Optimum Choice of Safety Rescue Equipment
“Amateurs talk equipment. Professionals talk tactics.”
—Unknown Source
The fourth and final column that supports Ayoob’s “Priorities of Survival” is the “Optimum Choice of Safety Rescue Equipment.” As it pertains to the discussion of the Newhall shooting, this particularly references the selection of firearms and ammunition.
There have been hints in previous sections about the issues surrounding this priority and how they were evident at Newhall. Indeed, there is a certain amount of overlap and interplay between Ayoob’s priorities that makes it quite difficult to address one without feeling the influence of another.
For example, in the previous section, which discussed skills priority, Officer Pence’s difficulty in using his ammunition dump pouches during reloading was mentioned. Although this analysis focused on the skill aspect (the software), there is no denying that the poor design of the equipment (the hardware) was a contributing factor in Officer Pence’s performance. Therefore, a review of the equipment priority will necessarily tread on some familiar territory to the reader.
It is important that the CHP’s selection of equipment should be considered in the proper context of the era. Many would say it would probably be accurate to point out that the CHP officers in the Newhall fight would have been better armed with semi-automatic pistols that offered a higher capacity and the ability to rapidly reload (as their opponents were and did—recall Twining’s use of two 1911A1 pistols during the fight). But such a move would have been quite extraordinary in the law enforcement culture that prevailed at the time. Indeed, aside from the Illinois State Police (which took the extraordinary and groundbreaking step of issuing the Smith & Wesson M39 semi-automatic pistol as early as 1967), every single state police or highway patrol force in the nation issued revolvers to its officers. This trend was also followed by the vast majority of county and municipal agencies, with occasional rare exceptions (such as the El Monte, California, Police Department, which approved 1911-pattern pistols for duty in 1966). Indeed, nationwide acceptance of the semi-automatic pistol for law enforcement would not come for more than a decade after the Newhall fight. Thus, it makes little sense to argue that the CHP made a poor choice in arming its officers with revolvers when a superior choice was available. That recognition would come in time, largely as a result of incidents like Newhall, but to argue the point in 1970 would have been largely premature.
Despite this, there are still areas involving equipment selection that are worthy of analysis.
Ammunition Policy
The CHP’s policy of issuing .38 Special ammunition in lieu of the more powerful .357 Magnum ammunition carried by three of the four officers at Newhall has come under criticism, as described previously. But, in the Newhall shooting, it appears that this policy probably had little to no effect on the outcome of the incident. It is doubtful that the event would have turned out any differently if the officers had trained extensively with the more powerful ammunition, or had been supplied the ammunition by the department in lieu of purchasing it themselves. Issues of mindset and tactics trumped issues of equipment at Newhall.
Considering the .357 Magnum’s superior penetration capabilities, it seems that it would be the preferred choice to the .38 Special for officers like highway patrolmen, who spend a lot of time working around cars and who would potentially need to penetrate thick layers of glass and steel with their weapons. However, this ammunition also places greater stress on handguns than the milder .38 Special, and it accelerates gun wear. Additionally, the greater recoil of the cartridge makes it more difficult for many officers to control during training and qualification, as many agencies would later discover during the heyday of the cartridge in law enforcement, in the 1970s. From these perspectives, a fairly good case can be made for the retention of the lesser round, which is why the Magnum never came close to replacing the Special in police service throughout the nation. Training issues aside, the CHP probably had the best possible policy in place at the time of Newhall—one that standardized the .38 Special but also permitted the optional use of .357 Magnum ammunition by those who desired to carry it. In any event, lack of handgun ammunition power or penetration was not an issue at Newhall.
This may not have been the case with the shotgun ammunition fired by Officer Alleyn. One of Officer Alleyn’s pellets struck Twining in the head after it penetrated the vehicle, causing a minor wound. Some reporting indicates that the pellet had spent most of its energy penetrating into the car and didn’t have much left by the time it struck Twining.83 Had this single .33-caliber 53.8-grain pellet been a one-ounce (438-grain) shotgun slug instead, it is likely that it would have delivered a much more powerful blow to the felon, possibly a fatal one. Of course, devil’s advocates will note that it is also likely a slug might have missed him entirely and that Twining was only hit due to the expanding pattern thrown by the 00 Buckshot round fired by Officer Alleyn.
Interestingly, the CHP has never issued shotgun slugs for use in patrol shotguns, preferring to issue the nine-pellet 00 Buckshot load exclusively. Considering the fact that most of the CHP’s potential shooting scenarios involve the use of vehicles, it would seem reasonable for the CHP to issue at least a few rounds of the better penetrating slug ammunition with each of the department’s shotguns. It’s impossible to say with any certainty that it would have made a difference at Newhall, but it remains an interesting academic exercise to ponder the “what ifs,” and it’s also conceivable that the penetrating capabilities of shotgun slugs could be useful in a future scenario.
In the present-day context, the same thought extends to the rapid proliferation of patrol rifles in the relatively light 5.56x45mm caliber. Agencies equipping their officers with these important lifesaving tools should ensure that the ammunition chosen for these firearms is capable of adequate penetration through vehicles and other objects that are likely to be used as cover by threats, and that the performance of such ammunition is suitable after defeating intermediate barriers.
Spare Ammunition
It has been previously discussed that the officers at Newhall were handicapped by the dump pouches used to carry their spare revolver ammunition. The pouches were famous for being rather clumsy to use, since the officer was required to pop open the flap on the bottom side of the pouch and catch the six loose rounds as they fell out into his hand. This operation was quite error prone, especially under stress or while the officer was moving. Once the officer got the ammunition out of the pouch and into his hand, he was required to juggle the cartridges, grab a single one, turn it around so that it was properly aligned, and feed it into the narrow chamber in the cylinder. He had to do this with the same hand that was cupping and retaining the remaining cartridges, since the opposite hand would be occupied holding the revolver. The complexity and required dexterity of the task just about guaranteed that the officer would have to abandon his scan of the surrounding environment and focus on the hand holding the ammunition supply and the revolver itself.
Even in the best of environments, this is a difficult and complex motor task that requires great amounts of dexterity to perform. However, with hands that are clumsy and shaking uncontrollably as a result of SNS activation, the task becomes even more difficult. If other factors are present, such as injuries, hands wet with blood or sweat, hands numb from the cold, a requirement to load while moving, or reduced vision in dark environments, the process becomes exceedingly problematic and prone to error.
