“Reynolds, who probably never received the Pipe Creek circular, was eager for the conflict and as his collision with Heth assumed the dimensions of a battle and it caused an immediate concentration of both armies at Gettysburg.” – Brigadier General Henry Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac
Napoleon once said that his generals and marshals could ask anything of him but time. Time was a precious commodity on July 1, 1863, and despite the Confederate mishandling of their concentration, they had achieved the time advantage and were building a decisive infantry and artillery superiority with every passing hour. Along the Chambersburg Pike, the hard knock that sent Archer’s and Davis’ Confederate brigades reeling back was quickly becoming ephemeral in its effect as the rest of Heth’s Division and all of Pender’s Division began shaking out from their line of march into battle order. By noon, Heth’s two fresh brigades (Pettigrew and Brockenbrough) were ready to move forward, and Pender’s four brigades were at hand to provide a continual escalating assault along with ample artillery support from the high ground of Herr Ridge. A. P. Hill’s two divisions were in an almost perfect position, as General Bedford Forrest would advise, “to keep up the scare.” But at noon, the fighting became quiet, with only an artillery duel ongoing, and for two hours generals Heth and Hill waited for guidance from General Lee. The hard-pressed I Corps of the Army of the Potomac was given the welcome gift of time – about two hours of no assaults.
Lee had made it clear that he did not want to bring on a general engagement until he was sure of how much of the Army of the Potomac he was facing. At this moment, the Army of Northern Virginia’s III Corps had the advantage of time as they were massing quicker than the Federals opposite them. It is always risky for corps and division commanders to seize the initiative and operate beyond the commander’s intent, but this was exactly what generals Henry Heth, William Dorsey Pender and A. P. Hill needed to do. Not a reckless rush forward, but a consistent building of battlefield pressure that could potentially transform a tactical victory into a strategic one that, with luck, could have enough political impact to weaken Federal resolve.
This scenario assumes that General A. P. Hill rode forward to Herr Ridge and saw that the resistance appeared to be Army of the Potomac cavalry – not Pennsylvania militia – and that the growing dust clouds south of Gettysburg probably indicated that its formidable infantry was not far behind. With that thought, he decided that it might be wiser to move forward in force rather than piecemeal. Since General Lee has emphasized caution, he would still hold Anderson’s five-brigade division and its artillery battalion back as a reserve. Hill reasons that Heth’s and Pender’s divisions should be more than adequate to punch through whatever resistance they might encounter, militia or otherwise. With that decided, this scenario assumes that he would have given the orders for those two divisions to attack by brigade in an escalating assault as soon as their commanders have them in position.
For the Union, the I Corps brigades of Colonel Stone and Brigadier General Baxter – which were historically sent north to check Robert Rodes’ division – are retained here along the Chambersburg Pike as the logical response to a Confederate pressure that would be more consistent and unrelenting than it actually was, since as yet Ewell had not arrived and there was no crisis to the north. This scenario is a classic matchup of a single Union Corps against two Confederate divisions.
This scenario starts with the exact same setup as does “The Devil to Pay” and continues from there.
This scenario starts with the 8 a.m. turn and ends with the conclusion of the 2 p.m. turn, for a total of 12 turns. Unlike the historical July 1 battle there is no battlefield lull from 12 noon until 2 p.m. Both sides can be as aggressive as they wish.
For the Confederates to win, by the end of the 2 p.m. turn no Union units can be on any part of the highest level of Seminary Ridge south of the unfinished railroad grade and north of the southern board edge – the Confederates must occupy it all. For the Union to win, they must avoid that. Historically, the Confederates would take Seminary Ridge by 6 p.m. with heavy casualties, particularly in Scales’ Brigade. However, had they cleared it by 2 p.m. – four hours earlier – then there may very well have been time, daylight and troops enough to clear Gettysburg and mount a “practicable” assault on Cemetery Hill.
