Notes
Introduction
1. Engel, Leonard, ‘Japan is NOT an Air Power’, article in Flying and Popular Aviation, January 1941 issue.
2. Zacharoff, Lucien, ‘Japan’s Bush-League Air Force’, article in Air News, September 1941 issue.
3. See: Roskill, Stephen Wentworth, Churchill and the Admirals, London: 1977. William Collins.
4. Somerville to his wife, 1 March 1942. Somerville, Admiral Sir James, The Somerville Papers, edited by Michael Simpson, Aldershot: 1995. Navy Records Society/The Scholar Press.
5. Marder, Arthur J., Old Friends, New Enemies: the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1936–45; Volume I. Strategic illusions, 1936–41, Oxford: 1981. Oxford University Press.
6. Best, Antony, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941, London: 2002. Palgrave Macmillan.
7. Aldrich, Richard J., Intelligence and the War Against Japan, Cambridge: 2000, Cambridge University Press.
8. Ford, Douglas, ‘British Naval Policy and the War against Japan, 1937–1945: Distorted Doctrine, Insufficient Resources, or Inadequate Intelligence?’ International Journal of Naval History, Volume 4 Number 1, April 2005.
9. ‘In Search of a Suitable Japan: British Naval Intelligence in the Pacific Before the Second World War’, article in Intelligence and National Security 1; No. 2, May 1986.
10. Dower, John W., War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, New York: 1986. Pantheon Books.
11. Sherrod, Robert, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, Washington DC: 1952. Combat Forces Press.
Chapter 1
1. American sources continue to present the conference, which extended from 12 November 1921 to 6 February 1922, as a great achievement, and of course, to them it was – see Goldstein, Erik, and Maurer, John, The Washington Conference 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor. London: 1994. Routledge. For Britain, it was a disaster that came home to roost eighteen years later, while for the Japanese to be frozen at 60 per cent of the western navies, was felt to be an humiliation.
2. So-termed because the programme would have seen the completion of eight battleships and eight battle-cruisers, all more powerful than contemporary western vessels.
3. Chalmers, Rear-Admiral W. S. The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty. London: 1951. Hodder and Stoughton.
4. This was paralleled by the conversion of the British battle-cruisers Courageous and Glorious and the American battle-cruisers Saratoga and Lexington in the same manner.
5. Genda Minoru, Kaigun Kōkūtai shimatsuki (Record of Japanese Naval Air Service). Tokyo: 1961–2. Bungei Shunjū.
6. Horikoshi, Jirō, Eagles of Mitsubishi, The Story of the Zero Fighter, Tokyo:1970. Kappa Books.
7. Compare this to the British Admiralty’s request for 241 aircraft by 1941, to which the Air Ministry objected in the strongest possible terms! – Till, Geoffrey, Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914–1945 – a historical survey. London: 1979. Jane’s Publishing Company.
8. Douhet, General Giulio, The Command of the Air, Tuscaloosa: 2009. University of Alabama Press.
9. Toshio Hijikata, My Naval Aviation Experience, Lecture dated 4 March 2005 at Kamakura. Transcribed by Naoaki Ooishi.
10. Hata, Ikuhiko and Izawa, Yasuho, Nihon Kaigun Sentōki-tai (later translated as Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II by Gorham Don Cyril), Tokyo: 1970. Kantōsha Publishers.
11. One such account was written post-war, claiming that the Japanese lost every one of its twenty-four fighters and twelve of its bombers for the loss of just eleven and two Russian fighters – see Caiden, Martin, The Ragged, Rugged Warriors, New York: 1966. E. P. Dutton. This would appear to be pure American hyperbole because the actual Japanese force appears to have been eighteen G3M bombers escorted by thirty A5M fighters, which were met by seventy to eighty Chinese and Soviet-manned fighters and even a Chinese source claims only a total of twenty-one Japanese machines for the loss of twelve of their own while the Japanese admit to only four losses, two fighters and two bombers.
12. Although not introduced until 1942, and then only gradually, a series of Allied code names were allocated to Japanese aircraft to enable easier identification by Allied military. Thus fighter aircraft were allocated boys’ forenames, bombers were given girls’ forenames, trainers were given the names of trees, while gliders had the names of birds. Under that system the G3M was dubbed the ‘Nell’, the G4M was called the ‘Sally’ and the A5M the ‘Claude’.
13. The -12 designation reflecting the twelfth year of the reign of the Shōwa era, the reign of Emperor Hirohito – termed ‘The Period of Japanese Glory’. See: Bix, Herbert P., Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, New York: 2000. Harper-Collins Publishing.
14. The carriers Akagi and Kaga, after their 1938 refits, came out at 36,500 tons and 38,200 tons standard displacement respectively and could each carry 91 aircraft. The recently completed Sōryūand Hiryū, built from scratch, displaced 15,900 tons and 17,300 tons respectively, and could only accommodate 63 aircraft; while the Shōkakau and Zuikakū, then under construction, had a designed stand tonnage of 25,675 tons and could carry 72 aircraft.
15. Contemporary Allied fighters were the American Curtiss P-36A Hawk with a top speed of 313mph (500km/h; and the British Hawker Hurricane with 340mph (547km/h).
16. Caiden, Martin, Zero Fighter, New York: 1969. Ballentine Books.
Chapter 2
1. This chapter relies heavily on Horikoshi’s own account, Horikoshi, Jiro, Eagles of Mitsubishi: The Story of the Zero Fighter, Tokyo: 1970. Kappa Books (Kobunsha Co. Ltd), an updated, corrected English edition of which was translated by Shojiro Shindo and Harold N. Wantiez by University of Washington Press, 1992. Also reference has been made, but with great caution due to numerous factual errors, to Yoshimura, Akira, Zero Fighter, translated by Retsu Kaiho and Michael Gregson, Westport: 1996. Praeger.
2. Hisamitsu, Matsuoka and Masayoshi, Nakanishi, The History of Mitsubishi Aero Engines 1915–1945, Tokyo: 2005. Miki Press.
