18
Yogācāra Theories of the Components of Perception

The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa

Dan Lusthaus

What does the world look like through enlightened eyes? How, if at all, does perception for enlightened beings differ from the way nonenlightened beings perceive? These would seem to be natural questions, especially considering the prominent emphasis Buddhists place on such themes as mental purification, correcting cognitive errors, theories of perception, “seeing things as they are” (yathā-bhūtam), and so on. Thus it is surprising that detailed and specific discussions of how enlightened beings perceive almost never appear in Buddhist literature, aside from attributing vague, honorific adjectives to such cognitions, such as labeling them “transmundane” (lokuttara), pure, unobstructed, and so on. The section of the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa translated here is a major exception.

Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa is a composite of (probably three) commentaries (upadeśa) on a sūtra called the Buddha-bhāmi sūtra.¹ Bhūmi can mean either “land,” or “stage”; hence the title suggests both “Sūtra on the Buddha Land” and “Sūtra on the Stage of Buddhahood”; the contents of the sūtra fit both readings, and the preamble of Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa plays on both meanings, as if treating the title as a double entendre. The central concern of the Buddhabhāmi sūtra is the “overturning of the basis” (āśraya- parāvtti) of the eight consciousnesses (vijñāna), so that they are transformed into the four cognitions (jñānas), also described as a purification of the consciousness stream and the manner of cognition from contaminated or polluted (āsrava) to uncontaminated (anāsrava). The eight consciousnesses are (1–5) the five sensory consciousnesses (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching); (6) mental-consciousness (manovijñāna), which cognizes thoughts as well as takes cognizance of what the previous five consciousnesses sense; (7) manas, the sense of selfhood; and (8) the warehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), also called “all-seeds consciousness” (sarva-bījāka-vijñāna),“karmic maturation consciousness” (vipāka-vijñāna), and “foundational consciousness” (müla-vijñāna), because it holds the contaminated and uncontaminated seeds, bringing them to karmic maturity and fruition.

When transformed, starting with the eighth, the warehouse consciousness becomes (1) the Great Mirror Cognition (mahādarśa-jñāna); manas becomes (2) Equalization Cognition (samatā-jñāna); mental-consciousness becomes (3) Attentive Cognition (pratyavekanā-jñāna); and the five sensory consciousnesses become (4) Accomplishing Activity Cognition (ktyānuṭhāna-jñana). While the warehouse consciousness superimposes habitual tendencies into perception, the Great Mirror Cognition contains the images of all things, equally, without attachment. While manas views the world in terms of “me” and “others,” valuing “myself” above “them,” Equalization Cognition sees all as the same. Mental-consciousness is easily distracted, but Attentive Cognition remains effortlessly focused. The Accomplishing Activity Cognitions perceive things just as they are. When all contaminations and obstructions have been removed from the consciousnesses and the uncontaminated seeds reach fruition, the Four Cognitions replace the consciousnesses; that is enlightened perception.

The passage translated here is of great interest for several reasons:

1. It explicitly discusses two important texts by the Buddhist epistemologist and logician Dignāga (late fifth to mid-sixth century)—his Pramāṇasamuccaya and Ālambana-parīkā²—providing us with a rare glimpse of how some Buddhists were utilizing and interpreting those texts prior to Dharmakīrti (c. 600–665).

2. It attempts to explain how cognition works after overturning the basis.

3. It demonstrates that the Yogācāras of that time all presupposed some sort of correspondence theory—though they differed on the details. For each issue that is raised in this section, three distinct theories are offered, suggesting that Bandhuprabha, who compiled the commentaries, was working with three commentaries.

4. It responds directly to arguments given by Nāgārjuna (in his Vigraha-vyāvartanī and Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā).³ In both texts, Nāgārjuna argues that light neither illuminates itself nor others; in the former text he does so specifically to criticize means of knowledge (pramāṇa) as providing a validly known object (prameya). Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa argues that consciousness can make both itself and other objects known; that is, consciousness can be a cognitive object for itself.

5. It presents a unique theory partitioning consciousness into four components: (1) a content or image part (nimitta-bhāga); (2) a seeing part (darśana-bhāga); (3) a self-reflective or ‘being aware of itself’ part (svasavitti-bhāga); and (4) a being aware that one is aware of oneself part (svasaṃveda-saṃvedabhāga). While the theory of the fourth component disappears from India once Dharmakīrti provides a more sophisticated version of the first three components,⁴ it became important in East Asian Buddhism, primarily due to its appearance here and in an expanded discussion in the Cheng weishilun (Treatise establishing consciousness only), a foundational text of the Weishi Chinese Yogācāra school.⁵ A short excerpt from the Cheng weishilun is translated and included after the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa passage here to illustrate some of the additions it offers.

