CHAPTER 7

The Development of the Italian City-states

From this it has resulted that they far surpass all other states of the world in riches and in power. . . . For they scarcely if ever respect the prince to whom they should display the voluntary deference of obedience or willingly perform that which they have sworn by the integrity of their laws, unless they sense his authority in the power of his great army1

WE HAVE seen that whereas a sovereign, territorial state developed in France, Germany fragmented into lordships and city-leagues, of which the Hansa was the most prominent. Although Italy, too, was affected by the economic expansion of the eleventh century onward, the new institutional arrangements that developed there differed from those of France and Germany. Italy gave rise to yet another form of political organization: the city-state. To reiterate, the ultimate cause for the demand for new systems of rule came from the increase in commerce. However, the outcome of these demands differed because of the variation in the type of political coalitions that formed in response to that overall environmental change.

Unlike the situation in France, no aspiring central actor managed to form a social alliance with the burghers in Italy. And unlike the situation with the German towns, the divergent interests and variation between the Italian towns prevented them from forming city-leagues. This chapter, therefore, centers around two main questions. Why did a royal-urban alliance not materialize in Italy? And why did the independent cities not form leagues as the members of the Hansa did? To answer these, we must again start with an analysis of the specific nature of the commercial revolution, this time in Italy (see Map 7.1).

THE IMPACT OF ITALIAN LUXURY TRADE

Throughout this book, my main argument has been that the economic expansion in the Late Middle Ages led to increased urbanization and the founding of new towns. Townsfolk used their newfound power to form political coalitions to restructure the old feudal system. Conversely, rulers sometimes saw in the towns a novel way of acquiring revenue and support. In France a royal-urban alliance developed. In Germany, by contrast, the emperor opted for a feudal strategy and towns pursued an independent course. Italy, too, was highly affected by the economic upswing of the eleventh century. Urban growth in terms of revenue and population resumed in this period. “The increase and movement of rural folk took many of them into the budding towns and older urban agglomerations. Such movement was well under way by the beginning of the eleventh century and would continue, on a massive scale, down to nearly 1300.”2

7.1 The Italian City-states in the Late Fifteenth Century (Source: Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination, New York: Vintage, 1979, p. 5.)

TABLE 7.1

Estimated Population of Italian Towns

Town Population Year
Bologna 50,000 1348
Bologna 40,000 1370
Florence 50,000 1200
Florence 74-100,000 1300
Genoa 80-100,000 1300
Genoa 100,000 1348
Genoa 100,000 1400
Genoa 117,000 15th century
Lucca 20,000 1300?
Milan >100,000 1288
Milan >50,000 1348
Milan 125,000 1400
Padua 33,000 1320
Pavia 30,000 1250
Pisa 20-30,000 1300-1350
Rome 35,000 1200
Siena 20-30,000 1300-1350
Siena >50,000 1348
Venice 80,000 1200
Venice 100-120,000 1300
Venice 90,000 1328
Venice 100,000 1348
Venice 110,000 1400
Venice 150,000 1423
Verona 30,000 1320

Sources: Schumann, Italy in the Last Fifteen Hundred Years, p. 103f (he also suggests that around 1300 Paris had about 50-60,000 inhabitants; London 35,000; Cologne 30,000; but that Venice, Milan, Genoa, Florence, Naples, and Palermo all had more than 50,000); Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, p. 125; Scammel, The World Encompassed, p. 155; Braudel, The Perspective of the World, p. 133; Ennen, The Medieval Town, p. 189 (She also notes that Naples had about 50,000 inhabitants and that the two most important Sicilian towns, Palermo and Messina, each had 44,000 and 27,000 respectively); Hohenberg and Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, p. 11; J. C. Russell, “Population in Europe, 500-1500,” pp. 34-35; Dodgshon, The European Past, p. 229; Mundy and Riesenberg, The Medieval Town, p. 30; Heer, The Medieval World, p. 78; Brucker, Renaissance Florence, p. 51.

Many towns of considerable size emerged, which were far larger and wealthier than their French or German counterparts. Italian towns dwarfed other European urban centers. Venice, Florence, Milan, and Genoa were all much larger than any of the German cities or French towns. Only Paris came close in number of inhabitants. Cologne, the largest German town, had roughly 35,000 inhabitants, and only a few other German towns had more than 20,000 citizens. Early medieval Italy, however, had at least twenty towns with 20,000 or more inhabitants (see Table 7.1).3 As a consequence, the division of labor advanced here more than anywhere else.

Each of these cities could thus field considerable armies and navies on its own. A contrast with the German city-leagues is illuminating. The Swabian-Rhenisch League of 1280, for example, could form an army of approximately 10,000 men.4 This army could compete with any of the German dukes, but to do so it had to unite eighty-nine towns. Italian towns, however, could raise such numbers by themselves. The Florentines could raise an army of 12,000 in this period.5 By 1295, Genoa had 200 galleys and 40,000 men at its disposal.6 Consequently, one of the main reasons for towns to choose either a central monarchy or league was absent in Italy. Unlike the individual German and French towns, the Italian cities could defend themselves.

The nature of Italian trade also differed. The Hanseatic towns traded in large quantities of relatively cheap commodities. Although the Italians also engaged in bulk trade, such as grain for the towns, they focused particularly on luxury goods. These were expensive commodities of relatively small quantity. This commerce created a different incentive structure for the Italian towns.