The alternative method available to the CHP involved the use of ammunition loops on the gunbelt. These loops typically held six rounds on a leather slide that was threaded onto the gunbelt. In use, the officer would pluck rounds from the loops and insert them into the revolver one or two at a time. This method was probably more positive and less prone to fumbling than the dump pouch method, because the officer could control how many rounds were being handled at any given time. However, it was still sometimes difficult to extract rounds from the loops, and the process was only marginally better at withstanding the effects of negative influences like stress, cold, injuries, and wet hands. Additionally, the loops left the ammunition more exposed to the elements and to physical damage. A highway patrolman (and especially a motor officer) makes his living outside in the elements and frequently finds himself digging through car wreckage and banging around the insides of tight spaces and on the ground as he provides aid to injured passengers. The gasoline, transmission fluid, oil, and water he is regularly exposed to would quickly corrode the brass cartridges in the leather loops if they weren’t regularly maintained, and the cartridges themselves are more subject to falling out or being dented when carried in exposed loops versus the fully enclosed dump pouches. These risks would have been unappealing to an agency that issued its officers only 30 rounds of duty ammunition each year and expected them to last the entire period.84
While the loops offered a nominal two- to four-second advantage over the dump pouch system in speed of reloading under ideal conditions, the additional risk of ammunition damage and loss probably swayed the CHP to choose the latter option. It also didn’t hurt that the dump pouches provided a much more uniform look for a department that was especially conscious of appearance. Thus, the loops chosen by early highway patrolmen in the 1920s and 1930s had disappeared from use by the late 1940s, as the Department advanced towards standardization and uniformity among the officers.
The development of speedloaders, which proved far superior to either the dump pouches or the loops, was proceeding quickly around the time of Newhall. Early designs had found their way into the catalogs of law enforcement supply vendors such as F. Morton Pitt Co. by 1964, and these items were just being introduced into competitive shooting circles by the early 1970s and gaining widespread acceptance there. In the wake of Newhall, the department rapidly adopted them for law enforcement use, but it appears that these products were just in their infancy at the time of the Newhall shooting, and it’s not surprising that the CHP hadn’t considered them beforehand.
The CHP does deserve criticism for its hesitance to issue spare ammunition with the shotgun. The precedent for carrying spare ammunition on the long gun dated back to at least World War II, when G.I.s routinely carried spare eight-round en-bloc clips for their M-1 Garand rifles clipped to their slings, or a pair of extra 15-round magazines in pouches attached to the buttstocks of their M-1 Carbines.85 Applying the idea to an ammunition-restricted gun like the Remington 870 shotgun seems like it would have been obvious, yet it took the negative experience of Newhall before the CHP began to add canvas ammunition pouches to the stocks of their patrol shotguns. If Officer Alleyn’s shotgun had been equipped with a system of carrying spare ammunition, he might have been able to keep it in the fight long enough to exact another, more damaging hit on Davis or Twining. Alternatively, the brave citizen-hero Gary Kness might have been able to get the gun into action against Davis after he picked it up and clicked on an empty chamber.
It has been suggested that the Newhall officers should have had access to backup guns during the fight and that such equipment might have saved some lives. While there is great merit to this observation, particularly for Officer Pence who died while reloading his empty revolver, it should be noted that the absence of backup guns at Newhall was not unusual for the period.
The use of backup guns was relatively uncommon in U.S. law enforcement at the time of the Newhall shooting. There certainly were individual officers who made great use of them, but the concept was not readily embraced by the vast majority of officers on patrol throughout the nation—and many thought such preparations were unnecessary.86
Officers who served in high-crime areas, or on high-risk, specialized teams (such as “stakeout squads,” “tactical teams,” or “felony cars”), were more prone to use backups, as were officers who worked for agencies (such as Chicago or Detroit), that dictated the use of underpowered primary weapons but had liberal policies on the carriage of more powerful secondary weapons. But the use of backup guns was simply uncommon amongst most patrol officers circa 1970. Additionally, most agencies at the time did not have policies that authorized or actively encouraged the use of backup weapons by officers. The CHP itself didn’t officially authorize the use of backup weapons until sometime in the mid ’70s, at which time they approved the use of Colt or Smith & Wesson .38-caliber revolvers exclusively in this role.87 Prior to this time, some officers carried backups in contradiction to the department’s intentions, but the lack of official departmental approval certainly stopped many officers from considering these lifesaving tools. In light of this specific situation in the CHP, it is not surprising that none of the Newhall officers were equipped with backup guns.
The resistance to backup guns in law enforcement eroded over time, due to a combination of factors. Increasingly violent criminals and anti-establishment figures began to attack officers with increasing frequency throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, making the use of backups more necessary. Additionally, the publicity surrounding high-profile events like the 1963 Onion Field incident, in which two Los Angeles policemen were held hostage with their own guns and one of them was killed, and the 1978 killing of CHP Officers Blecher and Freeman in similar circumstances, made officers and their chains of command more aware of their vulnerability. So, too, did the growing “officer survival” movement that gained hold in the 1970s.88 However, these developments occurred long after the Newhall shooting, and it would be several decades before the presence of backup guns was more commonplace than their absence.
In the end analysis, the possession of a backup gun by Officers Gore, Frago and Alleyn would have made no difference, since each of these officers died while in possession of primary guns that were still loaded. Only Officer Pence, whose primary arm had been shot empty, could have benefited from having a backup gun at the ready. If he had been able to put a secondary gun into action against Twining, instead of having to reload his primary gun, he might have been able to put effective fire on his opponent and the outcome of the fight might have been different, especially if he could have held them off until the arrival of Units 78-19R and 78-16R moments later.
It should be noted that both Davis and Twining used backup guns to good effect during the fight. Davis shot at least three different guns during the fight (a snub revolver, a sawed-off pump shotgun, and Officer Frago’s revolver), and Twining shot three, as well (a four-inch S&W Highway Patrolman revolver and two 1911A1 semi-automatic pistols). Neither of the felons took the time to reload an empty gun in the middle of the fight, instead opting to choose another already loaded firearm to continue the battle. Twining was especially fortunate to have access to multiple weapons, as one of his weapons (the first 1911A1 he fired) malfunctioned. Instead of fixing the gun, he simply procured another from their ample supply and eventually used it to kill Officer Pence as he struggled to reload his empty primary weapon. As fate would have it, the felons not only had the advantage of superior mindset, tactics, and skill, they were also armed with better and more plentiful equipment.
Endnotes
1. Brooks, P.R. (1975). Officer Down, Code Three. Schiller Park, IL: Motorola Teleprograms, Inc. p.4.
2. Massad F. Ayoob is an internationally known firearms and self-defense instructor. He was the Director of the Lethal Force Institute in Concord, New Hampshire, for 28 years and is currently the director of the Massad Ayoob Group. Ayoob has taught police techniques and civilian self-defense to both law enforcement officers and private citizens in numerous venues since 1974, and has appeared as an expert witness in several trials. He has served as a part-time police officer in New Hampshire, since 1972, and currently holds the rank of Captain in the Grantham, New Hampshire, police department. He was the former Vice Chairman of the Forensic Evidence Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and is believed to be the only non-attorney to ever hold this position. He has served as Chair of Firearms Committee of the American Society of Law Enforcement Trainers (ASLET), serves on the Advisory Board of the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association, and is an instructor at the National Law Enforcement Training Center. Ayoob has authored several books and over one thousand articles on firearms, combat techniques, self-defense, and legal issues, and has served in an editorial capacity for Guns Magazine, American Handgunner, Gun Week, and Combat Handguns. Since 1995, he has written self-defense- and firearms-related articles for Backwoods Home Magazine. He also has a featured segment on the television show Personal Defense TV, which airs on The Outdoor Channel in the United States, and is a regular contributor to the ProArms Podcast. For more information, go to <http://massadayoobgroup.com/>.
