Think among yourselves the way that Christ Jesus also thought.
—Philippians 2:5
Together follow my example . . . because many . . . are enemies of Christ’s cross. These are the ones whose destiny is destruction, who worship their desires, who count as glory their shame, whose focus is earthly matters. Also do this because we have our citizenship in heaven, from which also we await the deliverer, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will transform our humiliated bodies to be like his glorious body.
—Philippians 3:17–21
Don’t worry about anything; instead, in every situation share with God your requests, using prayer and petition but also thanking him. Thus, God’s peace that exceeds your ability to fathom will guard your hearts and thoughts in Christ Jesus. Further, my family, whatever matters are true, whatever matters are honorable, whatever matters are just, whatever matters are sacred, whatever matters are delightful, whatever matters are commendable—if anything is virtuous and if anything is praiseworthy—these are the things you should be pondering!
—Philippians 4:6–8
Three passages in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians offer further samples of Paul’s interest in thinking. I address the third of these passages (Phil. 4:6–8) first because it revisits the issue of peace, which also appears in Romans 8:6. In Philippians 4 Paul invites believers in Philippi to meditate on virtuous matters (4:8) and to entrust their requests to God, whose peace will guard their hearts and minds in Christ (4:6–7).
In Philippians 2 Paul exhorts believers to think in a way that supports unity and service to one another, thus thinking in the way that Jesus exemplified (2:5). More explicitly than in 4:6–8, Paul addresses the problem of division and strife in the church (cf. 4:2–3); as in some other passages (cf. Rom. 12:2–5; 1 Cor. 2:14–3:4), a mind for Christ is also a mind for Christ’s body.
Finally, Philippians 3:19–21 contrasts a mind focused on earthly things with a heavenly focus. This passage provides a natural segue for chapter 8, on Colossians 3:1–2, a passage that also develops this theme.1
Divine Peace Guards Minds in Christ (Phil. 4:7)
In Philippians 4:7 Paul promises divine peace,2 elsewhere a fruit of the Spirit (Rom. 14:17; Gal. 5:22), to guard believers’ hearts and thoughts. I have already discussed the emphasis on, and backgrounds for, peace with respect to Romans 8:6.3 As there, this peace appears to be partly within an individual (Phil. 4:7–8) but also appears to have communal implications (cf. 4:1–2);4 it may also involve, as it certainly does in Romans 8:6–7, peace with God (cf. “enemies” in Phil. 3:18).
In this passage Paul seizes his ideal audience’s attention with an oxymoron: divine peace both surpasses all thinking and guards believers’ thoughts. That is, in contrast to typical philosophic expectations, it is not self-generated, for example, by philosophic reasoning.5 If “guard” here evokes the military or custodial image of guarding or keeping watch,6 its conjunction with “peace” may also be striking.7
Looking to God or his agents for protection more generally was not a new idea. Jewish people looked to God to guard or protect his people.8 This language was familiar in the regularly recited priestly benediction, which prays for God to keep his people and give them peace (Num. 6:24–26);9 at least some understood this protection to include protection from demons and from the evil inclination.10 Already in Scripture itself David prays for God to keep the inclinations of his people’s hearts (1 Chron. 29:18).11
Because I already treated some possible backgrounds or resonances for Paul’s language of divine peace in the earlier discussion of Romans 8:6,12 I survey below merely how the preceding context prepares for this promise and how the following verse continues its cognitive interest.
Celebration in Christ (Phil. 4:4)
Paul’s promise of God keeping people in peace is, however, conditional, depending on preceding exhortations. The promise of Philippians 4:7 may depend especially on the exhortation of 4:6, but the other exhortations might also play a role.
An emphatically doubled “Rejoice!”13 introduces the immediate context’s summary exhortations (Phil. 4:4; cf. 3:1; 1 Thess. 5:16).14 Paul regards joy as a natural product of the Spirit’s work (Rom. 14:17; 15:13; Gal. 5:22; 1 Thess. 1:6)15 and expects it in fellowship, that is, in positive relationships with other believers and in sharing or serving their joys (Rom. 12:15; 16:19; 1 Cor. 12:26; 16:17; 2 Cor. 1:24; 2:3; 7:4, 7, 9, 13, 16; 8:2; 13:9, 11; Col. 1:24; 2:5; 1 Thess. 2:19; 3:9; 5:16; Philem. 7).16
Stoics could connect cheerfulness with the proper outlook on life, that is, submission to Fate’s lot.17 By this they did not mean something like modern positive thinking; indeed, they encouraged followers to expect misfortune so that they would be in the right frame of mind when it happened.18 Stoics could also qualify the connection between the proper outlook and cheerfulness, noting that the ideally wise person would have virtue at all times, but not always joy and cheerfulness.19
The ultimate goal of most ancient philosophy was happiness (εὐδαιμονία),20 a term absent in biblical Greek, perhaps because most biblical ethics’ goal was oriented toward God’s pleasure rather than that of mortals.21 Nevertheless, Stoics felt that one could achieve such happiness, which required only virtue, without necessarily having joy or cheerfulness.22 For what it is worth,23 although Stoics distrusted emotions,24 Greek philosophy, including Stoicism, valued joy;25 among philosophers, wisdom and virtue rather than bodily pleasure yielded happiness.26 Some moralists condemned frivolous laughter and jesting, emphasizing true joy instead.27
Jewish people often connected joy with keeping God’s commandments,28 living according to wisdom (Wis. 8:16), right living (Let. Aris. 261),29 and virtue or divine ecstasy.30 Particularly frequently, they associated joy with worship.31
Perhaps especially relevant to the letter’s setting, one could experience joy even in the face of hardship (Rom. 12:12; 2 Cor. 7:4; 8:2; 1 Thess. 1:6).32 Unlike that of some philosophers (especially earlier Stoics), Paul’s submission to God is not fatalistic; he recognizes that God may change circumstances in response to prayer (see comment below).33 Nevertheless, he does not condition joy on the changed circumstances. Instead, believers are to rejoice “in the Lord” (Phil. 4:4), a familiar Pauline phrase.34
Considering this letter’s size, Paul seems especially emphatic about joy (Phil. 3:1; 4:4), regarding both relationships (1:4, 25; 2:2, 17–18, 28–29; 4:1, 10) and the spreading of the gospel (1:18). Perhaps the emphasis here reflects both his own positive outlook and his desire to encourage a church that has proved very supportive.
It is important to recognize the ideal character of Paul’s exhortation. Paul himself often experienced sorrow (Rom. 9:2, continually; 2 Cor. 2:1, 3; Phil. 3:18; potential sorrow in Phil. 2:27) and encouraged believers to grieve with those who grieve (Rom. 12:15; cf. 1 Thess. 5:14); difficult conditions regularly required him to hold sorrow in tension with joy (2 Cor. 6:10). Thus, while it is possible to experience a measure of the Spirit’s joy even in the midst of grief (and hope that qualifies grief, as in 1 Thess. 4:13, 18), Paul’s general exhortation to “rejoice always” does not mean that believers will never have legitimate cause for grief.35
Prayer Rather Than Worry (Phil. 4:6)
Whether or not Paul’s expectation of peace in Philippians 4:7 rests partly on 4:4, it clearly rests on 4:6. Paul warns against worry or anxiety (4:6a), a condition that philosophers often deemed inimical to peace (by which they often meant tranquility). Here Paul may echo Jesus’s teaching attested especially in Q.36 Lest we suppose that Paul understood this ideal as perfectly attainable in the present age, or a rule concerning the performance of which itself merits anxiety, Paul’s love for others often drove him to anxiety (2 Cor. 7:5; 11:28–29; 1 Thess. 3:5), though not in this letter.37 Paul’s interest here is not in a neurochemical emotional state but in an activity, and in context his exhortation is an encouragement (believers may leave their problems with the one powerful enough to resolve them), not a legal stipulation.38
Paul’s alternative to worry is not the anxious attempt to suppress it but rather acknowledging the needs to God and entrusting them to him (Phil. 4:6). In contrast to the futility of worry, prayer provides an active way to address concerns. That the prayer is complemented with thanksgiving probably suggests trust,39 which is antithetical to the need to worry. Thanksgiving, the appropriate and necessary response to God’s work (Rom. 1:21),40 is also sometimes connected with joy, especially in worship contexts (1 Thess. 3:9; 5:16–18).41 (Stoics could also connect joy with thanking God for everything,42 although the Jewish context of early Christianity suggests more active praise.) Recognizing God’s sovereignty, some Stoics of this period (who valued providence) urge thanksgiving for everything.43 But whereas Stoics emphasize resignation, Paul urges prayer that can sometimes affect circumstances and thus generate more thanksgiving (2 Cor. 1:11; Phil. 1:19; Philem. 22).44
Paul’s “in everything” (ἐν παντί) could suggest simply “in every respect”;45 more likely, it means “in every situation” (cf. Phil. 4:12; 1 Thess. 5:16–18).46 It contrasts with “nothing” (μηδέν) in the preceding clause and thus means “Worry for nothing, but commit your prayers to God in everything.”47 The thankful prayer that Paul enjoins entrusts needs to God in faith, rather than continuing to focus on them by repeating or trying to suppress them. It is this entrusting of needs to God in Philippians 4:6 that brings peace in 4:7.
