The attack at Hamel confirmed the widely held belief that neither side could claim a decisive victory, nor even a strategic advantage. Like two punch-drunk boxers bashing each other about the ring, bloody and bruised, one always rose for another blow, another attack. But it remained to be seen which of the two could sustain this pummelling, the pain and the blood, and maintain their resolve and morale.
The various German attacks from the March offensive were now petering out, and the Allied generals Foch and Haig had discussed the idea of a Somme initiative. Their aim was to protect Amiens not by a strengthening of the defensive line, but by counteroffensive. Their planning had before this point been long-term, with consideration given to a war stretching until 1920. However, Operation Georgette, the German offensive of mid-1918 in Flanders, postponed this idea. Now, with the Australian successes in Villers-Bretonneux and Hamel, and the end of the Germans’ Operation Michael, new Allied offensive plans, which included the French, Americans and the British along a broad front, began to be considered.
Ludendorff’s offensive plans had not yet fully played out, however. On 27 May, he had launched Operation Blücher-Yorck, with the Germans attacking on the Aisne, in particular the strategic Chemin des Dames Ridge to the south of the French sector. The offensive started with 4000 artillery pieces firing high explosive and gas, followed by the assault of seventeen stormtrooper divisions. By nightfall they had opened a twenty-five-mile (forty-kilometre) gap in the Allied line, gaining ten miles (sixteen kilometres) of territory and, within a few days, they had taken 50,000 Allied prisoners and captured 800 guns. They were now only thirty-six miles (fifty-six kilometres) from Paris. Though this attack finally stalled on the Marne through German exhaustion, high casualties and supply problems, the Allied High Command realised there was still fight in the German army and cancelled offensive action on the Somme.
The German advances of Operation Gneisenau in June and Friedenstrum in July, while initially successful, finally ended Ludendorff’s offensives. One further planned offensive, Operation Hagen, was also cancelled by 7 August. By the end of July, when the last attack flickered and died, Germany had lost 227,000 killed or missing, 765,000 were wounded and a further 1,960,000 – one fifth of the German army – were sick, many from the influenza pandemic. As well as these losses, the effect of the offensives’ failure on German morale was enormous.
The initiative now passed to the Allies. General Foch, the supreme commander of all Allied forces, wanted to counterattack; the question was where it would take place. Like Ludendorff, Foch needed to consider his long front line. He saw advantages in the Somme region, not the least being the apparent neglect of the Germans to strengthen their defences, relying instead on re-occupying the old French Amiens outer defence line. Perhaps they saw the Allies as beaten and unable to mount an offensive, underestimating their recuperative powers, the industrial output of Britain and the supply line from America. Foch also needed to relieve the pressure on Amiens and Paris, where further threats were feared given recent German attacks on the Marne.
Encouraged by Haig, General Rawlinson submitted an attack plan in mid-July which was approved by both Haig and Foch. From the start, the plan was based on two crucial elements: surprise and secrecy. The Australians, under Rawlinson’s British Fourth Army, as well as the Canadians under General Arthur Currie, were to be used for the advance in the British sector. Haig had offered the Canadians to Rawlinson, who welcomed these seasoned and successful troops for inclusion in his planning. The Canadian troops and the five divisions of the new Australian Corps would form the vanguard for the attack, which would incorporate the lessons learnt at Hamel and include the new tanks and equipment now available. There was much to do beforehand – the current line to consolidate, planning, training, the vast logistics of troop movement and supply, intelligence gathering – all under the cloak of tight secrecy.
New techniques and weapons, such as the successful use of tanks at Cambrai in 1917, artillery that was more comprehensive and had improved accuracy, sound detection and more Lewis guns (light machine guns) had significantly improved AIF performance by 1918. Better, faster and more reliable communications were also an integral part of the Hamel success, particularly the effective use of reconnaissance planes to track and report the attack. Pilots marked on maps the movements of German and Australian troops, and the maps were then dropped to motorbike riders who quickly despatched them to the relevant headquarters. Consequently, Monash and battalion commanders had current information on the progress of the battle within minutes, compared with the slow, tedious communication systems of the past.
