Emidio Spinelli

e9783110364958_i0351.jpg contra Νοούμενα: Sextus Empiricus, the Notion of Place and the Pyrrhonian Strategy at Work

1

The main goal of this paper is clear: I wish to examine the prickly question of the philosophical notion of place (τóπος), as it is presented and discussed by Sextus Empiricus, especially in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (=PH 3 119–135).354 Let me point out in advance, however, that I will not enter into any kind of minute philological discussion; and in addition, that I will not focus on the parallel passages about e9783110364958_i0352.jpg in Sextus’ Against the Physicists (=M 10).355

Right from the beginning I wish to stress that the passage about place in PH (and especially the initial and final paragraphs on which I will be exclusively focusing my attention) can be deemed a clear case-study of Sextus’ polemical attitude and at the same time of his genuine Pyrrhonian point of view. Accordingly, in this paper I will endeavour only to outline the general ‘doxographical’ trustworthiness of Sextus’ reconstruction, while especially concentrating both on the main features of his specific dialectical strategy and on his final approach to a possible and coherent sceptical outlook (with the ethical consequences this entails).

2

Without entering suddenly in medias res, I deem it necessary, if we wish to correctly understand the proper framework of Sextus’ philosophical effort in PH, to begin with the most important presentation of what he seems to consider a sort of ‘basic definition’ of the authentic ‘nature’ of his ἀγωγή:

Scepticism is an ability (δύναμις) to set out oppositions among things which appear (τὰ φαινóμενα) and are thought of (τὰ νοούμενα) in any way at all (e9783110364958_i0353.jpg ), an ability by which, because of the equipollence (ἰσοσθένεια) in the opposed objects (πράγματα) and accounts (λóγοι), we come first to suspension of judgement (ἐποχή) and afterwards to tranquillity (ἀταραξία).356

This description, which seems to offer a peculiar form of philosophical ‘know-how’, while adopting a method possibly familiar to Aenesidemus as well (cf. D.L. 9, 78) and offering a functional résumé of some sceptical features clearly listed at PH 1, 7,357 is so decisive for Sextus that in the following paragraph (PH 1, 9) he immediately explains the exact meaning he wants to attribute to each of its parts.

First of all, although he is clearly aware of the multifarious semantic value of the term δύναμις, he does not want to stress any of its philosophical (and therefore inevitably subtle or even fancy) meanings; he rather uses it in its simple occurrence as a sort of handy linguistic substitute for the ‘neutral’ verbal expression “to be able to”. Thanks to this initial caveat we are immediately informed of a more general trait of Sextus’ attitude, i. e. his conscious choice of resorting – as far as possible – to utterances and wordings reflecting a common everyday linguistic habit or συνήθεια.358

As concerns φαινóμενα, Sextus seems to be equally precise. “At present/ now” they are intended simply as “objects of perception”. The presence of νῦν not only indicates a chronological restriction but also alludes to the fact that the same term can be (and indeed is) used by Sextus in another way in different contexts.359

The linguistic freedom adopted by Sextus in order to avoid any strictly dogmatic, semantic or syntactic, correspondence is surely at work also in the case of the formula “in any way at all” (e9783110364958_i0354.jpg), since this can be ap plied – according to a widespread technique of loose usage or even καταχρηστικῶς in Sextus’ jargon (see below, pp. 162 – 163) – to more elements of the ‘basic definition’ we are examining: not only to the word δύναμις for reinforcing its plain meaning, but also and perhaps especially to the continuous discovery (or even invention) of multiple cross-oppositions. This last remark opens the way to any kind of antithesis between e9783110364958_i0355.jpg and φαινóμενα, or νοούμενα and νοούμενα, or indeed – a possibility particularly interesting for our purposes and relevant to PH 3, 119–35, as we shall see – between e9783110364958_i0356.jpg and νοούμενα. But it also enables the Sceptic to take a further step: he can apply that formula directly to the objects of any opposition (whether e9783110364958_i0357.jpg and/or νοούμενα) and therefore accept them once again simply or loosely, without any additional question about their epistemological or ontological status.360

