The term wu 無, or nonbeing, is a concept particular to the Laozi and the Daoist tradition. This article will analyze the four meanings of wu based on the Laozi and WANG Bi’s (226–249 CE) annotation of that text. In addition to textual and philosophical discussion, I will also introduce wu’s significance in social and political life as suggested by the Laozi and Wang’s theories.
In modern Chinese, the word “wu” 無 means there-is-not, nothing, or non-being; it denotes the opposite of the word “you” 有, there-is, substance, or being. Wu usually functions as a negative particle, just like “not” in English phrases such as “there is not,” “have not,” or “do not.” As a negative form, wu is inevitably and frequently used in the language of everyday life, but not as a philosophical concept in the modern world. It is notable then that wu is an important philosophical concept in ancient Daoist texts. It is critical not only in a metaphysical sense, but also as an idea that can guide human social and political life, as well as individual self-cultivation. Although the idea of wu was only popular in ancient times thanks to the historical preeminence of Daoist thought, it may still exercise a positive function in today’s world if we understand and reinterpret it properly.
The idea of wu originated with a text known as the Laozi or the Daodejing, which is conventionally attributed to a senior contemporary of Confucius, Lao Dan, who was revered as Laozi, the suffix zi indicating something like “master.”1 The thought laid out in the Laozi was spread broadly through numerous commentators and their interpretations, among them the youngest-ever philosopher, WANG Bi, who lived for only twenty-three years. WANG Bi’s work has remained the most influential annotation on the Daodejing since he has dramatically developed its ideas, bringing them into a new form that was relatively systematic, coherent, logical, and well-defined—though perhaps not in the modern academic sense. In this chapter, we will discuss both the original meanings of wu in the Laozi and the clearer ideas about this concept developed by Wang in his annotation.
In Wang’s version of the Laozi, we count a total of 101 references to wu. This frequency is significant considering that the word dao gets only 76 references and the whole text has only about 5,400 words. However, this is not an entirely fair comparison because in most instances wu just plays the role of a negative particle and cannot be understood as a philosophical term like dao. Still, among the 101 references there are six places in three chapters where wu is used as a noun,2 and is clearly one of the essential ideas of the Laozi. In Wang’s annotation, there are 304 references to wu in numerous chapters, and among them twenty-six in nine chapters are nouns,3 four times more than in text of the Laozi. The reason we present this statistic data is that nouns are much more significant in philosophical discussion than other classes of words, such as verbs, adjectives, and adverbs.
In philosophical narrative and discussion, concepts are the major foci for theoretical analysis, and these are framed in nounal forms that may denote general, universal, or abstract meanings. For example, if we want to discuss the characteristic feature of various religions, we need the term religiosity, which is obviously different from merely generically qualifying something adjectivally as religious. In other words, nominalization is a primary step that is standard in the formation of philosophical concepts. Chinese is an analytical language, rather than an inflected one, like many European languages are. This means that in Chinese, whether a word is a verb, noun, or adjective depends on its function with respect to a sentence’s other words and word order, instead of on an identifying suffix. Thus, we cannot tell what part of speech a given Chinese word may be based merely on its form; instead, we have to analyze its position and function to decide its word class.
Elsewhere I have proposed four standards for judging whether or not a Chinese word indicates a philosophical concept in a text.4 1) It has a fixed form, namely, its meaning and form are associated consistently. This refers to compounds, such as wu-wei (nonaction, 無為) and wu-si (unselfish, 無私). 2) It must be used as a noun. This is a primary principle for a philosophical concept; in other words, not all important and representative words and terms may be considered philosophical concepts. For example, in the Laozi, wu-wei (nonaction, 無為) is used as a noun, but wu-si is not. Accordingly, wu-si cannot be counted as a philosophical concept, though it is meaningful in Laozi’s thought. 3) A noun can be used in sentences as either a subject or object or both. This may be the most convenient way to determine whether or not a word is used as a noun. 4) Its content must concern general or universal issues or situations, not only specific cases. The first three standards concern linguistic formalities, while the last one is about the content of a term. The latter is obviously a necessary condition for a philosophical term. According to these standards, we can find four philosophical senses of the concept wu in the Daodejing itself and in WANG Bi’s annotations of the Daodejing: wu as the origin of the universe, wu as a feature of Dao, wu as relative to you in particular things, and finally, as introduced by WANG Bi, we see wu as representing a transcendent and immanent Dao. We shall turn to these four senses next.
The most important sentence about wu appears in Chapter 40 of the Laozi, which states:
Reversion is the action of Dao.
