–16. Seneca notes that even Epicurus could speak in terms of an ideal sage (Ep. Lucil. 66.18). In principle, Zeno thought that perfection in virtue was attainable (Diog. Laert. 7.1.8). Cf. the ideal king as “perfect” in word and action (Mus. Ruf. 8, p. 64.11).
174. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 61–62; Meeks, Moral World, 50; in earlier Stoicism, only the world is perfect and divine (so Cic. Nat. d. 2.13.35–2.14.39). Though the ideal wise person has achieved perfection (Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 109.1), every wise person still has other things to learn (109.3). One cannot be completely faultless, though one can strive to be (Epict. Diatr. 4.12.19); the mind is not instantly perfected (Epict. Diatr. 1.15.8), but those who are not perfect can make progress toward perfection (Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 94.50; Epict. Diatr. 1.4.4). The terminology may not always be consistent; Epictetus speaks of a person as both being mature (τέλειος) and making progress (Arrian’s summary in Epict. Encheir. 51.2), and other Stoics could name someone as “perfect,” i.e., without blame (Marc. Aur. 1.16.4).
175. Plot. Enn. 1.4.4.
176. Max. Tyre Or. 15.1 (noting in 15.2 that philosophers are less imperfect than others).
177. Iambl. Letter 8, frg. 7 (Stob. Anth. 2.8.48), because the soul’s genuine essence is perfection.
178. Iambl. Letter 3, frg. 3 (Stob. Anth. 3.5.46).
179. Iambl. Letter 16, frg. 1.1 (Stob. Anth. 3.1.17; trans. Dillon and Polleichtner, 47).
180. Iambl. Letter 4.5–6 (Stob. Anth. 3.3.26).
181. Apul. De deo Socr. 146; for God as changeless, see Max. Tyre Or. 8.8; Proclus Poet. 6.1, K109.12–14; possibly James 1:17. Cf. what is “perfect” (the ultimate) in Aristotle in Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 48. That which is most perfect is in the highest heaven; the closer to highest, the more perfect something is (Arist. Heav. 2.12, 291b.24–293a.14).
182. Apul. De deo Socr. 127.
183. Max. Tyre Or. 38.6; Iambl. Letter 16, frg. 4 (Stob. Anth. 4.39.23), encouraging likeness to God. So also other thinkers, e.g., Marc. Aur. 10.1; cf. Ael. Arist. Def. Or. 130, §41D; Lutz, Musonius, 27n111, on Mus. Ruf. 17, p. 108.11–13.
184. See Satlow, “Perfection”; for the logos guiding toward perfection, see, e.g., Migration 174. Philo speaks of the “perfect person” (QG 4.191); for him, the ideally wise person is also the “perfect” person (Sacr. 8). The Philonic corpus employs the adjective more than four hundred times, the cognate verb more than fifty times, and the noun τελειότης some thirty-five times. Pearson, Terminology, 28–30, emphasizes Philonic usage.
185. E.g., Sarah representing “perfect virtue” in Philo Posterity 130 (for perfect virtues, see also, e.g., Unchangeable 154; Drunkenness 148; Sober 8; Dreams 1.177, 200; Abr. 100, 116; Mos. 1.159). Cf. “perfect wisdom” in Posterity 174; Migr. 166; Dreams 1.39; Spec. Laws 2.231; Virt. 129; “perfect” understanding in Wis. 6:15.
186. Dey, World, 72–74.
187. 4 Macc. 7:15.
188. E.g., Philo Creation 42, 59; Spec. Laws 2.204; Dio Chrys. Or. 8.16; 77/78.17; Plut. Educ. 10, Mor. 7C; Men. Rhet. 2.1–2, 376.31; 2.1–2, 377.2. So also with the Latin perfectus, e.g., Fronto Ad M. Caes. 4.1.
189. Philod. Death 34.10; Crit. col. 4 b.5–6, 8a. In Stoic ideals, however, such “perfection” was in practice unattainable (Lucian Hermot. 76); cf. Arius Did. 2.7.11g, p. 74.11–13.
190. Men. Rhet. 2.14, 426.27–32; cf. Epict. Diatr. 2.19.29.
191. E.g., L.A.B. 4:11 (perfectus); Noah in Gen. 6:9 LXX and Sir. 44:17; Abraham in Jub. 15:3 (cf. Gen. 17:1); Jacob in Jub. 27:17; Leah in Jub. 36:23; cf. perhaps Apoc. Zeph. 10:9. One comparatively perfect by human standards still needs God’s wisdom (Wis. 9:6).
