State of the Industry
As encouraging as that last example may be, there are still indications that the general law enforcement community, including frontrunners such as the CHP, still has a long way to go.
Law enforcement trainers and researchers from across the industry continuously question the efficacy of today’s firearms training, especially in light of statistics that indicate persistently low hit ratios (roughly 30% at best, and most probably lower on average), for officer-involved shootings.17 Some industry leading trainers like Dave Spaulding ask challenging and troubling questions about whether officers are being trained in street relevant skills, or merely being qualified in accordance with useless, irrelevant protocols.18
Some industry leading departments, such as the New York City Police Department (NYPD), have contracted with research groups like the Rand Corporation (sometimes under direction from the courts or the Department of Justice), to analyze their use-of-force policies and training, as well as their actual use-of-force events. Invariably, these reports indicate there are deficiencies in the training programs that would be familiar to the Newhall investigators of a generation or two ago.19
Some of the policies would be familiar as well. One would think that the discredited pre-Newhall practice of sealing shotguns with evidence tape would have completely disappeared from the scene, but rumors persist that some departments have continued the practice with a modern twist by moving the seal to the rack in the car instead of placing it on the gun itself. In one major California agency, officers are required to document, via Use of Force Memorandum, every time they draw and point their sidearm at an offender in this high-crime city. Is this a “virtual seal?” Perhaps these pre-Newhall demons haven’t been fully exorcised from the law enforcement culture after all?
Some of the industry’s most influential trainers and publications openly editorialize and fret that officers have either completely forgotten the lessons of Newhall or were never properly taught them to begin with.20 Others decry the organizational mindset they fear has become pervasive in law enforcement, that which places “a greater emphasis on making everyone happy and avoiding complaints at all costs, than [on] the safety of the officers.”21
The new technology of the ages, the Internet, has allowed officers from diverse backgrounds and agencies to compare notes on the “state of the industry,” and even the most casual search through some of these forums will indicate a high level of anxiety from officers whose mental preparation for duty—their survival sense—is negatively impacted by fears of administrative punishment from unsupportive departments, criminal punishment from politically motivated district attorneys, or of getting sued by litigious citizens armed with video cameras that don’t tell the entire story.
Then there are the failures. The information technology era has allowed us to capture many police actions and fatalities on video, where they can be analyzed in horrible detail. It’s heartbreaking and baffling to law enforcement trainers to see these officers making mistakes in judgment and tactics that wind up costing them their lives, especially when the mistakes occur at the most basic level.
Who can explain the mindset of an officer who is unable to bring himself to shoot a violent and aberrant suspect who’s openly loading a gun so he can use it against the officer? Why would that officer take no defensive measures (other than warning the suspect to stop over and over), right up to the point of the fatal gunshot that was clearly forthcoming? What does this incident say about the mental preparedness of the slain officer, the culture of officer safety at that department, or the state of training, if anything?
Who can explain why an ad hoc S.W.A.T. team rushes in prematurely after an armed suspect who has just killed two officers, instead of using the time they have to negotiate and wait the suspect out, or at least develop a coordinated attack plan with the proper assets prior to entry?
Who can explain how a veteran officer fails to find a 9mm handgun in a suspect’s waistband during his search—the same gun that the handcuffed suspect would soon use to murder the officer from the back seat of the patrol car?
Who can explain why officers are dying from the same mistakes in preparedness, judgment, and tactics that were being made when their fathers and grandfathers walked the beat? Can we really say the lessons of an event like Newhall have been learned and ingrained in the fabric of the law enforcement culture in the face of examples such as these?
Where are we? What have we truly learned? Where do we need to be going?
Perhaps it’s instructive to step back and take a more historical look at firearms training, to see where we have been, in order so that we can determine where we are going.
Law enforcement firearms training changed relatively little from the start of the twentieth century up through approximately World War II, in that there was almost no formal training conducted in the vast majority of agencies. In the few places where instruction was provided, it was essentially general instruction in basic marksmanship skills.
Post-war, this changed very little. Instruction became more common throughout the law enforcement community, but the curriculum still involved little more than basic marksmanship taught in a sterile, competitive target-shooting environment on a square range. Officers were primarily taught to fire from stances with little real world application and were not forced to demonstrate anything beyond basic gun handling skills. In the spirit of today’s computer-driven culture, this could easily be termed as “Version 1.0” of firearms training, and it lasted roughly up to the Newhall shooting in most corners of law enforcement.
