Chapter 12
Final Sacrifice
With the war now reaching home territory Japan’s plight was desperate. Cut off from the very sources of oil and essential war materials she had gone to war to obtain, her fleet obliterated, the bulk of her army on guard in Manchuria against the Soviet offensive, more and more desperate measures had to be resorted to in order to stave off the impending finale. Thoughts turned to the past to turn around the present. The providential intervention of great typhoons in past ages had wrecked the invasion fleets of the Mogul Empire on two occasions. Might such divine aid be invoked in her current dire peril? For the A6M the final chapter in her story was one of self-sacrifice, but on a scale never before envisaged.
Iwo Jima
The power of the American 3rd/5th Fleet1 in the Pacific was, by the summer of 1944, overwhelming. Wherever the sixteen fleet and light fleet carriers with their 1,200 embarked aircraft and supporting warship groups wished to go, they did go. Attempts by the Japanese to build up the air power of various island garrisons proved in vain, for at any chosen point of impact the US carrier aircraft could always totally overwhelm any opposition. Like boys frantically trying to poke their fingers in the dyke as a tsunami surged in, the Japanese were always behind the loop, with always too little, too late to influence the inevitable. One example of this was the situation on Iwo Jima in the Bonin Islands, a mere five hundred miles from the Japanese mainland, which had been Japanese territory since 1875. There were two airfields on the island, which were capable of supporting up to eighty fighters, and since June the garrison had been steadily built up under Lieutenant-General Tadamichi Kuribayashi and the Japanese were in the process of moving their best units and pilots in to defend their home turf among them 301 and 601 Kōkūtai. They were equipping with the powerful new Mitsubishi J2M Raiden point fighter (code-named ‘Jack’) designed by Horikoshi and powered by the 1,530hp Kasei engine, but at the last moment continuing problems with this power plant saw their substitution with the A6M Model 52. A6M production, which was to have been run down, was now re-boosted and in 1943 Mitsubishi at Nagoya produced 1,029 A6Ms and Nakajima, 1,967.2 At the battle-front the US Navy was determined not to allow the Japanese to build up their air strength and the airfields on both Iwo and Guam were ‘softened up’ with numerous pre-emptive strikes in preparation for landings at Saipan.
The first American air attacks on Iwo were mounted on 15 June, and sixty F6Fs were met by eighteen A6Ms, ten from 1 Chütai, led by Lieutenant Shigeo Jūni, with Chief Petty Officers Isamu Hirano, Suminori Kawabata and Kazuo Ōshi, Petty Officers Sotojirō Demura, Akio Nagashima, Mitsugu Yamazaki, and Takeo Yoshitake and Leading Seaman Kaihaku Kumagaya and Shüzo Nakagawa; and eight from 2 Chütai under Lieutenant (j.g.) Chōbei Morita, with Warrant Officer Fukuju Kawakami, Petty Officers Yukio Kubota, Kaname Shibata and Hiroshi Shigemitsu, and Leading Seamen Kazuwa Honda, Mitsuo Shiraishi and Kesaji Sugihara, which between them claimed four aircraft destroyed but suffered horrendous losses of sixteen of their own with only Kawakami, who crash-landed, and Yamazaki surviving the encounter. This massacre was put down to inadequate training as the majority of the pilots had only previously flown two-seater floatplanes.
On 24 June fifty-nine fighters rose to meet the enemy, claiming the destruction of thirty-seven Americans but lost half their own number, and on 4 July 110 sorties were flown, with thirty-nine enemy machines claimed for the loss of twenty-three Japanese. The battle on 4 July 1944 was against the carriers of Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Task Force 58 whose F6F pilots later commented that the aerial opposition encountered was strong. Twelve VF-31 from the carrier Cabot had twelve Hellcats flying top cover at 15,000ft that day but some thirty-one A6Ms, led by Lieutenant Kikumasa Fujita, managed to lure them into pursuit then rapidly made a climbing turn to 20,000ft and attacked them from above and out of the sun, a classic A6M manoeuvre that caught the Americans flat-footed. Lieutenant (j.g.) Cornelius Nicholas Nooy reported, ‘We ran into a real hot Jap outfit and had our hands full. Planes were being shot down all over the sky and I couldn’t tell whether they were Japs or ours.’ Lieutenant Adolph Mencin, the XO, recalled: ‘It was our toughest fight; we were out-numbered, and the Jap pilots were the best we ever encountered.’ Lieutenant (j.g.) Robert Clark Wilson stated: ‘In that predawn attack, we ran into some of the best pilots the Japans ever put up against us. Until our Hellcats thinned them out, the Zeros outnumbered us and had the altitude advantage.’ The twelve American airmen claimed to have destroyed ten A6Ms in that encounter, but lost four F6Fs, those of Lieutenants (j.g.), Haig G. Elezian, Jr, Frank Hancock, Malcolm L. Loomis and Bob Wilson, only the latter pilot surviving.3
The Japanese A6Ms actually flew forty-five sorties this day and claimed a total of twenty-six enemy machines destroyed for the loss of fourteen, including several destroyed by anti-aircraft fire from the US warships conducting bombardments offshore. One successful pilot that day was a former flying instructor, Lieutenant Kunio Iwashita of the Yokosuka Kōkūtai; parts of this unit had reached Iwo on 22 June with nine A6Ms and further reinforcement arrived over the next two days. Many were intercepted en route to the island with Lieutenant Katsumi Koda near the Uracus Island (Farallon de Pajaros), in the northern Marianas, and seven A6Ms were destroyed.
