1. Son Sae-il, “Pyeongyangsimindaehoee natanan ‘Kim Il Sung janggun’” [The appearance of “General Kim Il Sung” in the Pyongyang citizens gathering], Monthly Chosun, August 2008, http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/print.asp?ctcd=I&nNewsNumb=201008100064.
2. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, North Korea: Building of the Monolithic State (Seoul: KHU Press, 2017), 19–20.
3. Ibid., 20.
4. Joo Sung-ha, “Mi seongyosa jungmaero taeeonan Kim Il Sung” [Kim Il Sung born through the arranged marriage introduction of American missionary], Radio Free Asia, February 3, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/joosungha/co-sh-02032017083700.html.
5. Ibid.
6. “The Identity of Kim Il Sung,” Central Intelligence Agency, September 1949, 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000600270269-4.pdf.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Based on discussions with Andrei Lankov in Washington, D.C. in June 2019.
10. “Soviet Report on Communists in Korea, 1945,” 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AGShVS RF. F. 172. OP 614631. D. 23 pp. 21-26. Translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114890.
11. Jeungeon: Kim Il Sungeul malhada [Testimony: talking about Kim Il Sung] (Seoul: Hankook Ilbo, 1991), 25.
12. Ibid., 28.
13. The Korean Communist Party was founded in 1925, but the Soviets were extremely disappointed by its internecine factionalism, and the party was expelled from the Comintern in 1928.
14. Quoted in Michael Fry, “National Geographic, Korea, and the 38th Parallel,” National Geographic, August 4, 2013, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/08/130805-korean-war-dmz-armistice-38-parallel-geography; Andrei Lankov, “Terenti Shtykov: The Other Ruler of Nascent N. Korea,” Korea Times, January 25, 2012, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/01/363_103451.html.
15. Fry, “National Geographic, Korea, and the 38th Parallel.”
16. Shannon McCune, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea,” World Politics 1, no. 2 (January 1949): 225.
17. Ibid.
18. Lankov, “Terenti Shtykov.”
19. Scalapino and Lee, North Korea: Building of the Monolithic State, 27.
20. Shim Ji Yeon, “Bukjoseonrodonddangeui changribgwa noseon” [The creation and guidelines of the North Korean Workers’ Party], in Bukhanchejeeui suribgwajeong 1945–1948 [The formation process of the North Korean system, 1945–1948] (Seoul: Kyungnam University, Institute for Far Eastern Affairs, October 1991), 99.
21. Central Intelligence Agency, “Implementation of Soviet Objectives in Korea,” ORE, November 18, 1947, 1–2.
22. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Current Situation in Korea,” ORE 15-48, March 18, 1948, 2.
23. Central Intelligence Agency, “Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring 1949,” ORE 3-49, February 28, 1949, 1.
24. “Meeting Between Stalin and Kim Il Sung,” March 5, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 5a, d. 3, p. 11, ll. 10–20, and RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 346, ll. 0013–0023, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112127.
25. “Telegram from the Leader of the Group of Soviet Specialists in Northeast China to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers About the Results of the Chinese-Korean Talks on Military Cooperation,” May 18, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AP RF, f. 4. op. 1. d. 331, pp. 59–61. Translated by Gary Goldberg. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114898.
26. Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime,” ORE 18-50, June 19, 1950, 1.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Nikita S. Khrushchev, “The Secret Speech—On the Cult of Personality, 1956,” Modern History Sourcebook, February 7, 2012, http://www.ht.lu.se/media/utbildning/dokument/kurser/EUHA14/20121/Nikita_S._Khrushchev__The_Secret_Speech_On_the_Cult_of_Personality_1956.pdf.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Hwang Jang Yop, Bukhaneui jinsilgwa heowi [North Korea’s truths and falsehoods] (Seoul: Sidae Jeongsin, 2006), 164.
33. Ibid., 161.
34. Kim Cheol Ju, “Kim Il Sung sengga munjjakeul tongjjaero tteueogan kimmocheongnyun, gyulguk 3daega myeoljok” [Three generations of a young man’s family executed who stole Kim Il Sung’s birthplace’s doorway], Chosun Ilbo, February 6, 2014, http://premium.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/02/06/2014020601189.html. Killing three generations of a person’s family, including in-laws, was the most gruesome punishment meted out by the king during the Joseon Dynasty. This was done to literally wipe a person and his extended family from the face of the earth in the name of preventing possible payback or to demonstrate the seriousness of the crime or offense that was allegedly committed. North Korea has extended this barbaric penal code into the twenty-first century.
35. Chinese president Xi Jinping is also fond of massive military parades. When the People’s Liberation Army prepares for a very important parade, such as the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II in August 2015, units are trained using rows of strings so that their movements are completely synchronized.
36. Fyodor Tertitskiy, “How the North Is Run: The State Affairs Commission,” NK Pro, February 2, 2018, https://www.nknews.org/pro/the-history-and-evolution-of-north-koreas-state-affairs-commission.
37. Kim Jong Un jeonggwoneui unyounggujowa gyeongjaesiltae bunseok [Analysis of the Kim Jong Un regime’s operating mechanism and economic condition] (Seoul: Institute for National Security Strategy, 2017), 2.
38. Ibid., 3.
39. Ibid.
40. “North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Shuffles Leadership and Consolidates Power,” CNBC, April 12, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/12/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-shuffles-leadership-and-consolidates-power.html.
41. “Bukhaneui nodongdang joongangwiwonhoe jeonwonhoe 7gi 4cha hoeeuiwa choegoinminhoeeui 14gi 1cha hoeui teukjing bunseok” [Analysis of special characteristics of the 4th Plenum, 7th Term meeting of North Korea’s Workers’ Party’s Central Committee and 14th Plenum, 1st Session of the Supreme People’s Assembly], INSS Issue Brief, no. 123, April 4, 2019, p. 1.
42. Ibid., p. 2.
43. “Gongwhaguk muryeok choegosaryeonggwan hochingae daehan euimi bunseok” [Analysis of the meaning behind the term ‘the Republic’s Supreme Armed Forces Commander’], INSS Issue Brief, no. 122, April 24, 2019, p. 1.
44. “4th Plenum of the WPK Central Committee Held,” North Korea Leadership Watch, April 11, 2019, http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2019/04/11/4th-plenum-of-the-the-wpk-central-committee-held/.
45. Ra Jong-il, Jang Seong Thaekeui gil [Jang Seong Thaek’s path] (Seoul: Alma Chulpansa, January 2016), 237.
46. Ibid., 238.