The Baltic, by the very nature and sheer volume of the goods it provided, could support a whole galaxy of entrepôts. But in the Mediterranean a traffic in small quantities of immensely valuable commodities was already in the 1300s contested between Venice and Genoa alone. . . . And so there emerged an imperial pattern soon widely emulated, in which a trade considered vital or particularly valuable was conducted as the carefully defined monopoly of a single port. 7

The German towns could benefit from some form of centralized organization which would maintain their relatively low profit margins and diminish the effects of feudal particularism. Given the German towns’ low profit margins, the transaction and information costs that they incurred were more problematic than they were for the Italians. The German towns preferred to cut costs and keep competition among their members to a minimum, while at the same time they sought to monopolize their trade vis-à-vis outsiders. The Italian towns, however, faced a predatorial market where fortunes could be made by eliminating rival towns. One of the most important factors preventing urban collusion,

I would argue, was the specific nature of the Mediterranean market. The trade of the Italian towns was small-volume, luxury trade.8 Profit margins in the northern seas ranged around 5 to 15 percent, very occasionally 25 percent,9 whereas those of the Venetians and Genoese could reach 150 percent.10 A few galleys of spices might have represented a fortune. Consequently the German towns had an incentive to collude, to negotiate higher prices, reduce risks, and maintain the slight profit margins that existed. The Venetians and Genoese, by contrast, were locked in a life-and-death struggle to control ports of access in the Black Sea and the Mideast.

The maritime technology of the Venetians and Genoese reflected this kind of trade. The labor-intensive galleys were equipped to move relatively small loads, and few ships were needed. Each ship, moreover, had considerable defensive capability of its own in contrast to the bulky, labor-extensive cogs and hulks of the northern waters. The Venetian galleys were manned with freemen, who could double as troops. They were complemented by about thirty to forty professional soldiers, usually crossbowmen, making a complement of about two hundred to two hundred fifty men per ship. Such ships sailing together with two or three others from the same town were highly invulnerable to pirates. The security of Venetian shipping was reflected in the low insurance rates of individual ships.11 This protection rent thus benefited the Italian maritime cities.

Genoese ships were different but had roughly a similar effect. The Genoese mixed the military ability of its landed aristocracy (which Venice did not have) with enforced galley slaves. Genoese trade was closely tied to the use of force. Trade, piracy, and territorial expansion were intertwined.12 Because of its defensive capacity, individually or in small contingents, Genoese ships proved unattractive targets.

Without knowing about the internal politics of the Italian towns, one can, therefore, infer that there were two a priori reasons why towns might not have preferred a central monarchy or a city-league. First, they were strong enough to defend themselves from lordly control. And second, their economic environment suggested mutual competition rather than alliance.

But this can only be a first estimate of the actual political outcome. As I have argued before, the towns’ preferred objectives need not have materialized in practice. Outcomes also depend on the agendas of other social groups and political actors. For example, in the German case, the choice for an imperial strategy forestalled a royal-burgher alliance. Furthermore, the question of why these cities did not band together during their period of decline remains. Why, for example, did not we see the formation of city-leagues in the face of foreign incursions during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? And finally, why did the city-states not transform themselves into sovereign states such as France? Although the character of the economic environment provides us the context in which these towns pursued material gains, it cannot provide us with answers to those questions. Once again, we need to retrace the actual preferences and bargains that were struck between towns and relevant political actors.

CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN THE ITALIAN KINGDOM AND THE ABSENCE OF A ROYAL-URBAN ALLIANCE

The Historical Origins of the Independent Communes

The Frankish Empire, which had replaced the Byzantines as the protector of the papacy, broke up after Charlemagne’s death in 814. Four kingdoms were established: the kingdom of Italy, the West-Frankish kingdom, the East-Frankish kingdom, and the kingdom of Burgundy. As in the West-Frankish kingdom (later France) and the East-Frankish kingdom (later Germany), the Carolingian lineage died out in Italy. Subsequently, central control in northern Italy declined.

The papacy lacked the ability to enforce centralized rule without a strong secular force to back it up. It soon become the pawn of opposing factions, which supported and deposed popes at will. One faction even went so far as to dig up and put on trial the body of a deceased pope.13

The local lords stepped into this power vacuum. The effect of Carolingian decline was thus similar to that in the West-Frankish kingdom and the East-Frankish kingdom; power shifted to local counts, bishops, and dukes.14 The bishops were particularly successful in their usurpation of royal powers. They assumed regalian rights of jurisdiction and control over weights and coinage. The bishops were well positioned to do this because of the continued urban character of Italy. Since the bishopric was an ecclesiastical office designed around an urban seat, from where the bishop controlled the surrounding diocese, he was well suited to take over many of the royal administrative tasks. Moreover, Italy continued to have a strong urban character even after Roman decline, because trade remained significant.15 The ascent of the Muslims did not alter this.16

As towns grew, secular and ecclesiastical lordship became less tolerable. By the tenth century, some burghers rebelled—particularly against ecclesiastical control—in a manner strikingly similar to the developments in France and Germany. Around the middle of the eleventh century, townsfolk started to organize themselves in a formal sense. They formed communes, sworn associations for the exercise of public authority. The first of such formal associations originated in 1081 in Milan and Parma.17 Many others soon followed. The communes specifically aimed to diminish the powers of all outside interference.18

Often these communes took over the powers the bishop had held. That is, the powers of jurisdiction, the levying of tolls, and control over weights and coinage were now seized by the urban governments.19 Genoa, for example, had these rights explicitly ceded to it by the emperor Frederick Barbarossa in 1162.20 Genoa also obtained exemption from imperial taxation and the right to make war and peace and conclude alliances. To demonstrate how the towns usurped the powers of the bishop, one need only realize that the towns used the boundaries of the diocese itself to delineate the area of urban rule over the surrounding countryside.21 These communes claimed independence and ruled as sovereign powers. 22

It is not clear to what extent the communes modeled themselves after Roman imperial government.23 Nevertheless it seems that there were parallels. The communes were first governed by consuls—clearly a reflection of the Roman office—and later by the podesta, who resembled the old office of dictator. Furthermore, Roman law was a critical source of legitimation of the communes’ sovereignty.24

In summary, Italy managed to maintain a strong urban character even after centralized rule declined. Local power-holders, particularly bishops, assumed regalian rights. Around the middle of the eleventh century, the urban centers rebelled against this lordly control. Influenced by old Roman models of government, they freed themselves from ecclesiastical and lordly control and exercised regalian rights themselves.

