Introduction and Acknowledgements

The story of the Mitsubishi A6M fighter aircraft of World War II has been told many times, with varying degrees of accuracy. It is essentially a story of myths. Before the outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941 both British and American sources, official and unofficial, were essentially united in the myth that their aircraft and their flyers were more than a match for anything that the Japanese could put into combat. More than just a totally unjustifiable belief in their own automatic superiority in production, design and fighting ability was the myth that the Japanese fighting man was basically inferior in every respect to the westerner. This misconception, rooted in racism and arrogance, as well as ignorance, was deep-rooted and slow to change. Such tenets were deeply held and indoctrinated, with otherwise intelligent people such as Winston Churchill and the British chiefs of all three services sharing with their American counterparts both a contempt for their new enemy and a totally false believe in their own invincibility.

Thus you have bizarre statements in pre-war American aviation magazines that the Imperial Japanese Navy’s total air component consisted of inferior aircraft carriers equipped with obsolete aeroplanes, themselves flown by incompetent pilots and offered nothing whatsoever for the United States Navy to fear. One typical contributor is Leonard Engel.¹ Among his enlightening revelations to the American public were that the Japanese Navy had ‘… less than 500 aircraft’; compared to other powers Japanese aircraft were ‘… the poorest qualitatively …’. Japanese aircraft carriers he stated, ‘… are inferior to the British. And the British are far inferior to the American’. The carriers Sōryū and Hiryū could, ‘… each carry about 30 planes’. The Kaga and Akagi, carry ‘30 planes apiece normally, but can handle as many as 50’. He predicted that new carriers (presumably the Shōkaku and Zuikaku), would, ‘… not be ready for at least two years’. One final ‘prediction’ made was that, ‘Some day, perhaps, the Japanese will have accumulated enough experience in a mechanical way to catch up, but that day will not come soon.’ It proved sooner than Engel thought, just eleven months after this boastful bombast all his bragging was blown asunder. In fact the IJN had ten aircraft carriers in commission with hundreds of modern aircraft embarked flown by veterans of the war in China; the crew of the carrier Lexington used to boast being worth at least four Japanese carriers, until, that is, she was sunk by aircraft from one of the least efficient such Japanese ships at the Coral Sea battle; similar bragging was commonplace until Pearl Harbor brought some reality into the situation. Likewise, even five months after the events at Hawaii had demolished, one would have thought, all such longheld illusions, reinforced as it was by the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, Malaya, the humiliating surrender of a British army in Singapore to a Japanese force about one-third its size, as well as the loss of Burma, Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies and most of the Philippines.

Another American prophet of complete superiority was Lucien Zacharoff² who concluded that Japanese military aircraft were, ‘… not up to the contemporary standards of efficiency …’ of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Among other nuggets of wisdom from this luminary were that Japan ‘… must depend on foreign types …’ and that the bulk of them anyway were ‘… ominously obsolete …’ and that they lacked range. In fact the IJN aircraft in general, and not just the A6M, consistently out-ranged US Navy aircraft throughout the entire Pacific War.

The British were no better. When, in April 1942, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, one Rear-Admiral Tom Spencer Vaughan Philips, CB, requested that Hawker Hurricanes be sent to Malaya he was mocked by the RAF representative, Air Marshal Sir Wilfred R. Freeman, who lectured him that the Brewster Buffalo was more than adequate to deal with any Japanese aircraft as ‘… they were not of the latest type’. Tom Philips was later to command the inadequate and ill-fated Force Z, sent east when Churchill, in yet another of his uninformed decisions, overruled Admiralty advice. Frequently accused since of being ignorant in air matters, one cannot help feeling that Admiral Philips was more in tune with reality than the RAF on this particular issue. In August 1941 Premier Winston Churchill, whose knowledge of the Japanese Navy and Air Force was notoriously abysmal,³ decided to send the Hurricanes, two hundred of them, along with a further two hundred US supplied P-40B Tomahawk fighters to the Soviet Union instead of Malaya.