Version 1.0 = Limited Square Range Marksmanship Training:
As the CHP example indicates, there was a significant change in most law enforcement firearms training programs, post-Newhall. Instruction moved beyond basic marksmanship to incorporate more dynamic and realistic skills. Shooting stances became more practical, reloads were accomplished from duty gear, full-power ammunition was used for training, use of cover was emphasized, targets became more realistic, time pressures were introduced to increase stress, and a whole host of other improvements were made. The shooting was still done on square ranges and at paper targets, but enhanced realism was stressed in all facets. This period lasted from Newhall to approximately sometime in the 1980s for most departments, although some agencies are still using programs today that have never advanced beyond this stage, primarily because they allow them to meet the training standards mandated by most state certification authorities.
Version 2.0 = Advanced Square Range Marksmanship Training:
Beginning sometime in the 1980s, law enforcement firearms training increasingly tried to link the use-of-force policies established by agencies with their firearms training. This trend really accelerated with the 1984 introduction of the Firearms Training Systems (“FATS”) simulator, which provided computer-based, interactive, live-fire training scenarios for officers to navigate. “Version 3.0” of firearms training had been launched, characterized by the dual use of advanced square range training to teach gun handling skills, and limited interactive computer simulations to teach and test decision making skills. This is the state of the art for many firearms training programs today.
Version 3.0 = Advanced Square Range Marksmanship Training + Limited Computer Simulation Training:
There is no doubt that Version 3.0 is vastly superior to preceding generations of firearms training, but the costs associated with computer simulation have prevented many smaller agencies from reaping the benefits of this technology. Additionally, because the equipment is expensive to acquire and operate, very few agencies can purchase a large number of systems. The limited availability of these systems means they typically only make up a very small fraction of the overall firearms training program. It’s valuable training, but the average officer is unlikely to experience it on a frequent basis due to logistical and budgetary issues.
Furthermore, while the simulators allow instructors to teach and evaluate candidates in conditions that cannot be replicated on the square range with live weapons and ammunition, there are limitations to the tool. The “firearm” used by the trainee frequently does not match the type of firearm, in weight, function or feel, used for duty by the officer. In some systems it cannot be holstered, so the officer must start the scenario with weapon in hand, even if that is not tactically desirable. The firearm frequently does not function or recoil like a real weapon, has a different trigger pull, cannot be “reloaded,” and cannot be cleared using traditional techniques when it malfunctions, causing some trainers to wonder whether or not there might be an element of “negative training” that occurs with systems like these.
The simulator frequently cannot accommodate the introduction of props that add fidelity to the scenario, such as the addition of a police car in the projection room. Furthermore, the officer has a limited area in which he can maneuver before images on the screen are no longer viewable and before the computer system fails to register hits from the weapon. The officer cannot take cover behind objects that are clearly visible on the screen, as we would want him to do in a real situation.
Some simulator systems do not allow for non-lethal force options and are strictly designed around firearms training. The scenarios are designed to be interactive, such that the actions of the suspect can branch off into variable paths dependent upon the actions of the officer, but the character on the screen will never be able to interact as naturally with the officer as a live person and will never be as responsive to the officer’s actions and commands as a real person.
Significantly, there is no pain stimulus associated with failure, either. An officer who is “shot” using computer simulation receives no blow, other than to his ego, and feels no pain, which limits the impact, literally and figuratively, of the lesson.
In Version 3.0 training, the officer gets good hands on training with the firearm in one venue and good decision making training in another, but there is little to no integration of both types of training simultaneously. So, while Version 3.0 training is a large advance, what it lacks is the ability to synthesize the advantages of training in real world and simulated environments. Agencies can and will continue to make improvements in their square range training environments and their simulation training environments, but until these two processes are truly integrated, it’s unlikely that training will become any more realistic or valuable to the officer.
This is perhaps one of the most important reasons why modern law enforcement agencies have been unable to significantly improve upon a 30% or less hit probability in real gunfights. There are, of course, many other factors besides training that can affect this number, but it would seem that training is among the most, if not the most, important variable. If so, this makes it even more critical for a firearms program to focus on realism, the first of Artwohl’s “Four R’s of Deadly Force Training.”22
Forward-thinking trainers have identified this issue and have addressed it by suggesting training methods that mark the beginning of a new phase, “Version 4.0” if you will.
