The AIF was now spread across the Somme and was blocking the German advance to the strategic railhead at Amiens in order to create a crucial defensive line. Meanwhile, the British army fell back and told the Australians that the Germans were coming in swarms, and were impossible to stop. The Australians relished the possibility of a good fight, with the Germans running at their guns and not the other way around, as had long been the case. The encounter with the Germans had yet more attraction for the diggers. An officer of the 56th Battalion noted, ‘I overhead one of my platoon remark to his pal, “Struth Bill, we’ll get some souvenirs now.”’1 The officer continues, ‘They knew that probably within a few days they would be thrown into battle … against a mighty army flushed with success. Their manner would almost have led one to believe that they were about to participate in a sports meeting.’2
While Dernancourt was being held, thanks to the Australians along the line of the Albert–Amiens railway, battalions of the 9th Brigade were moving south of Villers-Bretonneux near Lancer and Hangard woods to plug a gap in the front line and join up with the French army.
At 10.30 am on 30 March, the 33rd Battalion marched towards the retreating British line as the rain came down. With them went the battalion cookers, and the men were served a hot meal, ‘thus keeping the men warm and in good spirits’.3 On the way, they were joined by four squadrons of the British 12th Lancers. The 33rd’s Commanding Officer, Colonel Leslie Morshead, noted it was ‘a proud privilege to be allowed to work with such a fine regiment [and be] judge of the splendid work they were doing for the Army at the present time … they cannot be too highly praised.’4
The proud British cavalry lifted the Australians’ spirits while, about them, British stragglers and wounded passed in the other direction. Colonel Morshead noted in his report, ‘During the whole time we were forward, men were constantly leaving the [British] line. There seemed to be no effort to check this straggling.’5
Gradually the cavalry moved ahead of the 33rd Battalion men and were soon heard to be engaging the enemy. They had quickly dismounted and advanced, taking the retreating, reluctant British soldiers with them. The cavalry attacked the enemy line, advancing against heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, and drove back the advancing Germans to re-establish the line. Morshead wrote, ‘The lancers deployed at once and moved forward without flinching. All ranks displayed the greatest determination and eagerness to get to the Bosch with the bayonet.’6
Charles Bean relates the story of a young British cavalry officer keen to have a go at the Germans, who asked Colonel Morshead’s permission:
‘Oh, let’s have a go at them Sir,’ he pleaded. ‘We’d dish them straight away.’
‘Not I,’ replied Morshead. ‘What would your Colonel say!’
‘Don’t ask him,’ urged the youngster, ‘He’s under your command, and if you order him he’ll have to do it.’7
The 33rd Battalion continued onwards, pushing through Hangard Wood. Heavy German artillery fire on Lancer Wood, however, devastated sections of the wood and slowed their advance. Along with the 34th Battalion, the 33rd rested and waited for the order to continue forward, which came at 5 pm. Three companies began the advance towards Lancer Wood, a name given to the area by the 33rd and adopted by the British army. There the 12th Lancers had held their forward position, their machine guns covering the flanks.
The Australians emerged from the cover of the wood and into the open, keen to get at the Germans now lining the ridge and firing into their ranks. Immediately the Australians took casualties, particularly on the right where the attack was stopped.
Colonel Morshead, meanwhile, needed to consolidate his position and consequently attacked the German ridgeline at 8 pm, driving the enemy back and establishing a new line in the old German trenches. That night, the 33rd were relieved and, wet and cold, returned to Cachy, where the men were billeted in the aerodrome, full of stories of the spirited attack by the cavalry and proud of their brief action with them. However, their casualties were considerable, with five officers and twenty-eight other ranks killed, five officers and 157 other ranks wounded and eleven men missing.8
At 10 pm on 30 March, orders arrived for the 35th Battalion, who had moved up from Corbie on the Somme to Cachy, to be ready to move into the line. At 2 am they advanced. Leaving a reserve company in nearby Villers-Bretonneux, they took up a line east of the village, closer to Warfusée on the Péronne road and stretching south to Marcelcave.
The war diary of the 35th Battalion tells a story typical of the front line at this time. The first day of April dawned bright and clear, but with it came the serious wounding of Captain Eade, shot by a sniper. That night, a German patrol lost its way and was captured; two Germans from a Prussian regiment were killed, and another was captured and interrogated. The following day was very quiet but, again, a German wandered into the battalion’s line and was captured. On 3 April, the enemy shelled Villers-Bretonneux and the line intermittently; one shell hit a billet, killing five men and wounding fourteen others.