On 5 July the Americans returned and Iwashita, who had been grounded with appendicitis the day before, volunteered to fight. Commander Katsutoshi Yagi allowed him to go under command of Peal Harbor and Midway veteran Iyozō Fujita, who was the Butaichō. Fujita took Iwashita aside and counselled him, ‘One’s first fight is the most risky. I will teach you how. Don’t stray from me. Follow me tight.’ The air raid warning sounded almost immediately and F6Fs were flying low over the airstrip and strafing even as the A6Ms clawed their way rapidly up through 328ft (100m) altitude. As he looked back Iwashita could see the big American fighters set ablaze aircraft and fuel tanks back at his base. He closed on a group of four F6Fs, which at first he mistook for Japanese aircraft. They were engrossed on creating mayhem and failed to see the lone A6M close from astern. Iwashita got to less than 30ft (9.14m) from the rear Hellcat before opening fire with his 20mm cannon. He recalled: ‘The wing of the F6F broke up. I saw the goggles and white muffler of the young pilot and his face as he looked back in surprise. The F6F was instantly engulfed in flames and crashed into the sea. Mount Suribachi was close to us.’ His victim had been Ensign Alberto Nisi from the carrier Wasp’s VF-14 Squadron.
The remaining three F6Fs instantly turned on the lone A6M seeking revenge, and Iwashita’s aircraft had his cockpit canopy shattered and his port wing perforated before Fujita and the rest of his section arrived and drove the Americans away. Iwashita managed to crash-land his aircraft safely just before US cruisers offshore began a fierce bombardment. At the end of the week the Yokosuka group had lost thirty-one pilots and claimed to have destroyed twenty American fighters. The few survivors were flown back to Japan in a transport aircraft and Iwashita went on to fly further successful combat sorties in the Philippines, at Okinawa and over Japan, and in the end ferrying A6Ms around, surviving the war.4
Just nine A6Ms remained and these were dispatched as escorts for eight B5Ns against the American fleet, where they were intercepted and destroyed, just four fighters and one bomber managing to struggle back to Iwo. But the island was spared invasion at that time.
More Suisen operations
Despite the obvious limitations of the A6M2-N concept this little floatplane saw widespread war service and was quite successful in its limited sphere, notwithstanding the Solomon Islands losses. The Rufe served with 802 Kōkūtai from the Shortlands Anchorage, south of Bougainville, being based at Faisi Island, and also from Jaluit Atoll in the Marshall Islands; with 902 Kōkūtai from Dublon Island (which the Japanese called Natsu Shima – Summer Island – now known as Tonowas) in Truk Atoll; with 934 Kōkūtai from Aru Island in the Arafura Sea, south-west of New Guinea; and with 5 Kōkūtai (later 452 Kōkūtai) out of Kiska in the Aleutians where they fought with US Army P-38s (the Rufes claiming seventeen scalps for the loss of eight, before being disbanded on 1 October 1943), and from the Kurile Islands. Six A6M2-Ns were utilized as impromptu bombers in lieu of anything else and attacked Amchitka, but lost two of their number in the process. They also served with 936 Kōkūtai (the former 40 Kōkūtai) at Singapore, having a dozen B5N2s from November 1942, working from the Sembawang Royal Navy Base, just west of Seletar, where the British had built a ramp for their seaplanes and commenced a jetty, just over 98ft (30m), which the Japanese later completed. Two American submarines are thought to have been destroyed by A6M2-Ns, the Grenadier (SS-210) on 22 April 1943 by 936 Kōkūtai and the Scamp (SS-277) on 11 November 1944, by 453 Kōkūtai. On 19 April 1944, two of these A6M-Ns intercepted the Allied air strikes on Sabang, from the carriers Saratoga and Illustrious, damaging two SBDs. The 934 Kōkūtai worked from Kai and Aru Islands, south-east Maluku in the Arafura Sea, known as the Barrier Rim. This unit was credited with destroying three B-24s and three Australian Bristol Beaufighter. The 13 Kōkūtai was based at Brunei, North Borneo, in 1942–1945 with both B5N2 and E13A1 on its strength for convoy escort and antisubmarine patrolling; and was also employed by the Otsu Kōkūtai in defence of the home islands against Boeing B-29 Superfortresses attacks working from Biwa Lake, Honshū, toward the end of the war. Home defence units flew from Kashima, Ibraki, and Konoike (Gonoike) also, from where at least two victories over F6Fs were claimed by the A6M2-Ns.5 The Sasebo Kōkūtai had A6M2-Ns at Chichi Jima (Peel Island) in the Bonin Group, north of Iwo Jima but in strong air attacks from Rear-Admiral ‘Jocko’ Clark’s Task Group 58.1 destroyed or badly damaged every one while they were still on the water. The pilots, now without mounts, were re-allocated to the Sasebo Kōkūtai. The A6M2-N also saw much hard sea-service aboard the seaplane carrier Kamikawa Maru in the Solomons campaign, as described later.6 Production ceased in 1943.
