With the Germans in retreat and disorganised, Monash came up with a bold plan to launch two advances on 10 August to cut off and bottle up the Germans in the area between Bray and Proyart. This involved the 13th Brigade (4th Division), made up of four battalions – the 49th, 50th, 51st and 52nd – north of the Somme, and the 10th Brigade (3rd Division) made up of four battalions – the 37th, 38th, 39th and 40th – south of the Somme.
The 13th Brigade was to push along the Bray–Corbie road from Gressaire Wood, which the Americans held after the Chipilly fighting, with the aim to advance 2000 yards then turn directly south to envelop the Germans in the village of Étinehem. Simultaneously, battalions of the 10th Brigade would advance 2000 yards along the Roman road on the south side of the Somme and turn sharp left, northwards, to envelop the Germans east of Méricourt-sur-Somme.
Monash’s plan immediately drew criticism from both British and Australian staff officers. The Commanding Officer of the 37th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Knox-Knight, who was to lead the advance on the south side, left the Monash briefing grim faced, and his staff ‘received their orders quietly but “with some amazement”’.1 The battalion history notes, ‘The colonel treated the matter very gravely, and showed by his manner, if not by his words, that he considered the proposed enterprise not merely risky, but rather foolish.’2
British tank commanders, however, were more vocal, stating they ‘thought the job was mad’.3 While the advance of the 13th Brigade and their tanks was covered by Gressaire Wood, the tanks and infantry of the 10th marching along the flat, exposed Roman road would be under German observation from the time they began their approach. Knox-Knight told the British tank commander, ‘There’ll be a train load of VC’s waiting for us when we get back, if it’s a success, but we won’t want them if we get through with our lives.’4
Knox-Knight had a formidable challenge ahead. Monash’s plan required three tanks abreast to advance along the Roman road; one on the actual road, the other two in the field parallel. They were to advance with as much noise as possible to panic the Germans and confuse them about the size and intention of the advance. As it turned out, the two outrider tanks could not traverse the fields beside the road due to shell damage and deep, wide trenches in the old Amiens defence line. Instead, it was decided they would travel along the road in a column of three, with three more tanks behind the 37th and 38th Battalions.
North of the Somme, Brigadier Sydney Herring of the 13th Brigade faced fewer challenges. First, he could assemble out of sight at the back of Gressaire Wood, which at the time was ‘reeking with enemy gas and with the decomposing corpses of horses and dead Boches’,5 and then move forward without alerting the Germans. He would also be advancing along the major Bray– Corbie road that ran along the spur, with the land dropping off to the Somme on the right and the Morlancourt valley on the left. He, too, had to make an advance of 2000 yards and then a similar right-angle turn to head south across the rolling fields to the east of Étinehem, and down to the river where he would meet Knox-Knight’s 37th Battalion across the river. Monash’s plan was ingenious but risky.
On the night of 10 August, the 10th Brigade’s commander, Brigadier General Walter McNicoll, spotted German observation balloons and delayed the departure until darkness could conceal his advance. This was one of the first times tanks had been deployed at night, and the tank commanders wanted to give their men the best chance of seeing exactly where they were going over the terrain. As there was no artillery support, except for strafes into back areas of the German front, these six tanks had much work to do, and being few in number they needed support and clear direction.
The advance of the 10th Brigade along the Roman road south of the Somme began as planned. In the lead were the three tanks, then the 37th Battalion, the 38th, three more tanks then the 39th and 40th Battalions bringing up the rear. The other battalions were to follow the 37th when it made the right-angle advance at Avenue Cross to turn north, and to follow through to the Somme. Here the 37th would form a new front line extending one mile south, with the 38th and 40th continuing the line to the Roman road and the 39th stretching back. Once this had been consolidated, the 10th Brigade would have enclosed an area 2.5 miles long and 1.5 miles deep in which many Germans – including guns, equipment and stores – would be encircled. Into this would go the 9th and 11th Brigades of the 3rd Australian Division to mop up.