Things were about to get a lot more active.
By 4 April, the Germans had moved up troops, determined to take Villers-Bretonneux. Ludendorff could sense victory and, although his exhausted troops needed rest and the long, extended supply lines needed consolidating, his eyes were on the Amiens prize only twelve miles away through the dust and haze. Villers-Bretonneux was important because, apart from the fact that the line of the old Roman road, which divided the French and British armies, ran through the town, the crucial railhead of nearby Amiens would, like Verdun, draw in the French army, who would be determined to defend it.
The Germans prepared to attack along a front crossing the old Roman road to Péronne and stretching south to Marcelcave and the northern trenches of the French army, less than a mile south. With the Australian 35th Battalion, which was manning the front line with three companies and one in reserve, were the British 6th Battalion London Regiment, the 8th Battalion Rifle Brigade and the ‘Buffs’: the Royal East Kent Regiment, one of the oldest regiments in the British army dating back to the sixteenth century. Behind them were the AIF’s 33rd Battalion and the 9th Machine Gun Company with eight guns, four in the line and four in reserve. In command was Lieutenant Colonel Henry Goddard, DSO, who was given the task of defending Villers-Bretonneux.
As the line stood-to, ready for a dawn assault, a heavy and concentrated barrage fell on Villers-Bretonneux at 5.30 am. Both high explosive and gas rained down, crashing among the 6th Londoners and inflicting heavy casualties, with over 100 men, including many senior officers, killed.
An hour later, the shelling shortened, falling along the front line. As it did, massed German troops were seen approaching along the Péronne road from the outskirts of Warfusée-Abancourt, three miles east of Villers-Bretonneux. They were in parties of about forty men each.
Immediately Allied machine guns, Lewis guns and rifles opened on them, ripping into their ranks and causing heavy casualties. The Germans fell back, but in the next hour they assaulted the line nine times. Each time they were driven back, the ground was strewn with their dead and wounded.
At 7 am, the Germans attempted a broad attack along the whole of the front, forming a wall of field grey uniforms, bayonets flashing, charging into the sustained British and Australian fire. The Allies fired an SOS flare and immediately an intense barrage fell upon the advancing Germans, tearing wide gaps in their lines. This barrage, and the heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, decimated the German attack.
Despite substantial losses, the Germans continued pressing the Allied line hard. When the Germans were 300 yards from the line, the British 8th Rifle Brigade on the left of the 33rd Battalion fell back in disorder, leaving the Australians’ left flank dangerously exposed, a yawning gap in the defensive line. The Germans quickly exploited this, advancing along an abandoned trench and firing into the rear of the Australians. The machine guns withdrew and fell back, but not before one was overrun and captured and one taken out by German shelling. To counter these moves, the Buffs swung their left flank around and joined the 35th Battalion to stop the German advance, with the subsequent fire again decimating the German line.
Colonel Goddard ordered the 33rd Battalion, then in reserve in Villers-Bretonneux, into the line, taking up a position on the threatened left flank with eight more machine guns of the 9th Australian Machine Gun Company, making ten now in the line and four still in reserve. The Australians were supported on this flank north of the road by the 1st Dragoon Guards, who had ridden into the gap, quickly dismounted and joined the additional Australians, slowing the German advance.
At 11 am, as rain came down and the muddy ground impeded the German onslaught, the AIF’s 34th and 36th Battalions came up from Bois l’Abbe to further strengthen the front line. Goddard now had the entire 9th Brigade engaged in the fight, with the enemy line 300 yards to the east.
The mud was also causing the Australians problems, as it was jamming weapons and rendering them inoperable. In response, remarkably, the Commanding Officer of the 6th Londoners offered clean Lewis guns to the 35th Battalion in exchange for their muddy ones.
Late in the afternoon, the British troops on the right of the Australians began to pull back in disorder, trickling through the battalion lines and reporting the Germans were advancing in thousands. A young subaltern, seeing the potential of his right flank becoming exposed, attempted to prevent their withdrawal, but the retreating troops had gone back too far, opening another gap in the line. The situation was critical.