Weakness is the function of Dao.
All things in the world come from you [being, 有].
And being comes from wu [nothingness or nonbeing]. (Chan 1973, 160)5
The first two lines reveal the features and attributes of Dao’s operation and function. As for our topic, wu, the last two lines are critical. The myriad things in the universe come from you, which denotes something primary and general, a kind of substance, like qi (material and vital force, or elementary matter); we may use being as a token for you. The Laozi contends that you arises from wu, which denotes nothingness or the original state of the universe when nothing has emerged. For convenience, we can use nonbeing as merely a symbol for wu. We should not think being and nonbeing are literally equal to you and wu, because the Laozi did not give us a clear definition or description of them, and neither gets one specific meaning across the whole text. Therefore, we should not expect a perfect translation of Laozi’s philosophical terms, though we should keep exploring possible accurate meanings as historical approach that differs from contemporary approaches pursuing new interpretations for improving or enriching the modern philosophical arsenal. Here being and non-being are just convenient and acceptable as tokens for the various meanings of you and wu in the Laozi; we should not suppose that you and wu have in all cases the same meanings as being and nonbeing in certain Western philosophies. One thing is clear, however, that both you and wu are here used as nouns with general and abstract meanings, distinct from most other occurrences of you and wu, which function more grammatically than philosophically.
The statement that “being comes from wu” suggests that wu is the primal root, origin, or first phase of all beings. Therefore, wu has the status of the ultimate origin or the primary condition of the whole universe. Is wu then equal to Dao?
It is worth noting that the Laozi never explicitly states that wu is Dao or Dao means wu, though similar ideas may be inferred if we compare and connect Chapter 42 with Chapter 40. In Chapter 42, Laozi claims:
Dao generated the One [sheng yi, 生一],
The One generated the two,
The two generated the three,
And the three generated the myriad things. [my compilation]6
In this passage, Laozi clearly claims that Dao is the source and origin of all things in the universe. Compare this with Chapter 40, where Laozi states that all things come ultimately from wu. So it is easy to infer from these two chapters that Laozi believes Dao is wu in the sense that Dao is the final source of the universe, though he does not say that explicitly. However, we should not over-infer and conclude that Laozi’s Dao is wu in a general sense, because we can find no textual evidence to support this idea. This point will become clearer after we discuss Chapter 1 in the next section.
To understand Chapter 1, we have to pay attention to the three excavated versions from the Han dynasty: two well-known silk versions and a more recently published bamboo-slip version (Beijing Daxue Chutu WenXian Yanjiusuo [BJDX] 2012). Because the earlier Guodian bamboo-slip version has no text of Chapter 1, these three Han versions are important as the earliest ancient versions, which can be supposed to be closer to the original text than any received versions. Intriguingly, the three versions of the following passage are identical, though different from all the received versions, which read:
The nameless (wu-ming, 無名) is the beginning of Heaven and earth (tiandi, 天地),
The named (you-min g, 有名) is the mother of myriad things (wan-wu, 萬物). [my compilation]
According to these statements in the received versions, the nameless and the named seem to be two stages of generation, of Heaven and earth and of the myriad things respectively. The meanings of “beginning” and “mother” represent two distinct cosmological phases. However, this reading has been seriously challenged by the excavated Han versions, which state:
The nameless is the beginning of myriad things (wan-wu),
The named is the mother of myriad things (wan-wu). [my compilation]
The critical difference of these newly discovered but oldest versions is the repetition of myriad things (wan-wu) in both lines. This repetition suggests that the nameless (wu-ming) and the named (you-min g) are used to describe the same thing: the generation of the myriad things (wan-wu), so they are two aspects of the character of the generator of myriad things, instead of designating two temporal phases. Here the words “beginning” (shi, 始) and “mother” (mu, ↡) are synonyms, indicating the earliest state or origin of universe. In the Laozi’s dictionary, shi and mu are not in chronological sequence. For example, Chapter 52 states: “There was a beginning of the universe, which may be called the mother of the universe.” Both “beginning” and “mother” denote Dao, the very initiating phase of the universe. Similarly, Chapter 25 argues: “There was something undifferentiated and yet complete … it may be considered the mother of the universe. I do not know its name; I style it Dao” (Chan 1973, 152). Here, mother is also the very Dao.
Thus, if we accept the conclusion that Dao is the ultimate origin and source, then we should understand that both the nameless and the named are two characteristic aspects of Dao, the source and origin of the universe. The named and nameless are not two stages of cosmological evolution. This understanding fits better with the theme of Chapter 1, namely the features and functions of Dao.