As the 10th Brigade advanced past La Flaque at 10 pm, the guides and the tanks had only 900 yards to go before the left turn and the drive north. Behind the three tanks came the other battalions, stretching back two miles to Méricourt-sur-Somme where the 39th was formed up. Suddenly, a German plane flying very low along the line of the road dropped a bomb on the lead tank, turning it over. The plane continued dropping bombs on the exposed line of infantry. Immediately dozens of flares rose from the German line and illuminated the road as numerous machine guns sent devastating fire into the lines of men stretching back for over a mile. Bean describes the scene: ‘Machine gun bullets now rained in torrents, sparking off the cobbles and outlining the tanks with a continuous glow.’6
Further, a fierce artillery barrage shattered the night and, along with the bombing and strafing by the German plane, the road was quickly strewn with Australian dead and wounded. Even the two battalions a mile in the rear came under this fire. Contradictory and confusing messages began passing up and down the line of the road. Word of the death of Knox-Knight was passed along; he had been hit by a fragment of anti-tank shell that had ricocheted off a nearby tree.
After the tanks halted, German fire slowed but, with the flares still illuminating the bare, flat landscape, any movement drew further fire. At about midnight, the commanders of the 38th and 40th Battalions formed a line, with the 38th parallel with the road, so they could extract the remainder of the 37th Battalion. By the time the 37th withdrew, they had 103 men killed and wounded, one quarter of their strength. While the withdrawal was underway, German aircraft continually ranged up and down the road, bombing and strafing the unprotected battalions.
Part of the advancing column included a heavily laden mule train, the men in charge being told they must, under no circumstance, allow their mules to get away as they were carrying precious ammunition. And indeed the mule drivers ‘stood to their animals throughout’,7 displaying great courage and discipline in the face of carnage and death.
When the barrage first landed, however, a stretcher-bearer by the name of Jock Young had found himself sheltering in a narrow hole. Suddenly another man landed on top of him and then a third, a mule handler, still grimly hanging onto his laden mule. The battalion history takes up the story:
The man held on like grim death to the unruly beast, which threatened at any moment to pile in on top of the three.
‘Let the blanky, blank, blank go.’ Yelled digger number 2 to the man above him.
‘I can’t,’ replied the mule driver. ‘I’ve strict orders that it must not be turned loose. Have you any authority to countermand that order?’
‘No, but I’ll ask this b—— below me. Hey there! Digger, what rank do you have?’
‘I’m a corporal,’ said the half smothered Jock Young.
‘Well you give this silly b—— authority to let this blanky mule go’.
‘Yes,’ said Young. ‘Let the damn mule go.’
And away went the mule to the relief of all concerned.8
North of the Somme, the 13th Brigade found things a little easier. The brigade formed up with the tanks, the 49th Battalion in the lead. They headed east along the Bray–Corbie road before turning right as instructed, and down the slope towards Étinehem. The Germans started to fire on the tanks, but their fire was high and wild, and missed the advancing Australians. The Germans withdrew, falling back towards Bray. Then for about 1000 yards they fired more flares, forcing the leading company, under Captain Richard Tambling, to deploy. At one point, the leading sections came under German light machine-gun fire and one of the scouts, Private Hockey, snuck around the back of the post where he killed two gunners and captured another five Germans. After this, the battalion joined up with the 50th and dug in on their objective.
At daybreak on 11 August, the Germans struck back. The Australians’ newly dug trenches, with their white chalk, easily disclosed their position to German aircraft and soon German artillery was firing around them. Losses quickly mounted, with forty-nine out of Tambling’s company of 110 men becoming casualties.
During the afternoon, a ‘line of men’9 was seen digging in. As it was not clear if they were Australians or Germans, no artillery fire was directed onto them. They were soon identified as Germans, but they made no effort to counterattack. The Germans also established a post on the northern side of the main road and captured a group of wounded Australians coming back. A number of attempts were made to free the Australians, but after more men were killed and wounded, the rescue was abandoned.