Enter the Kamikazes (神風特別攻撃隊)
The Kamikazes represented just one facet of the extreme Japanese measures originated to present a last-ditch defence against the American onslaught, under the overall title of Tokku (Special Attack) and the latter term is the one used by them. As in all things, the western usage of the term Kamikaze to apply generally to all such facets of self-sacrifice, has become the accepted norm. The Japanese term Shimpū (Divine Wind) so named after two opportune typhoons that legend had it had providentially arisen and destroyed two huge invasion fleets sent by Kublai Khan against Japan in 1274 and in 1281 applied to the air-to-sea arms of the Tokku. There have been many theories as to when exactly the idea of the suicide attack, as a given policy rather than as a personal decision, were adopted, and just as many speculations as to the originator. In my study on this subject7 I have tried to list the precedents down through the war. Before proceeding in detail with how the A6M came to be involved, it should also be firmly held in mind that the lone ‘suicidal’ attack was far from just a Japanese concept. All nations’ armed forces had embraced the ‘take one with you’ philosophy down the ages, from forlorn hopes such as King Leonidas and his Spartans who sacrificed themselves to hold the pass at Thermopylae against the Persian hordes of Xerxes in 480 BC, throughout succeeding centuries, and World War II was no exception. In the particular field of aerial warfare the examples of Major Katsushige Takada off Biak in May 1944 and Rear-Admiral Masabumi Arima’s sacrifice on 15 October of the same year had been preceded by many similar actions by all other air forces. Russian fighter pilots such as Lieutenant II Ivanov of 46 Fighter Regiment became ‘Heroes of the Soviet Union’ for ramming Luftwaffe bombers, and even women pilots got into the act when First-Lieutenant Yekaterina Zelenko rammed a Bf.109. Major Ernst-Siegfried Steen of the Luftwaffe crashed his Junkers Ju.87 dive-bomber into the Soviet heavy cruiser Kirov and was awarded a posthumous Knight’s Cross. The Americans were no exception to this list, with Captain Colin P. Kelly, Jr, for example lauded coast-to-coast by the press back home for his heroism in diving his huge B-17 bomber into the battleship Haruna and sinking her off the Philippines on 10 December 1941– when in fact he did no such thing, only a light cruiser was present and she was not scratched, while Haruna herself was hundreds of miles away at the time.8 That same day Lieutenant Samuel H. Marret of 34 Pursuit Squadron was killed when his P-35 fighter was caught in the up-blast from a bomb hit on a Japanese transport ship and the two stories became intertwined. Neither man committed suicide of course but the American press, hungry for some grain of success, invented stories to say they had, and, in doing so, also treated them as heroes for so doing. At Midway Marine Captain Richard E. Fleming is credited with diving his Vought SB2U dive-bomber into another ‘battleship’ (actually his target was the heavy cruiser Mikuma) at Midway, but his citation clearly stated he scored a near miss and crashed into the sea, the press knew otherwise; but other American pilots most certainly did self-sacrifice in this way, and were rightly hailed as heroes. So self-immolation for the defence of one’s country was not an exclusive trait of the Japanese.
However, the Japanese most certainly embraced the concept (although not without considerable reservations on the part of many and outright rejection by many more) more than any other nation had done up to that point. The suggestion of deliberately crashing aircraft into enemy ships as a matter of policy had been raised at various times, by various people, only to meet rejection. The American landings at Leyte Gulf on 20 October, at the start of their campaign to re-conquer the Philippines, brought all such speculations to a high pitch.
When Vice-Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi, commanding 1 Kōkū-kantai, visited 201 Kōkütai at their Mabalacat base (Clark Field) that day events did not auger well. Bombarding battleships and cruisers lined the coast, tens of thousands of American troops were in transports just offshore protected by dozens of small escort carriers, while over the horizon the all-powerful US Task Forces with their massed aircraft prowled in overwhelming strength. What was left of the Japanese surface fleet was to be committed to an all-out assault to drive the enemy back, but to facilitate their task, those carriers just had to be eliminated. The Admiral had been charged by the High Command to do just that, destroy the American carriers, but, from previous experience and failures, he had come to the conclusion that there was only one way left to achieve his brief and save his nation. Originally when the question of suicide attacks had been raised, Ōnishi had been rigorously opposed it; he called it ‘heresy’.9 Now faced with the direness of the situation he had put all such scruples behind him. He postulated to assembled officers that Japan’s position was a desperate and extreme one. If the Philippines went then Japan would be cut off from the oil sources she had gone to war to obtain and then it was just a matter of time to total defeat. He put to them the option of loading their sleek little A6M fighter planes with 551lb (250kg) bombs and deliberately crash-diving (Tai-Atari – literally body-crash) them into the wooden flight-decks of the American carriers operating offshore. Such a revolutionary concept, deliberate suicide, would, one would have expected, have caused considerable pause, but it would appear that, after the briefest of consultations between Executive Officer Commander Asaichi Tamai and Lieutenant Masanobu Ibusuki, senior squadron leader (the Group commander, Captain Ei Yamamoto, was hospitalized after an accident at this time) they accepted the Admiral’s option without reserve. The generally accepted versions of events presented are that the pilots of 201 were immediately assembled and the news broken; volunteers were called for; every man raised his hand. Almost in a trice then the Kamikazes were born. Other accounts recall a considerable reluctance on the part of the chosen leader, Lieutenant Yukio Seki, but, upon reflection, he finally consented. Whatever the truth, and there must surely have been some pause, the ultimate outcome was the same and planning commenced. Four units were set up, named after elements in the poet Norinaga Motoori’s epic one-line homage to Japan – Shikishima-Tai (traditional name of the Japanese islands); Yamato-Tai (the original name of the Japanese nation), Asahi-Tai (the rising sun) and Yamazakura-Tai (the mountain cherry blossom).
Admiral Ugaki duly noted this revolutionary step in his diary entry for 21 October.
In view of the present situation, the 1 Kōkū-kantai is going to organize a Kamikaze Special Attack Corps with twenty-six carrier fighters of the 201st Kōkūtai, all of its present strength, of which thirteen were suicidal ones. They are divided into four units. They intend to destroy enemy carriers without fail – at least put them out of order for a while – before the thrust of the [our] surface force, when they come to the sea east of the Philippines.
He added in an emotional outburst of spiritual pride, ‘Oh, what a noble spirit this is! We are not afraid of a million enemies or a thousand carriers because our whole force shares the same spirit!’10
The selection of the A6M as the first Kamikaze operator may appear a bizarre choice. The agile little fighter plane was renowned for her deftness and lightness and the options of various bomber types would seem more apt as pile-drivers to sink carriers. Ōnishi was certainly influenced by the fact that the group’s earlier experiments with the chōhi bakugeki method made them stand out in this regard. Considered practically suicidal anyway they were used to toting bombs around and making high-speed approaches. Instead of bouncing the bomb off the water into the side of the ships, they could adopt varying approaches, which included a low-level approach with a final climb and dive, according to the conditions and scale of defences. That the A6M had the necessary speed to penetrate US defences whereas the Philippine Sea battle had shown that the dive-bombers and attack planes stood very little chance of doing so, decided the choice. The same problem remained, the size of bomb that the suicider bakusō could carry into battle to be an effective carrier-killer. It still remained in essence a 551lb (250kg) weapon when at least 1,100lb (500kg) was required to smash up such large ships as fleet carriers and fulfil the basic premise of the Kamikaze, ‘one ship for one plane’. Of course all other types of aircraft were soon pressed into service, even floatplanes and flimsy wire-and-strut trainers, in fact anything that could be flown piloted by anyone capable of flying them; but it was the A6M that led the way, and indeed remained the mainstay of the earlier Kamikaze attacks.