3

All these elements of Sextus’ overall strategic definition of the effective nature and structure of his scepticism are the background against which we can also test his polemical analysis of many aspects of the so-called εἰδικὸς λóγος, explicitly dedicated to “each of the parts of what they call philosophy” (cf. PH 1, 5–6). Apart from his attacks against dogmatic logic (in PH 2) and ethics (in PH 3, 168ff.), this seems to be particularly true in the case of the section on physics of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH 3, 1–167). Sextus opens it by recalling another feature of his method: the main target of any sceptical critique will be the demolition of the more general theses and accounts put forward by dogmatic schools, without wasting any time on the more specific characteristics of their doctrine.361 Such a method will also impose on Sextus the additional duty of selecting for each topic discussed the most relevant and significant positions, in order to ensure that he will be presenting to his reader the most comprehensive reconstruction of any argument he might be debating.

One can attempt to test the coherence of Sextus’ methodology not only by analysing the chapters he immediately devotes to many central topics of the dogmatic approach to physics,362 but – as stated at the beginning of this paper – also and especially, in my opinion, by insisting on the compact section he writes about the notion of place/τóπος.

As a general and introductory remark, also useful for expressing a careful (and in no way naïve) judgement on Sextus’ doxographical richness or even faithfulness, one should subscribe to Keimpe Algra’s conclusion. By selecting in PH 3, 119–135 two basic dogmatic doctrines (the Stoic and the Peripatetic), “Sextus’ accounts on place basically cover all there was to cover for someone writing in the early Imperial period”.363 Before selecting any philosophical definition of τóπος, however, Sextus applies here one of the caveats clearly expressed and employed in other passages from his works.364 He distinguishes two senses in which one can speak of place (PH 3, 119): ‘strictly’ (κυρίως) and ‘loosely’ (καταχρηστικῶς).365 The first sense indicates what encloses something in a proper way (e. g. the air that surrounds me);366 the second must be intended ‘intuitively’367 or according to ‘the sloppy usage’,368 as when one very simply says something like “the city is my place”.

Sextus explicitly states that he will concentrate his attacks only on the first point. What does this exclusion of the second sense mean? Although one can speculate about his decision, the special occurrence here of the adverb καταχρη e9783110364958_i0358.jpg seems to be clear enough, since “Sextus presumably allows that things have places in the loose sense, a sense accepted by common sense and not invented by the Dogmatists”.369 Indeed, each time we find the semantic family linked to κατάχρησις in Sextan works, this is in relation to everyday life and its usages/habits; and in addition we are told that all those aspects are not called into question by the Sceptic, but rather are a basic feature of his global attitude for facing the world and acting370 within it. Also in the case of the existence of place, therefore, what Sextus would like to stress is the fact that regardless of the fancy disagreements due to the clash of dogmatic doctrines, any genuine Sceptic could not deny the evidence of his being located somewhere, in a place.371 If and only if we decide to play the game of abstract philosophical disputes, we are then invited to turn our back on the real world and enter into a dangerous, parallel universe. Here plenty of strange theories are available, even for speculating against τὰ φαινóμενα. This is the only ‘Matrix-dimension’ where even Sextus admits – to return to a passage quoted before – that “if we do propound arguments directly against what is apparent, it is not because we want to reject what is apparent that we set them out, but rather to display the rashness of the Dogmatists” (PH 1, 20).

We can thus understand and explain not only why the discussion will be restricted to the first sense of place alone, but also and above all why one of the conflicting, but not definitively overwhelming parties will propose its conclusions exactly on the basis of that evidence/ἐνάργεια, which should be sufficient for the Sceptic not involved in the philosophical enterprise, but consciously confined to the needs of e9783110364958_i0359.jpg and e9783110364958_i0360.jpg.372

Given such a qualified inclusion of e9783110364958_i0361.jpg too among the possible elements proper to a philosophical διαφωνία, Sextus can accordingly quote three fixed positions representative of all the alternatives available about place strictly speaking:

  1. some admitted it;
  2. some ruled it out;
  3. others suspended judgement about it.

First of all and from a textual point of view, Sextus’ use here of the past tense (ἔθεσαν…, ἀνεῖλον…, ἐπέσχον…) seems very significant to me: it means that he wants to describe three actual/historical positions and therefore to give more force both to the e9783110364958_i0362.jpg and to the precision of his doxographical report.