Yet even as late as April 1942 the British Admiral James Somerville, in command of the Eastern Fleet and reputed to be the most ‘air-minded’ of British admirals, could still espouse the same nonsense to justify his policy, ‘I’m told the Japs are afraid of the dark so I must try and specialize in night attacks.’⁴ The battles of Savo Island and Tassafaronga, among others, which saw radar-equipped Allied naval forces destroyed by Japanese units lacking such equipment, put paid to that particular illusion as well.

Professor Arthur Marder opined that the Admiralty was prone to prejudices about Japanese military ability while suffering from inadequate Intelligence assessments;⁵ a viewpoint that Antony Best also shared and commented on ‘… the problems caused by the influence of racial thinking and ethnocentrism’. In downplaying the Japanese ability to both construct and effectively operate military hardware superior to their own, it was always assumed that the Japanese would be inferior in every way. As West concisely put it, ‘That British forces might not rise to the exalted heights expected of them seems never to have crossed anyone’s mind …’⁶ Similarly, Richard Aldrich noted that there was ‘… an atmosphere of unreality …’ about the RAF intelligence set-up at Singapore prior to the war.⁷ Douglas Ford contends that, ‘Britain entered the Pacific War with a misinformed perception of the IJN, as well as an erroneous notion that it possessed sufficient strengths and capabilities to confront the Japanese.’⁸ That misconception of the abilities of the Japanese Navy predominated pre-war British Admiralty thinking is also postulated by Professor Wesley Wark, PhD, in his examination.⁹ Finally, the American John Dower agreed that, ‘… it was not so much the success of the Japanese Navy in shrouding the Zero in secrecy that made its “sudden” appearance against the Westerners so shocking in December 1941 as the blindness of the most highranking Allied officers, who simply could not conceive of Japan independently designing and manufacturing an aircraft of this caliber.’¹⁰

However, lest there be bleeding hearts at this evidence of racial stereotyping by the west, it should be made clear that the Japanese were, if anything, even more convinced of their own racial superiority and sure (with more justification) of their military prowess.

And yet, especially in the case of the Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter aircraft, this combat aircraft had been observed and reported upon at some length and in some detail by knowledgeable commentators of the war in China from 1937. Both British and American (as well as Chinese) military experts had sent in detailed reports on its extraordinary performance and its undoubted abilities. How then, did the appearance of this remarkable aerial fighting machine appear to come as such a total surprise to both British and American aircrews when they first met it? We will examine this extraordinary failure in some detail but it led, almost immediately upon the outbreak of the Pacific War, to a myth on top of a myth. From being a despised and contemptible enemy, the Japanese, and the Zero in particular, became almost immediately the very symbol of a ravaging Japanese military that was rampaging almost at will across vast swathes of the globe and brushing aside all resistance. Now, at a stroke, an assumed impotent enemy became a vastly superior foe, and the Zero fighter became an aircraft to be dreaded as it cleared the skies of what were hitherto considered more than adequate Allied interceptors, the British Hawker Hurricane, Fairey Fulmar and even the Supermarine Spitfire – hero of the Battle of Britain; and also the American P-40, Brewster Buffalo and Grumman F4F Wildcat (known as Martlet to the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm). The cult of the Fuhai no Zero-sen (‘ Invincible Zero Fighter’), had gripped the Allies within a few short weeks of combat. One historian wrote how: ‘U.S. fighter pilots were apt to go into combat with a distinct inferiority complex. Tales from the Pacific had filtered back to the United States, which attributed to the Zero (and Japanese pilots) a sort of malevolent perfection.’¹¹