3. This landing gear was a development of that first fitted to the American Vought 143.
4. Japan, which had quit the League of Nations earlier over the Manchurian incident, had in 1936 renounced and then pulled out of all International Naval Limitation Treaties also and was re-arming as fast as she was able.
5. See: Somitomo Light Metal Technical Reports, History of Extra Super Duralumin – Part 1, Somitomo Technical Review, 51 No. 1, 2010.
6. Some people have tried to associate the magnesium content contained in ESD with the tendency for the A6M’s wings to ignite easily under fire, the alleged ‘flammable wing’ problem, but even at the extreme range 2.8 per cent content (US modification 7075 being a modern equivalent), such solution heat treated aluminium alloys were never more vulnerable than any aluminium-clad aircraft, Japanese or Allied.
7. A = Carrier-based; 6 = sixth Navy fighter sequence; M = Mitsubishi; 1 = First version of the Prototype 12.
8. Ki – abbreviation of Kitai or airframe.
9. Horikoshi, Jiro, A Research on the Improvement of Piloted Airplanes, Report No. 396. Tokyo: 1965. Institute of Space & Aeronautical Science, University of Tokyo.
10. Yoshimura, Akira, Zero Fighter, Westport: 1996. Praeger.
Chapter 3
1. The unit was originally known as the Technical Intelligence Unit (TIU) and was based at McIntosh Building, Fortitude Valley, with the Enemy Equipment section headed by Lieutenant C. D. Gessel, but the name changed when an international team from the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Navy, US Navy and US Army Air Corps combined in 1942. The actual code naming idea appears to have originated with a suggestion from Technical Sergeant Francis Williams. Like most other things in that area the idea became known as MacArthur Southwest Pacific Code Name System but soon became Pacific-wide once local variations had been ironed out.
2. ‘Plane Facts: Zero-sen Ancestry’, article in Air Enthusiast, Volume 3, No. 4. Stamford: 1976. Key Publishing.
3. The USAAS did not become the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) until summer 1941.
4. Boyd, Gary, ‘Vought V-143, 1930 Technology Transfer’, article in Air Power History # 43 (Winter 1996). Clinton, Maryland: 1996. Air Force Historical Foundation.
5. Air Classics, April 2006.
6. Some comparison muzzle velocities included the Hispano-Suiza HS 404 at 880 m/s, the German MG 151/20 at 800 m/z, the British Hispano Mk. II at 880 m/s and the Soviet ShVak at 770 m/s.
7. Williams, Anthony G. and Gustin, Emmanuel, Flying Guns of World War II, Shrewsbury: 2003. Airlife Publishing.
8. All the inspection panels on the A6M were flush fitted and were manually opened by pressing a black dot with one finger, which opened the latch so the plate could be slid out.
9. Drake, Hal, ‘Howard Hughes was a Liar!’, article in Air Classics, Volume 12, No. 9, September 1976.
10. Matt, Paul R. and Rust, Kenn C., ‘Howard Hughes and the Hughes Racer’, article in The Historical Aviation Album: All American Series, Volume XVI. Temple City, Cal.: 1980. Historical Aviation Album.
Chapter 4
1. It should be remembered, however, that between January 1940 and March 1942 almost nine hundred A6Ms were produced.
2. Yoshimura, Akira, Zero Fighter, translated by Retsu Kaiho and Michael Gregson, Westport: 1996. Praeger.
3. Hata, Ikuhiko and Izawa, Yasuho, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II, Annapolis: 1989. Naval Institute Press.
4. Burton, John, Fortnight of Infamy, Annapolis: 2006. United States Naval Institute Press.
5. Horikoshi described these as ‘Army Type 96 bombers’ but there were no such aircraft.
6. Okumiya, Masatake and Horikoshi, Jiro, with Caidin, Martin, Zero! The Story of the Japanese Navy Air Force 1937–1945, London: 1957. Cassell.
7. See Farrell, Brian and Hunter, Sandy, The Great Betrayal! The Fall of Singapore Revisited, London: 2020. Marshal Cavendish.
8. Nonetheless, Japan planned to produce a licence-built version of the He-100 and Hitachi was selected as the builder, but nothing ever materialized on this project, one of many mysteries surrounding this aircraft. See: Dabrowski, Hans-Peter, Heinkel He 100, World Record and Propaganda Aircraft. Atglen, Pen: 1991. Schiffer Publishing.
9. Pitot tube, named after Henri Pitot, is a pressure measurement device that measures fluid flow velocity. It was initially used to measure boat water speed and later modified to measure aircraft airspeed at a given moment.
10. Critical Altitude – the height at which an aircraft achieves her maximum speed with the engine work at full military power.
11. Gunston, Bill (ed.) The Illustrated Book of Fighters, New York: 1985. Exeter Books, and Jackson, Robert, Mitsubishi Zero: Combat Legend, Ramsbury: 2003. The Crowood Press.
12. Okumiya Masatake, and Horikoshi, Jiro, with Caidin, Martin, Zero! The Story of the Japanese Navy Air Force 1937–1945, London: 1957. Cassell & Company Ltd.
13. Board of Inspection and Survey Reports featuring Production Inspection Trials on both the F4F-3, Contact 68219, dated 23 January 1941, and the F4F4, Contract 75736, dated 24 March 1942, reported that both failed to achieve their contractual requirement speeds of 350mph and 328mph respectively.
Chapter 5
1. Natingly, Major Robert E., USMC, Herringbone Cloak – GI Dagger, Marines of the OSS, Marine Corps Command & Staff College, 10 May 1979. Quantico: 1979. Marine Corps Command & Staff College.
2. Tuchman, Barbara, Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1917–45, New York: 1971. Macmillan.
3. Chennault, Claire Lee, Claire Lee Chennault Papers 1941–1967, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Ca.
4. For other fighter tactics see Thompson, J. Steve, with Smith, Peter C., Air Combat Manoeuvres: the Technique and History of Air Fighting for Flight Simulation, Hersham: 2008. Ian Allan Classic.