Version 4.0 = Advanced Square Range Marksmanship Training + Computer Simulation Training + Force-on-Force Simulation:
In Version 4.0 training, square range and simulation training are combined into a new, “reality based” training where the officers train directly against other persons in simulation, using functional but non-lethal weapons. This “force-on-force” training represents the highest level of lethal force training to date, and the law enforcement community is just now starting to really get on board with the concept.
Officers have certainly dabbled in elements of force-on-force training in the past, practicing unarmed combatives or handcuffing with each other in the gym, or perhaps even limited exercises with modified weapons, but the thorough integration of realistic firearms skills, tactics, and equipment against a live actor in simulation reached its genesis only in the mid-1990s, and it didn’t enjoy much popularity until well into the next decade.23 Part of the reason for this was that technology limited the options of trainers who would have been interested in this style of training. The guns and training munitions that make this kind of training possible (“Simunitions,” which, by the way, is another one of those trademarked labels that has become so common in use that it’s now generically applied to the genre, much like “Kleenex” is used to describe facial tissues), simply weren’t readily available or affordable prior to this time. To a large extent, the protective gear wasn’t either.24
However, with the creation and adoption of these technologies, the door is now open for creative trainers to take advantage of the tremendous training opportunities afforded. This force-on-force training allows the students to test ther decision making skills, communication skills, tactics, and their armed and unarmed combat skills against a thinking and moving opponent in extremely realistic scenarios and environments. The training:
“…is based upon teaching students to fire at a human opponent who is exhibiting a life threatening stimulus. Without this type of stimulus, trainers cannot expect their students to respond automatically and accurately in their first combat experience.”25
Perhaps significantly, the small sting that accompanies being struck by a Simunition round or an Airsoft pellet, even through protective garments, is likely to have a profound effect on the learning process. Even the toughest of officers doesn’t want to be stung by one of these projectiles, and this motivation is likely to aid in the learning process. It’s an undeniable aspect of the human condition and learning process that the lessons associated with pain are rarely forgotten—touching a hot stove is much more likely to leave a lasting impression than simply being told that it is dangerous to do so. One of the greatest utilities of a tool like force-on-force is that a pain stimulus that is sufficient to enhance learning but not enough to jeopardize the health of the student is part of the process.
The famous World War I flying ace Manfred Von Richtofen, aka the “Red Baron,” once surmised that a fighter pilot’s chances of survival in combat increased dramatically once he had survived his first 10 combat engagements. In this vein, force-on-force training allows an officer to experience the stress of those 10 formative engagements in a safe training environment and dramatically increase his survival quotient. As Siddle notes:
“The primary advantage of dynamic training exercises is the experience of interacting with an open environment. Each exposure to a threat stimulus allows the student a chance to identify the subtle cues, which can only be gained through experience. Each exposure allows students an opportunity to work out solutions and program the correct survival response.”26
A firearms training program that makes well-planned and -executed force-on-force training a principal component (not the only component, but a significant one—some square range training will always be necessary and desirable), is guaranteed to prepare an officer much better for an armed confrontation than even the most sophisticated “Version 3.0” program. There is simply no substitute for dynamic role-playing with live actors and functional, yet non-lethal, training weapons to better prepare an officer for the street. Learning to think and function under extreme stress, programming good survival habits into the brain, and allowing a person to build experience that allows him to more quickly recognize and react to a threat is more critical to gunfight survival than raw marksmanship skills.
That last statement needs to be emphasized and, perhaps, explained. Most law enforcement officers who are killed in gunfights are killed at very short distances, where the marksmanship problem or task is not particularly difficult in itself. New York Police Department statistics (collected 1854 to 1979) indicate that 82 percent of their slain officers were killed within six feet of their assailants, and similar FBI data (from 2001 to 2010) indicates that nationally, 67 percent of the slain officers from those years were killed within 10 feet of their assailants (and 49 percent within five feet).27 Further analysis of FBI data indicates that some 92 percent of FBI agent-involved shootings between 1989 and 1994 occurred within six to10 feet.28 From a standpoint of pure marksmanship alone, it is not particularly difficult to shoot a human-sized target from six or even 10 feet, and the training required to impart competency in this level of skill is minimal. It’s a far more difficult task to teach someone how to identify and anticipate threat cues, then think clearly and function smoothly while facing lethal attack from a real person at this distance.