At this time, back on the Roman road to the south, the 10th Brigade withdrew and was replaced by the 11th Brigade, which immediately attacked, capturing 260 prisoners and thirteen machine guns after heavy and bitter fighting. Quickly they cleared the village of Méricourt-sur-Somme, and in the rear Cateaux Wood, which ran along the Somme.
Brigadier Herring brought together his battalion commanders and issued instructions for the clearance of the whole of the Étinehem peninsula on the night of 12 August. The Battalion Operation Memo No. 2, dated that day, specified the 51st ‘will attack and mop-up the whole of the southern area of the spur and then establish strongpoints on the lower ground covering the bridges and possible crossings of the River Somme. The 50th Battalion will operate on the left and establish a strong position covering the exits of Bray.’10
The attack went in ‘behind an excellent barrage’11 and, although the Australians were met with intermittent fire, the peninsula was secured on 14 August, with over 100 Germans captured. The two battalions, the 50th and the 51st, then linked up, but not before a party of Germans in a post halfway down the cliff turned four machine guns on them. These Germans were hard to dislodge, but when an attack went in the following night, with a supporting Stokes mortar bombardment, the German post was found abandoned. By this action, the whole area was cleared of enemy. In all, one officer and 174 Germans were captured along with twenty machine guns, one light trench mortar and five horses. Australian casualties were five ranks wounded.
With the clearing of the Étinehem peninsula by the 13th Brigade, all objectives of Monash’s plan had been obtained and consolidated. The Germans had withdrawn to Bray, exhausted and beaten. The Australians now turned their attention to attacking Bray.
Meanwhile, at the very southern end of the line, the Canadians had taken Rosières, with the Germans pulling back as the AIF’s 8th Battalion advanced. The next objective was the village of Lihons, sitting as it did on the top of a long, flat sloping hill. This was allocated to the 3rd Brigade, comprised of the outer state battalions as they were known (those from Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania), with orders to follow the 2nd Brigade in the advance on the village.
As the Australians moved forward in the dawn mist on 9 August, German machine guns raked the advancing lines and casualties mounted. Two men quickly moved forward: Private Robert Beatham and his mate Lance Corporal William Nottingham. Together they attacked four German machine guns holding up the advance, killing ten in the gun crews and capturing a further ten Germans. They then laid down covering fire using two of the captured guns, allowing the 8th Battalion to continue their advance towards Lihons. (Two days later, Beatham was again in action, this time while wounded. He rushed a German machine gun, throwing bombs and silencing it, but he was riddled with bullets and killed. For this and other actions, he was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. He is buried nearby, in Heath Cemetery.)
However, on the whole, things were not going well for the Australians on the southern end of the line, and confused orders compounded a difficult situation. As the mist rose, the advancing troops became clear targets for the Germans along the line of the Framerville–Lihons road and, without tank support and with the barrage falling 800 yards to the rear, later described in one report as ‘wretched, skimpy and without sting’,12 they struggled to push forward.
The 9th and 11th Battalions were tasked with seizing Crépy Wood and the Blue Line east of Lihons. Meanwhile, the Victorian 5th and 6th Battalions were to pass to their right or north of Crépy Wood. As they advanced, they sustained heavy casualties from the Germans along the Framerville–Lihons road and the wood itself, with German machine guns concealed in the tangle of old trenches and barbed wire.
Parties of Australians entered the wood, moving from shell hole to shell hole, one of them led by Lieutenant Hereward Gower, MC. (Gower had joined two weeks after the declaration of war, and had been wounded on the Gallipoli peninsula a few days after the landing.) Locating the guns, he worked around behind them, outflanking them and attacking. At one point he attacked a machine gun, threatening the crew with a Lewis-gun rod and forcing them to surrender, but soon after he was badly wounded.
A company from the 10th Battalion attacked through the wood again at 1 pm and was able to establish a new line on the eastern and northern edge of the wood. At 3.45 pm the Germans laid down a heavy bombardment on the wood, and two of the four posts were completely destroyed.
