While American and the North Vietnamese delegations talked of peace in Paris that summer, the air war over the North not only continued, but grew even more intense. For while Le Duan and the politburo now opted to pursue a pragmatic diplomatic solution to the war, Nixon and his advisers had yet to abandon their military tool of coercion. It would be a colossal mistake for Washington to give up its prime source of negotiating leverage, and Nixon knew it. In addition, senior military officers argued forcefully that scaling back the air campaign now would undercut their gains; Linebacker had “greater impact in its first four months of operation than Rolling Thunder had in three and half years,” according to one Air Force general.1 Moreover, any bombing halt would permit Hanoi to regroup, rebuild, and resupply its forces. Nixon, now increasingly confident of his reelection and support for his war strategy, didn’t need much convincing. The bombing would continue.
Eager not to repeat the errors of the past nor lose momentum during peace talks, both the White House and the Joint Chiefs pushed to increase the number of Linebacker attack sorties and put more bombs on target. Three carrier air wings were now ordered to concentrate on bombing the North, half of their strikes to be against targets in Route Pack VI.2 Despite his commitment to smaller, but highly effective laser-guided bombing missions, General Vogt reluctantly agreed in August to fly at least two mass missions— those involving at least 48 strike aircraft—per day against the northern heartland.3 The Pave Knife pod shortage and the high requirement for non-strike aircraft supporting laser-guide bombing missions, however, meant a return to using less effective conventional bombing methods to achieve this goal. Poor weather conditions over much of the far north of the country throughout August grounded dozens of missions and forced the Seventh Air Force to rely on the long-range all-weather navigation system or LORAN for radar bombing, which produced questionable results.4 The Navy with its all-weather-capable A-6s and advanced A-7Es would be tapped to make up much of this shortfall by flying near 5,000 sorties in August—the highest monthly total during Linebacker.5
Despite these obstacles, the air campaign pressed forward into September as the repulse of the Easter Offensive freed up of more air assets and newly arriving men and equipment made the American air order of battle stronger than ever. Key military, industrial, and transportation targets in the Hanoi–Haiphong–Nam Dinh triangle and along the northeast and northwest rail lines to China were now under near constant bombardment. Likewise, the disabled Paul Doumer Bridge was the target of a September 10 attack by the 8th TFW. An Air Force strike force effectively avoided Hanoi’s defenses and four F-4s armed with laser-guided bombs dropped two additional spans of the bridge into the Red River. All strike aircraft returned safely, but a Navy A-7 Iron Hand off the USS America was lost and the pilot killed when it was hit by an SA-2 missile.6
The USS Newport News fires her 8-inch guns against North Vietnamese coastal targets. The Newport News along with other cruisers and destroyers comprised Task Unit 77.1, which aggressively shelled enemy military installations and infrastructure from the DMZ to Haiphong harbor between April and December 1972. (Photo Department of Defense)
No part of the country it seemed was safe from the American onslaught. Daily F-4, A-6, and A-7 strikes targeted North Vietnamese air defenses, communications centers, weapons storage and repair facilities, along with industrial complexes, thermal power plants, POL storage facilities, rail and highway bridges, and railyards throughout the North’s heartland. Meanwhile, B-52 bombers pummeled truck parks, ammunition and supply depots, and troop concentrations in the southern panhandle. Dozens of day and night armed recce flights also sought out and struck vehicle convoys, coastal shipping, and other targets of opportunity from Thanh Hoa southward to Dong Hoi. The pressure on Hanoi was clearly building.