How did their designer feel about this apparent waste of his outstanding design concept, the A6M? Did he feel it was being thrown away in a totally unsuitable manner? Did he resent the misuse of his brainchild? At the time he contributed an article for the Asahi newspaper group’s publication Kamikaze Special Attack Forces, which he titled ‘Compliment to the Kamikaze Special Attack Forces’. Horikoshi was to write, ‘As I have witnessed the birth of the Zero, I know there is nothing to fear, since we have created an aircraft worthy of its task and the Kamikaze Special Attack Forces does the job that must be done.’ This seemed to be a very clear and unequivocal endorsement of the role to which his creation had been assigned. Later he recalled that he reflected that this was not really the case, asking himself, ‘Why were the Zeros used in such a way?’ He mused, ‘Of course, I could not say such things publicly at that time …’11
However Hirikoshi thought about things there is no doubt that the A6M carried out the strange new role that was thrust upon it very well indeed. Indeed, initially, the whole Kamikaze concept took the Allies totally by surprise. Not only were they amazed at the alien mind-set that could conceive, and carry out continuously, such a sacrificial effort, but at its effectiveness. The debut was made during the closing stages of the Leyte Gulf battle, a sprawling encounter as labyrinthine and complex as all of the previous Japanese grand assaults from Midway onward, which saw the remnant of the still powerful surface fleet crushed and scattered to the four winds and yet another instance of a Japanese commander turning back with victory almost within his grasp. At Savo Island in 1942 with the Allied warships beaten and bewildered and with the American transport fleet at their mercy, the Japanese had turned back, a decision which led to the long-drawn out defeat in the Solomons. At Leyte Gulf, in the Shō-Gō Operation – with the whole American landing fleet within their grasp and the chance to justify the sacrifice of their whole fleet, command irresolution again took place at the critical moment and lost the Japanese their one last chance. But if the Americans had survived the massed salvoes of the Japanese battleships and heavy cruisers, the arrival of the Kamikaze gave them much pause for thought.
There were initially several abortive missions, on 21 October the Shikishima-tai failed to find the enemy carriers, while the Yamato-tai (‘Spirit of Japan’) flew a sortie from Cebu, from which Lieutenant (j.g.) Kōfu Kunō vanished without a trace. However, the Australian heavy cruiser Australia was hit and badly damaged by a suicide aircraft, the first of many such crashes endured by this ship. Similar failures by the Shikishima-tai were recorded on each succeeding day up to the 24 October. It was not until 25 October that the Kamikazes made their mark when the Commander Yukio Seki’s group of five bakusō, including Ensigns Iwao Nakano and Nobuo Tani and Petty Officers 1st Class Hajime Nagamine and Shigeo Oguro, with a four A6M fighter escort, attacked the eighteen escort carriers of Task Group 77 under Rear-Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague off Samar where they had just narrowly escaped total destruction by Kurita’s premature withdrawal. The carrier St Lo was sunk, and the Kalin Bay, Kitkun Bay and White Plains were all damaged. These attacks were all observed and confirmed by Warrant Officer Hiroyoshi Nishizawa of the escort. That same day Lieutenant Hiroyoshi Nishizawa was refused permission to lead his own group and his aircraft was instead flown by Petty Officer 1st Class Tomisaku Kastsumata, who crashed the escort carrier Suwanee off Surigao. Others of his group hit and damaged her sister ships, the Sangamon and Santee, in the same mission.12
After these initial victories the High Command in Tokyo enthusiastically embraced the Kamikaze concept and it rapidly became the most efficient method of anti-ship operation, although it never totally replaced conventional dive- and torpedo-bomber sorties entirely, and was itself supplemented by the Oka (‘Baka’) human-guided-bomb missions, Maru-dai, on which 252 Kōküati also flew as escorts, and other innovations. The missions themselves rapidly developed and Allied defensive methods, which included stronger fighter patrols, heavier radar-controlled gun barrages at longer ranges, picket-destroyers and proximity AA fuses, were countered by intelligent use of the land mass, mountains and cloud cover to shield approaches, the alternation and constant variation of altitudes and early morning and dusk attacks to take advantage of poor light, to keep up the pressure. Another tactic that confused the defending gunners was to make a determined run against a specific ship in the fleet and then, at the last moment, turn hard to port or starboard and crash an adjacent ship. Once the A6Ms were inside the warship formation at low level the gunners were restricted in their fire because the chances of hitting a friendly ship in the heat of the action were high.13 In public the Allies derided the Kamikaze as ‘wasteful’, in private the US Navy was seriously worried as warship losses sharply escalated.