5. Another example of the widespread ethnocentrism prevalent in the West at this time. See: Booth, Kenneth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, London: 1979. Croom Helm. The true story of the development of the Ki-46 can be found in: Ferkl, Martin, Mitsubishi Ki-46 Dinah, Cat.No. II-4002. Ostrava-Porkuba: 2005. Revi.
6. Prados, John, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II, New York: 1995. Random House. See also: Stephen Jurika Papers 1926–1987. Collection Number 80035. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Cal. 10 boxes and Jurika, Captain Stephen, Jr, US Navy (Rtd) Volumes I and II, US Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD. Volume 1 contains fourteen interviews conducted by Paul B. Ryan from October 1975 to April 1976.
7. Packard, Captain Wyman H., USN, A Century of U S Naval Intelligence, Washington DC: 1996. Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Historical Center.
8. Presentation #433, see The Japanese Army Wings of the Second World War, Tokyo:1972. Koku Fan/Burin-do Publishers.
9. The AVG flew their first combat mission in China on 10 December 1941 and were principally engaged with the Japanese Army’s 64 Sentai, flying the Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa (Peregrine Falcon), which the Allies were later to codename ‘Oscar’. Also engaged were Nakajima Ki-27 (later allotted the Allied codename ‘Nate’). These aircraft were invariably erroneously reported as the Zero, AVG pilots having dubbed it the ‘Army Zero’ due to its similarity in appearance to the Navy plane.
10. Note Chennault said ‘leak-proof’ and not, as some American historians have alleged, ‘self-sealing’. See: Records of the War Department: General and Special Staffs – RG165. Records of the War Plans Division, WPD 4449-1, Archives and Records Administrations (NARA), College Park, MD.
11. Bland, Larry I. (ed.), The Papers of George Catlett Marshall II, Baltimore: 1986. Johns Hopkins University Press.
12. US Army FM-30-38, Identification of Japanese Aircraft, 10 March 1941. Washington DC: 1941.
13. Elphick, Peter and Smith, Michael, Odd Man Out: The Story of the Singapore Traitor, London: 1993. Hodder & Stoughton.
14. See JIC (41) 327, Probable Scale of Japanese Air Attack on Malaya, dated 13 August 1941. CAB 79/13, National Archives, Kew, London.
15. Aldrich, Richard J., Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge: 2000. Cambridge University Press.
16. AIR40/1453, ALO Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 30, dated 29 October 1940. National Archives, Kew, London.
17. AIR22/74, AID Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 75, dated 6 February 1941, and AIR40/1448 Warburton (AA Chungking) to DAI (Director, Air Intelligence) No. 19, dated 22 April 1941. National Archives, Kew, London.
18. CAB101/160, National Archives, Kew, London.
19. Brooke-Popham, LHCMA 6/8/8, on Maltby (AM) report dated 18 November 1946.
20. Mollahan, Colonel David J., USMC; DeVine, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas J., USA; Victor, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross A., USAF and Mayer, Commander Edward, USN, The Japanese Campaign in Malaya: December 1941 – February 1942: A Study in Joint Warfighting, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Staff Officer School, Class 02-3S, dated September 2002. Faculty Advisor: Captain Gary R. Chiaverotti, Seminar A.
21. It was not until late August 1943 that the A6M appeared in force in the area, when the 331 Kōkūtai arrived at Sabang, Weh Island, Sumatra, with thirty-two Zeros under Lieutenant-Commander Hideki Shingō. They had been transported from Saeki aboard the carrier Junyōand flown ashore despite the majority having had no previous carrier operating experience whatsoever! And it was not until December that twenty-seven of these A6Ms, moved into Magwe airfield, Burma, via Tavoy (now known as Dawei) on the south-west Burmese coast. They made their first sortie on 5 December, escorting bombers to attack Calcutta, and destroyed six Hawker Hurricanes IIC (AI) s without loss to themselves that day with Warrant Officers Sadaaki Akamatsu and Hirsohi Okano. Before they could add to that tally, pressure from the Americans in the central Pacific brought about their withdrawal almost before they had begun. They were re-designated as Haikōti 603 and moved to Mariaon, Woleai Atoll, in the Caroline Islands, on 24 March.
22. Sonokawa, Captain Kameo, IJN, Captain ofGenzan Kōkūtai, Operations of 22nd Air Flotilla in Malaya, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Interrogations of Japanese Officials, OPNAN-P-03-100, Naval Analysis Division. Interrogation NAV NO.77, USSBS No.387, dated 14 November 1945.
23. Allied fighters comprised Brewster Buffalo 1, Curtiss Mohawk IV, Hawker Hurricane 1, 11a and 1b and Curtiss P40B/C Warhawk/Tomahawk and Curtiss P-40E Warhawk/Kittyhawk of the AVG. Despite some American internet historians’ fevered imaginations, there were no Spitfires in the Far East at this time; the first arrived in September 1942 and flew her first mission on 10 October.
24. Now Yangon International Airport, Myanmar.
25. And not just at the beginning of the war. At the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, American Navy pilots from both VF-2 and VF-42, like Lieutenant Noel Gayler, were reporting attacking, and being attacked, by German Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighters. One US pilot, Lieutenant-Commander Paul Ramsey, the commanding officer of VF-2, was even officially credited with shooting down a Bf.109! At the Battle of Midway a month later the same stories proliferated, with Ensign Albert K. Earnest of VT-8 claiming his aircraft was shot up by one. Even during the Battle of Eastern Solomons in August 1942, Bf.109s were being ‘identified’ by American pilots such as Ensign John Kleinman of VF-5 from Saratoga, while Ensign Francis Register of VF-6 aboard Enterprise claimed to have destroyed one in combat in that battle. Never mind that the Bf.109 was a land-based fighter not a carrier aircraft; nor that it had an in-line engine and not a radial engine; had a entirely different tail and empennage; different cockpit shape; that, in fact, it looked nothing at all like an A6M. The US pilots ‘saw’ them, engaged them and claimed them! Nor were the Americans alone in this, as in April 1942 Admiral Somerville had reported Aichi D3A1 naval dive-bombers as German Junkers Ju.87 Stukas in a similar state of denial. During the fighting for Singapore Australian pilots of both No. 21 and No. 453 Squadrons recorded engaging both Bf.109s and even Junkers Ju.88 bombers, an incredible state of affairs.