To prepare for a counterattack, Colonel Goddard ordered forward the 35th Battalion, the 6th Londoners and the remaining four machine guns of the 9th Machine Gun Company, which had been held in reserve in Villers-Bretonneux.
Colonel Goddard moved to an exposed position swept by machine-gun fire and shells to better appraise his options. He then advanced the 36th Battalion, who moved forward ‘in splendid order’9 to counterattack south of the Villers-Bretonneux– Marcelcave railway line, thus protecting the right flank of the 35th Battalion. Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Milne, who had risen through the ranks of the old British Army, called to his men as they loaded magazines and prepared for the attack, ‘Goodbye boys. It’s neck or nothing.’10 Then the companies moved off from the dead ground where they had shaken out. With them went ‘a party of Queens’11 – the Queen’s Royal West Surrey Regiment – but a nearby unit of Buffs refused to join the attack.
The attack went in, assisted by the British cavalry, and the flank and forward line were restored. This counterattack was successful, with the enemy suffering considerable casualties and the Australians capturing four machine guns, which were turned on the Germans to great effect.
To further consolidate the gains, it was decided to advance the line forward again. The 9th Brigade moved out at 1 am on 5 April and, while German fire was heavy, few casualties were sustained. Men advanced and fired their Lewis guns from the hip, sweeping the German forward defences and overwhelming them. Rifle fire also took a toll on the German defenders and many surrendered, with thirty prisoners, including one officer, taken in the attack. Yet, despite these successes, the Allied line remained fragile.
At 8 pm, the 18th Battalion AIF relieved the exhausted men of the 35th, who had been fighting since the night of 30 March, had endured rain, cold and difficult conditions and, at times, had been the only battalion in the line. During that week, two officers had been killed and a further six wounded, while there were 283 casualties of other ranks. After a relatively quiet day, the men of the 35th silently filed out of the line and moved back to a temporary rest area at Bois l’Abbe, before returning to the aerodrome at Cachy. However, even out of the line, they were not safe. On 6 March, two men were killed and three wounded from German shelling. The battalion moved back to cellars in the destroyed town of Villers-Bretonneux, where another man was killed and two more wounded. These fatalities continued for the next few days until they moved to Gentelles, further behind the line.
On 10 April, Major General R. L. Mullens, Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division, wrote to General Monash to thank him for the 9th Brigade’s assistance:
I was very much stirred by the courtesy of your officers and their desire to do everything in their power to help. As you know, we had a curious collection of units to deal with, and it was a very real relief to know that I had your stout-hearted fellows on my left flank and also later on my right flank and that all worry was therefore eliminated as to the safety of our flanks. Your order for the placing of your heavy guns and batteries so as to cover our front was of very real assistance, incidentally they killed a lot of Huns, and was much appreciated by us all.12
Colonel Benson of the 6th Londoners also wrote, ‘The counter attack of the 36th Battalion was got away very rapidly and efficiently. The greatest credit is due to the OC (Milne) of the 36th who organised and launched the counter attack, and to his battalion for the spirited way in which it was carried out. This officer undoubtedly retrieved a very awkward situation.’13 Sadly, while Milne had survived the attack, he was killed on 12 April, when a shell landed on his headquarters.
The successful defence of Villers-Bretonneux pushed two German divisions back in what became known as the First Battle of Villers-Bretonneux. While the German offensive had failed to take the town, it had pushed back the British Fourth Army and, to the south, the French, providing tantalising views to the Germans of Amiens and its Gothic cathedral shimmering in the distance.
Ludendorff now turned his attention to Flanders, launching Operation Georgette. Though the Australian 1st Division had just arrived on the Somme, they were quickly recalled back to Flanders to protect the vital railhead at Hazebrouck, the main supply centre for the British. The town was also the gateway to the Channel ports, and its loss would have had a devastating effect on resupply and morale.
When the Australians arrived at Hazebrouck on 12 April, they were deployed to a defensive line across the front of the Nieppe Forest. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were spread along a front of nearly six miles, an area usually defended by two divisions. The 2nd Brigade’s 8th Battalion had a front of 3000 yards; 1000 yards per company, each comprising about 200 men at this time.14
When the Germans attacked on 14 April against the 3rd Battalion at Gutzer Farm, they came in waves and were mown down, so tightly packed were their ranks. The Germans took the farm, but the Australians retook it, only to then be driven out by heavy German machine-gun fire on two sides. Throughout the afternoon, the Germans pressed their attack on the Australian line, but were driven back. The strong defence by both Australian and British troops saved Hazebrouck, and by the end of April, Operation Georgette was over.