Resistance to Change
The CHP, like many progressive agencies, is starting to integrate some force-on-force training into their program. They are in a transitional stage between Version 3.0 and Version 4.0, where the force-on-force training is not yet a significant core component of their initial and in-service training programs. For now, the CHP still spends a disproportionate share of its firearm training resources on what is essentially Version 2.0 level training—advanced, square range training.29
This is common throughout law enforcement, largely because agencies “teach to the test.” The certification authorities that draft police training and qualification standards in the states have directed that officers must meet certain minimum standards before they are allowed to work. These standards typically specify courses of fire and minimum passing scores to be attained, and they are almost always rooted in a Version 2.0, square range mindset. In fact, many of these criteria have remained largely unchanged since their creation in the 1920s through the1940s.30 It should come as no surprise that law enforcement agencies, whose training programs are always short on time and money, largely plan their training to optimize employee performance on these mandated tests. Force-on-force training may enhance an officer’s skills and readiness, but to a bureaucrat who is more concerned with protecting and guaranteeing the size of the department’s labor pool, experimenting with new teaching methods is less important than meeting the mandates that are the gateway to employment.
Budgetary trends have been a significant factor in driving agencies to cling to these outdated firearms training standards, as well. Many states, counties, and cities have drastically cut police funding in recent years, due to economic pressures (including potential bankruptcy for some municipalities), leaving very little in the budget for training of any sort. Because firearms training can be expensive (due to ammunition costs, in particular), many agencies have cut back their firearms training programs to the bare minimum required to meet state standards. Officers who once found themselves at the range four times a year when their agencies could afford it, are now qualifying once only every two years, because that is all the state requires.31 Interestingly, the extreme affordability of force-on-force training is one of its greatest virtues and offers a potential solution for not only preserving the amount of training time, but increasing its productivity for agencies that are bold enough to embrace it as a core component of their program.
Liability concerns are yet another reason why some departments have been slow to adopt promising new methods like force-on-force training and stray beyond the qualification mandates of the certification authorities. The agencies and departments are hesitant to divert training resources into areas that are not specifically required by the state, because they don’t want to appear as if they are neglecting the mandates. In this increasingly litigious age, no agency wants to look as if it short-changed the training specified by the state so that it could divert time and resources into other areas. Additionally, a program that strictly adheres to the state mandates is easily defensible in court, while an innovative program that uses methods not specifically recommended by the state, and for which the state has not developed evaluation criteria, subjects the agency’s program to greater scrutiny by opposing counsel in the wake of a line-of-duty shooting.
Unfortunately, these factors appear to have a perverse effect on the quality of training received. Instead of utilizing the most promising, cost-effective methods and focusing on the areas of greatest concern, agencies find themselves preoccupied with standards that often have little to do with real world needs. Researcher Thomas Aveni puts it this way:
“Good risk management would suggest that resources should be allocated to problems that are seen frequently and to infrequent problems that are very severe when they do arise. We don’t allocate resources that way in firearms training. In fact, training by and large has been part of the problem, not part of the solution.”32
To put a finer point on it, veteran officer and survival instructor Evan Marshall observes, “Remember, qualification is simply a program to monetize liability. It is rarely training, and tragically all the ‘training’ some coppers get.”33
The Way Forward
The critical task at hand, then, is to revise these standards in a way that frees agencies to implement more effective training programs with their scarce training resources. It is unlikely that law enforcement agencies will ever find themselves with enough money or time to conduct “extra” training, so we have to ensure they are allowed to maximize their efforts. Arcane courses of fire with aggregate minimum passing scores that allow an officer to fail an entire stage/skill set yet still pass the test, need to be eliminated. Qualification tests that are based on early twentieth-century training standards need to be updated to account for advances in education and learning. New standards that emphasize task-oriented qualification requirements and encourage reality based, force-on-force simulation training as a key component of a firearms training program are a necessary prerequisite to advance the state of law enforcement firearms training.
If this can be accomplished, if law enforcement firearms training can truly advance where agencies are free to use the most effective training techniques and tools to prepare their officers for duty instead of being shackled by outdated state training mandates, then the lessons written in blood in the J’s Coffee Shop parking lot one dark night in April of 1970 will have finally been learned.
1. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office (later, Department) was eager to collate the lessons of this incident as well, and later released their own training film that reenacted the shooting. The film identified tactical errors and suggested alternatives that would enhance officer safety, and it was widely circulated within the law enforcement community alongside the earlier 1975 CHP training film on Newhall.