Urbanized Nobility and Factionalism in the Commune

The relationship of nobles to burghers differed in northern Italy from that in France and Germany.25 In both France and Germany, the economic, political, and cultural interests of the nobility were antithetical to the burghers’ interests. This was not the case in most Italian towns.

Unlike the urban communities of northwestern Europe, many Italian towns can trace their origins to Roman foundation.26 Florence, for example, expanded from its Roman core. Even towns that emerged after this period still developed earlier than in the rest of Europe. Venice did not have Roman origins and was founded in the ninth century as a port of trade with Byzantium.27 As a consequence of their historical development, the Italian towns contained a resident nobility. Many German and French cities, by contrast, did not originate from Roman foundations and were only founded in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by the merchants in response to the upswing in trade.

In Italy the landed aristocracy were involved in trade and finance: “there was no stage at which noble descent was incompatible with trading.”28 The absence of runaway serfs in the towns demonstrates the lack of controversy between urban and rural economy. The aristocrats surrendered their residences in the countryside and moved to the city.29 As Hibbert has noted, the nature of the Italian town differed from that in northwestern Europe.30

The divergent social composition of the towns in northwestern Europe from that in Italy is thus demonstrated by the physical location of the mercantile quarters. In northern Europe the free citizens did not establish residence in the area or villages controlled by a lord; instead they set up residence outside the old fortification, hence suburbs, or formed new towns altogether.31 They soon built town walls and thus physically differentiated themselves from those living under lordly control. Such demarcation did not occur in Italy. Most towns simply expanded beyond their old Roman confines and incorporated the older part of the town. Furthermore, in northern Europe aristocrats were forbidden to settle in the city, whereas in Italy they were often obligated to do so.32 Italian social development was thus quite different from that of France or Germany and had important political consequences.

The townsmen of north-western Europe, and of the eastern towns they helped to found, were hostile to the aristocracy and the feudal system, and turned naturally to the monarchy as their protector and ally. But in Southern Europe, particularly in Italy, towns were the centres of aristocratic landed properties, and the nobility were drawn into the life of the city and took to trade, particularly overseas trade, at an early date.33

Why was the gap between the Italian nobility and the burghers less pronounced than in France and Germany? There are several reasons. First, nobleburgher coalitions formed the communes from the very beginning. The lesser aristocracy in particular allied with the commoners against ecclesiastical rule.34 These lesser nobles, below the level of counts, sought to gain from the bishop’s loss of power.

Second, Italy arguably was less feudalized than France or Germany.35 As we saw, feudalism was to a considerable extent a Germanic practice, going back to the allegiance of chieftain and retinue.36 Despite the Lombard and Frankish presence, feudalism proper never quite took root to the same extent as it did in northwestern Europe. The Roman influence predominated. (For the same reason, feudalism was less strong in southern France.) Consequently, military and mercantile pursuits were never completely distinct enterprises. Although the man at arms might have denigrated the commoner, he was astute enough not to forego profit when the opportunity arose.37

Third, the nature of Mediterranean trade offers a further explanation of why nobles made this urban transition. The luxury goods traded in the Mediterranean were obtained through long-distance commerce. Thus, luxury trade in products unobtainable in Italy would not encroach upon the agricultural production of landed nobility. The import of spices, for example, would not hurt domestic grain production. Moreover, much of this trade depended on the successful marriage of military power—the domain of the landed knight—and maritime capability.38 That is, both interests were mutually reinforced. Genoa’s trade, in particular, melded force and economic interests.39 Venice, too, was not averse to military involvement. It managed to divert the Crusaders to Constantinople and overthrow the Byzantine Empire in 1204. Its expansion throughout the eastern Mediterranean offers further proof.

This urbanized nobility provided Italian towns with some unique traits. For example, one consequence of the noble presence was internal factionalism. Although there are few generalizable categories that hold true for all Italian cities, such cleavages played a very real part in the lives of most Italian town-dwellers.40 Nobles were conspicuous by their military lifestyle. They were thus sometimes denoted as milites (the Latin description of a mounted knight) to distinguish them from the pedites (those on foot, hence commoners). Sometimes they were simply described as magnates (“the great”) to distinguish them from the popolani (populus meaning “the people”).41 Hence, one cleavage was that between noble and commoner, however wealthy the latter might have been. As with the aristocracy in Germany and France, these nobles placed high value on their bloodline to distinguish themselves from commoners.42 This was one source of perennial tension in the Italian cities. In the two years following 1293, the Florentines exiled just under half of their nobility.43

Nobles also feuded among themselves. Families might clash because of economic competition or perceived offense to a family member. Another split divided urban nobility and landed nobility, although it was virtually impossible to distinguish where one group began and the other ended.44 Rather than compress into nuclear families, the common result of urbanization, noble families actually extended in the city.45 Families that were not blood related might even assume a similar last name to fortify their allegiance. Such extended families used their sons as business agents, at home and abroad.46 These family clans formed armed companies, the consorterie, to defend themselves from rival families.47 They often lived in adjoining houses, with their own parish church and the ubiquitous tower into which they could withdraw in times of danger and pelt the streets below.48 Blood feuds between different clans were not uncommon.