Sixty miles south, on the Somme, the Allied line of the Fourth Army was predominantly held by Australian units along a front of seventeen miles. This ‘was due to the daily reoccurring fears of a German breakthrough to Amiens, and the necessity for buttressing the much-tried British infantry with reserves of first rate quality’.15 General Henry Rawlinson, Commander of the British Fourth Army, which included the Australian Corps, summed up the situation in his diary: ‘I feel happier about the general situation and I now have three brigades of Australians in reserve, so I think we will be able to keep the Boche out of Amiens.’16
While the situation had indeed stabilised, the Germans still retained the strategically important Hangard and Lancer woods south of Villers-Bretonneux, an area which became the focus of the next stage of the Allied defence.
The task of taking Hangard Wood was given to the AIF’s 5th Brigade. Rather than launching a major attack, small units of troops were to advance through the two sections of the wood and form a defensive line along the road that ran along the wood’s eastern edge and faced the open ground to Lancer Wood further east. The main attack would be undertaken by two companies – one from the 19th Battalion and one from the 20th Battalion – and on either side would be flanking platoons for protection.
Early on 7 April, the two attacking companies moved out, the 19th under the command of Captain Clarence Wallach, one of five Wallach brothers who had enlisted. When the anticipated artillery barrage did not come, Wallach led his men across the open ground towards Hangard Wood. German machine guns opened on the advancing line, killing two officers and taking out many of the men. Wallach was badly wounded, having been shot through both knees.
At this point, Lieutenant Percy Storkey took command. He and eleven men pushed through the low regrowth of the wood and, on hearing a German machine gun to their south, wheeled around and came upon the rear of a number of German machine-gun pits, where the enemy troops were firing towards the advancing Australians. Twenty yards from the Germans they were spotted. Storkey charged, yelling as he went. The Australians ‘got in quickly with bombs, bayonet, and revolver’.17 Storkey demanded the Germans’ surrender, but three hesitated so he shot them with his revolver, at which point it jammed. His men slipped the pins from their grenades to threaten the Germans, who then quickly surrendered. Thirty Germans had been killed, and three officers and fifty men were captured and quickly escorted to the rear. Australian casualties were 151 officers and men.
With Operation Georgette in Flanders stalled by mid-April, Ludendorff again turned his attention to Amiens and Villers-Bretonneux. Over the next few weeks, the Germans brought down troops, guns and supplies.
Facing them were the British 8th Division, which had been savagely dealt with during the German March offensive, losing 250 officers and about 4500 men. To replace these losses, and as the British were desperate for reinforcements to fill the ranks, they had lowered the enlistment age, allowing 140,000 reinforcements to be sent to France to help stall the attack. However, these reinforcements were mere boys. An Australian noted in his diary, ‘For two days companies of infantry have been passing us on the road – companies of children. English children, pink faced, round cheeked children, flushed under the weight of their unaccustomed packs, with their steel helmets on the back of their heads and the strap hanging loosely on their rounded baby chins.’18 Some British units were made up of sixty per cent new, young recruits who, as Bean states, ‘till a week before had never fired a shot’.19 While General Rawlinson was concerned about using these untrained troops in so important a defensive task in the Somme, pressure from both Foch and Haig made it necessary to push these lads into the line.
A German prisoner captured by the French told the Allies that an attack would come on 16 April. While this didn’t eventuate, the Australians brought up the 5th Division, and battalions from the 14th Brigade moved to the north of Villers-Bretonneux in readiness.
Early on the morning of 17 April, the Germans drenched the town with mustard gas, sometimes at a rate of one shell every two seconds. The shelling lasted from 4 am until 7 am, by which time the Australians had suffered nearly 700 casualties. The gas formed a coating and, if touched, blistered their skin. Men were especially affected in tender parts of their body, particularly their eyes, throat, under their arms and in the crotch. It was later found that the Germans had fired 12,000 gas shells made up of mustard gas, sneezing gas and phosgene gas into the town.
Again it was learnt from captured Germans that a further attack would come, this time on 24 April, which would be preceded by a heavy gas bombardment and would include fifteen German tanks, something not seen before in battle. Aerial photographs appeared to confirm this plan, as massed German troops could be seen lining trenches to the east of the town.