Through July and into early August, planning continued at a feverish pace. Once the line for the attack was determined, detailed planning started. It was decided to attack along a front of 25,000 yards (14.2 miles or 22.7 kilometres) from Morlancourt south to Moreuil. The British in the north would have a front of 5000 yards; the Australians, south of the Somme, 7500 yards; the Canadians, on the Australians’ right flank, 7500 yards; and the French, at the southern end of the line, 5000 yards.1 The front line was across well-drained farmland, free of craters and extensive wire, and north of the Roman road, generally flat and ideal for tanks. The area had been well photographed, and detailed typographical maps were produced in colour for broad distribution.
As at Hamel, the offensive elements of the attack – the infantry, tanks, artillery and aircraft – needed close coordination. Attention needed to be given to medical organisation, meteorology, communications, engineering works, training and preparation, rail and road movements and resupply, along with intelligence on German disposition and strength. This involved detailed planning for the logistics and movement of trains, motor lorries and guns, the build-up of supply dumps and engineering work. Secrecy needed to be maintained and the offensive kept from the men, even while the massive build-up stated the obvious.
Rawlinson’s plan, the details of which were drawn up by Monash, involved fourteen infantry divisions (one British, five Australian, four Canadian and four French), three cavalry divisions, 3000 guns and 650 tanks. The broad attack would have an average objective of 10,500 yards (six miles or ten kilometres) and would be initially undertaken with three objectives: the ‘Green Line’, the ‘Red Line’ and finally the ‘Blue Line’. Once an objective line was reached, the following division, brigade or battalion would then leapfrog the first unit and continue the advance. This broke down to a setpiece advance for 3000 yards under a protective barrage, a further advance of 4500 yards in open warfare relying on tanks instead of artillery, and a further exploitation zone of 1500 yards if this could be achieved. To minimise fatigue, the leapfrogging divisions would be brought up close to the start line and rested, with the initial attacking divisions passing through them before crossing the start line.
Artillery was to be quietly moved into the line at night and carefully camouflaged before dawn. This was to be checked by aircraft from the Australian Flying Corps No. 3 Squadron every day and carefully watched. Guns were not to fire before the opening of the offensive so their locations would remain concealed, and there would be no ranging shots on targets, the guns’ accuracy having been checked at a specially prepared artillery range behind the lines.
Once the attack started, the lighter artillery needed to be quickly hitched up and moved forward with the advance, particularly the rapid-firing eighteen-pound guns. Detailed barrage maps were drawn up, providing precise timings and distances for guns to keep up the barrage just ahead of the advancing troops. In all, there would be eighteen brigades of field artillery with six guns per battery – 432 guns in all – plus mortars and medium and heavy artillery, for a total of 680 guns for the Australian advance.
As with Hamel, coordinating the infantry with the artillery barrage needed careful planning. It was proposed that from zero hour, the line of the barrage should be straight along the whole front, falling 200 yards in front of the infantry start line. It was hoped that the artillery could not only eliminate all known German artillery, but could lay down an accurate barrage line for the infantry to follow and reduce inaccurate firing or ‘drop-shorts’ – shells falling among the advancing lines of infantry.
Tanks, too, were crucial. At Hamel, the Australians had learnt the value of tanks and would never again fear their presence, while the British tank crews had been impressed with the morale and fighting qualities of the Australians. Yet the operation of tanks required training, and it needed to be demonstrated that tanks were a suitable, and indeed necessary, alternative to artillery. On 9 July, the 7th Battalion practised with tanks near Rivery on the outskirts of Amiens to rehearse cooperation, in particular signalling. Similarly, on 29 July, the 27th Battalion was taken to a tank park north of Amiens where ‘they practiced the latest methods in tank and infantry co-operation’.2 This training continued so that most units spent time during July and early August practising signalling and learning how to work with, and protect, tanks.