Other divisions proliferated, particularly during the twelfth century. The cause was increasing division of labor in the growing cities. Although the difference between the nobles (magnates) and the upper class of the commoners (popolani grasso) was sometimes minute, economic differences between burghers could be quite large.49 The popolani grasso (traders and established middle class) were distinguishable from the popolani minuto (guildsmen), who in turn were differentiated from the capette (urban proletariat). Many of these factions not only regulated economic activity but also formed cohesive social units with their own guard. The guild, for example, regulated marriage ages and entry into the profession and formed a military company.50 Economic differences thus crystalized in social and cultural differences. All of these groups provided themselves with the military means of defense.

These social cleavages might overlay or crosscut geographic divisions within the city. Cities were often divided into quarters, or contrade (neighborhoods).51 Bologna thus had four quarters which were subdivided in seventy-two contrade. The latter were often centered around a chapel. These, too, might be cohesive units with their own armed force.52 The differences between the various contrade and quarters were often reinforced by rituals that enhanced the competitive character of the geographical areas.53

In short, Italian towns were quite different from those in northwestern Europe. They had two particularly unusual characteristics. First, landed nobility had become urbanized and engaged in mercantile pursuits. Second, Italian towns were rife with factions. The political organization of these factions paralleled that of the city government. Such factions, too, appointed consuls and had their armed forces. The towns of the Hansa, by contrast, were dominated by a mercantile patriciate which ruled through town councils. These towns were politically and juridically relatively homogeneous, partially because they accepted the law codes of their mother towns. The dispersion of families throughout the Hansa towns also aided social homogeneity across the various member cities.

The Influence of Foreign Actors on the Divisions between and within the Cities

Historically, foreign powers had played an important role in Italy even before the emergence of the independent communes. Their continued interference throughout the later Middle Ages and Renaissance exacerbated the internal rifts within the communes. These powers also divided the communes among themselves, thus preventing any unified opposition. Conversely, the competing interests of the cities sometimes welcomed and enabled foreign encroachment. Some cities allied with foreign powers in order to overcome their external competitors.

As we have seen, the German king tried to establish a strong authority in northern Italy and the papal states. Consequently, the Ottonian Dynasty controlled papal elections with a heavy hand at least until the Investiture Conflict. At virtually the same time, however, a new power, the Normans, established themselves in the south. When the Byzantines were gradually evicted from Sicily by the Muslims of the Aglabid Dynasty (902), they turned to mercenaries. They recruited the Normans, Viking descendants who had settled in France.54 As elsewhere, the Norman warriors proved to be highly successful. Their military prowess, however, was matched by their unreliability. In 1043 the Normans turned against the Byzantines and evicted them from Italy. The Normans then went on to take Sicily from the Muslims.

The pope saw in these Normans possible new secular allies against the German king. Consequently, in the direct aftermath of the Investiture Conflict, Pope Gregory sought support from the Normans against the Germans who were marching on Rome. The Normans provided the pope with the help requested, and German conquest was forestalled. However, once again the Normans proved to be less than reliable allies, and they sacked Rome themselves.55 They then retreated to their southern holdings and concentrated on the formation of a strong feudal state. They divided property holdings into allods of the church (free holdings), feudal fiefs (held by vassals), and a royal domain. As a consequence, the towns became subjected to feudal domination and their independence was prevented.56 This is part of the reason why only the northern towns would become independent and develop into prosperous city-states.

Under the Hohenstaufen (1138-1254), the German emperors renewed their interest in Italy. Frederick I succeeded in marrying into the Norman dynasty (1177). And in 1198, his grandson, Frederick II, was crowned king of Sicily. From then on the Norman kingdom of Sicily was in German hands, and the Germans continued the Norman feudal strategy.57

Needless to say, with the German Hohenstaufen seeking to enforce imperial privileges in the north and factually holding on to the south, the papacy felt extremely threatened. The revenues of Sicily, a major grain producer at the time, added moreover to the imperial cause.58 Consequently, the pope sought alliances with the communes in the north and sought to weaken the imperial position in the south. Some communes sided with the papacy and thus became part of the anti-imperial party, the Guelphs, whereas others, the Ghibellines, sought to gain imperial favors.59 The formation of these two parties dates from roughly 1240, when Frederick II was a major actor in Italy.60

The pope now turned to Charles of Anjou, the brother of the French king, to challenge the German hold on Sicily after the death of Frederick II in 1250. In 1254 the direct heir to the Hohenstaufen line died, so the pope, as nominal suzerain,61 offered the lands to the French House of Anjou.62 The pope further offered Charles the revenue of a tithe in France to cover expenses. The Angevins indeed took Sicily, and Charles had all German contenders, of all ages, killed or imprisoned for life. The Sicilian population, however, did not take well to French domination. On Easter of 1282 a rebellion broke out, and within a day about two thousand Frenchmen had been killed. This rebellion was supported by the Aragonese who had married into the Hohenstaufen lineage and thus laid claim to the Hohenstaufen heritage.

The result was that the French withdrew to the mainland and established the kingdom of Naples.63 The Spanish, the Aragonese, now held the kingdom of Sicily. The German emperors still had nominal claims on the north, although de facto the communes ruled as sovereign.64 The middle of Italy was still held by the papal state which would ally with any foreign actor and/or the communes to oppose German imperial pretensions.

A multitude of foreign intrusions thus occurred. These had important consequences for the communes and their subsequent development to that of city-states. External forces divided the communes. The already vacillating urban strategies to ally with either pope or emperor were further accentuated with the French entry into the south. Guelph therefore became a term representing support for the pope as well as the French against the emperor.65

Foreign involvement also heightened the factionalism within the towns. Each faction was willing to sacrifice communal peace and independence for its own gain.66 As a rule, one can argue that nobles favored the imperial strategy, perhaps hoping for feudal favors, whereas the merchants favored the Guelph party.67 But because of the interchange of burghers and nobility, the generalization is very rough.