3. Ayoob, M.F. (1990). Lethal Force Institute, Priorities of Survival. [Film] and Izumi, M.T. (1993). In Self Defense. Concord, NH: Police Bookshelf. p.7.
4. Six of the 10 were related to Mental Awareness and Preparation (Sleepy or Asleep, Relaxing too Soon, Missing the Danger Signs, Tombstone Courage, Preoccupation, and Apathy), two were related to Tactics (Taking a Bad Position, Failure to Watch Their Hands), two were related to Skill with the Rescue Equipment (Improper Search and Use of Handcuffs, Failure to Maintain Proficiency and Care of Weapon, Vehicle and Equipment), and none were related to the Optimum Choice of Safety Equipment, all of which proves the validity of Ayoob’s model. Brooks, P.R. (1975). Officer Down, Code Three. Schiller Park, IL: Motorola Teleprograms, Inc. pp.6-7.
5. Ayoob, M.F. (2010, July/August). The Ayoob Files. American Handgunner Magazine, Volume 34, Number 4, Issue 206, and Police One TV. (2011, April 26). Will to Win: Jared Reston. [Film]. <http://www.policeone.com/policeonetv/videos/3592582-will-to-win-jared-reston/>.
6. Police One TV. (2011, April 26). Will to Win: Jared Reston. [Film]. <http://www.policeone.com/policeonetv/videos/3592582-will-to-win-jared-reston/>.
7. Ibid.
8. Indeed, many medical studies indicate that the survival rate for gunshot wounds in the United States is quite high. In one study, the average survival rate for persons shot during an assault in the United States was around 80%, with the survival rate spiking as high as 84% for persons who were not shot in the head during an assault. Beaman, V., MS, and Annest, J.L., PhD, and Mercy, J.A., PhD, and Kresnow, M., MS, and Pollock, D.A., MD. (March 2000). Lethality of Firearm-Related Injuries in the United States Population. Annals of Emergency Medicine, Volume 35, Issue 3. http://www.annemergmed.com/article/S0196-0644%2800%2970077-1/abstract.
9. Miller’s books are among the most insightful studies of violence and how to prepare for it ever penned. His observations are founded in real world experience as a corrections officer and law enforcement trainer, and the books are must-reads for law enforcement officers and armed citizens who want to understand the psychology of violence and how to prepare themselves for potential combat.
Miller’s concept of “freezes” is vitally important and beyond the scope of this work, but the important issue here is that the person might need to force himself to act when his mind is frozen. One method that Miller discusses is talking one’s self through the problem with the aid of a simple, pre-established plan of action. The plan need not be elaborate. Instead, a simple framework is what is desired.
For instance, in the aviation world, pilots are taught that, in times of stress, their priorities (in order) are to “aviate, navigate, communicate.” That is, they need to keep the aircraft flying and under control first, then worry about where the aircraft is pointed, and then, finally, worry about communicating with crew, passengers, and air traffic control. When a pilot encounters an emergency, this framework doesn’t provide all the answers, but it does provide a structure for organizing and executing his response appropriately and might provide an anchor point for a temporarily frozen mind.
In a similar, more relevant vein, officer survival instructor and author Rich Grassi provides a model for what officers should do in the immediate moments after shooting stops. In Grassi’s model, the officer is advised to consider the following priorities: “Cover, reload, scan, check for wounds (leak check), communicate.” Again, the plan is basic, but provides some structure for an efficient response that covers the most important priorities and might help to break a freeze.
Miller, R.A. (2011). Facing Violence.Wolfeboro, NH: YMAA Publication Center, pp. 126-127, and Grassi, R. (2009, May 26). Skill Set. Post Shooting Procedures. The Tactical Wire. [Online]. http://www.thetacticalwire.com/archives/2009-05-26.
10. Author Mark Moritz wrote an outstanding article on the necessity to separate the extraneous from the important during crisis. The reader is highly encouraged to read his article on the subject. Moritz, M. (n.d.). All That Later. The Gun Zone. [Online] <http://www.thegunzone.com/allthatlater.html>.
11. Asken, M.J., Dr., and Grossman, D.A., Lt. Col. (2010) Warrior Mindset. United States: Warrior Science Publications, p. XVI and p.38.
12. For an outstanding treatment of tactical performance imagery, arousal control, and the training techniques to enhance the “mental toughness skills” required by modern warriors, the reader is encouraged to read Dr. Michael Asken’s and Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman’s Warrior Mindset. Their expertise is first rate and their treatment of these critical areas is infinitely better than anything the author can propose. Asken, M.J., Dr., and Grossman, D.A., Lt. Col. (2010) Warrior Mindset. United States: Warrior Science Publications.
13. Mireles, Ed. Jr., quoted in Anderson, W.F., M.D. (1996). Forensic Analysis of the April 11, 1986 FBI Firefight. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, p.127
14. Rand Corporation. (2008). Evaluation of the New York City Police Department Firearm Training and Firearm Discharge Review Process. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. p. 8.
15. Ibid.
16. Grossman, D.A. Lt Col. (2004). On Combat. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications. p.155.
17. Ibid.
18. To be clear, Marshall knows that police officers are ethically and legally bound to use reasonable and proportional force in their duties, and is not advocating unbridled and unnecessary aggression. As an honorable, spiritual warrior, Marshall knows that the awesome power entrusted to law enforcement officers is also accompanied by an equally awesome responsibility to control it and use it prudently. His thoughts should not be construed to mean that anything goes on the street, but rather to mean that, when the specific conditions exist which justify the use of force by an officer, he must fully commit to that path, without restraint of any kind, to ensure his survival and the protection of the innocent. Marshall, E. (n.d.) Stopping Power Forums. [Online]. <www.stoppingpower.net>.
19. Marshall, E. (2009, 14 December). Stopping Power Forums. [Online]. <http://www.stoppingpower.net/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=17928>.
20. Grossman, D.A. Lt Col. (2004). On Combat. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications. p.159.
21. Miller, R.A. (2011). Facing Violence. Wolfeboro, NH: YMAA Publication Center, p . 23.
22. Gaylord, C. (1960, 1997). Handgunner’s Guide. Boulder CO: Paladin Press. p.147.
23. Suarez, G. (2003). The Combative Perspective. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press. p.2.
24. Newhall was a rural area frequented by large numbers of hunters and target shooters in April of 1970, and gun-related infractions were apparently common, especially misdemeanors like the one in question. It is felt in some quarters that Officers Gore and Frago had no reason to be at an especially heightened state of alert when they stopped the Pontiac containing Davis and Twining. While this conclusion may seem cavalier and reckless by today’s standards, it seems that it appeared more reasonable at the time.
However, CHP Chief John Anderson relates that, while gun-related complaints were common in the area, it was not beyond imagination that they could turn violent. According to Chief Anderson, only a few months previous a pair of motorists had engaged in a shootout in the nearby Fresno area over an argument involving the dimming of high-beam headlights. More ominously, Officer Warren Loftus had recently been shot in the Newhall area during a routine stop for speeding—an incident that, while not a “gun” call, showed that even the most mundane activity could quickly turn deadly.