At 4.45 am on 24 April, all hell broke loose along a six-mile front from Villers-Bretonneux south into the French sector. The bombardment was intense and included a mix of gas, particularly mustard. Shrouded in fog and smoke, the Germans advanced on the British line to the east of the town, with visibility down to 100 yards. Soon reports came in confirming that the enemy were supported by tanks and that the British line was folding, with men streaming back.
Brigadier Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott, Commander of the Australian 15th Brigade, was to the north-west of Villers-Bretonneux on high alert for such an attack. He sent forward two patrols, which established a line on the east side of the town and attempted to collect stragglers, many of whom were found without a rifle or equipment. Elliott also laid out his Lewis guns.
By now German units were in Villers-Bretonneux and were swarming across the open fields to the south-east, where the defensive line ran from Monument Wood. Elliott was chafing at the bit to initiate a counterattack, but the British had reassured his commander, General Talbot Hobbs of the 5th Australian Division, that their help was not required, something that rankled both men.
In the front line, things were not going well for the young British recruits. To the south-east, three German tanks appeared out of the mist, supported by infantry. They lumbered forward, each tank an iron pillbox bristling with machine guns. Attempts to stop them by Lewis-gun fire failed and the tanks rumbled forward, crossing the British front line. Men crouched low in the trenches as the tracked monsters crossed a yard above their heads. Many British troops were cut off or killed, but others were able to fall back into the town and along the railway cutting.
At Monument Wood, the British resisted and dealt high casualties on the advancing enemy as they crossed the open land towards Hangard Wood, but the British were overrun. Six German tanks advanced and four more broke through at Hangard Wood, pushing the British defenders back to the outskirts of Cachy, to the south-west of Villers-Bretonneux. As in other parts of the line, the appearance of the tanks out of the mist and smoke created panic, with men fleeing back towards Villers-Bretonneux itself.
It was at this time that the first tank-on-tank engagement in the war occurred, with three British Mark IV tanks taking on the lumbering German prototypes. While all tanks were damaged and the battle inconclusive, it was a watershed technological moment. Nonetheless, with the supporting infantry, the German tanks swept around the flanks, cutting off the retreat in many places and capturing 2400 British troops.20 One German tank alone captured 175 British soldiers. As dawn broke the situation became very grim, with British troops withdrawing in disarray, many without weapons.
The looming threat to Amiens was not lost on General Rawlinson or General Foch. By 8 am on the 24th, German units held the north and south of Villers-Bretonneux and were advancing rapidly towards the western outskirts.
At noon, Foch ordered Rawlinson to recapture Villers-Bretonneux, but Rawlinson had already ordered the Australian 13th Brigade under Major General Thomas Glasgow to bring his men forward and take the town ‘that night at the latest’.21 At 9.40 am, Glasgow had received his orders and by 11.15 am, his men were marching to Bois l’Abbe on the western side of the town. He was fully aware of the importance of his mission and the nature of the task ahead, having conducted a personal recce at Cachy of the switch there, a long communication trench across the line of an enemy advance or a junction in a trench system. However, Glasgow remained concerned for his men, noting, ‘Poor chaps, they’re in for a tougher time than they realise.’22
Rawlinson also ordered Pompey Elliott’s 15th Brigade to be ready to attack at 8 pm. (The 15th Brigade, who had suffered so badly at Fromelles in July 1916 and had matters to settle with the Germans, supported the move, coming up from the flats on the Somme and quickly taking a position close to where the Australian National Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux stands today.) Glasgow, however, reasoned that it would still be light at this time and his men of the 13th, without any preparatory barrage, would be exposed to German fire across the bare approach to the east of Hill 104. He noted, ‘If God Almighty gave the order, we couldn’t do it by daylight.’23 He argued for a later attack, needing the time to prepare his men, get to the start line and have the cover of darkness. It was finally agreed to attack at 10 pm.
Glasgow and Elliott met briefly at the nearby village of Blangy-Tronville at 8 pm, where they sorted some differences and settled on the plan to encircle Villers-Bretonneux with the 15th Brigade to the north and the 13th Brigade to the south, cutting off the superior German forces within the town boundaries.