Considering What Is Pure (Phil. 4:8)
After the promise of peace, Paul probably transitions to a new thought, while also continuing the cognitive emphasis of the preceding verse. Most translations render Paul’s λοιπόν as “finally”;48 this is a normal sense of the term,49 although it can also simply transition to a new point or mean “in addition.”50 Paul has already said it once (Phil. 3:1) and also uses it elsewhere to transition to a new section rather than to close a letter (1 Thess. 4:1). It is possible that Paul uses the term to bracket the hortatory material between Philippians 3:1 and 4:9, addressing more personal issues in 2:17–30 and 4:10–19. In any case, he offers in 4:8 an exhortation to think carefully about virtuous matters, continuing the interest in cognition that appears in 4:7.
THE IDEAL FOCUS
I previously surveyed some ancient exhortations that invited thinking about good things, particularly matters connected with the divine.51 Nevertheless, further examples seem appropriate for this context. One classical orator advises, “Make it your practice to talk of things that are good and honourable, that your thoughts may through habit come to be like your words.”52 Pythagoras reportedly started a group in Samos where people contemplated “things noble, just, and advantageous.”53 Cicero praises a man whose thoughts all focused on behaving honorably and on the welfare of Rome.54 Although Stoics urged people to anticipate misfortune, as already noted, many thinkers did emphasize a positive outlook and positive topics of thought. Thus, a Middle Platonist boasts, “All we know of is splendid and fair, serious and lofty and heavenly!”55 Using various terms, others also insisted on keeping thoughts pure,56 valued speaking about matters honorable and dignified,57 identified what is honorable with what is good,58 and so forth.
Some scholars suggest that Paul’s specific interest may be not simply “thinking about” these things, the approach of the many philosophers who would often recognize some of their language in this verse, but “reckoning” (λογίζομαι, Phil. 4:8). The verb might suggest taking into account these good things,59 or carefully evaluating matters,60 which fits an emphasis I also surveyed earlier in this book.61 The verb can, however, simply mean pondering a matter deeply,62 in which case Paul’s interest here may resemble that of the thinkers noted above.
Virtue lists were a common literary and rhetorical form in ancient sources, both Jewish and Greek.63 Paul’s list here is rhetorically arranged, repeating ὅσα six times with adjectives all ending in -α or -η, and then using εἴ τις twice.64 This arrangement offers a forceful way to communicate his central point, which the repetition reinforces.
Paul’s list may be somewhat ad hoc, like many virtue lists; certainly, he does not borrow the standard four primary virtues often treated in philosophy,65 of which he refers to only one here: what is “just” or “right” (δίκαιος).66 But others could also include different individual virtues under the wider heading of virtue (ἀρετή); in one passage, for example, a Roman Stoic cites four virtues, of which only one (δικαιοσύνη) belongs to the traditional four subheads.67
Ἀρετή calls for special comment here because this is its only occurrence in Paul, despite how widely the term appears in discussions of Greek ethics. It was a basic Greek term for virtue,68 also used in the plural for virtues;69 it was a frequent topic for intellectual discourse.70 Various schools defined its content somewhat differently,71 but there was considerable overlap among them. Many intellectuals, including both Cynics72 and Stoics,73 regarded it as the chief goal.74 Although many objectives that people value are beyond our grasp, a Stoic reasons, if it is ἀρετή that one seeks, then one can obtain it and thus be happy and free from the disturbance of passions.75
In Hellenistic Jewish circles, Philo, writing before Paul, uses the term ἀρετή roughly one thousand times.76 He employs the term especially like Aristotelians but also has incorporated Stoic elements.77 Josephus employs the term nearly three hundred times.78 Earlier, the Letter of Aristeas defines ἀρετή as the fulfillment of good works;79 such virtue characterizes the elders whom the Judean high priest sends to Ptolemy.80
Perhaps because ἀρετή is not customary language in Paul’s extant letters, some commentators seem quick to distance Paul’s use here from the common use or to associate Paul’s reference with merely worldly virtue.81 There is no reason, however, to assume that Paul could not employ a common term in a positive way. This is not a polemical context, and this is one of Paul’s later extant letters, reflecting additional experiences with Diaspora thinkers; further, the term appears in the Septuagint82 and later early Christianity.83 Possible adaptation of other language from popular philosophy in the context (Phil. 4:11)84 and the presence of popular philosophic language in his earlier letters allow for the possibility that Paul increasingly appropriated more popular philosophic language later in his ministry, while adapting it to his own ends.
In any case, Paul may employ ἀρετή generically. Ἀρετή could encompass other individual virtues (such as function as wisdom and courage).85 It also could function as a summary of virtues after listing them; thus, for example, a Roman Stoic lists a few virtues and adds, “and virtue as a whole.”86 Paul may shift toward “virtue” and “whatever is praiseworthy” at the end of his list to summarize all virtues, including those he has not named. In the context of Stoic ἀρετή, “praiseworthy” (ἔπαινος)87 probably means “those things that merit the praise of” people.88
Although one cannot argue from silence, the absence of at least some accepted virtues or advantages may reflect Paul’s worldview, suggesting that those that he did include in his list are among those with which he agrees. Many, especially in the Platonic tradition,89 valued beauty90 and sometimes linked it with virtues,91 though others recognized beauty as a good external to virtue proper.92 Ultimate beauty was different from mere appearances, which Platonic tradition did not value highly anyway. Stoics appreciated beauty in terms of what was good.93 Thus, some Alexandrian Jewish sources speak of God’s beauty;94 likewise, they envision piety as a major form of beauty.95 Ideally, God is “the mind’s guide” toward beautiful matters.96
The mind’s focus here in Philippians 4:8 is a world away from Romans 7, resembling instead the mind of the Spirit (Rom. 8:6) and the mind of Christ (1 Cor. 2:16).
Thinking like Christ (Phil. 2:5)
What way of thinking does Paul have most in view in Philippians 4:8? He probably does include the entire gamut of right ways of thinking, but one of his particular concerns with the way Philippian Christians are thinking, as already noted, is the problem of their disunity (see again 4:2–3). Paul addresses this issue also in Philippians 2, where he provides several models for serving others: Christ (2:5–11), Paul himself (2:17; cf. 4:9), Timothy (2:19–22), and Epaphroditus (2:25–30).
In 2:5 Paul urges believers to have the way of thinking, or the focus, among themselves (φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν) that was also in Christ Jesus.97 Paul employs this verb, φρονέω, several times in Philippians (1:7; 2:2, 5; 3:15, 19; 4:2, 10), slightly more frequently even than in his much longer Letter to the Romans.98 One of these references is where Paul is urging Euodia and Syntyche, possibly different house church leaders, to “think the same way in the Lord” (4:2). In so doing, Paul addresses the most explicit rift in the Philippian church.
Another reference to φρονέω surfaces in Philippians 2:2. This reference appears in the context immediately preceding 2:5 and therefore most directly informs it.99 Here Paul frames his charge for unity by speaking of how the Philippian believers should think, and he employs the same expression (except with a subjunctive rather than infinitive verb) as in 4:2: “think the same way” (τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε; the second instance in 2:2 is similar: τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες).
In 2:1 Paul employs rhetorical artistry to drive home his point with greater emotional intensity. Here he appeals to various compelling emotional grounds in four clauses, each opening with εἴ τις or εἴ τι (depending on the gender of the following noun). Opening repetition, or anaphora, was a familiar rhetorical device, amplifying or driving home a point.100 Emotional appeal was what rhetorical critics today call pathos,101 which appears widely in persuasive speeches102 and in rhetorical training and handbooks;103 letters could also show deep or playful emotion at times.104 Paul’s predication of his request on matters such as those that could be translated “fellowship,” “affection,” and “compassion” already suggests the character of his plea.105
In 2:2 Paul again appeals to emotion by asking the Philippians to complete his own joy (in a letter that already highlights this theme) by urging them, as we have noted, “to exercise the same frame of mind,” “to have the same love,” “to be united in spirit,” and again “to have one frame of mind.”106 Such exhortations to unity were common in ancient Mediterranean urban society,107 responding to the frequent divisions there.108 Paul’s four exhortations each say essentially the same thing, so that the repetition again reinforces his appeal.
The call to have Jesus’s frame of mind (2:5) appeals to Jesus’s example of service (2:6–8), which thereby summons the Philippian believers to unity.109 Thus, in humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη) each should value or “regard” (ἡγούμενοι) others more than oneself (2:3), just as Jesus did not “regard” (ἡγήσατο) being equal with God as a right to be seized (2:6) but instead “humbled” himself (ἐταπείνωσεν, 2:8).