With the Air Force focusing its efforts on interdicting the supply routes out of China and attacking high-value targets with laser-guided bombs, Navy aircraft picked up the lion’s share of this intensified bombing effort. Over the course of September alone seven different air wings—comprising almost 1,500 aircraft—would be hurled against the North as part of Nixon’s effort to break the deadlock in Paris.7 While the sophisticated A-6 and A-7s and their F-4 escorts carried the burden north of the 20th parallel in the high air-threat environment, the venerable, yet reliable A-4 Skyhawks and F-8 Crusaders flying off the USS Hancock (now on its seventh deployment of the war) took to the air once again over the southern panhandle. Here they would join Air Force Phantoms of the 8th TFW to interdict lines of communications and harass the enemy from Vinh to Dong Hoi to the DMZ. All this firepower, however, came at a price—19 American aircraft would be lost in combat over the North and six more to operational accidents during the month; eleven pilots and crew would be killed and another six men taken prisoner.8
While air power was the focus of the 1972 campaign against the North, U.S. Navy surface combatants also provided a valuable contribution to the war effort by attacking and inflicting significant damage on variety of North Vietnamese targets from May to December.
A mere two weeks into the Easter Offensive nine destroyers of the newly created Task Unit 77.1 were already operating north of the DMZ, bombarding everything from bridges and road junctions to radar installations, SAM and anti-aircraft sites, and coastal defense batteries as far north as Vinh. Four destroyers along with the cruiser USS Oklahoma City also fired more than 600 rounds against shore emplacements on Haiphong’s Do Son peninsula on April 14 in support of the Operation Freedom Porch Bravo air raid on Hanoi and Haiphong. So it came as little surprise that Seventh Fleet headquarters integrated surface combatants into the Linebacker interdiction mission from the onset.
During the course of the first two days of Linebacker I, ships of Task Unit 77.1 bombarded Dong Hoi, Vinh, and twice shelled targets in the Haiphong area with 8-inch gunfire from the cruisers USS Newport News, Oklahoma City, and Providence. By mid-May, Task Unit 77.1 had already expended nearly 42,000 rounds. Ranging up and down the coast from Dong Hoi to Thanh Hoa over the coming months, the destroyers and cruisers continued to regularly strike military installations, POL storage facilities, and worked to impede the flow of men and material southward along Highway 1 by targeting the transportation network. Operations were conducted both day and night and often in coordination with airstrikes.
One of the most daring attacks took place on the night of August 27 against a dozen military installations in and around Haiphong harbor. Coastal defense gun emplacements, SAM sites, ammunition depots, and the airfield at Cat Bi were targeted by a four-ship task force that included the Newport News and Providence. The Newport News and the destroyer USS Rowan entered the harbor channel before unleashing gunfire, while the other ships bombarded the Cat Bi targets to the southwest. Shore batteries engaging the Americans were estimated to have fired some 300 rounds of heavy artillery at the attackers, but failed to score any hits. Several North Vietnamese patrol boats attempting to intercept the departing ships were either sunk or damaged by a combination of naval gunfire and air attack.
The destroyer USS Goldsborough was not so fortunate on the night of December 19 when it and the USS Hoel were attacking targets near Hon Me Island north of Haiphong. After successfully shelling a radar installation and road junction, counter-battery fire scored a direct hit on the aft section of the Goldsborough with the resulting explosion and shrapnel killing two crewmen and fatally wounding a third. Six other sailors were also wounded. Damage to the ship, however, was considered light and after repairs she return to duty off South Vietnam.
The September tally included the first combat loss of an F-111 aircraft; the planes had just recently arrived in theater for the first time since their ill-fated rushed deployment in March 1968.9 The aircraft was one of the first six F-111s deployed to Takhli air base, Thailand, with the 429th TFS and was on its first bombing mission southeast of Yen Bai on the night of September 28 when it and its two-man crew were lost under unknown circumstances.10 The aircraft may have been shot down, flown into the ground or destroyed by shrapnel from its own exploding bombs dropped at very low altitude, but whatever the cause the much-heralded plane’s return was off to a poor start.