Secondly, it must be noted that:

  • – the alternative (a) can be supported by an appeal (a more or less direct one, as we shall see) to the force of ἐνάργεια (cf. PH 3, 120–121), as well as by elaborate philosophical arguments put forward either by the Stoics (cf. PH 3, 124) or the Peripatetics (cf. PH 3, 131);
  • – behind both the counter-arguments against (a) in all its aspects (contra evidence: PH 3, 122–123; contra Stoics: PH 3, 125–130; contra Peripatetics: PH 3, 131–133; more generally contra some definitional features of place: PH 3, 134) and the final appeal to e9783110364958_i0363.jpg (cf. PH 3, 135) it is possible perhaps to detect the active presence of a sceptical enterprise, in its negative and positive features.

Let me remark in advance that the defence of the real existence (or ὕπαρξις) of place is based on some allegedly evident and hence undeniable facts,373 which seem to echo at least some of the e9783110364958_i0364.jpg already quoted by Aristotle in his Physics. Apart from the presence of parts of place (right/left, up/down, in front/ behind),374 Sextus alludes also to the well-known phenomenon of changing place at different/successive times (or ἀντιμετάστασις),375 while adding as an example a personal experience: “where my teacher used to talk there I now talk”.376 The dependence from Aristotelian material seems to become certain not only when Sextus presents as a fact what is rather a precise philosophical theory strongly defended by Aristotle (i. e. the different place which light and heavy things occupy by nature/φύσει),377 but also when he invokes the auctoritas of Hesiod’s poetic stress on the role of χάος378 (although he also adds some terminological speculations on its etymology). The final argument pro the existence of place perhaps also shows (at least partially) a similar Aristotelian flavour and seems to be immediately based on facts, although it is presented as a sort of double modus ponens:

The battery of Sextus’ objections against the ‘party of evidence’, however, reveals his distance from any Aristotelian method, since he does not want to use facts in order to produce a more refined and comprehensive theory.382 He simply aims to oppose not only the denial of any force to poetry for the discussion of philosophical topics, but also some negative counter-arguments, maybe of Pyrrhonian origin383 and based explicitly on the charge of circularity or of petitio principii. However, these do not always appear cogent and convincing, so that Sextus himself decides to give more force – or better a more systematic variety (e9783110364958_i0367.jpg ποικιλώτερον, PH 3, 123) – to his pars destruens through a chameleon-like attack against the more powerful dogmatic stances/e9783110364958_i0368.jpg available ‘on the market’ at that time.

4

I do not wish here to provide any in-depth analysis of the paragraphs of PH 3, 123–133 in which Sextus reports and at the same time criticises first Stoic theories and then Aristotle’s (and/or Peripatetic) positions. As I already mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the job has already been done – very well – by Keimpe Algra, not least through a close engagement with the parallel passage in M 10, 1–36.384

All questions of Quellenforschung aside, what I am pursuing is a different goal. For I here wish to focus on the last two paragraphs of PH 3, devoted to the concept of place, since they effectively enable us to appreciate at least two elements:

4.1

So let us start from PH 3, 134. First of all, it is worth noting that the objections raised in this paragraph are labelled in a very specific way by Sextus himself: for they are formulated ‘in a more general manner’, i.e. κοινóτερον. In particular, it is worth analysing the function which Sextus would appear to be assigning this term. On other occasions too, he uses it for significant points in his argument, apparently for the same purposes. One may refer to several passages in Sextus’ writings,386 starting from the locus difficilis (or indeed terribilis, as far as conflicting interpretations go) PH 1, 13. But I cannot and do not wish to focus on it here.387

In support of my overall analysis, just to provide an example, I might refer to at least three passages from Sextus’ corpus in which the presentation of more general arguments (or rather of arguments with a more generally philosophical tone, and which are also regarded as the most important or at any rate most effective ones on a polemical level, possibly on account of their genuine sceptical origin) is connected – in a direct and intentional way, I believe – to the Pyrrho nist’s aim of achieving a correct ethical condition.