Although Jesus was in “the form [μορφῇ] of God” (2:6), he took “the form [μορφήν] of a slave,” in the likeness and form of a human (2:7). His slavery included obedience even to the point of death—even the most shameful death of the cross (2:8), a form of execution considered most appropriate for those of the most abject status, including slaves. Paul thus presents a model for believers to give up caring about their own rank in the body of Christ and to serve one another. As Jesus was exalted after humbling himself (2:9–11), so believers, currently in humble bodies, will someday share his form (3:21).110 Many scholars note in Jesus’s example a reversal of Adam, who did seek equality with God (Gen. 3:5–6), though he was already in the likeness of God (Gen. 1:26–27, although Paul does not use the same terminology here as in LXX Genesis).111
Citizens of Heaven (Phil. 3:20)
Paul also uses the verb φρονέω in Philippians 3:15 and 3:19. In 3:15 believers should think with their intention focused on pursuing the “upward” goal (3:14), that is, toward heaven (cf. 3:10–11, 20–21).112 By contrast, in 3:19 those who focus on temporal, “earthly matters,” such as their own desires, will face destruction. Because Paul is speaking of those who will be destroyed, he is not speaking of his fellow ministers who seek their own interests (2:20–21) and not necessarily even of those who proclaim Christ with partly self-centered motives (1:15–17).113 Rather, he addresses here “enemies of Christ’s cross” (3:18),114 who, like the mind at enmity with God and focused on the flesh in Romans 8:5–7, lack Christ and the Spirit and, hence, peace with God (cf. Phil. 4:7). These enemies constitute polar opposites of the model offered by Paul and his colleagues (3:17).
Paul’s reference to the κοιλία (“stomach, belly”) in Philippians 3:19 develops a familiar image for pleasure, also used elsewhere by Paul (Rom. 16:18; for sexual pleasure in 1 Cor. 6:13;115 cf. perhaps strife in Gal. 5:15). This was a common image for self-indulgence among Greek and Roman thinkers; it was originally a metonymy for desire and gluttony.116 It is especially pervasive in Philo, who regarded the belly as the seat of irrational desire.117 The point is not enjoyment of food (or digestion!)118 but the pursuit of pleasure,119 perhaps exemplified in the gluttony of elite banquets.120 Those who live for pleasure have their minds fixed solely on earthly matters.
Such language may recall the “dogs” of Philippians 3:2, whose focus is circumcision of believers’ flesh rather than worship by God’s Spirit (3:3). Although dogs had various positive uses and associations,121 “dog” was a familiar insult throughout antiquity.122 Dogs were known for sexual looseness123 and for enjoying filth and excrement,124 possibly relevant to Philippians 3:8.125 Some early Christians employed the language of “dogs” (cf. Mark 7:28; Matt. 7:6; Rev. 22:15) as an example of irrational “beasts” (2 Pet. 2:12, 22)—those who live for pleasure rather than by reason.126 As I noted earlier, philosophers often depicted the unreasoning masses as beasts.127
“Remove the desires of the belly,” one orator declares, “and you have removed the beast from man.”128 Gluttons act like pigs or dogs rather than human beings, a Stoic complains.129 Thus, a parasite, someone who depends on wealthy patrons’ banquets, serves his stomach and may be compared with an animal that obeys for food.130 Men controlled by licentiousness are compared to beasts, including dogs.131 Philo links the belly with animal desires132 and often links the “belly” with pleasure via the serpent condemned to move on its belly, facing downward.133 In contrast to believers’ hope and focus in heaven (Phil. 3:20–21), the end of these beasts is destruction, and their focus is earthly, perishable matters (3:19).
Paul contrasts this earthly frame of mind in Philippians 3:19 with an eternal, heavenly perspective: believers in Christ recognize that their citizenship is not earthly but heavenly (3:20). They also look to heaven because Jesus will return from there to resurrect the righteous and rule the world (3:20–21).134 As in Romans 12:2, 1 Corinthians 2:9–10, and Colossians 3:2, Paul here suggests a heavenly and future focus: a true believer in Jesus lives not to fulfill animal passions but in light of eternal hope and reward in Christ.135
Paul’s image of heavenly citizenship would have made sense to urban people who were even partly culturally literate. Many philosophers regarded the entire world as their city or fatherland.136 Some writers came closer to Paul’s language here. A Cynic, for example, claims that a citizen bears “his fatherland in himself”137 and speaks of his soul’s “fatherland” as heaven.138 When asked whether he cared about his fatherland, Anaxagoras said yes and pointed to heaven.139 Philo claims that the soul of a wise person recognizes heaven as their homeland but earth as foreign.140 He also speaks of the Therapeutae, an idealized Jewish sect, as being citizens of heaven and of the world.141
That Paul employs the image of heavenly citizenship in a letter to Philippi may be even more significant. Because Philippi was a Roman colony, believers there who were Philippian citizens were also Roman citizens and hence understood what it meant to be a citizen of a place other than where they currently lived.142 Although Paul has special reason to address the image of heavenly citizenship to believers in Philippi, other early Christians could apply the image of heavenly citizenship more widely: thus, Christians are both aliens and citizens in their earthly lands143 and are citizens of heaven living on earth.144 They are citizens in God’s commonwealth.145
This discussion of heavenly citizenship brings us to the book’s final, brief chapter, which discusses the heavenly mind in Colossians 3:1–2.
Conclusion
In Philippians 4 Paul invites believers in Philippi to meditate on virtuous matters (4:8), leaving their needs with God, whose peace will guard their hearts and minds in Christ (4:6–7). In Philippians 2 Paul challenges disunity and exhorts believers to follow Jesus’s example by thinking in a way that supports unity and service to one another (2:5). Finally, Philippians 3:19–21 contrasts a mind focused on earthly things with a heavenly focus. I address the ancient context of this final theme in chapter 8, on Colossians 3:1–2.
1. If, as I believe, Paul wrote Colossians, it presumably comes from the same period of detention addressed in Philippians. Even scholars who regard Philippians and Philemon as Paul’s final extant letters will view them as closest in time to the earliest post-Pauline letters.
2. Paul plays on this peace from God by speaking of the “God of peace” being with believers in Phil. 4:9, although that phrase is not unique to this Pauline context (Rom. 15:33; 16:20; 1 Thess. 5:23; Heb. 13:20; it is rare elsewhere in early Jewish sources outside T. Dan 5:2; some compare “angel of peace” in the Similitudes, 1 En. 40:8; 52:5; 53:4; 54:4; 56:2; 60:24; T. Dan 6:5; T. Ash. 6:5; T. Benj. 6:1).
3. See pp. 135–41. Cf. here Marius Victorinus Phil. 4.7 (Edwards, Commentary, 268).
4. See also Fee, Philippians, 411–12; cf. Snyman, “Philippians 4:1–9.”
5. Cf. a similar oxymoron in Eph. 3:19: knowing God’s love that surpasses being known.
6. Cf. e.g., 1 Esd. 4:56; Jdt. 3:6; Philo Mos. 1.235; Jos. Ant. 9.42. This is its most common sense in BDAG, although Paul was not alone in applying it figuratively (e.g., Philo Agr. 15, the cognate noun; 1 Pet. 1:5; later Diogn. 6.4). In Rhet. Alex. pref. 1421a.16–18, health guards the body and education the soul; in Mus. Ruf. frg. 36, p. 134.11, reason guards discernment. In this period even the figurative usage often evoked the literal image (e.g., Philo Decal. 74). Some think of guards in Philippi or, perhaps even more relevant to the letter, in Paul’s own setting (cf. Phil. 1:13; Cohick, Philippians, 222).
7. So, e.g., Vincent, Philippians, 136; Michael, Philippians, 199; Erdman, Philippians, 141; Fee, Philippians, 411n58; Garland, “Philippians,” 253; Witherington, Philippians, 248–49; the anti-imperial interpretation in Popkes, “Aussage.” It does not necessarily function as an oxymoron, however; the Roman Empire claimed to have established peace and unity first through conquest. For subjugation as pacification in Roman ideology, see, e.g., Res gest. 5.26; Cic. Prov. cons. 12.31; Vell. Paterc. 2.90.1–4; 2.91.1; 2.115.4 (cf. perhaps Col. 1:20 in view of 1:16); cf. the interpretation of Roman iconography in Lopez, “Visualizing,” 83; Lopez, Apostle, 49–50. Cf. Seneca’s critique of the false peace in Huttner, “Zivilisationskritik.”
8. E.g., Num. 6:24; Wis. 9:11; 10:1, 5; 1QS 2.3. Cf. the semidivine Protesilaos guarding a land in Philost. Hrk. 4.3.
9. Some Aramaic paraphrases of the benediction’s context retained Hebrew for the familiar benediction (e.g., Tg. Onq. to Num. 6:24–26; Tg. Neof. 1 on Num. 6:24–26), as one would expect from m. Meg. 4:10. This is not the case, however, with Tg. Ps.-Jon. on Num. 6:24–26 (which also expands it with reference to understanding of Torah in Tg. Ps.-Jon. on Num. 6:25). For early echoes of the benediction, see Jub. 1:20; 31:15; 1QS 2.3 (cf. Black, Scrolls, 95); 4Q381 frg. 69.5; probably the spreading of fingers in Jub. 25:11.