At 4 pm the Germans counterattacked, but only a few of them, laden with full packs and greatcoats, attempted the advance. They were driven off. Then at 5.30 pm, after a heavy barrage, the Germans again counterattacked with about 300 men. While they captured sections of 9th Battalion trench, they were driven back by the support platoons, leaving ninety of their dead in the wood. By the end of this attack, the 9th Battalion had captured ninety prisoners, eight 4.2-inch howitzers, thirty machine guns, two trench mortars and three field telephone systems. It was these captured machine guns that were to be put to good use in the days following.
As the 9th Battalion had mistakenly stopped short of its objective, digging in on the east of Crépy Wood rather than the eastern side of Auger Wood, the 11th and 12th Battalions of the 3rd Brigade were given the objective of the Blue Line. A gap had opened up between the 11th and 12th Battalions just north, however, which needed to be quickly filled. As the exhausted 9th Battalion moved to fill the gap, so did the Germans. Fighting quickly started, and the enemy was driven back.
During this fighting, a party of fifty Germans was encircled and trapped in a trench. Posting a Lewis gun to prevent them escaping, Company Sergeant Major George Walker found two men to help him. The three charged into the trench with bayonets, one being killed on the way, driving the Germans before them. The Australians threw a bomb into the crowded Germans, killing four, and the remainder surrendered. While a few escaped, Walker returned with twenty-eight prisoners, and by 9.30 am on 11 August, the gap had been filled. For this action, Walker was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Also sent to fill the gap was Lieutenant Ernest Meyers, who moved with his platoon of about thirty men against Auger Wood to the north. Again, machine guns in the wood slowed their advance but these were slowly eliminated, leaving only a heavy machine gun manned by two Germans. They were picked off, the gun captured and the wood cleared. As the Australians emerged from the wood they came across a group of Germans, some 100 to 150 strong. Meyers immediately attacked with his remaining platoon and again drove the Germans back, taking thirty prisoners and re-establishing the line by setting up small posts 100 yards apart to fill the gap. Meyers had already proven his leadership skills, and was to finish the war with a Military Cross and two bars. After this action, the 9th Battalion was sent to the rear, but their casualties had been heavy: twelve officers and 166 other ranks.
One incident mentioned in the 9th Battalion history reveals the sense of humour, or perhaps cynicism, in response to the mounting Australian casualties. Before the advance on Lihons and the fighting in Crépy Wood, a private in the battalion had made a small fortune playing two-up. As was often the case, men could not bank winnings or lodge them anywhere safely so this private went into action with 10,000 francs, worth about £370, stashed in his pack. (Soldiers were paid five shillings a day at this time.) As he advanced, a 5.9-inch shell ‘burst beside him and he was blown to pieces, bank notes and all. After the battle, his mates were loud in their lamentations that so much good money had gone up in the air, but no word of regret was heard for “poor old blank”.’13
On 15 August, battalions from the 4th Brigade moved into the area of Crépy and Auger woods, and occupied the railway embankment at the southern end of the line recently vacated by the Germans. Colonel Douglas Marks of the 13th Battalion immediately sent out patrols to continue with nibbling and peaceful penetration.
On 17 August, the Germans laid a heavy bombardment on the two woods, ‘where it seemed the enemy knew the exact position of our posts’.14 As they advanced, the men of the 13th Battalion moved through the old overgrown trenches of 1916, where they found signs of recent occupation: beer, cheese and meals on the table, showing the haste with which the Germans had evacuated. Marks, fearing a German counterattack, spread his men thinly across the front, setting up listening posts and gun positions, and sending out patrols to stall German intrusion and counterattack.