2. Uelman, D. Lieutenant (ret.). (1995, April). Remembering the Newhall Murders: April 6, 1970. The California Highway Patrolman, 8-16.
3. Multiple sources contributed to elements of this discussion. Interviews with CHP Officers Jay Rice (ret.) and Gil Payne (ret.) were foundational, as well as written material from Anderson, J. (1999). Newhall Incident Prompted Police Nationwide to Make Changes in Procedures. The California Highway Patrolman.
4. California Highway Patrol. (1975). Newhall: 1970 [Film]. Sacramento, CA, courtesy of Santa Clarita Valley Historical Society and SCVTV, <http://www.scvtv.com/html/newhall1970-chp1975btv.html>.
5. Even today, the CHP’s firearms training program is largely decentralized. Training and qualification standards are centrally directed, but the area training officers and rangemasters are given wide latitude, for the most part, in how they run the programs within their areas. This is mostly a matter of practicality in many respects, because the training facilities available to each area office vary widely throughout the state and prevent a more standardized approach. An office with access to a private outdoor range is capable of providing certain training opportunities that are unavailable to an office that is restricted to using a portion of an indoor public range, for example.
6. Nuttal, G.C., Captain (ret.). (2008). Cops, Crooks and Other Crazies. Chula Vista, CA: New Century Press. p.300.
7. See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of historical ammunition and firearm developments in the CHP.
8. Prior to Newhall, each car was capable of monitoring Channel 2 (car-to-car) transmissions if they were in range of the relatively weak vehicle-based transmitter, but when individual officers radioed dispatch on Channel 1 (car-to-station), the officer’s part of the transmission could not be heard by other officers—only the response from dispatch could be monitored. Dispatch could monitor both Channel 1 and 2 transmissions if they were within range.
On the night of the Newhall Shooting, the embattled Officer Pence broadcast his “11-99” distress call on Channel 2 (car-to-car) and the vital transmission was picked up by Units 78-16R and 78-19R because they were within suitable range. Fortunately, because the scene of the shooting was close to the Newhall Area Office, the transmission was also received by heroine Dispatcher Jo Ann Tidley, who rebroadcast the urgent call to all CHP units in the area, including those beyond reception of the original car-to-car transmission. If the shooting had occurred farther away from the Newhall Office, and if Units 78-16R and 78-19R had been beyond range (due to distance or terrain), it’s possible that nobody would have heard the urgent plea for help on Channel 2. Post-Newhall improvements to CHP radio equipment would help to fix this potentially dangerous gap in capability and greatly improve communications, officer and dispatcher situational awareness, and officer safety.
California Highway Patrol Museum, and Anderson, J. (1999). Newhall Incident Prompted Police Nationwide to Make Changes in Procedures. The California Highway Patrolman and interviews with CHP Sergeant (Retired) Harry Ingold and CHP Officer (Retired) Richard Robinson.
9. The 1970s were the deadliest decade in law enforcement history up to the present. According to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, a total of 2,286 officers died in the 1970s (due to accidents and assaults), an average of almost 229 each year. Research quoted by Morrison and Vila indicates that the felonious killings of law officers peaked in 1973 at 134 officers, while the Officer Down Memorial Page statistics indicate a slightly higher average of 144 officers killed each year in the 1970s due to gunfire, stabbings, vehicular assaults, and assaults by other means. While the statistics may vary a bit, there is consistent agreement that more officers were feloniously assaulted in the 1970s than in any other decade. The reasons for this are varied, but the widespread civil disorder of the time, the mounting breakdown in societal structures (family, church, school) and values, the increasing use of powerful illegal drugs, and the rapidly growing class of violent criminal actors are among the principal causes. Officer Down Memorial Page. (n.d.) [Online] <http://www.odmp.org/search/year> and National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund. (n.d.) Research Bulletins. [Online] <http://www.nleomf.org/facts/research-bulletins/> and Morrison, G.B.& Vila, B.J. (1998). Police Handgun Qualification: Practical Measure or Aimless Activity? Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. MCB University Press. Vol 21, No. 3, pp 510-533 <http://spokane.wsu.edu/academics/crimj/vila/1996Policing,PoliceHandgunQualMorrisonVila.pdf>.
