“He had misunderstood my orders, or that he was carried away by the ardor of the conflict.” – Major General Carl Schurz, temporary commander, XI Corps
Brigadier General Francis Barlow was a recent addition to XI Corps, having just joined in May of 1863. He had been brought over to the XI Corps by its commander, Major General Oliver Otis Howard, to rebuild the fighting spirit of its First Division following its rout at Chancellorsville. Barlow was an experienced, tough and stubborn fighter who welcomed the upcoming fight as an opportunity to redeem the reputation of both his division and the XI Corps. Upon arriving at the battlefield, his brigades were immediately taken under fire by the Confederate guns on Oak Hill as they debauched from Gettysburg. Though few men were killed, the fire was persistent and galling. Looking northward, Barlow saw a generally flat plain with only a few good artillery positions – the one exception being a gently rising knoll that was part of the Blocher Farm along Rock Creek. Barlow’s consternation concerning this knoll increased as he spotted Confederate skirmishers taking position on it. Barlow instinctively knew that this piece of high ground could prove critical in his plans to engage the flank of Robert Rodes’ Confederate division to the north, and he was also seriously concerned that the Confederates might get a battery or two on it to threaten his right flank. Barlow claimed that he then sought permission to advance forward and seize this knoll before the Confederates reinforced their grip on it.
At this point, the responsibility for approving or ordering the advance to Blocher’s Knoll – which would henceforth be forever known as Barlow’s Knoll – becomes murky, as this movement would become the key mistake that would totally unhinge the XI Corps position. Believing that full permission to advance had been obtained, Barlow ordered Von Gilsa’s Brigade and Wilkeson’s Battery to occupy the knoll and drive off Doles’ feisty battalion of sharpshooters, and then ordered Ames’ Brigade to move up in support. Had Barlow only been facing Rodes’ division – which was potent enough – occupying this knoll might have been an excellent move, as it would have anchored Barlow’s right flank. To explore that possibility, play this scenario as presented, without introducing the impact of Early’s division.
Unfortunately, Barlow’s advance to Blocher’s Knoll would instead have the disastrous effect of exposing the entire right flank of the XI Corps to Jubal Early’s arriving division, which by 3 p.m. was moving forward to roll up the entire Union right flank. Historically that is exactly what happened. To recreate that historical situation, simply play this scenario and the “Slocum Arrives” scenarios together. Without the Union XII Corp units, it will be a most difficult day for Billy Yank. While Barlow probably did not know of the impending arrival of Early’s division, General Howard, who with the death of General Reynolds was now the senior Union commander on the field, most certainly did. Earlier, Colonel Devin’s cavalry brigade had been scouting northeast of Gettysburg and had reported to Howard that Early’s Confederates were advancing in strength. It is unclear, however, if General Schurz, now commanding the XI Corps, had been informed and if an appropriate warning had been given to General Barlow. Unfortunately, General Barlow had been seriously wounded and taken prisoner in the subsequent debacle and never filed an official report. However, in a later letter to his wife he clearly stated that he was only following orders.
What if Early had not arrived to an uncontested field and caved in the flank of the XI Corps? Could Howard’s XI Corps’ “Dutchmen” have held off Rodes’ superb division? That question is the subject of this scenario. This scenario can be played as a stand-alone fight, or it could be played in conjunction with the 2 p.m. XII Corps scenario, “Slocum Arrives,” as the arrival of Brigadier General Alpheus Williams’ Division of the XII Corps would certainly have slowed Early’s flank attack against the XI Corps. Likewise, “Barlow’s Knoll” could be played in conjunction with either the “McPherson’s Ridge” scenario or the “Seminary Ridge” scenario from the “Chambersburg Pike” scenario series.
Normally, the 54th New York and the 153rd Pennsylvania regiments of Leopold von Gilsa’s Brigade are used in the 2 p.m. version of “Slocum Arrives” scenario and are not available for “Barlow’s Knoll.” However, if the two scenarios are played in conjunction with each other, then those two regiments can be deployed on either game board. To win the combined scenario, the Confederates must meet the victory conditions of both scenarios. For the Union to win, they also have to win both scenarios. If each side wins one, then it is a draw. For this combined scenario, the game is extended to the end of the 6 p.m. turn.
If playing these as a combined scenario in conjunction with “McPherson’s Ridge,” the Confederate player has the option of bringing in Daniel’s Brigade at 2.30 p.m. on either this board or on the top adjacent edge of the western game board. Likewise, the Union player has the option of bringing in Paul’s Brigade on either this board or on the bottom adjacent edge of the western game board. To win the combined scenario, the Confederates must meet the victory conditions of both scenarios. For the Union to win, they also have to win both scenarios. If each side wins one, then it is a draw. For this combined scenario, the game is extended to the end of the 6 p.m. turn.
Regiments from Doles’ Brigade gradually push the Federals off Barlow’s Knoll. (Doug Kline)
For “Barlow’s Knoll” the Confederates have the initiative. If playing this scenario by itself, neither side may cross Rock Creek. If playing this scenario in conjunction with the “Slocum Arrives” scenario, then either side may cross Rock Creek with any of their units.
The scenario can be played with either a 2 p.m. or 3 p.m. start time and ends at 5 p.m. for a total of six or four turns. Historically, this battle was over by 5 p.m., but by mutual agreement the scenario could be extended to 6 p.m. If played as a combined scenario with either the “McPherson’s Ridge” or the “Slocum Arrives” scenarios, the 6 p.m. turn is the last turn.