Similarly, you-yu (having desires, 有℆) and wu-yu (having no desires, 無℆) in the next couplet should not be read as you (being) and wu (nonbeing). According to the silk versions, a particle ye г immediately follows you-yu and wu-yu; thus, in the phrases “wu-yu ye (無℆г)” and “you-yu ye (有℆г),” you and wu cannot be read as being and nonbeing according to the grammar rule. The silk versions read:
Therefore, always be without desire [wu-yu ye, 無℆г,] so as to see their subtlety,
And always have desire [you-yu ye, 有℆г], so as to see their margins. (Lynn 1999, 51, with minor modification)
However, some philosophers prefer a rather different reading initiated by WANG Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086), who reinterpreted the compounds you-ming 有名 and wu-ming 無名. He read you and wu as single-word nouns and ming 名 as a verb and he read the next two lines similarly; that is to say, he read you and wu as single-word concepts as in you-yu (having desires, 有℆) and wu-yu (having no desires, 無℆), wherein yu ℆ serves as a particle. Thus the four sentences, on this construal, read:
Wu (nonbeing) names [ming, 名] the beginning of Heaven and earth [tiandi, 天地],
You (being) names [ming, 名] the mother of myriad things [wan-wu, 萬物]. Therefore, be with constant wu (non-being), so as to perceive its subtlety,
Be with constant you (being), so as to perceive its margins. [my compilation]
This reading effectively turns the terms you and wu into being and nonbeing, making them more conceptual, and the text more philosophical, in comparison with ancient thought. Generally speaking, in the Song Dynasty, scholarship, represented by Neo-Confucianism, paid more attention to conceptual analyses. This is the reason why some modern philosophers favor WANG Anshi’s reading. Unfortunately, the excavated versions have undercut this reading and proved that the ancient text need not satisfy later philosophers’ desires and needs. However, since we aim to approximate the true form and the original meaning of the text, we have to relinquish this more conceptual and philosophical reading for the earliest, less ideal versions.7 In this way, we can observe the development of the Laozi’s thought through WANG Bi’s theories, and get a sense of the early evolution of this ancient thought.
According to the Han bamboo and silk versions, the Laozi’s Dao could be wu as the source and origin of the universe, but it does not mean that Dao is wu or nonbeing in a general way. In Chapter 1, Dao is given the characteristics of both the named and the nameless. What is named suggests nameability, while what is nameless suggests unnameability; which in turn suggests that Dao’s perceptible features are equal to you or being, and its incomprehensible features are equal to wu or nonbeing. These two aspects refer to the human faculty of recognition of a metaphysical being and have nothing to do with the empirical world.8 The description of Dao in Chapter 21 helps us to better understand these two attributes:
The all-embracing quality of the great virtue [de, 德] follows alone from the Dao.
Dao as a thing is but dim, is but dark.
Dark, oh, dim, oh, but within it some image is there.
Dim, oh, dark, oh, but within it something is there.
Abstruse, oh, indistinct, oh, but within it the essence of things is there.
Its essence is most authentic, for within it authentication occurs. (Chan 1973: 150; Lynn 1999, 86, with my compilation)
Here, words such as dim, dark, abstruse, and indistinct describe the incomprehensible aspect of Dao, pointing to wu or nonbeing; while words such as image, something, essence, and authentication suggest Dao’s perceptible aspects, pointing to you or being. The general feature of Dao combines both you and wu, though not straightforwardly. So there is no textual evidence for the claim that the Laozi’s Dao is only wu or nonbeing. All descriptions of Dao seem to be wu, in the sense that human beings cannot grasp it because it is not any concrete thing humans can know. Chapter 14 describes it this way:
We look at it and do not see it, its name is the invisible. We listen to it and do not hear it, its name is the inaudible. We touch it and do not find it, its name is the subtle (formless) …. Infinite and boundless, it cannot be given any name [unnameability.] It reverts to wu-wu [nothingness, 無物.] This is called shape without shape, image without entity … (Modification of Chan 1973, 146)
So this chapter also describes characteristic aspects of Dao as you and wu. Again, wu is a feature of Dao, distinct from wu as the initial status of the universe.
How might notions of you and wu operate in the empirical world? Chapter 11 in the Laozi argues:
Thirty spokes are united around the hub to make a wheel,
But it is on its wu (nothingness) that the utility of the carriage depends.