192. See, e.g., “perfect holiness” (CD 7.5; 20.2, 5, 7; 1QS 8.20), related to “perfect” behavior (CD 2.15–16; 1QS 1.8; 2.2; 3.9; 5.24; 8.1, 9, 10, 18, 21; 9.2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 19; 10.21; 11.2; 1QSa 1.17, 28; 1QSb 1.2; 5.22; 1QM 7.5; 14.7; 1QHa 9.38; 4Q255 frg. 2.5; 4Q259 2.18; 3.1; 4Q266 frg. 5, col. 1.19; 4Q403 frg. 1, col. 1.22; 4Q525 frg. 5.11); the “perfect way” of behavior (1QS 4.22). It can also mean “complete” (as in “a complete year”; CD 15.15; 4Q252 2.5; 4Q266 frg. 8, col. 1.6).
193. E.g., 1QS 11.3, 14; 1QM 11.4; 1QHa 8.30, 34; 15.32–16.3; 17.7; 18.23; 19.32–34; 4Q504 frg. 4.5–7. Cf. also Kim, New Perspective, 150.
194. See 1QS 11.17.
195. 1QHa 12.30–33.
196. Skilled ancient readers also took into account authors’ vocabulary elsewhere; see, e.g., Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 108.24–25; Philost. Hrk. 11.5; cf. Dion. Hal. Demosth. 46.
197. Intellectuals expected attention to context, e.g., Quint. Inst. 10.1.20–21; Apul. Apol. 82–83; Hermog. Method 13.428–29.
198. Cf. the pesher hermeneutic in the Dead Sea Scrolls (see, e.g., Dimant, “Pesharim”; Brooke, “Pesher”; Brooke, “Pesharim”; Brooke, “Interpretation”; Aune, Dictionary of Rhetoric, 347–50; Longenecker, Exegesis, 31, 38–45; Fitzmyer, “Quotations,” 325–30; Brownlee, “Interpretation,” 60–62; Lim, “Orientation”), although a hermeneutic of hindsight is in no way limited to the Dead Sea Scrolls. Cf. also the Spirit’s role in providing insight in the scrolls (1QS 4.3; 1QHa 20.15; 4Q427 frg. 8, col. 2.18).
199. For the concept of greater knowledge demanding greater responsibility, see also, e.g., Philost. Vit. soph. 1.16.501; Amos 3:2; 2 Bar. 15:5–6; 19:3; Sipre Deut. 43.14.1; b. Shab. 68ab; Yoma 72b; Luke 12:47; James 3:1; 4:17.
200. As often noted, e.g., in Dunn, Romans, 708. Admittedly, Paul uses the conjunction freely (more than thirty times in Romans), but it carries its normal meaning in these instances, and conjoined with a fresh exhortation (as also in 1 Cor. 4:16), the element of consequence is important. Sometimes Paul uses “therefore” when developing an ethical section that follows more theological groundwork (Marshall, Thessalonians, 104), and some commentators envision its function thus here (Moo, Romans, 748). Writers often transitioned even by restating a point and then setting forth what would follow (Rhet. Her. 4.26.35).
201. Many view “mercies” here as referring back to Rom. 9–11, e.g., Schreiner, Romans, 639. Cranfield (Romans, 2:448) regards the keyword of Rom. 9–11 as “mercy.” The LXX employs Paul’s term for “mercies” here for God’s mercy with respect to God’s covenant faithfulness (Gupta, “Mercies”). Furnish (“Living,” 194) applies it also to all claims about God’s love in Christ (including Rom. 5:8; 8:35, 39). Some suggest instead that mercies here are empowerment for presenting oneself, as by the Spirit (Talbert, Romans, 282–83, citing Rom. 8:4 and Phil. 2:1–2); but Paul could easily specify the Spirit here, and even Phil. 2:1–2 may be a response to God’s mercies shown in his acts.
202. See, e.g., Isaeus Menec. 47; Rhet. Alex. 15, 1432a.1–2; Dio Chrys. Or. 33.45; Rowe, “Style,” 139; for invoking deities in other ways, see, e.g., Mus. Ruf. 2, p. 38.17; 3, p. 42.2; Dio Chrys. Or. 47.14; in letters, Fronto Ad Ant. Pium 2, 4; Ep. graec. 1.5; 2.1; 5.4.