26. See, for example, the many citations quoted in Shore, Christopher F., Cull, Brian and Izawa, Yasuho, Bloody Shambles, Vol.1; The Drift to War to the Fall of Singapore, London: 1992. Grub Street.
27. Willmott, H. P., Empires in the Balance, Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942, Annapolis: 1982. Naval Institute Press.
Chapter 6
1. Most of the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Island Groups, other than the Gilbert Island (British) and Guam (American) in the western Pacific, had effectively been under Japanese control since 1917 and were officially League of Nations mandated from 1919 onward.
2. The CS40B propeller was almost 6in (15cm) smaller.
3. Unlike Hollywood’s recent fantasies, taken as gospel by many, no American pilots had won the Battle of Britain single-handed and then gone on to destroy the IJN’s attack force at Pearl Harbor immediately afterwards!
4. In mitigation, such was the case in the armed forces of all nations in the 1930s, an age when ruggedness of life was considered not just the norm, but essential if one was to perform well in battle and endure the toughness of combat. Also it was a starker and more basic age, and the accepted ‘norms’ of the twenty-first century military had not been softened by such things as ‘human rights’, counselling nor influenced by the inclusion of females in the front-line fighting forces, and so cannot be judged by modern standards. This was particularly so in the case in the Japanese armed services where the very concept of surrender was totally alien, hence the total lack of concern for the welfare of any defeated or captured enemy.
5. A note on the ‘ace’ system. Again, the Japanese differed from the Allies in how this status was recognized. Thus, no emphasis was ever given to totally establishing enemy losses to the nth degree, the mere hitting and consequent breaking off of an attack often being automatically credited. Similarly, the practice of attributing even absolutely absolute ‘kills’ was by no means universal in Japanese fighter groups, many of them crediting the unit itself rather than any individual, and this became more the norm as the war went on. Consequently the many tally totals assigned to certain pilots should always be taken with a grain of salt and a general rule of thumb of about 1-in-3 claims being accurate might be a more prudent and meaningful score line. Often promotion followed if a pilot proved outstandingly successful at his job. It should be also be stated, of course, that the Allied claims of Japanese losses were often more astronomically misleading in the first year of the war and indeed were to remain so, especially under General Douglas McArthur’s command – but no Air Force, Allied or Axis, had ever proved immune to this false accounting, just look at the absurd figures given during the Battle of Britain and a recent claim that during the last eight months of the war the US Navy suffered the loss of only two SB2Cs and five TBMs.
6. Hata, Ikuhiko, and Izawa, Yasuho, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II, Tokyo: 1970. Kantōsha Publishers.
7. Neuman, Gerhard, Herman the German: Just Lucky I Guess, Bloomington, Ind: 2004. Authorhouse.
8. Both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy had operated two- and three-carrier formations pre-war, with the latter Navy even producing, in War Games, a remarkable foretaste of the actual Pearl Harbor attack. During the war the Royal Navy occasionally managed to scrape together sufficient aircraft carriers to mount three-carrier forces for specific events, for example the Pedestal convoy operation to Malta in August 1942 with three fleet carriers included in the escorting naval force, plus a fourth engaged in flying off fighter aircraft to the island. However, until 1944, such large assemblies of carriers in one fleet were rare achievements for the Allies, though they had been the norm for the Japanese between December 1941 and April 1942 when operating in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Allied naval commanders became well aware of this fact from Intelligence and visual sightings during both operations, although some modern revisionists have sought to deny the fact that they knew.
Chapter 7
1. Nitaka (now re-named as Mount Chia-i) was the highest mountain in Japanese-owned Formosa, (now Taiwan) higher even than Mount Fuji.
2. Okumiya, and Horikoshi, Jiro, with Caidin, Martin, Zero!: The Story of the Japanese Navy Air Force 1937–1945, London: 1957. Cassell & Co. However, this version of events is disputed by Dan King who asserts ‘… there are no hangars, nor were there any hangars or buildings in the area in 1941.’ See: King, Dan, The Last Zero Fighter: Firsthand Accounts from WWII Japanese Naval Pilots, Irvine, Ca: 2012. Pacific Press.
3. Smith, Carl, with Laurier, Jim, Pearl Harbor 1941 – The Day of Infamy, London: 1999. Osprey Publishing.
4. In addition the Navy lost a further five F4F Wildcats of VF-6 from the same carrier, which were subsequently were shot down by panicky ‘friendly fire’ while attempting to land at Ford later that day many hours after the last Japanese aircraft had departed.
5. Some doubts had already surfaced and it was planned to move some B-17s to Mindanao, but this was not done due to a party for top brass held on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack.
6. Brereton, General Lewis Hyde, The Brereton Diaries: The Air War in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe 30 October 1941 – 8 May 1945, New York: 1946. William Morrow].
7. Sakai, Saburō, with Caidin, Martin and Saito, Fred, Samurai! London: 1957. William Kimber.
8. The Americans remained convinced that these must have been carrier-based and conducted fruitless searches accordingly.
9. Suburo Sakai, who chalked up his third kill that day by easily destroying a P-40 over Clark Field, claims only five A6Ms were lost, one to anti-aircraft fire and four others during the long flight home. ‘But not a single plane was lost to an enemy aircraft.’ Sakai, Saburo, Samurai, London: 1959. William Kimber & Co. Ltd.