The F-111 had the potential to be a difference-maker and was part of the push to upgrade the Seventh Air Force’s all-weather capability and increase its lagging sortie rate. Using state-of-the-art terrain-following technology the plane was designed to fly at night a mere 200 feet above ground level at nearly the speed of sound and could deliver up to 24 conventional 500-pound bombs or 16 cluster bombs accurately on target. Its ability to strike suddenly without warning and quickly depart allowed it to overcome air defenses at will. Appropriately, the North Vietnamese nicknamed the plane “whispering death.” Still, it was dangerous work. As one squadron’s bulletin board warned pilots: “Flak effectiveness is 5%—missile effectiveness is 8%—ground effectiveness is 100%—AVOID GROUND.”11 By October two squadrons totaling 48 F-111s were operating out of Takhli with the 474th TFW, striking airfields, SAM sites, communications facilities, and other well-defended military targets and accounting for half the Air Force sorties into the high-threat Route Packs V and VI.12
Late September also saw the replacing at Korat of four F-4D squadrons of the 49th TFW that had previously been rushed to Thailand with the new A-7D (the Air Force version of the Navy Corsair II). By mid-October three A-7D squadrons were flying combat mission over North and South Vietnam as part of the 354th TFW. The introduction of the A-7D not only improved the ground attack capability of the Seventh Air Force, but its ability to reach North Vietnamese targets without aerial refueling permitted the reduction of the tanker fleet by nearly 50 planes.13 Similarly, the Air Force’s modification of three dozen F-4C Phantoms into Wild Weasel aircraft in 1972 allowed General Vogt to grow the number of hunter-killer teams supporting Linebacker missions. In early October, 18 of these new F-4C Wild Weasels with the 67th TFS arrived at Korat. Although not as sophisticated or well-equipped as the existing F-105Gs, as they were unable to provide distance to a radar site or carry the AGM-78 missile for instance, their addition would ease the work burden and replace losses by nearly doubling the Wild Weasel fleet to a total of 40 aircraft; the F-4Cs would fly 460 sorties over the North from October to January 1973.14
The introduction of the A-7D in September and October 1972 added additional punch to the Air Force’s close air support and strike capability in both South Vietnam and the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. (Photo National Museum of the U.S. Air Force)
The USS Midway heads toward the Gulf of Tonkin in early 1972 with its complement of A-6, A-7, and F-4 aircraft. The Midway and Air Wing 5 would spend over 200 days on the line from April 1972 to February 1973, shooting down four MiG fighters, but also losing 15 aircraft and six pilots in combat. (Photo National Archives)
Even more critical than the arrival of new reinforcements was the mounting success of the Air Force and Navy in establishing near complete air superiority over the North and eviscerating Hanoi’s air defenses in the air and on the ground to the point that no target was safe from the unrelenting wrath of American aerial firepower.
The once dangerous MiG threat in particular had largely been neutralized as the campaign moved toward its climax. American air crews had gained the upper hand in air-to-air combat, because of vastly improved tactics, increased specialization and combat experience, and more effective air warning and control systems. In contrast, the North’s inability to replace the loss of experienced pilots and advanced aircraft, chronic maintenance problems, and the ineffectiveness of its older MiG-17 inventory put it on the losing end of the aerial battle of attrition with the Americans. During September and October, U.S. pilots downed 16 enemy fighters (12 MiG-21s and four MiG-19s) in air-to-air combat; all but one of them being brought down by Phantoms from the Air Force’s 432rd TRW and 388th TFW, while losing only two F-4s to their opponents.15 This put the North’s fighter losses at 62 since the beginning of Linebacker; about half its MiG-21s and many of its best pilots were now gone.16 Perhaps more tellingly, the bulk of VPAF fighter force—its aging MiG-17 units—now seldom challenged the Americans. Their only success came in early July when a plane from the 923rd Fighter Regiment shot down a Navy F-4J off the USS Saratoga with cannon fire during a dogfight over Kep.17 Shortly thereafter, Hanoi tacitly acknowledged that the planes were a non-factor and began shifting resources from them to support MiG-21 and MiG-19 operations.
