Captured in an unexpected spur-of-the-moment coup on March 7, the bridge at Remagen was an accident of war and, despite the romance and drama of its capture, not entirely desired–at least ahead of time. Of all the possible crossing sites, it was at the bottom of the list for good reasons. At Remagen, the Rhine flowed through a gorge rather than an open valley. Directly east of the river the Westerwald, an area of sharply-compartmented wooded hills is at its most rugged and reaches right to the river.
Nevertheless, it was the only Rhine bridge to fall into allied hands in usable condition, though so damaged by the failed German demolition attempt, compounded by possible bomb damage, that it collapsed on March 17. Although Eisenhower was never tempted to shift from his strategy of making the main attempt in a massive thrust through the area north of the Ruhr, coupled with a lesser thrust up the Frankfurt–Kassel corridor, where, in both routes, excellent terrain for armour and good communications favoured rapid advance, the opportunity was exploited. The immediate response to, first the opportunity, then the fact of capture, was to push everything at hand across the bridge to build, defend and extend the bridgehead.
Rapidly, however, perspective returned and further development of the bridgehead was carefully regulated, the main emphasis continuing to be on crossing sites that, while lacking a surviving bridge, led to terrain and communications suitable for continuing the advance into the heart of Germany.
The German reaction was surprisingly slow, disorganized and inadequate. The fact that the American Ninth Army had made no immediate attempt on reaching the Rhine to cross over had lulled the Germans into thinking the Americans planned to mop up the west bank before crossing. Command relationships along the river were confused, cross-cutting (and under-cutting), a confusing jumble of competing responsibilities and claims of competence between party-controlled Wehrkreis jurisdictions that were supposed to be turned over to the army as the fighting approached, conflicts between regular field-army and replacement army, Luftwaffe Flak units and, as if that was not enough, changes in assignment of responsibility between different army commands that came at a bewildering pace.
Much German attention was focused on getting the maximum number of units, the maximum amount of fighting-men and irreplaceable equipment, back across the river before they were cut off. That, of course, was in competition with the pressure to blow the bridges in time to deny an Allied crossing. Hitler’s fear that preparation of defences to the rear would act like magnets and draw troops attention from defending the front, combined with the shortage of fighting units, meant that there were few if any usable combat units available for rapid response subsequent to the capture of the bridge.
The initial German response was fragmented and ineffective, allowing the Americans to get 8,000 men across the bridge before there was a significant German reaction. The German response was not up to the task it faced. The Panzer Lehr Division was already heavily involved, as described above, in combating, first the Canadian advance down the west bank of the Rhine in Operation ‘Veritable’, and then in battling the American Ninth Army’s Operation ‘Grenade’. It suffered extremely heavy losses in the Wesel bridgehead.
In MS # B–850, in his ‘Preliminaries’, Hudel details how, on 9 March, Kampfgruppe Hudel, (under his own command) was hastily thrown together and sent to Remagen.
Index for MS A # 970
| Bridgehead, Extension of an important bridgehead by continuous attacks | 326–7 | |
| Bridgehead, fragmented armoured attack to eliminate same | 326–7 | |
| Armour–forming an ‘extremely strong armoured group’ for the attack | 329 | |
| -attack, fragmented, against the bridgehead | 326–7 |
Fritz Bayerlein, Ober Ursel 26 March 1946
former Lt. Gen.
To
HISTORICAL DIVISION
Section CENTRAL EUROPE
Captain SCOGGIN
In my work about ‘Remagen Bridgehead’, Appendix 1, [tr. note-original letter in German included ‘Course of the Combat Operations’] Sheet 5
I made a mistake by adding an incorrect sheet 5. Herewith I hand the correct sheet as Appendix a.
In the ‘Explanations of Appendix 10 (Situation on 22 March)’ the last sentence is to be replaced by the sentence in Appendix b.
(Signed) BAYERLEIN
(handwritten) Appendix a
A–970
Lehr Division, with the 74th Korps. In addition, the schwerste Panzergruppe [extremely heavy Panzergruppe]. Change of commanders of the 53rd and 74th Korps–less staffs, except for the chiefs-of-staffs–was to take effect on the evening of 22 March or in the morning of 23 March, since the bulk of the armoured forces were now concentrated with the 74th Korps.
22 March
In the sector of the 53rd Korps there was no significant action.