10. Interestingly Lieutenant-General Walter Short, in command of the Army air units at Pearl found himself out of the service and working in a car factory within a few weeks of his errors of judgement, while MacArthur became a national hero despite, some would say, this far greater blunder.
11. Okumiya, and Horikoshi, Jiro, with Caidin, Martin, Zero!: The Story of the Japanese Navy Air Force 1937–1945, London: 1957. Cassell & Co.
12. Back in London, following the Prince of Wales and Repulse debacle, and the premature withdrawal of the RAF from northern Malayan airfields, the British Air Ministry’s Air Intelligence Division (AID) was coming to the (rather belated) conclusion, that ‘Events in the Far East suggest that Japanese naval aircraft may be worthy of closer study than has yet been undertaken’ – Japan: Preliminary Report on T97/1. T97/2 Torpedo Bombers and T.99 Navy Dive Bomber, AI2c, 13 December 1941, AIR40/35, National Archives, Kew, London.
13. The twin-engined Martin 139 was the export version of the well-known B-10.
14. This pilot survived only to be killed with 230 fellow inmates during an attempted mass breakout at Cowra POW camp in 1944.
15. Lewis, Tom, A War at Home. A Comprehensive Guide to the First Japanese Attacks on Darwin, Darwin: 2003. Tall Stories.
16. Roskill, Captain S. W., DSC, RN, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Volume II The Period of Balance, London: 1957. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Chapter 8
1. The A5Ms were not replaced by A6Ms until 23 April, after the Bay of Bengal operation had been completed despite what some recent western sources state.
2. T/B = torpedo-bombers, she carried no fighters at all.
3. Somerville to Admiralty, 8 April 1942. Somerville, Admiral Sir James, The Somerville Papers, edited by Michael Simpson, Aldershot: 1995. Navy Records Society/The Scholar Press.
4. Both the Albacore and the Fulmar were considered among the poorest combat aircraft ever flown – see Winchester, Jim, The World’s Worst Aircraft; From Pioneering Failures to Multimillion Dollar Disasters, London: 2005. Amber Books.
5. Somerville, Admiral Sir James, The Somerville Papers, edited by Michael Simpson, Aldershot: 1995. Navy Records Society/The Scholar Press.
6. Officially Royal Naval Air Service, RNAS, but hardly anyone actually used that term, either then or since.
7. Popham, Hugh, Sea Flight, London: 1954. William Kimber.
8. Smith, Peter C., Aichi D3A1/2 Val, Ramsbury: 1999. Crowood Press.
9. See: Senshi Sōsho (War History) Volume 29. Hōkutō Hōmen Kaigun Sakusen (North-Eastern Area Naval Operations) Tokyo: 1969. Asagumo Shimbunsha.
10. Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War: Volume IV. The Hinge of Fate, London: 1949. Cassell.
11. Tomlinson, Michael, The Most Dangerous Moment, London: 1976. William Kimber. This author was actually consulted by the publisher at the time on the figures and I warned them that Japanese records showed only eighteen losses; they nonetheless went ahead and published the misleading figures without amendment.
12. Hata, Ikuhiko and Izawa, Yasuho, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II, Annapolis: 1989. Naval Institute Press. Even an older British source, claims just eighteen Japanese losses; see Shores, Christopher and Cull, Brian, with Izawa, Yasuho, Bloody Shambles: Volume Two – The Defence of Sumatra to the Fall of Burma, London: 1993. Grub Street.
13. In 1948 an official British inquiry was undertaken in Tokyo with the sole purpose of establishing whether or not the Japanese had intended to invade at this time, and unanimously concluded it had not – the findings being reflected in Admiralty, Naval Staff History – War with Japan, Volume II. C.B.3303 (2). London: 1954. Admiralty Historical Section.
14. Somerville, Admiral Sir James, The Somerville Papers, edited by Michael Simpson, Aldershot: 1995. Navy Records Society/The Scholar Press.
15. SEEBEE from Naval Construction Battalion (CB) For a detailed account of their work see – Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II, Volume 1, Washington DC: 1947. United States Government Printing Office.
16. See Kahn, David, The Code Breakers: The Story of Secret Writing, London: 1966. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
17. Wilmott, H. P., The Barrier and the Javelin, Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies – February to June 1942, Annapolis: 1983. Naval Institute Press.
18. The Shōhōwas the former submarine support ship Tsurugizaki and her sister, the Zūiho, was the former Takasaki whose conversion had been completed in December 1940.
19. Apparently she almost capsized on her return journey, which indicated heavier damage than generally admitted.
20. Speculation that, had she have been readied sooner it would have turned the tide at the Midway battle, are irrelevant, because Japanese signals indicated that, even if her Kōkūtai had been ready to participate, which she was not, she had been allocated to join the Aleutians part of the force, and thus would never have had the opportunity to play any part in the main carrier-to-carrier battle itself.
21. Also known was the fact that the KidōButai operated its carriers as a single group, as the signals from the PBY Catalina and the eyewitness accounts from the debriefing of the surviving Blenheim pilots, both off Ceylon in April, were sent to the Americans under the COPEK mutual Intelligence exchange channel arrangement, which had been set up by OP-20-G (NEGAT) in January 1942 and extended to Melbourne at the end of March. Pearl Harbor and Melbourne shared the same Japanese Navy information. See: A Priceless Advantage: U S Navy Communications Intelligence and the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians. (CH-E32-93-01) Washington DC. In addition, Premier Churchill had cabled President F. D. Roosevelt as early as 7 April that: ‘According to our information, five, and possibly six, Japanese battleships, and certainly five aircraft-carriers, are operating in the Indian Ocean.’
22. Books, articles, discussions and embarrassingly bad motion pictures and TV documentaries pertaining to deal with the Battle of Midway are so numerous that it would be futile to try and list them all here in a book dedicated to the A6M Zero. More such books on this battle appear all the time; not all of them are very well researched, while a few appear to have agendas of their own and are very partisan. For a detailed, comprehensive and, more importantly, strictly neutral and objective account, researched from the viewpoint of both sides, see – Smith, Peter C., Midway Dauntless Victory: Fresh Perspectives on America’s Seminal Naval Victory of World War II, Barnsley: 2007. Pen & Sword Maritime.