In short, external pressure led to conflicts between towns and increased factionalism within the towns. Towns had to contend with the internecine struggles between the various noble clans, between nobles and commoners, and between the different classes of commoners. Any one of such groups had different preferences as to which external power might be the ideal ruler.

The Conflicting Interests of King and Towns

These external pressures illuminate why the German king could not profit from the urban revival as did the French king. By shifting their allegiances between the foreign powers that tried to dominate Italy, the towns were able to improve their negotiating position or gain independence outright.68

But there were other reasons as well. First, the communes united both noble and mercantile interests. The communes had early on freed themselves from ecclesiastical lordship. The main factor that drove French towns to seek royal support, freedom from lordly control, was thus absent in Italy.

Furthermore, as I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Italian towns were far stronger than their French or German counterparts. Venice, Florence, Milan, and Genoa were all two to three times the size of Cologne, the largest German city. All the other German cities were far smaller. Likewise, the French towns were of limited size—the exception being Paris which was slightly smaller than Genoa at the time. Since each of the Italian towns had considerable strength of their own, they did not need allies for military protection.

Third, as an outsider, the German imperial position was always suspect. In France the towns could hope that the king would protect their interests because they in turn provided him with his source of revenue. But the Italian towns had little reason to expect that behavior from the German emperor. The kingdom of Italy might simply serve as a revenue basis for the emperor’s imperial pretensions in Germany or elsewhere. Additionally, Frederick I tried to reimpose feudal obligations. Feudalism, however, was a mode of organization based on “a web of personal relations.” Hence such obligations were not useful for abstract corporate entities.69 In a system of personal bonds, possession over time might suffice to uphold title; but in an urban system based on market exchange, more clearly defined property rights are necessary.70

Moreover, during the period of weak German kingship, in the decades preceding the Hohenstaufen, the towns had managed to gain power and free themselves from these feudal obligations. When Frederick I sought to reimpose them, it was too late.71 The towns were unwilling to relinquish their acquired liberties.

Finally, as in Germany, the Italian towns could unite when absolutely necessary. Despite the rivalry between the communes, and the internal factionalism, the towns occasionally realized that their convergence of interests dictated united action against the emperor in times of crisis. They formed the Lombard League in 1160 and renewed it several times in the face of imperial pressure by Frederick I (1152-1190) and Frederick II (1211-1250). It formed a mutual defensive alliance and set troop contingents to be borne by the independent towns.72 This league dealt Frederick I a crushing defeat at Legnano in 1176. And although Frederick II had more success in the field, he, too, could not gain an outright victory.

We should also not forget the role of the pope in bringing such towns together. Given the disparity of interests between the cities and their different domestic coalitions, they could face serious collective action problems, which now were partially overcome by the willingness of the pope to help organize such leagues. Indeed, Hay and Law blame the lack of centralization in Italy basically on the pope’s strategy of opposing any secular lord who sought to establish such authority.73

As a response, the German emperors turned toward their holdings in southern Italy. They kept these in feudal form.74 This was partially due to the fact that urbanization was less advanced in southern Italy and partially due to the agricultural nature of Sicily.

In short, German imperial policy failed in the north and reinforced urban independence, whereas in the south it successfully reinforced a feudal monarchy, with little urban independence.75 An alliance between king and northern towns was precluded because the king had little to offer the towns. The towns themselves had eliminated lordly repression; they had long since exercised regalian rights such as jurisdiction, coinage, and taxation; they did not need any external military ally to defend them; and they objected to reintroduction of feudal obligations by the emperor. Moreover, the diversity of urban political regimes made any coalition difficult. Finally, the continued influence of outside powers—the Germans, French, Spanish—meant that towns could switch sides when necessity dictated.

CITY-STATE RATHER THAN CITY-LEAGUE

Many of the factors that made a royal-burgher alliance impossible also worked against the creation of city-leagues. The factionalistic interests that divided the towns internally, and the variation in regimes across the towns, negated any attempts at a more permanent form of cooperation. But perhaps most important was the predatorial market environment which led towns to compete rather than unite.

Concentration of Power: The Ascent of the Signoria

Between the late twelfth century and the early fifteenth century, internal factionalism and external involvement led to changes in the type of government of the Italian communes. The consular government of the early communes disappeared. It was replaced by more autocratic forms of rule.

The communes, from their very origins in the eleventh century, all had to contend with debilitating internal strife. Nobility of birth demarcated aristocrat from commoner. Money demarcated wealthy from poor. Across these divisions there were rivalries between noble clans and geographic divisions of the contrade. The original communal government, the rule by two consuls, proved inadequate to control this cauldron of competing interests. These consuls were often aristocrats (milites) and hence not necessarily neutral. Since none of these factions trusted the other with strong powers of authority, they not only kept the consularship weak but each also formed armed companies of its own.

Starting in about 1170, the communes turned to an alternative form of government—the rule by the podesta. The podesta was an outsider brought in to fulfill executive powers, particularly police functions.76 He was basically an entrepreneurial captain with military skills. He was thus often an aristocrat and was accompanied by a small armed retinue. The podesta was a temporary position, normally lasting between six and twelve months, after which the podesta was responsible to the communal council for the actions undertaken during his command.77 The position in this regard resembled the Roman dictatorship, which gave absolute power for six months, with accountability afterward. The podesta was thus meant to be a neutral arbiter to control the many armed factions in the city.

Podestal government, however, was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the captain had the task of maintaining the peace. Hence he had to control the exercise of violence by the armed noble consorterie, and the guilds which likewise possessed armed companies. On the other hand, he also had a personal incentive to increase his position within the city. The neutralization of other powers left him with a possible monopoly of violence. Hence, the podesta often ended up dominating the very groups that had brought him in.