25. Boyd developed the model and refined it over decades. He gave it life in a series of evolving lectures, such as the “Patterns of Conflict” seminar that continuously matured over time. Boyd, J. (1986). Patterns of Conflict. [Online]. http://www.slideshare.net/noobgank/patterns-of-conflict and Wikipedia. (n.d.) OODA Loop. [Online]. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop> and Wikipedia (n.d.) John Boyd. [Online]. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_%28military_strategist%29>.
26. Actually, Miller advocates using “Operant Conditioning” principles to eliminate the middle steps entirely. Miller, R.A. (2011). Facing Violence. Wolfeboro, NH: YMAA Publication Center, p . 95 and P. 137.
27. Ibid.
28. Ouellette, R. (1993). Management of Aggressive Behavior. Powers Lake, WI: Performance Dimensions Publishing. p.3.
29. Ibid., p.2.
30. Ibid., p.3
31. Ibid. pp.51-53.
32. Lieutenant Colonel John Dean “Jeff” Cooper (ret.) popularized the use of the color code, adapted from the USMC, as a model to describe a person’s mindset as they oriented themselves towards a threat. As a person progressed through the various stages of the color code, they were becoming more mentally prepared to use force against a specific threat. In the third stage of the code, Orange, a person has recognized that something is not right and has gone from a condition of relaxed alertness where there was no particular threat (Yellow) to a condition where a particular threat has caused the escalation in alert status. The person shifts focus to the particular threat and in the final step, Red, the person is prepared to fight that threat immediately when warranted. Cooper, J. (2005) Jeff Cooper’s Commentaries. Volume 13, Number 7. [Online]. http://dvc.org.uk/jeff/jeff13_7.html.
33. The CHP Enforcement Tactics Manual of the time advised:
“When two officers are working together, both should get out of the patrol unit upon stopping a violator, one going up to the violator’s car and the other standing to the right front of the patrol vehicle. At night, it is a good practice for the officer covering to stand just behind the right front headlight of the patrol car.”
From the context of the manual, it is understood that this instruction is intended for “routine” operations in which there is no specific threat, but only the general threat that accompanies stopping any vehicle with unknown occupants—in other words, a low-risk or routine stop. In CHP Academy training exercises of the period involving “hot stop” procedures, the passenger-side officer is described as taking cover behind the door of the CHP cruiser with the CHP shotgun while the driver’s-side officer makes the approach to the suspect vehicle, which makes much greater sense when facing opponents who are suspected to be armed and dangerous.
It would seem that Officer Frago’s position behind the headlight was not compatible with hot stop tactics of the time, and it is presumed that he either took this position out of routine habit or because there was a lack of coordination between him and Officer Gore and it was unclear which tactics they were going to employ. In Officer Frago’s defense, it has been observed by many, including the CHP itself, that the brandishing event that prompted the stop was a routine occurrence in this area and would have been only a misdemeanor offense at the time. Such a crime would be treated differently in today’s environment, but, at the time and in this rural area, it would not have been unusual to view this as a rather routine stop. However, in a routine stop, the officers usually don’t draw and aim their weapons at the suspect vehicle, and they also don’t grab the shotgun from the car, which is reserved for more serious confrontations. Thus, this hybrid mix of tactics used by the officers is difficult to understand in retrospect, and perhaps indicative of some level of confusion (perhaps due to inexperience), as to how to deal with the situation.
34. Indeed, taking cover would have been essential to ensure their protection, since it is an established fact that “action beats reaction,” and even if the CHP officers had the felons at gunpoint, the felons still could have drawn and fired before the CHP officers had mentally processed the action and stopped them with gunfire of their own.
This point was amply demonstrated in the research conducted by Officers Thomas A. Hontz and Raymond P. Rheingans, whose 1997 study of 76 officers indicated that criminals could draw and fire a handgun in as little as 0.78 seconds, while the average officer response time from recognition of a visual cue to the first shot fired was 1.15 seconds, a deadly 47% increase. Notably, this 1.15-second average was developed with officers starting the exercise with their weapon already in hand at a “low ready” position, similar to how they would hold a criminal at gunpoint. If the officers were required to draw their weapon from the holster as part of the response, the total reaction time to first shot fired increased to 1.90 seconds on average, a 144% increase that dramatically increased the risk of the officer being shot before he could even respond. Hontz, T.A., and Rheingans, R.P. (1997). Firearms Response Time. PPCT Research Publications, Millstadt, IL.
35. Personal interview with CHP Officer Jay Rice (ret.), whose decision to retain all his cadet materials and notes from the era was exceptionally fortuitous and a true gift to a researcher such as the author. His extensive and detailed handwritten notes provide critical and detailed insight to the instruction received by CHP cadets of the era.
36. McLain, J. (1970, April 12). You Could Get Shot For Missing Class Here. The Sacramento Union and CHP Class I-65 “Hourly Distribution of Subjects,” courtesy of CHP Officer Jay Rice (ret.).
37. Although the FBI agents at the CHP Academy mentioned in class a standing search (with the suspect standing freely—the least used), and a kneeling search (a “new” position that was a “good holding position”), the greatest emphasis was placed on using a modified wall search position, with the suspect leaning forward onto the vehicle. It was presumed that the vast majority of CHP contacts would involve this search position, and it formed the core of the exceptionally short instructional periods at the Academy to the exclusion of any other techniques. Today, the CHP’s PMA instruction provides for four different arrest methods—two standing, one kneeling, and one prone, with the prone method being used in all felony vehicle stops. Personal interview with CHP Officer (Retired) Jay Rice, and CHP Officer (Retired) Gil Payne, and personal papers of CHP Officer (Retired) Jay Rice.
38. After the Newhall shooting, the CHP would instruct officers to cuff dangerous suspects first, then search them later as part of the renewed emphasis on improving Physical Methods of Arrest (PMA) procedures. However, in the pre-Newhall era, officers were instructed to search first, then cuff. Personal interviews with CHP Officer Jay Rice (ret.) and CHP Officer Gil Payne (ret.).
39. By staying removed and monitoring the bigger picture when his immediate assistance is not required by the contact officer, the cover officer performs a very important safety function. If the cover officer allows his attention to be unnecessarily drawn into the actions of the contact officer, then the situation becomes very similar to the crew of Eastern Airlines Flight #401, who allowed all three members in the cockpit to become so engrossed with fixing a suspected landing gear malfunction (which later turned out to be nothing but a burned out light bulb), that nobody was flying or monitoring the aircraft anymore. Unfortunately, this meant that nobody recognized the aural warning that the autopilot had disengaged, nor the subsequent gentle descent of the aircraft into the Everglades, until it was too late. A total of 101 people aboard the flight were killed in the December 29, 1972, crash.
40. Officer Frago’s decision to leave the cover position was tactically unsound and the subject of much criticism in some circles, but it’s interesting to consider whether a mix of armament and flaws in the standard tactics influenced his decision.