10. The interpretation of the Aaronic benediction in Sipre Numbers (in Gaster, Scriptures, 41); Num. Rab. 11:5; Tg. Ps.-Jon. on Num. 6:24; and possibly already implicitly in the elaboration of the benediction in 1QS 2.2–4; 4Q398 frgs. 14–17, col. 2.4–5; 4Q399 frg. 1, col. 2.1–2; cf. 1QM 14.10; 4Q158 frgs. 1–2.8; Matt. 6:13; John 17:15; Montefiore, Gospels, 2:103; cf. Abrahams, Studies (2), 101; Jeremias, Prayers, 105. This association was not exclusive; 4Q374 frg. 2, col. 2.8 applies the benediction to healing and strengthening God’s people, and both 4Q398 frgs. 14–17, col. 2.4–5 and 4Q399 frg. 1, col. 2.1–2 exhort hearers to ask God to protect one from evil thoughts and Belial’s counsel.
11. LXX: φύλαξον ταῦτα ἐν διανοίᾳ καρδίας.
12. See again pp. 135–41.
13. Cf. a slightly different doubling of joy in Phil. 2:17–18. On the rhetorical function of such various forms of repetition, cf. Rowe, “Style,” 130; Porter, “Paul and Letters,” 579; Black, “Oration at Olivet,” 85.
14. For parallels between Phil. 4 and 1 Thess. 5, see Kim, “Paraenesis,” 110–13; for the specific exhortation to give thanks, see 118–19.
15. Cf. also Luke 10:21; Acts 13:52; possibly Sir. 39:6; 1QHa 4.38; 15.9. Stoics could associate it with a correct outlook on reality (see comment below).
16. Cousar (Philippians, 85) suggests corporate implications from the preceding context; Witherington, Philippians, 245, from the plural verb.
17. Sen. Y. Dial. 7.15.4; 7.16.1–3; Mus. Ruf. frg. 38, p. 136.1–3; cf. also Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 73. On submission to Fate, see also Sen. Y. Dial. 1.1.5; 1.2.4; 1.3.1; 7.8.3; 7.15.6; Ep. Lucil. 96.1–2; 98.3; Mus. Ruf. 17, p. 108.37–38; 27, p. 130; 43, p. 138.14–15; Epict. Diatr. 2.5.4; 2.14.7; 4.13.24; Marc. Aur. 2.16; Crates Ep. 35; Libanius Thesis 1.6; Porph. Marc. 5.90–94; cf. Eurip. Oenom. frg. 572 (from Stob. Anth. 4.35.8); frg. 965 (from Epict. Encheir. 53); frg. 1078 (from Stob. Anth. 4.44.36); Aeol. frg. 37 (Stob. Anth. 4.44.49); views of God in Philo Spec. Laws 4.187 and among Essenes in Jos. Ant. 18.18; b. Ber. 60b–61a; Taan. 21a. A calm mind could find comfort in any situation (Sen. Y. Dial. 9.10.4).
18. Sorabji, Emotion, 235–36 (on 237 citing Cic. Tusc. 3.32–33 for the opposite view of Epicureans); cf., e.g., Galen Grief 52, 55–56, 74.
19. Arius Did. 2.7.5c, p. 28.3–9.
20. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 7, p. 58.13–15; Arius Did. 2.7.5b5, p. 20.15–16; 2.7.6d, pp. 38.34–41.3; 2.7.6e, p. 40.11–13; cf. Lutz, Musonius, 28; Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 74; Hossenfelder, “Happiness.” Cf. pleasure for Epicureans, Diog. Laert. 10.131; 10.144.17; for them, a wise person is happy even when groaning because of torture (Diog. Laert. 10.118). I adapt here material used in Keener, Acts, 2:2112–13.
21. Though cf. more hellenized Jewish and Christian approaches in, e.g., Diogn. 10.5; the term and its cognates appear 151 times in Josephus (e.g., Ant. 1.14, 20, 41, 44, 46, 69, 98, 104, 113, 142–43) and 189 times in Philo (e.g., Alleg. Interp. 1.4; 2.10, 82, 101–2; 3.52, 83, 205, 209, 218–19, 245).
22. Arius Did. 2.7.6d, pp. 38.34–40.3. In today’s language we might think of long-term “satisfaction” or “fulfillment” without always feeling cheerful. “Joy” and “cheerfulness” remain goods (Arius Did. 2.7.5g, p. 32.4–6) but are not on the level of virtues (p. 32.5–6), which are necessary for εὐδαιμονία (p. 32.7–9).
23. Wojciechowski (“Vocabulary”) doubts that philosophic moral philosophy shaped much NT language. I find some overlap in Pauline literature (e.g., Keener, “Perspectives”; Keener, Corinthians, 44–47, 57; see esp. Malherbe, Philosophers), most prominently in the Pastorals.
24. E.g., Knuuttila and Sihvola, “Analysis,” 13, 15; cf. Plato (17); Aristotle was more positive (16); most non-Stoics regarded the Stoic position as unworkable (17). Plotinus urged suppressing emotions insofar as possible (Emilsson, “Plotinus on Emotions,” 359). Apparently, most Stoics viewed humans as entirely rational (Brennan, “Theory,” 23); but Posidonius may have broken with this approach (Cooper, “Posidonius,” 71, 99), assuming, as is likely, that Galen correctly understood him (Sorabji, “Chrysippus”); some think Galen misunderstood Chrysippus (Gill, “Galen,” e.g., 126–27). Marcus Aurelius appreciated positive, “sane” emotions (Engberg-Pedersen, “Marcus,” 334–35).
25. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 17, p. 108.7; Arius Did. 2.7.5k, p. 34.1; 2.7.11e, p. 68.12–16; Iambl. Pyth. Life 31.196; cf. Vorster, “Blessedness,” 38–51. Stoics approved of joy as a good emotion (Engberg-Pedersen, “Vices,” 612; Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 72–73). It was not, however, a moral “virtue” (Arius Did. 2.7.5b, p. 10.19; 2.7.5c, p. 28.7; 2.7.5g, p. 32.4), though Paul lists it with virtues that belong to the Spirit’s fruit (Gal. 5:22–23). Stoics appreciated a “calm pleasure” concerning what was good (Brennan, “Theory,” 57).
26. Cic. Parad. 16–19; Leg. 1.23.60; Tusc. 5.7.19–20; Mus. Ruf. 7, p. 58.13; 17, p. 108.7; Iambl. Pyth. Life 31.196; Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 23; 27.3–4; 59.10; Ben. 7.2.3; Dial. 7.16.1–3; Epict. Diatr. 4.7.9; Dio Chrys. Or. 25.1; Arius Did. 2.7.6e, p. 40.13–15; 2.7.11g, pp. 70.33–73.4; Lucian Dem. 19–20; also Meeks, Moral World, 46–47; Lutz, Musonius, 28; Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 73. Self-knowledge also yielded full joy (Cic. Tusc. 5.25.70).
27. Dio Chrys. Or. 32.99. Cf. also warnings against excessive laughter or frivolity, e.g., Arist. N.E. 4.8.1–12, 1127b–1128b (esp. 4.8.3, 1128a); Epict. Encheir. 33.15; Dio Chrys. Or. 7.119; 32.99–100; 33.10; frg. 7 (Stob. Anth. 4.23.60 p. 588, ed. Hense; 74.60, ed. Meineke); Aul. Gel. 4.20.4–6 (cf. 4.20.11); Iambl. Pyth. Life 2.10; 17.71; 30.171; Porph. Marc. 19.321–22; Diog. Laert. 8.1.20; Pelikan, Acts, 148–49 (citing Arist. N.E. 2.7.11–13, 1108a; Clem. Alex. Instr. 2.8); 4Q269 frgs. 11ii+15.1; Eccles.7:3, 6; Sir. 21:20 (allowing quiet smiles but condemning loud laughter; cf. 27:13); m. Ab. 3:13/14; t. Ber. 3:21; b. Ber. 30b; perhaps 4Q266 frg. 18, col. 4.12–13; 4Q184 frg. 1.2; Gen. Rab. 22:6; Exod. Rab. 30:21; Eccl. Rab. 2:2, §1 (but the rabbis disapproved of only inappropriate laughter; Reines, “Laughter”). But contrast Gen. 21:6; Ps. 126:2; Prov. 31:25; Eccles. 3:4; Luke 6:21; spiritual laughter in Philo Alleg. Interp. 3.87, 217–19; Worse 123–24; Names 131, 261; Abr. 201–2, 206; Rewards 31. For the approval of rhetorical humor as long as dignity is maintained, see, e.g., Cic. Brut. 43.158; Or. Brut. 26.88–90; Quint. Inst. 4.3.30–31; Plut. Table 2.1.4, Mor. 631C.