The use of the suicide attacks rapidly gained favour and the Japanese Army Air Force was also a contributor, indeed, some sources say they originated it. From being a purely voluntary operation before long the commanding officers of entire units were ‘volunteering’ them for this mission. Love of one’s country, the need to protect one’s family, peer pressure, even mental blackmail, the motivation varied from individual to individual. There was not the blanket blind obedience that nowadays many Americans allege existed. Even among those that volunteered and died, rational doubts were uppermost in the final thoughts. One young pilot, Lieutenant-Commander Iwatani, wrote:
I cannot predict the outcome of the air battles, but you will be making a mistake if you should regard Special Attack operations as normal methods. The right way is to attack the enemy with skill and return to the base with good results. A plane should be utilized over and over again. That’s the way to fight a war. The current thinking is skewed. Otherwise, you cannot expect to improve air power. There will be no progress if flyers continue to die.14
The A6M remained one of the principal aircraft utilized as Kamikaze during the Philippine campaign. The principal -tai (units) in which the A6M were involved either as suicider or as escort, were the Kamikaze Tokubetsu Kōgekitai Asahi-, Baika-, Byakko-, Chihaya-, Hazakura-, Jimmu-, Junchū-, Kasagi-, Kashima-, Kasuga-, Kazaki-, Kikusui-, Kongō-, Kōtoku-, Niitaka-, Ōka-, Reisen-, Sakon-, Sakurai-, Seikō-, Shikishima-, Shinpei-, Shisei-, Shōmu-, Taigi-, Tenpei-, Tokimune-, Tsukuba-, Ukon-, Wakazakura-, Yamato- and Yamazakura-tai. As far as can be ascertained approximately 230 A6Ms were despatched on suicide sorties from the Philippines, with a further eighty assigned as escorts.
The shock of being on the receiving end of one of the first A6M suicide attacks was recorded in the Action Report of the St Lo, all the more graphic because of its detachment.
At about 1051 AA fire was seen and heard forward and general quarters was sounded. Almost immediately thereafter, numerous planes, believed to include both friendly and enemy, were seen at 1000 – 3000 feet ahead and on the starboard bow. These planes moved aft to starboard and one of them when about abeam to starboard went into a right turn toward the St. Lo. The after starboard guns opened [fire] on him, but with no apparent effect. This plane, a Zeke 52, with a bomb under each wing, continued his right turn into the groove, and approached over the ramp [aft] very high speed.
After crossing the ramp at not over fifty feet, he appeared to push over sufficiently to hit the deck at about number 5 wire, 15 feet to the port side of the centre line. There was a tremendous crash and flash of an explosion as one or both bombs exploded. This plane continued up the deck leaving fragments strewn about and its remnants went over the bow. There is no certain evidence as to whether or not the bombs were released before the plane struck the deck.
The Captain’s impression was that no serious damage had been suffered. There was a hole in the flight deck with smouldering edges which sprang into flames. Hoses were immediately run out from both sides of the flight deck and water started on the fire. He then noticed that smoke was coming through the hole from below, and that smoke was appearing on both sides of the ship, evidently coming from the hangar. He tried to contact the hangar deck for a report, but was unable to do so. Within one to one and a half minutes an explosion occurred on the hangar deck, which puffed smoke and flame through the hole in the deck and, he believes, bulged the flight deck near and aft of the hole. This was followed in a matter of seconds by a much more violent explosion, which rolled back a part of the flight deck, bursting through aft of the original hole. The next heavy explosion tore out more of the flight deck and also below the forward elevator out of its shaft. At this time, which he estimated as still shortly before 1100, he decided that the ship could not be saved. With the smoke and flame, he was even uncertain as to whether the after part still was on the ship, though later he had glimpses of it. All communication was lost, except the sound-powered phones, which apparently were in for some time although no reports could be obtained from aft.The word was passed ‘stand by to abandon ship’ and the order given to stop all engines. The order to the engines appeared to get through, and the word to stand by to abandon ship reached all parts of the ship, partly by sound-powered phone and partly by word of mouth, and the personnel assembled largely on the flight deck forward, and on the forecastle. During this time, some personnel had been blown overboard, and some had been driven over by fire.
Iwo Jima falls
Even before the Americans turned their eye to the occupation of Iwo Jima, it had been fully recognized by the Japanese defenders that they would not be able to count on the Navy fighters to defend them for very long, but would have to be self-reliant. ‘Even the suicidal attacks by small groups of our Army and Navy airplanes … could be regarded only as a strategical ruse on our part.’15 This, despite the fact that on 10 August Rear-Admiral Toshinosuka Ichimaru had arrived on the island with 2,216 naval personnel, including aviators and ground crew and that by the time of the invasion this had increased to 7,347. The two airfields at Motoyama were not expected to survive the landings but were kept going through frequent American softening-up bombings for as long as possible so that the A6Ms based there could intercept US bombing forays against the home islands from Saipan.
In the event the only assistance the Navy was able to mount was a Kamikaze attack launched by the Kamikaze Tokubetsu Kogekitai Di 2 Mitatetai (Imperial Shield) from Katori air base. The unit had only just been established on 19 February, from the 601 Kōkütai and 254 Kōkütai under Lieutenant Hiroshi Murakawa. The strength of this unit was twelve A6Ms led by Lieutenant (j.g.) Senzō Iwashita, ten Yokosuka D4Y Suisei dive-bombers (code-named ‘Judy’) and eight Nakajima D6N Tenzan carrier attack bombers (code named ‘Jill’). They had taken off when news of the American invasion came in that same day, but bad weather caused this mission to be aborted. The weather had cleared by the 21st and early that morning the unit again set off early in the day for the long flight south. They were staged through Hachijo Jima air base in the Bonin Islands, where two aircraft were forced to aboard the mission. One B6N failed to take off as her undercarriage collapsed while a second got airborne but developed engine faults and had to return to Hachijo Jima. For the rest it was a long flight down to the target area but, as this was to be a one-way mission, that was not important. In the event all twenty-eight remaining aircraft reached the battle zone. They were first detected by the radar of the fleet carrier Saratoga while still about one hundred miles distant, but she mistook them for friendly aircraft and took no action. This was to cost the Americans dearly. Not until 1700 did F6Fs on the CAP identify the incoming group at Japanese. Six A6Ms attacked and while the ships guns shot down two of them the others hit, two more ‘… bouncing off the water into the starboard side, one hitting the flight deck forward, the fourth hitting a large crane …’ Three of the bombs they carried detonated inside the Saratoga’s hull setting her ablaze. After a while the fires were brought under control but she was then struck by a third Kamikaze, which brushed her flight deck before crashing in the sea, but the bomb she carried penetrated the carrier’s flight deck blowing a large hole in it. It took until 2000 before she was able to affect sufficient repairs to land back her airborne aircraft and she lost thirty-six of her aircraft, which were burnt out, while a further six had to ditch in the sea and were also lost. The carrier also suffered 123 of her crew killed and 192 wounded and she was forced to head back to Eniwetok and then all the way back to Bremerton to repair.