For the Confederates to win the “Barlow’s Knoll” scenario, they must have four regiments south of the York-Fairfield Road at the end of the last turn. The Union wins if they can prevent that. If playing this scenario in conjunction with one of the eastern board XII Corps scenarios, then the Confederate must get seven regiments anywhere south of the York-Fairfield Road by the end of the last turn to win. The Union wins if they can prevent that.
If an infantry road column comes under any fire that results in a morale check, regardless of whether it passes the morale check or not, that road column must immediately use its next action or reaction to change into a battle formation. If it was moving as part of its second action and consequently would not have an action left, it simply stops and must use its next reaction to change into a battle formation.
Union artillery can do non-canister fire over the heads of friendly units if the battery or the targeted unit is at least one elevation higher than the intervening friendly unit, provided that both the firing battery and the targeted unit are at least two inches from the intervening friendly unit. Confederate batteries can also fire over friendly units in the same manner, but either the battery or the target must be at least two elevations higher than the intervening friendly unit, and both the firing battery and the targeted unit have to be at least three inches from the intervening friendly unit.
Just outside of Gettysburg was the brickyard, which was a complex of brick kilns and storage areas. It can hold up to two regiments or one battery, and any unit in the brickyard gets an additional +1 target DRM over and above the usual “best two” against infantry fire – but not artillery fire – and is entitled to the -1 MMP benefit for being in cover.
Daniel’s Brigade is optional, and if used enters at 2.30 p.m. either where Iverson’s Brigade entered or behind where O’Neal’s Brigade started. Ramseur’s Brigade can enter at 3 p.m. as shown or anywhere on the northern board edge. If Daniel’s Brigade is used, it is recommended that the Federals get Paul’s Brigade.
The brigades of Colonel Charles Coster and Colonel Orlando Smith made up the second division of the XI Corps under Brigadier General Adolph Von Steinwehr. For the most part they were held back as a reserve on Cemetery Hill. Coster’s Brigade and Heckman’s Battery would eventually be released at about 3.30 p.m. in a futile last-ditch effort to halt Harry Hay’s “Louisiana Tigers” and Avery’s North Carolina brigades at the “brickyard” just northeast of Gettysburg.
Historically, Colonel Orlando Smith’s Brigade and Weidrich’s Battery were kept back on Cemetery Hill throughout the first day and would become the foundation for the Union defense of that position that evening. As these were the last reserves of XI Corps and since General Howard was convinced that Cemetery Hill was the key position that must be held at all costs, this scenario assumes that it would have been most unlikely that they would have been released, so they are not included.
(For brigade, regiment and battery details see Army List)
XI Corps, Major General Oliver Otis Howard (1 LB)
Major General Oliver Otis Howard starts anywhere in Gettysburg
XI Corps/1st Division, Brigadier General Francis Barlow (1 LB)
• Von Gilsa’s – 1st Brigade – Colonel Leopold Von Gilsa (1 LB)
The 153rd PA & 54th NY are not available except in combined scenarios
• Ames’ – 2nd Brigade – Brigadier General Adelbert Ames (1 LB)
XI Corps/2nd Division, Brigadier General Adolph Von Steinwehr (1 LB)
• Coster’s – 1st Brigade – Colonel Charles Coster (1 LB)
• Smith’s – 2nd Brigade – Colonel Orlando Smith (1 LB)
Not available, remained on Cemetery Hill
XI Corps/3rd Division, Major General Carl Schurz (1 LB)
• Schimmelfennig’s – 1st Brigade – Brigadier General A. Schimmelfennig (1 LB)
• Kryzanowski’s – 2nd Brigade – Colonel Waldimir Krzyzanowski (1 LB)
XI Corps Artillery Brigade – Major Thomas Osborne (No arty LB)
• Wheeler’s Battery
• Dilger’s Battery
• Wilkeson’s Battery
• Heckman’s Battery (3.30 p.m.)
• Weidrich’s Battery (Optional, 5 p.m.)
I Corps/2nd Division, Brigadier General John Robinson (1 LB)
General Robinson (1 LB) is available if both Paul’s and Baxter’s brigades are used in this scenario
• Paul’s – 1st Brigade – Brigadier General Gabriel Paul (1 LB) – 2.30 p.m.
Optional – to be used if Confederates elect to use Daniel’s Brigade
• Baxter’s – 2nd Brigade – Brigadier General Henry Baxter (1 LB)
II Corps – Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell (1 LB)
Lieutenant General Richard Ewell starts together with Major General Robert Rodes
II Corps/Rodes’ Division, Major General Robert Rodes (1 LB)
• Doles’ Brigade – Brigadier General George Doles (2 LB)
For this scenario assume that Blackford’s Sharpshooters are part of Doles’ Brigade
• Daniel’s Brigade – Brigadier General Junius Daniel (1 LB) – Optional
• Iverson’s Brigade – Brigadier General Alfred Iverson (no LB)
• O’Neal’s Brigade – Colonel Edward O’Neal (1 LB)
• Ramseur’s Brigade – Brigadier General Stephen Ramseur (1 LB)
Rodes’ Divisional Artillery Battalion – Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Carter
• Reese’s Battery
• Carter’s Battery
• Page’s Battery
• Fry’s Battery