Scale is an illusion. Though the figures are 15mm, the 6mm buildings look right for this terrain. (Patrick LeBeau & Chris Ward)
As long as General Reynolds is alive, the Union has the initiative until the start of the 1 p.m. turn, when General Lee has arrived, and from then on the initiative is decided by a competitive 1D6 die roll, with a tie going to the Confederates. If, however, at any time in the scenario should General Reynolds be killed, then the initiative shifts to the Confederates, beginning with the next turn and continuing through the rest of the scenario.
Archer’s Brigade of Heth’s Division has been skirmishing with Buford’s cavalry since early morning, and hence it does not have an opening volley benefit. Each brigade commander starts or enters the scenario attached to any one of his regiments. General Heth starts on Herr Ridge. General Pender can enter with any of his brigades. Corps commander General A. P. Hill enters on Herr Ridge on the 11 a.m. turn. Historically, Thomas’ Brigade of Pender’s Division was held back as a reserve, but in this scenario it is released, though it is the last unit of Pender’s Division to be so.
The Confederate artillery cannot move off Herr Ridge until the Confederate turn after all Union units have been driven off all parts of lower McPherson’s Ridge from the Chambersburg Pike to the Fairfield Road. At that point, the Confederate artillery may freely redeploy to McPherson’s Ridge. However, at no time in this scenario may they move beyond McPherson’s Ridge. In the actual battle, the Confederate guns were not moved forward from Herr Ridge until after Seminary Ridge had been secured, and thereby deprived Pender’s division of any artillery support when it attacked that ridge. Both Garnett’s and Pogue’s artillery battalions were also, for the most part, kept in reserve. In this scenario both are released for combat at what would have been an appropriate historical time.
Line of Sight (LOS) for Pegram and McIntosh’s batteries on Herr Ridge is limited to any enemy unit on or anywhere west of McPherson’s Ridge, anywhere on the western slopes of Oak Hill and on the highest level of Seminary Ridge. Union units between the highest levels of McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge are considered to be in “blind zones” and cannot be fired at. Likewise, Union units behind the high ground of Seminary Ridge cannot be fired on by the Confederate guns on Herr Ridge.
All Union cavalry starts dismounted. The 17th Philadelphia starts behind the stream and cannot advance beyond it. By this time Buford’s cavalry brigades and Calef’s Horse Artillery Battery were exhausted and beginning to run low on ammunition. To reflect this, they have a +1 MMP additional modifier to all morale checks and an additional -1 DRM to all their fires until the start of the midnight turn, when these penalties increase to +2 MMP for morale and -2 DRM for firing. These modifiers are over and above the two worst modifier restriction. Also, since the cavalry has been skirmishing all morning, it does not get any opening volley benefits. Beginning with the start of the 10 a.m. turn, every Union cavalry battalion and Calef’s Horse Artillery Battery must roll a 1D6 for immediate withdrawal as the Union infantry comes on to the battlefield. It takes a 5 or 6 for the cavalry units or Calef’s battery to withdraw. For the Union cavalry withdrawal, if a 6 is rolled the unit is spent and it withdraws out of the scenario, but if a 5 is rolled the unit retires to Gettysburg as a reserve. Starting with its next active turn, it can be used anywhere on that board. However, since it is considered to be a voluntary withdrawal, there is no morale detriment “for element removed” against the rest of the brigade. It is assumed that the brigade commanders, colonels William Gamble and Thomas Devin, will stay on the board until their last unit withdraws and that the division commander, General John Buford, will remain until all the cavalry units have departed, at which time he will also leave.
When Calef’s Battery withdraws, it retires to Seminary Ridge where it must remain until the start of the 10 p.m. turn, when Calef may return to the fight and deploy freely. At that time it is assumed that it has refilled its limber chests from the I Corps Artillery Brigade, which arrived at 11 a.m., and consequently when Calef’s Battery returns to the fight it no longer has the -1 DRM firing detriment for low ammunition.