6. It is a prime example of how commentarial style can utilize the declarative statements of a text such as the Buddhabhūmi sūtra to fashion a philosophical discussion. Where opposing theories are presented, each builds its case by interpreting the same key terms in its own way, illustrating that these terms were never univocal but always available for a variety of meanings.

7. It is the earliest text I know that addresses the issue of whether enlightened cognition is imageless (nirākāra) or involves images (sākāra). The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa argues for the latter position. The nirākāra-vāda versus sākāra-vāda controversy became more prominent later on in India, and continued to be debated for centuries in Tibet.

After arguing that consciousness can know itself, Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa turns to the four components theory, attempting to show how consciousness can know itself without incurring an infinite regress. Finally it turns to the question of the status of the image that appears in consciousness. Three different theories are offered. Underlying all three is a theory of perception generally accepted in India and throughout the ancient and medieval world, called prakāśa,“illumination,” in which a light is believed to go out from the eye and shine on an object (bimba), illuminating it, the reflection (pratibimba) bouncing back to the mind. For contaminated or unenlightened cognition, this also entails obstructions, attachments, imaginative distortions and overlays (vikalpa, parikalpa), and effort. A grasper (grāhaka) grasps or apprehends (grāhaṇa, upalabdhi) a “grasped” (grāhya); that is, ordinary perception is an act of appropriation, grasping. For uncontaminated cognition, the first theory says that the mind becomes a replica (sādśya) of whatever is in front of it, without imaginative construction (nirvikalpa), like a mirror effortlessly reflecting what is in front of it. This theory holds that uncontaminated cognition is similar to contaminated perception, except it is devoid of attachment and grasping. The second emphasizes that things are seen just as they are; it is not like a mirror that only receives reflections, or like a light going out in search of an object; the object itself is immediately known, without grasping or pursuing, such that cognition directly perceives sensory forms (rūpa) without obstruction. The third theory has the replica arise from the mind’s uncontaminated seeds.

Indian Buddhists used a rich, nuanced vocabulary for aspects of cognition and types of cognitive objects, with fine distinctions that are often lost in translations that render a host of different terms reductively as either “subject” or “object.” For instance, an ālambana (which I leave untranslated here) is a cognitive object from which mental impressions are derived. An ākāra is a mental image or mental impression drawn from the ālambana. A viaya is a sense object (a color, sound, etc.). Nimitta is a cognitive object whose characteristics cause a perception resembling it to arise. A vastu is an actual thing that may underlie a cognition, though whether it is perceived as it is or obstructed by imaginative constructions depends on the extent to which one’s cognitive abilities are purified of contaminants.

The quality of the Buddhabhumy-upadeśa’s arguments are crude compared to later developments, but, as a comparison with Williams (1998) would demonstrate, the later tradition basically reworked and reiterated the arguments already found here, dropping the fourth component (the svasaṃveda-saṃveda) while refining and fine-tuning the rest.

The Cheng weishilun provides a similar description of the four components of perception, but adds a few additional wrinkles, one of which is to point out that all four components by and large reduce to the second. The passage from Cheng weishilun explaining that has been included here.

The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa survives only in a Chinese translation made by Xuanzang in 649.⁶ The Chinese Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa designates authorship only as “Bandhuprabha, etc.,” with no information as to whom the “etc.” refers. It presents conflicting opinions that were debated between different Indian Yogācāra thinkers on a variety of topics during the sixth to early seventh centuries. A Tibetan translation⁷ of a commentary on the Buddhabhāmi sūtra that seems to correspond to a large extent with the core commentary contained in the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa is attributed to Śīlabhadra, who was the head monk at Nālandā—the leading Buddhist university in the ancient world—when Xuanzang arrived there on his pilgrimage to India (c. 637). Roughly half of the Chinese Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa does not correspond to the Śīlabhadra commentary, and of that noncorresponding half, major portions reappear, almost verbatim, in the Cheng weishilun. Kuiji, Xuanzang’s disciple and successor, in his commentaries on the Cheng weishilun, attributes some of these shared passages to Dharmapāla; hence some modern scholars have argued that the core commentary is by śīlabhadra, while the rest, or most of it, is by Dharmapāla, an important sixth-century Yogācāra. Bandhuprabha, who probably compiled the three Buddhabhūmi commentaries, was a disciple of Śīlabhadra. Whether or not these are the actual authors of these commentaries, it is reasonable to assume that the positions discussed represent Yogācāra debates of the late sixth to early seventh centuries, a time when Dharmapāla, Śīlabhadra, and Bandhuprabha, were prominent.⁸

Translation: From the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa
(Fodijing lun)

[Dignāga’s] Pramāṇasamuccaya says that all citta and caittas are aware of themselves; (this self-awareness) is called “perception” (pratyaksa). If that were not the case, there would be no memory, [so that to perceive something would be] just as if [the thing] had never been seen.⁹

Hence each and every mental component associated with the Four Cognitions also illuminates (i.e., perceives)¹⁰ and knows itself.