At daybreak on 19 August, the 4th Brigade’s line was again hit with a heavy German barrage. Marks quickly stood his men to, but the Germans attacked the 2nd Manchesters on the brigade’s left, driving the Englishmen out of their trenches and pushing them back. These troops had relieved the Australian 6th Brigade, and were ‘composed largely of raw soldiers, many were boys who had little war experience. The enemy (well informed as usual) took advantage of the relief of the seasoned troops stationed there to make a cleverly executed and successful raid in broad daylight, under cover of a heavy barrage.’15
Sergeant William Boyes, MM, DCM, of the 14th Battalion, seeing the German attack, rallied some of the surviving Tommies and twice led a small group against the Germans now holding the trench, shooting three of the most prominent enemy soldiers. As the battalion history relates, ‘When the enemy, strongly reinforced, swarmed back against his little party, Boyes, kneeling by a sandbag, held them practically singlehandedly at bay, playing on them with rifle grenades. Boyes was soon wounded when the Germans laid down a box barrage to cut off any assistance, but he survived and was awarded the DCM. A widower with a child, he returned to Australia in early 1919.’16
Having taken Lihons and the high ground, the Australians could see far and wide across the Canadian sector to the south, as far as Chilly and ahead to the German-held village of Chaulnes. Now the 2nd Australian Division was on the left of the 1st, astride the Roman road.
After the capture of Lihons, the Australians slowed their advance although they continued their peaceful penetration and nibbling, waiting for new orders in the wider offensive plans of Foch and Haig. The GHQ planners realised that German resistance was stiffening, and the old battlefields over which they were now fighting were creating a problem for the movement of tanks and cavalry. This vast area was strewn with overgrown trenches, rusty barbed wire and a desolate moonscape extending north to south in a band twenty to thirty miles wide. Given the success of the advance to date, the commanders wanted to keep the pressure on the Germans.
Foch wanted to take the Somme bridges near Péronne and, through General Rawlinson, ordered the Australians to push forward along the Somme on 15 August, an advance that would include the capture of Bray and Suzanne. Haig, meanwhile, issued orders on 15 August for a substantial offensive further north. This involved the British Fourth Army stretching on a front from the French army across the Roman road, up to Albert, and the Third Army from Albert to Arras. Over three days, the two British armies would advance on a thirty-three-mile front extending from Herleville, south of the Roman road, to Mercatel, 3.5 miles south of Arras, and push across the old 1916 battlefields to take Bapaume.
On 20 August, the Australian 3rd Division – made up of the 9th, 10th and 11th Brigades – moved to secure the northern side of the Somme and support the very southern flank of III Corps in the extensive British plan north of Albert. The 9th Brigade’s 34th and 35th Battalions, with the 33rd in support, relieved the 13th Brigade east of Tailles Wood and along the Bray–Corbie road to a position north of Bray, to secure the northern flank of the Australian advance, always of concern to Monash and the Australian command. This attack was orchestrated in conjunction with the British 47th Division, which would be supported by tanks and a smoke barrage.
The three Australian battalions moved up the Bray–Corbie road to the start line. Here, lying on their tapes in the darkness just before zero hour, a heavy German bombardment fell among them. Miraculously, only six men were wounded. Then, at 4.45 am, the Allied barrage fell 300 yards ahead and the men rose, shouldering their rifles and moving forward in the mist, which was quickly thickened by dust and smoke. German machine guns fired briefly, but these were quickly overrun, as was a forward command post where the commander, his officers and forty men were captured. The 34th Battalion, however, lost its lieutenant, and twenty other ranks were killed and fourteen wounded.17
At 7 am, the lead battalion was ordered to move forward ‘as the Imperial troops were reported to be retiring on the left flank, under pressure of an enemy counter-attack’.18 In the 9th Brigade war diary, an entry on the 21st states:
Enemy counter-attack commences with the result that the English troops on our left (47th Division) and the 12th Division further north retreated before the enemy who was making only a half-hearted attempt to gain ground on their front. The enemy’s attitude during this advance was one of hesitation. He was apparently surprised at the English withdrawal for no apparent reason and seemed to suspect it as being somewhat in the nature of a ruse to draw him in. A result of these operations was to leave the left flank of the Brigade entirely in the air as the English troops became very demoralised and disorganised during the course of the counter-attack.19