Elliott was pleased to have the 13th on his right, trusting his fellow Australians. He and Glasgow agreed the full moon would assist the attack, and requested there be no barrage to alert the Germans. What was most important, given the failed counterattacks attempted during the day, was to retake Villers-Bretonneux and re-establish the British line of the previous morning. Orders were passed down, with Captain Harburn of the 51st Battalion telling his men, ‘The Monument [Wood] is your goal and nothing is to stop you getting there. Kill every bloody German you see, we don’t want any prisoners and God bless you.’24
At 10 pm, against Glasgow’s advice, a bombardment fell on Villers-Bretonneux, removing the element of surprise. His 13th Brigade moved from their start line and began their advance of two miles. The men of the 51st Battalion on the left took heavy machine-gun fire from Aquenne Wood, but Second Lieutenant Cliff Sadlier, with Sergeant Charlie Stokes and a bombing party, attacked through the woods, eliminating two machine guns and their crews. Wounded, and without his bombers, all of whom had become casualties, Sadlier attacked a third machine gun with his revolver, killing the gun crew and capturing the weapon. For this action he was awarded a Victoria Cross.
North of the village, Elliott’s 15th Brigade did not get into position until two hours later, and began their attack at midnight. Their approach had been silent but once the order to charge was given, the cry went up, ‘Into the bastards, boys.’25 Heavy German machine-gun fire swept into the ranks and men fell, but the charge surged on. Quickly they overran machine-gun posts, shooting or bayonetting the German gun crews. Charles Bean noted, ‘for the time being, the men had thrown off the restraints of civilised intercourse and were what the bayonet instructors of all armies aimed at producing by their tuition – primitive, savage men.’26 The Australians reportedly said that ‘they had not had such a feast with their bayonets before’.27 While flares lit the sky, the Germans were silhouetted by the burning village behind them and ‘old scores were wiped out two or three times over’.28
Elliott’s 15th Brigade reached the north-eastern corner of Villers-Bretonneux, wheeled and dug in on an arcing front along the Hamel road, their backs to the town. At this time they had not linked up with Glasgow’s boys south of the town, and neither brigade had succeeded in closing the gap and bottling up the Germans as planned.
Enemy troops were still coming and going into the town, oblivious to the Australian encirclement. Bean notes that, ‘many Germans came along the road from the town “apparently quite unconcerned, smoking cigarettes” and from the other direction arrived a party of them pulling a hand cart with trench mortar shells. All were allowed to approach, and then abruptly challenged and made prisoners.’29 In another incident, Major Kuring of the 59th Battalion saw a large party of men approaching, challenged them and, after a brief firefight, captured twenty Germans and four light machine guns.
In an attempt to link the two brigades, two patrols moved out before dawn on 25 April but were quickly engaged by German machine guns in scattered posts, and a number of Australians were killed and wounded. Lieutenant Simpson of the 60th Battalion had all his men hit, but was able to drag the wounded to cover, eliminate a German post and, for the remainder of the day, hold the post, sniping Germans as the opportunity arose. Meanwhile the second patrol was also finding stiff opposition, and no further efforts were made during daylight to link up the two brigades.
South of the town, Glasgow’s 13th Brigade was holding a line between the town and Hangard Wood with the assistance of British units. At 9 am, two blindfolded Germans were paraded at 52nd Battalion headquarters bearing a message from their commander that requested the Australians to surrender. The German sergeant major informed the Australians they were surrounded on three sides by superior forces, and they should surrender to avoid serious loss of life. If not, he threatened to ‘blow you to pieces by turning the heavy artillery onto your trenches’.30 It was explained to the Germans that this had to be referred above, but, in the meantime, another German arrived with another demand for the Australians to surrender.
When Glasgow received the request by field telephone, his answer was clear and unambiguous: ‘Tell them to go to Hell.’31 The three Germans, meanwhile, were led away into captivity, much to their relief.
By early 26 April, the front line was joined and Villers-Bretonneux totally encircled. The 13th Brigade had 1009 casualties, including a total of 365 officers and men of the 51st Battalion. Elliott’s 15th Brigade had 455 casualties but, given the success of the combined attack, these casualties were considered reasonable though regrettable. British casualties were about 7000 in the 8th and 58th Divisions, and German casualties were about the same.
The Australian recapture of Villers-Bretonneux was broadly celebrated and brought ‘great fame to the Australian infantry’,32 with the Australian Corps recognised as a major factor in the slowing and then turning of the German offensive north and south of the Somme.