Clay is molded to form a utensil,
But it is on its wu (nothingness) that the utility of the utensil depends.
Doors and windows are cut out to make a room,
But it is on its wu (nothingness) that the utility of the room depends.
Therefore, regard you (being) as advantage, and regard wu (nothingness, non-being) as utility. (Modification of Chan 1973, 144–145)
Here wu and you are mutually dependent. ‘You’ indicates the concrete part of objects, while ‘wu’ is their vacant part. Wu in the first three verses is just emptiness, or the spaces in an entity, and these instances are used to introduce the last verse, in which wu and you are more general and abstract concepts. Though you and wu are a pair that cannot be separated, this chapter’s larger purpose is to promote awareness of and reverence for wu, and to correct the common mistake among people ignorant of or forgetting its function and utility in the world. Wu and you in this chapter of the Daodejing have nothing to do with the metaphysical kingdom, and are very different from you and wu as Dao’s two aspects. There is a similar case made in Chapter 2:
You (being) and wu (non-being) bring about each other;
Difficult and easy complete each other;
Long and short contrast with each other;
High and low distinguish each other;
Sound and voice harmonize with each other;
Front and back follow each other,
Therefore the sage manages affairs without action [wu-wei, 無為],
And spreads doctrines without words [bu-yan, ϡ言] …. (Chan 1973, 140)
Some points should be noted: 1) You (being) and wu (nonbeing) are seemingly equal in a pair, and either side can bring about the other. 2) In this chapter, every line is concerned with affairs in the mundane world; there is nothing related to Dao or metaphysical concerns. 3) Obviously, the relationship of mutual transition between you and wu is not suitable to Dao or a feature of Dao. Dao, as the source of the universe, cannot be you, and the named and nameless sides of Dao cannot be transformed into each other. 4) In the mutually dependent relation of you and wu, as well as that of the other oppositions, people are used to seeing and pursuing the positive sides (being, easy, long) and are inclined to neglect and avoid the negative sides (nonbeing, difficult, short). Therefore, the author’s emphasis on oppositional dependence and transformation is actually intended to promote the negative aspect, and this introduces a special way to deal with social and political issues—the wu-wei (nonaction) and bu-yan (no-words) that are principles of operation for Daoist sages.
The fourth form and meaning of wu was produced by WANG Bi about six or seven centuries after the Laozi gained currency. Wang provides an important development, supplement, and even logical completion of the Laozi’s philosophy, especially with regard to the theory of wu. His philosophy was expressed through his famous annotation of the work, and he was the first to establish the convention that an annotator may build a new philosophical system through formal commentaries (Liu 2008–2009, 23–33; Liu 2009b, 131–156). Wang’s dramatic development of the Laozi’s theories made Daoism more conceptual and philosophical. He transformed the term wu as nonbeing into a more abstract, universal, and coherent concept that denoted both the ground and source of the universe.
Wang introduces three new premises related to wu. The first is that Wang states literally that Dao equates with wu or nonbeing, which is a hidden idea in the Laozi. Wang takes this for granted in his annotation on the Laozi without serious argument to support it, but he does argue for it in his “Outline introduction to the Laozi” (Laozi zhilue, 老子指略) (Lynn 1999, 30–47). Chapter 8 of the Laozi highly praises the attributes of water:
The highest good is like water.
Water is good at benefiting myriad things and competes for nothing.
It dwells in [lowly] places that all disdain,
This is why it is so near to Dao. (Chan 1973, 143 with modification)
This passage does not mention wu or nonbeing, but in his annotation Wang introduces nonbeing as Dao’s essence: “Whereas Dao [is] wu (nonbeing), water [is] you (being), thus [the text] says [it is] ‘so near to Dao.’”9 Wang’s annotation is so brief and terse that it omits the “be” verb in the statement “Dao is wu”; even though such an omission is not an uncommon practice in classical Chinese, this brief assertion suggests that Wang doesn’t think there is any need to argue the point in his commentary. The statement that “Dao equals nonbeing” is a critical statement that establishes a clear and general connection between Dao and wu (or nonbeing) in the history of Daoist philosophical developments. This is a point the Laozi itself never actually reaches.
Wang proposes a second premise about wu in his annotation of Chapter 40:
That all beings in the world come into existence is due to being, but the origin of being takes nonbeing as its ben [root, 本]. If one wants to keep the wholeness of all beings, one must return to nonbeing [wu]. (Lynn 1999, 40, with my compilation)
Ben 本 originally and literally denotes the root part of a plant, in opposition to mo 末, the branches, twigs, and leaves. So we may translate ben as ‘root’. However, root is merely a metaphor that suggests the association of a plant temporally growing from a seed into a tree or from nothing into something. But this is not precisely the thrust of Wang’s theory. As early as in the Analects, the word ben had shed the original image of a plant root and was used in an abstract and general sense as the most important foundation of something.