Aircraft were also a major element in the offensive. It was found that the noisy, slow-flying Handley Page bombers would cover the noise of tank engines. These bombers were to fly up and down the line, night and day, particularly in the days immediately before the attack. Reconnaissance aircraft were also important for aerial photographs and intelligence gathering, and fighters worked to protect both the bombers and the reconnaissance aircraft.
The No. 3 Squadron was also preparing for the big day. Throughout July, it had continued its work bombarding German artillery and photographing German positions. This was particularly important when the Australian line was extended south to Cachy and Hangard, where up-to-date reconnaissance photos of the German lines were urgently required. On 17 July, four RE8 aircraft that were directing artillery fire onto a German position by radio were caught in a severe hailstorm with lightning and high winds. Unable to reach their aerodrome, they were driven down and landed behind the Allied lines with no injury or damage. Other squadron aircraft became involved in aerial dogfights, in one case shooting down a German albatross fighter who had just destroyed four British balloons in quick succession.
Though inclement weather often grounded reconnaissance flights, the Australian Flying Corps kept a close watch on the movement of German batteries. The Germans were at the time replacing real guns with dummies, a diversionary tactic, and these were logged and noted so that Allied artillery could fire on these German positions to continue the deception and cover their own plans for the upcoming offensive.
On the day of the offensive, the squadron would have three different tasks. ‘A’ flight was to carry out artillery patrols, calling down counter-battery fire on enemy artillery batteries. ‘B’ flight was to conduct counterattack patrols, seeking out concentrations of enemy infantry whose position they would radio to the artillery and then, flying directly over the concentration, drop a red flare to indicate the position to the Australian infantry. ‘C’ flight contact patrols were to work with the attacking infantry, identifying individual units by simple field signals and signs, and relaying these positions back to headquarters either by radio or by dropping marked maps at division or corps headquarters, or army report centres.3 Both ‘A’ and ‘B’ flights also had the task of dropping phosphorus bombs along the Morlancourt ridge to obscure German observations from this area.
With the speed of the anticipated advance, a forward radio station was established in Aubigny to continually test the radios carried in aircraft, and to be ready to warn artillery of any unexpected breakthroughs so that artillery would not fire on lines of advancing infantry. As Bean notes, ‘The perusal of the battle-orders for the aeroplanes and every other arm engaged in the attack affords a fascinating insight into both the machinery of modern battle and its scientific employment.’4
Throughout July, while the Allies built up their troops and supplies for the planned offensive, the infantry war continued. In particular, the Australian tactic of peaceful penetration was a regular pastime, supported and encouraged by Monash and his divisional commanders. Major General Rosenthal, commander of the 2nd Division, had watched with interest as this tactic was developed informally within battalions. He encouraged his brigade commanders to undertake raiding where possible, particularly against the weak defensive German line where the troops were demoralised by the failed offensives and reinforced by young, inexperienced soldiers.
German defences at this time were generally scattered and often in poorly constructed trenches. Many of the German trenches were in the old French defensive trench line east of Amiens, and lacked barbed wire and obstacles. Australian units continued to nibble away at the German line, pushing outposts into no-man’s-land and linking these with a continuous trench line.
On the night of 16–17 July, a raiding party from the 19th Battalion, made up of two officers and fifty-six other ranks, raided two German positions near Villers-Bretonneux. The attackers quickly overran the German posts, with the enemy bolting as the Australians fired into their backs, killing seventeen and wounding twenty, and coming away with three prisoners. While two Australians were killed and a further eight wounded, this aggressive action spread fear among the Germans. Unknown to the Australians at the time, this raid also disrupted a planned German attack on the Australian line, allowing the battalion to push their front forward. While this was perhaps the slow way to Berlin, it kept the initiative with the Australians and enhanced morale, self-confidence and determination.