As always, the truth lies somewhere in between the two extremes of pre- and post- December 1941. In any period of time the development of aircraft proceeds roughly along a steady path of improvement. The development of new, larger and more efficient power plants, both radial and in-line engines; of technical advancements, guns, aerodynamics, methods of construction, advances in techniques and ideas, which from the mid-1930s saw huge strides forward in the efficiency of fighting aircraft, was not confined just to the west, however much they themselves might considered it to be so. These advances applied world-wide, and so in Nazi Germany, in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, in France and in Japan, these same strides forward moved forward at the same period, with one design gaining an edge in one country, only for another nation to move the bar a little higher within a few months, before it in turn was overtaken by new advances elsewhere. In those nations whose drive was more dictatorial, this world-wide advance in aviation advancement was government driven, whereas in the western democracies it was far less so and was more independently driven and backed by far smaller arms budgets. So the Spitfire was the match for the Messerschmitt Bf.109, French and Italian fighter designs mirrored each other, Russia, Germany and Italy combat-tested their new aircraft in war condition in Spain; while Russia, America and Japan did the same in China. All moved forward, unevenly, but along the same general lines. The sole exception proved to be the Royal Navy whose aircraft, as a whole, remained an obsolete mixture of inferior types. Long after the US Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy had moved over to good performance monoplanes to equip their air arms, Britain continued to employ biplanes such as the Swordfish and the Albacore whose performance and ability had hardly improved since the Sopwith Cuckoo of two decades earlier. This was due to inter-war Government parsimony and the crippling effect of the RAF control of all aircraft production, including naval aircraft of which they knew little and cared even less. It was not until as late as 1943, and by the adoption American aircraft, correctly designed for the job, that the British managed to catch up, and by then it was far too late. No such restraints bothered the development of the IJN’s naval aircraft programmers, which by 1941 had encompassed not only the arrival of the superlative Zero fighter, but of long-range torpedo- and altitude bombers of great ability also.

The Zero then, was not a totally unique wonder-machine, but part of a logical progression. It was as much a balance between offence and defence, of aggressive intent against defensive capability as any fighter aircraft of the same vintage. The Japanese, had always placed greater emphasis on attack over defence (as they did with every aspect of their martial skills, from the Banzai charge, through the design of their heavy cruisers and destroyers, which were also world beaters, to the Kamikaze concept of the final days), and had thus opted for a fighter aircraft that was as fast as equivalent British and American machines, but far more agile, and with a range that was beyond the conception of western standards of naval fighter aircraft. Thus it had these strengths, but, in compensation, and because there was no alternative, these just had to be paid for by weaknesses; lack of armour being the main one. Another was that the assets (large wings and big ailerons) that made the A6M so unbelievably nippy at speeds below 200mph (322 km/h), rapidly fell away at higher speeds due to air pressure, which made those self-same ailerons progressively sluggish and heavy. Also its light weight and high wing lift features tended to make it less efficient in a dive than its American opposite numbers, which were always heavier and grew ever more so, so the tactic of an attack pass from a superior height and a fast dive away was generally adopted for otherwise inferior machines such as the Curtiss P-40 (‘Boom and Zoom’). To use one form of analogy, that of the duelling swordsman, the A6M was a rapier; the P-40, (and to a similar extent the F4F), was a cutlass while the Fairey Fulmar was broadsword. How these different concepts played out when they came into contact forms the basis of the first part of our story. But for a crucial period between December 1941 and December 1942, the Mitsubishi A6M fighter was the combat aircraft of the Pacific War.

I would like to pay thanks to the many, many people in Japan, America and the United Kingdom who helped me during my researches in all three countries down the decades. Many of these kind and considerate people who gave their time and knowledge unstintingly have now passed on. I remain ever grateful to them all for their assistance and advice and emphasize that the conclusions reached in these pages, although owing much to these contributors, are strictly my own. I also know that in the new-found freedom of the Internet, a reversion has been made to pre-war scepticism about the Zero, with many forums openly deriding the Zero fighter as being inferior to almost any American aircraft it ever met. Such opinions are not likely to be changed by such things as facts of course, so I remain dedicated to trying to present an unbiased account here. Finally, this book, although largely researched from Japanese and American sources, is written for a British readership from a British viewpoint and some of the views expressed may not sit well with other audiences and critics; but facts are facts and for this the author does not apologize in the slightest.