According to Wang’s doctrine, all beings come from their ben, namely non-being, and each one must return to nonbeing to realize its completeness. The term nonbeing negates the temporal and physical association of the root image. One’s returning to nonbeing is not meant in a temporal or physical sense, but at a spiritual and intellectual level; it means transcending earthly attractions and the mundane life to preserve one’s wholeness. Therefore, it is better to render ‘ben’ as grounds or foundation instead of root. Both ben and nonbeing denote the grounds of the universe and human life, much akin to Dao; thus, people should constantly turn their minds to nonbeing or Dao, so they will not lose sight of their life’s direction and become entangled in the twigs and leaves, that is, in life’s trivial affairs.
WANG Bi’s equation between nonbeing and Dao is critical. Dao as nonbeing suggests that the whole universe and all human beings are based on the final grounds, wu or nonbeing, for their existence. This means that nonbeing as Dao denotes both the origin and grounds of the universe and the human world. While the term “origin” implicates cosmological theory, “grounds” suggests ontological issues. Wang actually occupies the gap between the two. Or more likely, he did not notice the difference between cosmology and ontology, which, after all, as philosophical concepts he would never have encountered. This explains his ontological interpretation of Chapter 42, in which, the statement that Dao generates the one, two, and three is apparently a process of universal temporal evolution. The meaning of “generate” (sheng, 生) is simple if we read it straightforwardly, but this easy passage has produced conflicting readings and much argument (see note 6 to this essay). These have been partly inspired by Wang’s commentary, which reads:
Although the myriad things exist in myriad forms, they all revert to the One [qi gui yi ye, 其歸一也]. Why do they all ultimately become One [heyou zhiyi, 何由致一]? It is due to nonbeing [wu 無]. Because One comes from non-being, can One still be called non-being? Because we already call it “One,” how can there not be a word for it? Because we have this word and because we have the One, how can there not be two? Because we have the One and have these two, this consequently gives birth to three … (Lynn 1999, 135)
Wang’s expressions guiyi 歸一 (revert to the One, reduce to the One, or return to the One) and zhiyi 致一 (become One) are apparently not about the origin of the universe, and as such, are irrelevant to the Laozi’s original expression shengyi 生一. According to Wang, the Laozi’s claim that Dao generated the One, two, and three does not necessarily describe a physical process of universal evolution. Wang’s explanation is more like an intellectual inference and language game influenced by the school of logic (mingjia, 名家) of the late Warring States period. We can say that Wang’s exegesis is closer to ontological theory than cosmological hypothesis. TANG Yong-tong 湯用彤 (1893–1964) has suggested that Laozi’s philosophy is cosmological, and that it was WANG Bi who first formulated Chinese ontological theories, taking wu 無 or nonbeing as ontic (Tang 1983, 195, 214).
Wang’s theory of wu as the grounds of the universe not only combines the cosmological and ontological issues, but also eliminates the gap between the metaphysical and mundane realms. In other words, under his interpretation, wu as Dao is both transcendent and immanent. The best illustration is the statement that all beings take nonbeing as their universal grounds, thus all beings should return to nonbeing to realize their completeness. In light of this, Wang’s third premise straightforwardly presents guidance for human beings. Wang argues: “If one preserves the child by holding fast to the mother and makes twigs [mo, 末] flourish by enhancing the roots [ben, 本,] form and names will all exist, but anomalies will not occur” (Lynn 1999, 183). Here the key statement is chong-ben-ju-mo 崇本舉末, to venerate or promote the root so that branches and twigs will flourish accordingly.10 In this usage, ben is the ground for both the universe and myriad things, and equal to Dao and wu. Hence, the premise is both a metaphysical claim and a practical direction for human beings to achieve success in both great enterprises and trivial affairs.11
We have analyzed four different meanings of wu in the Laozi. But the Laozi is not purely theoretically focused and neither is the concept of wu. The Laozi contains the author’s concern and reflections about the tendencies of human civilization, and it manifests his worry and his hope for human societies and life. This point is supported by the late preeminent philosopher LAO Siguang 勞思光 (1927–2012), who made a brilliant remark about the function and features of Chinese philosophy. Lao points out the general idea that Chinese philosophy is “philosophy as proposal,” whose function is to present an orientation for the world and human life. Thus, Chinese philosophy might have less explanatory power, but it is strong in its “orientating power” (Lao 2003, 9, 20). Certainly, Daoism must be counted as a key thread of Chinese philosophy. The phrases “philosophy as proposal” and “orientating power” are perfectly suited for the wisdom in the Laozi. This point liberates us from the simplistic demarcation that Daoism is “naturalist” while Confucianism is “humanist.” Indeed, Daoist theory seems to draw more on the natural world and explore more metaphysical topics than Confucianism does, but its essential concerns still focus on human life and destiny. The “naturalist” impression, moreover, is partly caused by the common misreading of another key term, ziran 自然, as the Nature or the natural world (Liu 2009a, 226–233). We will come back to this point later.