First off, let us consider a very important section in PH 2, 251– 252, devoted to an attack against sophisms, “that lead not only to falsity but also to other absurdities”. Without going into the details of the complex structure of this specific polemic raised by Sextus,388 we should note that in one of the turning points in his argument he claims that there are two alternatives to each reasoning: this will lead to a conclusion that is either inadmissible or to be necessarily accepted. In the latter case, in the face of necessity, the Pyrrhonian will have to grant his assent, with no further problems. In the former case, by contrast, if the conclusion suggested turns out to be absurd, even if it is presented in highly plausible terms, we should not yield to προπέτεια/rashness, which is a typically dogmatic vice. In other words, we must not assent to this absurd conclusion, but rather demand it be put aside, if we are really striving for the truth and wish to avoid engaging in childish drivel. In order to strengthen this stance, Sextus draws upon an example (which had possibly already been used by Chrysippus, albeit in a different context, namely a discussion on sorites).389 Sextus also refers to elements that presuppose the concept of space (as well as that of motion), without questioning their existence or theoretical legitimacy. The text (PH 2, 252) reads as follows:

If a road is leading us to a precipice, we do not drive ourselves over the precipice because there is a road leading to it; rather, we leave the road because of the precipice: similarly, if there is an argument leading us to something agreed to be absurd, we do not assent to the absurdity because of the argument – rather, we abandon the argument because of the absurdity.

The outcome of this ‘supplementary enquiry’ and of this rejection of rash assent can only be a cautious suspension of judgement, which is even presented here as a kind of conscious and expanded extension of a requirement upheld by Chrysippus himself and his followers, “when the sorites is being propounded”.390

The second passage in which arguments presented “in a more general manner” prove philosophically compelling while having what is almost certainly a familiar Pyrrhonian air is the conclusion of the ethical section of PH 3, which contains a radical attack against all possible forms of education. Here, in § 270, Sextus sets out to criticise the specific idea of an art of living and the alleged possibility of teaching it. Before doing so, however, he applies the adverb κοινóτερον to the range of arguments he has developed so far against the subsistence and ‘conceivability’ of the fundamental elements constituting the educational process (namely what is taught, teachers, learners and the way of learning). No further explanations are provided as to what value should be assigned to this term. Luckily, however, the topics discussed in these closing paragraphs of PH are also explored in two other sections of Sextus’ corpus: at the end of M 11 and at the beginning of M 1. Without wishing to overlook or downplay the differences between these parallel treatments, it will be useful for our purposes to take note of one detail. The anti-educational arguments which are succinctly presented as being of a more general sort in PH 3, 270 are labelled in the same way not just in the parallel passage M 11, 243, but also and most significantly in M 11, 217, since they reflect a selection drawn by Sextus from among his most important arguments (τὰ κυριώτατα). The latter, in turn, are described in M 1, 7 as “the effective arguments” (e9783110364958_i0369.jpg): a different and significant expression which is nonetheless used once again to emphasise the polemical effectiveness of attacks carried out κοινóτερον.391

Finally a third passage is worth mentioning, M 1, 270. Here Sextus claims that the criticism he has levelled so far may be taken to suggest that even “the part of grammar concerning poets and prose-writers” has been potentially destroyed. But he then adds:

none the less, we shall attempt to examine what can be said on a general level (κοινóτερον) in this part too, especially because the grammarians have so much confidence in it that they dare to use it to make grammar’s usefulness for life and necessity for happiness plausible.392

Leaving aside the developments of Sextus’ subsequent criticism of poets and prose-writers, and taking the explicit and confirmed ethical relevance of this polemic against the grammarians as a given, in this case too – as in those previously examined – it seems to me that Sextus’ use of more general arguments (κοινóτερον) “is a remainder of his overall method of attacking the most important, most fundamental tenets of his opponents, rather than the details”.393

Thanks to the three passages just discussed, we have, in sum, strategically relevant examples, in which Sextus insists on the special character of sceptical attacks. Often described elsewhere by means of images taken from the military world, as for example that of the siege, and distinguished from the polemical practices of, for example, the sceptical Academy,394 such attacks aim not so much to insist on matters of detail or those peripheral to this or that dogmatic theory, but rather to demolish its fundamental principles and essential elements. This then becomes the target of Sextus’ critiques: according to an Ockham-like principle of economy, one needs to concentrate the fire of one’s polemic against the foundations of the dogmatic edifice, since only by totally knocking them down will the collapse of all the other theoretical aspects that depend on them also be guaranteed.