A 33rd Battalion officer, Captain N. Cains, reinforced the left flank and organised some of the British troops, who were then able to repulse a German counterattack on their position, inflicting ‘very heavy losses on the enemy’.20
The men had been fighting all day and were badly in need of a hot meal. At midnight, the battalion ration limbers arrived ‘in spite of heavy shelling and machine gun fire, to the men who had a hot meal whilst actually holding the enemy at bay’.21
On 23 August, the 9th Brigade’s other battalion, the 36th, left Hazel Wood, crossed the Somme and tramped up the dusty road through the ruins of Sailly-Laurette, passing large parties of German prisoners walking westwards to the POW cages around Villers-Bretonneux. The 36th then marched past Gressaire and Tailles woods, where the faint smell of gas lingered. About midnight, they reached what was then the front line a mile north-west of Bray, where they relieved the 33rd in the trenches. They were told that, two days earlier, the British battalion on the left had withdrawn several hundred yards to the rear to take advantage of a better defensive position, leaving the 33rd’s left flank exposed. Quickly posts were established to the left to connect up with the British troops. Eventually, the British troops reestablished this front line after a short barrage and some tough fighting.
Shortly after midnight on 23 August, the 10th Brigade’s 38th Battalion took over from the 39th, allowing them to move forward ready for the attack upon Bray. As the battalion moved towards the Bray railway yards, they were subjected to heavy shelling with high explosive and gas, and the men were forced to advance with their gasmasks on. At 2.30 am, a tremendous British barrage crashed into Bray and obliterated German defences, with only a few machine-gun crews surviving. One of these fired directly into the advancing Australians at twenty-five yards, but was quickly silenced by a Lewis-gun team, avoiding serious casualties.
German artillery responded, but as they were unsure where their own men were, they fired over the heads of the advancing 39th Battalion, cutting the telephone wires that had already been laid. This required some brave work by battalion runners and signallers, who dashed into the barrage to get messages through and to repair lines. Two privates, John Reeves and David Marsh, continually ran messages and returned with answers through the German barrage now falling in the rear.
During the night, the 37th Battalion was lined out in shallow posts holding an important section of the line. The young lieutenant, Lubin Robertson, whose platoon held one of these posts, knowing that a German machine gun and a British Vickers machine gun sounded very different when fired, decided to try and entice the Germans nearby into thinking it was a German post by firing the captured German machine guns in intermittent bursts into the houses nearby. At 4 am, a German approached their post. The men lay silent until the figure was right among them then they jumped up, frightening the life out of the man and capturing him. He turned out to be a machine-gun officer doing his rounds, unaware his guns had been captured.
Robertson and his men again baited their trap and waited. This time a party of five Germans approached the post, but upon being challenged, dived for cover. They were fired on and quickly surrendered. Next came a ration party of two men who were also captured. Such was their relief that they cried with joy on being captured, glad to be out of the war. When questioned, they mentioned that a group of twenty from their unit were also willing to surrender, but these men were not followed up, Robertson feeling this was a ruse to fire on the Australians.
The attack on Bray was supported by units of British cavalry, the Northumberland Hussars. At 8.45 am they had passed Australian positions on the Bray–Fricourt road and charged the German guns. Of the 150 that went out only twenty survived, as most fell victim to German machine guns or were bombed from the air. Riderless horses streamed back past the Australians, and it was a grim task for some diggers to shoot the wounded horses after this dashing failure.
On 24 August, Bray fell to the 10th Brigade, who had relieved the exhausted 9th Brigade. As they moved into Bray, mopping up and clearing houses, they found a massive supply dump mined with explosives and ready to be blown. The retreating Germans had had no time to fire these charges before their hasty withdrawal, so these stores fell into Australian hands. As the town had not been seriously damaged by Allied shellfire or in the fighting, the Australians were able to use the village houses for accommodation and administration.
