The Long Haul
In the more professional departments, there was a greater long-term commitment to evaluating tactics, procedures, training, and equipment. These agencies kept the fire burning and the movement alive. They developed agency cultures that placed officer safety in the forefront and served as catalysts for progress throughout the profession.
Quite naturally, one of these agencies that refused to rest on its laurels was the CHP, which continued to make improvements in the training and equipping of its officers long after the echoes of Newhall gunfire had faded away. Like any bureaucratic institution, the CHP had its share of stumbles and missteps along the way, but there is no doubt the tragedy of Newhall promoted long-term improvements in the officer safety culture of this organization.
The comprehensive review of the felony stop, Physical Methods of Arrest, and other tactics in the wake of Newhall was not the end of the road. As noted previously, all tactics, training, and equipment fell under the spotlight, and many changes were made by the middle of the 1970s, but the improvements continued beyond that.
The 1980s saw the maturation of the CHP firearms training program and the adoption of such new equipment as radio extenders (1981), PR-24 side-handle batons (1982) and .223-caliber Ruger Mini-14 patrol rifles (1989), all of which increased the officer’s capabilities and safety. The CHP also conducted a second (post-Newhall) comprehensive overhaul of its search and handcuffing (PMA) tactics, requiring all officers to be trained and evaluated in the enhanced procedures. New technologies such as video simulators, which pitted officers in shoot/don’t shoot scenarios were incorporated into Academy and in-service training regimens.
In the 1990s, the CHP converted to semi-automatic pistols. It also added another non-lethal tool to the arsenal, when it began to issue pepper spray (Oleoresin Capsicum, or O.C.). In the wake of the Rodney King arrest, a serious evaluation of the department’s use-of-force training was conducted, and it became apparent that improvements were needed, so the department created and fielded a “Force Option Training Simulator” (FOTS), which brought use-of-force training to a new level for the agency. The key improvement with FOTS compared to earlier shooting simulators was that it included non-lethal force options as part of the simulation—the officer had to identify the threat level and respond with an appropriate level of force, which might include an option other than the firearm. System capabilities allowed the training officer who ran the program to alter the suspect’s actions, based on the response of the officer being tested. This enhanced realism and improved the training experience. The FOTS system was a mobile system that could be transported to each of the area offices in the state, ensuring all officers had access to this critical training.12
The 1990s also saw one of the most critical developments in law enforcement firearms training, when the CHP adopted a new framework that changed how skills were selected, taught, and evaluated. This groundbreaking effort, steered by Training Officer Lou Chiodo, implemented a reality-based training program in which officers were taught techniques that took into account the physiological effects of survival stress and the dynamics of real life confrontations. Techniques that could withstand the negative effects of these influences were identified and taught, providing the officers with a superior skill set compared to earlier training programs that neglected these important factors and so often fell short of teaching them valid survival habits. Additionally, the new firearms training program identified particular tasks in which the officers had to demonstrate competency during qualifications, and identified minimum standards of proficiency for each of the skills. In the past, officers could attain a passing score during firearms qualifications even if they hadn’t performed well in a particular area, as long as their aggregate score was high enough to meet the minimum. However, under the new Task Oriented Qualification Course (TOQC) championed by Officer Chiodo, a minimum level of competency was required for each of the evaluated skills, ensuring that an officer would not go out on duty self-possessed of a dangerous vulnerability.13
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the CHP’s patrol rifle program expanded, and an AR-15-pattern rifle was soon in each patrol car, riding alongside the shotgun. The department adopted electronic control devices (Tasers, or “Conductive Energy Weapon,” in CHP parlance), to expand its non-lethal force options. Advanced Officer Safety Training courses expanded to reinforce essential officer survival skills and included new and exciting training aids such as non-lethal training ammunition (“Simunitions,” or marking projectiles that can be fired from modified weapons).
The CHP’s training programs have continuously improved since Newhall, and they have become more comprehensive, as well. The old 16-week, 900-hour Academy that Cadets Gore, Frago, Pence, and Alleyn attended has grown to 27 weeks and 1,285 instructional hours in the years since. Recurrent in-service training for officers has likewise expanded in breadth and depth.
This is not to say that the CHPs performance has been perfect. It has demonstrated leadership in many facets of development, but it has also found itself catching up to other agencies that outpaced them. For example, while the CHP was the first major agency to issue speedloaders to its officers, in 1971, it was relatively late to transition to semi-automatic pistols, in 1990, falling far behind other state agencies such as the Illinois State Police (1968), Connecticut State Police (1981), and New Jersey State Police (1983).
The CHP didn’t take this long walk without its share of problems, either. In 2006, the CHP lost eight officers to suicide in as many months, and a total of 13 officers between 2003 and 2006. This prompted a comprehensive review, in 2007, and the institution of several initiatives aimed at this growing and unique threat to officer safety.14 More recently, in 2010, the CHP lost five officers to vehicular accidents in the course of two months, prompting another thorough review of CHP policies, procedures, and training.15
Despite these problems, the point to this discussion is that the Newhall shooting gave birth to a strong officer safety culture that has continued to get stronger within the organization as it has matured. This culture has allowed the CHP to aggressively tackle challenges such as the clusters of suicides and the string of line-of-duty deaths, and to take positive actions to fix the problems and improve officer safety.
This culture has paid dividends. Once a weakness, the CHP’s felony stop tactics are now recognized as among the best in the law enforcement community. These tactics were put to the test in the most severe manner during a 17-minute shootout in July 2010, with a heavily armed suspect in Oakland, California. That incident had begun as a routine traffic stop. Hundreds of rounds were fired by the suspect and the officers during this shootout, which resulted in the wounding and capture of the gunman. Despite being fired upon with a pistol, rifle and shotgun by the armor-clad gunman, no CHP officers were killed during the shooting, and only two received minor wounds from flying glass. While the details of that shooting have not been shared with the public or the CHP’s officers due to pending trials as of the date of this book’s publication, initial reports indicate that the officers retreated and called for backup shortly after approaching the vehicle, which had been stopped for speeding and erratic driving. At the initial contact, the officers noted the presence of multiple weapons and apparently saw the suspect starting to don his body armor. Heeding the lessons of the Newhall shooting, the officers retreated to a tactically superior position and called for backup, both of which allowed them to survive and prevail.16