If we return to the passage from PH 3, 134 we are concerned with, then, we can now better appreciate its value and significance. The text reads:

More generally, the following points can also be made. If there is such a thing as a place, it is either a body or incorporeal. But each of these is at an impasse, as we have suggested. Place too, then, is at an impasse. A place is thought of in relation to the body whose place it is. But the account of the reality of bodies is at an impasse. So too, therefore, is the account of place. The place of anything is not eternal. But if it is said to come into being, it is found to be non-subsistent since generation is not real.

This paragraph too deploys more general arguments against the concept of place. The latter, however, is understood in its specific sense – as we have seen – stripped of its simple communicative and pragmatic value (‘this is my city’), so as to justify its use in more sophisticated terms or at any rate according to what is regarded as a unique definition.395 In his attack in PH 3, 134, Sextus draws upon the most significant and general notions employed by his opponents, with the added corollary that all these notions are presented as being mutually interconnected: either they all stand or they all fall.

In this case, Sextus chooses to base his polemic on the highest genus in Stoic ontology (τὸ τί), under which we should count both bodies and what is incorporeal. Consistently with this, he poses a dilemma: if place is ‘something’, then (according to those dogmatist theories which Sextus draws upon and at the same time fights the most) it can only be either a body or an incorporeal.

Without recalling in any detail the objections raised just a few paragraphs earlier, but with the advantage of being able to easily bring his readers’ minds back to them, Sextus unambiguously rules out both alternatives. Both bodies and incorporeals, he notes, have been subjected to e9783110364958_i0370.jpg and their non-subsistence has clearly been demonstrated in PH 3, 38–55. This e9783110364958_i0371.jpgand the impossibility it entails of affirming the existence of place extend – almost as if by transitive property – to place itself, which apparently cannot be accounted for in any legitimate and valid way.

After this first attack, Sextus’ argument changes its focus, while preserving its general character and indissolubly linking the two concepts of place and body. It would be difficult to deny that thinking of place means thinking of it as the place of a body, as the place in which a body de facto finds itself or might potentially find itself; but if this is the case, and if the aforementioned objections raised against the body remain valid, then along with bodies place too must prove non-subsistent.

The last argument which deserves the label of ‘more general’ sets off from yet another consideration. Possibly building upon a previous objection raised against the Peripatetic stance, it would appear to assume that the place each thing occupies cannot be eternal. If this is the case, then, one must admit that the place in question had an origin, a γένεσις. Here too, without going into any details, through a kind of effective cross-referencing Sextus simply refers to the objections he raised against generation (and at the same time against corruption) not just a little earlier, in PH 3, 132–133,396 but also in a more extensive way in PH 3, 109–114.

It seems clear to me that these arguments of Sextus in PH 3, 134 suitably fit within the framework of the general strategy we have just discussed. They target the basic points or concepts – not details – upheld by Sextus’ opponents by resorting to a range of weapons typical of the Pyrrhonian arsenal: from hypothetical dilemmas to the correlated demolition of two objectives, while significantly latching on to the sceptical polemical approach which has already been established and presented to the reader in the previous sections targeting dogmatic physics.

4.2

The fact that Sextus’ aim at this point is to make his own polemic both as succinct and as effective as possible is shown by the very opening sentence of PH 3, 135. Let us read the full passage:

It is possible to make many other points too; but, in order not to lengthen our account, we should infer that the Sceptics are confounded by the arguments (λóγοι) and discountenanced by the evident impressions (ἐνάργεια); hence we subscribe to neither side, so far as what is said by the Dogmatists goes, but suspend judgement about place.