From roughly 1270 onward, the temporary podesta transformed into the permanent signoria. The signoria, the rule by an aristocratic leader, had several sources of support from which to choose.78 A captain might form an alliance with the leading powers in a city. Fellow aristocrats or moneyed men from the upper class might enlist his support against their internal rivals. Other captains enhanced their standing by gaining external support. Foreign powers could prove to be useful allies for aspiring despots.79 Furthermore, as the conflicts between cities increased, the military capabilities of these professional soldiers became more important. The commercial and military struggles between Genoa, Pisa, and Venice rose to a serious pitch during the thirteenth century. Also, as cities started to expand beyond their contado, the area surrounding the city, they automatically encroached upon the territories controlled by other cities. The rivalry between Florence and Lucca was of this nature.

The career of Castruccio Castracani in Lucca provides an illustrative example of how this office might evolve.80 Lucca had been involved in a period of warfare and hence required the services of a skilled military professional. Furthermore, aristocrats had previously backed a Pisan takeover, since they favored Pisan aristocratic rule rather than independence under the popolo. The city was thus in intense turmoil and called in a strongman from outside in the hope that an outsider would have less affinity with particular factions. Castracani, however, expanded his position by making alliances with specific groups and by controlling internal violence. He also obtained imperial support against Florence, which was Guelph. The emperor therefore granted him the ducal title. With internal and imperial support, Castracani managed to expand the territory controlled by Lucca. This generated trade benefits and a larger revenue basis which he used to strengthen his position with the mercantile groups.

Basically, seigneurial rule in the form of an autocratic ruler meant the triumph of the nobility.81 However, this did not necessarily mean a loss to mercantile interests. The popolani grasso, the moneyed class, would sometimes support such strongmen in order to control the lower commoners and the guildsmen.

But not every city moved toward absolute rule by a single aristocrat. Signoria could also mean the rule by a few. Some cities, about seven, such as Venice and Florence (the latter with some interruptions), maintained a republican oligarchy. Venice managed to maintain republicanism by concentrating government in the hands of a fixed number of influential families. The last modification of the Venetian nobility occurred in 1382 and included between 2,000 and 2,500 citizens, with only minor changes in the next centuries.82 This might have been due to Venice’s greater homogeneity. More than in other towns, mercantile pursuits dominated every other economic interest. In Florence other factors were at work. Here, too, social forces moved away from popular government. In 1328, Florence established a rule by the thirty. In the 1420s, the core of the regime was made up of sixty to seventy families. The new constitution of 1494 included 3,000 out of 90,000 citizens in the political class.83 Nevertheless, it did not evolve into a dictatorship, and oligarchical government was kept in check.84 Oligarchical government was sporadically alternated with popular and dictatorial regimes. The nouveaux riches, the continuing influx of new wealthy, also worked as a stabilizing factor. Any group excluded from power could find in these up-and-coming individuals, who were themselves yet without political power, valuable allies to alter the existing power structure. The result was continual compromise.85

But one should not confuse these developments as democratic forms of government. Even the republics did not enfranchise more than 2 to 3 percent of the population.86 Authority thus always rested on the specific elite coalitions in each town.

The Divergent Interests of the Towns

The development of the cities toward oligarchical republics or despotism proved, therefore, another barrier to league formation. These differences in types of government reflected whether trade or landed interests had gained the upper hand. The preconditions for republicanism, such as a sound commercial base, a vibrant bourgeoisie, and a defeated nobility, were increasingly difficult to meet for many Italian cities.87 Consequently, there was little conformity of interests across towns. The turn to more despotic regimes reflected a move toward a greater reliance on landed interests as compared to the mercantile interests of the republics, such as Lucca, Siena, Florence, Genoa, and Venice.

Among the towns of the Hansa, by contrast, there was a stronger political and social homogeneity. In all towns a mercantile patriciate dominated. Indeed, as we saw earlier, one of the functions of the city-leagues was to maintain such elites in power. Towns that overthrew their town councils could be excluded or, worse, provoked military and economic retaliation by the other members. Landed aristocracy was not integrated into the towns. Furthermore, social mobility between the towns was high. The genealogy of many commercial families can often be traced across several Hansa towns. In Italy, however, social mobility was low. Migration was discouraged by tough citizenship requirements. New arrivals only obtained citizenship rights after many years of residence, and they had to meet certain requirements, such as owning property in the city.88Each city was also adamant in asserting its own particular social and cultural heritage as opposed to that of other towns. Migration to another town was not taken lightly but required a conversion to the particular rules of order and local customs, the regimento.89

Furthermore, political reasons that might necessitate a united front by the towns were absent in Italy. German towns had formed leagues with the explicit intent to curtail encroachment by secular and ecclesiastical lords. In Italy the nobles had since long acquired mercantile interests—partially because of the Italians’ mixture of trade and warfare—and thus the urban-rural rift was less pronounced. The bishops had early on been subjected to the control of the communes and thus constituted no threat.

With the exception of the Hohenstaufen, there was no outside force, prior to 1500, that could effectively challenge the independent cities. And when there was a serious challenge to the autonomy of the cities, they formed temporary unions. The repeated formation of the Lombard League against the Hohenstaufen, particularly Frederick I and Frederick II, proved that an external military threat could provide sufficient impetus to form a temporary alliance. A permanent league, however, would need more than a military threat to be viable in the long run.