23. Actual Japanese bomber losses were nine with three damaged beyond repair.
24. Confidential – Action report - United States Marine Corps, Marine Fighting Squadron 221, Marine Aircraft Group 22, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, c/o Fleet P.O. San Francisco, Calif. A1-1/olg, dated 6 June 1942. Enemy contact, report on. Statements. Kirk Armistead, CO.
25. Japanese Self-Defence Agency, War History Office, Senshi Sosho: Middowe Kaisen (War History Series: Midway Naval Battle), No. 43. Tokyo: 1971. Asagumo Shimbun.
26. Admiralty, Information on Midway Island Battle, dated 11 August 1942. From DACD (Director, Airfields and Carrier Division) to various departments. A.C.D.1842. Contained in ADM 199/1302, National Archives, Kew, London. Main report contained in Admiralty Weekly Intelligence Report, No. 126, dated 7 August 1942. These records have been open to the public for many decades, despite claims to the contrary.
27. ‘Sequence of Events’, contained in ADM 199/1302, National Archives, Kew, London.
28. The B-17 crews became notorious for this throughout the Pacific theatre of war and it was a standing joke with US Navy pilots, who called it ‘creative vision’.
29. Ringblom, Major Allan H., USMC, Dive-Bomber Pilot’s Narrative, Battle of Midway, 1996: USMC Historical Section, Quantico, Va.
30. Modern-day armchair and internet theorists opine that the best move Yamaguchi could have made was to have put as much distance between himself and the American Task Forces as he could. This option does not take into account the mind-set of a leading exponent of Japanese Navy air power in 1942, even had it been practical. Nor were American naval officers throughout their history prone to cut-and-run, so why should the Japanese have acted differently? A modern example, maybe, of the same old dual-standard thinking?
31. King, Dan, The Last Zero Fighter: Firsthand Accounts from WWII Japanese Naval Pilots, Irvine, CA: 2012. Pacific Press.
Chapter 9
1. For example, Air Vice Marshal Paul Copeland Maltby was informed that the intelligence that had been gleaned about the A6M by the British in Malaya had not been passed down to individual units, ‘… due to a lack of junior intelligence staff’. Air Marshal Stanley Jackson Marchbank to Maltby, 21 September 1954, CAB101/156, National Archives, Kew, London. Even in Burma far later a Hurricane pilot was recording that they received very little useful information on the A6M. See: Hemingway, Kenneth, Wings Over Burma, London: 1944. Quality.
2. Kelly, Terence, Hurricane Over the Jungle, Leicester: 1993. Ulverscroft.
3. This occupation was never intended as a ‘diversion’ for the Midway operation, as is so often proclaimed – the whole purpose of the latter operation was to lure the American fleet to its destruction (with Midway’s occupation merely as the bait), and not to divert parts of it away from Yamamoto’s fleet.
4. By far the most detailed account of this incident and subsequent salvage and re-building work is contained in – Rearden, Jim, Koga’s Zero: The Fighter that Changed World War II, Missoula, Montana: 1995. Pictorial Histories Publishing Company Inc., which despite the hyperbole of the sub-title, has been meticulously researched.
5. Willmott, Hedley Paul, Zero: A6M, London: 1980. Arms & Armour Press.
6. My italics. Considering the universal bad press the IJN’s radio equipment has received this is a quite remarkable statement. Post-war it was found that although there were constant complaints about the falling standards of their radio equipment, little of this found its way back to the constructors and manufacturers.
7. Hammel, Eric, Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons August 1942, St. Paul, Mn: 1999. Zenith Press.
8. Originally another carrier, the Hiyō, was part of this force but due to a fire in an engine generator room, which badly damaged the condenser, she had to be sent back to Truk with a two-destroyer escort on 22 October.
9. The remaining Hiyōaircraft, sixteen A3Ms and seventeen D3As, commanded by Takeshi Mieno, transferred from Truk to Rabaul and continued to pound Guadalcanal as a land-based unit and later moved to the forward airstrip at Buin on 1 November and they did not rejoin their carrier at Saeki again until 18 December.
10. The relief felt ashore at Guadalcanal at Halsey’s appointment was recalled by one who was present when the news broke: ‘I’ll never forget it. One minute we were too limp with malaria to crawl out of our foxholes, the next, we were running around whooping like kids.’ – See: Potter, E. B., Nimitz, Annapolis, Md: 1976. Naval Institute Press.
11. The Enterprise, operating some distance away, being hidden by a rain squall, was not molested at this stage.
12. Fisher, Commander Clayton E., Hooked: Tales and Adventures of a Tailhook Warrior, Denver, Co: 2009. Outskirts Press.
13. The exaggerated Japanese claims continue to be presented as fact, for example Akira Yoshimura wrote in 1996 that the Japanese offensive had sunk one cruiser, one destroyer and thirty-five transports! The American publisher allowed this to stand without query. Yoshimura, Akira, Zero Fighter, Westport, Conn: 1996. Praeger.
14. It is asserted that ‘… command at Rabaul, believing that control of the air was completely on the Japanese side, had inadvertently reduced the number of escort aircraft. Also, the pilots of the six aircraft were not necessarily the best that might have been selected,’ Hata, Ikuhiko and Izawa, Yasho, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II, Annapolis: 1989. Naval Institute Press. However, the authors do not elaborate in any way as to who made these allegations.
Chapter 10
1. Shaw, Jr, Henry and Kane, Major Douglas T., History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Volume II – Isolation of Rabaul, 1963: Quantico, Va, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
2. Letoumeau, Roger and Letoumeau, Dennis, Operation KE: The Cactus Air Force and the Japanese Withdrawal from Guadalcanal, Annapolis: 2012. Naval Institute Press.