[Objection:] Doesn’t this contradict how the world works? A knife doesn’t cut itself and a fingertip cannot touch that [same] fingertip.

[Reply:] Don’t you see that lamps, etc., are able to illumine themselves?

[Objection:] How do you know that lamps, etc., illuminate themselves?

[Reply:] When in perception one sees the absence of darkness, the light, being separate [from darkness], is clearly perceived. If [the lamps, etc.] didn’t illuminate themselves they would be obstructed by darkness, and so not seen in perception. Due to this, therefore, know that lamps, etc., illuminate themselves.¹¹

[Objection:] Lamps, etc., are not dark. Is it necessary [that, in addition, they would have to further] illuminate [themselves]?

[Reply:] This is just like jars, cloth, etc . . Although in themselves they are not darkness, in the absence of a lamp, etc. to illuminate them, they are encompassed by the obstruction of darkness, so one cannot see them in perception. When lamps, etc. illuminate them, [the light] clears away that encompassing darkness, making [those things] visible to perception. We call that “illumination.” Lamps, etc. are the same case. When their self-nature [to illuminate] arises, the encompassing obstruction of darkness is cleared away, making them visible to perception; therefore this is called “self-illumination.”

Citta and caittas, regardless whether dominant or weak, are all able externally to [cognize] cognitive-conditions and internally to be aware of themselves (svasaṃvitti). This is analogous to light actually illuminating others as well as illuminating itself. It is unlike (i.e., not analogous to) such things as knives, etc., which are of a different sort.

Concerning the coarse characterization of citta and caittas, each is said to have two parts—an image part (nimitta-bhāga) and a seeing part (darśana-bhāga). In Pramāṇasamuccaya [Dignāga] explains that citta and caittas all have three parts: (1) a part that is grasped (grāhya),(2) a part that grasps (grāhaka), and (3) a part that is self-aware (svasaṃvitti). These three parts are neither the same nor different. The first is the known (prameya), the second is the knower (pramānṃa), and the third is the effect [of the act of] knowing (pramāṇa-phala).¹²

If one makes finer distinctions, then there is a theory that establishes that [cittas and caittas] have four parts. Three parts are like the previous (three), to which it adds a fourth: being aware that one is aware (svasaṃveda-saṃveda). The first two are external [in terms of their cognitive object]; the latter two are internal [in that their cognitive objects are other parts of consciousness]. The first is only a “known”; the rest include two types [i.e., known and knower]. That is, the second part only knows the first. Sometimes this is a valid cognition (pramāna), sometimes an invalid cognition (apramāṇa); sometimes a perception (pratyaksṃa), and sometimes an inference (anumānṃa). The third is aware of itself being aware of the second and it is aware of the fourth.¹³ The fourth is aware of itself being aware of the third. The third and fourth are classified as valid perception (pratyaka-pramāṇa).

By this reasoning, although [cognition] is a single event, it is a composite of many parts that are neither identical nor separate. The inner and outer [components that constitute a cognition], being altogether known, there is no fallacy of an infinite regress.

Hence the (Ghanavyūha) sūtra says:

The mind of sentient beings has two natures:
Inner and outer; all parts
grasped and grasper entangled;
Seeing the plethora of differentiations.

The idea of this verse is that the nature of the mind of sentient beings is a composite of two parts. Whether [directed] internally or externally, all [cognitions are] intertwinings of grasped and grasper. [Particular acts of] seeing (darśana) the plethora (of perceptual objects) may be either valid or invalid. [One sees] the multitude of distinct differentiations either (directly via) perception or (indirectly via) inference.

The mental components of the Four Cognitions, even though they have many parts, are nonetheless all classified as uncontaminated valid perception (anāsrava-pratyaka-pramāṇa). This idea has been elaborated elsewhere. The idea is that while [cognition’s] activities (Chin.: yong) are divided into many, [cognition] has no difference in itself (Chin.: ti). This is just like the one Dharma being differentiated into a plethora of ideas such as suffering, impermanence, etc., while [the Dharma] itself is one.