In the sector of the 74th Korps the planned counterattack with the 11th Panzer [Division], the 3rd Panzergrenadier [Division] and Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr took place with its objective of forcing the enemy that had crossed the PLEIS sector back.
23 March
Noon: Assumption of command in the 74th Korps sector by General Bayerlein.
For situation at the time of the change of command in the sector of the 53rd Korp see sketch-map, Appendix 10.
(handwritten) Appendix b
A–970
Amendment to Appendix 10 (Situation in the evening of 22 March)
Situation in the Evening of 22 March:
Delete the last paragraph!
Replace with:
At noon of 23 March General Püchler’s 74th Korps took over the sector.
A–970
Remagen Bridgehead 53rd Korps Appendix 1.
Course of Combat Operations.
7 March
Remagen bridge captured by U.S. troops, bridgehead built.
8 March
Commander of the 11th Panzer Division, General von Wietersheim takes over command at the bridgehead front. Troops: The forces of the former Rhine Defense and elements of the 9th Panzer Division.
9 March
Elements of the 11th Panzer Division arrived and stabilized the front.
At noon of this day General Bayerlein–formerly employed at DÜSSELDORF–was summoned to the command post of the commander of the Rhine Defense (General von Kortzfleisch) in OBER PLEIS. There Generalfeldmarschall MODEL briefed him on the situation at the bridgehead: UNKEL, BRUCHHAUSEN, OHLENBERG and OCKENFELS had been captured by the enemy, who was continuing to press his advance. Mission for Korps BAYERLEIN: Take over the bridgehead front and eliminate the bridgehead as quickly as possible. Available troops: 11th Panzer Division, Kampfgruppe 9th Panzer Division, remnants of Brigade Feldherrnhalle and one Kampfgruppe of the Panzer Lehr Division (this was to arrive during the night). Additional forces were expected in the immediate future. For strength of the troop elements see Appendix 2. Proposals for conduct of the operations to eliminate the bridgehead were to be presented in the shortest possible time to Feldmarschall Model.
After reconnaissance and determination of the situation General Bayerlein decided to deliver the attack to eliminate the bridgehead from ERL. Advance via OHLENBERG to the heights of KASBACH and OCKENFELS to split the bridgehead and then, depending on the situation, to roll it up either to the south or to the north. The attack was to be delivered with Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr. The attack was to be launched early in the morning of 10 March. For a sketch-map of the intended attack see Appendix 4.
Final discussion between Model, Bayerlein and Wietersheim at the command post of the 11th Panzer Division in KALENBORN. [spelled both ‘Kalenborn’ and ‘Kahlenborn’ on sketch-maps] The attack order was issued.
10 March
0400 hours in the morning, 53rd Korps assumed command on the bridgehead front.
Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr arrived and was attached to the 11th Panzer Division. The planned attack, however, could not be delivered because elements of the Panzer Lehr Division arrived too late and the attack was forbidden by the Heeresgruppe.
In the course of the day the enemy attacked, penetrating HONNEF and significantly widening the bridgehead.
See the sketch-map in Appendix 5 for the evening situation.
11 March
Conference with Feldmarschall KESSELRING, who had just been appointed Oberbefehlshaber [Commander in Chief] West in OBERPLEIS regarding possibilities for eliminating the bridgehead. During the morning the 9th Panzer Division delivered a successful counterattack east of HONNEF. The enemy took the LEYB[erg, hill]. Enemy tanks advanced via LINZ against HOENNINGEN [Hönnigen??-from Rawson–clearly Hönningen on Bayerlein’s sketch map]. Thereupon the Korps sector was widened south to LEUBSDORFERBACH. HONNEF was lost in the evening.
Small counterattacks by the 11th Panzer Division forced the enemy back at a number of different positions. There was particularly fierce fighting for the HARGARTEN-peak. It remained in the hands of the 11th Panzer Division.
12 March
The lines of the previous day remained essentially unchanged.
13 March
The remnants of the 340th Volksgrenadier Division arrived and were attached to the Korps. For strengths see Appendix 2.
Strong enemy attacks from HONNEF to the northwest. The 9th Panzer Division was forced back. The superbly equipped 130th Infanterie-Regiment (brought in from Holland) arrived, complete. The Intention was to attack ERPEL with this regiment, reinforced with one Panzer company, from the AS-BERG [As-Hill] area via BRUCHHAUSEN-ORSBERG.. For Plan of attack, see sketch-map in Appendix 6. MODEL personally forbade this promising attack because he intended to give this regiment to the 340th Volksgrenadier Division in order to bring that division up to fighting strength. That put an end to any possibility of eliminating the bridgehead. The enemy then began to slowly but surely, steadily push forward. The German forces were worn down and gradually consumed until the enemy had gained favorable positions for his offensive to the east.