To discriminate between wu’s different meanings is necessary and signifi-cant. But as far as practical functions are concerned, the different meanings of wu work together coherently and indicate the same direction: toward better social goals and order. Specifically, the Laozi’s wu is a negative measure that is recommended in achieving a positive ideal. The negative direction connotes reflection and criticism of mainstream values and styles of human social and political life. The positive direction suggests advocacy of transcendent pursuits and yearning for order and harmony in the world. Although the negation perspective is a distinctive feature of the Laozi’s philosophy, it is neither the whole nor the last of it. The more important perspective lies in its ideal of an inclusive peaceful world operating in natural harmony. This positive and constructive aspect of the Laozi’s thought has been neglected for a long time.
The negative aspects of wu make it distinct: as a negative particle, it exercises a negating function in many sentences and many expressions, such as non-action (wu-wei, 無為), no-name (wu-ming, 無名), no-affair (wu-shi, 無џ), not-selfish (wu-si, 無私), no-knowledge (wu-zhi, 無知), no-desire (wu-yu, 無℆), no-self body (wu-shen, 無身), no-taste (wu-wei, 無味), and no-army (wu-bing, 無兵), and so on. All these wu-combinations are used to criticize mainstream actions and pursuits, including being aggressive in profit-driven activities, endlessly pursuing fame, knowledge, self-interest, or victory in war. Furthermore, another negative particle, bu ϡ, is also used frequently, in expressions such as not-competing (bu-zheng, ϡ爭), not-daring (bu-gan, ϡ敢), not-speaking (bu-yan, ϡ言), not-claiming (bu-shi, ϡ恃), not-humane (bu-ren, ϡҕ), not-initiating (bu-wei-shi, ϡ為始), and not revering worthies (bu-shang-xian, 不尚賢). Still another negative particle, wu 勿, forms compounds such as not being supercilious (wu-jing, 勿矜), not being haughty (wu-jiao, 勿驕), and not showing strength (wu-qiang, 勿強), just to name a few (Liu 1997, 111). These many negative compounds present weak or strong criticisms of rulers’ thoughts and actions, and on the common people’s habits and goals in life. At the same time, they suggest a more natural, peaceful, and leisurely way to live.
Although Laozi’s criticism was leveled as a general negation of prevailing trends in ancient Chinese societies, some scholars are inclined to limit it to a more narrow sense. They interpret wu-wei as critical of only wrong-doing, wild behavior, or actions generally against natural laws. According to this view, the Laozi is merely a book of common sense for children, because few adults, especially those in power, think they are doing wrong even if their actions result in terrible disasters. In fact, however, the Laozi’s wisdom is based on a radical observation of the movement of the universe and human civilization: everything has its opposite, and everything moves toward or brings out that opposite; what is normal and even good is necessarily tied to its other extreme. Only people who recognize and admit the existence of this oppositional transformation may be able to prevent or reduce the effects of this process by controlling desires and activities. This general negation is supported by Dao, which is both equal to wu as the root of the universe and integrates wu as characteristic of its features.12 Thus, we may understand why Wagner renders wu as “negativity” (Wagner 2003, 257), though “negativity” may not give a completely adequate account of wu. It is perhaps impossible to translate a Chinese philosophical term across history and cultures into another single word that carries all of the original term’s resonance.