28. Ps. 19:8; Jos. Ag. Ap. 2.189; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 27:2; b. Yoma 4b; y. Pesah. 10:1; Lev. Rab. 16:4 (purportedly from Ben Azzai); Pesiq. Rab. 21:2/3; 51:4; Urbach, Sages, 1:390–92; Bonsirven, Judaism, 95; especially the Tannaitic sources in Urbach, Sages, 1:390; most fully, Anderson, “Joy.” In Song Rab. 4:11, §1, public teaching of Torah should generate as much joy as wedding guests experience from beholding a bride (cf. John 3:29).
29. The Spirit appears with joy in y. Suk. 5, cited in Montefiore and Loewe, Anthology, 203; cf. Tg. Onq. on Gen. 45:27–28.
30. E.g., Philo Names 175; Dreams 2.249; Alleg. Interp. 3.217; Abr. 206; Migr. 157 (mental laughter from ecstatic joy); Spec. Laws 2.54.
31. E.g., Pss. 2:11 (LXX); 5:11; 20:5; 27:6; 31:7; 32:11; 33:1, 3; 35:9; 42:4; 43:4; 47:1; 63:7; 67:4; 68:3–4; 71:23; 81:1; 84:2; 90:14; 92:4; 95:1; 98:4; 132:9, 16; Jub. 36:6; 1QS 10.17; 1QM 4.14; 1QHa 11.24; 19.26; 4Q177 frgs. 12–13, col. 1.10; 4Q403 frg. 1, col. 1.9; 4Q405 frg. 23, col. 1.7; 4Q427 frg. 7, col. 1.14; 4Q502 frgs. 6–10.3; 4Q542 frg. 1, col. 1.11; 11Q5 22.15; Pss. Sol. 5:1; Jos. Asen. 3:4. Joy could also lead to praise (Tob. 8:16; 13:17; James 5:13; Luke 1:47). Joy could be associated with public festivals (Neh. 8:10–12; Ps. 42:4; cf. also, e.g., Halpern-Amaru, “Joy,” on Jubilees), as was common in ancient festivals (though not in all cultures’ personal piety; cf. Walton, Thought, 161).
32. Cf. also Sir. 2:4. So also both Stoics and Epicureans but not Aristotle (Stowers, “Resemble,” 93; for Stoics, see, e.g., Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 123.3; Nat. Q. 3.pref.12–13, 15; Dial. 1.5.8; 7.15.4; 7.16.1–3).
33. See pp. 223–24.
34. It appears nearly fifty times in Pauline literature, especially in the undisputed letters and Ephesians, and only once elsewhere in the NT; 1 Clem. 13.1 draws on 1 Cor. 1:31.
35. He would not have avoided grief to the extent that Galen claimed in Grief 1–5, 11, 48, 50b, 71, 78b (though even Galen would have allowed grief for destruction of his homeland [72a] or loss of health [74]); cf. also Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 66.37–39.
36. Matt. 6:25, 28//Luke 12:22, 25–27; cf. also Matt. 10:19//Luke 12:11 with Mark 13:11. Elsewhere in the Jesus tradition, cf. Mark 4:19; Luke 10:41; 21:34. See also Hunter, Predecessors, 50; Fee, Philippians, 408n40.
37. Although the particular term here (μεριμνάω) has a range of nuances (see BDAG), it is noteworthy that Paul does value concern for the churches (2 Cor. 11:28, using the cognate noun; cf. 1 Cor. 12:25), including Timothy’s concern for the Philippian church (Phil. 2:20).
38. The NRSV translation, “Do not worry about anything,” is more helpful here today than those translations that urge avoiding anxiety (e.g., NASB, NIV), since worry is something one does, whereas we generally think of anxiety as a state. We understand today that depression and anxiety often have neurochemical causes, sometimes stemming from genetic factors or early brain development. Paul is not urging people to evaluate their neurological state, but he is encouraging them simply to commit needs to God in prayer rather than to worry about them. Not worrying may be neurologically and environmentally easier for some people than for others, but again, Paul is providing not a criterion of spiritual self-evaluation but an exhortation.
39. Some associate it only with answers to past and present blessings (O’Brien, “Thanksgiving,” 59), but its immediate mention may connect it more directly with the prayers here. This need not mean certainty that one’s request has been granted, but it would at least connote trust that it has been heard. Thanksgiving was normal in Jewish prayer contexts (Oesterley, Liturgy, 67), but distinctions could be made according to circumstances (cf. James 5:13).
40. See the discussion regarding gratitude on p. 12.
41. Cf. also Neh. 12:27; Pss. 95:2; 97:12; 107:22; Isa. 51:3; Jer. 33:11; Jub. 22:4; 1QM 4.14; 4Q403 frg. 1, col. 1.4; 4Q511 frgs. 28–29.2 (reconstructed); 3 Macc. 7:16; Philo Migr. 92; Spec. Laws 1.144; 2.156, 185; Jos. Ant. 11.131; 14.421; 4 Ezra 1:37; 2:37; T. Jos. 8:5; T. Mos. 10:10; Luke 10:21; other praise in Tob. 8:16; Luke 1:46–47.
42. E.g., Epict. Diatr. 4.7.9.
43. Epict. Diatr. 1.6.1; 4.7.9; Marc. Aur. 6.16. In Jewish circles, see also Jub. 16:31; m. Ber. 9:5.
44. Cf. also other Jewish exhortations to thank God for everything (1 En. 108:10; 1QS 10.15–17).
45. As in, e.g., 1 Cor. 1:5; 2 Cor. 7:11, 16; 8:7; 9:8, 11; 11:6; cf. Polyb. 12.8.4.
46. Cf. further Eph. 5:20; perhaps 2 Cor. 6:4. See Fee, Philippians, 408–9: “in all the details and circumstances of life.”
47. Cf. Witherington, Philippians, 247.
48. E.g., NRSV, ESV, NIV; or “in conclusion” (GNT); “as to the rest” (Young’s Literal); “summing it all up” (Message). A notable exception is “and now” in NLT or the term’s omission in the NCV.
49. E.g., 2 Cor. 13:11; Philost. Hrk. 18.1 (although the guest already claimed belief in 16.6). Recapitulation was common (e.g., Dion. Hal. Demosth. 32).
50. See BDAG; cf., e.g., T. Reub. 5:5.
51. See, e.g., above, pp. 120–21; below, pp. 239–40. Cf. perhaps 1 Cor. 13:6–7, but between Paul’s commitment to anaphora there and a probably narrower sense of πάντα (“all things”), we might want to avoid reading too much into that passage.
52. Isoc. Ad Nic. 38 (trans. Norlin, LCL, 1:61).
53. Iambl. Pyth. Life 5.26 (trans. Dillon and Hershbell, 49). These were standard ethical criteria. In keeping with comments on the divine mind (above, pp. 128–30), some viewed such thoughts as having “emanated from the divine” (Porph. Marc. 11.199–201; trans. O’Brien Wicker, 55).
54. Cic. Vat. 11.26.
55. Apul. Apol. 64 (trans. Hunink, 86).
56. E.g., Porph. Marc. 23.368, although for Porphyry this meant heavenly matters. A prostitute leaving her profession declares, “I purify my mind or purpose” (καθαίρω τὴν γνώμην) to follow Athena rather than Aphrodite (Libanius Speech Char. 18.3). The heart and soul must be pure to enter some temples (Nock, Christianity, 18–19). Josephus includes in the Essene initiation oath the promise to keep one’s soul pure from desiring unholy gain (Jos. War 2.141).
57. Men. Rhet. 2.7, 406.4–7 (for a wedding).
58. Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 87.25.
59. Fee, Philippians, 415.
60. Hawthorne, Philippians, 187. Although it is rhetorically suitable, some propose that the shift to “if anything” (εἴ τις) might suggest the need for discernment, since believers apply these widely praised values in ways that differ from unbelievers (Fee, Philippians, 415–16; cf. Sandnes, “Idolatry and Virtue”).
61. See pp. 158–65, 184–89.
62. See BDAG.
63. E.g., 1QS 4.3; Philo Sacr. 27; Rhet. Alex. 36, 1442a.11–12; Corn. Nep. 15 (Epaminondas), 3.1–3; Cic. Mur. 14.30; 29.60; Theon Progymn. 9.21–24; Mus. Ruf. 4, p. 44.10–12; 14, p. 92.31–33; 17, p. 108.8–11; 38, p. 136.3; Arrian Alex. 7.28.1–3; Arius Did. 2.7.5b, p. 10.16–25; 2.7.5b2, p. 14.18–20; 2.7.11i, p. 78.12–18; 2.7.11m, p. 88.1–8; Dio Chrys. Or. 32.37; Plut. Stoic Cont. 7, Mor. 1034C; Lucian Portr. 11; Max. Tyre Or. 3.1; 18.5; applied also to what we might call gifts, e.g., Theon Progymn. 9.15–19; Pliny Ep. 6.11.2; 6.26.1; Symm. Ep. 1.2.7.