Officer Frago was armed with a shotgun, which has crude sights and fires multiple pellets in a pattern and is therefore less precise than a rifle or pistol, which shoot a single bullet and have precision sights. Although the shot pattern from Officer Frago’s Cylinder-bore shotgun would probably have opened up only to a 12-inch pattern or so at the short distance to the Pontiac, it’s unlikely his limited CHP shotgun training would have prepared him to understand this advanced user concept. Indeed, the layman’s understanding of shotguns would have reinforced the opposite. Ever since World War I, shotguns had been known as “trench brooms” and “alley sweepers,” due to their supposed ability to throw a wide pattern of devastating shot. These misconceptions had been imprinted in the collective psyche of the public by legions of returning Doughboys and scores of Hollywood films depicting cowboys and gangsters, and so were not easily ignored.
Even the CHP as a whole was somewhat taken with the mystique of the shotgun. An April 1965 article in the San Diego Evening Tribune which triumphed the “Psychological Value of Shotguns,” reprinted in the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP) magazine, quipped that, “The short barrels [of the CHP’s new “sawed off” shotguns] cause a quicker and wider pattern of the shot range, which makes a target within 50 yards almost impossible to miss … you just aim and fire.” The CHP Shotgun Training Manual in use at the time encouraged this line of thinking, with pictures of CHP silhouette targets that had been shot at various distances displaying widely spread patterns.
It’s possible that Officer Frago, like most shotgun novices and the author of that misleading Tribune piece, could have believed that his shotgun would fire a pattern so large that it would have endangered Officer Gore, who was approaching the suspect vehicle. This may have encouraged him to move forward, thereby reducing any risk of fratricide.
The other alternative would have been to abandon the shotgun and switch to his less-powerful revolver, which would have had its own tactical consequences. Additionally, Officer Frago would have had to make the tough choice between merely setting the shotgun aside (a security and safety risk), or putting it back in the cradle in the patrol car (a delay and distraction that would have been unacceptable as his partner moved forward into danger).
By this logic, did the CHP hot stop procedure that required Officer Gore to advance forward inadvertently force Officer Frago’s hand? Did Officer Gore’s advance leave Officer Frago no choice but to follow and move forward with shotgun in hand, lest he risk shooting his fellow officer? CHP Shotgun Training Manual, (1965), Page 2.
41. This was called the “hip rest” carry position in CHP parlance, and it was proscribed for “conditions where an officer may be holding a shotgun for an extended period of time or its immediate use is not anticipated.” It was not a position that allowed the officer to quickly get the gun into action. CHP Shotgun Training Manual, (1965), Page 9.
42. California Highway Patrol. (1975). Newhall: 1970 [Film]. Sacramento, CA, courtesy of Santa Clarita Valley Historical Society and SCVTV, http://www.scvtv.com/html/newhall1970-chp1975btv.html.
43. This does not mean that Officers Pence and Alleyn failed to maneuver during the fight. They did indeed abandon their initial positions after their weapons ran dry, to assume a new fallback position at the rear of their respective vehicles, where they again began shooting. The key distinction between the officers and their opponents is that the officers did all their shooting and fighting from fixed positions, never moving and shooting at the same time, while the felons did their shooting on the move. This made the felons especially difficult to target and gave them the initiative in the fight, as they forced the officers to react to their movements, thus interrupting their OODA cycle and getting “inside their loop.”
44. Aveni is intellectually honest enough to note that, while he can’t disprove the link, he also cannot positively establish one either, because it is so difficult to obtain meaningful data from law enforcement agencies. Many agencies don’t collect the requisite data, and of those who do, even fewer will share it out of liability or political concerns. The lack of a standardized reporting format across the profession, which asks specific questions about important details such as lighting conditions, distances, and other critical factors, is another impediment to gaining meaningful data for analysis. Aveni, T.J. (2003, August). Officer-Involved Shootings: What We Didn’t Know Has Hurt Us. The Police Policy Studies Council. <http://www.theppsc.org/Staff_Views/Aveni/OIS.pdf>.
45. Surefire Institute. (n.d.) Lowlight and Tactical Training. Study Reveals Important Truths Hidden in the Details of Officer-Involved Shootings, Reprinted from Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Operation Safe Streets. [Online]. <http://www.surefireinstitute.com/images/pdfs/Officer-Involved_Shooting_Study.pdf>. Aveni’s conclusion is supported by a number of notable law enforcement trainers and writers, to include Richard Fairburn, Tom Marx, Gregory Morrison, and Dave Spaulding, all of whom have discussed the complexities of making law enforcement firearms training realistic and relevant to actual gunfight conditions. See Marx, T. (2010, March 1). Five Ways to Blend Marksmanship and Reality-based Training, PoliceOne.com. [Online] <http://www.policeone.com/police-products/firearms/articles/2009465-Five-ways-to-blend-marksmanship-and-reality-based-training/> and Fairburn, R. (2008, December 12). Where Did All the Bullets Go? PoliceOne.com. [Online] <http://www.policeone.com/police-products/firearm-accessories/gun-cleaning/articles/1764925-Where-did-all-the-bullets-go/> and Spaulding, D. (2004, January 21). How to Improve Marksmanship. PoliceOne.com. [Online]. <http://www.policeone.com/columnists/PoliceMagazine/articles/77176-How-to-improve-marksmanship/>.
46. Officer Alleyn’s involuntary final shot into Unit 78-8 was obviously not targeted at Davis. California Highway Patrol. (1970). Information Bulletin (July 1, 1970): Shooting Incident—Newhall Area. Sacramento, CA and California Highway Patrol. (1975). Newhall: 1970 [Film]. Sacramento, CA, courtesy of Santa Clarita Valley Historical Society and SCVTV, <http://www.scvtv.com/html/newhall1970-chp1975btv.html>.
47. Ibid, and Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department Homicide investigation files.
48. Further discussions of Boyd’s OODA loop concept and its application to personal combat can be found in the excellent books from Lou Chiodo, Dave Spaulding, and Gabe Suarez. Chiodo, L. (2009). Winning A High-Speed, Close-Distance Gunfight. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, and Spaulding, D. (2003). Handgun Combatives. Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., and Suarez, G. (2003). The Combative Perspective. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press.
49. Siddle, B.K. (2012). High Risk Human Factors [Briefing]. Human Factor Research Group, Millstadt, IL.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid, and Siddle, B.K. (1995). Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, p.7-8.
53. Ibid, and Siddle, B.K. (1995). Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, p.91-101.
54. Siddle, B.K. (1995). Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, p.61.
55. Rory Miller neatly summarizes the negative effects of SNS activation on performance and trained skills when he makes the incredibly insightful observation that:
“Under attack, you will not have either the mind or the body that you have trained. You will have an impaired, partially deaf and blind, clumsy beginner who isn’t that bright. You will be like a rank beginner because, surprise, you are a rank beginner.”
Miller, R.A. (2011). Facing Violence. Wolfeboro, NH: YMAA Publication Center, p . 142.
56. Siddle notes that SNS-caused decreases in peripheral vision, depth perception, and the ability to focus on close objects not only rob the individual of the ability to see things in the general environment around them, but also prevent the individual from clearly seeing their gun sights. Per Siddle, “the ability to focus on the front sight of a handgun is not possible when the SNS is activated,” which complicates the marksmanship problem dramatically when engaging targets beyond “close quarters” distances, like the officers in Newhall were required to do. Siddle, B.K. (1998). Scientific and Test Data Validating the Isosceles and Single-Hand Point Shooting Techniques. Belleville, IL: PPCT Management Systems, p.3.