Field Marshal Haig had sent a message on 25 April stating his ‘congratulations to the III Corps Commander and the troops engaged particularly the 13th and 15th Australian Brigades on the most successful and important operations carried out in the neighbourhood of Villers Bretonneux’.33 Some months later, on 20 July, Haig wrote, ‘A night operation of this character, undertaken at such short notice, was an enterprise of great daring. It was carried out in the most spirited and gallant manner by all ranks. The 13th Australian Brigade in particular, showed great skill and resolution in their attack, making their way through belts of wire running diagonally to the line of their advance, across very difficult country which they had no opportunity to reconnoitre beforehand.’34 General Rawlinson was also impressed, and expressed ‘his appreciation of the excellent arrangements … and the gallantry and determination exhibited by all troops’.35
The attack reaffirmed the effectiveness of the Australian troops, especially when allowed their own planning and timing. Even the British High Command was starting to recognise that the Australians needed to fight in their own unique, perhaps peculiar way. The officers understood the Australian attitude, their commitment and their perseverance and, most importantly, the trust that existed between Australian units which meant that they would not let down their mates, nor fall back or vacate the line.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the success at Villers-Bretonneux, and the halting of the Germans across the Somme and in front of Amiens, was not singularly an Australian victory. The Australian part in the action, while significant, was not undertaken without help.
Bean was careful not to exaggerate the Australian achievement of March to April 1918. He wrote:
It has frequently been claimed that the Australian infantry divisions stopped the advancing Germans in their previously victorious progress towards Amiens and also towards Hazebrouck … if this claim means that the Germans continued to advance until they came up against Australian troops hurriedly brought to the rescue, and that these were the troops that first held up the enemy on the line on which the offensive ended, it is not literally true of any important sector of the Somme front …36
A footnote in Bean perhaps best describes the Allied opinion of the Villers-Bretonneux attack:
Brigadier General Grogan of the 23rd British Brigade, who was in an even better position to know the nature of the achievement, has generously described it as ‘perhaps the greatest individual feat of the war – the successful counter-attack by night across unknown and difficult ground, at a few hours’ notice, by the Australian soldier’.37
In Villers-Bretonneux the front line now ran to the east of the village, facing the Germans at the eastern end. This was a dangerous place, where the land was flat, windblown and devoid of any cover. The new front line comprised a series of gun pits and hastily dug trenches, which made communications, resupply and movement both difficult and dangerous. As it was devoid also of trees or any landmarks, the area was confusing and men on both sides of the line became lost or wandered into each other’s trenches. To provide cover and a degree of safety, a communication trench protected by wire was dug, allowing hot food to be brought forward and for the relief troops to enter the line and move on to the scattered posts with a greater degree of safety.
Just south, the Germans now held Hangard and Monument woods, where attacks by French Moroccan units had failed. The French had been keen to force the Germans back from the town. For this task they brought in Moroccan troops and elements of the Foreign Legion, but had made little headway against stubborn German resistance. Their attack had been observed by the Australians, who initially watched with admiration before witnessing the colonial troops suffer heavy losses.
On 28 April, the AIF’s 4th Division took over. The 4th Brigade, recently moved from the defence of Hébuterne in the north, occupied the trench line that crossed the old Roman road to Péronne. Nightly they sent patrols into no-man’s-land, raiding German trenches and creating panic. A German record notes ‘that the days were quiet, but by night our opponents, Australians, were very active’.38 These were the days of ‘peaceful penetration’, or trench raiding.
Another initiative undertaken by AIF battalions along the line was ‘nibbling’. As Colonel Douglas Marks, the commander of the 13th Battalion, described it:
The policy of nibbling forward was one at which the 13th Battalion excelled, no night passing without our advancing a Lewis gun or a few snipers to form a post which later became a J.O.T. [jumping off trench] for another nibble, which irritated Fritz so much that he became extremely jumpy and nervy sending up all night continuous streams of flares and bursting out spasmodically into fits of hurricane strafe.39
However, the Germans had taken control of the old British aircraft hangars opposite the corner of the Hamel road, which allowed them to mass troops undetected, sometimes just fifty yards from the Australian line, for assaults on the Australian trenches. The Germans also had well-sited and well-protected machine guns among these hangars. The recapture of Villers-Bretonneux had been a victory for the Allies, but the situation remained grim.