10. The CHP had already established a history of involvement with civil disturbances by the time of Newhall (such as the agricultural labor riots in the 1930s and the infamous Watts Riot of 1965, the latter of which began as a CHP traffic stop), but the decade would see an expansion of that role in the Isla Vista Riots (II and III) in April and June of 1970 (right on the heels of Newhall), and it would become one of the principal law enforcement missions for the department. The CHP would be deeply involved in other riots of the decade and later, such as the San Francisco Gulf War Protests in 1991, the 1992 Rodney King Riot in Los Angeles, and the 2010 Oscar Grant Riot in Oakland, to name but a few.
The CHP expanded into other areas of law enforcement throughout the decades to come. The “War on Drugs” saw the CHP involved in counter-trafficking efforts in the 1980s, and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics brought a new counterterrorism mission to the agency. In the 1990s, some cash-strapped municipalities contracted with the CHP for basic law enforcement services, and, in 1995, the California State Police was absorbed into the CHP, giving the department a new security, executive protection, and S.W.A.T. mission it didn’t previously have. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the CHP also gained a new role in the “War on Terror,” adding new responsibilities such as site protection for certain high-value targets, explosives detection, and other anti-terrorism missions. CHP officers now participate in an increasing number of task forces with county and city agencies, taking on non-traditional missions such as crime suppression and narcotics and anti-gang efforts, in addition to combating more traditional vehicle theft and smuggling crimes. All of this “mission creep” represents a distinct change from the original traffic safety and enforcement mission the department exclusively focused on in the early days.
11. Including such classics as Pierce R. Brooks’ Officer Down, Code Three and Street Survival, by Ronald J. Adams, Thomas M. McTernan, and Charles Remsberg. The latter book actually spurred the development of a very popular traveling seminar series (co-founded by Remsberg and sponsored by the publisher, Calibre Press), which became the industry standard for this type of training. Incidentally, Remsberg is still very much a key player in the officer survival training movement.
12. California Highway Patrol. (n.d.) Force Option Training Simulator. [Online]. <http://www.chp.ca.gov/programs/fots.html>.
13. For more information regarding this reality-based training program and the TOQC concept, see Chiodo, L. (2009). Winning A High-Speed, Close-Distance Gunfight. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press or Mr. Chiodo’s website at <http://www.gunfightersltd.com/>.
14. Ritter, J. (2007, February 8). Suicide Rates Jolt Police Culture. USA Today. [Online]. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-08-police-suicides_x.htm> and Lee, V. (2007, March 5). High CHP Suicide Rate Worries Officials. ABC7 News, KGO-TV, San Francisco. [Online] <http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/state&id=5093384> and Hill, B. CHP’s New Danger: Officer Suicides. LA Daily News. [Online]. <http://www.theppsc.org/forums/showthread.php?t=1657>.
15. Watkins, T. (2010, June 28). 2010 is CHP’s Deadliest Year in More Than a Decade. Associated Press. [Online]. <http://www.bakersfieldnow.com/news/97316749.html>.
16. Jabali-Nash, N. (2010, July 21). California Highway Gunman Byron Williams Aimed for “Revolution” Say Cops. CBS News. [Online]. <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20011219-504083.html> and Courtney, J. (2010, July 18). Wild Morning Shootout Between Gunman, CHP Hospitalizes Three. California Beat. [Online]. <http://www.californiabeat.org/2010/07/18/wild-oakland-freeway-shootout-between-chp-gunman-sunday-morning> and Francis, M. & Greene, J. (2010, July 19). CHP Shootout Suspect Was Upset With “Left Wing Politics.” NBC Bay Area.com. [Online]. <http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/CHP-Shootout-Suspect-Was-Upset-With-Left-Wing-Politics-98740324.html>.
17. The reader is particularly directed to the excellent work conducted by researchers at the Police Policy Studies Council <http://www.theppsc.org/> and the Force Science Institute <http://www.forcescience.org/>, as well as the outstanding work of Morrison and Vila, whose collective research indicates that modern police firearms training might not be having any significant positive effect on gunfight performance. Morrison, G.B.& Vila, B.J. (1998). Police Handgun Qualification: Practical Measure or Aimless Activity? Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. MCB University Press. Vol 21, No. 3, pp 510-533. <http://spokane.wsu.edu/academics/crimj/vila/1996Policing,PoliceHandgunQualMorrisonVila.pdf>.