57. Statistics gleaned from the NYPD SOP-9 reporting system and from Metro-Dade Police data support the 15% average across the board. Of course, many variables affect the hit probabilities. Shootings that occur in low light typically have a lower hit probability than those in daylight (perhaps as much as 24 to 30 percent), while shootings that occur at close distances have higher hit probabilities than those which occur at farther distances (between two and 10 times as much, depending on distance). Aveni, T.J. (2003, August). Officer-Involved Shootings: What We Didn’t Know Has Hurt Us. The Police Policy Studies Council. <http://www.theppsc.org/Staff_Views/Aveni/OIS.pdf>.
58. Mister. Kness’ shot struck an intervening object first, probably the car, which caused the bullet to fragment. The CHP report on the incident noted that, “two copper-jacketed fragments were found imbedded in the suspect’s chest after his capture.” California Highway Patrol. (1970). Information Bulletin (July 1, 1970): Shooting Incident—Newhall Area. Sacramento, CA.
59. Santa Clarita Valley Historical Society. (2010). The Newhall Incident: A Law Enforcement Tragedy [Film]. Santa Clarita, CA, courtesy of Santa Clarita Valley Historical Society and SCVTV, <http://www.scvtv.com/html/scvhs040510btv.html>.
60. Gabe Suarez notes that, “Man has the capability, based on his perspectives in prehistoric times, to engage in combat in either an emotionally aroused state with the resulting stress effects and inhibitions against killing, or in a cool predatory state, which may not have a stress response in evidence and is similar in nature to the hunting behavior [which lacks emotionally based reactions and inhibitions against killing].” It appears that Mr. Kness, like Davis and Twining, was able to function in this latter realm and capitalize on the performance benefits of this lower state of arousal. Suarez, G. (2003). The Combative Perspective. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, p.93.
61. This situation was possible because of lax ammunition policies in the CHP, which allowed officers to provide their own ammunition for duty. The CHP issued standard pressure .38 Special 148-grain wadcutter ammunition for training and 158-grain RNL ammunition for duty, but allowed its officers to purchase .357 Magnum ammunition on their own and load it in their revolvers for duty. The officers who elected to do this were not required to train or qualify with the more powerful Magnum ammunition. In the aftermath of Newhall, the CHP adopted a .38 Special 110-grain JHP loaded to +P+ pressure levels and required its use for all training and duty purposes, prohibiting the use of privately purchased ammunition. The use of .357 Magnum ammunition would not resurface in the CHP until the late 1980s (just prior to the adoption of the .40 Smith & Wesson caliber, in 1990), when the CHP began to issue limited quantities of Remington 125-grain JHP .357 Magnum ammunition to those officers who owned privately purchased .357 Magnum revolvers (the CHP still issued .38 Special revolvers at the time). Officers who elected to carry the .357 Magnum ammunition were required to train and qualify with it under the supervision of agency training officers.
62. There are many good reasons for officers to train with full-power ammunition that replicates the recoil of their duty load. Training with such ammunition allows the officer to work on shooting skills such as recoil control (especially with the off, or “weak” hand), trigger reset, and rapid fire cadence in a realistic fashion, and helps to increase the officer’s confidence and ability with his weapon.
The point of impact for a bullet relative to the point of aim can be greatly affected by the weight and velocity of the bullet. Training with duty analogue ammunition allows the officer to learn this relationship for his weapon, which enhances his ability to place his shots where they need to go in a critical situation.
There are legal precedents that encourage the use of full-power training ammunition, as well. In Popow vs. City of Margate, 476 F SUPP. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979), the law enforcement establishment was put on notice that they had a responsibility to train officers in realistic conditions that would prepare them for their duty environment. This would seem to include training with ammunition that matches the operating characteristics of the duty ammunition.
However, the most critical justification is to validate the reliability of the firearm. The widespread adoption of semi-automatic pistols in police service led to increased capability at the price of increased complexity and maintenance requirements. While revolvers are not immune to malfunctions caused by incompatible ammunition, they are typically less sensitive to ammunition selection than semiautomatic pistols and readily function with a wide range of ammunition power levels. Furthermore, their proper function does not rely upon the shooter providing a firm resistance to the gun during recoil. In contrast, a semi-automatic pistol’s reliability depends on a complex interaction between the energy of the cartridge, the properties of the recoil and magazine springs, the mass of the slide, and the support provided by the shooter’s stance. If any one of these components is altered, the proper functioning of the pistol may be affected.
Shooting a service pistol with full-power ammunition that mimics the energy level of the duty ammunition allows the officer to ensure all the mechanical components in his pistol (most notably, recoil and magazine springs, which have a limited service life), are in the proper working order and that his shooting stance and grip provide the proper resistance to allow reliable functioning. It also validates the officer’s shooting grip, since a poor grip may cause hands to come apart during recoil or digits to interfere with the operation of the slide during recoil and induce a malfunction. Any of these latent weaknesses could go undetected if the officer only fired low-power ammunition through the pistol in training. Additionally, low-powered ammunition may not possess the energy required to ensure proper functioning of the pistol, leading to a series of malfunctions in training that detract from the training experience and decrease the officer’s faith and confidence in his equipment, which could have disastrous effects on his mental readiness for combat.
63. Artwohl, A., Dr., & Christensen, L.W. (1997). Deadly Force Encounters. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, and Grossman, D.A. Lt Col. (2004). On Combat. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications.
64. In one survey conducted by police psychologist Dr. Alexis Artwohl, 88% of the 72 respondents reported diminished sound—almost nine out of every 10 officers! Some 60% reported memory loss for some of their actions, and 50% experienced dissociation, the sensation of watching the event from a detached state, perhaps even from “outside the body.” Artwohl, A., Dr., & Christensen, L.W. (1997). Deadly Force Encounters. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press pp.41-2, 49 and Grossman, D.A. Lt Col. (2004). On Combat. Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications. pp.54-59, 94-95.
65. Cirillo, J. (1996). Guns, Bullets, and Gunfights. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, p.73.
66. Marshall, E. (n.d.) Stopping Power Forums. [Online]. <www.stoppingpower.net>.
67. Some experienced wags would refute the statement, claiming that the pouches were specifically designed to deposit two to three rounds into the hand (all facing different directions) and scatter the rest onto the ground, in a cynical (but realistic) recognition that they were exceptionally difficult to operate. It’s interesting to note that Charles Remsberg’s groundbreaking and widely acclaimed officer survival “bible” of the early 1980s, Street Survival, indicated that the dump pouch system was the slowest of the available reloading methods at the time, requiring about 12 to 14 seconds to complete a reload, in comparison to the 10 seconds required to load from belt loops. The newly introduced speedloaders, adopted by the CHP after Newhall in 1972, require only three seconds by comparison, according to Remsberg. Remsberg, C., & Adams, J., & McTernan, T.M. (1980). Street Survival. Northbrook, IL: Calibre Press. pp.224-5.
