Analysis of the Newhall Gunfight
Traditionally, in such cases, we, the police, have reported only those facts acceptable to us. Under the circumstances, it is much easier to say, “Our officer was shot down in an heroic attempt to . . .”, or, “Our officer died without a chance . . . “, or, “As the officer attempted to arrest (or question) the subject he was suddenly shot and killed without warning.”
It is easier to avoid dwelling upon the “Why.” It is easier on the families, it is easier on the department and, most of all, it is easier on ourselves. In almost every instance of a police officer murder we have subconsciously (or consciously?) blocked out any thought that the officer might have erred. That the officer committed an error is really “why” he died.
We cannot continue to disregard unpleasant facts when police officers are murdered. Difficult though it might be, we must admit that many police officers who die in the field have made mistakes. Perhaps not intentionally, but an error nevertheless. An awareness of the most commonly made errors and constant alertness will, undoubtedly, greatly increase the officer’s chance of survival in the street.1
—Pierce R. Brooks, Officer Down, Code Three
“Indeed, he must be a very extraordinary man who, under these impressions for the first time, does not lose the power of making any instantaneous decisions.”
—Karl von Clausewitz, describing a novice’s introduction to the horrors and terrors of the battlefield in the book On War
More than 35 years ago, in 1975, Pierce R. Brooks wrote his groundbreaking book on officer survival, Officer Down, Code Three. As a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Homicide Detective, and the lead investigator on the infamous “Onion Field” murder of LAPD officer Ian Campbell, Brooks was familiar with the mean streets, and he knew that unless someone was willing to break the silence and discuss the errors made by slain police officers, more of them would die as victims of those same mistakes.
Brooks wrote that, “Too often, there is a common practice of departmental secrecy designed to hide the true facts when a slain officer is found to have died through his own error.” He understood that this practice was often grounded in respect for the dead and the protection of their families, but he also knew that burying the truth would pave the way to even more police funerals. Brooks knew he had to shine the light on these cases and provide his fellow officers a chance to learn from the critical mistakes made by their brothers, so they wouldn’t do likewise.
It’s important to note that Brooks’ underlying assumption is that the officers failed to achieve the desired performance in combat because they made errors of cognition. That is, they made mistakes that were rooted in their thinking process. This is certainly the case in many instances, but, in the last 15 years or so, there has been a growing awareness of the influence of physiology on performance, with the result that we now know some officers perform poorly in combat because they are the victims of uncontrollable physiological changes in their bodies. These changes can alter or shut down some cognitive processes entirely, can make them freeze in place when they should be moving, and can also dramatically impact basic senses like sight and sound, which can corrupt or block the information an officer needs to make proper and timely decisions and take precise actions. Despite the advances of the last few years, we still don’t fully understand the mechanics of these changes and the extent of their impact, but we’re beginning to appreciate why the novice that Clausewitz wrote about was so likely to “lose the power” of decision making when he perceived his life was in danger.
Thus, any study of the mistakes made by law enforcement officers in combat must tread very lightly. It’s in this spirit that the following analysis of the Newhall shooting is attempted. The goal is not only to identify the errors made by the officers, but also to identify the flaws in training, policies, procedures, tactics, and equipment that contributed to their performance. Additionally, the study will attempt to explore some of the involuntary human factor influences that may have inhibited their performance.
Although the analysis will be critical of the officer’s actions, it is not intended to assign blame for the tragedy or to smear the personal reputations of the officers involved. The analysis is simply designed to learn the lessons of their great sacrifice, in order to give them meaning and allow them to save the lives of other good men and women. It must be presumed that the fallen officers would be supportive of this goal, were they still available to discuss it.
As students and analysts of this fight, we benefit from all the advantages that the officers did not have. We can analyze the fight from the safety of the sidelines and spend hours leisurely pondering decisions that the officers had to make in fractions of seconds under intense stress, physical punishment, and threat of death. We have extensive knowledge about the threats, their weapons, their plans, their locations, and all the other essential elements of information that the officers lacked. We know what all the other players in the fight were doing at any given time. We know how the fight would develop and how it would end. As such, we can clearly see things that they could not in the fog and friction of the fight. We can identify errors, make observations, and draw conclusions that the officers were unable to, as they struggled to adjust to the ever-changing chaos around them. It is important to be mindful of this moving forward.
Therefore, this analysis is presented with a humble admiration for the officers, their extreme courage in the face of danger, and the way they handled this extremely difficult situation. The analysis will be critical because it must be to be of any utility, but the reader should know that none of the criticisms are intended to discredit the reputations of the heroic officers involved.