Next, as to what was said about the mental components associated with the Four Cognitions as having an image part, a seeing part, and so on, there definitely is a seeing part that illuminates (prakāśa) and a cognitive-object (viaya) that is illuminated. [That is obvious to everyone’s experience.] There is a self-aware part that illuminates both the seeing part and the being aware of being self-aware part, since the being aware of being self-aware part illuminates the self-aware part [and validates it]. [The latter two parts] also definitely exist, since if they didn’t exist, differentiated in this way into three parts, then there would be no cognitive-support (ālambana) and they wouldn’t be called cognitions (jñāna).

The [status of] the image part is inconclusive. [There are three theories.]

There is a theory: Since there is no obstruction between real things (tattvas) and the uncontaminated mental components, [the components] directly/immediately illuminate the objects that are before them, without having to pursue them.¹⁴ The mind turns itself into a replica of the image of the objects that are before it. The term “imageless” (nirākāra) refers to the uncontaminated mind, since it doesn’t imagine (nirvikalpa), and “nonconceptual” (acintya) refers to the cognitive object (ālambana-viaya).

Another theory: [For the cognition of] real things (tattvas), uncontaminated mental components also have an image part. What are called the ālambana for [the uncontaminated] citta and caittas is the appearance of cognitiveobjects that discloses them as dharmatā [i.e., just as they are]. This is not like pincers, etc., actively grasping things, nor is it like lamps, etc., whose light radiates to illuminate things.¹⁵ [The cognition] is like a bright mirror, etc. perceiving the reflections of illuminated things.¹⁶ The term “nonobstructed” [indicates] that the replicas¹⁷ of the cognitive-objects in perception are clearly seen, illuminated, and discerned. The term “imageless” [indicates] that [these mental components] neither attach to nor schematize [their objects]; and the term “nonconceptual” [indicates] the nondiscriminative [cognition] whose wondrous functioning is difficult to calculate. It is not that it doesn’t perceive images (pratibimba). If one says there are no images (ākāra), then there is no image part (nimitta-bhāga). If one says there is no discriminating [of images], then there would be no seeing part [either]. If the image and seeing parts were both entirely nonexistent, then this would be like empty space (ākāśa), or [like proposing a nonsensical chimera] like “the horns of a rabbit”; [that sort of nonsense] shouldn’t be called “cognition.” The terms “images devoid of grasper and grasped, etc.” [are used] because there is no attachment to or schematizing of [these images]; it is not that [this citta] lacks the function which illuminates intentional objects (artha), [mentally] replicating cognitive objects (viaya) from those cognitive conditions (ālambana). If uncontaminated citta was entirely devoid of an image part, then Buddhas wouldn’t perceive bodies and fields, etc., nor [would they perceive] the plethora of images (* pratibimba). That would contradict what the sütras and śāstras say in many places.

If overturning the basis of the rūpa-skandha didn’t attain¹⁸ rūpa, then overturning the basis of the [other] four skandhas should [result in] being without consciousness, etc. [Thinking like that] would be to commit a great error.¹⁹

And another theory: The mental components associated with uncontaminated, nondiscriminative cognition [are to be explained as follows]. Because they are nonimaginative (nirvikalpa), the ālambana is [seen] just as it is (tathatā), since [seeing things exactly as they are means there are] no separate [imaginary images intermediating between the cognition and] the thing itself, just as when illuminating the self-nature (svabhāva) [gof something] there is no separate image part. If [a cognition] has discriminations (savi-kalpa), the mental components are associating with postattainment cognition (pṭhalabdha-jñāna²⁰) [and not nirvikalpa cognition]. Since ālambanas and cognitive-objects (*viaya-gocara) sometimes are separate from the things themselves, [in such cases this is] just like when a contaminated mind perceives a replica of the image of a cognitive object by clearly seeing (*vispasṃtṃa) and illuminating the ālambana.

[Objection:] If an uncontaminated mind takes as its ālambana [something that] is separate from the object itself, [it could happen that] it has no resemblance to the image of that [object] and yet one apprehends an ālambana.²¹ [That would be a problematic cognition, not the type of jñāna being extolled.]

[Reply:] [According to Dignāga’s] ĀLambana-parīkā one shouldn’t say that because the image of atoms does not appear in the five consciousnesses that therefore there is no ālambana (at all). In this way, the image of the cognitive-object is identical to the uncontaminated mind.²² Uncontaminated seeds arise. Even though they resemble contaminated dharmas, nonetheless they are not contaminated, just as a contaminated mind may [have cognitions that] resemble an uncontaminated image, though they are not uncontaminated.

This ends the elaboration.