68. See Section One, Endnote 38, for a discussion of the evidence that proves this assertion.
69. The bloodied hats are clearly evident in the crime scene photos, resting where the officers fell. California Highway Patrol. (1975). Newhall: 1970 [Film]. Sacramento, CA, courtesy of Santa Clarita Valley Historical Society and SCVTV, <http://www.scvtv.com/html/newhall1970-chp1975btv.html> and Anderson, J., & Cassady, M. (1999). The Newhall Incident. Fresno, CA: Quill Driver Books. p.144.
70. In his book Guns, Bullets, and Gunfights, legendary NYPD gunfighter Jim Cirillo described an officer who encountered a similar situation when he shot his revolver empty during a gunfight. According to Cirillo, “He opened his cylinder, poured the empty cases into his strong hand, and looked at his feet for the brass can before he realized there was none and that he had better dump the brass and reload quickly. Luckily by this time his opponent had taken off.” Cirillo also describes another officer whose agency required trainees to fill their pockets with 100 rounds of spare ammunition during training in the interest of saving time. When one of those officers had his weapon run dry in a gunfight, “He quickly reached into his pocket, came up with a dime, a quarter and his car keys, and attempted to stuff them into his open revolver cylinder. He stated that he wondered what happened to his ammo. Who took his ammo? Why wasn’t the ammo in the right pants pocket?” Fortunately for this officer, he realized his mistake and was able to complete a reload of his gun in enough time to shoot the offender. Cirillo, J. (1996). Guns, Bullets, and Gunfights. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, pp. 62-63.
71. In his book on the Newhall incident, Chief John Anderson describes that Officer Pence dropped two of the six rounds he was attempting to load into his revolver. According to Anderson, he searched for and located one of the two and managed to load it and close the cylinder at the very moment Twining leaned over the fender to deliver his execution-style shot to Officer Pence’s head. This author has been unable to confirm Anderson’s account, and the available evidence actually contradicts it (eyewitness accounts from officers on scene report that when Officer Alleyn’s body was moved, his revolver was found with the cylinder open and six cartridges loaded in the cylinder). However, if it is true, then it further illustrates the point that loading the gun to full capacity may have fatally delayed Officer Pence from getting back into the fight quickly enough. Anderson, J., & Cassady, M. (1999). The Newhall Incident. Fresno, CA: Quill Driver Books. p.146.
72. Per interviews with CHP Officer Jay Rice (ret.), during some timed courses of fire, CHP cadets and officers would shoot 10 rounds at each stage, loading four and six rounds. With the partial load, officers would have to pay attention to how they closed the cylinder and where the first cartridge was lined up, otherwise they might waste time clicking on empty chambers before they got to the first live round. This required officers to understand which way the cylinder turned on their particular make of revolver—on Smith & Wesson revolvers the cylinder rotates counterclockwise, while on Colt’s revolvers the cylinder rotates clockwise—and position the first round accordingly. Unfortunately, this kind of exposure to the partial load was not addressed as a gunfight tactic, but as an administrative action pursuant to a marksmanship exercise. It appears that Officer Pence had no training experience that would have prompted him to consider cutting the loading process short and accepting a partially loaded gun so that he could get back into the fight more quickly.
73. Officer Pence displayed some very common traits of people who are task-saturated and trying to solve a problem under stress. When an individual becomes task-saturated, they are overwhelmed by the presence of other inputs, stimuli, and requirements that distract them from solving a particular problem. As such, these individuals shut off their sensors and ignore inputs from the environment around them in order to focus all their mental energy on completing a single action. When a person who is task-saturated identifies a solution to the problem, it is very difficult to get them to alter course after they have begun to implement it. The individual remains fully committed to the original solution, even after additional information and evidence (often unnoticed by the individual), indicates that the problem or situation around them has changed and their plan needs to be reconsidered. When the problem changes, difficulties arise, or the plan fails to work, they get stuck in a mental loop and simply redouble their efforts and try harder to make it work, rather than making corrections and changes to the plan. Additionally, people who are task-saturated lose the perspective of time, often failing to realize how much time has passed while they have been busy trying to solve the problem.
In Officer Pence’s case, he was so fixated on loading six cartridges into his revolver that it probably never occurred to him to curtail the process and accept a partial load. It is likely that he was also experiencing sympathetic nervous system-induced time distortions that made him incapable of understanding how much time had elapsed while he was struggling to complete the full reload. There was nothing in his memory banks (from training) to short-circuit the mental loop that he’d gotten himself stuck in, and it was only after he finally finished the task of loading six rounds that his brain released him to move on to the next task of locating Twining and engaging him. Unfortunately, by that time, it was too late.
This is not meant as a criticism of Officer Pence, merely an observation. That Officer Pence displayed these inherently human characteristics is entirely understandable, given the intensity of his situation and the fact that he was grievously wounded.
Interestingly, lawman Jim Cirillo describes a similar situation that involved an officer reloading under fire. In the case described by Cirillo, the aggressor saw the officer fumble and drop his rounds onto the ground during reloading and recognized an opportunity to press the attack. He rushed the officer, who was able to load one round and dry-fire on two empty chambers before the live round fired, stopping the opponent when he was only eight feet away. Had Officer Pence’s training or good fortune allowed him to make a similar decision, it’s possible that there would have been one less dead officer on the ground at Newhall. Cirillo, J. (1996). Guns, Bullets, and Gunfights. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, pp. 63.
74. Fortunately, the design of the semi-automatic pistols carried by most police officers today makes it very easy to load the gun up in the lower edge of the officer’s field of view. Furthermore, the action is a simple gross motor skill that really doesn’t depend on the officer looking at the pistol at all, which allows the officer to complete the task without taking his eyes off the adversary. This gives the semi-automatic pistol an advantage, as reloading the revolver is a more complex task and is more dependent upon fine motor skills that erode with stress. These factors sometimes demand the officer to look at the revolver during reloading.
75. CHP Officer Jay Rice (ret.) remembered many of these initiatives, pioneered by enthusiastic instructors like CHP Sgt. John Mahe. Sergeant Mahe and his fellow instructors taught officers to seek and use cover, ignore spent brass after it was ejected, keep their heads up while reloading and look for the adversary, and always keep a round ready in the chamber of the shotgun for immediate firing when they were topping off the magazine. The instructors would occasionally test officers by loading spent hulls into the shotgun to induce malfunctions and encourage the diagnosis and correction of these life-threatening stoppages. They taught an offensive, fighting mindset that made their trainees much better prepared to dominate a fight than the four officers who tragically perished at Newhall.
76. It took the November 15, 1963, shooting of Officer Glenn W. Carlson at the hands of parolee bank robbers in Truckee, and the resulting action of nearby California Assemblywoman Pauline Davis, before the CHP was finally provided with a limited number of shotguns, in 1964 (about one for every five to 10 officers). The shotguns proved invaluable during the August 1965 Watts Riot, and the CHP soon began to outfit every patrol car with one. Personal interview with CHP Captain George Nuttall (ret.).