By daylight, the 37th Battalion had moved east and were on the hill overlooking the next village, Suzanne. As dawn broke, a heavy ground fog enveloped the area, reducing visibility to ten yards and creating a dangerous situation for the Australians. Patrols were sent out and reports came back that the enemy were still retreating. As the fog lifted, men started sniping the Germans, firing into their backs. Others attacked a gun crew, putting it out of action.
The Germans could be seen withdrawing towards Ceylon Wood on the western outskirts of Suzanne. The wood was entered and searched by the 42nd Battalion. Meanwhile, the Tasmanians of the 40th Battalion pushed south-east towards the end of the peninsula and the village of Cappy. Here they captured twenty-nine prisoners and eight machine guns from a party of Germans who reported that, if attacked, they had been ordered to fall back on the main line of resistance in Suzanne.
To the north of the Australians around Bray, things were going well for the British divisions. The commanders of III Corps had decided to push on with the advance and take Maricourt, north-east of Suzanne, which commanded the northern slopes of the Somme.
The commander of the AIF’s 3rd Division, General Gellibrand, also decided to push forward in four stages to the northern end of the next bend of the Somme at Fargny Mill, but word came from Monash, probably a direction from Rawlinson, that the 3rd Division must stop and allow the III Corps to take Maricourt before recommencing their advance.
As the 3rd Division’s 11th Brigade advanced, with the British 58th Division on their left, it was reported that Billon Wood, the main defensive obstacle before Maricourt, had been cleared, but as the brigade’s 43rd Battalion advanced, machine-gun fire indicated that these reports were false.
By dawn on 26 August, the 11th Brigade had taken the area south of Billon Wood and the 10th Brigade was on the north-western outskirts of Suzanne. Again the Australians were ordered to wait until the British 58th Division had taken Maricourt. Yet Australian patrols remained active, particularly patrols from the 37th and 39th Battalions who were pushing forward and across the top of Suzanne, continuing their advance eastwards.
At this point, the 37th was held up by Germans firing from Murray Wood on the eastern side of Suzanne. Lieutenant Stanley Le Fevre and Sergeant Cornelius Loxton went forward with a runner. They dashed into the wood, where they found a group of Germans and charged them with fixed bayonets, putting the enemy to flight. The runner was then sent back to order a Lewis-gun team to come up to consolidate the position while Le Fevre and Loxton remained to hold the position. The Germans had retreated to another post a short distance away, so Le Fevre and Loxton charged this post, killed the crew and captured their machine gun. This action allowed the advance of the battalion and the occupation of the wood.
While this was happening, one patrol under Lieutenant Robertson and another under Lieutenant Ayers attacked the main trench, dislodging several hundred Germans who then ran across the open ground towards Vaux Wood, which bordered the next bend of the river. The men were fired on by Australian rifles and Lewis guns, and many fell. The Germans continued their retreat eastwards, exhausted and disorganised. The historian of the German 120th Infantry Regiment later wrote, ‘You could no longer call it a fight … The enemy brigades rolled up behind a mighty curtain of fire and ceremoniously crushed the motley assembly of German soldiers.’22
The Germans now fell back to Fargny Mill – a mill complex, which was the last of their designated defensive lines along the Somme – where they were resupplied with ammunition from the air.
By late August, the advance of the British Third Army south of Arras was proceeding while the Fourth Army, to the north of the Australians, continued to maintain pressure on the enemy. The 57th British Division, however, had suffered severe casualties and it was unable to capture Fargny Wood south-east of Maricourt. This task now fell to the 3rd Australian Division, who were advancing steadily through Vaux Wood on their way to Curlu.
South of the Somme, the 1st Australian Division was pushing towards Péronne. Monash, keeping a close eye on the advance of both divisions, ensured the flanks were secure and the advance was in tandem on both sides of the river.