Among the sceptical objections against the philosophical and dogmatic view of place, which had possibly been developed in a sweeping and systematic way ever since Aenesidemus,397 it would be possible to find many other arguments intended to stress the aporetic character of this notion. Yet this is not the method Sextus adopts. Rather, he wishes to embrace the criterion of economy in exposition as a guiding thread consistently running throughout PH. For this reason, Sextus draws his analysis of place to a close by explicitly and unambiguously stating that he does not wish ‘to lengthen’ his argument/λóγος. The verb used here (e9783110364958_i0372.jpg) is a sort of terminus technicus. Sextus employs it in those cases in which he seeks to programmatically express his desire not to over-extend his anti-dogmatic polemic through the method of attack which – as already men tioned – was considered as typical of the sceptical Academy.398

Sextus, then, regards his discussion up until this point as being perfectly adequate for justifying the aim he has set himself, as far as the level of philosophical λóγος is concerned. Sextus’ discussion should be seen as confirming the need to ultimately embrace the cautious Pyrrhonian idea of a healthy suspension of judgement on the matter of the conceivability and subsistence (or ὕπαρξις) of place.399

So what has this discussion revealed? Sextus sums up the opposition (μάχη, according to his technical terminology) which has characterised his analysis (like many others developed on the level of a clash between different but equally plausible δóξαι) by using two particularly significant verbs and making one crucial clarification.

Sextus argues that on the one hand the λóγοι of dogmatic philosophers have proven compelling, to the point of confusing even the Sceptics.400 On the other hand, however, what has elicited bewilderment and confusion (again among the Sceptics) has been the evidence invoked, or to be more precise the evidence used as part of the philosophical argument (or even included in initial claims of an already Aristotelian bent).401

Sextus ultimately provides a crucial and in my view perfectly uncontroversial clarification regarding the consequences of the equipollence of νοούμενα and φαινóμενα. This certainly leads to e9783110364958_i0373.jpg – as indeed it must – because there is no way of choosing between opposite theses not in an absolute sense, but rather in a qualified and circumscribed way, which is to say only with regard to the arguments upheld by the Dogmatists (“so far as what is said by the Dogmatists goes”).402 Yet in life – in the real, common and eventful life of our everyday experiences – this might not be the only available option.

5

Might a different scenario be envisaged then? In a way, yes. Taking a careful and honest look at the conclusion reached by PH 3, 135, we might sum it up by saying that even the discussion of place presented in PH may undoubtedly and consistently be described as an opposition and theoretical clash between φαινóμενα and νοούμενα. Perhaps, then, the most correct and legitimate way to read and interpret this conclusion – without embarking on some bold speculation –would be in the light of the text we have set off from: PH 1, 8 (see above, p. 160). For this is where Sextus expounds – in a direct and highly programmatic manner – the fundamental premises for measuring the consistency of the Pyrrhonian ‘essence’. Without yielding to the temptation of diving into the complex debate on the alleged need for ‘insulation’ and without all too easily levelling a charge of self-contradiction against Pyrrhonism, which always seems to be forced on the defensive and to be brushed to the side as philosophically inconsistent, it might be worth examining Sextus’ discussion about e9783110364958_i0374.jpg within the framework of the methodological guidelines he claims to be following right from the start and which he constantly applies in his pursuit of happiness. It is on this level that many of the analyses made of the passage in question so far would appear to have overlooked an important, or indeed decisive, factor. Let me explain what I mean by this.

First of all, we should ask ourselves about the nature of this conflict of stances concerning the notion of place which I have sought to reconstruct, at least in its essential outline. This question may adequately be addressed by considering those paragraphs in which Sextus clearly describes – by drawing a distinction all too often ignored by his interpreters – not the aim of Pyrrhonian philosophers but rather the double aim that characterises their ethical choices and lives (cf. PH 1, 25 – 30). It is difficult to deny that at one level the aim of Pyrrhonism is pursued by engaging with opposite δóξαι, or rather, to use Sextus’ terminology, that it exclusively applies “in matters of opinion” (ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς). Lest we ignore, and hence betray, the premises of Sextus’ genuine stance, we should also bear in mind, however, that within this interpretative framework Sceptics can reasonably strive to attain the specific, albeit not sole and all-embracing, goal of e9783110364958_i0375.jpg – tranquillity or imperturbability. As is clearly shown by the opening passage of PH 1, 8, e9783110364958_i0376.jpg stems from the suspension of judgement.403 This imperturbability is in turn determined by the equal force of λóγοι on the one hand (stricto sensu philosophical λóγοι or at any rate ones that are also philosophically conditioned by an appeal to ἐνάργεια, as is usually the case with mere men, or simple men, or – to use a more cogent expression – οἱ ἰδιῶται) and of πράγματα on the other, which is to say something which may even have to do with all that concerns the crude and concrete conduct of our lives.