During the night of 13/13[sic.] [13/14] March the 340th Volksgrenadier Division took over the WINDHAGEN–ROTTBITZE [Sketch-maps 7 & 8 show a quite legible Robitze(?), sketch-map 9 is almost illegible, but might show it as Rottbitze, sketch-map 10 is small, but clearly Rottbitze] sector from the 11th Panzer Division. For the evening situation see sketch-map in Appendix 7.
14 March
In the sector of the 9th Panzer Division the enemy advanced to HIMBERG. The 340th Volksgrenadier Division and 11th Panzer Division essentially held their positions.
15 March
A counterattack by the 9th Panzer Division from the AEGIDIENBERG [Ägidienberg] area regained the HIMBERG–KOENIGSWINTER [Königswinter] road. Heavy enemy pressure shifted toward KOENIGSWINTER [Königswinter] in the adjoining (74th Korps) sector. In the center and southern portions of the Korps sector the enemy gained but little ground.
In the sector adjoining to the left (67th Korps) the enemy exerted heavier pressure on HOENNINGEN [Hönningen], and along the HOENNINGEN [Hönningen]–WALDBREITBACH road.
16 March
The enemy exerted heavy pressure on the right wing and in the center of the Korps [sector]. HIMBERG, VETTELSCHOSS and STROEDT [Strödt] were lost. There was fighting around ROTTBITZE.
In the sector adjoining to the right the enemy captured the DRACHENFELS and broke into KOENIGSWINTER [Königswinter]. For the first time he reached the AUTOBAHN near BRUENGSBERG [Brüngsberg]. The GROSSE OELBERG [Grosse Öl-Berg] was also lost. With that the enemy controlled all the commanding hills of the SIEBENGEBIRGES [Seven Mountains].
For the situation in the evening of 16 March see the sketch-map in Appendix 8.
17 March
In the sector of the 9th Panzer Division Aegidienberg [Ägidienberg] was lost, in the sector of the 340th Volksgrenadier Division ROTTBITZE [is this the ROBITZE shown on sketch-map 8? On sketch-map 9 the label is very tiny and hard to read but might well be ‘Rottbittze’. On sketch-map 10 still tiny and hard to read but looks like ‘ROTTBITZE’. ROTTBITZE is again mentioned with that spelling in the notes to Appendix 8.] was finally lost. The enemy extended his penetration in the sector adjoining on the right to the AUTOBAHN. The 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division was committed in a counterattack from the north. In the sector adjoining to the left, the enemy reached the WIED [river] south of WALDBREITBACH.
18 March
Strong enemy attacks in the sector of the 9th Panzer Division and the 340th Volksgrenadier Division thrust forward between ORSCHEID and WINDHAGEN over the AUTOBAHN. WINDHAUSEN, STOCKHAUSEN AND WID[?]SCHEID were lost. The 11th Panzer Division held its positions.
19 March
The Korps front was generally quiet.
In the sector adjoining to the right the enemy continued to advance via KOENIGSWINTER [KÖNIGSWINTER] to OBERCASSEL.
In the sector adjoining to the left [the enemy] reached the WIED [river] on a broad front and built a bridgehead south of WALDBREITBACH.
20 March
Major attacks along the entire Korps front. The Schwerpunkt of the attack was in the sector of the 9th Panzer Division. The enemy penetrated near STOCKHAUSSEN [sic.] [Stockhausen] and captured the airfield north of GERMSCHEID. He achieved a penetration in EUDENBACH. GERMSCHEID, HUENGSBERG [HÜNGSBERG] and ROTT in the ELSAFFTHAL [Elsaff Valley] were lost. In the southern part of the Korps front the enemy reached the WIED [river]. What were, by now, only weak forces of the division somewhat delayed, but could not halt, the enemy’s advance with small counterattacks.