Around this time, there was an incident with a man from the 25th Battalion. The private had been ordered to locate the flanking Australian battalion and make contact, then return and report in. He made contact but, walking back to his unit, he became lost and wandered into a German post. The Germans quickly disarmed him and were marching him to the rear when they were fired upon, and his guard was wounded. The Australian ran into a wheat crop and hid, waiting for the darkness. However, as he was so close to the German line, he did not find an opportunity to escape overnight and had to spend the following day also in hiding. He finally made his way back into the Australian lines the following day, having had nothing to eat or drink for two days.
In a raid by the 25th and 26th Battalions, also on 16–17 July, the Australians attacked what was known as the ‘mound’, a low rise or hummock of high ground south of the railway line and east of Villers-Bretonneux that dominated the Australian line and needed to be eliminated. An attempt had been made on the night of the 15th to secure no-man’s-land by capturing two enemy outposts, but the attack had failed. When this new attack went in, there was heavy fighting, with the Germans leaving their trench line with fixed bayonets to take on the advancing Australians. This was an unusual move, as the Germans normally fell back when attacked, or surrendered.
During the attack, ‘C’ Company, on the right, reached a spot called Jaffa Trench, but mistakenly thought this was the objective and propped. The mistake was fortunate, as the fork off the trench contained around 200 Germans and the small remaining band of Australians – two officers and about twenty men – would have been easily wiped out. In the end, both the outposts and the mound were secured, with the 25th Battalion capturing twenty-eight and killing an estimated sixty enemy troops, plus capturing two heavy and two light machine guns. The battalion had one officer and twenty-three men killed, and a further sixty-eight wounded.
Later that day, sentries spotted 250 Germans moving up Jaffa Trench and through a grain crop towards the mound. After an Australian SOS flare went up, the artillery landed high explosive among the advancing Germans, and when Lewis guns and rifles joined in, the results were devastating. When the firing stopped after fifteen minutes, over 100 Germans lay in front of the Australian line.
Two hours later the Germans again deployed, moving forward until they were only fifty to 100 yards from the Australians, ready to counterattack. Again the artillery opened on the advancing lines and accurate Lewis-gun fire, directed by Lieutenant Cecil Auchterlonie, scythed into the Germans. They were mowed down and a further 150 fell. For his decisive action, Lieutenant Auchterlonie was awarded a bar to his Military Cross, which he had received only two weeks before at Hamel. After this, the 25th Battalion was withdrawn, but their short time in the line had seen fifty-four men killed and a further 158 wounded, leaving a battalion of only 473 men at less than half their effective strength.
Apart from raiding and nibbling, Australian troops were also tasked with identifying German units for intelligence reports. This required a small fighting patrol of an officer and a few men raiding a German trench, grabbing prisoners and bringing them in for interrogation. A typical note in the 40th Battalion history notes:
That day enemy identification was asked for and a lieutenant, R. S. McKenzie, took out a patrol of seven ORs to procure it. They moved from our line at 10pm and went about 800 yards down to the Hamel–Warfusée road where they located an enemy post. Lieutenant McKenzie left his party about 30 yards from the post and crawled forward with Sergeant A. H. Richards towards it. They got within 10 yards of it, threw bombs in and rushed. They found two men in the post and Lieutenant McKenzie shot one and secured the other as a prisoner. Bombs were at once thrown at them from another post in the rear and Lieutenant McKenzie was wounded. He sent the sergeant off with the prisoner while he made his way back more slowly to join up with his patrol. Just as he reached his patrol they were attacked by an enemy patrol, who threw bombs among them, fired a few shots and ran, severely wounding Sergeant Richards and one of the men. Rifle grenades were by this time bursting on the road where a patrol was and our party moved off with the prisoner, carrying two of the wounded, both of whom later died. Lieutenant McKenzie was able to walk back slowly without assistance.5