Likewise, Hanoi’s much vaunted surface-to-air defenses began to show signs of strain as the campaign dragged on. Dozens of surface-to-air missile batteries and anti-aircraft emplacements, along with radar tracking and communication sites from the panhandle to Hanoi and Haiphong had been either destroyed or heavily damaged under the weight of nearly six months of bombing. Air Force Wild Weasel hunter-killer teams and Navy Iron Hands not only flew strike support missions, but they also independently sought out and attacked SAM sites and threatening anti-aircraft positions wherever they found them. It was, however, the naval blockade and the interdiction effort against overland supply routes from China that had the most crippling impact. With the closure of its ports, Hanoi had to rely on Soviet military resupply through China, which was increasingly problematic given growing strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship and the American focus on interdicting Chinese–North Vietnamese rail and road traffic. By October, it appeared that the North Vietnamese had expended nearly their entire inventory of SA-2 missiles and shortages of anti-aircraft ammunition, especially for larger-caliber weapons over 85-mm, were growing more acute.18
Targeting the North Vietnamese electrical grid, thermal power plants like this one at Nam Dinh southwest of Haiphong came under increasing attack as the intensity of the air campaign increased. (Photo Naval History and Heritage Command)
Old school, the USS Hancock on station during Linebacker I and flying the A-4 Skyhawk and the F-8 Crusader much as it did during the ship’s very first Vietnam deployment in November 1964. (Photo National Archives)
This became readily apparent in the steady decline of SA-2 firings as Hanoi was forced to conserve its diminishing missile inventories. Unguided barrage firings became less common and North Vietnamese defenders also appeared to be more selective in when they opted to engage attacking forces. Not surprisingly, U.S. aircraft losses to SAMs showed a consistent downward trend; half as many American planes were lost in September and October than in the first two months of Linebacker.19 Although improved ECM equipment and anti-SAM tactics likely also contributed to the reduced losses, the decreasing number of missile launches was undeniably a significant factor.
American air commanders, however, were not about to let up and had the full support of the White House to prosecute the war with unrelenting vigor. Early October saw some of the heaviest attacks on North Vietnamese airfields during the campaign in which Phuc Yen, Yen Bai, Vinh, and Quang Lang were all struck on a single day; five MiGs were caught on the ground and destroyed and another nine were reportedly damaged.20 On October 6, Admiral Noel Gayler took over from Admiral McCain as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and ordered a prioritization of air operations against the North’s transportation system and electrical power grid. To support this reenergized effort, Gayler modified the route pack structure by creating an “integrated strike zone” from Route Packs VI a and VI b that included both the northeast and northwest rail lines and the area around Hanoi so as to bring the necessary force to bear to ensure success.21
While the more advanced A-6s and A-7s carried the burden of the bombing north of the 20th parallel, the venerable A-4 Skyhawk continued to do yeoman service attacking less well-defended targets in the southern panhandle right up until the ceasefire. (Photo U.S. Navy)
Even the air war raging, there was growing optimism in Washington and Hanoi that a peace settlement was finally now within reach as both sides realized that diplomacy was “the best means for ending the war on the most favorable terms they could hope to achieve.”22 For Le Duan and the politburo, the confluence of the failure of the Easter Offensive and the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November gave it a new sense of urgency. Failure to reach some kind of settlement before Nixon’s reelection—which the North Vietnamese saw as all but certain by this time—might risk an even more extreme U.S. military response. Washington, for its part, had some leverage at the moment thanks to the vastly improved military situation in the South and the success of the Linebacker bombing campaign. But time was of the essence for the White House. The ongoing unilateral U.S troop withdrawal and the constant threat of a congressional cutoff of war funding meant this leverage could quickly evaporate. Both sides had much to lose, yet everything to gain from reaching an agreement now.