The Kamikazes also hit the escort carrier, the Bismarck Sea, which was operating close-support air missions some twenty miles east of Iwo. Just before 1900, one of these smashed into her ‘square abeam’. Fully fuelled up aircraft on her deck immediately started to burn, the blaze being fuelled by exploding ammunition. There was a twenty-two-knot wind over the fleet at the time, which rapidly spread the flames. Soon the whole ship was ablaze and the order to abandon ship was issued. While that was in progress the carrier detonated in a huge explosion and quickly sank. Many of her crew were picked out of the rough waters by her escorts but she lost 218 of her crew, 943 officers and men as well as most of her aircraft. The Tenzans went for another jeep carrier, the Lunga Point, but she avoided being hit. The naval auxiliary Keokuk, a net tender, was hit, set on fire and badly damaged with seventeen dead and forty-four injured. Two of the large Landing Ship Tanks (LCTs) 477 and 809 with 3 Marine Division artillery pieces embarked, were also hit and damaged.
The Americans later claimed that all of the about forty attackers had been destroyed, but this was not the case, in truth the Mitate group lost forty-three men killed in that attack, including five A6M pilots. After the battle, on their return, a group of F6Fs ambushed two of the fast D4Ys and damaged them, but both managed to land intact back safely at Hachijojima.
On 1 March 1945, one of these Suisei bombers sortied alone from Hachijojima toward Iwo Jima to make a lone suicide attack.
Okinawa
In April and May it was the turn of Okinawa as the Allies edged closer to Tokyo. The US Fleet had commenced heavy attacks on homeland airfields from 18 March onward and Kamikaze units struck back hard, badly damaging the fleet carriers Intrepid, Wasp, Franklin, Enterprise and Essex, battleships New Mexico and West Virginia and heavy cruiser Indianapolis, flagship of Admiral Spruance. The battleship Yamato was sacrificed on a one-way mission, with her fuel bunkers half-full and with no fighter protection. She was overwhelmed by almost eight hundred US carrier aircraft before she got anywhere close to the invasion beaches. The Americans had started landing on 1 April under Operation Iceberg. By now the American fleet had grown yet further to include fifteen fleet and light carriers, and it had the added assistance of the British Pacific Fleet with between four and six fleet carriers at various times during the battle with four light carriers en route to join them. The Japanese responded vigorously under the prepared Operation Ten-Go, which was put into effect on 25 March with 3 and 10 Kōkū-kantai working under Vice-Admiral Ugaki’s 5 Kōkū-kantai based on southern Kyushu and 1 Kōkū-kantai from Formosa (now Taiwan). Kamikaze attacks began immediately, organized in Kikusui waves and during the course of the campaign reached a new intensity. Although they had lost the initial impact of surprise and found the Allies prepared, the scale of the attacks was large and the Japanese had also learnt a lot. The Kamikaze attacks were preceded by the dropping of foil strips to block Allied radars, by conventional diversionary attacks and by the ranks of suicide aircraft of all types. Losses of warships, but especially of the isolated picket duty destroyers out on the fringes of the fleet, were very heavy indeed. Fortunately for the Allies many of the fairly green young Japanese pilots simply attacked the first warships they came across, thus expending much of their fire-power on the destroyers, which saved the troopships, transports and landing craft untold casualties.
To undertake the defence of Okinawa 3 Kōkū-kantai began to concentrate all available units in the southern home island of Kyūshū within striking range. With the remaining carriers relegated to ferry duties or laid up, the A6Ms concentrated ashore and by 1 April 601 Kōkūtai at Kokubu air base had thirty-eight A6Ms on strength led by Lieutenant Hideo Katori. The 352 Kōkūtai (Kusanagi) previously engaged over northern Kyushu against B-29s from Chinese bases, also moved in with thirty-nine A6Ms commanded by Lieutenant Shinei Uematsu. The plan was to send wave after wave of Kamikazes south to destroy the invasion fleet under Operation Kikusui (Floating Chrysanthemum). The principal role envisaged for the A6Ms was to conduct low-level strafing runs ahead of the main suicide units to clear the way for them to get through to the ships. On 3 April a force of thirty-two A6Ms and eight Kyushu J7W Shidens under Lieutenant Hideo Katori were dispatched on a sweep. These engaged American fighters over Kikai naval airfield on Kikaiga Shima, off north-western Amani Island at the beginning of the island chain down to Okinawa on 3 April, claiming sixteen enemy destroyed for the loss of eight A6Ms. Another fierce air fight took place over Kikaiga Shima on 16 April with Lieutenant Kakichi Hirata leading twenty-six A6Ms and four J7Ws, which resulted in the loss of four fighters from each side. Four A6Mb aircraft led by Lieutenant (j.g.) Makio Aoki made an assault on the US Task Force off Okinawa the same day but all were lost. On 17 April after a fortnight’s operations only nine A6Ms were left fit for duty and these were withdrawn to Hyakurigahara Air Base, at Higashiibaraki-gun, Ibaraki Prefecture, where its strength was built up to one hundred A6Ms, which were carefully husbanded ready for the final battle for the homeland but never actually employed again.
The principal -tai (units) in which the A6M were involved either as suicider or as escort, were the Kamikaze Tokubetsu Kōgekitai Schichisei-, Shinken-, Shōwa-, Taigi- and Tsukuba-tai. Estimated numbers of A6Ms were 208 despatched as suicide attackers with thirty acting as escorts. The biggest A6M fighter battles were fought on 3 April, when forty fighters were despatched on escort duties and claimed to have destroyed seventeen Allied aircraft for the loss of eight of their own; on 12 April, when seventy-five Japanese fighters were engaged, destroying an estimated twenty-five enemy for the loss of twelve; and on 16 April, when no fewer than ninety-three fighters went out and claimed to have destroyed a further twenty-three Allied machines for the loss of seventeen.