64. Five of the eight adjectives or nouns also begin with vowels, ἀ, ἁ, εὐ, or ἐ.
65. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 4, p. 44.10–22; p. 48.1, 4, 8, 13; 6, p. 52.15, 17, 19, 21; 8, pp. 60.22–64.9; 8, p. 66.7–8; 17, p. 108.9–10; Marc. Aur. 3.6; 8.1; Arius Did. 2.7.5a, p. 10.7–9; 2.7.5b1, p. 12.13–22; 2.7.5b2, p. 14.1–4; 2.7.5b5, p. 18.27–31; Dio Chrys. Or. 3.7, 58; Men. Rhet. 2.1–2, 385.8.
66. Stoics valued being holy and pious (Arius Did. 2.7.5b12, p. 26.17–18).
67. Mus. Ruf. 14, p. 92.31–33; in 16, p. 104.32–35, two of the traditional virtues appear alongside several other virtues. Of the five positive qualities Lucian Portr. 11 adds to beauty, only one belongs to the four cardinal virtues; also in 11, he lists four virtues (including ἀρετή itself), of which again only one belongs to the traditional four. The list of six virtues in Philost. Vit. Apoll. 1.20 (which also includes ἀρετή itself) includes three of the conventional four. Among several rhetorical grounds for commending a matter listed in Rhet. Alex. 1, 1421b.25–26, only one (δίκαια) directly reflects one of the cardinal virtues.
68. E.g., Dio Chrys. Or. 3.47; 35.2; Lucian Hermot. 22; Arius Did. 2.7.11i, p. 78.28. Hawthorne, Philippians, 186, emphasizes the breadth of the classical usage and the sense of “glory or praise” in the LXX. It can mean “excellence” (e.g., Philost. Hrk. 36.3) or expertise (Arius Did. 2.7.5b5, p. 18.15–17; Men. Rhet. 2.5, 397.23–24; 2.14, 426.27–32).
69. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 17, p. 108.9, 12; Arius Did. 2.7.5b2, p. 14.1; 2.7.5b5, p. 18.15–17; 2.7.5e, p. 30.3; 2.7.5f, p. 30.19; 2.7.5g, p. 32.6; Men. Rhet. 1.3, 361.14–15; 2.1–2, 369.30; 2.3, 379.30; 2.11, 421.30–32; Iambl. Letter 3, frg. 6 (Stob. Anth. 3.5.49).
70. E.g., Dio Chrys. Or. 69 (On Virtue).
71. In Platonism, see Gould, Ethics, 142–53; Krämer, Arete (also treating Aristotle). For Philo’s definition, see Wolfson, Philo, 2:268–79; Philo is close to the Aristotelian definition of virtue but found use for the Stoic definition (272–75). Aristotle’s concern was value to the polis, but Hellenistic usage focused on character (Finkelberg, “Virtue”). For its foundation in self-control, see Iambl. Letter 3, frg. 5 (Stob. Anth. 3.5.48). Iambl. Letter 16, frg. 1.1 (Stob. Anth. 3.1.17; trans. Dillon and Polleichtner, 47), describes it as the completeness or perfection of the soul.
72. Diog. Laert. 6.9.104. Crates (Ep. 12) contends that a person acquires ἀρετή only by practice.
73. Diog. Laert. 6.9.104; 7.1.30 (ἀγαθὸν μόνον, “the only good”); Arius Did. 2.7.6e, p. 40.11–15, 26–32 (by identifying it with happiness); Long, Philosophy, 199. For ἀρετή in Stoicism, see, e.g., Marc. Aur. 3.11.2; Arius Did. 2.7.5b1, p. 12.31–33; 2.7.11h, p. 74.14–17 (esp. 14); further Long, Philosophy, 199–205; Kidd, “Posidonius,” 208. Lucian mocks the Stoic association with virtue in Phil. Sale 20. For Stoics, each creature has virtue characteristic to its nature (Mus. Ruf. 17, p. 108.1–4), and, most oddly, virtues (like other qualities and indeed anything describable by a noun) were considered material entities (Arius Did. 2.7.5b7, p. 20.28–30; pp. 20.35–22.1).
74. Eurip. frg. 1029–30. Cf. the gods’ high interest in this matter in Dio Chrys. Or. 39.2.
75. Epict. Diatr. 1.4.3 (i.e., one may achieve ἀπάθεια).
76. An Accordance search (August 26, 2014) yielded 955 hits in the Philonic corpus.
77. Wolfson, Philo, 2:272–75.
78. An Accordance search (August 26, 2014) yielded 290 hits.
79. Let. Aris. 272. Most reject ἀρετή because they are given to passions (277).
80. Let. Aris. 122, 200.
81. Sevenster, Seneca, 156 (“your old heathen conception of virtue,” the world’s view of virtue). By contrast, Hawthorne (Philippians, 186) reasonably suggests that Paul probably uses the term as the Stoics did. Although Paul uses the term only here, his letters often express concern with matters that popular philosophy would have subsumed under the heading of virtues (with Engberg-Pedersen, “Vices,” 608–9).
82. The six times in the portions of the LXX that overlap with the Hebrew canon use a more general sense; it appears more frequently in Maccabean texts. It certainly is used with knowledge of at least popular philosophic uses in 4 Maccabees (4 Macc. 1:2, 8, 10, 30; 2:10; 7:22; 9:8, 18, 31; 10:10; 11:2; 12:14; 13:24, 27; 17:12, 23) and Wisdom of Solomon (Wis. 4:1; 5:13; 8:7).
83. Besides the LXX quotation in 1 Pet. 2:9, see 2 Pet. 1:3, 5; 2 Clem. 10.1; Herm. 26.2; 36.3; 46.1; 61.4; 76.3.
84. For αὐτάρκεια, cf., e.g., Arist. N.E. 1.7.6–8, 1097b (true happiness must be self-sufficient); Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 9.1; 55.4; Arius Did. 2.7.11h, p. 74.31; Marc. Aur. 3.11.2; Socratics Ep. 8; Plut. Virt. 3, Mor. 101B; Diog. Laert. 6.1.11; Porph. Marc. 27.428–29; 28.448–49; 30.469–70; Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 48–50, 101; in Plato, Lodge, Ethics, 68–72. Use of the expression does not, however, always indicate philosophic expertise or interest (cf., e.g., Pss. Sol. 5:16–17; Orph. H. 10.13; Aul. Gel. 2.29.17–20; Max. Tyre Or. 24.6 [farmers]). Cf. contentment in Val. Max. 7.1.2; Mus. Ruf. frg. 43, p. 138.15; Epict. Diatr. 1.1.27; 2.2.3; Lucian Dial. D. 436 (8/26, Menippus and Chiron 2); Ps.-Phoc. 6. Commentators often cite a Stoic or Cynic connection here, though sometimes noting that Paul’s application differs, since he depends on Christ (Phil. 4:13; Vincent, Philippians, 143; Bornkamm, Paul, 170; Sevenster, Seneca, 113; Beare, Philippians, 157; Hawthorne, Philippians, 198; Hengel, Property, 54–55).
85. Arius Did. 2.7.5a, p. 10.7–9; Iambl. Letter 4.7–9 (wisdom; in Stob. Anth. 3.3.26).
86. Mus. Ruf. frg. 38, p. 136.3 (trans. Lutz).
87. Also valued among Stoics as a characteristic of what is good (Arius Did. 2.7.5i, p. 32.25–26).
88. Hawthorne, Philippians, 186. If so, its summary includes εὔφημα earlier in the list.
89. For Plato’s interest in aesthetic beauty as well as moral, see Gilbert, “Relation,” 279–94; Warry, Theory; Lodge, Theory, 210–33; Partee, Poetics. For the relation of beauty to the highest good, see Gilbert, “Relation,” 290; Gould, Love, 147 (with beauty as that which is desire’s primary object). Cf. Warry, Theory, 51: “Beauty is thus stimulated by Truth and is itself a stimulus to Goodness.”
90. The question of human beauty aside, Philippi lay in a beautiful area, known for its hundred-petaled roses (Athen. Deipn. 15.682B).
91. Beauty’s connection with symmetry connects it with virtue (Lodge, Ethics, 61).
92. Rhet. Alex. 35, 1440b.17–19 (along with noble lineage, strength, and wealth); here one is praised not for virtue but for “good fortune” (1440b.20–23).
93. E.g. (though often using terms that can be translated more generically), Epict. Diatr. 1.8.5; 1.22.1; Marc. Aur. 4.20.
94. Wis. 13:3, 5.
95. Let. Aris. 229.
96. Let. Aris. 238 (trans. Hadas, 193). Likewise, in Let. Aris. 287 learned people train their minds for the “beautiful matters.”