18. Spaulding has been amongst the most vocal of trainers who have challenged establishment practices in law enforcement firearms training and questioned their utility to developing combat appropriate skills, but there appears to be rather widespread support for his position. In a 2012 survey of 411 law enforcement officers in the United States, almost 52 percent of the respondents indicated that the firearms qualification course in their agency was “primarily a marksmanship course” and not a “course designed to enhance [their] combat skills.” Only 34 percent felt that the course actually focused on street-relevant skills that improved their combat capabilities. Team One Network. (2012) Basic Marksmanship Vs. Combat Skills Training Survey. http://survey.constantcontact.com/survey/a07e5sljqgwh0ojm1rk/results and http://teamonenetwork.com/index.html.
19. In example, the reports of Rand Corporation researchers who observed felony car stop training exercises at the NYPD Academy in 2007 were chillingly reminiscent of the CHP Academy’s training prior to Newhall.
The NYPD academy cadets were given two hours of classroom instruction on how to accomplish felony car stops, and then were given four hours of hands-on application to cement the training. For the hands-on training, the student teacher ratio was so lopsided that over half the cadets had no direct participation in the role-playing exercises, and no cadet was able to participate in an exercise more than once. The various elements of the car stop were modeled by instructors in a disjointed, nonlinear fashion, and the cadets never once got to see the execution of a model car stop by the instructors en toto, in a complete, chronological sequence.
The cadets were neither formally nor informally tested on their understanding of the classroom material and were not individually evaluated or scored during the exercises. The instructors made no attempt to ensure each student on the roster was observed and did not take any notes on individual student performance. Students who completed the exercise incorrectly were not given the opportunity to repeat the exercise and demonstrate they could accomplish the objectives. How the staff could certify that the cadets were properly trained and could apply the lessons in the real world with any veracity remains unclear.
In retrospect, the CHP Academy’s pre-Newhall felony car stop training was arguably superior, because even though the cadets didn’t receive enough hands-on training and their tactics weren’t as sophisticated, at least all of the CHP cadets got their hands dirty as a participants. Rand Corporation. (2008). Evaluation of the New York City Police Department Firearm Training and Firearm Discharge Review Process. Rand Center on Quality Policing. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. [Online]. <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG717.pdf >.
20. For example, see O’Brien, R. (2007, July 25). Police Shootouts: How Soon We Forget. Police Magazine. [Online] <http://www.policemag.com/Blog/SWAT/Story/2007/07/Police-Shootouts-How-Soon-We-Forget.aspx> and Grassi, R. (2011, May 19). Skill Set: Patrol Tactics. The Tactical Wire. [Online] <http://www.thetacticalwire.com/features/224448> and Haggard, C. (2011, April 20). He Who Ignores History. Police Magazine. [Online]. <http://www.policemag.com/Blog/Patrol-Tactics/Print/Story/2011/04/He-Who-Ignores-History.aspx> and Smith, C. (2010, September/October). Reality Check. American Handgunner Magazine. Vol 34, Number 5, Issue 207, p.32.
21. Boyd, J. (2011 March/April). Organizational Mindset. American Cop Magazine. Vol 7, Number 2, Issue 34, p.48.
22. Artwohl, A., Dr., & Christensen, L.W. (1997). Deadly Force Encounters. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, pp.69-75.
23. Bruce K. Siddle, one of the early advocates of this “Dynamic Training,” credits the legendary Capt. W.E. Fairbairn of the Shanghai Municipal Police with the use of plastic bullet training in the 1920s, and Robert Welsch of the Ohio State Patrol with the use of cotton wad projectiles in training in the mid 1970s, but these early experiments were isolated and not widely adopted. Siddle, B.K. (1995). Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, p.100.
24. The excellent “Red Man” training suits went to market in 1984, but these early models were designed for a different mission—full-contact fighting with hands and feet, instead of force-on-force scenarios that involved firearms that shot projectiles. Later developments of the Red Man product would be optimized for Version 4.0 type simulations, after the highly successful Simunitions products entered use in the late 1980s and became popular in the early 1990s.
Use of the proper protective gear is a critical element of force-on-force training, as the safety of the participants must be paramount. There is no training lesson so important that the safety and health of the students should be needlessly and recklessly put in jeopardy. Training and learning are best accomplished when the student’s mind is not preoccupied with safety concerns.
25. Siddle, B.K. (1995). Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, p.99.
26. Siddle is quick to emphasize that the training needs to be carefully crafted and executed to encourage success and learning. Officers should not be exposed to no-win scenarios, as they are destructive and do little to program the proper survival response. An officer who is “killed” repeatedly in training because he is not given proper feedback or instruction will quickly lose confidence. Trainers are encouraged to consult Siddle’s list of considerations when designing their own dynamic training exercises, as well as Gabe Suarez’s outstanding text on the subject. Siddle, B.K. (1995). Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, pp. 100-101, and Suarez, G. (2005) Force on Force Gunfight Training. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press.