While the American carriers with their wooden decks were seriously damaged and had to retire to the West Coast to repair, the British carriers with their 3in (7.62cm) armoured steel decks, fared better and direct hits merely ‘dished’ the flight decks rather than penetrating into the aircraft hangars. The British carriers also had their aviation fuel (‘Avgas’ in American parlance) stored aboard in tanks contained within water-filled compartments under the armoured decks, which minimized the fireballs that had destroyed or crippled so many American and Japanese carriers. Where the British were second-best was in everything else; numbers of aircraft embarked were less than half those of American carriers; anti-aircraft weapons were fewer and less efficient; mobility was poorer due to the short-ranges of British warship design; the British fleet was slower, its refuelling techniques antiquated. The aircraft with which they fought were mainly Lend-Lease types, chiefly F4U Corsairs (which the Fleet Air Arm had pioneered as carrier-based fighters), F6F Hellcats, plus a few British Fairey Fireflies and the ‘navalized’ variant of the famous Supermarine Spitfire, known as the Seafire.
The twenty-four Seafire L.111/F.111s with which No. 894 Naval Air Squadron under Lieutenant-Commander (A) J. Crossman, DSO, RNVR, was equipped aboard the fleet carrier Indefatigable, had the powerful Merlin 55M in-line engine, with a single-speed, single-stage supercharger with a ‘cropped’ impeller for extra low-altitude boost, but had very short range and was principally used as a ‘point defence’ fighter over the fleet. It was also fragile and delicate and unable to withstand the rough-and-tumble of intensive carrier warfare, a fact known for at least two years. It suffered three times the number of losses from accidents than in combat.16 Subsequently they were fitted with 45-gallon (170.34-litre) ‘Slipper’ tanks and later ex-RAAF 89-gallon (336.90-litre) P-40 tanks for longer-range missions. The Seafire’s strength was the same as the A6M’s, it was best at low altitudes and had a good rate of turn – a perfect duelling match had the quality of both pilots been similar at this stage of the war but such was rarely the case. The British Pacific Fleet was assigned the thankless and far from glamorous task of neutralizing the runways in the Sakishima Gunto off north-west Formosa, being used to ferry aircraft down from Kyushu to the Okinawa battlefield.
Nonetheless the Seafire, despite its faults, was credited with destroying eight A6Ms while serving with the British Pacific Fleet off Okinawa. The most prolific Zero killer was Sub-Lieutenant (A) Richard Henry Reynolds of No. 994 Naval Air Squadron. On 1 April he became embroiled with no fewer than three A6Ms. The first was a Kamikaze sighted at 0728, which penetrated the CAP and made a strafing run against both the carrier Indomitable killing one man and wounding five others, and then the battleship King George V. Unable to do any harm against this armoured monster the A6M continued on and Sub-Lieutenant Reynolds ignored standing orders and courageously entered the Gun Defence Zone in pursuit. The A6M had a good lead, however, but Reynolds managed to get in some long-range shooting using maximum deflection for his cannon and hit her in the wing root. Despite all the talk, the Zero did not explode, in fact seemed impervious and was able to gain a little altitude before flipping over and crash-diving hard into the base of the carrier Indefatigable’s bridge structure. The explosion killed four officers and ten men and wounded sixteen more and damaged three aircraft. The armoured deck was dented by 3 inches and was soon repaired.17
Reynolds resumed his patrol and at 0748 a second A6M, not a Kamikaze but a fighter-bomber, suddenly appearing out the overcast, penetrated through to the destroyer screen and dropped a 551lb (250kg) bomb close alongside the destroyer Ulster. The ship’s midships side was opened up and she had to be towed back to Leyte for repairs. After the attack this aircraft was caught still at low level by Reynolds and, after two firing runs, she was shot into the sea. Within a few minutes yet a third A6M appeared and Reynolds once more engaged. This A6M was looking for a fight and attempted to trick Reynolds into a close-turning combat, which he wisely refused. Instead the Seafire maintained its high speed until within optimum firing range and using combat boost for the climbs thus dictated the action, with Reynolds finally managing to shoot her into the sea after five bursts, with almost his last remaining ammunition. This very able pilot was later to confirm his hattrick against the A6M when he shared a kill with another Seafire on 4 May.18
It was estimated by the US Army survey, that some 1,900 Kamikazes sacrificed themselves off the Ryukyus. A total of twenty-six US vessels were destroyed off Okinawa, and a further ten had to be sunk after being badly damaged in Kamikaze attacks, a net loss of thirty-six ships. A massive further 368 ships were damaged, a large proportion of which were by Kamikazes. The Allies lost 763 aircraft, ninety-eight of them being British, while the US Army lost 4,907 men killed or missing and 4,824 wounded. The A6M was not only the first Kamikaze, it predominated in such actions and, of the 2,663 aircraft used by the IJNAF in this role, the A6M numbered 1,189 of them.
Preparation for the final battle
Once the Philippines had been cut off and Iwo and Okinawa taken the Japanese prepared themselves for the final defence of the home islands. Every attempt was made to assemble every possible aircraft and build up the air strength in readiness. The planes were secreted away as best they could be, to prevent them being destroyed piecemeal as at Guam and elsewhere, and in the main they were not committed, no matter what the provocation. Thus when the Allied fleets sent hundreds of aircraft to destroy what remained of the Japanese fleet at their anchorages, they met almost no aerial opposition as they methodically went about avenging Pearl Harbor. Even when Allied battleships closed the coast and shelled industrial targets close to Tokyo itself, nothing stirred. All was to be saved for the actual landing.