97. Translations normally supply the past-tense verb “was” because in context Paul refers to Jesus’s historical example in Phil. 2:6–8 (cf. Rom. 15:5, also citing Christ’s example in 15:3, 7). At the same time, the exhortation to “think . . . in Christ Jesus” (φρονεῖτε . . . ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ) may refer to the “mind of Christ” (cf. 1 Cor. 2:16), already addressed above, pp. 195–99. This is consistent with the idea of Christ dwelling and working in believers (Gal. 2:20).
98. Romans is more than four times the length of Philippians, but the verb appears ten times in Philippians, nine in Romans, once in Col. 3:2, and only three other times in the Pauline corpus (1 Cor. 13:11; 2 Cor. 13:11; Gal. 5:10).
99. Noting the link between Rom. 8:6 and Phil. 2:2, see also Moreno García, “Sabiduría del Espíritu.”
100. E.g., Cic. Sest. 1.1; Anderson, Glossary, 19, and sources cited there; Rowe, “Style,” 131; Black, “Oration at Olivet,” 86; in letters, e.g., Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 47.1; Fronto Ad Ant. imp. 2.6.1–2; Ad verum imp. 2.1.4; Ad M. Caes. 2.3.1; 3.3; Nep. am. 2.9; in Paul, see Porter, “Paul and Letters,” 579; in the OT, Aune, Dictionary of Rhetoric, 34, cites Ps. 29:1–2; Lee, “Translations: Greek,” 779, cites Prov. 13:9 LXX. In conjunction with its frequent emotive effect, repetition also served aesthetic purposes; see, e.g., Hermog. Method 13.428–29; Pickering, “Ear.”
101. See, e.g., Walde, “Pathos”; Olbricht and Sumney, Paul and Pathos, passim. For repetition in pathos, see, e.g., Quint. Decl. 251.5; 260.10; 335.3, 8, 10; Pliny Ep. 9.26.8; Fronto Ad Ant. imp. 1.4; Hermog. Inv. 2.7.125.
102. E.g., Lysias Or. 7.41, §§111–12; 10.27–28, §118; 13.46, §134; 20.35–36, §161; Isaeus Menec. 44, 47; Aeschines Embassy 148, 179; Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 4.33.1–36.3; Isaeus 3; Cic. Cael. 24.60; Mil. 38.105; Quinct. 30.91–31.99; Font. 21.46–47; Sest. 2.4; 69.144–46; Rab. Perd. 17.47; Val. Max. 8.1. acquittals 2; Sen. E. Controv. 1.4.2; 1.7.10; 4.pref.6; Pliny Ep. 2.11.12–13; 4.9.22; Dio Chrys. Or. 40.12; Plut. Cic. 39.6; Philost. Vit. soph. 2.5.574; Apul. Apol. 85; Dio Cass. 8.36.5; Libanius Declam. 44.78–81.
103. See, e.g., Isoc. Ad Nic. 23; Rhet. Alex. 34, 1439b.15–1440b.3; 36, 1443b.16–21; 36, 1444b.35–1445a.26; Cic. Or. Brut. 40.138; Brut. 93.322; Quint. Inst. 4.1.33; 6.1.9; 6.2.20 (on ēthos and pathos); Ps.-Quint. Decl. 299.1–2; 306.6–7; 329.17; Hermog. Method 31.448; Men. Rhet. 2.5, 395.26–30; Libanius Topics 1.11; 3.14; 5.11–12; Descr. 17.7. See, further, Hall, “Delivery”; Leigh, “Quintilian.” Opponents, of course, called for proof as opposed to emotional appeals (e.g., Lysias Or. 27.12–13, §§178–79; Hermog. Progymn. 6, “On Commonplace,” 14; Libanius Topics 1.27–30; 2.20; 4.19); emotion wore off in the long run (Pliny Ep. 2.11.6).
104. E.g., Cic. Fam. 1.9.1; 2.2.1; 2.3.2; 10.23.7; 12.12.1; 12.30.3; 15.20.2; 15.21.1; 16.25.1; Sall. Pomp. 1; Lucius Verus in Fronto Ad verum imp. 2.2; Symm. Ep. 1.5.1; 2 Cor. 6:11–13; Gal. 4:12–20 (on Gal. 4, note Kraftchick, “Πάθη,” 61; Martin, “Voice”). Cf. revealing one’s character in letters in Demet. Style 4.227. One may expect its use somewhat more in Paul’s letters because they involve persuasion and argumentation more than most ordinary letters.
105. Although handbooks assign pathos especially to the closing peroration (Wuellner, “Rhetoric,” 340–41), speakers employed it at various points in their speeches (Sumney, “Use,” 147).
106. For being of one mind in exhortations to unity, see, e.g., Lysias Or. 2.24, §192; Dio Chrys. Or. 38.15; 39.3, 5, 8; esp. Mitchell, Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 76–77, 79. In Paul, see Rom. 12:16; 15:5; 1 Cor. 1:10; 2 Cor. 13:11; Phil. 1:27; 4:2.
107. E.g., Xen. Mem. 4.4.16; Demosth. Ep. 1.5; Rhet. Alex. 1, 1422b.33–36; Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 7.53.1; Livy 2.33.1; 5.7.10; 24.22.1, 13, 17; Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 94.46; Mus. Ruf. 8, p. 64.13; Dio Chrys. Or. 34.17; 38.5–8; 40.26; Max. Tyre Or. 16.3; Men. Rhet. 2.3, 384.23–25; 2.4, 390.14–16.
108. On the dangers of disunity, see, e.g., Hom. Il. 1.255–58; Sall. Jug. 73.5; Livy 2.60.4; 3.66.4; Babr. 44.7–8; 47; Dio Chrys. Or. 24.3; Plut. Sulla 4.4; 7.1; Aul. Gel. 6.19.6; Lucian Prof. P.S. 22.
109. As often noted, e.g., Heriban, “Zmysl’ajte.” The studies on Phil. 2:6–11 are legion, and readers interested in topics beyond the brief summary of issues here are referred to those studies (note already the massive collection of sources in Martin, Carmen Christi).
110. Compare Jesus’s human form (σχῆμα) in Phil. 2:7 to believers being transformed (μετασχηματίζω) in 3:21; Jesus humbling (ταπεινόω) himself in 2:8 to believers’ present bodies of humiliation (ταπείνωσις) in 3:21; Jesus’s assumption of human form (μορφή) in 2:7 to our sharing his form (σύμμορφος) in 3:21; and the reversal of death in 2:8 and 3:21.
111. There may also be allusions to Isaiah’s servant, but again Paul does not follow the usual LXX renderings; more clearly, he refers to Isaiah’s divine Lord (Phil. 2:10; Isa. 45:23), as he is well aware (Rom. 14:11).
112. Paul elsewhere employs ἄνω only for the heavenly Jerusalem (Gal. 4:26) or the heavenly matters of Col. 3:1–2, discussed esp. on pp. 238–45. Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and Stoics, 90. This observation is not intended to discount the athletic imagery familiar here and in ancient literature (cf. Pfitzner, Agon Motif).
113. Contrast Paul’s rejoicing in Phil. 1:18 with his weeping in 3:18, although by itself this contrast need not be decisive since different causes are named.
114. Paul reserves such “enmity” language for those hostile to Christ (Rom. 5:10; 1 Cor. 15:25; Col. 1:21; cf. Rom. 12:20; Eph. 2:14–16), sometimes even those who try to observe the law without the Spirit (Rom. 8:7; 11:28); this does not include even believers under discipline (2 Thess. 3:15). Likewise, those who do not embrace the cross are perishing (1 Cor. 1:18), including those who prefer circumcision to it (Gal. 5:11; 6:12, 14).
115. Thinkers often linked pleasures of the belly and of sexual organs, e.g., Epict. Diatr. 2.9.4; cf. Corrington, “Defense.”
116. Hom. Od. 17.286; Eurip. frg. 915; Mus. Ruf. 16, p. 104.18; 18B, p. 118.7; Epict. Diatr. 2.9.4; Sen. Y. Dial. 7.20.5; Ep. Lucil. 60.4; Philost. Vit. soph. 1.20.512–13; Epicureans in Plut. Pleas. L. 3, Mor. 1087D. Cf. “slave of the belly” in Rom. 16:18; Max. Tyre Or. 25.6; Ach. Tat. 2.23.1; Philost. Vit. Apoll. 1.7; Libanius Encom. 6.9; “captive” of the belly in Dio Chrys. Or. 32.90; enslaved to passions, including gluttony, Aeschines Tim. 42; chained by the belly, genitals, and the rest of the body, Porph. Marc. 33.506–7; following the stomach, Syriac Menander Epitome 6–8; the belly depicting slavery to passions, Philo Migr. 66; glutton as a slave to food, Philo Alleg. Interp. 3.221; their god is their belly, Apoc. Elij. 1:13 (probably dependent on Phil. 3:19).