Thus properly incentive by their respective governments, Kissinger, Xuan Thuy, and Le Duc Tho worked throughout late September and early October to find creative ways to overcome, or at least paper over, their differences in the search for a peace settlement. Increasingly the concerns of both the Saigon government and the Viet Cong were being swept aside in the name of expediency. On October 8 the North Vietnamese delegation handed Kissinger and his deputy Alexander Haig a draft agreement of the minimum terms that Hanoi would accept, one “aimed at ending the American military involvement and providing for a number of principles regarding the internal problems of South Vietnam.”23 It was a turning point in the Paris talks. The North was now willing to make significant political concessions to Washington in the belief that ultimately it would triumph once the Americans were completely out of Vietnam. Importantly, there was Hanoi’s tacit acceptance of Kissinger’s two-track approach that did not make a ceasefire contingent on a political solution, but Tho did insist that the accord be signed by October 31.
The proposal, entitled “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” called for an immediate ceasefire in place without waiting for all political issues to be resolved first; a total withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam, while implicitly allowing North Vietnamese troop to remain there; the return of all American POWs within 60 days; an implied, but murky commitment by Hanoi not to infiltrate more troop into the South; and the right of the United States to continue to aid the South Vietnamese and for North Vietnam to do the same for the Viet Cong. In addition, it call for the creation of an “Administration of National Concord” that would organize elections and make decisions by consensus, but not displace the authority of the Saigon government or Provisional Revolutionary Council (the Viet Cong), each of whom would run things in areas it currently controlled.24 Most significantly, the North had abandoned its demand that President Thieu be removed and a coalition government installed in the South. It also omitted several other divisive and sensitive issues that could be addressed later, such as the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos.25 As lead negotiator Kissinger was more than pleased at the North’s change of heart and anticipated a major breakthrough.
The Paris talks now kicked into high gear. Over the course of the next four days beginning on October 8 and ending with a marathon 16-hour session on October 11, a tentative peace agreement was hammered out between Kissinger and Tho. The final product consisted of a 58-page draft that had nine chapters and 18 associated articles for all four parties—the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Council—to sign. Despite the achievement, it was somewhat anticlimactic for Kissinger. “For nearly four years we longed for this day, yet when it arrived, it was less dramatic than we had ever imagined. Peace came in the guise of the droning voice of an elderly revolutionary wrapping the end of a decade of bloodshed into legalistic ambiguity,” he later wrote.26 Still there were some concerns among the U.S. delegation that while the draft agreement met American requirements for peace with honor it would be a tough sell in Saigon. This would prove to be prophetic.
In the final stages of the negotiations Kissinger requested that Nixon restrict the bombing campaign as a sign of American good will. Nixon agreed and ordered Admiral Gayler on October 14 to cut the sortie rate to 200 in Route Packs V and VI (although the actual number being flown was less than that amount) and a further reduction to 150 was made two days later, which was just above the actual rate at the time.27 With the finishing touches on the agreement coming together, the White House ordered a complete halt to all Operation Linebacker bombing north of the 20th parallel on October 23. Significantly, air operations south of the 20th parallel would continue, albeit at a reduced level.
During the course of the five-and-a-half-month campaign American pilots flew nearly 42,000 sorties against the North, dropping 155,548 tons of bombs; B-52 bombing of the southern panhandle contributed greatly to this tonnage figure.28 Overall the Navy flew 57 percent of the sorties, including close to 7,900 at night. The lower Air Force sortie percentage reflected in part its emphasis on conducting highly directed laser-guided bombing missions rather than multiple conventional bombing sorties throughout the campaign. The Americans lost at total of 89 aircraft, split 45 to 44 between the Navy and Air Force. The majority of Air Force losses were to MiG fighters—61 percent—while the majority of Navy losses were to defensive fire—60 percent—reflecting each service’s contrasting role and operational area focus.29 Despite some teething problems, Linebacker was deemed a success. It had helped stem the flow of men and matériel southward to the battlefield. It vastly restricted overseas resupply coming into the country and heavily damaged the North’s military and economic infrastructure. Most important, it was seen as a key factor in driving Hanoi toward a peace settlement. But would it be enough to finally end the war?