In the final analysis the Kamikazes failed to save the Philippines, they failed to save Iwo Jima and they failed to save Okinawa. Whether they would have saved Japan itself had Operation Olympic ever been launched is harder to say. The policy to be adopted, that of attacking the troop transports rather than carriers or heavily armed warships as conducted in the earlier campaigns, would have most certainly led to very heavy Allied casualties. Already war-weary (the British had been fighting for six years, the Americans for four) such losses might have given pause, but it is doubtful whether the Allies would have been turned from their course, especially as their Soviet partner, who had ignored the Pacific totally during its colossal struggle with Germany, now sought to finalize things with Japan in Manchuria, China and Korea. It is as well that it never came to the test for tens of thousands of young men on both sides. When the Emperor ordered them to cease fighting, the greater majority did so, those who resisted being disarmed and the carefully stored aircraft made inoperational by the removal of their propellers etc. The war ended for most A6Ms not with a bang but a whimper.19
There were exceptions of course; some just could not accept they had been defeated. As related, the originators of the Kamikaze ideal, which had so involved many A6Ms and their pilots, took their own lives. Admiral Ōnishi composed a final poem, which can perhaps be taken as recognition of all the young Zero pilots who died that way.
I tell the spirits of the tokkotai
I thank you from my heart for your brave fights.
Even though you believe the final victory (of Japan) and Died gracefully like cherry blossoms, your faith has never been accomplished.
I apologize to the spirits of my men and their bereaved families With my death.
Next, I bid obedience to all in Japan. It would be bliss if all of you realize that acting rashly, Throwing your life would only profit your enemy, and decide with Faith to follow the sacred order of the Emperor his majesty, and endure the pain.
While enduring your pain, do not forget the pride to be Japanese.
You all are the treasure of the country.
Yet in the time of the peace, adhere the spirit of Kamikaze and do your best for the welfare of the Japanese race and for the Peace of the people around the world.
Takijiro Onishi. Admiral Imperial Japanese Navy.20
Assessments
In the end 10,449 A6Ms were finally produced between March 1939 and August 1945, of the various models,21 and, as the first Navy plane to outperform land-based fighters by a wide margin, it was unique. This little aircraft formed 60 per cent of the IJN’s fighter force when she went to war in 1941 and was still serving in the front line four years later. She had served aboard the aircraft carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Hiyo, Hōshō, Junyō, Kaga, Ryūjō, Ryuho, Shōhō, Shōkaku, Sōryu, Zuihō and Zuikaku and with the fighter component of every major land formation. Even a few JAAF units are rumoured to have used a few. With the massacre of the IJN carriers between 1942 and 1944, it became mainly a land-based aircraft itself at the end of the war, and, although its leading-edge had long since disappeared, it still commanded considerable respect in the hands of the dwindling band of expert and veteran flyers. The A6M illustrated perfectly the Japanese approach to war and typified the aggressive approach adopted up to and throughout World War II. The attack was the primary thought; the offensive was always to be maintained, even if it often resulted in heavy losses. A nation of one hundred million could, perhaps, afford a certain amount of sacrifice, and the modified and distorted version of the old Samurai code introduced into the military during the Meiji-jidai at the end of the nineteenth century, bushido (‘way of the warrior’), imbued in generations a spirit of selfless self-sacrifice and unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor, and from 1882 onward was taken to extremes that western minds simply could not comprehend.22
However, in 1941 by simultaneously making war against the vast populations of China, the United States and the British Empire, and holding itself in readiness to embroil itself also with the Soviet Union as well, the rulers of Japan appeared set on a course of self-destruction.
Attack was the doctrine, and the A6M embodied that as no other aircraft of the period. With its clean and pure lines, its sensitivity to the pilot’s touch, its superlative climb and its powerful armament, it fitted the Japanese Navy pilot like a glove and had the reach to project power to an undreamt of degree for a fighter aircraft. It could react in an instant – Allied pilots have related many times how they had an A6M in their sights and then, within seconds, it was on their tail. Its effect on the stunned Chinese, American and British Commonwealth pilots was as much psychological as anything. It became the great air benchmark of the Pacific War, and initial Allied tactics were to avoid it, or defend against it, to tackle it meant death. Joseph Jacob Foss, legendary US Marine Corps fighter pilot with VNF-121 of Guadalcanal’s ‘Cactus Air Force’, recalled, ‘I told my pilots that if you were alone and saw a Zero at the same altitude you were flying that you were outnumbered and should go for home. They were not a plane to tangle with unless you had an advantage.’23 This mind block was even more remarkable in that it almost instantly displaced the distain that had hitherto dominated Allied thinking about Japanese military aircraft.
Excellent weapon though the A6M was, and timely as was its adoption on the eve of Japan’s greatest challenge, it had many Achilles’ heels and, once these had been fully evaluated and understood, its aura began slowly to fade, even in the minds of the Japanese airmen themselves.
The A6M remains a unique aircraft and will always have a special place in the aviation hall of fame as an aircraft that broke the mould and made history.
Museum A6Ms
These are of widely varying authenticity and more are being dug out of the Pacific jungles and atolls all the time. The most well-known examples reside at the Imperial War Museum, Duxford, Cambridge, UK; Auckland War Memorial Museum, Auckland, New Zealand; Australian War Memorial, Canberra ACT, Australia; China People’s Revolution Military Museum Beijing, China; Museum Dirgantara Mandala, Yogyakarta, Indonesia; Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, Washington DC; Marine Corps Air Station Museum, Iwakuni, Japan; Yamato Museum, Kure, Japan; Yasukuni Shrine War Museum, Tokyo; Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Co., Nagoya Air and Space System Plant, in-house display; Fantasy of Flight, Polk City, Florida; Planes of Fame Museum, Chino Airport, California; Museum of Flying, Santa Monica, California; Naval Aviation Museum, Pensacola, Florida; National Museum of the United States Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio; Pacific Aviation Museum, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; San Diego Air and Space Museum, California, USA; Nagoya International Airport, Japan.