3. Despite this brilliant piece of dive-bombing, an Americans Intelligence team later recovered five JN25D-13 to D-17 code-books and a complete Naval Call-Signs list from the wreckage, forcing the Japanese to immediately change all their codes.
4. The Japanese Navy had commenced the war with only 2,120 aircraft on strength and, by April 1943, still only had 2,980 machines of all types. Production increased considerably in the year that followed, and in April 1944 6,598 aircraft were available, but the casualty rate had equally soared and the standard of construction had fallen away severely.
5. Ugaki, Admiral Matome, Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945, Pittsburg: 1991. University of Pittsburg Press.
6. (1) Interrogation No. 601 NAV No. 116. Naval Analysis Division, Japanese Land Based Air Operations in Celebes and Rabaul Area, Commander Nomura, Ryosuke, Imperial Japanese Navy (Ret.) Meiji Building, 28 Nov 1945.
7. See: Bergerud, Eric M., Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific, Boulder, Colorado: 2000. Westview Press; and Saki, Saburo, Samurai, London: 1959. William Kimber.
8. Miyazaki, Commander Takashi Miyazaki, IJN, Interrogation Nav.47, Washington DC: 1946. United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
9. A good, if brief, account of Rabaul’s final days can be found in – Sakaida, Henry, The Siege of Rabaul, Louisville: 1996. Phalanx Publishing.
Chapter 11
1. See: Paxton, John, ‘Myth vs. Reality: The Question of Mass Production in WWII’, article in Economicst Business Journal, Vol 1, No. 1, October 2008. Wayne State College.
2. These filters, the enormous Volkes model, which hung below the aircraft’s nose, were responsible for a drag factor that reduced these Spitfires speed by at least 30mph. The RAAF pilots tried to replace them with an improvised version of more moderate dimensions, but failed.
3. The ‘Killer’ tag was applied by the Press after it became known that he had shot and killed several Luftwaffe pilots in the air after they had parachuted out of their aircraft. He was credited with over twenty-eight confirmed aircraft destroyed, including four A6Ms. See: Alexander, Kristen, Clive Caldwell: Air Ace, London: 2006 Allen & Unwin.
4. Morehead, James, In My Sights: The Memoirs of a P-40 Ace, Novato, Ca.: 1998. Presidio Press.
5. Hata, Ikuhiko, and Izawa, Yasuho, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II, Tokyo: 1970. Kantōsha Publishers.
6. Chennault, Claire Lee, with Hotz, Robert, Way of the Fighter, New York: 1949. G P Putnam & Sons.
7. Baeza, Bernard, Soleil Levant sur L’Australie (The Rising Sun over Australia), Historie de L’Aviation No. 19, Montreal: 2008 Editions Lela Presse.
8. See: Bergerud, Eric M., Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific, Boulder, Colorado: 2000. Westview Press.
9. Under the 15 February 1944 re-organization the previous practice of aircraft-carriers being assigned their own Kōkūtai (Air Groups) had been abolished and autonomous independent Kōkūtai were formed, which were then allocated as required.
10. It was estimated that the US Pacific Fleet had more AA guns aboard its warships by this time than were available to defend the entire British Isles.
11. Dickson, W. D., Sea Battles in Close Up: 11. The Battle of the Philippine Sea June 1944, Shepperton: 1975. Ian Allan.
12. Tillman, Barrett and Coonts, Stephen, Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II, New York: 2007. New American Library. Also Y’Blood, William T., Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea, Annapolis, Md: 1981. Naval Institute Press.
13. Other surviving carriers were Amagi, Junyō, Ryuho, Shinano and Unryūbut these were utilized as ferry carriers taking replacement aircraft south to the main battle area, in which capacity Shinano and Unryū were lost.
14. Originally the aircraft complement was to have been eleven Yokosuka D4Y Suisei dive-bombers (codename ‘Judy’) and eleven Aichi E16A Zuiun floatplanes (codename ‘Paul’). Later this was changed with the establishment of 4 Koko Sentai with the two light carriers and this required the addition of 163 Hikōtai and 167 Hikōtai, both under Lieutenant Sumio Fukuda, each with an allocation of forty-eight A6M5s but an actual strength of about thirty fighters each, which began training at Tokushima airfield, Shikoku Island.
15. Willmott, H. P., The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action, Bloomington, Indiana: 2005. University of Indiana Press.
16. Okumiya, and Horikoshi, Jiro, with Caidin, Martin, Zero!: The Story of the Japanese Navy Air Force 1937–1945, London: 1957. Cassell & Co. Despite this one recent internet ‘expert’ has claimed that once the Zero’s weaknesses were known and countered, even novice US pilots could easily shoot down superior Japanese pilots, adding that even in 1941 the Wildcat was superior!
17. ‘Where is the rest of your crew!’ a Royal Navy Pilot is said to have ribbed a US Navy Hellcat pilot on first seeing the F6F.
18. Some armchair internet jockeys in the USA claim that the A6M had a maximum speed of 309mph and that any higher speed would cause the skin to wrinkle.
19. See: Japanese Radio Equipment [E-08] – DS820.52U524 [E-08]; Japanese Radio Apparatus Construction Methods [E-18] DS20.S2 U524 [E-18] and Japanese Insulation Materials [E-23] DS20S2 U524-[E-23], Naval Historical Division, Operational Archives Branch, Washington DC, for further details. Of course Allied airborne radios were not much better and also the subject of constant complaint.
20. Tagaya, Osamu, Imperial Japanese Naval Aviator 1937–45, Wellingborough: 1988. Osprey.
21. Which used an almost equal combination of water and Methanol (CH3 OH) – MW50.
22. Combat Evaluation of Zeke 52 with F4U-1D, F6F-5, and FM-2, TAIC Report No. 17 dated November 1944, Washington DC.
23. Minoru, Dr. Akimoto, Oinaru Zereosen no eiko to kuto (Nihon gunyoki kokusen zenshi, Tokyo: 1995. Gurin Aro Shuppansha.