Such distinctions (vikalpa) are only from the conventional point of view, as explained logically. They are not from the [perspective] of ultimate meaning; the ultimate meaning is apart from words and deliberation. From the perspective of the imageless (nirākāra-dti) one already is incapable of speaking of citta, caittas, and so on.²³ It is beyond fictional-proliferation (prapañca) and incapable of being conceptualized (acintya).

Translation: From Cheng weishilum

Sometimes the seeing part is not classified as a pramāṇa [i.e., it sometimes has erroneous cognitions].²⁴ Due to this, the seeing part doesn’t “verify” (or isn’t aware of) the third, since to verify itself it would necessarily have to perceive [itself]. Of these four components, the first two are external, and the latter two are internal.²⁵ The first is only an ālambana; the other three are both (ālambana and ālambaka, i.e., perceiver and perceived).²⁶

That is, the second part has only the first for its ālambana. Sometimes it is a valid cognition (pramāṇa), and sometimes an invalid cognition (apramānṃa). Sometimes [it cognizes its ālambana] by perception (pratyaka), and sometimes by inference (anumāna).²⁷

The third takes the second and fourth as its ālambana [i.e., the darśana and svasaṃveda-saṃveda are the ālambana for the sva-saṃveda]. The svasaṃveda-saṃveda only has the third as its ālambana, but not the second, since it lacks that function.

The third and fourth are both classified as “valid perception” (pratyaka-pramāṇa).

Thus, citta and caittas are established to consist of these four parts. [Since this is the] full [account of the relation between] ālambaka and ālambana, there is no fallacy of infinite regress. Neither the same nor different, they are established by reason to be consciousness only (vijñapti-mātra).

This is why a gathā in the [Ghanavyūha] Sūtra says:

The mind of sentient beings has two natures:
Inner and outer; all parts
grasped and grasper entangled;
Seeing the plethora of differentiations.

What this verse intends to say is that the nature of the mind of sentient beings is a composite of two parts. Whether [directed] internally or externally, all [cognitions are] intertwinings of grasped and grasper. Seeing (darśana, dśya) has many types. Sometimes [seeing] is valid knowledge (pramānṃa), and sometimes invalid knowledge (apramānṃa). Sometimes [it cognizes its ālambana] by perception (pratyaksṃa) and sometimes by inference (anumāna). It differentiates into many parts. Among these, “seeing” is the darśana-bhāga (seeing part).

[Reducing the number of bhāgas]

In this way, the four parts may be grouped as three, since the fourth category gets included in the svasaṃveda part. Or they may be grouped as two, since the nature of the last three is to be a cognizer (ālambaka). So all (three) are classified as darśana-bhāga. The meaning (artha) of the word “seeing” (darśana) is “cognizer” (ālambaka).

Or they may be grouped as one, since there is no separation between them.

As a gathā in the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra says:

Due to attachment to one’s own mind (svacittābhiniveśa),
The mind appears (nirbhāsa) as the operation of external things
(bāhya-bhāva).
That which is seen (dśya) does not exist.
Therefore we say it is only mind (citta-mātra).

In this way, in every place and situation, we say there is only a single mental event (ekacitta-mātra). This term “single mental event” also includes the caittas. Hence, the defining activity (ākāra) of consciousness (vijñāna) precisely is discerning (vijñapti). Discerning is precisely the seeing part (darśana-bhāga) of consciousness.

Bibliography and Suggested Reading

Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar, E. H. Johnston, and Arnold Kunst, Editors and Translators. (1986) The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: “Vigrahavyavārtanī.” Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Cook, Francis H. trans. (1999) Three Texts on Consciousness Only. Berkeley: Numata Center.

Garfield, Jay L. . (1995) The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s “Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.” Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hattori, Masaaki. (1968) On Perception: Being the “Pratyakapariccheda” of Dignāga’s “Pramānṃasamuccaya.” Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kapstein, Matthew. (2000) “We Are All Gzhan stong pas: Reflections on the The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence.” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7: 105–125.

Keenan, John. (1980) “A Study of the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa: The Doctrinal Development of the Notion of Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin.

Keenan, John. (2002) The Interpretation of the Buddha Land. Berkeley: Numata Center.

Lusthaus, Dan. (2002) Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the “Ch’eng wei-shih lun.” London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Tat, Wei, trans. (1973) Ch’eng Wei-shih lun: Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness. Hong Kong: The Ch’eng Wei-shi lun Publication Committee.

Tola, Fernando, and Carmen Dragonetti. (1982) “Dignāga’s ĀLambana parīksṃāvrṃtti.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 10/2: 105–134.

Williams, Paul. (1998) The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence. Richmond, Surrey, England: Curzon Press.