203. See appendix B.
204. Cf. also the idea of internalizing here Jesus’s model in Murphy, “Understanding.”
205. Historians often attributed the process of history to fate or providence, although often deeming it intelligible only in retrospect; see, e.g., discussions in Grene, Political Theory, 75–79; Squires, Plan, esp. 15–20, 38–51, 121–37, 154–66; Squires, “Plan”; Brawley, Centering on God, 86–106; Walbank, “Fortune,” 350–54; Brouwer, “Polybius and Tyche.”
206. Jewett (Romans, 733) goes too far when he suggests that the focus in Rom. 12:2 is “on group decision making.” This is not the perspective one would gain reading the text in light of ancient philosophy. This interpretation could fit 12:3–6, but the only necessary point is that one takes the group into account in making the decision, whether it is the individual or the group hearing and deciding. Thus, it does require the larger context of Christ’s body, but Paul expects individuals to apply the counsel as well as groups. Note the “individual” responsibility as well in 12:5.
207. He also plays on ὑπερφρονεῖν, creating rhetorically pleasant repetition (with Longenecker, Introducing Romans, 423; cf. Furnish, Corinthians, 308). Many note the connection regarding cognition between 12:2 and 12:3 (e.g., Rodríguez, Call Yourself, 237).
208. See esp. Plato Charm. 159B–176C; cf. Xen. Mem. 1.2.23.
209. See, e.g., Mus. Ruf. 18B, p. 116.20; Arius Did. 2.7.5f, p. 30.23; 2.7.11g, p. 72.15; Lucian Icar. 30 (Zeus complaining that they were not living accordingly). Cf. also the moralist Plutarch in Poetry 11, Mor. 32C.
210. Though ultimately said to derive from Socrates (Plato Rep. 4.428–34).
211. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 4, p. 44.10–22, esp. 16–22; p. 48.1, 4, 8, 13, esp. 4; 6, p. 52.15, 17, 19, 21, esp. 15; 7, p. 58.25–26 (minus “courage”); 8, pp. 60.22–64.9, esp. 62.10–23; 8, p. 66.7–8, esp. 8; 17, p. 108.9–10; Marc. Aur. 3.6; Arius Did. 2.7.5a, p. 10.7–9 (Zeno’s views); 2.7.5b1, p. 12.13–22 (and their converse in lines 22–29; as samples of virtues and vices—see lines 29–30); 2.7.5b2, p. 14.1–4 (esp. 3); 2.7.5b5, p. 18.27–31 (with lines 21–26, 32–35). Cf. Mus. Ruf. 7, p. 58.25–26 (esp. 26); 16, p. 104.32–34, esp. 33; frg. 38, p. 136.3. See discussion in Lutz, Musonius, 27, including n. 113. Cf. lists of virtues including at least three of these, e.g., Arius Did. 2.7.5b, p. 10.16–21 (esp. 17); 2.7.11e, p. 68.12–16; Philost. Vit. Apoll. 1.20.
212. E.g., cf. Mus. Ruf. 3, p. 40.20–22; 4, p. 44.18–22; 6, p. 52.15–17; 8, p. 62.14–17; 16, p. 104.33–35; 17, p. 108.11–14; frg. 24, p. 130; Arius Did. 2.7.5b2, p. 14.6. Against sexual indulgence, see, e.g., Mus. Ruf. 12, p. 86.13–16; against gluttony, e.g., Mus. Ruf. 18A, p. 112.6–7 (cf. 112.29); 18B, p. 116.4–22, esp. 19–20; 18B, p. 118.4–7, esp. 5; p. 120.2–7, esp. 6–7; against grief, e.g., Arius Did. 2.7.5L, p. 36.3–5. See, further, Lutz, Musonius, 28 (noting esp. 6, p. 54.2–25). For the fullest definition, see Arius Did. 2.7.5b1, p. 12.18–19; 2.7.5b2, p. 14.15–16, 31–35; p. 16.1–3; cf. also 2.7.5b, p. 10.21–25 (esp. 23); p. 12.1–2.
213. Mus. Ruf. 5, p. 50.22–26.
214. Mus. Ruf. 8, p. 60.10–23; 8, p. 62.10–21; Dio Chrys. Or. 3.7; Philost. Vit. Apoll. 5.35, 36.
215. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 8, p. 66.8; Dio Chrys. Or. 35.2.
216. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 3, p. 40.17–18, 20; 4, p. 44.16–18. For the virtue as appropriate for women, see also Mus. Ruf. 4, p. 48.4; for philosophy teaching women this virtue, see also Mus. Ruf. 3, p. 42.26–28. See more broadly North, “Mare.”