The Germans, on the other hand, showed a marked decrease in aggression and in their fighting morale. Aside from being understrength, many units were, like British units, filled with poorly trained younger men, many of them boys. As the 40th Battalion history notes, ‘During this period [July] in the line, there was a marked decrease in enemy artillery and an increase in our own which gave us a fairly quiet time in the trenches.’6 The 22nd Battalion reported, ‘During the concluding days of July, the German offensive spirit definitely collapsed,’7 while the 24th Battalion reported, ‘Fritz was plainly nervous, displaying many signs of unease.’8 Later, the 24th reported that Germans around Monument Wood south of Villers-Bretonneux, including the elite 2nd Grenadier Regiment, ‘were rather passive and showed no desire to fight’.9 A 19th Battalion intelligence report dated 17 July, under the title ‘ENEMY ATTITUDE’, simply reads, ‘Alert’.10
The old Roman road between Villers-Bretonneux and Péronne was the boundary between the British and French armies, which was the reason Ludendorff had expended so much energy and men along it. For the Australians in early to mid-1918, their deployment just over this line and south of Villers-Bretonneux brought them in contact with the French army for the first time. In Somme Mud, Private Edward Lynch of the 45th Battalion writes about coming into contact with the French army:
A noise on our immediate right. A man is running towards us. He jumps down amongst us. Two arms wave, two hands flicker in our faces. Two anxious, excited eyes jump at us. A little black goatee beard is bobbing up and down under our noses. A hole opens in the beard and ‘Aux Armes! Aux armes! L’ennemi!’ the man excitedly gasps, and his imploring eyes burn into each face of the post as he asks if we understand him. I answer in my best French that I understand him. He jumps at me and calls me ‘comrade’ half a dozen times, and I tell him we are on guard already. Then he dives at me and get a mouthful of bristly beard, and before I know what’s what, the excited beggar is kissing me for all he’s worth. I jump back, getting rid of that mouthful of beard and hear the boys roaring and rocking in mirth.11
The 24th Battalion, on the very right end of the Allied line, connected with the most northern French units, in this case the Algerian troops, and reported, ‘On our right were the Third Zouaves Regiment who were enthusiastic in their praise of the Australians. They posted the following notice: “Vivent les Australians, qui nous donnent des cigarettes” which translates to “Hurray for the Australians who offer us cigarettes”.’12
On the night of 30 July, an advance party from the 13th Battalion completed their relief of French colonial troops in Aquenne Wood, west of Villers-Bretonneux. Here the Australians found the French to be ‘methodical and thorough in their handing over and the defensive scheme of the area was carefully explained and also the role of the Battalion in case of penetration of the defences by the enemy. The condition of the trenches was excellent and communication with the rear could easily be maintained in daylight by means of numerous communication trenches.’13 Colonel Douglas Marks was also impressed, recording in his diary, ‘French are very methodical in their trench organisation. Best relief we have had. Sanitation their weak point.’14
Also coming into the line now in greater numbers were the American troops, organised under three different formations. There were eight regular Army divisions, seventeen National Guard divisions and eighteen National Army divisions formed by men drafted for National Service. While they were late in arriving, the impact of this new injection of men and matériel was soon felt, relieving both the French and British sections of the front.
After Hamel, the Americans continued to be involved with the Australians, especially in training behind the lines. For example, the 7th Battalion had five American officers and eighty men attached for experience, while the 40th Battalion sent two officers and four NCOs to Querrieu, where a training trench was built so untried soldiers could carry out routine duties as they would in the front line and learn ‘Australian methods of scouting and patrolling’.15
After their experiences together at Hamel, the Australians had a genuine respect for these newcomers, although the US troops still had a lot to learn. American Command ignored Allied experience and offers of advice, and took the ‘American way’ of doing things. It showed. While Australia had 60,000 dead in the Great War from the Gallipoli landings in April 1915 until early 1919, the Americans lost nearly the same amount of men in just the last five months of the war.
Also new for the Australians was the arrival of the Canadians on this sector of the front. The Australians greatly admired their colonial cousins, particularly their aggressive fighting qualities and their great successes, like the taking of Vimy Ridge in April 1917. The Germans also respected the Canadians, believing that wherever the Canadians appeared in the line, an attack was imminent. Their deployment therefore required great secrecy and the careful invention of suitable ‘excuses’ to cover their movement.16 One widely spread story was that the Canadians were to be moved south to counter an expected renewed German offensive on the Somme and so, without arousing German suspicions, four Canadian divisions were quietly spirited into the support lines.