77. The CHP’s policy of sealing the shotgun has been discussed elsewhere in the book, as has the lack of focused and continued training with the shotgun. The Newhall officers, like every other CHP officer at the time, simply didn’t have the right training, support, and encouragement from the department to make them fully competent and comfortable with the shotgun, which doubtlessly affected their performance on the killing field.
78. The California Highway Patrol Shotgun Training Manual that served as the textbook for all CHP shotgun training specified only two approved carry methods for the shotgun, “high port” and “hip rest.” Officer Frago reportedly took the high port position while he was covering Officer Gore’s approach, but later moved to the hip rest position described in the text as he reached to open the passenger door of the Pontiac. While it may have been an approved procedure, the hip rest position was tactically inappropriate for the situation and prevented Officer Frago from quickly employing this lifesaving tool when he came under fire from Twining. The California Highway Patrol Shotgun Training Manual, circa January 1965.
79. It was the CHP’s conclusion that Officer Alleyn had mistakenly ejected the additional round. Presumably, this was an error prompted by the effects of survival stress. To eject the live round, Officer Alleyn would have had to unlock the fore-end of the gun with the button located forward of the triggerguard. This action is not normally required and it should have given him pause, but his thinking was probably clouded by the effects of severe stress. California Highway Patrol. (1970). Information Bulletin (July 1, 1970): Shooting Incident—Newhall Area. Sacramento, CA.
80. The CHP initially issued shotguns without a ready supply of spare ammunition on the gun itself. The canvas pouches (later, leather loops) attached to the shotgun’s buttstock to hold an extra five rounds of ammunition did not appear in CHP service until after the Newhall shooting, roughly late 1971 to early 1972. Therefore, Officer Alleyn began the fight with a sum total of four rounds of ammunition in the gun, which allowed the gun to be stored in the dashboard-mounted Lektro-Lok rack with a fully loaded magazine and an empty chamber (so-called “cruiser ready”). By ejecting one of those four rounds, Officer Alleyn significantly handicapped his ability to fight back with the most powerful weapon in his arsenal.
81. The CHP’s official report on the Newhall shooting credited Officer Alleyn with striking Twining with one shotgun pellet (after it penetrated through the rear window), as Twining dove into the rear seat of the Pontiac to obtain additional weapons. The spent pellet creased Twining’s scalp, creating a “minor wound” that an enraged Twining later said “hurt like hell.” However, the lead investigator on the shooting, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office Homicide Bureau Detective Sergeant John Brady, recounted that Officer Alleyn actually hit both Twining and Davis with pellets. According to Brady’s testimony:
“A pellet from Alleyn’s shotgun streaked across the top of Twining’s scalp, ripping an angry red gash. If it had been just a little lower, it could have opened the top of his skull, or at least knocked him down. Davis was turned sideways to Alleyn. A shotgun pellet tore right over the bridge of his nose. If he had been looking directly back at the officer, the pellet would have hit him right between the eyes.”
Thus, Officer Alleyn came awfully close to ending the fight with his shotgun and might have succeeded if he hadn’t lost the fourth shell from his inventory. Kolman, J., Captain. (2009). Rulers of the Night, Volume I: 1958-1988. Santa Ana, CA: Graphic Publishers, pp 132-3.
82. Indeed, the felons were in the process of returning from a shooting session that involved long guns, when they were pulled over by Officers Gore and Frago. Davis was a former Marine and had received extensive rifle marksmanship training during his military service. Los Angeles County Homicide investigators also determined that, when he lived in Houston, he was a frequent visitor to Carter’s Rifle Range, where he befriended some shooters and was allowed to borrow and shoot their rifles.
When the Pontiac was inventoried after the fight, officers found a Ruger .44 Magnum carbine in the trunk that had a spent cartridge jammed in the action from the day’s shooting session. Davis fought part of the engagement with a sawed-off pump-action shotgun that was kept in the back seat of the car along with the two Colt 1911A1 semi-automatic pistols used by Twining during the fight. A further search of their rented apartment in Long Beach, California, turned up a 1903 Springfield rifle in .30-06 and a Remington Model 572 rifle in .22-caliber. There is no question the pair were experienced and competent with long arms. Anderson, J., & Cassady, M. (1999). The Newhall Incident. Fresno, CA: Quill Driver Books. p.137 and Ayoob, M. (1995). The Ayoob Files: The Book. Concord, NH: Police Bookshelf, p.116.
83. Ayoob, M. (1995). The Ayoob Files: The Book. Concord, NH: Police Bookshelf, p.119.
84. At the time of Newhall, the CHP issued 30 rounds of 158-grain RNL ammunition to its officers each year—six for the weapon, 12 for the dump pouches, and 12 for spares. The agency would likely have been unwilling to adopt a spare ammunition carrier that would have required it to issue more ammunition to replace damaged or lost equipment. Personal interviews with CHP Officer Jay Rice (ret.).
85. Actually, the concept dated back much farther than World War II. The frontiersmen and Indians of the late nineteenth century frequently carried spare ammunition in loops that were laced to the buttstocks of their rifles.
86. In the most important law enforcement book of the era (No Second Place Winner, published 1965), the legendary Bill Jordan, an Assistant Chief Patrol Inspector with the U.S. Border Patrol, fast draw champion, survival instructor and all-around gunfighting expert, completely ignored the concept of a backup gun. Jordan’s treatment of compact handguns centered around off-duty or plain clothes use, but he never once suggested carrying one as a backup or addressed this vital officer safety concern. Indeed, as late as the mid-1970s, officers who carried backup guns were often chided by their fellow officers as being paranoid or foolish. One officer who served in the Laguna Hills/San Juan Capistrano office of the CHP circa 1977 was jokingly nicknamed “Two Gun” in recognition of his propensity to carry a backup weapon on duty. This kind of attitude was pervasive throughout law enforcement, not just the CHP. It would take the birth of the “officer survival movement in the mid-’70s and its eventual embrace by officers and agencies before the tide would finally turn in the 1980s and ’90s. In a complete reversal, by today’s standards, an officer is now considered foolish if he doesn’t carry a backup gun. Jordan, B. (1989). No Second Place Winner (12th Edition). Concord, NH: Police Bookshelf.
87. The newly approved backup revolvers had to be inspected by the office rangemaster and were required to be carried in a holster with a safety strap, according to department policy. Personal interview with CHP Captain George Nuttall (ret.).
88. The “Onion Field” event received national attention with the 1973 publication of best-selling author Joseph Wambaugh’s book on the subject, and the subsequent 1979 movie adaptation, but within the CHP itself, the similar murders of Officer Roy P. Blecher (a 21-year veteran), and Officer William M. Freeman (a 12-year veteran), were even more stirring and traumatic, perhaps as much as the Newhall murders themselves. During a traffic enforcement stop on December 22, 1978, the killer took Officer Blecher at gunpoint and forced him to surrender his weapon. Officer Blecher was found handcuffed and shot once in the back of the head, and Officer Freeman was shot five times by the killer. California Highway Patrol. (n.d.) Badges of Honor – 1970 Through 1979. [Online]. <http://www.chp.ca.gov/memorial/memorial70.html>.