217. Cf. even Epicureans in Cic. Fin. 1.14.47 (temperantiam), a concession Stoics were ready to exploit (Mus. Ruf. frg. 24, p. 130, with Lutz’s note, p. 131). Cf. Lucian Nigr. 6.
218. Cf., e.g., Philost. Vit. Apoll. 5.36; 6.11; Iambl. Pyth. Life 1.1; ruling the tongue, 31.195; concerning the temptations of youth, 8.41; 31.195 (sexual).
219. Dio Chrys. Or. 80.1.
220. Thinking “above” one’s role (on which see, helpfully, Jewett, Romans, 739–41) was often expressed in arrogance (e.g., for Chrysippus in Diog. Laert. 7.7.183, 185; boasting beyond one’s strength in Hom. Il. 17.19; the object of Socrates’s critique in Diog. Laert. 2.38). It should not be confused with positive ancient comments about noble-mindedness or great-mindedness, on which cf. Galen Grief 50b; Iambl. Letter 6, frg. 2 (Stob. Anth. 4.5.75). Nevertheless, in view of Rom. 12:16, part of what Paul clearly has in mind is setting aside considerations of social status (cf. Taylor, “Obligation”), and that verse also evokes Rom. 11:20, which warns God’s people against ethnic prejudice.
221. Cf. some philosophers’ practices of self-evaluation and self-improvement (Sorabji, Emotion, 211–27, Stoics on 213–14). Against inappropriate pride, see, e.g., Eurip. frg. 963 (from Plut. Mor. 102e); frg. 1113a (= 1040 N; from Stob. Anth. 3.22.5).
222. See Marshall, Enmity, 190–94 (for “beyond measure” in 2 Cor. 10:13, see 369). Cf. also North, “Concept”; North, Sophrosyne.
223. Treating μέτρον πίστεως (12:3) as roughly equivalent to ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως (12:6), with, e.g., Dunn, Romans, 727–28; Byrne, Romans, 371; Schreiner, Romans, 652; pace, e.g., Cranfield, “ΜΕΤΡΟΝ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ,” 351; Bryan, Preface, 197. In support of faith apportioned for gifts, cf. (in Bray, Romans, 309–12) Origen Comm. Rom. on 12:3 (CER 5:46); Basil Baptism 8; Rules 7 (on Rom. 12:6); Chrys. Hom. Rom. 21 (on Rom. 12:6); Ps.-Const. Rom. (on Rom. 12:6); Pelagius Comm. Rom. on 12:6 (PCR 133); Gennadius of Constantinople, catena on Rom. 12:6 (PGK 15:404). The point here, however, is not the amount of faith God apportions to a believer but the distinctive purpose (a particular gift) for which he apportions it.
224. Neither should one underestimate one’s role (cf. the relation between σωφροσύνη and self-respect in Thucyd. 1.84.3; avoiding low thoughts about oneself by reckoning ourselves as children of God, Epict. Diatr. 1.3.1), but of course Paul’s greater concern in Romans is boasting and looking down on others (e.g., Rom. 2:17, 23; 3:27; 4:2; cf. 1 Cor. 1:29; 3:21; 4:7); to boast about God’s grace is different (Rom. 5:2, 3, 11; 15:17; 1 Cor. 1:31). On the value of modest self-esteem as the correct mean between being vain and being of small soul, see Arist. E.E. 3.5.16–20, 1233a.
225. E.g., Dunn, Romans, lvii; Lung-Kwong, Purpose, 413–14; Haacker, Theology, 48–49; Grieb, Story, 7.
226. Some see this as Paul’s primary image (Manson, Paul and John, 67; Robinson, Body, 9); this verdict may be overstated (cf. Daines, “Use”; Ridderbos, Paul: Outline, 366; Judge, First Christians, 568–73), but it is certainly important to Paul (1 Cor. 10:17; 11:29; 12:12–27; Eph. 1:23; 2:16; 3:6; 4:4, 16; 5:23, 30; Col. 1:18, 24; 2:19; 3:15; cf. Rom. 7:4). Later, see 1 Clem. 37.5; 38.1; 46.7; 2 Clem. 14.2; Ign. Smyrn. 1.2; Herm. 95.4.
227. The metaphor is a natural one; in Confucian tradition, see Jochim, Religions, 80. Some also cite Jewish mysticism (2 En. 39:6 A; Kim, Origin, 252–54; cf. Schweizer, “Kirche”) or even Diaspora Judaism (Quispel, “Mysticism”). Political comparisons in the latter case (Grant, Christianity and Society, 37, citing Philo Spec. Laws 3.131; Virt. 103; Jos. War 1.507; 4.406) may be natural or may reflect wider Mediterranean usage.