Meanwhile, along the front, routine patrolling, nibbling and peaceful penetration continued. Men were keen to undertake aggressive patrolling, and battalion commanders were never short of volunteers.
On 6 July, a party from the 20th Battalion had just moved into the line from Morlancourt and were occupying newly captured trenches above Hamel at Accroche Wood. Soon their position was taking sniper fire. Corporal Wally Brown, a Tasmanian, crept out with two grenades, having located where the fire was coming from. Racing across the open, he was soon under fire from another post and forced to ground. He rose and raced on, hurling a Mills bomb, which fell short. He leapt into the post, quickly knocked a German down with his fist and threatened the other in the post with his remaining grenade. One officer and twelve men emerged from a dugout and surrendered, whereupon Brown guided them back to the Australian lines under heavy German fire. Major General Rosenthal, a supporter of peaceful penetration tactics, recommended to Monash that the Victoria Cross be awarded to Wally Brown for his audacious attack, but also to encourage others to undertake raids of their own.
While British units shunned small-scale offensives, preferring to rest and rebuild their battalions and their armies, the Australians continued with these tactics. At night, active patrolling was carried out, right up to the enemy wire, which in many places was sparse and easily crossed. It was later heard that the continual activity of Australian patrols had prevented the German wiring parties from going out in fear of being killed or captured. ‘Cutting out’ sections of German trench made German patrols reluctant to extend into no-man’s-land. Australian frontline units ‘owned the night’, and it is now known that the aggressive tactics of the Australians ‘shook the German troops facing the Australian Corps’.17
As an indication of this aggressive work and the success of ‘bush tactics’, as a German general described this activity, the AIF captured eighty-five officers and 3700 men, thirty-eight trench mortars and 400 machine guns. The 22nd Battalion history notes, ‘A letter captured from a Hun in one of our raids … mentions a dread of the Australians “who creep up to our posts at night like cats, killing and carrying off”.’18
Secrecy remained key, however. There was a moment of concern in the 24th Battalion headquarters when, after establishing their headquarters in a chalk pit, they later found a German buzzer installation that looked very suspicious. A buzzer was a simple telephonic contrivance to allow Morse code to be transmitted on poor lines or over long distances. This particular installation ‘was designed to record all conversations in the vicinity and transmit them to the Hun’.19 While there was much speculation as to whether it was still able to transmit, it was a concerning time for the commanding officer. Naturally the device was quickly dismantled, but its discovery and capability remained a mystery.
Up and down the line, the diggers were getting ready for the next action. In camps behind the line, equipment was replaced and repaired, and clothes washed. Men showered and exchanged their underclothes and torn tunics, cleaned their rifles and sharpened their bayonets on the large stones set up for the purpose. Some received local leave to Amiens or the nearby villages to enjoy chips, meat and fried egg plus beer and vin rouge. A solid training programme continued, along with sports meetings and inter-battalion competitions. Swimming parties were organised in the afternoons, weather permitting, but the incessant thunder of artillery meant the war was never far away.
To be prepared for the opening of the Allied offensive’s first stage, the Australian Corps was assembled on the Somme. The 1st Division, which had been holding the line to the north, were at the time marching south from their deployment areas in Flanders around Hazebrouck, Strazeele and Merris, where they had held the German advance in March and April, and had been retained there to secure the line. They, like the Canadians who were secretly moving from Arras, were to join the rest of the Australian Corps, taking up positions behind the 4th Division.
Monash needed to bring to bear not only new tactics and the application of a range of weapons on the offensive, but also his strong, impressive intellect, his engineering experience and skills, his supportive staff and also, through his confidence and respect, his beloved AIF. Most of all, he wanted to put his men in the forefront of the offensive, at the very vanguard of the assault, for it was here he believed success and victory would come.