The mood in Washington and Hanoi was celebratory as the momentum for finalizing a settlement seemed unstoppable, so much so that Kissinger publicly declared in Paris on October 26 that “peace is at hand.” Kissinger’s keen optimism was somewhat surprising given his visit to Saigon the previous week to discuss the terms of the proposed agreement. It did not go well.
The White House’s desire to keep the Paris negotiations out of the limelight and Kissinger’s secretive and close-to-the-vest negotiating style already had left many in Saigon feeling isolated and neglected. These insecurities were further compounded when President Thieu first learned about terms of the draft peace agreement, not from the Americans, but from documents captured by South Vietnamese intelligence in the days leading up to Kissinger’s October 19 visit.30 Thieu and his closest advisers were incensed. They saw the agreement as an utter betrayal that gave far too many concessions to Hanoi by permitting North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South, by failing to create a secure DMZ that would prevent resupply and troop movements, and in allowing the inclusion of a national council of reconciliation that smacked of a coalition government. It was seen as “tantamount to surrender” and a death sentence on the Saigon government.31
Over the course of the next several days, Kissinger, senior American diplomats, and U.S. military officers sought to assuage Thieu’s anger and overcome South Vietnamese feelings of distrust and abandonment through a carrot-and-stick approach.
The Nixon administration, which had already committed itself to replacing South Vietnamese equipment and material losses from the Easter Offensive, used the enticement of vastly accelerated military deliveries to gain Thieu’s acquiescence. Under the name of Project Enhance Plus (Project Enhance was the existing program for replacing military equipment losses on a one-to-one basis), Washington sought to boost Saigon’s military capabilities and provide it with a stockpile of equipment to defend itself after the American withdrawal. This golden handshake was to consist of nearly 300 fighter-bombers (including more than 100 advanced F-5s), the transfer of all existing A-1 aircraft in Southeast Asia to the VNAF, 227 UH-1 helicopters, 32 C-130s, 200 armored vehicles, equipment for three artillery battalions, and 2,000 trucks, as well as large quantities of spare parts, ammunition, and POL products.32 Enhanced Plus was not without its critics, with American military officers pointing out that it would years for the South Vietnamese military to absorb this much equipment. In particular, the goal of creating a 20-squadron ground attack air force might take over five years and would likely lead to a degradation in VNAF capabilities in the near term.33
Kissinger also worked to coax the South Vietnamese toward acceptance. He pledged wording changes to address their concerns and told Thieu that he had no reason to fear North Vietnamese forces remaining in the South, because Washington would “enforce the settlement” in the case of any massive violation.34 Likewise, General Abrams, as MACV commander, added his personal assurance by saying that President Nixon’s commitment to South Vietnam was firm and that the military situation in the South was now secure.35 Kissinger, however, was not beyond applying strong-arm tactics as well. On October 21 he handed Thieu a letter from Nixon saying that “were you to find the agreement to be unacceptable at this point” in light of concessions by the North, “it is my judgement that your decision would have the most serious effects upon my ability to continue to provide support for you and for the Government of South Vietnam.”36 American military aid was on the line and Saigon was embarking on a suicidal course warned Kissinger. But still Thieu resisted.
Meanwhile, frustration at the delay was boiling over in Hanoi. Le Duan and the politburo were growing increasingly annoyed with the Americans over the objections now being raised by Saigon when they believed that the agreement was complete. Moreover, Moscow and Beijing were insisting that Hanoi sign and not jeopardize this opportunity to end the war.37 Seeking to shift the pressure back to Washington and Saigon, the North Vietnamese on October 25 released a chronology of the Paris talks, the key terms of the agreement, and the now abandoned timetable for signing. Kissinger tried to put the best face on things and paint an optimistic picture, but he knew better. Amid Thieu’s intransigence and Hanoi’s rehardening of its position, the best chance for peace in four years had just slipped through the American’s hands. It was now back to the drawing board.