All this will hold and prove compelling for a Sceptic if and only if it is set against the dogmatist claim to be able to ascertain the truth or falsehood of our statements concerning what surrounds us. Do I wish to know, beyond the slightest doubt, that I am in a place, rather than merely accept that I appear to be in a place? Indeed, do I also wish to ascertain, in a strong epistemic sense, just what this place essentially is and what justifications I can or ought to adduce in order to be able to both envisage it and declare it to be ontologically existent? In this difficulty lies the origin of the genuinely sceptical approach in the philosophical field:

For Sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are true and which false, so as to become tranquil; but they came upon equi-pollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they suspended judgement. And when they suspended judgement, tranquillity in matters of opinion followed fortuitously.404

6

Yet, is it possible to live exclusively e9783110364958_i0377.jpg? I might be intellectually paralysed if I decide to apply a philosophical λóγος more or less backed by some evidence or based on mere speculation to the question: is Anacapri the place of the conference I will be attending? Or again: how can I reach my place of departure, the railway station, given that the very concept of place is unthinkable, non-subsistent and subject to ἀπορία?

But if I then receive a telephone call and one of the organisers reminds me that my ferry will be leaving from the port on Thursday morning at twelve, or that my hotel is on Anacapri and that the conference session will be taking place in ‘Villa Orlandi’, since I have given my (wholly pragmatic and – I should add – not very philosophical and by now rather compelling) adherence to this event, can I still afford to be paralysed? In other words, to quote Sextus, if I switch from the level in which I am simply caught “in matters of opinion” to the one he strikingly describes as being marked by necessity (be it natural or cultural – in other words, when dealing with “matters forced upon us”, when we ‘fall’ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις),405 I can no longer pursue the utter lack of perturbation as my aim. Rather, I will be pursuing a different goal: μετριοπάθεια, or ‘moderation of feeling’, since

We do not, however, take Sceptics to be undisturbed in every way – we say that they are disturbed by things which are forced upon them; for we agree that at times they shiver and are thirsty and have other feelings of that kind. (30) But in these cases ordinary people (οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται) are afflicted by two sets of circumstances: by the feelings themselves, and no less by believing that these circumstances are bad by nature. Sceptics, who shed the additional opinion that each of these things is bad in its nature, come off more moderately even in these cases.406

What guides me in this context cannot be the abstract force of philosophical arguments. If I accept the presence of a place or rather the fact that I can speak of place in broad or even ‘inaccurate’ terms (“the city is my place”, as PH 1, 119 states), and turn it into a non-contradictory pragmatic suggestion, this is because I can regulate my life on the basis of what everyday experience has offered me in the past and continues to offer me today. This is what Sextus means when, against the charge of ἀπραξία, he claims that the Pyrrhonist can act (be active)407 “according to the non-philosophical observance” (e9783110364958_i0378.jpg τήρησιν, M 11, 165). This is what he wishes to stress again in PH 1, 23–24. Sextus rejects the charge of inactiveness (ἀνενεργησία), after having passively and unwittingly accepted τὸ e9783110364958_i0379.jpg as a criterion for action explicitly removed from any further form of e9783110364958_i0380.jpg (cf. PH 1, 22); he rejects it by stating – ἀδοξάστως, i.e. without any wish to turn his claim into a dogmatic assertion –that he leads his life e9783110364958_i0381.jpg: “according to the observance of everyday life”. This might not be a very flowing or charming translation,408 but it avoids inappropriately introducing the notion of ‘ordinary’ in the description of one’s dependence on βίος. The latter is not a field for abstract speculation, since it has to do with “matters forced upon us” and thus imposes a series of inevitable points of reference, on a natural level (given that as human beings we cannot avoid perceiving, thinking and experiencing emotions and affections) as much as on a cultural level (given that we are not living on Mars but in the here and now – in both a geographical and historical sense – and are constantly conditioned by our education, by the rules of the community to which we belong and by the technical know-how which all around us seeks to put experience to the service of our own needs).409