What, then, are the constructive and positive aspects of wu in the Laozi’s philosophy? To get to this we must backtrack a bit. The most distinctive idea in the Laozi is ziran 自然 (naturalness),13 which represents transcendence from regular values and ideals. The last passage of Chapter 25 reads:
Man takes his models from Earth [ren fa di, Ҏ⊩地],
Earth takes its models from Heaven [di fa tian, 地⊩天],
Heaven takes its models from the Dao [tian fa dao, 天⊩道],
and the Dao takes its models from ziran [dao fa ziran, 道⊩自然]. (Lynn 1999, 96, with my modification)14
The assertion that “Dao takes its models from ziran 自然” puts ziran in the highest position, though it does not posit ziran as an entity, but as an idea or principle. Here, ziran cannot mean the natural world or human nature, since these ideas cannot be mapped into ancient Chinese thought. Like many ancient Chinese philosophical terms, ziran does not have a singular meaning, and it is very difficult to find a proper counterpart for it in either English or modern Chinese. Therefore, we will use naturalness as a token for it. Ziran is a good result that comes from the negation of mainstream or deviant policies and strategies. The Laozi argues that the principle of naturalness or natural harmony can reduce levels of unhealthy transformation and avoid the disasters caused by regular competition and strife. Comprehensively, then, we can say that ziran is the central value, highest principle, and the ideal state of human societies in the universe (Liu 2009a).
Too much could be said about how to realize ziran or naturalness. Since space is limited, we will briefly introduce one term, fu 輔, from the Guodian bamboo Laozi (A):
And so the sage is able to assist the myriad things’ naturalness,
but is unable to act [in the common manner] [shigu shengren neng fu wanwu zhi ziran er funeng wei, 是故聖人能輔萬物之自然而弗能為.] (my compilation)
This earliest version foregrounds the contrast between “able” and “unable,” which in turn illuminates the relation between fu (assisting, 輔) and wei (acting, 為). We can make out that the Laozi does not intend “assisting the naturalness of the myriad things” to be the usual sort of “action,” but rather a wu version of action. Here, fu, or assisting, is promoted as a special kind of behavior that proceeds in accordance with the principle of naturalness. In other words, the sage is able to advance the prosperity of the myriad creatures and things, but not by the usual means. Thus, fu carries the senses of assistance, aid, or support. It is better understood as the middle of the spectrum where one extreme is restraint, manipulation, interruption, interference, exploitation, control, and oppression, while the other is pampering, spoiling, indulgence, permissiveness, and over-protection. In this way, ‘fu (assist)’ as a positive term depicts a principle that arises between two common modes of action and behavior that are usually negated by the Laozi’s philosophy of wu.
Both these negative and positive sides are significant and intended to help correct a prevailing tendency in the human world, where people pursue certain values blindly, endlessly, and purposelessly. Paul Tillich (1886–1987) once criticized modern people for competing mindlessly with the line “better and better,” “faster and faster,” “more and more” (Tillich 1987, 2). The Laozi’s idea of wu can help us recognize and correct this unhealthy social trend. The principle of a different course of engagement with things, such as assisting (fu), deserves to be adopted by all modern people, but especially those in higher positions.
Through his concept of nonbeing, WANG Bi has also successfully fused his metaphysical theory and instructions for human life, creating a rich and coherent system. It applies equally to the explanation of the origin and development of the universe, as well as serving as a guide for people’s political and social life and their moral cultivation. Wang argues in his annotation of Chapter 38:
How is virtue to be attained? It is to be attained through Dao. How is virtue to be completely fulfilled? It is through non-being as its function. As non-being is its function, all things will be embraced. Therefore, in regard to things, if they are understood as non-being, all things will be in order, whereas if they are understood as being, it is impossible to avoid the fact that they could not avoid [adversity] with their life. (Chan 1973, 322)15
This is a full fusion of transcendent nonbeing and humans’ political, social, and moral life. Wang’s theories may seem mystifying and distant from the concerns of the modern world, but if we understand nonbeing as a negation of common values, which promotes a transcendent level of human consciousness, his philosophy can be inspiring and enlightening.
In this chapter we have examined four meanings of wu. 1) Wu is the source of the universe, or the state before anything has emerged. This meaning of wu is more like nothingness. As a concept, this wu relates to cosmology and has nothing to do with affairs of the mundane world. 2) Wu, together with you, expressed as nameless and named, reflect the conceivability and incomprehensibility of Dao. In this sense, wu and you are two aspects of Dao. Neither of the two is directly related to issues of the physical or the human world. 3) Wu is a notion or phenomena opposite to you in the empirical world. At this level, wu and you transform from and into each other; this relationship should not be applied to the two above-mentioned metaphysical levels. 4) These three meanings of wu belong to different realms, but WANG Bi fused all these meanings of wu into one abstract and universal concept, as nonbeing and Dao, the origin and grounds of the universe and human societies. Wang’s theory is an early peak of abstract thought, with both coherence and comprehensiveness, in the history of Chinese philosophy.