To push the Germans from Fargny Wood and the mill complex on the river, the 41st and 44th Battalions of 11th Brigade had made a silent advance, first to Vaux Wood and then northwards into Spur Wood. At 4.55 am on 26 August, after fighting through Spur Wood, the leading company of the 41st Battalion emerged into open country, where they came into Fargny Wood and pushed forward to Fargny Mill. Here they were hemmed in by steep cliffs rising above them, the river and the Germans on the heights above.
At this time, a German machine gun that was enfilading the battalion was attacked by a Tasmanian, Lance Corporal Bernard Gordon. He had earlier been awarded a Military Medal on 8 August near Hamel and now found himself, along with his mates, in a difficult and dangerous predicament. After Gordon had led his section through heavy artillery fire and consolidated their position, he went out alone and attacked the machine gun. He killed the gunner and captured the post, which contained an officer and ten men. Gordon moved along the enemy trench, where he captured a further twenty-nine Germans and two machine guns. By the time he had finished this stunt, he had captured two officers and sixty-one other ranks and six machine guns. He was awarded the Victoria Cross and returned to Australia in January 1919.
While the exhausted 57th British Division once again continued its advance, capturing Flint Ridge above Curlu, the Australian 11th Brigade was relieved by the 9th Brigade. This brigade needed to divert men to the flanks as ‘The English troops on our left have again failed to keep up with the barrage and our left flank is subsequently exposed.’23 The 9th Brigade’s war diary went on to state, ‘The enemy is very strong in machine guns opposite our whole front … where he is offering very strong resistance.’24 Their war diary further expresses their displeasure with English communications:
English troops do not appear to have sufficiently qualified signals personnel or sufficient organisation to maintain efficient communications between the frontline and Brigade HQ. Some English brigades rely solely on runners while we usually have telephones and Fuller phones, power buzzer and amplifier sets, pigeons, message carrying rockets, visual signalling, Lucas lamp and flag, success signals, flares, contact aeroplanes and trench wireless sets as well as runners.25
Meanwhile, the 10th Brigade from the 3rd Division had its rest cancelled, and was deployed to the right of the 9th to continue to clear the next peninsula eastwards. General Gellibrand then took responsibility of 500 yards of the British 57th Division’s front at Fargny Mill. When the 35th Battalion advanced, however, they found the mill deserted and the Germans gone. Meanwhile, the 37th Battalion had cleaned up the remainder of the Suzanne bend and peninsula, and the river crossings established at Frise and Eclusier, which had been guarded by men of the 38th Battalion. During this time, Lieutenant Murie and some of his battalion mates had occupied a recently vacated large German dugout. Early the following morning, they heard noises from a separate section of the dugout and were amazed when four German officers, who had been asleep or holed up there, came out and surrendered.
On 28 August, the 38th and 40th Battalions formed skirmish lines and advanced eastwards towards Curlu. The 38th Battalion went straight for the village with the 40th in support, while the 35th Battalion wheeled around to protect their northern flank. Here the 35th took the Chapeau de Gendarme, a ‘steep scrubby cliff’,26 capturing sixty Germans and eight machine guns.
After the capture of Curlu by the 38th Battalion, their advance continued towards Hem and, by 29 August, these battalions were closing on the village of Cléry-sur-Somme, an advance of 8000 yards from Vaux Wood in less than two days. This advance was extraordinary, given the German resistance and the resupply requirements to own this ground. It was here that the Somme turned south past Péronne, forming a natural defensive barrier for the Germans.
Meanwhile, the British Third Army to the north had continued their successful advance on Bapaume, and by 23 August had decided to break through with the New Zealand Division. This put pressure on Monash to push his men forward again, asking them to give their last ounce of strength and resolve.
The AIF’s 3rd Division was now past Curlu and in sight of the high ground of Mont St Quentin, a formidable German line, the key to Péronne and the crossing of the Somme. Given their strategic importance, it was anticipated that both Mont St Quentin and Péronne would be strongly contested by the enemy. But first, Cléry-sur-Somme and the bridgeheads to the immediate west of Mont St Quentin and Péronne needed to be fought for.