Nor was the pope a threat to urban independence. Despite the fact that the communes gained their independence at the expense of the bishops, there was little conflict between the papacy and the communes. Both were allies in their opposition to German imperial rule. Moreover, the financial organization of the communes proved to be valuable for papal financial interests as well. Although knightly orders were useful for collecting and transporting revenue, as the Templars did for the French king, the papal administration soon realized that their financial needs were best served by merchant bankers. Members of the clergy would thus take out loans from these merchant bankers, even though the clergy would occasionally balk at tacit interest charges.90

As I already mentioned, a contributing factor to the lack of any urban alliance was also the sheer size of the Italian towns. The towns could individually muster considerable military and economic strength. At the end of the fifteenth century, when Venice had started to acquire considerable territorial holdings beyond its original city confines, Venice and the terra ferma had a population of almost 1.5 million.91 This was comparable to Burgundy’s population and the Dutch Republic’s population in the sixteenth century.

Economically, the revenues of the cities matched or even outstripped those of far larger states. The Della Scala signoria, which controlled Parma, Lucca, and Modena, is estimated to have had a yearly revenue of 700,000 florins in the early fourteenth century. English revenue was about the equivalent of 350,000 florins. Florence in 1336 and 1338 had a yearly revenue of 500,000 florins and Siena, in 1315, a revenue of 250,000 florins.92 These revenues came from direct taxes (particularly from the forced loans, the prestanze) and indirect taxes. In 1423 the Venetian budget was about 750,000 ducats, whereas that of France was 1 million ducats. The English and Spanish budgets were about 750,000 ducats.93 If one considers the revenue of the Venetian Empire, that is, Venice and its territorial holdings in Italy and the Adriatic, the total rises to 1,615,000 ducats. And one must keep in mind that this was raised by a population of 1.5 million, whereas the population of France was ten times that number. The revenue of the Genoese commercial colony of Pera was almost equal to that of Genoa itself and was ten times that of Lübeck.94 In short, the cities were large enough to go it alone. They needed neither king nor alliance to defend themselves.

Moreover, as I discussed at the outset of this chapter, the nature of Italian long-distance trade did not favor collusion as it did with the Hansa. Instead it favored competition wherein fortunes were made by relatively few ships of individual towns. Maritime technology enhanced the ability of individual towns to work alone rather than form large convoys.

Consequently, the history of Italian trading towns is filled with conflict. In 1204 Venice managed to divert the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople and take the city. It claimed Crete and three-eighths of the city and Byzantine Empire and obtained a monopoly on the Black Sea trade by excluding Pisa and Genoa. It thus gained access to the ports that formed the endpoints of the caravan routes that crossed Central Asia. Half a century later, the Genoese supported the Byzantine emperor in retaking the city, after which it was Genoa’s turn to obtain a monopoly on the Black Sea trade. In 1284 Genoa defeated the Pisans in a brutal war.95 In the War of Chioggia (1378-1381), Genoa almost succeeded in taking Venice itself. Venice ultimately won and embarked on a policy of conquest, taking Treviso (1389), Vicenza (1404), Verona and Padua (1405), Bergamo (1428), and additional towns. Others were not to be outdone. Florence, for example, captured Prato (1350) and Volterra (1361) and managed to obtain a port by conquering Pisa (1406). The policies of Florence and Venice were nothing new; “the two republics extended their dominions to pre-empt rivals, to protect earlier gains and to defend their trade routes.”96

To sum up, each Italian city had material reasons to see itself as a sovereign entity. At the end of the fourteenth century, the Florentine Republic introduced new concepts to denote the entire city and its centralized authority. Florence also introduced the crime of lesae-maiestatis, offenses against the government and unofficial head of state, the Medici.97 The city-states thus claimed similar status with any sovereign state. Cities legitimated their power as independent authorities and were unwilling to cede their independence to some form of federation with other cities. Consequently, other cities were perceived as rival entities, which if possible, were to be subjugated.

CITY-STATE AND SOVEREIGN, TERRITORIAL STATE COMPARED

Rather than form city-leagues, the individual Italian towns sought expansion by annexation of rivals. Between 1200 and 1450, the Italian landscape changed from roughly two hundred to three hundred independent communes to a handful of territorial city-states. In the north, Venice, the Papal State, Milan, and Florence gradually came to dominate the others.98

Reasons Behind the Territorial Expansion of the City-state

One reason for the expansion of the city-state was the town elites’ renewed interest in territorial holdings. In cities where the podesta had changed to signoria, and then finally to princely authority, the landed interests of the aristocracy serves as a partial explanation. The princely territories, such as Milan and Ferrara, consisted of many small feudal estates with considerable powers of their own.99 Their revenues were based on indirect taxes rather than on the direct tax of property; they did not distinguish public and private revenue; and the princes themselves were not subject to the rule of law. In other words, these princes had essentially set themselves up as despots serving the landed interests of the privileged.

But even in more mercantile cities such as Venice, with only a small number of landed aristocrats, there was a turn toward a territorial policy. An explanation of Venice, as a least likely case to expect territorial holdings, thus illuminates why towns turned to expansionism.

Starting in the fifteenth century, Venice increasingly encountered impediments to its trade. The renewed Turkish expansion under the Ottomans drastically curtailed the Venetian position in the eastern Mediterranean. The Black Sea, certainly from 1453 on, became inaccessible because of the fall of Constantinople. Furthermore, Portuguese and Spanish competition increased at the end of the fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century. The Iberians utilized different maritime technology. The opening of Atlantic commerce favored larger ships which were driven solely by sail. The start-up costs for such new technology proved too high for the Venetians.100 This presented yet another reason to invest in landed property closer to home rather than in increasingly risky trading ventures. The economic hazards and already accumulated wealth led to the development of rentiers rather than mercantile entrepreneurs.101

Another reason for the decline in the number of independent cities lay in the economic and political rivalry we have discussed. Within the framework of those rivalries, Genoa fought and defeated Pisa. Florence tried to get territories from Siena and in turn subjugated Pisa to get a harbor.102 Venice annexed Vicenza. Milan gained suzerainty over Genoa. Even the Papal State followed similar methods of expansion. The continual cycle of urban warfare thus eliminated those who were unable to meet the challenges of their larger predators. There was thus “incessant warfare between the Italian cities.”103

In the process, the cities might ally with a strong external force. In 1312, Pisa, threatened by Florence, supported the empire, whereas Florence was Guelph. Later, when Siena and Lucca felt Florentine pressure, they, too, favored imperial intervention.104 The duke of Milan gained the support of the Habsburgs to get control over Genoa.105 The aristocrats within Genoa thereupon sought support from France, which by the end of the fifteenth century wished to curtail Habsburg encirclement. Foreign powers thus played no small role in reducing the numbers of competing Italian cities.