Some people may be dissatisfied with these itemized analyses of the Daodejing’s usage of wu. As philosophers, they prefer to latch onto a single meaning of wu that is suitable for the whole text and good for interpreting the Laozi’s philosophy systematically. This preference—a common approach and practice—relies on the assumption that the Laozi is a consistent philosophical treatise. Obviously this is not the case: the Laozi is neither a treatise in the modern academic sense, nor a miscellaneous collection of aphorisms and proverbs. Thus, to faithfully understand it, we must take considerable care to analyze wu in each chapter and verse according to its specific context. Certainly, one can consciously reform and improve the Laozi’s thought for modern consumption, but that is a different project from regular interpretation. Methodological issues in Chinese philosophical studies are significant and difficult, and demand sustained thought and discussion.
1 There are controversies about the Laozi’s author and date. This essay will not be concerned with this issue. Readers who are interested in the author’s position and arguments about the text’s origins are invited to consult Liu (2009a) for a brief discussion in English and Liu (1997) for a Chinese discussion.
2 See Chapters 2, 11, and 40 of the Daodejing.
3 Chapters 1, 11, 14, 16, 21, 38, 40, 58, and 64 of the Daodejing or the Laozi.
4 This is the first time I discuss these four standards for a Chinese philosophical term in English. The first Chinese version was published in 1988 and reprinted in 2010 (Liu 2010, 138).
5 All translations, no matter from whom, are modified according to my understanding and for narrative smoothness. I have consulted many translations, including Chan (1973), Lynn (1999), Henricks (1991), Lau (2001), Ivanhoe (2002), and Wagner (2003).
6 There are controversies about the translation of the word sheng 生 in this context. Fu, following Mou Zongsan, argues:
the passage about “Dao generates One” should be re-rendered philosophically as “Dao (metaphysically) comes before One … Three (metaphysically) comes before all things.” Taking the ontological version of Laozi’s cosmological thinking, I would maintain that Dao is the ontological ground of all things in the non-conceptual, symbolic sense. (Fu 1973, 378)
Nevertheless, in the most straightforward reading, sheng just means to generate, produce, or bring about, though not necessarily as a mother’s giving birth to a baby.
7 I have argued that there are two essentially different orientations in the study of Chinese philosophy, namely, 1) textual and historical orientation for approximating the possible truths of ancient thought; and 2) modern and constructive orientation that presents new ideas for contemporary and future societies. Both orientations are significant and crucial to quality research. Scholars of Chinese philosophy should consciously differentiate these two kinds of tasks for better research outcomes. See Liu (2008–2009) in English and Liu (2009b) in Chinese.
8 Therefore, the theme of Chapter 1 is about the human faculty of recognition of a metaphysical being, not the Dao itself. This reading is different from popular impressions of the chapter.
9 Citations of Wang in this essay are adapted from translations in Lou (1980), Lynn (1999), Wagner (2003), and Chan (1973).
10 Here, chongben jumo 崇本舉末 is from Wang’s commentary on Chapter 38. In his “Laozi zhilue” 老子指略 (Outline introduction to the Laozi), Wang uses chongben ximo 崇本息末 instead. The word xi 息 can denote both tingxi 停息 and shengxi 生息, namely to cease and to grow; the two meanings are in opposition. Some reasonable textual evidence exists for reading it as “cease,” but since it always appears together with shoumu cunzi 守母存子, xi should be read as “grow.” This reading is in accordance with Wang’s commentary on Chapter 38.
11 In the context of Chinese philosophy, “metaphysics” cannot be understood in a Platonic or essentialist sense, since Dao is also imminent in all the myriad things.
12 The term “oppositional transformation” was suggested by Prof. Douglas L. Berger in a personal communication.
13 Based on extant literature, we are able to say that the word ziran was first coined and used in the Laozi. In central early texts, such as the Shangshu 尚書, Shijing 詩經, Zuozhuan 左傳, the Analects 論語, and the Mencius 孟子, there is no reference to this term. The Guanzi 管子 refers to it once; the Mozi 墨子 twice; in the Xunzi 荀子 there are two references, in the Zhuangzi 莊子 six, and in the Hanfeizi 韓非子 eight.
14 Lynn (1999) translates ziran as “the Natural”, p. 96.
15 The meaning of the last sentence is not clear. The word “adversity” is added according to my analysis and understanding of the context.