So thanks to: Takashi Doe, Yokohama WW-2 Japanese Military Radio Museum, Yokohama; Ronald M. Bulatoff, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University, California for the Official History of the United States Naval Group China, file in the Milton Miles Papers (Box 5); Caroline Herbet, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge for access to the papers of Admiral Sir James Somerville; Jonathan Parshall, co-author of The Shattered Sword for views on IJN Fighter Control; Mark R. Pettie, Stamford University, California, author of Sunburst and co-author of Kaigun, with his information of IJN fighter Control; Lieutenant-Commander Iyozo Fujita, Zero pilot aboard the carrier Soryū; Lieutenant Takeshi Maeda, Honorary President Unabaraki; Mitsuharu Uehara, Military Historian; Lieutenant-Commander Sadao Seno, JMDF; Captain Masato Shimada; Rear-Admiral Kazuo Takahashi, Chief-of-Staff, Commandant Kure District; Lieutenant-Commander Zenji Abe; Rear-Admiral Taemi Ichikawa, Matsudo City, Communications Officer aboard Akagi; Captain Masato Shimada; Rear-Admiral Sadayoshi Matsioka, Superintendant off the Officer Candidate School, Etajima; Commander Sadamu Takahashi, author of Flying Clouds; Commander Iyōzō Fujita, Daizawa, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo; Mr and Mrs Shuzo Inaba, Kurre; Tohru Kizu, Editor-in-Chief Ships of the World, Tokyo; Lieutenant Takashi Miura; Hitoshi Hasegawa, Ships of the World; Rear-Admiral Sadayoshi Matsuoka; Rear-Admiral Hideshi Koyayashi; Miss Misa Matsugi; Vice-Admiral Kazunari Doke, Commandant Kure District; Ensign Kazutaka Abe; Rear-Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Director of the Administration Department, Maritime Staff Officer, Etajima who kindly made arrangements via Rear-Admiral Kobayashi for the author’s visit to Etajima; Kengo Yamamoto, Hyogo; Captain Hatsuhiko Watanabe; Kunio Kosemoto; Commander Noritaka Kitazawa, Military History Department, National institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo for his unfailing courtesy and assistance during my visits there; Ryunosuke Valenetin Megumi during our meeting in London; Colonel Shogo Hattori; Kunio Kosemoto; Professor Akira Nakamura, Dokkyo University; Nakamise Suzuya, Tokyo; my good friend Tetsukuni Watanabe, his wife and daughter, Nagoya; Seizaburou Hoshino, Sizuoka Prefecture, Etajima; Robert McLean, National Air & Space Museum, Paul E. Gerebet Facility, Suitland, Maryland; Jennifer A. Bryan, PhD, Head, Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, US Naval Academy; Barry L. Zerby, Modern Military Records (NWCTM), Texual Archives Services Division, NARA;

Ray Wagner, San Diego Aerospace Museum; Captain N. J. ‘Dusty’ Kleiss, VS-6; Evelyn M. Cherpak, PhD, Head, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport RI for assistance and hospitality during my visits there; John Vernon and Patrick Osborne, Modern Navy Records, Textual Archives Services Division, National Archives, Washington DC during my visits there; Heidi Myers, Reference Librarian, Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, for her help during my visits there; Timothy T. Petit, Archivist, Naval Historical Center, History and Archives Division, Operational Archives Branch for his great help and assistance during my visits; Ms Debbie Stockford and Mrs Catherine Rounsfell, Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovilton for great help during my visits.

NB In some cases some imperial measurements have been rounded down when they are given as conversions for metric equivalents. For instance, when converting 12 metres the precise imperial conversion would be 39 feet 4⁷/16 inches but this has been rounded down to 39 feet 4 inches as it was felt such preciseness was not required or helpful.

Peter C. Smith
Riseley, Bedfordshire,
November 2013