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By drawing upon what is so clearly stated in PH 1, 23 – 24 for our own purposes, we can therefore provide a different reading of the acceptability in Sextus’ eyes of a plain and straightforward notion of τóπος:

I do believe that this strategy represents the real core of the Pyrrhonian approach to life.412 In the eyes of the Pyrrhonist, too much theory, an over-abundance of philosophical λóγος and the clash of beliefs claiming to be absolutely true represent a disease to be fought in different ways, by administering drugs of various strength at dosages that vary from case to case, depending on what dogmatist intoxication lies behind the disease.413 If even the simple determination of the place in which we find ourselves or act falls within this framework, then we must deploy sceptical δύναμις. In such a way, we will be able to neutralise opposite and conflicting theses, reach equipollence, and attain the neutral and at the same time cautious outcome of ἐποχή, thus achieving imperturbability – at least (or rather only) “in matters of opinion”, including with regard to the concept of place and its subsistence.

If instead we wish to leave the bar in which we find ourselves (a place) and head for our cousin Harry’s house (another place), since the two of us have planned to go to the stadium (yet another place), we can do so without having to subject to ἀπορία either the whole of our previous experiences, by virtue of which we have grown acquainted with these places, or the linguistic habits (according to the empirical e9783110364958_i0386.jpgof γραμματιστική, accepted even by Sextus!) by which we refer to them, simply for the purpose of communicating effectively – calling ‘bar’ the bar, ‘house’ the house and ‘stadium’ the stadium.414 The Pyrrhonist will not waste time fighting over words: e9783110364958_i0387.jpgis something quite foreign to him (cf. PH 1, 195 and 206). Nor, we should add, will he fight against the standard points of reference in everyday life, those sustained and upheld by συνήθεια. So he will not be engaging in any ‘τοποσμαχεῖν’ either, if I may use a fanciful and perhaps inappropriate neologism – one employed καταχρηστικῶς, no doubt, yet useful to counter the all too stifling tyranny of philosophical λóγος, be it that of the professional (and almost parochial) sort or that which has by now crystallised in the opinions of the ἰδιῶται.

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In order to understand this Pyrrhonian acceptance of the elements which regulate common life, all we need to do, perhaps, is suppose that behind Sextus’ pragmatically effective solution (which was probably influenced by the position of ancient medical Empiricism) we find the acceptance of a form of empirical generalisation.415 This seems to be valid if and only if we reject the dogmatic tendency to establish firm, stark and necessary inferential connections; indeed, we have to limit ourselves to the acceptance of just those connections guaranteed by repeated and constant empirical observation, by that ‘everyday observance’ that can offer us a useful, even attractive, model of life, possibly because it can help us avoid any strong (but also rash and therefore dangerous) commitment to strictly dogmatic, even absolute, concepts and values.

Provided we do not arrogantly expect to pass judgement on every aspect of reality according to the philosophical λóγος; and provided we refuse to make a rash claim to truth, whether in the form of an absolute positive dogmatism or in that of a rigid negative one, we can perhaps not only cherish the hope of attaining an open and ever-searching intellectual condition (cf. PH 1, 1– 3), but also –and most importantly – let ourselves go and accept our own Gegebenheit (or better Vorgegebenheit), ordering some of its aspects through a mild empiricist approach and living – in a full and straightforward sense – even without philosophy.

Thus, well before Wittgenstein, Sextus reached the following conclusion:

just as it is not impossible for the person who has climbed to a high place by a ladder to knock over the ladder with his foot after his climb, so it is not unlikely that the sceptic too, having got to the accomplishment of his task by a sort of step-ladder – the argument showing that there is not demonstration – should do away with this argument,416

as well as with any other argument. Beyond the philosophical (and instrumental) ladder, perhaps, there may actually be a high (and at the same time very ‘ordinary’) place, namely: life – the uncontroversial, even customary or conventional life common to all of us in its simplest (natural and cultural) forms and in its most immediate approach.417