The Korps received PREPARATORY ORDERS [Vororientierung] that the 11th Panzer Division was going to be withdrawn immediately for commitment with the 74th Korps. By order of the Heeresgruppe ‘Schwerste Panzergruppe HUDEL’ [Extremely Heavy Tank Group HUDEL] was formed, consisting of Schwere Panzer Jäger Abteilung 654, Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 and Schwere Panzer Jäger Abteilung 512 (Jagdtiger). Immediately upon its arrival this armoured force was also to be employed in the sector of the 74th Korps. The focus of the enemy’s offensive was expected to fall in that sector. The commanders of the 53rd and 74th Korps were to exchange commands, with General BAYERLEIN taking over the former sector of the 74th Korps and General PUECHLER that of the 53rd Korps. See sketch-map in Appendix 9 for the situation in the evening of 20 March.
21 March
The 11th Panzer Division was withdrawn from the front, minus Kampfgruppe BUTTLAR, to launch a counterattack in the 74th Korps sector. The Heeresgruppe believed that the main weight of the enemy’s assault was directed at SIEGBURG. Remaining on the Korps front were: 9th Panzer Division (now no more than a weak Kampfgruppe), the 340th Volksgrenadier Division (approximately at battalion strength) and Kampfgruppe BUTTLAR (also at reinforced-battalion strength). At noon Feldmarschall MODEL, at the command post of the 74th Korps in OBERROTH (five kilometres south of EITORF), ordered that the planned counterattack be launched with the 11th Panzer Division and the newly brought up elements of the Panzer Lehr Division, along with the Schwerste Panzer Gruppe in the 74th Korps sector.
The exchange of commanders of the 53rd and 74th Korps–leaving the staffs behind, except for the chiefs of staff–was to take effect in the evening of 22 March, since now the bulk of the armoured forces was concentrated with the 74th Korps.
22 March
Assumption of command in the 74th Korps sector in the evening of 22 March.
New mission for 23 March: Attack in the morning of 24 March with all elements of the Korps to repulse the enemy advancing over the PLEIS STREAM SECTOR.
For the situation at the time of change of command (in the sector of Bayerlein’s 53rd Korps) see sketch-map in Appendix 10.
Signed (actual signature) BAYERLEIN
[note-Bayerlein stated that the following ‘appendix a’ is to be inserted to replace the last part of the above entry for 21 March and what follows.]
(handwritten) Appendix a
A–970
Lehr Division, with the 74th Korps. In addition, along with the Schwerste Panzer Gruppe in the 74th Korps sector. [the extremely heavy Panzergruppe].
Change of commanders of the 53rd and 74th Korps–less staffs, except for the chiefs-of-staffs–was to take effect on the evening of 22 March or in the morning of 23 March, since the bulk of the armoured forces were now concentrated with the 74th Korps.
22 March
In the sector of the 53rd Korps there was no significant action.
In the sector of the 74th Korps the planned counterattack with the 11th Pan zer [Division], the 3rd Panzergrenadier [Division] and Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr took place with its objective of forcing the enemy that had crossed the PLEIS sector back.
23 March
Noon: Assumption of command in the 74th Korps sector by General Bayerlein.
For situation at the time of the change of command in the sector of the 53rd Korp see sketch-map, Appendix 10.
A–970
Appendix 2
ORGANIZATION OF THE 53rd KORPS AT THE REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD AS OF 10 MARCH 1945
11th Panzer Division: General von Wietersheim
Combat Strength: Manpower, 400; Armour, 25; Guns, 18.
9th Panzer Division: Oberst Dingler *
Combat Strength: Manpower, 600; Armour, 15; Guns, 12
Kampfgruppe of the Panzer Lehr Division: Major Hudel**
Combat Strength: Manpower, 300; Armour, 15, Guns,–
Brigade Feldherrnhalle
Combat Strength: Manpower, 100; Armour, 5; Guns,–
from 13 March
340th Volksgrenadier Division: Generalmajor Tollsdorf
Combat Strength: Manpower, 200 (without weapons); Armour, –; Guns, –
from 13 March
Infanterie Regiment 130: Oberst ?
Combat Strength: Manpower, 2000
Volksartillerie Korps 208: Oberstleutnant?
Combat Strength: Two heavy, one light Abteilung with a total of about 20 guns
from 15 March
Werfer Brigade?: Major?
Combat Strength: A total of about 20 Werfer [see glossary note on Nebelwerfer]
Schwere Panzer Jäger Abteilung 651: Major Noak
Strength: About 15 Jäger
Sturmgeschütz Brigade 243: Hauptmann?
Strength: About 10 Sturmgeschütze
* from 17 March: Obersti ZOLLENKOPF
** later attached to Kampfgruppe von BUTTLAR as part of the 11th Panzer Division.