228. E.g., Diod. Sic. 1.11.6; most often among Stoics: Cic. Fin. 3.19.64 (providing the Stoic view); Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 95.52; Epict. Diatr. 1.12.26; cf. Marc. Aur. 4.14, 40; 10.6.2; Long, “Soul.” Lincoln (Ephesians, 70) notes that the image may have originated with Plato (Tim. 30B–34B, 47C–48B; cf. Schweizer, Colossians, 58) and that it appears in Philo (Plant. 7; Spec. Laws 1.210; cf. Creation 82; Migr. 220; Spec. Laws 2.127, 133, 134).
229. Marc. Aur. 7.13. For the body image used for human unity in other ways, see Mitchell, Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 119, 158–59; cf. family members in Hierocles Love (Stob. Anth. 4.84.20; also cited in Sandnes, “Legemet”), though ancient writers connected household and civic management; to some extent friends in Lucian Tox. 53; Philost. Hrk. 48.22.
230. Cic. Phil. 8.5.15 (recommending amputation of a harmful member); Resp. 3.25.37; Sall. Ep. Caes. 10.6; Dio Chrys. Or. 34.22; Max. Tyre Or. 15.4–5; cf. Catiline in Cic. Mur. 25.51; Plut. Cic. 14.4–5.
231. Note the early comparison already in Arist. Pol. 1.1.11, 1253a; cf. Philo Spec. Laws 157; T. Naph. 2:9–10. Note also the early Aesopic fable The Belly and the Feet (cited variously as fable 159/132/130) in Wojciechowski, “Tradition,” 108; cf. the similar fable in Dio Chrys. Or. 33.16. In rabbinic sources, cf. later Song Rab. 4:1, §2; 7:5, §2.
232. Widely noted (e.g., Allo, Première Épitre, 328; Horsley, Corinthians, 171); see, further, Grant, Christianity and Society, 36–37; Lindemann, “Kirche”; Judge, First Christians, 568–95 (esp. 581–95). Besides references above, commentators (e.g., Conzelmann, Corinthians, 211; Lincoln, Ephesians, 70) cite Plato Rep. 5.464B; Arist. Pol. 1.1, 2; Cic. Phil. 8.5.16; Off. 1.25, 85; 3.5.22; Livy 26.16.19; Sen. Y. Clem. 1.5.1; Ira 2.31.7; Quint. Curt. 10.6.8; 10.9.2.
233. E.g., Moffatt, Corinthians, 183–84; Knox, “Parallels”; Héring, First Epistle, 129–30; Cerfaux, Church, 266. As Oster (Corinthians, 301) points out, the correspondence with Paul was already recognized by John Calvin, who was a humanist scholar as well as a Reformer.
234. See Livy 2.32.9–12; Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 6.86.1–5 (climaxing the speech of 6.83.2–86.5); Plut. Coriol. 6.2–4; Dio Cass. 4.17.10–13; cf. Val. Max. 4.4.2; Sen. Y. Dial. 12.12.5.
235. Some generally helpful discussions may overemphasize differences, e.g., Sevenster, Seneca, 170–72; Jewett, Romans, 744.
236. See, e.g., Robertson and Plummer, Corinthians, 269; Kim, Introduction, 27; Witherington, Corinthians, 254, 259; cf. Troeltsch, Teaching, 1:76–77. It should be noted, however, that the notion of hierarchy was not always present in ancient use of the image. On Paul’s inversion of the conventional hierarchical function in ancient speeches on concord, some of which exploited this image, see Martin, Body, 38–68, esp. 39–47.
237. E.g., Cic. Fam. 3.1.3; 13.1.5; 13.5.3; 13.18.2; 13.19.1; 13.26.1; 13.32.2; 13.34.1; 13.35.1; 13.36.1–2; 13.39.1; 13.45.1; 13.51.1; 13.78.2. Cf. even 2 Kings 18:5; 23:25.
238. Kraeling, John the Baptist, 139, citing the Mekilta. Hyperbole was common in Semitic speech (Caird, Language, 133).
239. Jesus’s chief disciple in the gospel tradition similarly sets his mind on (φρονέω) human interests rather than God’s; ultimately, this is a satanic perspective (Mark 8:33; cf. Matt. 4:10; 16:23). The ideal standard and goal do not change, but neither do the disciples always match it, at least within the period narrated in the Gospels.
240. Pages 206–15 below.