In short, the ascent of the signoria, tougher market conditions, competition between towns, and foreign intervention all played a role in diminishing the number of independent city-states. In many ways, the remaining city-states started to resemble sovereign, territorial states.

The Fragmented Sovereignty of the Italian City-states106

Although the city-states expanded, they never made the complete transition to sovereign, territorial statehood. Although the difference between city-states and sovereign states is difficult to portray,107 city-states were not simply small sovereign states.108 First, internal hierarchy in the city-states was more diffuse than in sovereign, territorial states. The towns that were annexed by more powerful cities maintained much of their previous independence. They continued to exercise their own sphere of jurisdiction.

In this sense, the general political orientation of the new states, whether principalities or republics, did not break with the old ways. Especially in matters of local government, old communal institutions, such as statutes, councils and offices, were maintained besides those of the central power. Legally or practically, large responsibilities were left to cities.109

Moreover, the large number of towns, which traditionally had been independent, made centralization difficult.110 A similar point can be made about the incorporation of rural areas. The dominant city was slow in granting these subjects citizenship.

Furthermore, none of these city-states developed formal kingship. Despots called themselves dukes or princes, but not kings, although they basically exercised regalian rights.111 The government of the city-state was always tied to some faction. The French king, by contrast, could claim to be a mediator of these social tensions. The interests of the king coincided with those of the realm. Aggrandizement of the realm by increasing revenue through trade (mercantilism) or territorial expansion benefited the king as well as his subjects. The Italian aristocrats were not mediators. The city-state never resolved factionalism.

One cannot help wondering how such far-ranging supremacy can possibly have been established and maintained on such a narrow foundation—particularly since power inside a city-state was always being challenged from within. . . . And all this for the benefit of the handful of families . . . who held . . . the reigns of power. These families moreover fought bitter feuds among themselves.112

In summary, the political organization of city-states remained one of a dominant city and subject towns. The previously independent communes retained a large amount of independence and were not fully integrated into the city-state. Hierarchy within the city-state was always contested. Sovereignty remained incomplete.

City-states, however, did develop the other characteristic similar to sovereign states. They did define authority by territorial boundaries. Unlike the Hansa, which lacked such territorial specificity, the Italian cities could agree on specific borders delimiting their claim to control.

CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on three matters. First, it examined why no sovereign state emerged in Italy. That is, it focused particularly on why no centralized kingship managed to reassert itself. Second, it analyzed why the cities formed independent city-states rather than city-leagues. And third, it briefly compared the city-state to sovereign statehood.

The strong impact and particular nature of long-distance trade are the primary reasons why no central authority emerged, be it a king or confederacy. The large urban population, made possible by this commerce, and their considerable economic and military resources diminished the necessity for a royal protector or town alliance. Moreover, the specific nature of this trade made towns prefer competition rather than central control. The Hansa’s low-value, high-volume trade yielded low profit margins. Collusion was one way to obtain a higher price for Hansa commodities. The great profits of Mediterranean trade, by contrast, were primarily from low-volume, high-value commerce. Individual towns sought, and Genoa and Venice often obtained, monopolies of particular trade routes.

A royal-urban alliance was furthermore unnecessary because the landed aristocracy resided in the towns and pursued mercantile interests. Italian towns were not under external lordly pressure, as were French and German towns. Foreign powers also played an important role in Italian politics. On the one hand, these powers consciously sought to divide the communes. But on the other hand, communes could also form alliances with these actors to maintain their independence.

Similar reasons prevented the towns from forming city-leagues, as the German, Dutch, and Baltic towns did in the Hansa. The factionalism in the Italian towns gave rise to a wide variety of institutionalized preferences. In some towns, landed aristocrats dominated; in others, the upper middle class; and in yet others, the artisan guilds. The variety of social conditions and different forms of government thus reflected a disparity of interests, quite unlike that of the city-leagues. The communes also perceived themselves to be culturally distinct from each other. Each commune had its regimento, rules of order, which regulated citizenship and social and political activity. Each commune also developed the concept of sovereignty and thus saw no legitimate reason why any authority, be it pope, emperor, or town confederacy, should stand above the government of the city.

In many ways the city-state resembled the sovereign, territorial state. Like the French monarchy, the city-state developed notions of sovereignty and the public realm. Roman law figured prominently. And like the sovereign state, the city-state had territorial parameters. Nevertheless, there were differences between the two. The city-state did not integrate its surrounding countryside and the subjected towns. This shows, for example, in the lack of citizenship privileges for the inhabitants in these subjected areas. Not all members within its territorial parameters were thus full members of the city-state.113 This lack of integration of different interests likewise shows in the inherent factionalism of many Italian towns. In France, the king could claim to be a mediator of interests, since he stood to benefit from the overall welfare of the kingdom. The Italian city-state lacked such a political actor. The government was simply perceived as the extension of a specific factional interest. As we will see, this proved to be an institutional weakness in the long run.