Since this is not a strict “historical” scenario, it does not have a strict “historical” result. However, that does not preclude reasonable historical speculation as to what might have followed using only the troops that were available and with only the time line changing. The most obvious result is that if Seminary Ridge had fallen two or three hours earlier, this may have given the Confederates enough time and fresh units to take either Culp’s Hill or Cemetery Hill. That certainly is a good possibility, assuming that Union did nothing different. However, an accelerated Confederate attack may have spurred an accelerated Union response. Both III Corps and XII Corps were within an afternoon’s march and both had been urged by generals Reynolds and Howard to come up At that point, the speculative equation changes and it becomes much more difficult to predict the sequence of events. If the Confederates do decisively prevail, then perhaps the most likely result would be that Meade activates the Pipe Creek option, which in turn throws the next decision back onto Robert E. Lee: whether to attack the Army of the Potomac in a strong position of its choice, or to ignore it and wait for the political pressure from Washington to force Meade to come up and attack him. Obviously, from then on, the timeline becomes unpredictable.
(For brigade, regiment and battery details see Army List)
Left Wing/I Corps, Major General Reynolds (2 LB)
If General Reynolds has been killed, substitute Major General Abner Doubleday (1 LB).
1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade
• Gamble’s Cavalry Brigade
• Calef’s Battery
I Corps/1st Division – Brigadier General James S. Wadsworth (1 LB)
• Meredith’s – 1st Brigade, Brigadier General Solomon Meredith (1 LB) (arrives 9.30 a.m.)
• Cutler’s – 2nd Brigade, Brigadier General Lysander Cutler (1 LB) (arrives 9 a.m.)
I Corps/2nd Division – Brigadier General John Robinson (1 LB)
• Paul’s – 1st Brigade – Brigadier General Gabriel Paul (No LB) (Arrives 12 noon)
• Baxter’s – 2nd Brigade – Brigadier General Henry Baxter (1 LB) (Arrives 12.30 p.m.)
I Corps/3rd Division – Major General Abner Doubleday (1 LB)
Brigadier General Thomas Rowley (No LB) if Reynolds was killed
• Biddle’s – 1st Brigade – Colonel Chapman Biddle (1 LB) (Arrives 11 a.m.)
• Stone’s – 2nd Brigade – Colonel Roy Stone (1 LB) (Arrives 10.30 a.m.)
I Corps Artillery Brigade – Colonel Charles Wainwright (1 Artillery LB)
All batteries on field by 11 a.m.
• Stewart’s Battery
• Hall’s Battery
• Stevens’ Battery
• Cooper’s Battery
• Reynolds’ Battery
Pender’s Division – Major General William Dorsey Pender (1 LB)
• Perrin’s Brigade – Colonel Abner Perrin (1 LB)
• Lane’s Brigade – Brigadier General James Lane (No LB)
• Scales’ Brigade – Brigadier General Alfred Scales (1 LB)
• Thomas’ Brigade – Brigadier General Edward Thomas (1 LB) – 3 p.m.
Pender’s Divisional Artillery Battalion – Major William Pogue – 2 p.m.
• Wyatt’s Battery
• Graham’s Battery
• Ward’s Battery
• Brooke’s Battery
Union XII Corps infantry arrive as Devin’s cavalry brigade departs. (Patrick LeBeau & Chris Ward)
Heth’s Division – Major General Henry Heth (No LB)
• Archer’s Brigade – Brigadier General James Archer (1 LB)
• Davis’ Brigade – Brigadier General Joseph Davis (no LB)
• Pettigrew’s Brigade – Brigadier General James Pettigrew (1 LB)
• Brockenbrough’s Brigade – Colonel John Brockenbrough (1 LB)
Heth’s Divisional Artillery, Garnett’s Battalion – Lieutenant Colonel John Garnett (no LB) – 1 p.m.
• Grandy’s Battery
• Lewis’ Battery
• Maurin’s Battery
• Moore’s Battery
III Corps Reserve Artillery
Pegram’s Artillery Battalion – Major William Pegram (+1 Artillery LB)
• Johnson’s Battery
• Marye’s Battery
• Bander’s Battery
• Zimmerman’s Battery
• McGraw’s Battery
McIntosh’s Artillery Battalion – Major D. G. McIntosh (1 LB)
• Rice’s Battery
• Hurt’s Battery
• Wallace’s Battery
• Johnson’s Battery