117. E.g., Philo Creation 158–59; Alleg. Interp. 3.159; Migr. 66; Spec. Laws 1.148, 192, 281; 4.91; cf. Wolfson, Philo, 2:225–37; cf. also 3 Macc. 7:10–11; 4 Macc. 1:3. For the belly and pleasure or passion (ἡδονή), see, e.g., Philo Alleg. Interp. 3.114, 116, 138–44, 160; Migr. 65; Spec. Laws 1.150. For kashrut and diet to control desire, see Rhodes, “Diet”; Stoics began self-control with inexpensive food (Mus. Ruf. 18A, p. 112.6–9; p. 114.21–26, 29), and Persians and Spartans reportedly in childhood (Xen. Cyr. 1.2.8; Lac. 5.4–7).
118. Cf. Epict. Diatr. 1.13.1; Philo Creation 77; Jub. 22:6; Sib. Or. 4.25–26; m. Ber. 3; b. Ber. 35ab; Sanh. 102a; Gen. 1:30–31; 1 Tim. 4:3–4; Did. 10.3.
119. See, rightly, Chrys. Hom. Cor. 17.1.
120. Elites sometimes even playfully praised the stomach or mocked gluttony (Ruscillo, “Gluttony”; Montanari, “Gastronomical Poetry”). Against gluttony, see, e.g., Polyb. 12.8.4; Pliny E. N.H. 28.14.56; Mus. Ruf. 4, p. 44.18; 18B, p. 116.4–22; 18B, p. 118.9–11; Mart. Epig. 2.40.1–8; 3.17.3; 3.22.1–5; 5.70, 72; 7.20; 11.86; 12.41; Plut. M. Cato 9.5; Educ. 7, Mor. 4B; Juv. Sat. 2.114; Max. Tyre Or. 7.7; 25.5–6; 36.4; Apul. Apol. 57–59, 74–75; Heracl. Hom. Prob. 72.3; Porph. Marc. 28.439–42; Iambl. Pyth. Life 31.203; Libanius Anec. 3.30; Invect. 5.16 (the wealthy who indulge the belly); Deut. 21:20; Prov. 23:20–21; 28:7; Sir. 23:6; 31:20; 37:30–31; 3 Macc. 6:36; 4 Macc. 1:27; Philo Dreams 2.155; T. Mos. 7:4. Vomiting was one remedy provided for overindulgence; Hipponax frg. 42; Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 108.15; Cic. Phil. 2.25.63.
121. Especially among Gentiles, e.g., Hom. Il. 22.66–70; 23.173; Od. 10.216; 17.290–304; Aelian Nat. An. 6.25; 7.10, 25; Pliny E. N.H. 8.61.142–47; Appian R.H. 11.10.64; Longus 1.21; Plut. Themist. 10.6; but even in Israel (y. Ter. 8:7; Schwartz, “Dogs”; Miller, “Attitudes”). Because dogs were used for hunting (Dio Chrys. Or. 4.34; 20.15), they were sacred to Artemis (Plut. Isis 71, Mor. 379D).
122. E.g., Hom. Il. 8.527; 11.362; 20.449; 22.345 (cf. 9.373; 21.394, 421); Od. 17.248; 22.35; Callim. Hymn 6 (to Demeter), 63; when addressed to women, it sometimes connoted sexual looseness, Hom. Od. 11.424; 18.338; 19.91. The wicked are compared to dogs in Exod. Rab. 9:2. Cynics were compared to dogs (Dio Chrys. Or. 9.9; Mart. Epig. 4.53.5; Lucian Runaways 16; Peregr. 2; Posts 34; Dem. 21; Phil. Sale 7; Diog. Laert. 6.2.40, 45, 60, 77–78; cf. Cercidas frg. 1; Gr. Anth. 7.63–68, 115) but wore the title proudly; Crates Ep. 16; Diogenes Ep. 2, 7; Dio Chrys. Or. 8.11; 9.3; Lucian Dial. D. 420 (4/21, Menippus and Cerberus 1); cf. Philost. Vit. Apoll. 6.31–33 (cf. philosophers generally in Lucian Hermot. 86). They earned the title partly by excreting in public, e.g., Dio Chrys. Or. 8.36. Called a dog, Diogenes drenches his hearers as a dog would (Diog. Laert. 6.2.46).
123. E.g., Aelian Nat. An. 7.19; Theophr. Char. 28.3; b. Sanh. 108b; y. Taan. 1:6, §8; Gen. Rab. 36:7; pointing to their private parts in Plut. Exile 7, Mor. 601DE. Sometimes also for savageness (Aeschylus Lib. 621; Eurip. Orest. 260), impudence (Song Rab. 2:13, § 4; Pesiq. Rab. 1:7; 15:14/15), or anger (Callim. Poems 380). Dogs reportedly killed Euripides (Val. Max. 9.12.ext.4; Aul. Gel. 15.20.9).
124. E.g., Phaedrus 4.19 (cf. 1.27.10–11); Mart. Epig. 1.83. Ancient literature is replete with dogs consuming or wanting to consume corpses, e.g., Hom. Il. 17.127, 255, 272; 23.21, 183–87; 24.211, 411; Od. 3.258–60; 21.363–64; 22.476; Eurip. Phoen. 1650; Thucyd. 2.50.1; Appian C.W. 1.8.72; Iambl. Bab. St. 18 (in Photius Bibl. 94.77a); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 7:6 (7:9 in some eds.).
125. Σκύβαλον often designates excrement; Paul may imply that the sort of human qualifications he cites in Phil. 3:4–6 are the sort of refuse that interests excrement-sniffing dogs.
126. Socrates reportedly claimed that most people lived to eat, whereas he simply ate to live (Mus. Ruf. 18B, p. 118.16–18; Diog. Laert. 2.34).
127. See p. 23.
128. Max. Tyre Or. 33.8 (trans. Trapp, 27), likewise advising removal of “the desires of the privy parts.”
129. Mus. Ruf. 18B, p. 116.14.
130. Quint. Decl. 298.10. The animal comparison for gluttony appears also in Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 60.4; Mus. Ruf. 18B, p. 116.18; Epict. Diatr. 2.9.4; Dio Chrys. Or. 77/78.29 (including “dogs”); Heracl. Hom. Prob. 14.4. No wise person who wishes to be a human, Musonius warns, will live to eat (18B, p. 118.18–19).
131. Plut. Bride 7, Mor. 139B. So also those greedy to fill their stomachs or copulate, Dio Chrys. Or. 77/78.29.
132. Philo Spec. Laws 1.148.
133. Philo Creation 157–58; Alleg. Interp. 3.114; Migr. 66. The serpent regularly represents pleasure in Philo, e.g., Creation 160, 164; Alleg. Interp. 2.71–74, 79, 81, 84, 87–93, 105–6; 3.61, 66, 68; Agr. 97, 108.
134. He will transform the present “humiliated” bodies (Phil. 3:21; cf. 2:8) into bodies of “glory” (3:21; cf. 1 Cor. 15:40–43, esp. 43), presumably also understood as heavenly bodies (cf. Phil. 3:20–21; 1 Cor. 15:40–41, 47–49).
135. In apocalyptic imagery, cf. Revelation’s contrast between the city of this world, depicted as a prostitute, and the city of the coming world, depicted as a bride (Rev. 17:1–5; 21:9–14).
136. E.g., Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 28.4; Mus. Ruf. 9, p. 68.15–16, 21–22; Epict. Diatr. 2.10.3; Max. Tyre Or. 36.3; Marc. Aur. 10.15; 12.36; Diog. Laert. 2.99; Philost. Ep. Apoll. 44; Philo Creation 142; Spec. Laws 2.45; Contempl. 90; cf. Heracl. Ep. 9; Diog. Laert. 6.5.93; Obbink, “Sage,” 189; particularities reflected fallenness from the original universality (Proclus Poet. 5, K52.7–19), including attachment to particular zones of the world, cities, or families (K52.23–24). World citizenship was especially relevant to Cynics, who applied it radically (e.g., Dio Chrys. Or. 4.13; Lucian Phil. Sale 8; Diog. Laert. 6.2.63, 72). Occasionally, other kinds of scholars borrowed this claim of world citizenship (e.g., Vitruv. Arch. 6.pref.2).
137. Heracl. Ep. 9 (trans. Worley, 211).
138. Heracl. Ep. 5.
139. Diog. Laert. 2.7.
140. Philo Agr. 65; see also Conf. 78; Heir 274.
141. Philo Contempl. 90. Cf. QG 3.45.
142. Cf., e.g., Michael, Philippians, 181; Beare, Philippians, 136; Hawthorne, Philippians, 170; Fee, Philippians, 378–79; Cousar, Philippians, 80; Witherington, Philippians, 218; Cohick, Philippians, 200.
143. Diogn. 5.5.
144. Diogn. 5.9; cf. 5.4.
145. 1 Clem. 54.4. Cf. Poly. Phil. 5.2.