24. Listed by some sources as the Model 55 – i.e. Okumiya, Masatake and Horikoshi, Jiro, with Caidin, Martin, Zero! The Story of the Japanese Navy Air Force 1937–1945, London: 1957. Cassel.
25. Navy Department, Bureau of Ordnance – Japanese Explosive Ordnance, OP 1667. 14 June 1946. Volume 1, Washington DC. Bennington, VT: 2011. Merriam Press.
Chapter 12
1. The two fleets essentially consisted of the same ships, only the title changing with the alternation of the C-in-C, with one controlling with his staff, while the other team prepared for the next offensive.
2. Ginjoro Fujiwara, a prominent industrialist, had been appointed in 1940 as Minister of Commerce and Industry, with a special brief to modernize Naval Procurement procedures. He determined upon tripling Japanese Navy aircraft production and soon introduced many practical steps to make improvements to the flow. A new airfield was constructed at Nagoya and river barges carrying five A6Ms at a time, replaced the primitive ox-cart method, still, incredibly, in use. With the completion of the Mizushima Aircraft plant at Okayama and the full operation of Kumamoto (Kengun) aircraft factory, A6Ms began coming off the line at one hundred a month at Nagoya and twice that number at Nakajima.
3. Hudson, J. ed., The History of the USS Cabot (CVL-28): A Fast Carrier in World War II, McAllen, Tx: 1986 Hudson.
4. Many years later, in June 2003 Iwashita met Nisi’s family in Massachusetts. For the full story see – Taylan, Justin, The Face of A Young Pilot Shot Down Over Iwo Jima, pacificghosts.com.
5. Yasuho, Izawa and Shores, Christopher, ‘Fighting Floatplanes of the Japanese Imperial Navy’, article in Air Enthusiast, No. 31 (July–November 1986 edition).
6. The A6M-Ns were never embarked aboard the Japanese Armed Merchant Raiders Aikoku Maru and Hokoku Maru in the Indian Ocean as frequently claimed.
7. Smith, Peter C., Kamikaze: To Die for the Emperor, Barnsley: 2015. Pen & Sword Aviation.
8. She was to be claimed sunk yet again by the USAAF at Midway and several times more during the course of the war – but survived until July 1945.
9. Like Yamamoto, Ōnishi had served a stint in the USA and knew its awesome industrial potential. Also like Yamamoto, he had advised strongly against going to war with the USA, ‘There is no nation this country should fight less.’
10. Ugaki, Admiral Matome, Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945, Pittsburg: 1991. University of Pittsburg Press. Ugaki was roundly condemned later as one of the ‘… evil old men’ who prolonged the war. In his own view, however, it was the ultimate sacrifice of pure patriotism and both he and Ōnishi were later to share the fate of those that went to their deaths, Ōnishi committing ritual disembowelment (hara-kiri or cutting the stomach), choosing the seppuku (ritual sacrifice) option and taking fifteen hours to die in slow agony in atonement, while Ugaki went to his death leading the very last Kamikaze mission of the war.
11. Hirikoshi, Jiro, Eagles of Mitsubishi: The Story of the Zero Fighter, Tokyo: 1970. Kappa Books (Kobunsha Co., Ltd).
12. The order failed to save Nishizawa, however, for he was killed en route to Tacloban as a passenger aboard a Shōwa LD2 transport plane intercepted by to VF-14 F6Fs from the carrier Wasp that same day. Ironically the LD2 was a licence-built version of the famous Douglas DC-3 Dakota.
13. The British AA cruiser Euryalus put two 5.25-inch shells into the carrier Illustrious in just one such incident on 29 January, killing eleven of her crew and wounding twenty-two more.
14. Iwantani, Lieutenant-Commander Taiyo (Ocean) magazine, March 1945, cited in Axell, Albert and Hideaki, Kase, Kamikaze: Japan’s Suicide Gods, New York: 2002. Longmans.
15. Tadamichi Kuribayashi to Yoshii Kuribayashi, see Newcomb, Richard F., Iwo Jima, Austin, Tx: 1966. Holt, Rineheart and Winston.
16. Off Salerno, Italy, in 1943 106 Fleet Air Arm Seafires embarked in five carriers, destroyed just two German aircraft, frequently pursued USAAF A-36s by mistake for German machines (but could never catch them) and in return lost a grand total of forty-two Seafires destroyed or damaged beyond repair in deck landings!
17. Smith, Peter C., Task Force 57: The British Pacific Fleet 1944–45, London: 1959. William Kimber.
18. Nijboer, Donald, Seafire FIII Vs A6M Zero: Pacific Theatre, Wellingborough: 2009. Osprey Publishing.
19. A few A6Ms, scattered around the former Empire, saw limited post-war usage, for example by the French in Indo-China, the rebellious inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies, and in China itself, but these were few and their activities brief and poorly documented.
20. Report No. 46, Tokko translated by Mr Ishiguro.
21. The breakdown was: A6M1, A6M2, A6M3 – between March 1939 and March 1942 – Mitsubishi 722 – Nakajima 115 and between April 1942 to March 1943 – Mitsubishi 729 – Nakajima 960. A6M5, A6M6, A6M7, A6M8 – from April 1943 to March 1944 – Mitsubishi 1,164 – Nakajima 2,268; between April 1944 to March 1945 – Mitsubishi 1,145 – Nakajima 2,342; from April 1945 to Aug 1945 – Mitsubishi 119 – Nakajima 885.
22. Under this the taught mantra stressed Chüsetsu (Loyalty); Reigi (Politeness); Buyü (Bravery); Shingi (Trust) and Shisso (Thrift) – all admirable qualities for the military to uphold.
23. Foss, Joe, with Foss, Donna, A Proud American: The Autobiography of Joe Foss, New York: 1992. Pocket Books.