27. The FBI average for the prior decade (1991-2000) was even higher, with 71 percent of officers killed by attackers within 10 feet. Aveni, T.J. (2003, August). Officer-Involved Shootings: What We Didn’t Know Has Hurt Us. The Police Policy Studies Council. <http://www.theppsc.org/Staff_Views/Aveni/OIS.pdf> and, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2010). Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted. Table 36: Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed with Firearms, Distance Between Victim Officer and Offender, 2001-2010. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/leoka/leoka-2010/tables/table36leok-feloniously-with-firearms-distance-victim-offender-01-10.xls.
28. Givens, T. (2011, June 6). Shooting Incidents: Common Factors Among Different Groups. Tactical Talk. Volume 15, Issue 6. [Online]. <http://www.rangemaster.com/>.
29. The CHP has embraced the use of Simunitions marking cartridges as part of Force On Force training for both initial and in-service training, but Force on Force training using this technology does not represent a significant part of its curriculum yet and has been one of the first victims of recent budgetary constraints. Academy cadets will train in limited amounts with the equipment during some phases of training, and in-service officers will also get exposure to it when they come back to the academy for Advanced Officer Safety Training (AOST), but most firearms training in the CHP is Version 2.0 level training. Simunitions training kits with marker guns, ammunition and protective gear are fielded at the Division level and available for checkout by Area Training Officers who have completed the appropriate CHP instructor training course, but budgetary, logistical and certification issues have limited their use in most Area level training in recent times. As of the date of publication, the CHP had just become fully funded for an “Active Shooter” training program (previously suspended, due to budget shortfalls) which plans to incorporate a large amount of Force On Force training with Simunitions equipment, so this is a positive development. All officers in the state are projected to receive this valuable training at the Area level, and it is hoped that it will lead to a greater emphasis on Force on Force training in other parts of the firearms and tactics curriculum. The CHP continues to demonstrate a zeal for enhancing its firearms training and continues to make steady progress in this area, setting a high standard for other agencies to imitate. Interviews with California Highway Patrol Academy Staff.
30. Indeed, some of the standard features in these qualification courses date back even further. For example, the five-round strings of fire found in many courses probably have their roots in U.S. Army standards developed around the 1873 Colt revolvers fielded in the latter part of the nineteenth century, which had six chambers, but were carried with the hammer resting on an empty chamber for safety. Similarly, the six-round strings of fire and the associated time limits in many of today’s qualification courses were obviously structured to accommodate the double-action revolvers that became the quintessential law enforcement firearms in early twentieth-century America. Holdovers such as these have no place in modern law enforcement training standards, which should be based on the equipment, procedures, and tactics currently in use by the profession.
31. A training officer and S.W.A.T. team leader from a major Northern California agency advised that the officers on his department used to shoot quarterly as recently as 2009, but now only shoot biannually. The only officers on the department who shoot more than once every two years are the officers detailed to S.W.A.T. assignments, and even their training program has been reduced from a monthly activity to a quarterly activity. This particular case is representative of what most law enforcement agencies are experiencing as of this writing, in 2011.
To its credit, the CHP has largely been able to resist these budgetary pressures. It continues to allocate 50 rounds of training ammunition every month for each officer, and continues to require quarterly shotgun and rifle training. At times, the CHP has been forced to suspend other training (“active shooter” training courses, for example), due to budget shortfalls, but has maintained a strong firearms training program, the benefit of a strong officer safety culture.
Ironically, in recent times the CHP has deemphasized its non-lethal training ammunition (Simunitions) program as a result of budgetary pressures. If the CHP were to consider an expanded use of the more affordable Airsoft-type training tools, it could actually accomplish even more training at a lower price.
32. Aveni, T. In, Surefire Institute. (n.d.) Lowlight and Tactical Training. Study Reveals Important Truths Hidden in the Details of Officer-Involved Shootings, Reprinted from Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Operation Safe Streets. [Online]. <http://www.surefireinstitute.com/images/pdfs/Officer-Involved_Shooting_Study.pdf>.
33. Marshall, E. (n.d.) Stopping Power Forums. [Online]. <www.stoppingpower.net>.